you, madam secretary. >> thank you, chairman menendez and ranking member corker for inviting me today. i apologize for being late. i will blame secretary kerry. we were meeting with lady ashton. i also want to thank this committee for its bipartisan legislation for its support and people of ukraine and many visits many of you have made. i hope collectively we can answer your questions here, senator corker and layout a strategy. when i testified before the subcommittee on april 10th i laid out four pillars of u.s. policy to address challenges in ukraine. supporting ukraine and reassuring nato allies and creating costs for russian behavior and keeping the door open for deescalation through diplomacy. collectively we'll speak to all of those things today. what i want to focus on are the

events since the last diplomatic encounter which is the russia slr ukraine meeting in geneva and crucial 19 days from now until the may 25th presidential elections in ukraine. for a quick reminder about the commitments made in geneva. at its core, it was kind of a grand bargain that offered amnesty and deep and broad decentralization of power to ukraine's regions through national dialogue and constitutional reform if and as pro-russian separatists ended their violence and left sized buildings and gave up weapons, all of it to be guaranteed and overseen. as you know, the ukrainian government began implementing its part of geneva before the ink was barely dry on the text. it introduced a broad amnesty

bill and authorities in kiev dismantling barricades and opening streets on april 14th and on the 29th the constitutional reform commission held public conferences to which all of the regions were invited by decentralization and reform. ukrainian security forces even instituted an easter pause in clearing operations and sent senior officials out to the east to try to talk to separatists and get them to pursue aims politically rather than through violence. in contrast, the russian federation fulfilled none of its commitments, none, zero. after we left jean knigeneva no issued a public statement calling for checkpoints vacated and weapons turned in. declined a request to send a senior representative to work with separatists on compliance. in fact, the separatists said

they heard no messages from moscow urging them to step down. since april 17th as you've seen the efforts of ukrainian side and osce have been met with more violence and kidnappings and torture and death. received at least 35 buildings and three tv and radio centers in 24 towns. on frip the ukrainian government announced separatists used man pads to shoot down a ukrainian helicopter killing pilots. on friday saw the deadliest tragedy of this conflict, the death of more than 40 in odessa following violent clashes reportedly instigate by pro-russian separatist thugs attacking a pro-unity demonstration. today russia claims it has no influence over the separatists rampaging in eastern ukraine. yet, a week after eight o sce

observers were taken hostage and moose could you finally agreed it would send an envoy, the hostages were released within hours. in odessa, it should come as no surprise that the ukrainian authorities report that those they arrested for igniting the violence included people whose papers indicate they came from crimea and from russia itself. as secretary kerry told the committee in april, we continue to have high confidence that russia's hand is behind the instability. moscow is providing material support funding weapons and coordination and russian agents on the ground in ukraine involved in this. equally worrying today from slo vancek, it is identical, create the upheaval and then intimidate the local population, then you hold a bogus independence referendum on two weeks' notice. that's exactly what's been

declared for may 11th in the so-called donetsk and lieu hans people's republics. we remember what came next in crimea, russian peace keepers swarmed in to protect the will of the voters. just as we do not accept the declared need for so-called peace keepers in crimea, we won't accept any unilateral to eastern or southern ukraine. the polling indicates that the separatists do not speak for the populations of eastern and southern ukraine. more than two thirds of ukrainians in the east report they plan to vote in the may 25th election. they don't want little green men or separatists or moscow deciding for them. with more than 20 candidates running, representing every viewpoint and every region in ukraine, these elections offer ukrainians a real democratic choice. that's why the united states and europe and international community are working so hard with the government of ukraine to help them ensure free and

fair elections do take place across ukraine. all toll the, the osce office of democratic institutions and hul an rights, deploying 1,000 observers to monitor elections and united states will provide 1/10th of these and other states are contributing. the united states is also supporting 255 long-term observers and over 3,000 short-term observers, some of whom will provide a parallel vote tab lags. three fair elections on may 25th are the best route to economic stability in ukraine. to o decembdessa to donetsk, th the right to their oeb future. those who claim to be pro terkts should stand up for the ballot box if they truly want the voices of eastern ukraine to be heard in the process rather than

dictating them tloup the barrels of a gun or barricades of burning tires. in this regard it's more than ironic that today moscow asserts that both the interim government in ukraine and may 25th elections are illegitimate and makes you wonder if moscow is afraid to allow the ukrainian people to participate in an election that's going to afford them far more choice than any recent elections in russia's own history. as we work to empower the ukrainian people to determine their own future democratically, we must also acknowledge that the people of russia are being cheated of their democratic rights. just since the sochi olympics, the russian government has taken new aggressive steps at home to tighten control of the media, curb dissent, criminalize free expression on the internet and trample on human rights. putin's formula is simple, repression at home. i would disagree with you with

regard to the impact of sanctions. russia's economy is already showing this model does not lead to a great russia, it leads to a broke one. russia's kreds it rating hovering just above junk. $51 billion in capital has fled since the beginning of the year, almost as much as in all of 2013 kpined and that was a bad year for capital flight. russian bonds are trading at higher yields than any debt in europe. as the ruble has fallen, the central bank raised interest rates twice and spent close to $30 billion from its reserve to stabilize the ruble. so at some point the nationalist fever in russia will break and give way to a sweaty and harsh realization that there are economic costs to what russia is doing. they will start to ask the government, what can we actually achieved. instead of funding schools and science and prosperity at home and russia, we've squandered our

national weather on adventurism, interventionism and envisions of a leader who cares more about empire than his own citizens. it doesn't have to be that way. russia can still accept back from supporting accept ra tix and violence. working cloegsly with ukrainians, the key european governments including germany, we're once again offering a diplomatic path forward, a rejuvenation of the geneva agreement, amnesty for accept tra tists and real comprehensive reform in exchange for peace and security and unity across ukraine. a russia that truly cares about the fate of the ethnic russians in ukraine and people of ukraine's east will let alone its own citizens will work with us on this. a russia that doesn't will face a tightening grip of isolation from the international community. as the president said standing next to chancellor merkel on

friday, if russia further destabilizes the election, they'll face sanctions. in 19 days the ukrainian people will have the opportunity to make their choice. it's in the u.s. national security interest that the may 25 kt presidential elections reflect the will of ukraine's 45 million people. we stand united with the overwhelming majority of the international community in support of ukraine's democratic choice. the stakes could not be higher for ukrainian democracy, for european stability or future of the international order. thank you. >> >> thank you, chairman, menendez and ranking member corker. thank you for inviting me to speak about the u.s. government's response to russia's illegal annexation to crime i can't and continued provocative actions. department of treasury is designing and implementing a strategy that uses targeted financial measures to raise

koflt to russia of its actions. our approach is cal bralted to impose immediate cost on russia and create conditions that will make it vulnerable to sanctions as the situation in ukraine escalates. to this end, treasury targeted not only corrupt crimean separatists and backers in the russian government but individuals and president putin's inner circle who have important holdings throughout the russian economy. russia is already feeling the impact of our measures. in my remarks i'll describe tools and how we're deploying them and discussion the more than measures we are taking to but tres the ukrainian economy. the treasury department is using tools at our disposal to contribute to the development of a strong and sovereign ukraine. president obama has signed three security orders that combine the secretary of authority for the continue of crisis in ukraine. as well as entities under their control, in total designated 19

entities. the most important of these include those in putin's inner circle. these include the chairman of the state run company and the ceo of the russian weapons and metals con glom rat and one of the world's largest commodity trading firms, we've targeted russian officials as well as crimean separatists. for example, treasury has additional authority authorized by president obama under execute order to significantly enhance russ russia's economic cost and targeting the entities operating in broad sectors of the company, such as defense, metals and mining and energy. i should note the importance of coordination with our international partners, particularly those in the european union and g-7.

to be clear, united states always stands ready to take the actions we deem necessary to safeguard international security. we do however, recognize that our financial measures are more powerful and effective when done in a unilateral framework. they have stated they are prepared to do more. we're working to ensure our international partners continue and expand measures as we move forward to address russia's aggression. as we speak, undersecretary of the treasury cohen is coordinating with counterparts in london and berlin, along with an interagency delegation from the state department. even as we lay the groundwork for extended measures if necessary, our sanctions are having an impact on russia's already weak economy. my numbers are going to be worse than hers. as sanctions increase the costs to russia -- as they increase the cost to russia not only increase but they are ability to mitigate costs -- mitigate those

costs will diminish. already market analysts are forecasting significant continued outflows of both foreign and domestic capital and further weakening of growth prospects for the year. the russian stock market declined over 13% and currency has depreciated by almost 8%. these are the worst numbers of any member in the major emerging methods. .2% this year and i suggest that a recession is not out of the question. this stands in stark contrast to previous forecasts which as recently as february are projecting 2% growth for russia. they expect to downgrade the credit rating to a notch above junk status. in addition to our measures to isolate the russian economy, the treasury department working with international community and

returning the country's economy to solid footing. last week's approval of a two-year imf reform program is a positive first step. treasury is offering its expertise in identifying tracking and recovering stolen state assets in support of a department of justice led effort. also deployed to kiev to implement reforms. as the united states and international partners continue to confront russia's illegal actions in ukraine, we stand ready to employ the arsenal as the situation escalates. if russia chooses to continue its illegal and destabilizing actions in ukraine, we can impose substantial costs on an already weak russian economy. i'll be happy to answer your questions. >> thank you. >> thank you very much, chairman menendez and senator corker and members of the committee for the opportunity to speak to you today on the crisis in ukraine.

