the memorial before. >> really? >> thank you for being here today. >> thank you. >> bob dole, former world war ii's veteran and former senator, greeting people at the memorial. >> next, a house subcommittee hearing on security on federal buildings, including the head of the federal protective service at homeland security with officials from the gao, american national and association of security companies. this is one hour and 40 minutes. >> this meeting will come to order.

today we are examining the federal protective service and security of our federal buildings and facilities. with 1300 personnel, including law enforcement officers and 14,000 contract guards, we are charged with protecting over 9000 federal buildings and nation,es across the owned or leased by the general services administration. while fps is not responsible for all federal facilities, its role is central to protecting federal workers and visitors to federal buildings nationwide. since the 9/11 attacks, our country has taken steps to prevent and be better prepared for terrorism and other threats. unfortunately, public buildings are a proven target. whether because of their symbolism or because of the number of federal employees and

visitors that use these facilities, the threat the federal government has a long history. in 1995, timothy mcveigh and his co-conspirators used a truck filled with homemade explosives to bomb the federal building in oklahoma city, killing 168 people, including 19 children. in 2010, a person targeted a building in austin, housing 200 irs employees by crashing a plane into the building. active shooter incidents have been an ongoing threat as well. this includes shootings at the navy yard in washington, fort hood, the u.s. capitol building, and united states holocaust museum. because of these threats and the steps taken since the oklahoma

city bombing, we should nearly 20 years later have significantly improved the security of public buildings. unfortunately, problems persist. over the past five years the government accountability office or gao and others into new to identify very real deficiencies. penetration testing done by the gao has revealed fake bomb components and guns have been secreted past security. the oversight of contract guards in their training needs improvement, and while the guards are armed, they lack training on active shooter situations. partnerships with local law enforcement agencies are patchy, raising questions as to whether state and local law-enforcement agencies are clear on their authority to respond to incidents on federal property. the facility risk assessment

conducted on the federal buildings to help identify their risks and needed security measures are behind schedule and sometimes ignored by custom agencies. on top of this, confidence may be eroding. steps have been taken to remove fps from the security aspects in its nebraska facility. building security is difficult. if it were not, these problems would have easily been resolved years ago. we have seen that even with the best security there is still a terrorist risk, and there have been improvements including the revamping of its risk assessments, improved relationship with local law enforcement, particularly here in the capital, and the strength and working relationship with gsa. today i hope this can be a productive hearing. we need to understand the challenges and problems, but we also want to hear solutions. ultimately, whether it is the members of the public or federal workers, those who come to federal buildings, must have confidence we are doing all we can to protect them.

i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and i thank you all for being here. i will call on ranking member of the subcommittee, mr. carson, for a brief opening statement. >> thank you. i want to thank the chairman for holding this hearing. i also want to welcome the witnesses to the hearing on federal protective service. as a former officer with over a decade of experience, have a strong interest in examining fps and ensuring it is functioning at the highest possible level. i find the issues facing fps deeply troubling. fps is responsible for protecting employees and visitors in approximately 9600

federal facilities across the nation. yet the department of homeland security inspector general and the gao have issued at least six reports since 2009 detailing serious challenges that fps has been having in meeting this expectation. the shortcomings detailed in these reports are troubling. they effectively highlight that fps relies on a private contract guards forced to provide security to federal facilities under the control of gsa. the gao has consistently noted that fps lacks effective management controls and systems to ensure its contract guards

had met their training certification requirements, which are necessary to ensure a slight of security in these buildings. it is unclear whether many of these contract guards have been trained on how to respond active shooter incidents or use x-rays and magnetometer equipment. these contract guards are often the first line of defense for our federal buildings and people inside. we must have assurances that they are prepared to offer the highest level of protection. more broadly, gao has reported that fps has limited ability to manage risk across facilities and implement security countermeasures. fps lacks a comprehensive strategic approach to providing security to the buildings in gsa's inventories. the problems are worsened by an inability to ensure it has a sufficient amount of law enforcement officers, and inspectors, necessary to conduct regular assessments. it is also uncertain whether the current fee structure is sufficient to fund a strong

law-enforcement presence. we have to be very mindful that federal facilities where federal employees work, particularly the pentagon, navy yard, and oklahoma city federal building, have been the site of major attacks. federal facilities are symbols of our government terrorists want to take down. terrorism is not the only threat. we must stay vigilant to protect federal employees and our constituents who visit these buildings on a daily basis. congress cannot afford to wait for an attack button. we are heralding this hearing to learn about our stakeholders how to better protect millions of federal workers and visitors to these facilities. i thank the witnesses and the chairman. >> thank you. we will have two panels. on the first panel we have the director of physical infrastructure, u.s. government accountability office, and the director of federal protective service, the department of homeland security.

i ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' speeches be included in the record. so ordered. the subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony to five minutes. mr. goldstein, you may proceed. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity to be here today and discussed the federal protective service. recent incidents demonstrate the continued vulnerability to attacks and other acts of violence. as part of dhs, fps is responsible for protecting employees and visitors in about 9600 facilities. to help with the mission, fps conducts assessments for the guards deployed. fps charges fees for security guards to tenants. my discussion includes ensuring guards are properly trained and certified and conducting risk assessments of federal facilities. it is based on gao reports issued until 2014. as part of our work we found the federal protective service continues to face challenges

ensuring contract guards had been properly trained. before being deployed. in september 2013, gao reported that providing training for shooter scenarios and screening access to facilities poses a challenge. according to officials at five guard companies, their contract guards had received training how to respond during incidents involving shooters. without ensuring guards know how to respond, fps has limited assurance their guards are prepared for the threat. an official stated 133 guards had never received screener training. as a result, guards deployed to federal facilities may be using equipment they are not authorized to, raising questions about their ability to fulfill primary responsibilities to screen access. gao was unable to determine the extent to which the guards had received response and screener

training in part because fps lacks a reliable system for oversight. gao also found that fps continues to lack controls to ensure its guards had met its certification requirements. although fps agreed with the 2012 recommendations that it develop a conference of system for managing information guard'' training, it does not have such a system. additionally, 26% of the files properd did not have the documentation. for example, some files, like documentation of screener training and firearms qualifications. additionally, we also found that assessing risk at federal facilities remains a challenge. gao found in 2012 that they pay millions to assess risks that facilities, but they are not

