about taking it out of the fed. alan greenspan always argued if you did have some regulatory authority over the fed, you would not be able to have the input you needed for monetary policy. i talked to two former fed presidents to talk about what they thought. that was not the major problem. the major problem came -- and the representative of one of the groups is here -- the state charter banks came to us and said, we do not want to be regulated by the occ because you will be throwing us in the same arena as the big national banks. the big national banks had very little political -- they only had representatives in a few cities. the problems we had to deal with came from the credit unions, the unitynce agents, in the

-- and the community banks. the community bank said, we will oppose any bill that puts us into the same regulator. that was the reason. that is what stop that. . we could not overcome it. it was something i thought about before. there was no way he you could pass a bill over the strong objections over community banks. -- were ready to lobby hard against this because they did not want to be with the big banks. draft,009, i proposed a what i called a discussion draft of the bill. -- in the midst of all this, the political considerations work is shocking to some.

votes too get enough pass it. the reaction was overwhelming, for a number of reasons. the regulators were going to be out of a job, so they were opposed. not a lot of constituency interest in the subject matter. i say respectfully of our colleagues, -- the idea of consolidation. .t's of consolidating, we grew >> if i had a magic wand, the one consolidation we would have rational world would you have a security exchange commission and the sharingies exchange jurisdiction. he would have asked me if it was possible to consolidate the two. i said of course, just on the eyes date. -- just not in the united states. [laughter]

the notion that they would be thrown in with the inspectors, never made sense. >> other countries have done it. brazil. >> is that under a general? >> that was under a general. [laughter] meanis when a junta something. [laughter] and then the supervisory function. we tried to find where you could in fedy .2 minutes conversations where the supervisory function had ever been a part of consideration. i could not find a single example. why the hell are you going to keep it that way? the idea of moving that often get that her supervisory activity seemed to be a natural inclination. the bottom line, i got three

votes for the idea. we moved away. at some point, someone needs to look at the fed's system. when you have, going back 100 years to woodrow wilson and the creation of the fed system, regional banks. two in missouri. one in san francisco because there was not anything between missouri and san francisco. the idea of going back and re-examining that role. barney and i doubt with every single day. i have asked -- been asked about vockler rule? why did we end up with three percent? i would like to say we gathered the smartest minds in the world. in the end, i had a bunch people who were for zero and a bunch of people who were 10. i could get sick two votes for

three. you have to get -- keep in mind if you do not get the 60th vote, everything dies. these numbers are not magical. nonetheless, you try to go through them it in an intelligent way. but that is how you bait fish end up with decisions based on realities. we had to do things we were not overly enthusiastic about. there are parts of the bill i voted against. i know that is hard for people to understand. when you are trying to get that to done, if you are not able majority, this is no more than a discussion. is thehe best example authority that the fed has the amount to cap you mount credit card issuers can charge retailers. i do not like that. but it got 67 votes.

-some votes. you mentioned the federal reserve's in missouri. the president had been a vigorous dissenter on much of fed policy. one official said, when you are mending things, how about a law that says no state can have two federal reserve presidents? >> like senators. senate, jim buckley decided to run having served in new york. the constitution is rather clear on that point that each state gets to senators not each senator gets two states. [laughter] >> i am going to take you back a bit before i do, have to say on

behalf of the occ that we regulate over 1500 community banks. >> barney was terrific on this. the community banks were tremendously constructive and helpful in putting this bill together. at a not been for the banks working with us, this bill would not have been passed. >> we can have a dual banking system, you have dual regulators to reflect the state federal. >> even at the federal level. timet to take you back in to september 18, 2008. it was the day you both were to the speaker's office. ben bernanke came in to tell you about what was happening with the financial system. i was wondering if you describe what happened in that room and what your reaction was. >> it was one of those days that become seared in your memory. that evening at about 7:30

