going down, i was watching yesterday and they made a good point. it is directly related to money. the more money that are in the rich peoples hands and less for other people, they cannot afford education. that is where we are falling behind the rest of the world at. last call we the will take on the topic. a new edition of "washington journal" tomorrow at 7:00. thanks for joining us. we will see you then. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] underway onare

capitol hill including the senate armed services committee hearing from all the joint chiefs of staff testifying as are testifying about proposals relating to military compensation. the defense department is proposing a cut in pay raises and allowances for housing, health care, and commissary stores. follow live coverage on c-span three or online at www.c-span.org. it's expected to last until early afternoon. also later this afternoon at 3 p.m., state department, treasury, and defense department officials will testify before the senate foreign relations committee talking about russian intervention in ukraine and that will also be on c-span three. yesterday, the supreme court ruled on it case involving prayers starting off the city council's legislative meeting. we get more on the case from reporter who joined us on this morning's "washington journal." ist: joining us on the phone

lawrence hurley. bit but what to the justices have to decide on this and talk about the decisions that were made. is more as is case question of what types of prayers you can have. the supreme court has not really weighed in on the subject very often. the motion being established was that prayers were ok before a legislative session in the same way they have in before sessions of congress. they have always had them. about the prayers in this case which arose from a town meeting in a place called greece in new york. whether those prayers went too far because the secretary -- the

sectarian nature which was primarily christian and had references to jesus christ. was the information from other types of religions that practice, before the lawsuit was filed by the, the residents objected to the prayers. the prayers were almost christian exclusively. otherad some people from religions. in the decision yesterday, the supreme court said the prayers had sectarian and it was not problem by itself. kennedy said that those types of messages are ok as long as the speaker does not go too intimidate or to coerce people or try to convert

people. argumenttice kennedy's was that an justice kagan wrote the dissenting view, talk about what she said. view that took the the prayers went too far. she sort of gave other examples of the types of speech or government sanctioned speech in public life that the court would not find acceptable and questioned how this is any different. host: this is one of the writeups in the papers --

those kind of reactions are getting notice from justice alito was well. guest: a bit of back-and-forth between justice alito and justice kagan. issue withto took the way the justice kagan characterized it and they both kind of last of each other in their opinions. point --agan's according to justice alito -- was that her point could be misconstrued that people disagree over that. host: this was a classic 5-4 decision. where to justice kennedy: this? one, it was the conservative majority of the court that got the vote. justice kennedy joined with the conservative justices it was a clear 5-4 split between the

conservatives and liberals. the liberals would not be opposed to some types of prayers , just a specific prayers in this case they had issue with. host: where do we go from here? other other consequences from this decision in your mind? guest: there's a question about that. this case was specifically about legislative prayers and a specific line of cases that stem from the historical practice of having prayers before meetings and back is back to colonial times. it was almost like a first amendment issue for these things. there ision is whether language in this case that can be used to train and encourage more religion in public life and iner contexts like displays

public buildings and that type of thing. host: will this decision affect other decisions like prayers at high school graduations or prayers another type of events that are not government sanctioned? possible thatite this case would get cited in those types of cases. it's not clear yet whether it would have any weight. host: lawrence hurley who supports data reports on the supreme court joining us to talk about the supreme court decision that would uphold prayer at public meetings. thanks for your time. ahead of this afternoon senate foreign relations committee meeting, discussion on military intervention and the ongoing developments in ukraine. russian specialists discussed vladimir putin's presidency and nato's role in the conflict and options for the u.s.. this is from the center for strategic and international studies. >> thank you for joining us. i'm a senior fellow at the ces

international security program and i'm privileged to be joined by three of my favorite foreign policy and security experts, the people whose opinions i want to hear on this issue. we are going to turn to them today to discuss the ukraine crisis and its implications for u.s. security. before i turn it over, i want to provide a little framing and i will let them take it from there and we will open it to questions from you at the end of the session. event of the past several days in eastern ukraine have underscored the growing danger of a prolonged civil and sectarian conflict. as high as the stakes are within ukraine, they are potentially greater for the united states, not just in europe and eurasia, but globally. fundamental questions about u.s. security strategies are being asked just in washington and op-ed pages but in capitals from around the world. considering this framing of the

crisis by un-american two days after the crimea referendum vote. he said like a mirror, the situation in ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades. after the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. i doubt many in this room would agree with mr. putin's analysis, but we would agree that the events in ukraine are forcing reflection on what the next decade has in store for the u.s. and its allies and partners globally. at the risk of oversimplifying a very complex set of issues, let me offer four key areas we can go into today -- ukraine has opened questions about u.s.-russia policies dating back to the end of the cold war, specifically questions about whether the clinton published -- president bush 43 and obama administration fundamentally mishandled russia. they failed to properly acknowledge it interests and humiliated in ways that haunt us

today or today try too hard to accommodate a russia that acts in ways contrary to international stability? how does this change the way we think about the salience of nuclear weapons? second, russia's coercive and successful use of diplomacy, operational operations -- informational operations has raised security about other states in russia's periphery, including nato allies belarus, moldova, poland, and others. today, the united states has responded with small-scale rotations of its forces in its -- and its nato allies have done likewise. diplomatic messaging has occurred, sanctions have been taken, but they have had very little impact on russia's decision-making. moreover, it has raised questions about nato's long-term ability to stand up to the challenge. secretary of defense chuck hagel suggested the next nato ministerial must include

ministers of finance, noting that today, america's gdp is smaller than the combined gdp's of our 27 allies. but america's defense spending is three times our allies' defense spending. third, just eight months after the russia-brokered syria chemical weapons deal, there are tough questions about the u.s. being willing to use force when push comes to shove. from allies and partners, i've heard sharp voices about a united states that has vacillated from drawing red lines to it would not enforce to a united taste that refuses to set red lights at all. her words, not mine. -- their words not mine. on this point, potentially most damaging to this presidency, president obama weighed in last week during his trip to asia. "my job as commander-in-chief is to look at what it is that is going to advance our security interests over the long term, to keep our military and reserve for when we absolutely needed.

there are going to be times when there are disasters our difficulties and challenges all around the world and not all of those will be immediately solvable by us. where we can make a difference using all of the tools, we should do so. there are occasions where clear actions can be taken, if it makes a difference, we should take them. we don't do them because somebody sitting in an office in washington or new york thinks it would look strong. finally, those watching wonder how might deflect attention, particularly in a time of overall significant fiscal pressure on the department of defense. they have asked how u.s. response may be viewed by that region's fast rising power, china. with that, let me say how grateful i am to be joined by three tremendous foreign and security policy experts who will share their views on issues today.