assessing risks in the manner consistent with federal standards. gao found that this is still a challenge for fps and several other agencies. forrisk management process standards requires risk assessed assess thees that threat and consequence to undesirable abilities. they identify and evaluate security risks that implement protective measures they use to assess federal facilities until there is so longer term solution. the level, duration, and age come from an undesirable event. a tool thatthat does not estimate consequence does not allow agents to from the sets that they have limited

knowledge of the risks facing the facilities around the country as a result. officials stated to us that it was not part of the original design of the system as they incorporated now. gao has made 31 recommendations to approve the contract guard risk assessment processes, of which six have been implemented, 10 are in process, and 15 have not. this concludes my oral statement and i will be happy to respond to any questions the members of the subcommittee have. >> thank you for your testimony. mr. patterson? you may proceed. >> thank you, chairman. ranking member, distinguished members of the committee, i am the director of the federal protective service within the national protection program service and homeland security. testifying before the committee today regarding the operations

of the service, we are charged with protecting and delivering integrated law-enforcement security services to 9000 facilities owned or leased by the general services administration. employ over 1000 sworn officers to provide uniformed lease response at fps protected facilities and participate in tactical andcises with personnel conduct facility security assessment nationwide. utilizing the modified infrastructure surveys, inspectors document existing postures of the facility, compare how the facility is or is not meeting the a sign of protection for its silly the security level, providing recommendations for security appropriateith

countermeasures to mitigate risks. this process was designed to meet the requirements of the inter-agency risk management process for federal facilities and we are in the process of the tool to the isc for validation. utilizing this tool, fps is on track to have completed the assessment on all level three through level five facilities in the portfolio by the end of the calendar year 2014. i am also pleased to report that the second generation tool is in acceptance testing. this system will feature among other improvements and enhanced user interface and improved visibility across the portfolio. at this time we expect the appointment of this system to begin in the fall of 2014. ,nspectors also oversee staff

approximately 13,000 protected security officers. they are responsible for controlling access to federal facilities, detecting and reporting criminal acts, responding to emergency situations. they also ensure that prohibited items do not enter federal facilities. they must all undergo background checks to determine their fitness to begin work on behalf of the government and are rigorously trained. however, it is important to note that they are not sworn law enforcement officers. rather they are employees of private security companies and fps does not have the authority to deputize them in a law enforcement capability. an individual's authority to perform protective services are based on state laws where they are employed. partner with private sector guard companies to make sure that guards have met certification, training, and qualification requirements

specified in the contract. additionally, they are working closely with the national association of security council new's to develop a national lesson plan to establish a basic and natural training program for them to ensure that standards are consistent across the nation. these efforts will further standardize the training they receive and provide great capability to validate training in facilities with rapid adjustments to account for changes in threat and technological advancements. to ensure high performance in the workforce, fps law enforcement personnel conduct post-inspection to monitor vendor compliance and countermeasure effectiveness. additionally, vendor personnel files are altered periodically to validate that they reflect compliance and contract requirements. to supplement this current partnered withe science and technology to develop a post-tracking system.

this system will be capable of integrating an individual's the timeand tracking or position in training and certification records in real time. we expect the first iteration of the system to begin testing within 12 months. continuously strive to further enhance and transform the organization to meet the challenges of an evolving threat landscape and are committed to the outstanding recommendations pertaining to operations. to facilitate the closure of open recommendations we have implemented a program management approach, utilizing this process fps has closed to open gao recommendations this year and expect to submit documentation for closure of eight additional recommendations by the end of june, 20 14. in total, fps hopes to close 10 to 15 of the 31 open recommendations before the end of this fiscal year.

in closing? i would like to it knowledge and thank the distinguished members of this committee for the opportunity to testify today. we remain committed to the mission of providing safety, security, and a sense of well-being to the thousands of visitors and federal employees who work at our facilities daily. i would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. thank you. >> thank you for your testimony. i will now begin the first round of questions, limited to five minutes for each member. if there are additional questions following the first round we will have additional rounds of russians as needed. federal protection services directly responsible for protecting federal buildings in the 1 -- and the 1.4 million workers and visitors to those facilities. the public openings act crafted by this committee gave fps and law enforcement authorities that very purpose, protecting the buildings and the people in them.

iner moving from gsa to dhs 2003, there has been report after report detailing serious security deficiencies at federal facilities. given the importance of this would expect the department of homeland security to make federal building security a top priority. yet these problems continue. just recently we received a copy of our may 1 memo from the dhs security officer, chief security officer, to the dhs under security for management that removed the federal protection service from its lead role of providing security at the homeland security headquarters complex on the nebraska avenue. my first question, mr. patterson, is -- why was this protection service removed as the lead security provider? does this mean that dhs has more confidence in fps?

>> to answer your question, sir, to my knowledge this was not an issue of performance, ok? believe that the department has lost confidence in the federal investigation services. i believe that this was an issue of support from the secretary's decision. in effect, fps will continue to provide security, including law enforcement, canine support -- we will continue to do it with a robust presence at the facility, as we always have. currently, this is really about overall contract management and not confidence in our ability to provide security and law-enforcement support. only 100 dhs facilities across the nation, to include ice headquarters, fema headquarters, secret service headquarters, tsa, and the u.s. coast guard headquarters.

do a very good job there. we have a robust presence there. i'm sure we will continue to provide the same level of support. the bottom line is we have active partners in ensuring that we provide safe and secure environments. the problem's at the department of homeland security headquarters that caused the chief security officer to take this action were similar problems at the other 9600 federal buildings that fps provide security for. and finally, can you explain why fps security is inadequate for dhs but good enough for the other agencies? >> i don't think that this is an indictment of fps security. again, i think this is a matter of efficiency and managing a contract. we are going to continue to provide security at the neck area that is not the issue.