when 14 of us gathered in that room. the respective chairs and ranking members of the committees and jurisdiction. there was quite a conversation. the moment i remember most clearly was ben bernanke sailing the following -- saying the following. i can tell you word for word what he said. ben bernanke is not the type to engage in hyperbole. he does not raise his voice. is a low-key individual. he turned to all of us midway through the meeting and said the following -- unless you act, speaking to the speaker and john boehner as well as harry reid and mitch mcconnell -- unless you act in a matter of days, the financial system of this country and a good part of the world will meltdown. that is the chairman of the federal reserve of the fight -- of the united states saying to the leadership of the congress about the significance of the

moment and the importance the act. the oxygen left the room. in may of been just a few seconds. i left that room with a sense of solidarity and working together. awas fortunate to have counterpart on drafting the legislation. we were able to put together a bill. hank paulson sent me a 2.5 page bill that said give me $700 billion and no court or regulator could intervene. the country erupted when that became public information. we were operating in that environment. we were trying to come up with wrapping around ideas such as the votes. a greater sense of security about what we were about to do. we went through it. 40 days before the national election, we passed in the

senate 75-24. ted kennedy was the only missing vote. never forget that night because i went around to democrats and republicans 40 days later. i said to them, i have the votes to carry this and this is the kind of opec and end your career. -- and this is the kind of vote that could end your career. oustand if you felt yiou needed to. gordon smith, republican senator from oregon, i went to him and said you were up in 40 days. need to take a pass on this -- his colleague was going to vote against the bill of the time. i was never forget his answer. he said he has the face the constituent tomorrow morning. he is not sure how to explain the vote. he said the constituent is the mirror.

i have to believe this is the right thing to do for the country. he cast a vote for it and 40 days later he lost his seat and in the senate. the point is that was a tough vote. i couldn't agree with barney more. i will go to my grave believing we did the right thing for the country at that moment. had we not done so, we will be looking at a very different place today. i know historians will talk about it endlessly. resourcescouped the but stabilizing the financial institutions at that moment was absolutely essential. a democratic house and senate with a republican president were 40 days away from a national election to get beyond partisanship and do the right thing for the country. [applause] >> we were not as successful in getting beyond partisanship in the house. the republicans voted against their president.

absolute power corrupts. i have always thought that needed an amendment. in some cases it is impotence that corrupts. the republicans in the minority felt free to vote against it. the first time they voted against the overwhelmingly and the second time after the crash they voted against it still, not by as much. after that night -- asked to night,ght -- as to that in 2008, about every other weekend after the markets close on a friday, i would get a call from paulson. we have this problem and that problem. iny had credibility particular because they were not telling us of this until lehman brothers went bankrupt. i think they try to save lh ehman. i do believe they were honestly

surprised by the depths of the reaction. we all said, this can be as bad as the great depression. it could've been worse in this meltdown. during the great depression, you still had granularity in the world. it wasn't affected. by two dozen eight, we were on one financial grid and the whole thing -- by 2008, we were on one financial grid and the whole thing was grinding to a halt. it didn't occur to us to say no. theulati--hing about initiative and a time like that is inevitably with the exception. we had two choices. either say no or say yes with modifications. there was no option of that.

>> in fact, you gave enough authority that they could change their approach because you remember in tarp they were going to purchase assets and you gave them the authority to add these equity injections and that is what they did. >> they have paid back. >> at some point, you determined that legislation beyond the tarp was needed to reform the system. do you think that providing the emergency relief to the system under the tarp created the urgency to pass reform legislation or did it undercut it? >> i don't think it was either. we were aware of the need before that. educated that we needed to do something more systemic with the bear stearns failure because what paulson and bernanke both set to us was, we were not happy with having to do this with bear stearns but we had no option. paulson began arguing all during that time until lehman.