i will introduce them in the order they will speak. to my immediate left, joined by andy cutchins, a senior fellow and director of the cs iso russia and eurasia program. he has written and commented extensively on russia, particularly over the past six months as demand has skyrocketed to understand russia's role in syria, the edward snowden affair, the sochi olympics, and now ukraine. he has just returned from research travel in central asia, where he was able to gauge key officials views of events. though he probably supported the need to reset relationships with russia, he has not minced words regarding the administration's handling of ukraine. in a march 30 commentary, he wrote "barack obama is making jimmy carter look like attila the hun with a series of empty threats and too little, too late. it enters against putin's russia ergo i will let him add some

context around those remarks. next is clark murdoch, a senior advisor and director for the defense and national security group and the project on nuclear issues. he's an expert on defense planning, the nuclear mission, and strategy with decades of executive branch, congressional, academic and think tank experience. his recent work has concentrated on the military force construction under continued sequestration cuts. he also spends time thinking about how to use hard power smartly. in a late 2013 analysis of lessons learned from the serious crisis, he wrote that there are three primary factors that should guide u.s. policymakers on use of force in maintaining credibility -- first, mean what you say and say what you mean. second, per pair to carry out your threats and deal with the consequences. and third, since actions always speak louder than words, use force from time to time to demonstrate your is all. -- your resolve. last, but certainly not least, i'm glad to be joined by vikram

singh, who recently joined the center for american progress for american policy. prior to departing the obama administration after five years of service, he was most recently this -- the assistant deputy secretary of defense when he was on the front lines of the asia-pacific rebalance for that -- before that, he was the deputy director for relationships on u.s. and pakistan. he cautioned that failing to impose a meaningful cost for russia's forceful annexation of foreign territories would further embolden russia to take similar steps and other neighboring states. it would also affect the strategic calculus of other nations and territorial disputes, increasing the willingness of states to use coercion, subterfuge, and military force with less fear and significant or national backlash. let me turn it over to andy to

get things started. >> thank you so much. i think we can go right to the questions and answers. you address the key questions and it sounds like we all agree from what you quoted from us. the only good news i have to report over what has happened in the last couple of months is vladimir putin's was to become -- quest to become dictator life, it is great job security for me. and the likes of us. before i addressed these questions, let me say what i think is actually motivating vladimir putin in ukraine right now. to me, it is fundamentally about domestic politics in russia. it's about a new political strategy he has for himself will -- for himself. for most of the time in which he has been the de facto leader of russia, there has been an economic social compact. russians have lived more more prosperously and has grown while putin has been president, with the exception of the time during

the global financial crisis and shortly after he became president again. what has happened since he became president in 2012 hummel the russian economy was till growing at the rate of about 3%, underperforming, but performing reasonably decently, the growth before the situation in ukraine started. it had already come to about zero. he faced a fundamental decision -- was he going to take the measures to restructure the russian economy so it would be more efficient? to do that, he would have to build more transparency, better governance, address corruption, improve the investment environment, etc. he could not count upon a multiple increase in oil price that occurred during his first two terms in power. he could not count on a 50% increase in production as happened during his first term. he could not count on a virtual global money party as in the second term of his president --

his presidency that made the international community ready to lend to russia a lot. the problem was, and to me it is a reminder of the soviet union around the early 1980's, let's say 1981, the year i graduated college. despite the fact the oil price was at a high, and oil production in russia had grown tremendously, soviet economic growth was at about zero. did the soviet ownership under -- soviet leadership under mr. brezhnev or andropov or chernenko and the rapid succession want to deal with that and structurally reform the system? no. it was too politically risky and that's the decision mr. putin has made. where is he going to get the basis for his political support in the future? the new strategies accommodation of a return to what nicholas the first's policy of official nationality in the second

quarter of the 19th century -- orthodoxy, russian nationality, and combined to that, this greater russia project he has in mind. russia has to be, despite the fact it is x times larger than any country in the world, it still needs to be larger. that, combined with foreign-policy successes of the nature we might have regarded, putin's performance on syria in the summer. that is a fundamental starting point for how we got to where we are around late february to today. unfortunately, i think it is a very, very injuries and risky strategy on his part, not only dangerous for him, it's probably going to result in ultimate failure. but there will be tremendous collateral damage all across the board. one of the first things that hit my mind on february 28, when

crimea was seized by the polite green men, was that gorbachev and the ussr went out with a whimper. something in my bones tells me vladimir putin is not going out with a whimper. it could get very, very ugly and we are still only in the early, early parts of this all stop the march 18 speech he gave to the federal assembly in moscow right after the annexation, which was really a mind bender, probably the most significant speech you -- speech he had given before that was in munich and to -- in 2007. i could agree with a lot of what mr. putin had to say at the famous munich speech -- economic balance of power, changing in the world, typically followed by a change in political power. the united states needs to adjust, etc. even his "new york times" editorial that got a lot of criticism, i could find a lot to agree with. at this march 18 speech marked a

new putin. and a very scary putin. the congressional testimony, i concluded that future historians may regard this up at -- may regard this as the point at which russia tipped into becoming a fascist state. look up fascism and i think you'll see a myth picture of mr. putin on the map. i don't mean to be flip, but that is kind of what it is. extreme nationalism, a very corporate type of lyrical come -- political economic linkage in the political system, quite repressive to any dissidents, and a focus on territorial acquisition and an aggressive foreign-policy. that is it. if he is talking about borders, it's not just the post cold war borders, not just the post world war ii borders, it is virtually any border mr. putin think is a

-- thinks is illegitimate is illegitimate. who is he ready to defend? is it ethnic russians? is it russian speakers? it even compatriots, a very broad category which can be very flexible. i find that an extremely frightening speech and a quantum leap in the evolution of mr. putin. so i see there will be increasing pressure on all neighbors. there is essentially an attempt to unwind 1991 and perhaps even earlier. and this will not stop as long as mr. putin is in power. if i'm correct and the starting point is this is part of the strategy for maintaining support, he's got a huge binge in popular support so far. you have to keep on feeding the beast, if you will, and that is

not a happy scenario. let me turn quickly to sam's question. his first question had to do with what is your view of u.s. policy since the outset of the crisis in ukraine, has a it been weak, provocative or about right? i think weak and provocative are not mutually exclusive categories. for me outset, i think it has been weak and thus provocative. for me, it started with the initial response on february 28 will stop -- february 20 eight. already, the airport had been seized by military forces, it had to be at the behest of russia. the parliament had been seized, the speaker of the parliament had been seized, and was -- and when mr. obama came on at 3:00 eastern standard time, ira member at well because i was at the university of indiana, where

my son who is a freshman there for the father-son weekend was watching the press conference and one would have thought none of that had already happened. president obama talked about the would-be costs for russia and i'm thinking, dude, i'm here in indiana and x has already happened. i was very disheartened to read a story in the "wall street journal" about 10 days later about the disagreement within the intelligence community as to what had actually happened. i'm afraid a lot of our intelligence assets, certainly human assets, are not available in that region. we had nobody on the ground and crimea if the story is true. it was very clear that if there was any weak spot in ukraine, it would be crimea. looking at february 20 1, 22. secondly, did we not have eyes on what was happening there on

the ground? some kind of intelligence failure happened and i think that's something we will need to look into. with that, it kind of began the series of too little, too late responses. i think there has been too much emphasis on a search for a diplomatic solution. of course we need to do that, but there was never a shred of evidence that would support putin was interested in a diplomatic offramp during this crisis. second, and this is kind of controversial, but the united states needed to take a firmer role in leading the alliance. given europe's deep economic investment with russia, it was not realistic to expect them to take a leading role, given the differences in europe in general.

i think we need to be more forward-leaning. for example, when president obama was getting ready to leave on his europe trip in the latter part of march and the second round of sanctions was announced, what was striking to me is while these were significant sanctions, none of them were going to have a negative impact on the u.s. economy. we were not going to go to europe and say we think this is a significant problem and we are ready to take a hit on our economy. if we are not going to take a hit on our economy, how are we going to make the case to europeans, who are much more deeply vested? thirdly, there's been too much emphasis on punishing ukraine -- excuse me, punishing russia rather than trying to help ukraine. unfortunately, the ukrainian government has been in ways criminally irresponsible at least since the war and revolution, probably longer, leaving themselves in an extremely vulnerable condition as far as russian pressure, but this is the core of the problem.