thank you also for your individual engagement on the crisis and committee's work in support of administration's efforts and ukrainian people. their continued aggressive actions are not just a threat to european security but challenge to international order. as demonstrated by the vice president's recent visit to kiev, they have made support for ukraine a top priority. as nuland just described, addressing the most pressing political issues relating to the situation in ukraine. meanwhile from a bilateral perspective, the departments of state and defense are working with ukraine to review, prioritize and response to its defense -- respond to its defense capabilities needs. our aim is to provide reassurance without taking actions that would escalate the crisis militarily. the first round of this process

was completed on march 29th with the delivery of 330,000 meals ready to eat to support ukrainian forces in the field. subsequently, the u.s. government approved delivery of uniforms and equipment to at the time ukrainian armed forces and border guard services. taken together this represents about $18 million of security assistance to ukraine. looking ahead, we will utilize all available tools to supply cost effective support to ukraine security institutions and working with the state department to identify additional resources for ukraine. we're mindful of the fact we can't fill out of the gaps and ukraine's request for material assistance are far reaching andout strich our ability to meet them. but we're also mindful of the fact that many of the members are trying to help us with those authorities and appropriations so we thank you again for that. in addition to material

assistance, the department is maintaining our senior level dialogue with ukrainian counterparts including multiple conversations between secretary hagel. we held bilateral defense in kiev and they'll reinforce with a senior level dialogue in ukraine next month. these represent the most recent developments in the programs with ukraine. many of our existing programs are intended to build capacity over the long term, particularly those that focus on education and training. we continue to realize the gains from investments that we have made over the last 20 years in the international military education and training program, one that this committee has a special responsibility for. as officers trained in u.s. military institutions have assumed positions of greater responsibility in ukraine's armed forces. we saw this manifested in the great professionalism and

restraint exercised by the ukrainian military during the demonstrations when the ukrainian military refutesed to use force against peaceful demonstrators and current and restraint in the face of overwhelming force in crimea. the united states has taken prompt and high profile steps to reassure nato allies in light of russia's inkurgs into ukraine, measures include bolstering the maritime presence. and 600 para troops arrived to begin exercises requested by those nations. these exercises are the first in the series of activity it's that take place in the next six months and beyond. and in addition to exercises already planned between april and june. we're also taking measures to support nonnato security partners to feel directly

threatened by russia's action. they support the unrecognized separatist regime and we recently held senior consultations and secretary nuland was there and approved $10 million in additional funding for moldova. we're also working to address georgia dsz n concerns given the ongoing occupation of georgian territory. since the start our nato allies acted with resolve. the netherlands and turkey offered air to hair refueling capabilities. and to ensure preparedness across the alliance, nato is updating and expanding its contingency planning. as we approach the nato summit in wales, we'll encourage all nato allies to increase support, including by bolstering their individual comments toal lied security to robust defense

investment. as a coordinated effort, they represent a clear eastward shift of forces significantly intended to counter russia's aggressive actions. we're also further isolating russia and imposing significant costs on russia for the actions. united states has led the international community in isolating it diplomatically as my colleague have laid out. at the department of defense we have halt the all military engagements with russia, including bilateral exercises and meetings and port visits and planning conferences. . although we maintain channels for dialogue that deescalate -- senior levels of dialogue. while we have worked hard over the last two decades to build the cooperative defense relationship with russia, its actions to undermine stability in europe mean we cannot proceed with business as usual.

chairman menendez, and members of the committee, russia's actions stand as an o front to the order that we have worked to build since the end of the cold war. the illegal ab annexation of crime ya and followed by blatant efforts signifies a para dime shift. to display the situation otherwise, it crisis is one of its choosing. these actions recommendation a wholesale rejection. i want to conclude by thanking the congress and committee again for the res lieutenant support so far. the outreach by the members here to the countries on the periphery of russia has provided reassurance in the time of great uncertainty and many of you traveled to these countries and we have taken note and appreciate that. as we move forward, it will be important to continue to show resolve and to speak with one

voice across our government. again, i appreciate we're doing so now. he look forward to your questions. >> thank you all very much. let me start with you secretary nuland, just to set the record -- i don't want long answers to the first set of questions. we have no doubt that russian agents are part of creating the unrest in eastern ukraine, is that fair to say? >> in this setting, senator, i can say that we have high confidence that russia is involved as i said. >> and we i think can take public notice that they are waging a propaganda war on the air wars in ukraine and beyond to paint a picture that the russians would like to paint as they paint in crimea? is that fair to say? >> absolutely. the russian effort to block air

waves of anything but their propaganda, particularly in eastern ukraine has been virtually complete as you know, one of the early targets of the pro russian thugs were some of these tv towers in eastern ukraine so that they koo take pro-ukrainian programming off the air. the government reclaimed two of the towers but it's a real problem. >> there are public reports about forces which are special forces of russia, among elements of some of these rebel -- i'll call them rebels for lack of a better name -- i won't even ask you to comment and acknowledge the public sources that have said that. and from everything we can tell snts it fair to say russia continues to try to generate economic coercion on ukraine? >> yes, there have been efforts

to close off access to russian market, et cetera. that actual aspect of russia's efforts have been less successful because they are equally dependent on the ukrainian market. >> but is there potential risk on energy sources been one of their threats? my point is this, there are a series of things the russians have done and are doing to destabilize eastern ukraine. in many respects there are many who suggest he doesn't -- putin doesn't have to send his 40,000 troops across the border because he's achieving what he wants. by vir few of the undermining elements of eastern ukraine. and if that is the case, that all of these different elements are taking place, the question in my mind, that's a troubling scenario and the question in my mind is what ultimately triggers the sanctions that have been

announced as a possibility but have not been pursued? does the administration look at the sanctions as something that is an effort to be preventative? or does it look at it as a element of consequence and punishment for doing something that's wrong? >> well, chairman, the president as you know has talked about cost for russian behavior. but obviously the sanctions he is escalatory ladder, as was made clear, we've done a number of rounds of sanctions getting closer to those who protect putin and protect his money and fund those aspects -- >> i get what has been done and applauded it. and said i think the administration is on the right path. my concern is the following. if we don't use this calibration

on sanctions in a way to prevent further inkurgs into the ukraine, we'll find ourselves using those sanctions an an aftermath as we did in crimea. in my mind, that's the -- that is a fact i don't want to envision. as i look at these elections that you so aptly said are critical to laying a foundation for u yan's future. i see the russians doing everything they can to disrupt those elections. it seems to me there needs to be a sequence for that up front so that disruption doesn't continue to take place. >> chairman, as you recall when the president was in europe in march, we were -- a month ago, we were talking as you said about sectoral sanctions kicking in and talked to the europeans about this in the context of russian forces coming over the border. we analyze the situation the same way you do, that russia has demonstrated through its actions since then it can zee stabilize

eastern ukraine without having to pour forces in. that's why you saw the president and chancellor merkel talk about sectoral sanctions in the context of destabilizing elections because the elections are the ukrainian's people's choice. and it is how people east of ukraine actually express their will in through the political process rather than having these little green men dictate -- >> what do we estimate is the ability of ukrainians to proceed with that election on the 25th? >> we can talk about this at some length. we had an internal review of what the osce is now saying of the they are giving the government of ukraine very high marks for election preparations across the country. and even is giving some of the hotter donetsk, relatively high marks for getting ready to receive ballots and protecting

the sites. there are sob obvious parts of donetsk and some parts of liuhanskey you would have to make alternative arrangements. they are prepared to consider alternative sites for places like -- >> at this point do we believe that the elections can take place on the 25th? >> if the elections were held today, yes. in the vast majority of ukraine, partly the news reporting disputes the fact that the vast majority of ukraine is stable and looking forward to elections. 3/4 of the people in the east say they want to vote. >> secretary glasier, the invasion of crimea treasuries suspended with the russian government over an intergovernmental agreement to

several reports in russian and u.s. press questioning whether russian banks will be able to comply before it takes effect on july 1st and raising the possibility that failure to do so would have a devastating impact on russia's financial sector, worse than the impact of any u.s. or eu sanctions to date. several members of congress, including on this committee,cau restart negotiations with russia as long as its forces are threatening the ukraine. what is the status of this issue with russia? >> thank you, senator menendez. there are individual russian banks that are able to bring themselves into compliance with requirements, and that is a good thing in that it allows the united states to get information on taxpayers. that said, the united states at this point, the treasury department at this point, has no intention of restarting negotiations with russia with

respect to the reciprocity that russia would get if they were able to enter into an agreement with us. >> beyond those banks that may be able to put themselves in compliance, has treasury analyzed how it would impact russian financial institutions without an iga in place or if the government does not change domestic laws to allow russian banks to register with treasury? >> well, if russian banks do not register with treasury because they're prohibited from registering with treasury because they decide not to register with treasury, then they would be subject to the same penalties that any other bank would. >> and those are pretty pervasive, are they not? >> they are strong penalties, certainly. >> so you, meaning the treasury department, is not pursuing at this point any further negotiations with the russian government? >> correct. >> you are not pursuing negotiations. >> correct, we are not. >> okay. lastly, there was a very

extensive article in "bloomberg" about how russia moves billions offshore in a handful of tax havens may be critical to the question of our sanctions ability. are you familiar with that issue? >> i'm familiar -- i'm generally familiar with the article. >> uh-huh. and are we looking at the potential of engaging in those tax havens to have a consequential effect as it relates to the sanctions we've already levied and those which we might levy? >> with respect to secrecy jurisdictions around the world whether they're small islands or otherwise, this has been an initiative of the u.s. treasury department for almost as long as i have been at the treasury department. for many, many years. through organizations like the financial action task force and