again, as the office of security, i believe they are looking to fulfill the secretary's vision of how they will streamline and better connect business at the neck. >> who is in charge of security today at the headquarters? if there was an active shooter incident right now, who would be the incident commander on scene? will the first responders know who is in charge? what would be their role in that situation? >> at the office of security and federal protective services share partnership, it could be either the office of security or federal protective services. it just depends who is first on scene. that is who is going to assume incident command of the situation. it will go from there. at that point we will look to bring in the metropolitan police department and other support for help in resolving that situation. >> mr. goldstein, what

percentage of security guards have active shooter training? what are scented have security screener training? haveity guards do not proper training, how would you expect them to keep weapons and bombs out of a federal building or respond to an active shooter? fax our study was not able to be generalized, i could not say for sure how many have the kind of screening today. however, what we found in talking to several different guard companies around the country is that there are still pockets of guards that do not. several years ago, when we did this kind of work, we found that there were 1500 and severally regions that did not have screener training. for the companies we are looking at now, there are still some work hundred that do not and we would expect others, although as i say it cannot be generalized. however, because of this problem persisting and the lack of training required to be provided

, we do have concerns that remain and have remained for a number of years now, as you know, about the ability and possibility of bombs and other types of weapons getting into these federal facilities because there is no assurance that the person standing guard and theing teams through have adequate training to prevent something from coming through that should not come through. >> thank you. the chair recognizes ranking member carson for questions. >> thank you, chairman. dr. patterson, how often do they find and penalize the -- penalize for not having the proper training? >> i don't have that statistic readily available for you. >> yes, sir. , how on the status quo would you expect contract guards to react to a navy type shooting

at another facility? of the things we're doing now is we are working aggressively with national how we canmpanies look at security guard practices for response. we currently have practices to provide each one of the security guards and two hours of active shooter training. what that really does for us as it makes them aware of what an active shooter event is. have thevidual will discretion, given the circumstance, at that point to actively pursue, depending on the circumstances. each one of these companies is still under the oversight of their state law. kind of caught

between a rock and a hard place right now. we would like to train them to the standard where we can give them active shooter training and move them into a position where there is no question, but right now because we don't have that authority it creates a little bit of drama. you, director. in your testimony you discussed is using aat fps vulnerability assessment tool that does not take into account the consequences of an undesirable attack or event. what is the impact of assessing the consequences of a terrorist attack or serious crime activity at a federal facility? standard requires that agencies look at the threat and the vulnerability and the consequence. numberok at a list of a of undesirable events and for each of those undesirable events they are required to determine ofther there is a threat

vulnerability and consequence component to all of those events. in our work we have found that the examination of consequence is important because it helps to determine how best to protect the facility. talking aboutly limited resources in trying to protect, in this case, some 9600 facilities. which the the way in federal government and fps actually looks at each building, it is kind of a cookie-cutter approach. i have said this a number of times here and elsewhere, there is no way that fps is able to examine threats of vulnerability and consequences across the intfolio to target resources those facilities. it looks at each of those facilities in a stovepipe kind of way and becomes quite toficult to better be able provide resources, which as we know are quite limited. >> mr. goldstein, what is the

value in individual security assessment currently? are these assessments properly assessing the threat? how could current assessments even be improved? >> our understanding is that since it has been in place, 18 months or so, fps has once again begun to do assessments. they have done around 1200, based on the information we have . but they had a backlog of 5000 when they started. that is still a fairly considerable number. level three" buildings are expected to be done every three years. there is quite a lot of backlog remains, as well as pent-up demand for new ones. when we look there are nine percent, 10% of them, hundreds -- thousands, really, the that

did not even have a date associated for the last assessment. it is hard to know how long it has been since many major federal buildings have had risk assessments. we also know that within the last couple of years on number of other federal agencies have done their weapons assessments, even while they are being paid to do separate assessments. so, there is a lot of duplication. the irs and many other agencies have done their own assessments for overriding of reasons, including that some did not like the standard to which it was being done, did not like what was being shared -- there has been a variety of risk as well with duplication also. we do believe that fps has to do it better job, as the director talked about, and hopefully this will help them achieve that in being able to allow them to do better assessments in the future. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> the chair now recognizes mr.

crawford for five minutes of questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. paterson, i think the chairman addressed this earlier, this memo from greg marshall, chief security officer, regarding an arrest of a complex. if i understand it correctly, what he said is that it was essentially a command and control issue, not necessarily anything related otherwise? is that accurate? knowledge. >> in a facility with that level of security, i am concerned about the proliferation of targets. can you describe what the protocol is, the response protocol, in the event of a large-scale ied detection or attack? >> first of all, the folks who are visitors that have to go through screening, if at that point there is a detection and we believe that there is an

explosive device, the area is cleared. at that point we will call the metropolitan police department, who will bring in their explosive team to assess whether or not it is truly an explosive device are not. is any assess that it explosive device, emergency evacuation plans for that facility will then be put into place. >> i am concerned about -- and i have had some talks with other metro bomb squads and fellow agencies that are also equipped or staffed with bomb tech -- in the event of a large-scale, do you have anything beyond just relying on the metro bomb squad? are there some fellow agencies that might respond as a backup? >> yes, sir. the fbi's going to respond, the metropolitan police department we will to respond,

probably have responsive park services. there will likely be a significant response, but the challenge with an explosive device is you want to limit the scope until we decide the magnitude of the threat. >> does fps have any kind of technical capacity to deal with an ied? the bomb techs within the ranks? >> no, sir, but we do have explosive ordnance dogs that we use. those are our first line of fence. if we suspect an issue, we will bring in the canine to give us an alert. if a alert, we clearly begin to evacuate the area. the police department and others have the capability to further explore the issue. d.c., i would assume there is a similar protocol in place with local municipalities who have the capacity to respond to a threat?