if ukraine can succeed, that is how mr. putin loses. i will get back to this on the economics sanction a little later. i was extremely disappointed with the speech the president gave in brussels in late march. a lot of latitudes, mom and apple pie and beautiful values, but virtually nothing concrete about what we were doing to support the sovereignty of ukraine. politically, economically, militarily or otherwise. my conclusion was in moscow they are laughing and in kiev, they are crying. second question -- i will go to these faster -- >> leave a question or two. >> ok. i would like to leave the military option off the table question for you. >> i feel real sorry to follow

because we both occupy a little of that space. >> i was just trying to follow instructions. the asia rebalance -- of course this is going to affect the asia rebalance. how could it not? we thought the security was virtually solved but the pie is not growing. i will leave it to my distinguished colleagues for details. but me say something about china -- i think it is pretty clear national sovereignty is a sacred pillar of chinese policy is a cell -- a slow self. -- a slow sell. its value is reduced. i think there is an ambiguity in china about this. at some level, i think ping has to admire vladimir hooton for -- vladimir putin for what he did

in crimea are -- in crimea. china's going to benefit economically and politically from russia possible strange but with the west, but i think it will be very cautious about signing up for vladimir's new cold war. we can watch carefully to see what happens with mr. putin when he goes to china at the end of may. certainly, russia's position has weakened and he will get a lower price on the gas deal. let me conclude with something on the sanctions. can economic sanctions substitute for use of force? clearly, no. that is obvious. but it's really a problem if your adversary feels himself somewhat impervious to taking a significant economic hit the top -- economic hit. here's the problem -- he knows

the economy is in trouble, sanctions come on board, that simply gives them the argument that well, it is the west, the outsiders trying to weaken us and punish us. this is the source of our economic troubles. it's going to play pretty well into his political narrative. the second point i would make is that tools are designed for the war on terror in rogue states. it is impossible to isolate russia. this is the sixth or eighth or 10th largest economy in the world depending on your common denominator. there are too many states in the world, including many european allies which are not ready to enthusiastically sign on to this. the last thing i would say about that is these sectoral sanctions could be interpreted by mr. putin as an act of war. i think we better be aware of all of our own vulnerabilities

because we could be dam sure he will becoming back at us very, very, very hard will stop i think we will be in a very long haul and difficult time with mr. putin as long as he is leading russia. >> not only did you follow instructions, but that was a great opening. i'm not worried that vikram can hold his own. he was specially selected to follow you. >> is it on? ok. i'm happy you did not use the word redline, because i want to talk about redline. sort of talk about the way obama and the united states and others have acted in terms of how you use force to get somebody to and do or not to do something you

want them to do. from a broader perspective, strategically, people are saying obama's weakness and the "washington post" has been tough on him blathering and dithering and so on, but that is responsible for putin's grabbing crimea. i don't think so. i think putin's plan a failed. when his guys fled moscow as with the rose revolution and other flower revolutions led to a change of power, he had to change his game plan because he has a lot at stake in ukraine for many of the reasons danny was talking about. from a broad strategic sense, it was not obama's weakness that led to to do what he did, it was that hooton's first option failed, so he went to the backup option. i would also argue, however, obama's alias at the tactical

level in far -- in so far as how you use redline's lead putin to underestimate him in terms of obama's ability to play the game. i go back again to the group of eight meeting in mexico where you see the two of these leaders in the same room together. i have not gone on the blogs, but apparently there is a film that shows the language of these guys next to each other for about five minutes will stop and disdain putin had for obama was almost palpable during that time. you could cut it with a knife. you could catch it in pictures, much less the video. i don't think putin had much respect for obama as a competitor, whether list chess, checkers or dodgeball. i think that same issue in the tactical level is something that has really bothered our allies. i have a few quotes on that

because there's no question -- as doug paul said, all of the big players out there watched what the united states did in syria and were appalled and worried about with the united states do the same thing if things went south for them on a particular issue? when you are dealing with china who makes no bones about its territorial ambitions, that is something they think about during that time. i go back to obama's use of red lines in syria, where he was a very specific about the redline issued in august of 2012, where he says we have been very clear to the assad regime and other players on the ground that a redline for us, we start seeing a whole bunch of emma: moving or been utilize, that has crossed it. he said that his a game changer, that changes the calculus. then we go through the same time he is talking about a game changer, we think he has been using chemical weapons on small

scales. it took the united states three months to confirm he has been using them on a small scale, and a third-tier white house official announces in june we are going to take some action. we will increase our assistance. we are going to meaningfully engage on this. but does not say anything about punishing syria for its use of chemical weapons. then on august 21, much larger chemical attack that kills 1400 people. that starts a swivel, where obama is about to use force and launch a retaliatory attack, and

then he says it is up to congress. when it is clear congress will hand his head to him, he reaches out to his former good buddy vladimir putin who comes up with this issue of removing chemical weapons as a way of taking a place of the automated the -- of the ultimatum that the united states had sent down with its red on the use of -- weapons. one of the things that i find disturbing is what this has been all about. people noticed that when obama at his press conference, a very defensive attitude, prickly attitude, 969 words in this particular response, and obama says those who would criticize our syrian foreign policy say we do not mean sending in troops.

what do you mean? you should mean assisting the opposition. what else do you mean? perhaps you should take a strike at syria. what else are you talking about? at this point the criticism trails off. that is ridiculous because that previous weekend samantha powers is asked on tv, the person who wrote the problem from hell about rwanda, what about these reports they are using chlorine gas? we will get to the bottom of that and see what is going on. within a day it is confirmed, they are using chlorine gas. a u.s. official said -- i want to make sure i have the right quotation -- we really do not want to draw much attention because we do not have much to do about it, because we cannot ask them to get rid of all the chlorine.

yeah, you can, but they agreed not to use chemical weapons as part of embracing the chemical weapons treaty. and they used them. when you are trying to deter the use of chemical weapons, what you are about is deterring they use of chemical weapons, not using force to impose an elimination of all chemical weapons, particularly when you are doing in a context that in libya, when gaddafi gave up his chemical weapons, we thought it was only eight months ago that they announced the last chemical weapons were gone. he hid a bunch of chemical weapons in that time, and to

think that assad will give them all up, not the way it works. it strikes me when you start looking at the track record of how this administration used force at the tactical level to try as an element of coercive diplomacy, it has failed at that. our adversaries do not fear us. they do not think we will hold them accountable. our allies are worried about what we will do under similar circumstances when we make those kind of commitments. what sam was talking about -- and i apologize for getting personal -- but when it comes to using force it is personal, because it was not just those three lines of thinking to consequences, being prepared to do it. a person has to have the right stuff when it comes to using force, the right stuff. and this president has asked about red lines on this most

recent trip, we do not like red lines anymore. he was asked, what about japan's territorial interests? that is not my red line -- i did not create that red line. the u.s.-japan treaty, before he went over for this trip, he sends a written message saying we support japan's right to administer these territories and asked and he says -- not my red line. what do you think if you are an ally concerned about your territorial integrity? you have had it. a defense minister from latvia points out we used some real red lines, ones that matter because we are in nato, or you have secretary kerry saying nato's

territorial integrity is inviolable. we will defend every piece of it. how credible do you think that is? how credible do you think that is? it is personal. and a consequence of not understanding when the united states draws a line in the sand it is the president's job to make sure that the line has consequences. we can call it a line in the sand. red lines have metaphors, pink lines, lines written in pencil, creeping red lines, but when it comes to saying do not do this or we will do that, when you make empty threats, how do you

have an architecturally of security guarantees? over to you, michael. >> ok. on that optimistic note, the floor is yours. >> thank you for having this event. this is an issue we will be talking about for a long time because it is not a small tactical action. it is a major choice by a large power, and it is a choice to do something that perhaps we in the past, the annexation of territory come so close to europe, and a lot of commentators are trying to say that there might be easy ways to deal with them there are not easy ways to deal with this from russia or any other problem. it is a tough problem.