directly we make clear to jurisdictions that are secrecy havens for tax purposes, for money laundering purpose, for any other purpose, that they risk access to the u.s. and international financial system if they're not able to comply by the international community's rules and norms with respect to information exchange. so certainly if we were to have information that an offshore jurisdiction was harboring sanctions evasion, whether it related to russia or any other target, we would be quite concerned about that and we would pursue that quite vigorously. >> i'd like to follow up with the department on that, but because between these two items that i've spoken to you about, fatca as well as the offshore tax havens, it seems to me we would have a far more devastating effect than any potential sanctions impact we might pursue. senator corker. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i appreciate all of you for

coming up here, and, again, i have a lot of respect for the secretary. i will say after listening to the testimony, sometimes i think the only strategy the administration has is getting people who talk about ukraine to look in the mirror and make sure they practice sounding tough, but i really don't see any evidence of anything other than people trying to sound tough. just as you mentioned, the president and chancellor merkel the other day talking, that's the way you referenced it, talking about what we might do in ukraine if things further destabilize. i would just ask you, madam secretary, are you satisfied with the u.s. response at present in ukraine? you're a professional that we all respect. are you satisfied with the response that's taking place today? >> senator, i think, as we've

made clear, particularly on the cost side for russia's actions, we will be far stronger if we move particularly when we move sectorially if we do it together with europe. it is a matter of ongoing consultation between us and the europeans at every level. >> but are you satisfied -- >> to be ready for that. >> are you satisfied today with our response to the crisis in ukraine where we know that russia is fomenting problems inside. we know that. when you say high confidence, i want the audience to understand that means you know it. that's about as high as it gets from the standpoint of understanding what's happening inside, so we know that it's occurring. so are you satisfied with our response, where we just keep talking? we have an executive order for sectoral sanctions, none of which have been put in place.

again, i just want you to tell me, do you think we are doing what we should be doing right now in ukraine to deter russia from annexing other portions of eastern ukraine like they did in crimea? >> i don't think any of us should be satisfied with what we're seeing on the ground in ukraine. i think we have more work to do with our european partners to make the costs real for russia on the sectoral side if, in fact, we cannot have elections on may 25th, and that's what we're trying to do right now. >> i know today you said the elections could be held in reference to chairman menendez's question. if you look at the trajectory of the way things are going, you guys keep saying, mr. glaser says, you know, if they choose to destabilize ukraine. now, i think it's pretty self-evident that russia has chosen to destabilize ukraine, but he said if they do that, then we can do some other things, and you mentioned -- you

quoted what the president said the other day with chancellor merkel. if they continue disruptions and destabilization that impedes the elections on the trajectory we're on today, will we have an election process that's credible? maybe i ask it in a different way. when do you discern that they have crossed the line and are doing things that merit sectoral sanctions between now and may 25th? >> again, the president standing next to chancellor merkel, the two of them together, declared that if we cannot have these elections, there will certainly be sectoral sanctions if there's continued destabilization such that there's not elections and that's 19 days from now. the goal there was to set a deterrent. >> so what we're going to do is after the fact we're going to respond, just like has happened in syria.

we're beginning to realize that in syria we've got counterterrorism issues, and so because it's gotten so bad, it's now a threat to us. so what you're say something when it gets really, really bad and russia has done the things they wish to do to discredit the election, which by the way is the most important thing for them to do right now, is that correct? do you agree with that? that's the most important thing for them to do. we're watching them do it, and we're saying after they disrupt the election, then we're going to consider putting some sectoral sanctions in place, is that correct? >> senator, what we're doing this week including with teams in europe, and i was in europe last week working on this and will be back in europe on monday, is trying to develop this strong sectoral package on both sides of the atlantic so that the russians can see it, understand it, and understand its impact if they take further action to prevent these elections from happening. >> and i have watched our

country hide behind europe. the chairman and i had dinner the other night with chancellor merkel and had an opportunity to listen a little bit to what she was thinking. most of us have been to ukraine recently and have seen firsthand what's happening there on the ground. we're hiding behind europe. i mean, i think everybody on the ground is appreciative of the things that we've done, but they know that russia is far more interested in them failing than we are in them succeeding. they know that. they're watching. they're hearing people talk tough and do nothing. there's a few banks we could hit, and i think you will have some witnesses who will come after you who will identify those. i think you have identified those. we don't have to hit entire sectors. there are second-party sanctions, so they don't really implicate europe. typically the united states has led on these issues, and europe

does about 75% of what we do in most cases. i mean, that's the way things typically have worked. i don't understand. i just -- i truly don't get it. we have 40,000 troops intimidating people on the inside. we've got black ops, little green men doing the things they're doing on the inside. we know it. we know their goal is to disrupt the election and discredit it so there's a massive setback to this young government. you know that. we know it. we're watching them. everybody is watching them. today the german foreign minister said, don't go to ukraine. it's becoming a war zone. other foreign ministers are doing the same thing. so we're watching this happen. we do these things last week that caused the stock market to go up 3.63% up after we announce them. i don't understand. i really don't. i just don't understand the thinking of waiting until the damage is done and russia has

won to put in place things that matter. i don't get that, and i really would like for you to explain to me why you think that is a good way for us to be going. >> again, ranking member corker, i think we are working currently on a lot of the things that you are interested in seeing. i think you know that we've already hit -- was it four or five banks in our previous rounds of sanctions, but as i said, it will be much stronger in the next round if we can coordinate with europe. that's what we're working on right now. >> mr. glaser, how are the separatists being financed right now? >> i think that would be a question for the intelligence community, mr. senator. >> are you kidding me? are you kidding me? that's the answer you're going to give me. this hearing with your responsibility knowing all of those things. that's an answer for somebody

else. don't you have a classified clearance? isn't this what you do? tell me how the separatists are being financed right now. >> mr. senator, i know that we could have a further conversation in a closed hearing. >> 41 days ago that's what ann patterson told us on syria. will you tell us that this afternoon at 5:00? >> i don't actually have too much information -- >> well, could he accompany you to the meeting today at 5:00 and you share with us -- >> if i'd like to invite him, we'll see if he's available. >> i'm going to be at the meeting this afternoon. mr. senator, though, i do think this is a question that the intelligence community will be able to answer. >> well, do you know the answer to the question? do you know the answer to the question? >> mr. senator -- >> if you don't, then we have problems in treasury since that's your focus. >> mr. senator, i don't think

the issue is how the separatists are being funded right now. it's clear that the separatists are being supported by russia in every way, shape, and form, but -- >> so is russia financing the separatists? >> i think it certainly stands to reason that russia is funding the separatists. i don't think the question though is whether russia is funding the separatists. the separatists are controlling territory right now. i think what our focus has been, mr. senator, is imposing costs on russia, not on breaking financial links between russia and the separatists which i think we have far less ability to do. mr. senator -- >> if i could, aren't those the people that are destabilizing the country? >> are the separatists destabilizing the country? >> yeah. >> absolutely. >> i guess i'm missing something, but let me move on. i know my time is up. you said within all the authorities you had, i think there are plenty of us that would love to give you authorities if you need

authorities to help ukraine defend itself. would you please outline the kind of authorities that you would like? by the way, there's not a person on this committee that's ever talked about boots on the ground or sending in military. nobody has ever said that. i will say that yacht sin yuck would like to have the ability to at least defend themselves. i think you saw the president the other day say they have lost control of the country. so i'd love for you to share with me what authorities the pentagon is seeking to help ukraine harden itself. >> thank you, senator. thank you for the question. i would like to say in answer to a comment that one of you made about the european -- about the u.s. taking the lead and working with the europeans, i think one of the things that we are actually very proud of, the united states is as a government, is that we have moved out very strongly bilaterally on the military front to do certain things to reassure our nato allies and our

european colleagues have followed and they are joining us in those efforts. >> so i rest my case -- >> i just -- >> i rest my case back to the sanctions, but answer the question. >> i couldn't resist. with regard to your particular question, it's more in the area of appropriations and the amount of funding that we have because we're looking at existing accounts in order to find -- >> what would you like to do? >> well, we would like to ideally -- one thing we're trying to do right now is we're trying to get the global security contingency fund, get a proposal together, and we have a draft one we're working on right now, get it up to the hill, and get some funding for ukraine and also for moldova. >> i hope at some point, i have to give it to other people here, but you never answered my question. you never told me what you'd like to do. what would you like to do in layman's language? >> what we would like to do is use those authorities with the right amount of appropriations to support ukraine and, as i

mentioned, and another neighboring country. the problem is we have to work within the existing funding streams we have, so we are working to find the necessary funding and we always welcome additional help with that. >> that was a nonanswer, but thank you. >> as i turn to senator corker, maybe before it's over here, i think what senator corker is looking for is not only do you need authorities and funding but what would you do with that funding? what would you do that we are not doing today? don't answer it right now because in fairness to other members i need to manufacture on but we may want to get you to that at some point in the hearing. senator cardin. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and i first want to thank you for mentioning the kidnapping in nigeria which shocks all of us. my work on the helsinki commission is focused on human rights globally, and what happened there with the

kidnapping of girls just going to school should be shocking to the entire world and i just want to note the senate this afternoon did pass the resolution, and this will be a matter that we will certainly continue to follow, and our strategy needs to be to get these girls released. human trafficking is one of the worst crimes in modern times, modern slavery, and we will certainly be focused on that. in regards to ukraine, i first want to talk about the osc mission, whether we believe that they're now getting access and whether they're safe. also want to talk a little bit about what you anticipate happening in the next 19 days. what are the risk factors. how can we mitigate those risk factors. you are correct that there will be one of the largest monitoring international groups ever to monitor an election.