>> absolutely. if an fps dog is not available, we have relationships with local law enforcement as well. if we in fact get a positive hit, if it is the city of chicago we will call on the city of chicago.ity whatever arrangements have been made for a response, that is where we will go. >> do you have any relationships with dod assets? the united states army has the primary responsibility of providing support to law enforcement on every level. do you have that in place? >> we have a relationship to where we could call them if we needed to. >> i appreciate that. one of the thing, you said you had detection dogs. you have handlers who have been trained? >> yes, sir. we have 74 or 75 canines across

the united states with their handlers and we have weapons at the nebraska avenue complex for about 15 hours per day. >> mr. goldstein, what percentage of federal buildings have up-to-date complete security risk assessments? >> it is not possible to say, sir, at this point in time. as i mentioned, there is a considerable backlog at this point the past do assessments. work in the past shows that because there are a number of them that have no date in the system at all, it is not possible to determine when the last one was done. fps is working to reduce the backlog and hopefully move thatrd with new ones so they can become up-to-date, but they are not as of today. is kind of disturbing. what kind of backlog? >> the backlog occurred over a. of time for a couple of reasons.

one, the old system that was being used, called ramp, its functionality was not sufficient . they pulled the plug on the program. backlog began to grow. additionally, over time, as the federal protective service change the nature of its work force from police to integrated inspectors with a lot of different duties, this particular responsibility of this assessment that fell on them that they were not trained for took up an increasing amount , including managing contract guards and other things . so, they fell behind, quite frankly. >> this seems to me that there should be something done annually to make sure that that assessment is up to date on the time. >> it should be done on a level three and level for building every few years.

but it is something that is not occurring at this point in time. >> my time is expired. mr. chairman? thank you very much, mr. chairman. i appreciate this hearing. there are chronic problems at fps and i would like to look at the difference between officers and contract guards. we understand who is really guarding these buildings. page two of your testimony, you say that you describe the law enforcement authority of fps police powersific -- including enforcing federal laws and regulations for firearms, etc.. then, of course, on page five of your testimony you distinguish these officers from the contract guards. -- and this is very

important, i think -- right here on the record, it is in your they rely on private persons, such as citizen arrest logs. can dot means that they no more than i can do in a federal prison? is that technically correct? >> yes, ma'am. they are governed by state law to the extent of their authority. avenuee nebraska bytract guards, replaced federal protective service officers? >> no, they were not. avenue is that nebraska now? >> contract protective service officers. >> what was the change? >> i'm sorry? >> what was the change at nebraska avenue?

>> the oversight of the contract. fps was over siding the contract. ,e had core responsibilities the day-to-day oversight of the contracts. -- is -- is supervising oversight over these guards at the department of >> that security? particular responsibility has now been moved to the office of security. >> and that is unique, then? only at the department of homeland security? at the nebraska avenue complex. we still retain that responsibility with hundreds of his -- hundreds of facilities around the country. >> i think we will have to ask, but i think it is pretty clear why -- they obviously felt that they had to be more secure and

they went through professional security authorities. now, when guards regard all the rest of the buildings and federal employees and visitors -- if someone comes into one of those facilities and has a gun, with or without a gun, decides not to go through the , can contract guard pursue that person? >> yes, ma'am. and they can be detained. at that point they will call the mega center, who will dispatch local authorities. >> i ask that because there have been incidences reported where contract guards stood by not knowing they had a gun, but when there was a disturbance than they could not leave their post. and >> ma'am, every day we have contract guards engaged in responding to disturbances.

especially at social security offices. we have literally hundreds that happen every year. >> contract guard is not dependent on the post, they can go anywhere in the facility for service. you can pursue someone with a gun, even though he does not have one? >> i'm not sure i understand the question. .> the person comes through >> right. what you arehat therefore is for surprises, not the average person. alright, someone comes through with a gun. >> yes, ma'am. >> i'm trying to find out if the contract guard with no gun can pursue that person. or what must you do? >> our contract guards are armed. >> all of them? >> yes, ma'am. >> is there a central curriculum or how they are trained? >> yes, ma'am.

>> who provides that curriculum? >> we do. we lay out the requirements. we are currently in the development of a national that wefor training were to employ. >> my time is up. i yield back, for the moment. >> thank you. we will now begin our second round of questioning. mr. patterson? clearly fps does not have enough officers to respond to all federal buildings in a timely manner. you have to rely on contract guards is your first line of defense, yet you noted in your testimony that the authority of these guards to use deadly force comes from state and local and that in most cases they do not have the authority to pursue subjects. in order to address the threat posed by active shooters, would it be helpful for fps to have

the authority to delegate some federal law enforcement authorities? guards and other agencies, do they have this ability? how does it work in those cases? >> if we look across the spectrum of the authorities, that is a federalized force. if you look at the u.s. marshals service, they have the authority to deputize, giving them thensive power to direct workforce in just about any direction they want. then you have the department of energy, who protects nuclear plants and facilities, where they have some limited law enforcement authorities that allow them to arrest and do the things that need to be done on an immediate basis. we would see to be able to streamline the authority structure. what that means is if you see an

opportunity where we needed to increase the authority, we can. for instance, during hurricane sandy and our response to it, we were being requested to provide to theve support citizens -- to the folks in new york and other facilities. our vendor quickly ran out of resources to provide to that situation and that event. we then began to query our other vendors to see if they could help with that response. we found that you had to go through these statements in new that this approval process took quite a bit of time. where we had had the authority to just more or less empowered them of the federal level to go in and do that, we could have done this more quickly in response.

anything of that nature would be of help. they rely on bigger facilities. to they have all of the authorities and tools that they need to respond? do you have what is necessary to ensure that they respond accordingly? >> we do in our smaller cities.

respond, this is a federal event. were able to provide that authority and say -- listen, you are now acting on behalf of the federal government, that would inarly give them some relief their willingness to help us. >> there have been concerns about fps staffing levels for , having required a minimum staffing level. you only have 1300 employees, but we understand that up to 40 may have been reassigned to functions outside fps. is that correct? of those employees have

been assigned outside that and why? left the fighte and came in, we lacked the infrastructure for things like human resources. that is what we had contributed to. that is how we created our infrastructure, if you will. >> given the outstanding number of work items at yes, can fps assign its employees or other parts of the department? >> we have not looked into whether they were assigned or what the rationale was for those

assignments, but it is clear that fps still struggles with trying to get the basic job done that we have talked about here this morning in terms of risk assessment and contract guard oversight and things you have brought up. i do think that that is something that needs to be looked at routinely. >> the chair now recognizes ranking member carson. >> thank you very much. mr. goldstein, are you aware of any of the shelf technology that would effectively allow fps to digitize their oversight of contract guard certifications and trainings? thisu believe that technology would allow fps to improve oversight of contract guards? >> we have not looked specifically at it, but in the course of our work we have been told by many people that there is off-the-shelf products that could readily do this job and that fps does not have to reinvent the wheel. >> director patterson?