other people gave him a different opinion but the lawyers of the treasury and the fed were convinced that in the case of a large financial institution faltering, they had two options. either they can let it go bankrupt with no special rules, just flat-out bankruptcy or intervening and profit -- propping it up. also need an alternative, a way we can put it out of business but not bankruptcy. we also, as chris noted -- this is one of the great historical misunderstandings -- we had both been working on the question of trying to curtail the responsible lending -- the responsible lending -- irrespon sible lending. i know there's his argument that the liberal democrats were ning in 1994,begini

liberal democrats were trying to slow down loans. the free-market guys were defending them. the data committee i chair that was going to pass, the wall street journal attacking my name and said subprime loans are really good. 80% of them have paid off on time. that seems like an odd statistic. they said i was trying to great an obsolete for subprime lending. we were aware of pieces of it but i think at that point we decided we had to get it done. i take the opportunity to reiterate. the more conservative free-market people who are trying to blame us for this crisis never had any problem with subprime loans in theory or practice until the crash.

>> i became chairman of the banking committee. the senate is not a meritocracy. you have a lot live in hope your friends get defeated. i was on the banking committee for 30 years and when paul trains decided to retire in january of 2007, i became the chairman of the committee. the first hearing was in the first week of february of 2007 on the subprime lending. hank paulson testified that he wanted to testify only about china. he didn't want to talk about the subprime issue. i said fine. i knew my colleagues didn't spend a lot of time on china. we got on the subject matter of the mortgage, the growing problems of mortgages. we had 90 hearings in 2007 on the subject matter.

some of the first witnesses were people actually cap lady what they thought this could result in in terms of foreclosures in the country. the first witness talked about having one million foreclosures. they were highly really fueled -- ridiculed as being engaged in hyperbolic political talk were nothing like that could ever happen. we learned millions of foreclosures happened over the coming years. despite that activity, it was a refusal to it knowledge the growing problem -- to acknowledge the growing problem. in 2008, you have bear stearns. many thought this was a on e-all problem. a ludicrous proposition when you think back. with the book talked about was a wonderful in september of 2008, everybody rallied and save the country. where were they? there was a lot of information about what was occurring. people unwilling to would knowledge this -- to acknowledge

this and get ideas. had there been an intervention early on, we wouldn't have had a crisis at the magnitude that we saw. never the 26 million jobs that were lost. never the 4.5 million homes that were for closed. not to mention what happened to some of the finest financial institutions in the country. failing, consolidation that occurred, insurance companies. it was a disaster. it didn't ever have to come to that had people but willing to see the growing problem that was clearly the evidence of. being paidve instantaneously and adjustable-rate mortgages when the banks knew well those arms that never the consumer can afford it. they were selling that mortgage and eight to 10 weeks. there was no liability.

all of that was occurring and unwilling to step up but it could've been stopped earlier on if people were able to see the magnitude of the problem was growing. >> let me build on that. the republican who told congress from 1995 until 2006 during which time nothing happened. no legislation passed. -- in 2006, iac hank paulson told the president he wanted to try again. the president people said it was too much trouble. he got the right to do it. fannie maeo us and and freddie mac award in reform and he was given the authority he wanted in the first two years of democratic and troll. -- control. you have is general deregulatory view. in 2006, as we were about to

become shares after the 2006 election, i was asked to go to a chamber of commerce conference at which they were discussing the serious problem facing the american financial community. overregulation. people go back and look at it. they were complaining that they were never be again initial public offerings in america because we were too stringent. schumer and mike bloomberg commission and report -- commissioned a report. as we took office, there was a staunch defense on the part of people who said they were the market defenders of an unrestricted subprime regime. i claim that we had to cut down further on deregulation. we started below zero. >> there clearly came a time where you agreed you had to move forward.