we expect that the helsinki commission will be participating in those monitors, including members of congress. so can you just bring us up to date as to osce's involvement in ukraine, their access, and what do we anticipate in the next 19 days and how can we mitigate the risk factors for an open, free, and fair election? >> thanks, senator cardin, and thanks for what you have done throughout the euro atlantic space to support osce. osce is busier than it's ever been as a result of the ukraine crisis. as you know, they are deployed in a number of ways. we have the special monitoring mission which has been deployed all over ukraine but primarily in the cities of the east to, first and foremost, bear witness to what is happening with the separatists, but as you know, the idea had been to have them implement the april 17th geneva

agreement and try to support the ukrainians in negotiating amnesty on the one hand for building releases. that has not been successful, as you know, and as i said in my testimony in part we believe because russia has not sufficiently supported the osce mission, including by rejecting the request of the chairman of that mission to send a senior level russian diplomat to tell the separatists that russia supported geneva and wants them out of these buildings. nonetheless, having the osce bear witness to what is happening has made a manifest difference in our ability to assess who is at fault and to make many of these assertions we've made about russian involvement. they also played a crucial role in odessa in bearing witness to what happened on friday. in addition to that, we have, as i said, one of the most massive election preparation and monitoring missions the

transflantic community has ever mounted in the last 25 years being planned by the osce, and thanks to all of you through the helsinki commission as well. they are doing everything from supporting the development of the list, the development of the ballots, getting things out to the regions, ensuring that there are election commissions in all of these towns that are constituted properly, they are working with the ukrainians on this question of whether there will be an additional question on the ballot now regarding unity but decentralization -- >> it sounds like the ukrainians are preparing for the election, and they will succeed in having a free election unless there's outside influence that disrupts that process. what can we do to mitigate that risk factor? >> i think the biggest concern they have, that the ukrainians have, that osce has flagged, obviously is the issue of security. i don't know if you were in the room when i said, they do assess if the election were held today, it can be held in the vast

majority of ukraine absent crimea where special arrangements have been made and, in fact, in most of luhansk and at least a third of gdansk there may have to be special arrangements made for some of these areas in gdansk, and they are working, as are we with the ukrainians -- >> can the international community help in providing this guidance on security and alternatives in those areas where it's not secure? >> that is one of the things we're working on. in fact, the prime minister asked the ambassador yesterday for some advisers to come who have had experience doing elections in difficult security environments in the past. for example, in iraq and afghanistan, and we will be supporting that in the coming days. >> thank you. secretary farkas, you mentioned what you would like to see done. it was interesting. we talk about helping countries in the region as far as perhaps additional u.s. support which may require appropriations.

you probably have the authority but you may need the appropriations, but we all have nato, and you have also mentioned nato. nay toesene toe's resources are available. what are we doing in regards to nato resources to make it clear to russia that we are prepared to defend our nato allies and are prepared to make sure that they understand that there is security issues that we cannot allow them to compromise. >> thank you very much for the question, senator. as you know, first of all, we, as i mentioned have done several things militarily to show our support to the eastern allies within nato. we've augmented our participation in the baltic air policing, many of the other nato countries, the noneastern nato countries have joined us in this effort. same goes for the aviation detachment training in poland as well as a number of other things

which i outlined a little bit in my earlier testimony. we also have at the moment ongoing an effort to essentially establish a continuous rotational presence through the end of the year and general breedlove is essentially working on this right now. the north atlantic council approved 16 reassurance measures, and those will be sourced by the relevant -- >> have you seen any russian response to what the reallocation of nato resources? >> yes, absolutely. they have taken some military measures to show that they have taken note of what we have done. so clearly colloquially i guess we're getting under their skin and they have made comments about our various rotations and our military deployments. i should also mention the maritime ones. we've also deployed at least two ships to the black sea, so we have a presence there as well. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator rubio. >> thank you. thank you all for being here

today. secretary nuland, here is what we see evidence of. first of all, we see an all-out effort -- i want to focus on this referendum which is a far as on the 11th. what we see is russian efforts to try to unite eastern ukraine and establish this unified political structure there that they can control. we see them working to bring all the institutions that would be responsible for carrying out those elections under pro-russian control. we see them working, by the way, to prevent any sort -- to protect their deniability by recruiting external groups to be a part of some of this, including by the way we have had in reports of mercenaries and even some argued crime figures to be part of the efforts that are going on in eastern ukraine. last but not least, we now see this term becoming increasingly used in russian political circles. the term is new russia which i think is a 19th century term for eastern ukraine. so this is in my mind, and i think senator corker was getting

there, actually got there in his comments, i don't think there's any doubt on the minds of anybody on this committee nor probably on this panel for that matter what's going to happen next there or at least what russia is going to attempt to do, and you actually speak about it in your statement, at least the written statement. you said just as we do not accept russia's declared need for the so-called peacekeepers in crimea, we will not accept any unilateral decision to deploy unsanctioned russian peacekeepers to eastern or southern ukraine. this, you say, in the aftermath of any sort of referendum on may 11th where as a result of everything i have just outlined we can surely expect, i do, that on may 11th, the pro-russian elements will win that referendum fraunlly but because they control all of this, they will declare the people of eastern ukraine or these two regions have asked for them to come in and then they come in with their peacekeepers. you say we will not accept that. we will not accept that or what? what will we do when that happens? and i guess my second question as part of the first question is why wouldn't we just do it now if we know that's where it's

headed? >> thank you, senator. as i said in my statement, this is something we are watching intensely. secretary kerry spoke to this today in his press conference with high representative ashton that this is the crimea playbook all over again, that if there is a referendum, and it's not clear that it will actually be held, but they're broadly mooting it on sunday, then the scenario would mirror crimea where you could conceivably see russia then recognize that and then come in with peacekeepers to defend it. obviously that would trigger sectoral sanctions. >> and has that -- so that would trigger the -- so the reason why we're holding back on those sanctions is to hopefully serve as a deterrent to keep them from doing that? >> senator, as i said, i don't know if you were in the room, we are working very intensively now with our european partners to develop that package of

sanctions as we judge that it will be a stronger package if we can do it together with europe. i was in europe last week working on it. we have a senior treasury and state team in europe today. as i said, secretary kerry has been burning up the phone lines and we have a european foreign affairs council on monday. >> when we talk about europe, the three most influential governments in terms of moving the community in that direction is the uk, france, and germany, is that right? would we expect if those three move in one direction, that's the way the community would go by and large? >> except, senator, yes, absolutely, and certainly germany has been the center lodestar of this, but i will say there are very diverse opinions and very diverse vulnerabilities across europe so keeping the cats herded is a challenge for europeans, and they are having intense conversations among themselves, including if we move to sectoral, the need to share the pain across europe because

some are more vulnerable on the energy side, some on the banking side, et cetera. >> but the actions we're contemplating -- we were prepared to move unilaterally on those, is that right? >> again, each -- the eu would move as a blaoc, we would move nationally, but they will be stronger if we do it in coordination with each other. >> and then secretary glaser, i wanted to ask you about the currency situation within ukraine. i know that's having a major impact on their banking sector's ability to provide loans to get them out of this recession. today i wrote a piece in "the wall street journal" calling for us to encourage them to set up a currency board to help them supervise the value of their currency and perhaps re-establish some confidence. do you have any openness to that? have you opined on it? has the administration or the state department, treasury, i apologize, opined on it? do you see value in that and is that something we should explore? >> thank you, senator rubio. i did read your editorial in

"the wall street journal," and i know you also have a letter in to secretary lew on this precise question you sent in a few weeks ago. it's an issue that we're examining very carefully, and i suppose the question becomes whether that's the path to it or whether to have a more free floating currency is the path to it. but the actions that we're doing that i articulated in my written statement with respect to the imf program on ukraine is going to the same direction that i think we're all pulling for, which is to have a strong and vibrant ukrainian economy as possible. with respect to currency boards, it is an idea we're examining. it's an idea we know we owe you an answer to and we're going to get you an answer to as soon as we can. >> finally, dr. farkas, i want to get back to the question senator corker had asked and senator menendez had asked you to address and that is if you had the funds available, what precisely would we do? what's the best use for those

funds? >> thank you, senator. thank you for your question and, again, thank you for your personal engagement on the issue of supporting ukraine. what we would do is essentially what we've been doing in the building, which is evaluating you a the ukrainian requests coming from the ministry of defense. we have quite a lot of requests. we can't take care of all of them but we work to prioritize them in conjunction with the ministry of defense and the embassy team in kiev. we would essentially address those priorities and we have been working through them gradually, as you know. there's already $18 million of assistance approximately that we have approved and is on its way to ukraine. so we would continue with that effort. the other part of it, which is a bigger component, it would require more money, we are working also on providing more medium and long-term assistance to ukraine. as you know, for 20 years we have been working very closely with the ukrainian ministry of defense. again, as i mentioned in my earlier testimony, it's one of

our successes at least to the extent that we've worked with them on professional military education. where we haven't been able to make as much progress is on defense institution building, and, frankly, on converting the ukrainian military from a post-soviet model to a more modern one. there are elements of the ukrainian military that can deploy and are deployed. they should be proud, they are in kosovo right now, they are in afghanistan, they have deployed as part of eu anti-piracy missions, and they're very active also in u.n. missions. so we would aim to increase the number of ukrainian forces that can do that, that can be interoperable and obviously also help them with their internal problems. it would be a package that would address not just the crisis but also move into a more long-term, sustainable path for ukraine. >> thank you. senator boxer. >> thank you, mr. chairman. before i ask my question, i'm going to kind of follow up on what senator rubio discussed with you, miss farkas, dr.