sir, you know that federal law requires law fps enforcement officers. has fps prepared a report that based on the activity-based cost model for human capital that fps needs significantly more law enforcement officers? what might that number be, generally? >> we have look at that and given the circumstances of today, when we did the assessment, it is about 1300 law enforcement that would give us the proper leveling, if you will , for the commitment we have today. that figure will absolutely change. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. figure.t to pursue that how many fps officers are there? how many contract guards are

there? >> today we have 1000 sworn law enforcement fps officers. there are -- the contract guard >> have budget effect on contract guards or fps officers? has there been a reduction in personnel for the last two years? >> there has not been a staff, butf the fps sequestration did have an impact on there are many buildings that digg that i did close. -- there are many buildings that .id close the reflexive kno

i would like to ask you about the supervision. you spoke of a cookie-cutter approach. to security.roach agencies the cap havettees dass -- each thanttees that are no more the people who work in the building and none of them have any security.

they have some significant .esponsibilities would you describe these laypeople? ofwe have done work a couple years old. that the individuals who make up the committees tended to be easy tenant of the building. the tenant who has the largest the print typically chairs the committee. a number into meetings over the years. they do tend to be made up of lady people. jobtends to be a delegated that many people do not really want. what is it that we have to do

is security? >> they are responsible for taking the information and making decisions about what kinds of countermeasures they will put and go back to get the necessary funds to do this. it could take a number of years. expertise canwhat they recommend changes in security and get funds for? >> they may call on their own security be will from their agencies or departments to assist them. the problem is you have the security of federal buildings being decided by a lots of

laypeople over a long time when countermeasures need to be put in place. one and the agency committees have points of vulnerability. obviously when he talk to someone who represents the head of the agency, i know this only by chance. to it is close to the capital. if the code to the transportation, you have to get someone to come down. even if you have a badge from the united states congress.

you cannot get into that public building at all. you can come into the capital. you can use our capital. transportationof is a beautiful new building. we have not figured out a way for the public to pay for that building to be able to come in. that has everything to do with the committees. do you believe these committees as decisionate makers on how much security is needed? >> the committee recently put out some standards. they have had concerns that the three leg and still has some responsibility.

this may not be appropriate today. >> nobody is in charge. these committees of people who are really in charge. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> thank you for holding this important hearing in looking at the services. the facilities are secure. a couple of questions. mr. patterson, all

threats still remain. probably one of the most devastating attacks i can recall inthe mcveigh bombing oklahoma. more than likely that was a domestic terrorist act. of bombs in the boston bombing. we are probably overdue for another yet. we can get a lot of explosives easily as we have seen. how often argued read on intelligence? who breeds you? committee whohe you are getting your intelligence information from

and how often are you meeting with those folk? we are building a structured apparatus. >> there are agencies that do that. ourhat we do is we have folks who are assigned this with the at the eye. you are getting most of your intelligence from the force here the >> we are getting a variety of sources. levely started the lower from the state fusion centers. folks meet with them every day. fbi and fromthe the defense department, from the

intelligence and analysis center. we talk to them every day. the bulk of your people are contract people. how is that information delegated? has to be the chain made aware that a certain threat is occurring and make people aware of what we are looking for. a threat, receive that information is impacted in a way -- is then packaged in a way we can use. and maybe classifies your it if it is classified, we had to figure out how we would get it down to its lowest level. are they at each location?

>> is there someone at each location? >> no, sir. we can get it electronically to our folks as well. how often are the warnings? ask it just depends. >> it would be good if you gave us a chain of commands. i would like to see it as part of the record. most of what has happens we still have this and are not able to connect the dots.

i see you have a massive dogs. >> i think it is about 74 today. i do not see a lot of explosive detection devices at some of these check points. i see the metal detector tours. the biggest threat right now is explosives. i do not feel out of it. you have a lot? >> not explosives. i think we're missing the boat here. i think that is where the threat is. theyusand leo's, do

participate in the testing? >> yes, sir. we do not use assimilation. i want to know why you're not using simulation. it is more cost do. them to then highest level possible. we use it for our military. none of your guys are in combat. i've not seen a lot of firing of weapons. in military are on the scene combat. a good portion of their training comes from assimilation. you're behind the times. i want a report back to the committee and me on your proposal to use simulations for trainings and stop using all the expensive costly ammunition. >> can i clarify? >> i just want to make sure i get the right thing. >> using simulation, training, weapons training, situations,

the whole thing. >> we do have weapons training where we do simulating training. the officer will have devices that are straight to them. when they do it it will say whether there is a hit or not. wheresimulate training you will see exactly what you have. >> give us a full report and then i want to see what your new proposal is. then we will introduce you to people. very good. it saves you a lot of the expensive bullets. thank you. we have had a lot of discussion here on human resource in the management. you guys are also responsible

for managing equipment such as security cameras. is that correct? >> there is indications that .ome cameras may not be working there's also no mechanism to track and maintain these cameras. is that correct? >> we do track and maintain it. we are developing a more robust system to do that more effectively. every time that we go out and conduct an assessment, we are tracking that. when our inspectors go out and visit the facility, they are also looking and inspecting cameras. iswhat type of expense procured by these cameras, insulation, purchasing? thehey are paid for by the facility.py

what percentage of the cameras do you guys go out and check? i have several companies on my phone. i can check in on all my companies. the security cameras are there. it is an unbelievable asset when utilized correctly. also a huge personal expense of our company has had to take on. if aameras are worthless are not being tracked and watched. and a percentage of those is not 10% or five percent. it is 100% of them. for are all there purpose. what percentage is actually looked at? when you're making sure they're even working, what percentage of that? about the business of

ensuring that all of them were. when they don't, we work with fixsecurity committee to the cameras or replace the cameras. >> are you actively seeking these? >> yes. we want to ensure the cameras are working. you are right. if our security becomes less effective, they are operated. ag jao?about with dj >> we have look in some of the cameras over time. we have done work which we have shown the number of facilities have not had adequate cameras and they were able to determine when crimes have been committed when things were taken out of the building.