people like hank paulson -- people have been talking about reforming the financial architecture of the country for a long time. it is a classic case. congress never ask until there is some sort of crisis. just sitting back and recognizing. they probably needed to do something. it is awful to do. you can never today -- you couldn't pass dodd-frank today. you couldn't pass in 2006 or 2007. the one time you could do it was when we did it. andy view, to come to tarp to walk away as if you had dealt with the issues would've been a travesty. you had to make an effort. others have talked about for a long time, how do you this in a way that makes sense? that stabilizes and strengthens the financial institutions, provides the kind of protections and transparency needed. to have some ability to look

ahead. to provide institutional framework in which future institutions can respond to emerging product lines or institutions that people cannot even imagine today might exist. my feeling was had we not moved when we did, we were just functioning as that of the world existed as it did in the fall of 2008, we would be in a mess. -- the dynamics of politics and the voters who sometimes are part of the problem. the tarp was very successful and very unpopular. but, the success didn't factor into people's opinions. in doing the tarp, we did something unpopular that staved off. here's a this advantage to politicians or economists.

they can do analysis in which they invoke the counterfactual. they can talk about why this was a good thing because they can talk about the counterfactual -- what would've happened. politicians are not allowed to use counterfactual. any elected official and goes up there and says i understand you are upset, but i saved it from getting a lot worse. slogan rented a up which -- printed up which i was dissuaded from using in 2010 that said things would've sucked worse without me. [laughter] that was my political view. we got all the negative political vibes from the tarp and very little public. that is why it was tough to get the bill through. crisismentioned the

providing the impetus for getting something done. kindst extent was it the -- the crisis, the congress, and the administration that allowed to do it? how much was it your relationships with others that allowed you to move forward? >> all those factors contributed. i mentioned something at the outset of your questions. barney and i feel very strongly about this. our names are there. irony number at about 4:00 in the morning when a congressman from pennsylvania made a motion to call this bill, to call up bill.ank-dodd they said they will think it's one person. nyou want to reverse the names. the fact is -- i think it is true in the house and barn he can speak of that -- this bill would of never been done if there was nothing done by

republican colleagues. one of the things i did early on, i didn't tell my staff i was going to do this. ed the republicans and democrats to meet together in the old historic room after a boat one night. -- vote one night. andok a democratic republican of the committee and assigned them responsibility to draft the various subject matters. to deal withwarner too big to fail. i asked chuck schumer and mike vapor to deal with issues. they were asked to work together on that particular issue. it is just too large a question for the committee itself to deal with. itle their names are not on and while they don't necessarily have voted for it, they are major factors that contributed

to what is and is built. -- what is in this bill. that was terribly disappointing to me because had there been more participation on some of these issues, the bill will look different today. i think we wrote a good bill. i regret we didn't have strong provisions on ratings. i would've loved to have this deal with fannie and freddie. a lot more could have been dealt with. i'm grateful for bob corker in mark warner -- and mark warner. they couldn't do so because of two issues and this is what -- there were two issues that drove people away. the creation of the consumer protection bureau and corporate governance issues. it wasn't the volcker rule. it had to do with the creation

of a consumer protection bureau and what they perceived to be too tough on corporate governance issues. those with the two factors that cause this bill not to have him bipartisan -- to have bipartisanship. was a necessary to have a democratic president and house and senate -- no, but it would've been a different bill. it would've been possible if we had a republican president and a democratic house and a democratic senate. it would've been possible if we had a democratic president and a republican senate. we showed much more willingness to quite right with a republican president. we would've had to weaken a little bit. the one example of that -- that w a major piece of legislationas. .

he created the first efforts to try to deal with foreclosure. it dealt with a very large chunk of thanksgiving large authority to the treasury. that happen with the bush administration. it could've been passed it wasn't a republican house-senate but it would've been a less liberal bill. house.er thing -- in the here is the other important point. we sent the bill over to the senate and the norm on things like that has been with a democratic majority on the house, you only need an absolute majority. andan be a little tougher you have to get some compromises to get to the 60. the public wasn't paying much attention with what we were dealing with. health care was dominating the media. i actually lost a couple of votes on the floor on derivatives.