it is not something new, and america sees russian leaders take actions that we vigorously object to but do not have a path solution or an easy way to quickly address. president eisenhower had to see the soviets go into hungary. lbj had to see the soviets go into czechoslovakia. president carter saw soviets go into afghanistan. president bush jr. saw georgia invaded by russia, and others in the neighborhood had faced russian aggression in recent years. in none of those cases was there an american response that would somehow magically roll back what had happened. in none of those cases was there something that would not be subject to a law that advocated about what we could or could not

do. it is important to say what are america's interests here, what are the things that we need to be willing to do in response to this kind of action, and to find a way to build consensus because one of the things that serves us best as a country in issues like this is when we are able to find consensus over what we could do, should do, even if there is debate about tactics. for all the critics we're hearing now about what policy choices have been made, they are primarily about tactics. there are not a lot of able advocating for military action to roll back a russian annexation of a piece of ukraine. that said, this is a pretty egregious violation, not only of international law, but of the agreement that russia inked with

the united states, united kingdom, and ukraine, budapest agreement that said we will not use force to violate ukraine's territorial integrity or sovereignty. russia has both violated the u.n. charter and the agreement they inked with us. not to mention that, the fragmenting of a sovereign nation by force is something that merits a response. the world of that response comes in the kinds of costs we are willing to impose them not just today, but over time. i think the best critiques right now is it has not been clear enough what this costs are going to be in the near term and clear enough how long and enduring the cost imposition of the united

states will be. my concern about whether the immediate response reflects on u.s.'s stature in the world comes from the fact that it has looked confused, and we have had that problem in several cases. it looks fairly confused because these things are hard to do with. how far do you go? do you unilaterally move forward on sanctions? do you get together with allies and come up with response? these are difficult things to do in my view, fairly clear steps to target at least one section of the russian economy that would cost us something as well as cost them something, and a demonstration that we are willing to keep that up for a long time would have served us better in incremental steps on -- then incremental steps or sectors that looked like they are reactive. the bottom line here is that the

annexation of crimea, that in itself requires a fairly clear response from the united states, and that is probably a response that will have to stay in place for some time, so we need to figure out what kind of steps we are willing to take to say we do not accept this action and we are going to imposing costs on you, that we are going to keep in place for 1, 5, 10 years? in my view that should be probably targeted at the banking sector where a longtime european and western willingness to look the other way in terms of money laundering and other financial crimes could very easily be ended and to allow us to enforce actions and target sanctions to constrain russia's financial sector. those are things we need to do. but i think the idea that somehow the recent development cast into doubt the framework of american alliances is overstated.

the fact is that we have treaty commitments to our allies, to our allies. they are not the rest of the universe, the rest of those world. those are with those countries with whom we have entered those agreements. the president has been clear on the nato front and on japan was extraordinarily clear despite the point that clark was pointing out, that the article five treaty applies to the islands. the value of ambiguity and the value of strategic implications

has been muddied by both sides, on the red lines and what would you do talking about in a given circumstance. being declared and clear about what you are going to do when your interests are challenged is not the best way to practice international policy, when you face challenges unique to be willing to make responses, when you are willing to take a concrete action, you need to sustain your action when you take it, but you need to leave room for a variety of actions and lead uncertainty in the minds of potential opponents. there is a lot of discussion right now about how we could be handling these situations in a fundamentally different way. i do not think that is true. i think the quibbling should be limited to what technically should we be doing and what we should be doing -- where we could take stronger action, where we could potentially have a better approach.

even john mccain's proposed legislation does not actually a -- actually get you out of the realm of this administration's response to this challenge. at the end of the day, vladimir putin has chosen to take on a czarist mantel. if you look back at -- he did not analyze the soviet union just in terms of a bolshevik ideology and a socialist system. he put it in the scope of russian history and talked about the neuroses of russian leadership going back centuries, and he said that russian leaders have learned to seek security -- a deadly struggle for total destruction of rival powers, ever in compacts and compromises with it. i think that might be one of the most informative places for us

to go, not a global ideological struggle, but a russian leader behaving in a way that russian leaders have long behaved, a way that has never been managed quickly easily by a turn of a phrase or a particular action, but a way of behaving that requires a clear response. the united states needs to lead the international community in rejecting the annexation of crimea and in resisting further dismemberment of the ukrainian body politic. i do not believe that any kind of sanctions i had hoped for early were the kind of sanctions implemented. i do not think those will change the calculus of vladimir putin, and we get into very fuzzy territory when we talk about changing the strategic calculus of another country, if you add pakistan or a russia.

what you do is manage this situation you find yourself in, protect your interests as best you can, and be clear about what costs you are willing to impose when behavior by states violate the norms by which you stand. that means focusing on a steady stead of things you can do, to impose costs on russia, but critically to support ukraine and other states in the periphery of russia and potentially into putin's sights. the most disappointing thing in our response so far is that congress authorized a fairly small package of assistance for ukraine. i think that if we look at two spots today is actually objectively better than the response that we made in 2008 when russia invaded georgia.

but given the scale of the activity in ukraine and the direction it seems that russia is going, i think we actually need to find the resolve in ourselves and with our european partners and with other countries around the world to have a much more robust response. so there are things out there that we did in the wake of a cold war that we have left staid in prominence and importance, like the partnership for peace, that helps a dozen nations and helps bring them up to military standards in education and support. those are the programs we need to look at ways to reinvested. i fear that domestic gridlock and the atmosphere of fiscal constraint is getting to the point that it is making us actually really overly narrow what we can do as a country when you ask about, can we do asia policy and handle ukraine?

of course, we can. we are still the largest economy on earth. we are still spending over $600 then billion a year on defense. we have plenty of resources. we have to have the willingness to apply those resources where they need to be applied. we seem to be in a political environment where gridlock is the watchword and tough political decisions do not come no matter how severe the provocation or how important the need. and that is what challenges american leadership in the world. and the gridlock is the issue, much more than the specifics of any given response, because the world understand how complicated these sorts of issues and responses are. i will wrap up with that. >> thank you. let me ask questions for the panel to pick up on the themes i and heard throughout the comments. the first one is a question, a difference reference, the and

utility of the ambiguity in terms of options and leaving no space for yourself as you manage a problem. and one of the first things the president did and has repeatedly done was take military force off the table as an option. you are andy, you had said right and you before that the know use of economic sanctions you are in may be asked to look a for in a way we do not anticipate. i assume taking military force off the table was done anyway to try to defuse the crisis a bit. what is your view of how putin may perceive those statements by the president, and does that need any policy correction going forward? >> thanks. great comments by both clark and vikram. my main problem against -- february 28 in the initial response, to me was clear that actually crimea was gone and what we were playing for at that point was for the rest of

ukraine, and it was clear that for mr. putin, winning crimea and losing the rest of ukraine would never be satisfactory. and in an winning and that is in why the response right from the get go had to be much stronger and firmer. in a more and you granted, that and you is a very hard thing to do when you see such a stealthy and and frankly surprising action that was taken. and you are you and but a couple days you after that don't you are and the week after i was a that and the week after that, in the public, the sense you a of a very permissive you and you and you and environment for mr. putin, that you are was in his head. in we know what he would have done with a different response. this gets to taking use of military force off the table. i am a huge believer in the you