farkas i should say. i wanted to thank the chairman and the ranking member from the bottom of my heart because they worked together and they got this resolution out of this committee where we're calling for more assistance to help free those 270-plus nigerian girls who were kidnapped by terrorists, and we just had a prayer vigil on the steps but that bore fruit because the senate passed the resolution unanimously. that's rare, and we're thrilled, and on behalf of mary landrieu and a bipartisan team on that, thanks to both of you, particularly senator corker who i know really helped. so thanks. i'm going to kind of press on your answer that you gave to senator rubio. so we know the russian military holds a significant advantage in both size and strength compared to ukraine. that's obvious. and since march russia has

amassed at least 40,000 combat troops and heavy equipment on the eastern border with ukraine, and today the russian defense minister stated russia will take steps to increase its presence in the black sea with additional warships and submarines. now, in response to requests by the ukrainian government, last month the administration announced $8 million in nonlethal military assistance. we know that this aid package was very welcome there and included bomb disposal equipment, hand held radios, engineering equipment, communications equipment, vehicles, and nonlethal tactical gear for the ukraine border guard. now, deputy assistant secretary farkas, in your testimony you state that the defense department is working to identify additional assistance resources for ukraine but that quote, ukraine's request for material assistance are far reaching and vastly outstrip our ability to meet them under current authorities and appropriations. so i need to press you.

what is it that they're asking for and what is it that we're not giving them? >> thank you very much, senator, for your question and for your interest. the ukrainian government has given us pages of letters and requests for specific things ranging from personnel, gear for personnel, helmets and things of that nature, all the way through the gamut. we have gone through the lists and prioritized with them. i'm sure you're well aware of that. >> no, i'm not. i'm not aware of that. >> okay. we have gone through those lists and prioritized them. again, our embassy in kiev has worked closely with the ministry of defense so that we know we are addressing their priorities -- >> well, how much do you think we should be giving them? given what i just said about what russia is doing today even increasing their military presence, forget the money for a minute because that's our problem, okay? so tell us what you think we need right now, right now.

supposing there were the votes to do an emergency package, i don't know that there are. i certainly would vote for it i think if it was smart. what are we talking about moneywise? >> there are a couple points, senator. one is, of course, we will never be able to in a short period of time build up the ukrainian military to be a modern agile, ready military in the near term and obviously russia's posturing on the border is one that we hope to de-escalate through our diplomatic and economic measures. >> well, can i suggest it might de-escalate more if they knew they would be paying a price because people need to defend themselves. if they're paying a price it might de-escalate it. can you not give me an answer? i don't have a lot of time left. >> yes, senator. >> what do you think you should be asking us for that you are not -- cannot give right now? >> i think part of the issue has to do with the actual dollar amounts. we're looking for more money within our couch cushions

because we are restrained by the existing budget and where the dollars -- >> i didn't you about your couch cushion. i'm saying suppose suddenly the couch cushion was filled. i'm not saying it would be but i'm just saying, it might be. what would it be? give me a number, please, or a range or would you rather answer in writing? >> i can certainly answer in writing. i can tell you that to give you a number would be irresponsible because it has to do with ukraine's requirements. it also has to do with their ability to absorb assistance. i could pull a really big number out but they couldn't -- >> let me just conclude. i please ask you to respond to this and i will put it in writing, i'm not asking you to be responsible. i'm asking you to act responsibly in this situation where we all know the constraints. we're not sending troops in there. we've told them they have to defend themselves. i am asking you what would it

take in the short run to be credible, so i'm going to ask you to write me as soon as you can on that. now, i'm deeply concerned also about the situation of the natural gas. you cra ukraine wants to begin reverse flow to europe and last week ukrainian and slovak pipeline operators signed an agreement that would allow for some reverse flow delivers of natural gas from europe to ukraine. according to "the new york times," pipelines in slovak ka could move up to 30 million cubic meters of gas from europe to ukraine. more than all the gas ukraine is expected to import from russia. so while i have colleagues here who want to take our natural gas away from us where we have a little dispute about that because i think we need it here for our manufacturing and so on, here you have a situation in a neighboring country and yet they're only giving them a very small percentage.

i think it's just 10% of what -- 1/10 of what they've asked for. i would ask you if you could please help us here. the slovak company that controls natural gas flows has only offered to do 1/10 of the gas ukraine has requested from europe. the reverse flows can't begin until engineer work is gl completed. how important is this and why are we meeting this resistance. this should be europe's problem. it shouldn't be at our doorstep. we have to deal with it because of humanitarian and moral reasons and everything else, but why isn't europe doing more to help on the natural gas front? >> senator, thanks. reverse gas to ukraine is absolutely an essential piece of the strategic protection of ukraine in the short run and over the longer term until they can get to the point where they can get the gas out of the ground. as you know, we have fracking

operations there as well. so we have born down very intensely with, as you said, slovakia, poland, hungary. we now have i think it's -- i'm going it get the numbers wrong, but about 3 billion cubic meters coming in from slovak why through the pipe that's now been reverse flowed. we have ten coming from a combination of poland and hungary. that will start to fill the tanks over the summer in ukraine. there are other things that can be done, including potentially more from slovakia. the problem there has to do with slovakia's contractual obligations to gas prom because gas prom owns the codes that would open the spigots. we're also working europe in its larger conversation about what might be done. it works against gas prom's market interests because they want to keep the price high. more broadly it is a strategic priority of the president to

accelerate our support for a more dynamic energy market within europe which will reduce the price and make more reverse flow available. >> my time is up. so if you were to sum it up in two seconds -- >> we've started, we have more to do. >> but why is slovakia not doing more? >> slovakia has -- is doing what it can -- >> very little. >> legally under its contractual obligations. we can put more pressure on gas prom but also on others to help accelerate reverse flow into ukraine. >> thank you. >> before i turn to senator johnson, dr. farkas, i think there's a degree of frustration here. let me try to get to the heart of what many of us are looking for, which is we'd like to hear from the department based upon your comment about authorities

and resources what it is that you would want, meaning the department, and for what purposes they would go to. we're not talking about the long-term modern ukrainian army. that's another longer term purpose. we'll have budgetary times for that. talking in this window, what can be done now to assist the ukrainian security so that it can provide internal security and at the same time send a message that there is a consequence to the russians because crimea was bloodless and, therefore, back at home, yes, rah, rah, it was great but when russian soldiers potentially are at risk it changes the dynamics back at home. so what we'd like for you to give the committee is what are the amounts of money and what would they buy because if what we're talking about are mres, well, that's great. the reality is though there will be members of this committee who will want to see far more than that. if we're talking about certain

type of weaponry, then there will be a greater support. so for us to be able to calibrate in the context of assisting the ukraine in a foreign policy context understand this one dimension on the security side, we need to get a better sense of it means "x" dollars and it means this is what we will do with it. if we do that, then i think members can make a judgment. provide that through the chair to the committee. >> i can provide that to the committee for the record. >> senator johnson. >> i'd like to thank the witnesses. i want to concentrate on just acknowledging the reality of the situation here. i made little notes here. one of the little scribblings i put was too little, too late. we threatened serious consequences with crimea. they've done it. we instituted sanctions. senator corker basically talked about the currency strengthened, the stock market rose slightly. i've heard the president repeat words that i know a lot of us

have also repeated as well. we need to change putin's calculus. i'm not hearing anything discussed here today that will change putin's calculus. when we were in ukraine i was asking the prime minister what can we do to do that, and he was very clear in saying vladimir putin will not respond to words. he will only respond to action. so secretary nuland, let me ask you first and foremost, why do we continue to only talk about providing nonlethal military support? >> well, i think, first, it's a question better directed to dr. farkas -- >> no, this is actually diplomatic. because early on before crimea was annexed, we were told that we better not supply small arms and ammunition because that could provoke vladimir putin into taking over crimea.

has the administration changed its calculus in terms of the fact that vladimir putin doesn't need provocation. we will create his own provocation. are we recognizing that raeleal as we're seeing this thing, i don't know, spin out of control? have you changed your calculus in terms of what you think may or may not change vladimir putin's calculus? >> senator, i though you know from our private conversations, i'm not persuaded personally he can be deterred the ambition he does but what we can do is make it cost for russia for these actions he's already taken. as i said in my testimony, i think whether he realizes it or not, there have already been significant cost to the russian economy. $51 billion in capital outflow in the first quarter alone. a credit rating just above junk. as i said, i was in europe last week and had a chance to talk to a number of european business folk who say that nobody in europe is investing in russia

anymore, that their products are being -- are too expensive for russians to buy. >> let me just point out, secretary glaser, when did the capital outflows start flowing? when did that capital start fleeing russia? >> the number that victoria gave and i think the number is actually closer to $63 billion are year-to-date numbers. >> so this is first quarter of 2014 alone. >> my point being is the stock market, they had their black monday on march 3rd, two weeks before we instituted sanctions. the currency already devalued before we ever instituted sanctions. my guess is the capital took flight out of russia certainly before we ever instituted sanctions. i'm not sure sanctions had any affect whatsoever other than the russians have mocked them. so we're threatening greater sanctions, but secretary nuland, you said there are diverse opinion, it's herding cats.