the bill that went out of the house was weaker in the derivative section that i wanted it. the assumption was when they got to the senate, they could weaken it. work and then what i think what was transformative was the passage of the health care bill in april because when the health care bill passed then we became the center of attention. at that point, public opinion which had been sitting out our in on our side and i think that was helpful. >> i mention this in other settings. i was incredibly fortunate to have the barney frank in the house. i am about to get him into some trouble with his former colleagues. house members have a healthy disregard for the senate and for obvious reasons. you need to have a house share that understands the role of the senate and how it functions.

had we not had barney as the chair of the house committee, dealing with the senate may have been much more difficult. i could've had a better ally we plan to work out the compromises than to have barney you understood -- who understood how difficult it is dealing with the senate. i've mentioned this and other for -- i have mentioned this in other forums. you understood that dynamic which unfortunately is not understood by a lot of others. >> understanding is not necessarily liking. [laughter] was you canly meant count the difference between 59 and 60. that is where we got the 3% and we got to the exception on the risk retention and where we got the one thing where i think the bill went further --

that was the lincoln amendment which said the banks cannot do any kind of derivatives even if it was for themselves. if you got connectivity that is necessary, why is a good idea to move it from the more regulated to the less regulated? those were all things that happened because we needed -- th other thing about the senatee. the senate is a very democratic place. everybody has a chance to be number 60. enabled by the fact we had a couple of democrats who voted no. but, yeah. every other day some senator decided to be number 60 and we had to do something. >> the numbers changed during that as well. >> it was constantly a moving

target. let me mention something else as well to this audience since many of you are involved in the business today. we have left the congress but as ve greatver -- i ha reverence for the institutions i have served in. it is going through a terrible time. something different from those of you who come from the perspective the financial services sector. the days where you have people like howard baker and bob dole are gone. me, theyrowd, believe look at these issues in a very different way. populism in aof a way that is worrisome to me in terms of how they look at the financial services sector. one of the classic examples we when you had rand paul guam the language of the federal reserve to require an audit from the federal reserve. >> on the open market.

on the voting process by which the open market sets the rates. >> had that amendment been adopted, i don't think barney and knight could've gone forward with the bill. -- and i could've gone forward with a bill. oftroying the independence the federal reserve could've easily brought the whole bill down. as a result, they came very close. the amendment was about to be offered by bernie sanders who joined with the most conservative members of the senate. they join together on that proposal. bernie sanders, i talk to him a great lengths and he decided to i and change that. as a result, the amendment was not offered. we dropped the house provision. had that exact language would've have been adopted, and you cannot get rid of it and that would've brought the whole bill down. that is an indication of what we're looking at today in terms

of how congress looks at the financial services sector. when people start talking about repealing all of this and going back to the fall of 2008 as if somehow you can create out of the system a reflection of what used to be, i would caution you to be careful of what you wish for. >> there was this problem of the increasing conservatism of the republican party. the ukraine bill passed only after every other country in the world had agreed to rearrange the voting structurae. try to get ans amendment through to tell the imf if they participate in the rescue of europe they had to stay out of dealing with the

european crisis. we have the attack on the fed. this woulde that work with some of their republican allies that they support. you, i thought it was a pain in the ass dude to be defending the federal reserve. i have business people telling me you had to protect the federal reserve and then they gave money to the people trying to destroy it. >> we have time for one question. no pressure on that one question. if someone wants to ask the one. really? not one brave soul? much fun to pick on former members of congress. >> we can repeat the question.

[laughter] >> i think everyone here respects your efforts to try and make the financial sector much safer. you are fabulous or visitors of the country. there are a lot of people that think financial status -- sector may be at better risk today. thes not just the size of shadow banking sector and the leverage, but because the government is less able to flexibility.less you say under dodd frank we have better foresight. tose committees will meet

look at these indicators. was --earns the ability to for see a panic and a run on the bank is difficult. ways, i knowome you have made things safer. have you made things riskier in some ways? have you done enough to make the thing less opaque and have less average? that as agestion result of the bill the system is riskier is nonsensical. that i haveticisms heard but rarely from the same person. [laughter] is is that the institution too much bank concentration,