know what you deterrence. you the counter argument made by the administration that any kind of military action or certainly military support for ukraine, the concern about it being perceived as provocative to moscow, to me it does not make sense. what i saw as more provocative was creating the impression in putin's mind of a more permissive environment. if you're thinking to yourself that you're taking military action off the table, fine, do not say it. what is the point in saying anything about it? you will want in a a a a you are in a you a low you and you and you and i and you and you and why not create ambiguity in your adversary's mind? more importantly, on this point, the administration would critique people like me and you

accuse us of being and you will warmongers -- i would never you he is in you will will suggest providing an article in an and five guarantee for a you ukraine or anything like that in that -- that is not --now you but there is a whole range of options in between that is and sending 300,000 meals ready to eat. is there are far more options. there is a problem that the security forces in ukraine are penetrated by russia's influence, that is an issue for sure. there could have been more done as there in a nuanced way that could have changed the calculus. you might >> you want to jump in want on that? >> i go to exactly what it was

that president obama is saying. he said many things, but on 26 is march, he said ukraine is not a member of nato in part because of its close history with russia. nor will russia be dislodged from crimea or be deterred by military force. did -- there is this ubiquitous official saying the american people are not going to war with russia over ukraine. i am not a warmonger. maybe i am a little bit. [laughter] there are lots of things you can do short of launching a desert storm-like invasion of kuwait. you might actually move forces into what they are now calling the front-line states, nato allies on russia's borders

during that time. nato has not. what has happened is the united states sent to each of the three countries in question, 150 paratroopers, and those paratroopers were delivered by commercial transportation because we were worried less about having them jump out of the sky or being delivered by military transport that would be too provocative, sending 150 paratroopers in when you have 100,000 troops on the borders. there are lots of things we should have done. i think obama has done a little bit better on the economic side that he has not done on the military side. you should be doing things to

indicate to our nato allies, the new europe, as don rumsfeld used to refer to, that we are really there for them, and we have not during that time. for me, strategic ambiguity about when you are going to use force, that is a concept that was developed in terms of the use of nuclear weapons. it is not a concept used for 150 paratroopers to signal intent. there are lots of things that could have been done on the military side that would demonstrate a much firmer intent than we had heretofore shown. >> the only thing i will throw into this mix is i think a lot is made -- as if there is a notion of high-speed tactical deterrence in itself.

there's the idea that had we just asked, he would've said i will leave crimea or i will not meddle in the rest of ukraine. that is not accurate, and the reason he was not that heard -- deterred finds its roots in how we respond to the georgia incursions into 2008, which remain in place. that russian invasion, which was much more sloppy, loud, noisy, messy, and it claimed like 500 georgian lives, that was met with no response by previous administration. vladimir putin has tested the waters and determine that in his immediate neighborhood he is not going to face a military response from the united states. so i agree with what my colleague is saying here. he can't debate about the

tactics. the failure to deter in this particular set of circumstances, which vladimir putin steadily encroaching on and grabbing a russian enclave of neighboring states like moldova, georgia, ukraine, and potentially others like azerbaijan, that is a position he has tested over the years, and i would say more of what we have done in this crisis, what we did not do in 2008, has affected the world we are looking at today. >> one last question. the question, there has not yet been a release of an obama administration second-term national security strategy, so there is opportunity to put something in there about this

issue to signal very publicly on this issue said that we brought up here. what would you recommend be in the national security strategy? i am not saying that putin will read it, but it is a chance to have a discussion internally in the and frustration like we're having here. what are some of the issues they need to take a hard look at? the second part of the question, we just had the release of a new defense strategy in the form of a 2014 quadrennial defense review. did that strategy adequately capture the space we are in now with russia? is russia properly accounted for and our defense strategy if it is going to be the kind of long-term challenge that you all believe it is going to be? whoever feels most comfortable going first. >> i will go first on that. i will start with the ease your question first, the 2014 qdr. like the one that came out six

weeks after 9/11. it was legislated to come have a certain time, so it came out. at the time it was legislated to come out. it was adjusted at the very last minute to talk a little bit about 9/11, but the whole thing had been written before 9/11 had occurred. same thing is true right now. a slated mandate to put out a 2014 qdr. we're still talking that qdr that we want to shape china as a responsible stakeholder and russia as a responsible partner as well. that was the language that was in there. you cannot rewrite those. they probably would have gone to the printers before it was clear what was going on right now with russia and ukraine. as far as the national security is concerned, do not put another one out.

last time you want to put something out was right after you are sitting there with egg all over your face, and people wondering about your resolve, and i would argue you have to rebuild your credibility for action, your reputation to action, to use a term that thomas schelling used, you have to rebuild that were one red line at a time. there was a recent article that said we need to reset our foreign policy, have a full architecture. we know well if we try to put up five red lines, we are going to get a number of them wrong no matter how stronger president is because we do not know what our toleration for pain is and we do not know what people we are trying to effect. he followed those kinds of things over time. that is a longer-term thing. i would argue right now if you have to put out a national strategic strategy, you probably should've done it two years ago. if you did not, do not do it now. >> i think that is great part. the qdr did not account for this

turn of events. the fact is the international community has rejected what russia has previously done in terms of these kinds of actions, and nobody recognizes other places as russian territory, but has attempted to move on and figure that there is going to have to be a resolution at some point, and we have continued to try to encourage russia to be a part of a responsible mobile order. and any logical -- if you take a longer term, not putin's political calculus, but the longer welfare of the russian society, that is a better course of action. long term, russia would do well to make those reforms that and he was talking about, to open up its society can have a free media, to make to be attractive

to capital again, to establish the rule of law, and got a russian that has a decent future in the 21st century. this is taking russia down a path that will not have a decent future in the 21st century, and that is something that does need to be factored in to national security thinking. i would imagine national security strategy is not that about anybody's list of the white house now given the number of challenges they are facing. obviously, the shifting dynamics from power and how sovereignty disputes have been muffled or very rarely acted on in recent years and how those might play in to challenging the international order and undermining security in large important regions of the world, that has to be something we look to address.

>> andy? >> thanks. of course, the qdr could not account for this. there are two sides of it. one is capabilities. the other are intentions. we know the russians have been working the last five or six years to improve their military sector, and i think this deserves a lot more attention, looking at the kinds of capabilities that they have. there has been a lot of focus, not surprisingly, on access of weapons, to raise the cost of military interventions that the united states and its allies has led. i would look very closely at the nuclear balance and look at what the russians are doing their

with their modernization program and what we are or are not doing with our program. i will leave it to clark to make a comment on that. you know, on vikram's comments on the long term, vladimir putin is 61 years old. he takes good care of himself. he plans on being in power for a long time. and so, sure, we would like to wish for the return back to a reforming russia, but i just do not see that happening any time soon. the logic of what he has done and where he has moved has constrained him and has encouraged him to go further. so i am afraid unless something happens to him personally, i do

not see any way that we are going to be doing with him for a long time. that has to be accounted for, i think, in the strategy, because that is where the intention has shifted in a fundamental way, from being in a quasi-partner, a frenemy, to clearly an adversary. and an adversary which i am worried is ready to inflict and sustain major losses all across the board. i know this is a kind of a crazy thought, but i have these crazy thoughts in the last few months. i do not even think about it, and they hit me. i was reading a piece last friday, and the thought hit me, the greatest achievement of the soviet union, besides winning