i'm not in any way, shape, or form convinced that the europeans will ever agree to any sanctions that would have any possibility of changing vladimir putin's calculus. i'm asking what else could we do that actually would change his calculus? because sanctions won't do it because we'll never institute the types of sanctions that might. >> senator, as i said, we are hopeful that working with europe we will have a strong passage, but obviously if that work is not successful, we'll have to move forward -- >> and it will be too little too late because this has spun out of control and vladimir putin will have accomplished what he wanted to in eastern ukraine and then what? >> senator, i think we're in this with this russian leadership for the medium term and we need to buckle our seat belts for that, and this economic approach is going to take some time. >> the economic approach is going to fail. so that's what i'm saying. when the economic approach fails, then what do we do?

are we ever going to consider providing even small arms to the brave and courageous people of ukraine who i know you share that opinion. you've been over there. you see the desperation in their voice. are we ever going to consider doing more than just threats, talking tough? >> i think there is a question whether in the short run what we're talking about, the 19 days between now and the election, even with all the will in the world one could pour enough in there to tip the balance vis-a-vis the mighty russian military if he chooses to use it. so, again, we need to make it clear what the costs are going to be and continue to escalate them going forward. >> we're not making it clear though. we're not making it clear at all. we're threatening sectoral sanctions, whatever that means, with a bunch of allies that have diverse opinions and are a bunch of cats. >> senator -- >> what is clear about that at all? why would that change putin's

calculus? >> with respect, whether he has registered this yet or not, the ruble is down 20% against the dollar since the new year. they are in recession now. >> exactly. what does that tell you? he seems to be impervious to the economic harm. he's not going to respond to that. what might you do that he might respond to? >> again, we are on an escalatory ladder and we need to continue to raise the pressure if he continues to pursue an aggressive path vis-a-vis ukraine. >> if i could just add one thing, senator, it's not as if the ukrainian military doesn't have small arms and ammunition or that they don't have their own lethal equipment, and when they came to us with their list of desired equipment and other support, they prioritized it for us, and, frankly, they did prioritize nonlethal, a lot of nonlethal assistance. >> that's because when we were there the prime minister specifically said he's not going to ask for something he knows

will be refused. so if he knows it's going to be refused, he's not going to ask for it. if you were in that position, what type of lethal weaponry do you think ukraine needs to change putin's calculus? anti-tank weapons? what might actually work? >> i think i'm not going to disagree with my colleague. frankly, it's not the military balance that's going to change the calculus for president putin. he will know that it will be bloody if he chooses to intervene militarily in ukraine, make no mistake. it will be bloody, and it will be a disaster tactically and certainly strategically. so i think that adding more military -- lethal military equipment into the balance isn't going to change things. >> okay. thank you. thanks, mr. chairman. >> senator murphy. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. madam secretary, as you know, i along with a few others on this panel were amongst the earliest to advocate for sanctions

against the yanukovych regime. we have argued for a robust american response to this crisis. but i think it's important for us to recognize a simple fact and that's this. that the future of ukraine matters more to russia than it matters to the united states. it is a neighbor of russia. it is on the other side of the world from us. and i sometimes worry that the hand wringing that happens over those who want a much more robust response risks viewing the world through an extinct prism in which russia is our chiefñi adversary and whereby o actions have to be equal, maybe not in exactitude of tactics but in proportion to the tactic that is russia uses. that's not the world we live in any longer. we should respond, we should be robust in that response, but we shouldn't be expected to care about this as much as the russians do.

and so let me posit a slightly complicated hypothetical for you here. let's say that we in the international community are not successful in changing putin's mind in the medium term and crimea stays effectively within russia control, that like he's done in other areas, he's able to cloud the title to eastern ukraine compromising the sort of future of their direction towards europe, but his economy continues to hemorrhage because we ratchet up sanctions, the rest of the world to the extent they are dictated by rational actions receives a message that if you try to change your boundaries, there is an economic price to be paid, and europe decides to move even faster towards energy independence because they have received this monumental wake-up call that they are not dealing with a rational actor themselves on the

other side of the european union. if that's the hypothetical six months from now, is russia in a better position than they were six months ago? are u.s. security interests in a better position than they were six months ago? >>. >> senator murphy, thank you for that and for your commitment throughout these many months on ukraine. i think you've just made the point that putin has done more in the last six months to galvanize and unify the transatlantic community than we've seen in years and years in terms of the commitment to nato and nato reassurance, in terms of the renewed energy that's going into energy security both within europe and across the atlantic, in terms of the energy that's going into the transatlantic trade and investment partnership because people understand that that offers real opportunities to shore up the economic underpinnings of our model, and

in terms of the unity that we've had so far in the first rounds of sanctions. so i'm not sure what president putin intended, but he is now reaping a lot of what he has claimed to be concerned about over all of these years, and as i said in testimony, you know, there's going to come a time after this nationalist fever in russia breaks where the russian people are going to turn around and say, what is all of this adventurism abroad brought to us? where are our schools? where are our roads? where is our investment as we're building expensive bridges between crimea and mother russia? so i do think over the medium term this will turn out to have been a grave mistake and, unfortunately, the russian people are going to pay as well. >> i don't claim to be a historian of the cold war, but i know we played the long game, and for the ukrainians, they

don't have that luxury, and that's why we need to be certain about the level of military support and economic support and diplomatic support that we're going to lend them today. this is not an argument to abandon them in their time of need, but we emerged from the cold war, quote, unquote, victorious because we did play that long game, and i think that those dynamics still play to our benefit here. i ask this question to both you, secretary nuland, and secretary farkas, you probably both have thoughts on this. some of us did get the chance to sit with chancellor merkel and one of the queries we had for her was the direction of nato. you can send messages in a crisis to your enemies and you can also send messages to your friends. it seems there's a tremendous opportunity with an application for instance for membership action plan from georgia that we can send a clear message to our friends that we're not going to

allow this tactic, which is where russia tries to invade half a country with provocations so as to make it less attractive towards membership in eu or nato. is there a way to get a membership action plan to georgia given the fact that that application will be compromised by the continued strange state of two territories there? it would be a really important -- you'd want to talk about messages, you want to talk about clear signals. that would be a very clear signal that if you think that by muddying up the waters in a section of a former republic you are going to forever take away their ability to join nato, if we were able to find a pathway to bring georgia into nato, give them a membership action plan, that is a very strong signal as to what russia may have in store for the future of a country like

moldova, et cetera. >> well, senator, thank you for raising that with chancellor merkel. i'd be interested in her response. as you know, it does take 28 affirmative votes in the alliance to grant m.a.p. status. certainly georgia has done an enormous amount for the alliance and has made enormous strides. they are working hard to build that consensus but they're not there yet. >> we are incredibly impressed with georgia's progress on the defense reform front. secretary hagel is actually meeting tomorrow with his counterpart. they'll go over and review everything that georgia has done. it's not just defense institution building, which is really the building blocks of a realmodern, professional military, but it's their interoperaability and their steady willingness to deploy with us to afghanistan and they've actually held their hand up for a number of other missions, u.n., eu, nato response force.

so we absolutely commend all of georgia's efforts. thank you. >> i wouldn't categorize her response as hyperencouraging, but clearly this is important to the europeans as well. >> having been at the dinner with senator murphy, i think he's optimistic. senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary farkas, a recent "wall street journal" editorial entitled "ukraine needs u.s. military aid." mr. obama it says is so worried about upset building putin that he refused to send even night-vision goggles offering 300,000 meals ready to eat. the ukrainians are battling to free themselves of russian domination and build a european democracy, they deserve more than spam in a can from america. the united states currently provides night-vision goggles to the afghan army. what military assistance has been provided to the ukraine

from the united states? >> thank you, senator. as i outlined in my testimony, i think maybe you weren't here yet, but we have provided them -- we are in the process of providing them with $18 million worth of assistance. some of that is going to their border guard. it's everything from engineering equipment to binoculars to personnel -- gear for personnel. we've also provided them with some equipment also for their armed forces and we have not said no to anything. we're essentially reviewing on an ongoing basis all of the ukrainian requests. so it's an ongoing process, and as we identify opportunities, we are moving forward with those packages. >> because we've seen over the weekend the situation in ukraine continues to spiral out of control, pro-russian forces take over local government facilities in eastern ukraine. last week i joined senator corker and a couple dozen other senators in introducing the russian aggression prevention act. it's authorizing up to $100

million for direct military assistance to ukraine, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft weapons, small arms. and i made two visits to the region. during a recent visit along with senator mccain and other members of the committee heard directly from government officials requesting this assistance. we have had a group that came forward with that russian prevention act. why has the administration decided not to provide this additional military assistance? >> i think the administration is going to provide additional assistance. we are reviewing the ukrainian requests. with regard to lethal assistance, that's an area where we are more careful again because we don't want to escalate the situation militarily and we don't believe it will change the balance of military force. >> secretary nuland, friday russian energy minister annou e announced energy said gas prom will deliver up front payment for gas deliveries in june.