which more often comes from the left. then the other is we haven't enough bailout authority. the bill didrst nothing to advance concentration. one factor that led to increase concentration was something, bank of america got bigger when it took over merrill lynch. have provided a mechanism so that we no longer have to be the federal reserve and the treasury . leverage, the leverage is substantially reduced by much higher capital standards. as to the nobel authority, there isn't ability to set up a

facility that can lend to institutions, not just a one off, but consecutively so they can advance funds which are solvent. beyond that, the notion that we would have a situation where the offayers would be paying the debts of these large financial institutions with no penalties, that is not possible. >> this goes beyond your question and something we haven't talked about. barney knight didn't write something that is -- barney and i did not write something that was biblical. we did the best under the circumstances. i've never seen a bill that didn't overstate something or understate something. the regulatory process is taking a long time to go forward.

i mention the costs that rarely get discussed. is people go forward, you get intelligent people stepping up and offering intelligent ideas of how to make this work better. this process of the reviews and so forth that require it. it is not going to shock me to find out that some changes need to be made to cousin unintended consequences. neither one of us have a problem with that. you don't not pass legislation changesthere may be required down the road. , which is the sec doing an incredible job under the circumstances given the pressure they are under, to make sure that what we are doing, barney and i tried to frame this , they gave all the power to the regulators. they never said anything of the

definitions. we try to provide some parameters, leaving flexibility for those who know more about this and have the benefit of more comment to a sure we're making the right decisions. i'm confident that can happen. a slowly, but it will happen. thing.last people who are in the business, who have experience, they play a constructive part in improving it. not as long as they are still pushing it would drop dead. the price of participation and improving something is a willingness to accept its reality and work with it. that is one of the problems we have encountered so far. >> please join me in thanking the senators. [applause] >> i would like to add my thanks. wherever you come out on dodd frank, the passion they bring to

the debate is phenomenal. i hope you caught the senator dodd biblical reference. that was a subliminal message for you to go see noah this >> coming up on c-span, president obama announces the drawdown of troops in afghanistan. followed by the future of afghanistan. and the supreme court oral moss.nt in wood vs. washingtonext journal, a look at the role on the changes plane in the 2014 elections. coalitionducation

discusses the obama administration's plan to train more teachers. later, the spotlight on magazines features a recent article on why gm keeps swerving from apology to aggression in the recall practice. -- washingtonwl journal is live every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. presidentay morning, obama delivers the commencement address. he is expected to talk about the plan to reduce the number of troops in afghanistan. live coverage at 10:00 a.m. eastern. and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. >> you can now take c-span with you wherever you go. app for your radio smartphone or tablet. listen to all three c-span tv channels or c-span radio

anytime. there is a schedule of each of our network so you can tune on when -- tune in when you want. play podcasts from key programs. take c-span with you wherever you go. app online for your iphone, android, or blackberry. announced hisbama plan for keeping a contingency force of u.s. troops in afghanistan beyond 2014. the president said the troop levels would be reduced to a normal embassy presents by the end of 2016. that is shortly before he leaves office. his remarks from the rose garden or 10 minutes -- are 10 minutes.

>> good afternoon, everybody. as you know, this weekend i traveled to afghanistan to thank our men and women in uniform and our deployed civilians. on behalf of a grateful nation for the extraordinary sacrifices they make on behalf of our security. i was also able to meet with our commanding general and ambassador to review the progress that we made. and today i'd like to update the american people on the way forward in afghanistan and how this year we will bring america's longest war to a responsible end. the united states did not seek this fight. we went into afghanistan out of necessity after our nation was attacked by al qaeda on september 11, 2001. we went to war against al qaeda and its extremist allies with the strong support of the american people and their representatives in congress.