world war ii, was achieving nuclear parity with the united states. what would really rock vladimir's world would be if to somehow acquire a first-strike capability. i have not even thought about that for decades. >> you have not even thought reform. >> look, this cannot be underestimated in any way, shape, or form. you know what? since we have little capacity to influence russia, i think we have to think about much more strategically, is how we support the sovereignty and independence of the state on russia's borders from east central europe to the southern caucasus. central asia -- i just came from central asia, spent a couple weeks there, and for example,

some very thoughtful kazakh analysts, maybe another 9/11 and how they think about their security and their position. that whole area -- we need a new eurasia policy, not just a russia policy, and the core weakness was ukraine's own sovereignty itself. >> let me turn it over to audience questions. please identify yourself and if you could keep it to a question so we can hear more from these gentlemen. somebody will come with a microphone, sir, in the back. >> thank you. retired diplomat. over the years, the u.s.-ukraine military to military relationship has and one of the best aspects of our bilateral

relations. the police have performed pretty poorly out there, but now that the military are engaged, is it likely that the bilateral military to military relationship is going to bear some fruit in the quality of performance of the military? and there have been suggestions from some observers that the west should provide some anti-armor, defensive weapons to the ukrainian military to help them to turkey and defend, and that kind of weaponry is available on the market so it would not the something like writing them weaponry that they would not know how to use. >> want to jump in on that? >> more than one or just ---- >> why don't we start with -- >> i think the provision of

defensive weapons would not be -- i do not think it would be decisive. i do not think that in the power dynamic there is a step that would be decisive in the immediate term. i do think ukraine needs a heck of a lot of help. the military to military relationship with ukraine has been good. i understand that from knowing that if has been one of these countries that we partnered with over the years, but it was nowhere nearly as good as the relations with georgia. i think you could see a situation in which perhaps it is not just an american issue, but the united states could be provided and a lot of higher-end military support in terms of how they do things and how they manage their military and how they can run things. european countries can provide additional equipment. rgw ukrainian army has stocks.

they have a military. the real question is do they have the command and control and integration they need to deal with this kind of complex threat? that will be tested if we see further military action. i do not think you will see a crimea situation where nothing happens. we are seeing the violence and things being contested now, and i imagine there's a point at which the ukrainians will stand up and they need to be backed up by countries around the world that do not think they should have their country dismembered just because there was a popular uprising and one corrupt leader ended up fleeing from office. unfortunately for the ukrainian people, they have been led in their country for decades by corrupt leaders who have left

the country. >> in the front here. >> i would like to see one of you all comment on arming ukrainians with stinger missiles so that the air force cannot operate anywhere near territory. they pulled out of afghanistan. therefore, it was totally inured. the russian air force has a low tolerance for casualties. when the russians from across the borders with their tanks in their armored vehicles, that they can take them out. both cases would such a high price on the russian game that the russians have no chance of

getting your people to put up with the casualty rate that they are going to incur. i would like to comment on that. >> let me take one more. sir, right here. >> thank you. i am representing the mccain institute from georgia. my question is on the nato contingency in the baltic direction. today russia officially notified lithuania that they are suspending weaponry information exchanges. this was the formal notification they received. i presume there will be some enhancement -- particularly in tactical nukes. my question is, if in the future we see -- appearing in one of

the baltic countries, article five considers the support of the ally when there is an armed attack on a member country. would it be considered an armed attack, or would nato continue their actions in this potential scenario? >> i do not think you will see in ukraine -- i will leave it to andy to make a more authoritative statement on that -- i do not think you are going to see a russian invasion of ukraine with lots of helicopters and with lots of aircraft. they are susceptible to being shot down with stingers. member, russia invaded afghanistan in support of a puppet government, so they

occupied a country, and it took >> quite a while for the united states to develop the supply lines and stuff to provide them the wherewithal to start shooting down aircraft in afghanistan territory. i do not know how far putin is going. there is a united institute of security for london that published that said nobody knows what putin will do next. do you sort of agree with that? do you think he knows how far he will go during that time? i do not think it is going to be an invasion. there will be lots more green men, lots more violence in cities, there will be a creeping. i do not think it will stabilize until a larger chunk of ukrainian territory has been lost to russia during that time.

i think it will go that far. putin has had more appetite for this than i thought he had. he has not been confronted with the kind of opposition that is going to lead him to back off for a while. i think he looks at this -- he is playing a great game in his mind and playing it better than his opponents, and he sees a feasible game. there will be forced ethnic cleansing, to use that kind of term, which is much more out of yugoslavia and so on, but i think you are going to find that there are not going to be ukrainian freedom fighters in that strip of southeastern ukraine that will go russian. i think the military aspect of it is not going to be part of it. as to your question, i think it depends a lot on how the world

reacts to what is going to happen to ukraine. i saw a tv show where the ambassadors for the three baltic countries talking to each other, saying, of course, ukraine is a part of nato. it was clear they were happy to be a part of nato at that time and to be having those defenses. i do not think putin is ready to take on that challenge yet unless we have a lot more dithering and ineptitude and capacity from the rest of the world in response to ukraine. i do not see that replay happening right away, but could it happen six months from now in ukraine? i think so. but i do not think it will, but it could. >> you want to pick up? >> i completely agree with what clark just said. let me use a term we used during the cold war.

we are coming up to a critical moment with the presidential election. it has been an essential part of the strategy to be able to claim that the ukrainian government in kiev is illegitimate. i think what we see the efforts to control if not to control, at the stabilize areas of eastern and southern ukraine are going to intensify up and to the election, and of course may 9, the great victory in europe, holiday friday, a nasty day that may look that last friday will look like a picnic. it will look like a typical day. when the elections are held, the goal is to have as few people vote in those regions where the

opposition's control or destabilize. then with the election results, the claim can be made legitimate, that their rights are being violated, and in the russians will declare the right to protect. they have already been talking about the right to protect. they likely will still want to avoid a full-scale military invasion to protect, but i would not exclude that as a possibility. i think that is what we are going to likely see up to the point where on april 17 in his phone-in program, mr. putin raised the term "new russia." to me, this is clearly what he wants. this is the most industrialized part of ukraine.

it is the most wealthy part of ukraine. it is where the heart of ukrainian military industrial complex is, and if you want to have a greater russia project, a greater russian military-industrial complex, you do not want the ukrainian industrial military comics competing with sales to china as they have the last couple years. in the some way, the endgame will be for a truncated ukraine and it will be an annexation of that territory to russia. i do not think that a frozen conflict zone will be satisfactory. you will be left with a -- which is much economically weaker, much more focused economically to the west, but much weaker. military supplies to the ukrainian -- i do not like to

say this, but i feel in some ways that the train might have left the station. we had been thinking about this two months ago in a more strategic way. nevertheless, we need to do what we can do. let me emphasize again. military to military relations, this is the distinguished former ambassador of georgia, who was so modest not to inform the audience that he was the ambassador of georgia. good to see you again. wherever countries have an appetite for a stronger

relationship with the united states, do it. secretary hagel, get on the airplane, go to central asia, and see what people are looking for. there is an interest for more cooperation with kazakhstan, and definitely with uzbekistan. certainly with turkmenistan, but more cautious. >> let me take a question from this side of the room. the conference is closing. >> i'm in touch with ukrainians currently that say give us tactical intelligence. in a country with a flat muslim population, putin just got himself a million russians. he got a couple million more by taking the southeast. that is a big driver here. pundits have failed to note it. is it possible to establish a training trigger force to serve that purpose? he is out of office in 4 1/2 years, so he has 4 1/2 years to establish this.