in april russia also doubled the cost of natural gas in ukraine for ukraine. so with gas prom's history of cutting off gas supplies, they did it in 2006, 2009, how likely do you think russia will cut off the ukraine for nonpayment of debts or refusal to pay the outrageous price increases that they're demanding? >> thanks, senator. well, as you know, if they do a complete cutoff, it hurts russia far more over the medium term than it hurts ukraine, which is why the second time they did it it didn't last very long. that said, there are many other levers -- economic levers at their disposal. this has -- this is why the whole question of appropriate ukrainian gas debt to russia has been part of the imf discussion with the ukrainians. i think they've worked through with the ukrainians what is legitimate and what's not legit

made. with regard to advanced payment, this is a question that has to do with the complicated gas history back and forth. we are gratified that we have a ukrainian russian manifest with them. that conversation has begun and there's considerable leverage for a fair and equitable resolution with a willing russia. >> i think you saw yesterday's "new york times" front page above the fold, kiev struggles to break russia's grip on gas supply r supply. wanted to advice itd on that. it highlights the problems and it's interesting the day senator mccain and i and some others on this panel were in the ukraine was a bipartisan group. it was a day before the election was held in crimea. it's when the helicopters landed

and took control of the gas facility just north of crimea. this is something that's been high on our minds. ukraine's been seeking help from countries in the u european union to secure gas supplies. poland and hungary started helping. the article from "the new york times" talks about the vulnerability of some countries to russia as well as the gas supply. senator boxer asked some questions. a lot of that seems to me to be there is the fear of dealing with putin and specifically russia. so how's the administration now helping ukraine break russia's grip on their energy supplies and history? >> senator, as you know, this is a very important priority for us, both in the short term and the medium term. in the short term secretary kerry had a meeting with representative ashton and the

e.u. commissioner ettinger and as a result of that they agreed to intensify support for ukraine in reverse flow. that resulted in new contracts for reverse flow from poland and from hungary and this initial reverse flow from slovakia that can be expanded although the big flow from slovakia, as you said, is dependent on the gas prom deal. more prodly, we need to intensify and accelerate intraeuropean work on the dynamism of their energy market. we're talking to them as a presidential priority about increased investment and interconnectors and lng terminals that would allow more gas from more locations, including the united states, to get in there to lower the price so that gas prom gas has to be more competitive, including reverse flow, but you know that the medium term game in ukraine

is its intense investment with u.s. companies in fracking, and if that goes well, ukraine could be energy independent in as little as eight years. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator cain. >> thank you, mr. chairman, the witnesses. we're not making your life easy. i mean, in terms of the -- any of our lives easy in terms of the options. no troops on the ground. we made that clear. that's a view that you and the president shared. congress has made that very clear. military, it costs money. i mean, i'm on the armed services committee. you ought to hear our armed services committee testimony about the effects of sequester on the military budget. i mean, we're cutting pay -- looking at benefits cuts that affect our active service members but, you know, we're going to talk theoretically about we're going to do all kinds of military aid to the ukraine. i know that that's what we want you to do, but we want you to do it for free because we're sure -- if we do not eliminate the sequester in fy '16 and out,

we clearly do not want you to do anything with respect to military aid to the ukraine or anyone else. we can talk about how we want to be tough but if we let the sequester continue, our actions are telling you we do not want you to do anything with respect to significant military aid to the ukraine or anything else. so that's why it's down to economic sanctions. so let's talk about economic sanctions for a minute. i want to get your opinions on some. here's something we could do economically that would really hurt russia. 90% of credit card transactions in russia are through two american companies, visa and master card. so we could do a sectional sanction that would say our american companies should stop doing credit card transactions. if you eliminate consumer credit in russia, that would blitz their economy, at least until they built their own indigenous consumer credit capacity, which

would probably take them about a year. it would be hugely expensive. they wouldn't build it near as well as their folks are getting served right now. it would accelerate capital outflow and hurt the economy in a very significant way. it would also hurt two american companies that are making hundreds of millions of dollars in profits, as they should, servicing these couples. th customers. they probably wouldn't get paid the money. that is an economic option at our disposal if we choose to do it. we could stop all of the american multi-national oil companies from doing joint ventures with russia over energy issues. that would have some significant affect on the russian economy, but it would also affect american companies. i wonder if we've got the stomach to do some of the economic sanctions that we could do that would affect the economy pretty significantly. this credit card thing would have an immediate and very

dramatic effect on their economy and they wouldn't be able to quickly recover and serve their con summe consumers are being served now. it would affect american companies. i tend to agree with senator brasso. there's some energy things that we can do over the medium and long term that would wean countries and others away from russian monopolies, especially helping europe develop their own energy assets or ukraine. if we get down to economic sanctions that we could do that would be tough, a lot of those sanctions, let's be honest, they hurt american companies, too. isn't that the case? >> thank you. thank you, senator, for the question. and let me begin by saying i know that there's been some skepticism expressed about the efforts and the sanctions that we've put in place to date, but as secretary nuland has articulated, i do think we are beginning to see very dramatic

impact on the russian economy. >> you're seeing an impact but it's not changing the tactical -- >> it may change next month, three months, it's not yet changing the tactics. >> i do think it's important -- i do want to say, you know, i've been working on sanctions for a long time, and oftentimes when we initially impose a set of measures, when we initially begin a strategy, what we see from the target, we see l. [ laughter ] ter, bravado, taunting. that normally is very short lived when they're up against. >> saw that from iran at the start of the sanctions. they said it wasn't going to be serious. it started to tighten them down across the board. brought them to the table. >> we see it all the time. when they start to realize what our capabilities are and they start to realize the seriousness of purpose, they start to understand that this is, indeed, a very serious threat that they're up against. now russia's -- >> these sanctions -- these sanctions are only going to be powerful if europe gets on board. it was ultimately getting the

support of the world community that made the sanctions of iran bite. it wasn't that we came up with a great sanctions regime. if you can't get europe on board to these economic sanctions, there's little we can do short of this credit card thing unilaterally that will come down hard on that economy. wouldn't you agree with that? >> i think we have a number of tricks up our sleeve. the credit card idea that you're articulating is certainly one of the levers that we have with respect to russia. we have a variety of economic and financial levers with respect to russia. >> did i state it correctly that 90% of their credit card transactions are done with these companies? >> i don't know the exact percentage. visa and master card are very, very, very significant. >> does that number surprise you? >> the number doesn't -- if that's the correct number, it wouldn't surprise me. i don't know what the correct number is. the -- the point though is that these -- that this is going to be effective if it's done in a

deliberate fashion. now russia may or may not have acted deliberately with respect to decision making, with respect to crimea and ukraine. they may not be acting deliberately -- >> you mean deliberately, with a lot of advanced planning. they're not in crimea by accident. >> with a lot of thought about what the costs would be to them in the future. >> haven't thought about the down the road consequences. >> in understanding what our tools are and how we can deploy them in the best, most effective way, we are as you point out, they are going to be more effective if done in conjunction with the europeans. but we have a lot of authorities ourselves, too. and i think the president made quite clear that should the -- should the elections be disrupted, we are prepared to impose quite significant costs on the russian economy. i think we've shown we can do that and we will do that and we can do that. it is a matter of, you know, taking very seriously, as you say, what the impact is within europe, within the united

states, within the international financial system trying to minimize those impacts but understanding there's going to be some of those impacts and taking the appropriate measures anyway. we're working on that with the europeans as we speak. we're working on it within the administration and we have every intention to move forward on it as we need to. >> thank you, mr. chairman. senator mccain? >> thank you, mr. chairman. ms. farkas, my understanding is that the -- we have committed $3 million worth of mres. $7 million of health and welfare assistance, $8 billion worth of nonlethal military assistance for the ukraine assistance and state border guard services, is that correct? >> i -- it's 18 million total. there's about -- >> then my numbers are correct. >> they probably are. >> i just asked if my numbers -- if that's correct. the mres have been delivered, right? >> the mres have been delivered, right. >> how were they delivered? >> they were delivered by -- through ucom by a german

company. >> they weren't flown in by u.s. air craft into the airport at kiev, right? >> they were not. >> of course not, that might be provocative. now, how much -- how much of the rest of the 7 million and 8 million have been delivered so far? >> excuse me, senator mccain. excuse me a minute. expressions of approval or disapproval of any remarks at this hearing are not in order. senator mccain. >> senator, i don't have the exact data for you. i can tell you that the border security assistance, $3 million, that has already been delivered to the ukrainians because that's sourced locally. the rest of the assistance is done through u.s. government contracting -- >> has it been delivered yet? >> it has not all been delivered yet. >> that's what i thought. now, is it -- secretary nuland, is it the administration's argument against providing body arm more, night vision

capabilities and similar nonlethal assistance, obviously that was not provided, right? >> senator, as you know, we are continuing to look at those issues. >> was it delivered or not? look, i've watched you dv. >> it has not been delivered. >> i've watched you testify. i'd like answers to the questions. is body armor, night vision capabilities and similar nonlethal military assistance been delivered? >> no. >> it has not. and can you explain to me how it might be provocative to provide some body armor to soldiers whose countries are being invaded by russian special forces? >> again, i don't think anybody has called those items provocative. i think we're continuing to review. >> why don't you supply them? they have asked for them repeatedly and begged for military assistance as their first priority in order to defend themselves. they reject the argument that they can't win anyway so why give them any capability. can you explain to me why we haven't given them even body armor or other equipment that they so badly need?