we know a number of instances , particulartenants have become quite frustrated with the protection service. they did not feel like maintenance of the cameras was sufficient and they paid for these themselves. i continue to hear and it totally that we have not done a comprehensive report. we do here and it does all the keeping these cameras working and modernize. >> you are saying the same thing that this committee has heard. that is what i was trying to get at. we have technology. it is not being utilized. these buildings, the ones that are dependent on these cameras, it is supposed to have a layer

of security incident a layer of frustration. there is a better way to do things. i would be curious if you could or if you would take a look at it. better this.is a just the way that we are doing it, just going through it. mr.just heard from goldstein. the committee has heard the saying ink. there is a layer of frustration that is taking place. >> i recognize there is a layer of frustration. i spent quite a bit of time on to road talking to the carts the iressa, social security. >> the difference between talking and doing are two different things. >> i am not giving lip service. i am ensuring that when folks are not happy with us that we, i'm not giving lip service. >> i hope the next time you

visit we can be a plan that is laid out. i would like to think that we could improve on this. >> thank you. i appreciate you giving me the time. >> one final round of questions. the law enforcement authority lies in the public buildings act. it is our understanding this authority has been redone like it to other entities such as the chief security officer, fema, i.c.e. why is this being delegated across dhs? responsibilityr in their delegation of authority preaching the unity of demand? this is what they cited as the reason for moving this as the security lead of the

headquarters. >> i do not have an answer for you. i do not know why different animals -- agencies have been granted. i do not know that. i also conclude our first panel. i would like to thank you both for your testimony today. and for your time and cooperation. thank you. we will now call on our second panel.

our second panel we have the afg.dent of and the general counsel national association of security companies. i ask unanimous consent that the full statement be included in the record. the written testimony has been made part of the record that you limit this to five minutes. you may proceed. >> thank you. thank you members of the committee. my name is david wright. i am inspectors since 1986. they are very vulnerable to attack criminal and terrorist threats. security is as effective as

this? definitely not. solutions include accountability for leadership, pushing staff to the field, effective on-site security and effective tools for risk assessment and recruiting. they reported problems with certification requirements. there is no use for these failures. they should have been fixed here and the responsible manager should have been held accountable. these are not failures. almost everything seems to go well in other regions. large received training. untrained ones are not used for screening. firearms qualification is monitored. guards are trained on actor shooter scenarios. these regions trust them to deliver.

or they simply refuse to fail. they appear to treat these as a structural issue to be solved by reorganization. this resulted in an unclear direction funneled through an extra layer of management who either ignored or missed problems. remove the extra layer and fire or demote managers who failed to tasks orh critical uphold the code of contract. building security is not a t-ball game to build self-esteem. it is serious business was serious consequences. , theding the staff officers who delivered the response the rest of centers and delivers assessment. it is not indicative of a lean, agile and high-performing

organization. over half of these are assigned to headquarters. they are top-heavy. this,ss should establish limit this to 125% of the numbers assigned to the region and had archers and mandate reduction of headquarters on 12.5 quarters and allow them to use building specific charges to add this when officers are dedicated to the facilities and staff tohe minimum 1100 50. regarding effective on-site security services unlike the buildings, the facilities

rely on contract guards. the contracts do not use economies of scale to reduce hourly cost. the staff has doubled. and now takes 400 days to implement a new contract. there are large tenant facilities that are open to the public and provide direction to facilitate this within the same state or areas. reasonablee recruitment model and mandate cost effective picture meant option such as the potential use of gsa. orarding effective tools recruiting and risk assessment, they currently use a risk pool. they recently found it was not fine with the governmentwide standards and there are available tools that do. brevity is the mandate that

they'd mandate this expeditiously and field this risk tool. regarding retention and recruiting, when asked for the law enforcement, look it up. one of the questions is are we covered a law-enforcement. we are told that we are not covered, the best and the brightest start looking elsewhere. were the names of u.s. law enforcement officers who have died in the line of duty are just drives. we recognize the supreme sacrifice to the heroes. the names are six officers of the officers who died in the line of duty. should any others die in the line of duty, their names will be added to that list. if we live and die, congress isuld recognize the service one. thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing.

and the employees at federal facilities, wait your expeditious action on these serious matters. >> you may proceed. the are in general counsel for the national association of security companies. largeste nation's security traded association whose member companies employing more than 300,000 security officers across the nation. in 1972, theyding have it for every level of government. they found this under here. not counting the military services.

not counting the military services, there are 35,000 contract security officers across the federal government. the use of contract security is n effective and cost-efficient countermeasure for safeguarding federal facilities, employees, and visitors. gao has identified challenges that fps faces in its mission to keep federal facilities secure. including issues related to the psl program. we have been working with fps, congress, gao, and gsa to ddress these issues. the pace of progress on some issues might not be as fast as gao would like, progress is being made. since the appointment of irector paterson in 2010 the degree of dialogue and cooperation between fps and security contractors has been unparalleled. there is no doubt that stricter patterson and others are committed to improving the program and fps is working on initiatives that will improve the program.

to address deficiencies in the capability to provide the crucial x-ray and magnetometer training, fps has launched a pilot program conceived with nasco. providing instructors to divide training. this training has been revamped and expanded by fps. in the area of active shooter training, nasco has met several times with fps to discuss development of new active shooter training for psl pause - psl's. fps is looking at what other agencies are doing with other contracts. it is also looking at revising and standardizing pso training plans. they recommended having all pso training instructors certified. in other areas, fps came out

with a much-needed revision of the pso manual. it governs and instructs pso's on how to act. there is a new chapter on active shooter response. there is better language on the shooting of bso -- pso authority. fps is undertaking a review of pso post orders. for this effort nasco ecommends that fps -- fps work with contractors who have to rovide an upload the data. one area that resents challenges is the authority to act. and liability for acting. in preventing or responding to an extreme situation such as an active shooter.

congress should consider providing dhs with statutory authority to authorize pso's to make arrests on federal roperty. there are other elements of the federal facility risk assessment and security process not related to pso's that need to be addressed. the decision to implement the civic security countermeasures for facilities. in gsa owned or leased -- or leased buildings, fps recommends which is made up of representatives from tenant gencies. representatives generally do not have any security knowledge or experience but are expected to make security decisions for their respective agencies.