maybe he puts a puppet in. >> there are elections in 2018, and he can run again. he would be president until 2024. >> tell us about that training trigger force. >> take another one in the back. >> national security -- mention was made of intelligence failures in this crisis. we know that snowden is entirely in custody of fsb, and it is reported we have had significant losses of intelligence assets with regard to russia. i'm wondering what the panel thinks is how big a factor it is in the administration's decision calculus. >> who wants to start on this

one? you want to take this one? >> sure. i will take the first one. you point out, with crimea, russia has also inherited more than 200,000 crimean tartars, who have a difficult history with russia and the soviet union. over the weekend i saw that a major political leader there was stopped at the border from reentering crimea. so far the crimean tartars have been very quiescent in all of this. i think that will be a problem for putin at it might actually increase the larger problem that he has with an increasingly islamifcation of the russian federation. there is no question that with the rapid environment of russian nationalism in russia today, beyond anything i have ever seen or deceived of, that is almost

certainly going to increase the problem of the insurgency that mr. putin faces in the north caucasus and in other areas in the -- region where there is a significant muslim population. >> snowden? >> above my pay grade. >> intelligence failure is not the way i would characterize what happened in the inability of our intelligence agencies to predict that putin was going to do what he was going to do. there was a comment made by a spokesman talking about 25,000 russian troops mobilizing and active on the borders of south east asia, where he said, we do not have an idea what their intentions are. ok. you cannot see those out front. you can see the forces. you do not see what they are going to do with them. a lot of us were surprised him including andy was apprise him that putin did as much as he did and could go on to do as much as what he is doing now. we're talking about people who have been nothing but russian leaders for a long time. snowden -- it has weakened the united states a bit in terms of its allies. certainly with merkel. that is not explaining why the european reaction to what russia is doing has been so weak. it is not snowden and that is responsible for a former chancellor of germany sitting on the board of a russian oil company. it is not snowden that is responsible for the effective united states has bilateral, economic relationship with russia, $27 billion a year, and europe has owned $370 billion a year. you talk about us sanctioned the

russian banking sector. let london go down the tubes. there has been a case of interdependency or dependency, depending on how you look honest, created between russia and europe now where europe is not an independent agent. where we said with nato, where we will move with nato as an alliance, we are asking malta, the united kingdom, countries that benefit from the russian empire to take strong action that will hurt their economies. it is not going to happen. as for a trigger force them there's no trigger force we can do in the near term that could stop the russians.

what will stop the russians from going further is the reading of their own interests that they have gone as far as they need to. why, if you are putin, think about that kind of stability? he is in a place where 45% of the population is russian and the rest is ukrainian. you push ukrainians further away and you make sure you just left the russians. what you do not do is you take

over an area that is 100% ukrainian and have to deal with them. as we know too well, occupations are tough, and i think putin is a little smarter about that. >> i agree i do not think putin is looking to occupy ukrainian parts of ukraine. i do not think we are looking at the reabsorption of ukraine into russia. we are looking at what will and he was talking about. we can easily move into the realm of talking about the terror options that may or may not be there. there are tactical decisions that could be made in terms of what kind of supports to provide, what kind of -- how you reassure and reinforce and make clear that the nato alliance is going to stand firm on protecting alliance members from aggression. but we should remember in dealing with russia as a

civilization that we have at challenges with for a long time, and that is the situation we are in now. we're not going to like sanctions but russia will hold its interest to continue to sell arms or continuing the energy market or continuing defendant the market. will portion the impact in some areas. sectoraction in banking is a high order step. see aimpossible to

credible response that does not include heard both ways. you would have to see that happen. the united states goes so goes the world because inks will have to self like that of doing business of russian banks if there are sanctioned by the u.s.. you can have an echo effect. it is important to be honest about the fact that this interdependence has developed, but you're absolutely right that only the economy but properties and all sorts of things in mayfair in london are owned by russian oligarchs and they own football teams. west a floodn the of russian cap -- cash. we're going to decide how to do less of it if we have to impose

cost. i believe that has to be something we are clearly willing to call for, and it has to be something we are willing to take action on even if we do not want to follow. we are going to delete on the imposing of cost -- we're going to have to leave on the imposing of cost. let me give a final word and then we will think the panel. that is another collateral .amage of economic cost is approximately based on remittance from migrant workers in russia.

all of those countries have strong economic ties from the south caucasus central asia to something that is to be thought about. what was the core weakness of -- ukraine, it really sort of the economic foundation of its own sovereignty. the chinese did abstain on the u.n. security council on this sanctions question.

this is something useful to talk to about her chinese counterparts and robbie about where they are. benk full -- that would useful for secretary kerry to have a trip to beijing, to have a serious discussion with them. this is where putin will be going at the end of may, and this is -- the chinese did abstain on the u.s. security council on the sanction question. i think it's worth trying to explore to what degree we can work together in this context as well. >> thank you very much. let me thank t.j. who did all the work to pull this together. kathleen hicks, who told me to stop the complaining about

working -- ukraine. thank you for coming this afternoon. [applause] >> the republican primary season starts today in three states and the hill has the story. business friendly gop groups have gone all in on tom phyllis thend his opponent incumbent senator kay hagan. presidential nominee mitt romney joined the endorsement. he falls below the market will betweenbe in the runoff

senator rand paul or reverend mark harris who has the backing governor arkansas mike huckabee. treasury officials will be before the senate foreign relations committee on the latest on russian intervention in ukraine. that will be live on c-span three. you can now take see spoon with you wherever you go -- take c-span with you wherever you go. with our free c-span radio app for your smartphone or cab let. -- listen to all three c-span tv channels. or c-span radio any time. there's a schedule of into our networks so you can tune in when you want. download your free app online for your iphone, android or blackberry.

>> the u.s. house is dabbling in in 20 minutes. just attorney general holder spoke at the national solution -- association of attorneys general. [applause] >> good morning. i want to thank attorney general van hollen for that kind introduction. also for your leadership as president of the national association of attorney generals. like to recognize district attorney henry garza for his service as president of the national district attorneys association.

i want to thank the leadership team, the professional staff and the dedicated members of both organizations for the really outstanding work that you perform everyday and for all that you done to bring us together for this really important symposium on the reduction of crime. as staunch volunteerings -- advocates for the rule of law, state authorities across america, you are two really remarkable organizations have for decades provided leadership and guidance in advancing our dialogue about criminal justice issue. through the work of the national attorneys general training and through gathers like nad. you routinely bring innovators, public servants leaders together to address what are the most pressing public safety challenges of our time. it's a privilege for me to help open this critical forum and to stand with all yet again as we share knowledge and expertise to speak frankly about the threats

facing our respective jurisdictions and to discuss cutting end strategies for reducing crime and victimization throughout the nation. i know that you and your colleagues serve on the front lines of this fight everyday. you're working closely with u.s. attorneys, fbi acts and other justice departments to protect the citizens that we are all sworn to serve. together we are reminding policy makers here in washington. something that's very important that dialogue on the most difficult and divisive issues need not break down along partisan lines. disagreements are inevitable whenever passionate people confront questions of real magnitude. we are showing that vigorous debate is not only healthy, it stands to make our work stronger and more effective. we're all responding to the same reality. we've come together in the pursuit of the same goals. these common names have led us

to find common grounds and a take meaningful steps to recalibrate policies. new actions and initiatives have risen from innovative federal, state and local partnerships. these -- they are driven by the recognition and the broad based consensus that we have both responsibility and the opportunity to make our criminal justice system more fair, more efficient and more effective. the importance of these efforts and the urgent need for action on the historic changes that we're working to bring about was really brought into sharp focus

by a landmark study that was released just last week by the national academy of science national research council. this new report was funded by the national institute of justice as well as by the mcarthur foundation. its findings were based upon a comprehensive, nonpartisan an independence examination of incarceration rates in the united states over the past four decades. as this study makes clear, the rise in incarceration that we witnessed over that period was, historically unprecedented. these conditions have been shown to contribute to family instabilities, to high unemployment as well as to low wage.