>> again, i think we're continuing to look at those things. >> i see. and that invasion took place when? crimea? how long ago? weeks ago. good, i'm glad you're going to continue to look at it. now as i understand it, the announcement made by the president and angela merkel was, quote, that if the u.s. and germany would impose additional sanctions on russia if, quote, it continues to destabilize eastern ukraine and continues to disrupt this month's presidential election. given what's going on in odessa today, would you say that that probably would disrupt the presidential election in odessa? >> again, in the view of the osce, an election if it were to be held today could be held in odessa. >> it could be held in odessa? >> it could be held in odessa in

the view of the osce and we checked that 3w6 coming here. that's not to say that it could be held -- >> do you think they're trying to disrupt the elections in odessa? >> as -- as i made clear in my opening, we certainly think that there were pro russian elements and there were aspects of odessa that were far from -- >> so then they are trying to disrupt the elections in odessa. and our strategy seems to be, mr. glaser, just let the russian economy fail, and i was pleased to note, and you've -- all three of you have repeated it now, the russian ruble and the flight of -- has declined but since the sanctions were imposed actually the ruble has strengthened and the russian stock market has gone up. i think those facts speak for

themselves. so would you agree that in fact putin continues to increase sanctions and aggression in ukraine as the recent unrest in odessa suggests, secretary nuland? >> as i made clear in my testimony, we continue -- we believe that since the geneva agreement, the aggressive actions of the russian federation have continued in the east and in the south. >> so, tell me, what would it take between now and the elections for these sanctions that the -- that president obama and chancellor merkel talked about to be triggered? what action? obviously there was just a building burned in odessa and 30 or 40 people were killed, more people are being killed, helicopters are being shot down by russian -- excuse me, pro russian in ukraine. what does it take to say, hey, this is enough? they've gone to odessa.

they're continuing to fullment combat and conflict in eastern ukraine and they're shooting down helicopters. tell me, what action on the part of putin would trigger -- specifically what action in order to trigger these sanctions that are supposed to be so severe? >> well, as you know, we have continued to escalate sanctions as we've seen more aggression. we've instituted a new package of sanctions. what is it ten days ago -- >> i'm asking specifically what the president and chancellor merkel said that if they continue to disrupt the elections and cause tensions, i can quote it to you again, what was it -- what would it take to impose a new round of sanctions? >> and the expectation is if the elections do not go forward, if we cannot have elections -- >> so if the elections can't go forward. so he can do anything he wants to prior to that, is that right? >> i think i made clear that we

are watching this may 11th. >> what are you watching for? what is the destabilizing moment that says, okay, we will impose these sanctions? >> again, we are developing the sanctions now with the europeans. i think we will have them at the ready very soon and we will be able to impose them as we watch and continue the stabilization. >> those a total nonanswer to my question. my question is not what you're developing. my question is, and i'm sure you understand me, what action would vladimir putin take in addition to what he's already doing, which is a lot, in order to trigger the sanctions? >> first, if we have a separatist referendum that is recognized by russia and results in russian peace keepers, that will be a trigger. if there is the inability to have elections in broad swaths of ukraine, whether that happens between -- earlier or later, whether -- if the elections don't go forward.

all of these are the kinds of triggers that we're talking to the europeans about. >> if there's a referendum in eastern ukraine that says they want to be part of russia or independent of kiev, that will trigger additional sanctions? >> if that referendum is recognized by rousch sha and they move into crimea -- >> not only they have the vote, but then they have to move in -- russians have to move into eastern crimea? >> again, senator, i think we will evaluate events -- >> so the answer is that you can't tell me what specific action russia would take in order to trigger sanctions outside of the actual elections being disrupted themselves? you are not answering the question, madam secretary. >> we have steadily increased packages of sanctions as the russians have destabilized. even before we get to sec to recall there is more we can do in the cronian named sanctions and we're prepared to do that on

a shorter string. >> you know, may i express my deep regret on the failure to answer the questions. i had expected more when i supported your nomination. >> thank you very much. >> it's pretty clear that russia is using natural gas as its weapon, not just against ukraine but in trying to influence the response from the e.u., and that is the achilles heel of the ukraine. it's the achilles heel that the russians are seeking to exploit across the spectrum. and i'm not going to talk about lng exports here except to say, one, we don't have a terminal built in the united states to export to ukraine. two, if we did have a terminal, ukraine does not have a terminal to accept it. and if we were trying to send it through the straits of bosporus,

the turniks would block us. the senate foreign relations committee, the administration, no one controls where it goes on the open sea. so just being realistic about lng. what we can do, however, is recognize that ukraine is the second least energy efficient country in the world. uzbekistan is last, ukraine is second to the last out of 180, 190 countries. pretty sad shape, huh? we know that if russia increases its efficiency to poll it, it backs out 3/4 of the natural gas. let me say that again. if it increases its energy efficiency to poland's level it backs out 3/4 of natural gas it has to import from russia, and

that's because right now they're using soviet era boilers, soviet era standards. russia moves after 1990, so didn't poland. ukraine stayed where they were largely because of the fact that energy subsidies are actually unbelievably 8% of their gross domestic product from russia. they had no stake because that subsidy kept them addicted. so i guess my question is this. what can we do with the e.u. and other countries to put together a set of incentives that moves in a telescoped time frame the ukraine economy to a modern energy efficient economy and what is the goal that you think makes the most sense and what is that time frame and what will we have to do in order to meet it? and i would like the goal to be as big and bold as you can make it because the bigger we make

it -- let me just tell you, the more frightened russia will get. the more frightened. gas prom is running their policy. that's who russia is -- that's who putin is meeting with every day. the bigger you set this, the more frightened they will be. can you give me some hope here that with the e.u. we're going to announce some huge goal for the ukrainian economy to transfer to -- to transfer over to a much more energy efficient model? >> senator, energy efficiency is one of our main lines of effort with the government of ukraine with our assistance. if you've ever spent time in the winter where the heat's blazing out of the radiators and all of the windows are open in government buildings, this speaks to the inefficiencies. as you know from your own work, fixing a problem like that is a medium-term problem. it involves giving them new technologies, it involves giving them lots of advice about tax incentives and the kinds of things that create change in the

way buildings are heated and the way energy is used, but it also speaks to -- so we're working on all of those things and we have part of the -- our a.i.v. assistance is very much targeted on this issue as is the work of a number of u.s. companies who specialize in energy efficiency, but as you say, the most important thing is to reduce the price of gas prom gas in europe, which speaks to this larger effort that we have going with the e.u. and in the trans atlantic space to encourage more building of interconnectors, more buildings of lng terminals for gas -- >> as i said, lng is just a red herring. might as well put an aquarium out here for the whole lng story. it just isn't going to be something that works in the free market in the world that we live in, okay? it's going to the highest price. i just want to come back to energy efficiency -- >> i'm talking about on this

one, u.s.lng but the price of gas is going down from algerian and u.s.lng and that we need to encourage. >> that's good but the big thing is energy efficiency. >> yes. >> in the united states i was in hearings in the late '70s where our department of energy was saying we need 200 new nuclear power plants by the year 2000 or else we're going to have blackouts and brownouts. we didn't build one new nuclear power plant. why? because we doubled our energy efficien efficiency. so what can we do for the ukraines so they can say to the russians, we don't need your natural gas anymore than we need your soldiers? the smartest way is energy efficiency. all i would urge you is that you announce the goal publicly and that you do so with the e.u. and the u.s. standing there with the ukraine leaders and you make it

50% reduction in ten years, 25% over 5 years, whatever it is, but on this pathway towards backing out all that natural gas and that's just keeping your windows down, huh? having thermostats that are smarter, having insulation that's smarter, all new buildings be smarter and it will work because they are so inefficient. uzbekistan, that's where they are. it's the most corrupt energy sector in the world, ukraine, and we have to basically say to the people who have been on the take in that country from the natural gas sector that you're out and we've got to condition it publicly, that they're out and we're putting in people who come from this new mentality. i say it basically as clear as it can be that their sector is so corrupt, so tied into the russian gas mafia, huh, that there was no way in which this day was not going to arrive. so i guess what i can ask from you is that you set a goal. i don't know amongst the three

of you if you have a goal yet that you've publicly announced in terms of the reduction of energy consumption in the country. >> i think it's certainly a worthy thing to take up with the newly elected president of ukraine, assuming we have free fair elections on may 25th to set a goal for the country. we are very much on the case and agree with you. >> i would -- amongst yourself and the europeans set the goal that you would like to see achieved so you can talk with the president of the country in the first meeting you have with him. i think it's the most important signal you can send to russia. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator. i understand senator corker has a brief comment he wants to make and then we'll let this panel move on. >> mr. chairman, i want to thank you for having the hearing. i certainly appreciate the way the members asked the questions they did. i know there was some discussion about russia blocking information coming into eastern ukraine and i hate to say this, but from a national security

standpoint and a global stability standpoint, i almost wish this testimony today was blocked and the rest of the world could not see what took place. this kind of testimony i'd expect in a third world country. not the united states. and while i think the witnesses probably are good people, i think what we're seeing today is that we have no strategy and no policy towards what's happening in ukraine, that we're reacting with as little as we can possibly react with. i just want to close with this final statement. i think that all of us are very concerned, and i think it's the type of policy that we've seen here today, which is no policy, that actually takes the world into a much more dangerous place. so i do not envy the people who come up here as witnesses when

the administration evidently has very, very evident to everyone here, has no strategy and no policy. and i hope that something will change. i hope this hearing will be such an embarrassment to this administration that somehow they'll decide that they have to as a great nation put forth some policy that's coherent so that others can understand, so that russia can understand what price they'll actually pay if they continue what they're doing, but i certainly don't know. i don't think anyone here does and i'm very disappointed that the three of you had to come up here and act as witnesses when there is no policy to really discuss. thank you. >> let me first of all thank this panel. i think there was a lot of important insights here that help us get to where we collectively want to be. i have a bit of a disagreement with my ranking member.

i don't think that it's fair to say that there's no strategy and no policy. we may have different views as to what we would add to the strategy or the policy, some on one side want to do the lng that senator murphy doesn't think is going to make a difference because they can't -- ukrainians can't receive it. you know, others would like to more militarily engage the ukrainians. some of us, including myself, think we could be a little bit more forward leaning even though i comment the administration who acted first. no other country in the world in response to what happened in the ukraine acted as quickly as the united states of america. now, i think, you know, we can have different views as to what is the standard that we would ultimately like to get to, but i think it's unfair to say that this