with the international community and our nato allies and with the afghan people who welcomed the opportunity of a life free from the dark tyranny of extremists. we have now been in afghanistan longer than many americans expected, but make no mistake, thanks to the skill and sacrifice of our troops, diplomats and intelligence professionals, we have struck significant blows against al qaeda's leadership, we have eliminated osama bin laden, and we've prevented afghanistan from being used to launch attacks against our homeland. we've also supported the afghan people as they continue the hard work of building a democracy. we've extended more opportunities to their people, including women and girls, and we've helped train and equip their own security forces. now we're finishing the job we started.

over the last several years, we've worked to transition security responsibilities to the afghans. one year ago afghan forces assumed the lead for combat operations. since then they've continued to grow in size and in strength while making huge sacrifices for their country. this transition has allowed us to steadily drawdown our own forces, from a peak of 100,000 u.s. troops to roughly 32,000 today. 2014, therefore, is a pivotal year. together with our allies and the afghan government, we have agreed that this is the year we will conclude our combat mission in afghanistan. this is also a year of political transition in afghanistan. earlier this spring, afghans turned out in the millions to vote in the first round of their presidential election, defying

threats in order to determine their own destiny. and in just over two weeks they will vote for their next president. and afghanistan will see its first democratic transfer of power in history. in the context of this progress, having consulted with congress and my national security team, i've determined the nature of the commitment that america's prepared to make beyond 2014. our objectives are clear. disrupting threats posed by al qaeda, supporting afghan security forces and giving the afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. here's how we'll pursue those objectives. first, america's combat mission will be over by the end of this year. starting next year, afghans will be fully responsible for

securing their country. american personnel will be in an advisory role. we will no longer patrol afghan cities or towns, mountains or valleys. that is a task for the afghan people. second, i've made it clear that we're open to cooperating with afghans on two narrow missions after 2014. training afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al qaeda. today, i want to be clear how the united states is prepared to advance those missions. at the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 98,000 u.s. troops -- let me start that over. just because i want to make sure we don't get this written wrong. at the beginning of 2015, we

will have approximately 9,800, 9,800 u.s. service members in different parts of the country together with our nato allies and other partners. by the end of 2015, we will have reduced that presence by roughly half, and we'll have consolidated our troops in kabul and on bagram air force. by the end of 2016, our troops will drawdown to a normal embassy presence in kabul with a security presence like we've done in iraq. now, even as our troops come home, the international community will continue to support afghans as they build their country for years to come. but our relationship will not be defined by war. it will be shaped by our financial and development assistance as well as our diplomatic support.

our commitment to afghanistan is rooted in the strategic partnership that we agreed to in 2012, and this plan remains consistent with discussions we had with our nato allies. just as with our allies have been with us every step of the way in afghanistan, we expect that our allies will be with us going forward. third, we will only sustain this military presence after 2014 if the afghan government signs the bilateral security agreement that our two governments have already negotiated. this agreement is essential to give our troops the authorities they need to fulfill their mission while respecting afghan sovereignty. the two final afghan candidates in the runoff election for president have each indicated they would sign this agreement promptly after taking office. so i'm hopeful we can get this done. the bottom line is it's time to

turn the page on more than a decade in which so much of our foreign policy was focused on the wars in afghanistan and iraq. when i took office, we had nearly 180,000 troops in harm's way. by the end of this year, we will have less than 10,000. in addition to bringing our troops home, this new chapter in american foreign policy will allow us to redirect some of the resources saved by ending these wars to respond more nimbly to the changing threat of terrorism while addressing issues around around the globe. i think americans have learned that it's harder to end wars than it is to begin them. this is how wars end in the 21st century. not through signing ceremonies, but through decisive blows, transitions to governments,

security force who is are trained to take the lead and ultimately full responsibility. we remain committed to a sovereign, secure, stable and unified afghanistan. and toward that end we will continue to support afghan-led efforts to promote peace in their country through reconciliation. we have to recognize afghanistan will not be a perfect place, and it is not america's responsibility to make it one. the future of afghanistan must be decided by afghans. but what the united states can do, what we will do is secure our interests and help give the afghans a chance, an opportunity to seek a long overdue and hard-earned peace. america will always keep our commitments to friends and partners who step up and we will never waiver in our determination to deny al qaeda