they often corollate with high rate of profit and serious public health concerns. they not only feed, they exacerbate, the poverty of criminality of incarceration that traps too many individuals and devastates the entire community. the n.a.s. principle conclusion, u.s. policy makers must take steps by making targeted reforms to criminal justice policies. in addition to broader social policy changes. these recommendations are entirely consistent with the work that's under way through the justice department's smart on crime initiative. which i launched last summer to improve the federal system.

the study findings also catalog the realities that so many of us see everyday as we strive to reduce crime in the jurisdictions that we serve. to illustrate the cost our nation's over reliance on incarceration are far too high to bare. increase in incarceration rates, impose those cause without materially improving public safety, without significantly reducing crime and without concretely benefiting our nation in a meaningful way. fortunately, leaders in this room are not only uniquely qualified to guide our national conversation on these issues, you're also empowered to make a lasting powerful difference by advocating for the proposals that you believe in. by calling for reforms to improve the lives of our fellow citizens.

by implementing strong and tested policies that can move our country forward. with new reentry and diversion programs like drug, mental health and veterans court, we can keep people out of prison and help them successfully rejoin their communities. with new sentencing measures and careful and appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. we can ensure punishments are fair and proportional to the conducts in every case. with the support of broad new coalition of experts, and other stakeholders, we can conserve resources, we can improve public safety and bring our system in line with our society of interest and our nation's highest ideals. many of you all already showing, i think, tremendous leadership in this regard. in recent years, a total of 17 states supported by the justice department's reinvestment initiative and led by state officials from both parties have directed significant funding away from prison construction

and towards evidence based programs and services like supervision and drug treatment are proven to reduce -- one report by the bureau of justice projects at least 17 state will save $4.6 billion over a event year period. although the full impact of these policies remains to be seen, it's evidence that they already show significant promise. they should be studied, they should be emulated. we must continue to support this kind of notification on -- innovation to expand on proven strategies. at the federal level, our smart on crime initiative that is bringing about major shifts in charging, expensing and

incarceration and executive clemency policies. last year, under this initiative i took steps to ensure minimum sentences for certain federal drug related crimes will now be reserved for the most serious criminals. defendants accused of low level, nonviolent drug offenses will face sentences fitting their individual conduct rather than penalties that are more appropriate for violent traffickers on drug kingpins. i also ordered a renewed focus of reentry of our 94 u.s. attorney's offices. i have been encouraged to see more and more leaders from both parties step forward to take up this cause to help ensure our criminal justice system is used to pitch, deter and rehabilitate and not to warehouse and to forget. earlier this year i was proud to be joined by senator rand paul to restore voting rights to those who have served their prison term, completed their

probation and have paid their fines. i urge each of you to take up this fight when you return home. because the free exercise of our most fundamental right should never be subject to politics or geography or the lingering effects of fraud policy. i also ask you to join me in working with congress to advance common sense legislation. the bipartisan smarter sentencing acts which would give judges additional discretion in determining sentences for people convicted of certain central drug -- federal drug crimes. as a nation, we pay far too high a price in terms of human, economic and moral. whenever our system fails to deliver the just outcomes that are necessary to deter and punishment crimes t keep -- to keep us safe. the justice department is doing important work to restore, justice and fairness and proportionatety with those

involved with the criminal justice system. to expanded approach to the executive clemency process. two weeks ago the deputy attorney general announced new criteria. that will allow the department and the white house to consider additional applications from deserving individual who not pose threat to public safety. we anticipate receiving an influx of really thousands of clemency applications as a result of these changes. we are committed to devoting the time, the resources and the personnel necessary to ensure that each one receives the full attention and the rigorous scrutiny that it deserves. at the same time, as the national academy of science report makes crystal-clear, we

must increase our efforts to identify and to confront despairty at every stage of the criminal justice process. with this goal in mind at my direction, a team of more than a dozen u.s. attorneys known as the racial disparities working group, is currently examining sentencing disparities and developing recommendations on how we can address them. the department also launching a new national center for building community trust. going forward, this center will enable us to explore, advance and assess and disseminate information about strategies for procedural justice. my colleagues and i will never stand oddly by as isolated acts of discrimination tarnish the outstanding work that is performed by the overwhelming majority of american law enforcement officers everyday in this country.

i have been registered to -- encouraged to see organizations take step to make good on this commitment by strengthening community outreach. by broadening engagement and bringing citizens and law enforcement officials together to end the era of suspicion and distrust. going forward this work must continue to grow. we need to keep extending the reach and impact of these other efforts across the board. finding new savings and efficiency the will allow us to invest in crime reduction strategies. it will forge stronger families and communities. including sentencing policies, expanding justice reinvestment and confronting racial disparities. it will save taxpayer money and it will build trust in law enforcement and taking a comprehensive view of crime challenge. rather than just responding to

individual symptoms. now, we convene this morning in a unique unprecedented moment of promise. at a time of innovation and potentially broad consensus when our national debate, our professional experiences and the latest in cutting edge research have cast the challenges we face in various relief. this is a time for thoughtful discussion, to give way to principle action. this the time for 21st century problems to be met with 21st century solutions. this is a time when policy makers from opposite ends of the political spectrum have laid aside their differences and resolve to stand together in the recognition that crime reduction is a goal that knows no

ideology. countless lives, in promising futures hang in the balance. the need for robust collaboration and series of reform is as urgent as ever. as we seize this important moment, as we accept the opportunities before us as we renew our determination to move aggressively in combating violence and reducing crime, i'm proud to count you as allies and friends. i'm confident in the hyperbole of -- i want to thank you once again for the chance to take part in this important symposium. thank you very much. [applause] >> the glass-steagall act that

was passed in 1933 was a very clear line between the speculative versions and services and things they bank itld do and the services provided to small businesses. there was a very clear distinction. the bankers were on the same site as fdr, the relation was on the same side as fdr, and things became stable for many decades after that. you contrast that to what happened in the wake of the 2008 crisis, which has been a much more expensive crisis for the general economy allow for the actual unemployment level not the tagline, for what was lost to individuals without -- throughout, and relative to the

bailouts and subsidies that have been given. and dodd frank came and did nothing remotely like dissecting speculation from traditional banking activities. >> a look at the relationship between 6000 pennsylvania avenue and wall street. of the tv this weekend on c-span two. club selection is it calls you back i luis j rodriguez. >> the u.s. houses gaveling in momentarily. 2:00 p.m.return at for more speeches, and then back at 4:30 p.m. to discuss bills. boats after 6:30 p.m. eastern.

--y will take by built to ill hold iris learner in contempt of congress. we may hear speeches today about the 200 girls in nigeria who in kidnapped. saying it is time to bring back our girls, we demand action to bring innocent schoolgirls and i give back to see the -- to safety. why not to the house floor. -- like not to the house floor. the speaker pro tempore: the united states house of representatives will be in order. the chair lays before the house a communication from the speaker. the clerk: the speaker's room,