with tightened budgets putting pressure to accept more risk it calls into question whether they are making informed, wrist-based decisions. countermeasures should not be projected because either a lack of understanding or unwillingness to fund them. legislation was supported for training members and allowing dhs to challenge the decision not to implement countermeasures. nasco looks forward to working to find ways to support the mission to render federal property safe and secure for federal employees, officials, and visitors and an effective and cost-effective manner. >> i will now begin the first round of questions limited to five minutes reach member. if there are additional questions we will have additional rounds as needed.

you highlight in your testimony challenges with the staffing of law enforcement officers and point out 67 officers are assigned to headquarters. do you know if they are assigned to fps headquarters or other parts of dhs? >> they are assigned to fps headquarters. those individuals do not respond to law enforcement calls for service on a daily basis. in my mind, they do not meet the definition of field law enforcement staff. >> you mentioned the delegation of law enforcement authority of building outside fps and the duplication of services at other agencies. can you explain how this duplication impacts federal facilities and the chain of command? >> most recently was the issue

with the nac in which security staff took control of nac ecurity. recently in past years, immigration and customs enforcement has stood up their own security unit. they use hr 1315 as their authority and the ss their i.c.e. buildings across the u.s.. fps conducts those surveys and so does i.c.e. that is the most recent example besides nac. >> you highlighted differences over how fps oversees and manages guards. you highlight doe and the u.s.

marshals. what do those agencies do differently in terms of the authorities and training they provide to their guards? >> the major difference is that with their contract security officers, they have authorized them to be able to make arrests on the federal properties where they are employed. this is statutory authority granted to doe through an act of congress and that is something we would like to see considered by congress for the so's at fps. there would be additional training required with that additional authority. >> have you looked at how private contractors have been used to provide security, the u.s. marshals service and even at dod to identify how fps can better utilize and train its guards and improve security at

other buildings? > of the three agencies that you cite, i worked most closely with the u.s. marshals service i can cite experience there. the contract security officers in these federal courthouses are all hired as former law enforcement. they all have been through some sort of law enforcement academy. i am unsure -- they are deputized by the u.s. marshals who have that authority. they are an effective force in the u.s. courthouses. i think it is the marshals that is most important. >> you mentioned other agencies use other companies to provide training.

can you provide us with other examples and how they can be applicable to fps? >> doe requires the contract security companies that they contract with to provide all the training for the contract security officers there, the training is very comprehensive. it involves weapons training and use of intermediate force. basic training, and all that training and many of the agencies, the training that is provided to contract security officers is done by instructors who are certified and also they are responsible for 100% of the training. a big issue is that for some reason, fps has held back the authority to provide the x ray magnetometer training and because of personal resource

issues as mr. goldstein pointed out, sometimes that x-ray magnetometer trading -- training is not provided. > thank you. mr. wright, what is the fps's relationship to the -- from the union's perspective. >> as an inspector i have worked with differing facilities across the government. firstly, it is a matter of how serious the agency takes that security committee. if it is a smaller property with fewer agencies, even less budget, they do not tend to take those facility security

ready recommendations seriously. we are the experts at the table. for the most part. as you go up in the size of buildings you have more tenants, more agency heads, these committees tend to like any other undesirable task it becomes a collateral duty. my experience is why becomes a collateral duty or when agency fund is not available the recommendations do not make it through. matter what an inspector says. these countermeasures are not going to be funded. that is the primary problem with facility security

committees. no agency is funded for ecurity countermeasures. >> how often are members of your association find are penalized for not having proper documentation and also to your knowledge has any contract guard company working with fps been debarred for not fulfilling their contractual duties? >> in terms of the information on the rate or the amount of times that contractors have been fined for not having officers who have their training and certifications, i do not have that information. that nasco, we've fully -- we fully believe that proper action should be taken. contractors have to pay back for the hours they are provided. it should affect their

performance rating for potential future contracts. we have no problems with fps enforcing the provisions of the contract against contractors but at issue is how -- who has the right data? one company has data and then it has to provide it to fps and fps's data management system is problematic. but definitely if there are pso's being put on post to do not have the training and certifications in violation of the contract that companies should be held in violation of the contract and be punished. >> how does the lack of recognition of fps officers as law enforcement officers for purposes of retirement and recruitment and morality, it has an impact clearly but is its extensive enough that we

need to look more deeply into this? >> it affects in a sense that sometimes you have law enforcement officers passed the age of the mandatory retirement to 57. you tend to have officers that stick around perhaps a lot longer than they should for their own safety and for the public safety. >> thank you. i yield back. >> what is the protocol to respond to an active shooter where an fps officer may not be on the scene? next contract guards are limited by their post orders which are basically subscribed

by their private contract. the contract spells out what the guards, what services will be provided. that is translated to what the facility needs and goes into the post orders. generally, guards do not leave facility needs and goes into the post orders. generally, guards do not leave heir post. guards are responsible for maintaining that post, locking doors, letting the tenants out and letting the good guys in. to come to pursue the active shooter. but generally these cards will not leave the post and that is per post orders and basically per contract which is also tied to state and locality issues ith their authority.

>> is an area where an active shooter where guard may be another floor and begins shooting, the guard does not leave his post. there is no authority that guard would have to do other than to wait for help. >> correct. technically, the guard should not leave that post. in some federal ill things, you do have a rover which is not tied to a post but those are few and far between. what is going to happen when it happens, we have a lot of good security officers in the field. i think just like any law enforcement officers, individuals are going to do what they have to do. then you face the consequences of what comes after.

>> you are highlighting the steps fps have taken to prove orders. is that on the authorities of the contract officers? >> they are getting provided -- better at providing that. one thing that we emphasize is that the post orders need to be facility-specific and tailored to the building. they are trying to provide better instructions and guidance to the pso's and that includes this recent issuance of the new pso manual. i would like to respond or to comment on that last question. in 2010, there were three active shooter incidents involving federal

facilities. one was at the holocaust museum, the pentagon, and one was at a federal courthouse. in all three incidents, and active shooter came in and had a gun and started shooting at the personnel. security personnel on duty. in all three incidents the shooter was neutralized. two of the incidents, they were contract security officers and a one incident he was a law enforcement officer. the pso's, they do have the guidance and instructions to engage in active shooter and protect self and third parties. that goes to the issue of the state law and the state powers. under most state licensing laws and armed security officer death valley has the authority to use his weapon to neutralize an active shooter. >> thank you.

>> my last question. can -- in your testimony, you indicate that members of your association use all the -- off the shelf technology to manager contract guards, training, and certification. have you shared this technology with fps, and if so, have they indicated they will use this technology and if not, why not? >> that is great question. i was talking with the pso row gram manager about this issue when i read in previous testimony of how pso is developing to -- is prototyping gram manager about this issue when i read in previous testimony of how pso is developing to -- is prototyping

a guard tracking system when security that fps when he to put on it security officer, certification, and tracking data management system. whatever system they use, it is going to have to interface with the systems that are being used by the contract security companies. there are as mr. goldstein said, there are commercially available technologies that fps might be able to use the laments of those technologies on their side. without a doubt, that is a big

problem and i think it can be solved because there was no reason why there cannot be a database management system where both the security contractors and fps can access and upload data. the idea that contractors are sending in paper forms and fps is manually uploading that seems and i chrism. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. the question will be directed to mr. amitay. the federal protective services has four alarm facilities that monitor federal government security alarm accounts. the centers also have the law enforcement function of dispatching federal protective service officers on emergency call. has your agency ever done an analysis on what the overall operation cost is to maintain facilities and whether he would be more cost effective for the taxpayer to move the alarm monitoring function or -- functioning to a commercial center? >> we have not looked into that. alarm monitoring is not inherently a governmental function so i think that is something that someone could look at. that goes to the issue of response. when the pso's see a problem they also -- should always contact the mega-center.

in terms of operation, whether it can be privatized, we have not looked at that. >> with that be something you would seek to do from a cost-saving standpoint? is there a concern that there ould be a breach in security or a diminution of security by doing such a thing? >> i think in this type of situation or as the centers act more in a management function, for fps, fps would want to retain control of that management function. that is just something that we have never looked at. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. and thank you for your testimony. your comments have been helpful

to today's discussion. if there are no further questions i would ask unanimous consent. let the record remain open until such time that our witnesses have provided westerns that may be submitted to them in writing and consent that the record remained open for 15 days for information submitted by members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's hearing. without objection, i would like to thank our witnesses again for their testimony today. i am concerned about what we have learned today. fps is per -- responsible for protecting one million visitors and staff. we know that federal facilities are targets. g.a.o. has documented numerous shortfalls over the years and their recommendations remain

largely incomplete yet rather than focus on departments' efforts on addressing these problems and enhancing fps we learned the department has removed fps from its lead security roll at d.h.s.'s headquarters. we learned they have reassigned their resources and staff for other purposes outside of protecting buildings, stretching already thin resources even thinner. and we learned d.h.s. has taken law enforcement authorities for protective federal buildings and delegated some of them to department security officer to fema, immigration and customs enforcement, and to federal law enforcement training center. unfortunately, this looks a little like what we saw happen to fema. fema was moved to d.h.s., d.h.s. disbursed its authorities and responsibilities throughout the department creating real confusion as to who was in charge for responding to a

disaster. and we saw the results of that in the poor response to hurricane katrina. i hope that this is not what is happening here. but when i look at this may 1 memo, it says there are no nac. unity of command at this is very disconcerting. frankly, i wonder if we had the correct witnesses from d.h.s. because it seems decisions are being made about fps from somewhere else in the department and it is not clear by whom. i expect we will have a number of follow-up questions as we assess what we have heard today. if no other members have anything to add, this subcommittee stands adjourned.

>> i want to understand post traumatic stress. i want to be able to tell with certainty that someone has post traumatic stress not by asking them 20 questions and i demand that we treat today's veterans better than we treated other veterans who we know had post traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury from every war we've ever fought in. and we are about 40 to 50 years behind in doing the research and connecting the dots that need to be connected to find

answers to help that 20%. and if we did that and could really clear up this mystery -- and it really is a mystery. it's a mystery to everyone, even the professionals and don't let them tell you otherwise. if we could clear up this mystery we would go a long way in helping i think veterans unemployment by taking away uncertainty of people having traumatic brain injury or post traumatic stress doing thing that is we don't want them to do. >> you can watch the entire event from the george w. bush institute tomorrow at noon eastern. >> in some respects apple and google arguably started at the same time. apple obviously started in the 1970s, but then steve jobs got fired from the company and in

the mid 19 0s and apple went through sort of a period of say 10 or 15 years where its for tunes really declined steadily. and it wasn't really until 1997 when steve jobs returned that apple's for tunes really began to rebound in fact it's pretty well known among people who pay attention to what's going on in the valley is that when steve jobs came back apple had about 90 days of cash left before it was going to auguster in. and so in some respects you could say both companies started right around the same time. >> tracing the origins of apple and google. monday on the communicators.

>> i always knew there was a risk in the bohemian lifestyle and i decided to take it because whether it's an illusion or not -- i don't think it is -- it helped my concentration, it stopped me being bored, stopped other people being boring to some extent. it would keep me awake it would make me want the evening to go on longer to enhance the moments. if i was asked would i do it again, the answer is probably yes i would have quit earlier possibly hoping to get away with the whole thing. easy for me to say of course not being nice for my children to hear sounds irresponsible if i would say i would do that again to you. the truth is it would be hit crpcal for me no say no. because i did know. everyone knows. and i decided all of life is a wager. i'm going to wager on this bit. and i can't make it come out

any other way. read the interview from our booknotes and q&a programs in c-span's sundays at eight. >> coming up next on c-span, "newsmakers" with vermont senator bernie sanders talking about recent issues at the veterans affairs department. after that the candidates in kentucky. >> this week the chairman of the senate veterans affairs committee senator bernie sanders, welcome.

>> you have a sophisticated and granular take on the veterans department as anybody on the u.s. senate hearings. should the leader of the department, a retired general, eric shinseki be fired? >> no. the da is a huge institution -- a is a huge institution. everyone here has heard about the claims backlog. what people do not know is that under bush we did claims by paper. an individual veterans could file this, multiply that by