the safe haven they had before 9/11. that commitment is embodied by the men and women in and out of uniform who serve in afghanistan today and who have served in the past. in their eyes, i see the character that sustains american security and our leadership abroad. these are mostly young people who did not hesitate to volunteer in the time of war, and as many of them begin to transition to civilian life, we will keep the promise we make to them and all veterans and make sure they get the care and benefits that they have earned and deserve. this 9/11 generation is part of an unbroken line of heroes who give up the comfort of the familiar to serve half a world away, to protect their families and communities back home and to give people they never thought they'd meet the chance to live a better life. it is an extraordinary sacrifice

for them and for their families, but we shouldn't be surprised that they're willing to make it. that's who we are as americans. that's what we do. tomorrow i'll travel to west point and speak to america's newest class of military officers to discuss how afghanistan fits into our broader strategy going forward. and i'm confident that if we carry out this approach, we can not only responsibly end our war in afghanistan and achieve the objectives that took us to war in the first place, we'll also be able to begin a new chapter in the story of american leadership around the world. thanks very much.

leaders responded to the remarks, including buck mckeon. pleased theyhe is met the military request, having an arbitrary egg timer doesn't make sense strategically. john boehner said, i welcome the the amount spent today -- i welcome to the president's announced today. and wednesday morning, president obama delivers the commencement address at west point military academy. he is expected to talk about the plan to use the number of troops in afghanistan and help train rebels in syria.

live coverage at 10:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter with your thoughts on the president's foreign policy. and later, the veterans affairs committee holds a hearing to hear from the v.a. over the failure to comply with a subpoena. that is live at 7:30 a.m. on c-span2. upthe house this week takes commerce and2015 science spending bill. she joins us from capitol hill. this is a wide-ranging bill. give us some sense of what is in it and how much congress is proposing to spend. they are proposing to spend $51 million. that is 400 million dollars less

than current spending levels. thank you said, this is a spending bill. it funds the department of commerce and justice. and agencies like the national science foundation. this truly is a wide-ranging bill. >> i want to ask you about the gun bill. doesit came out in -- that mean the debate on the floor will not see any gun amendments? guest: not at all. this made up the majority of debate time. because of the recent shootings at uc santa barbara, we really are expecting to see many of the same gun amendments we saw in committee in addition to perhaps some new ones. >> tomorrow, tweeting about this bill. nifty cq -- a link

to that chart at roll call. it shows the departments such as missedional oceanic and ration getting a fair chunk of money. also the patent office and the national institute of standards and technology. you said it was less than last year's. is the same in percentages? >> it is about the same. they want to cut 24% from the climate research side of the they want tonic -- move the funding to weather satellites. >> in addition to the gun issue that may, in amendment, there's also the issue of medical marijuana and law enforcement. >> there's a very interesting

harmonization of lawmakers looking to back best on the floor. state rights, conservative republicans as well as some of your most liberal members looking to include a provision that would bar the justice department prosecuting any medical marijuana users who have a prescription in states where it's legal. this one has been brought up in previous years and it was turned down in committee. giving the increasing poll numbers for the legalization nationwide, the number of supporters this will get, that will be something we will be watching. >> the heritage foundation has been opposing. shouldite that congress also require nasa to expand its contract with private firms to provide space transportation and rockets pointing out the proposed budget has fund established for food items for a trip to mars despite the fact that nasa has no current plans

for a martian expedition. when groups like the heritage foundation put together a piece like this, does it have an impact on members? >> especially your conservative republicans. we will see with -- who breaks with heritage to support the measure. >> this is the last cgs appropriations bill for frank wolf of virginia. what will his legacy be in terms of this bill and the overall appropriations process? are lot of provisions legacy issues particularly related to gang violence, something that has been an issue in his northern virginia district. he cares deeply about science funding and is proposing the highest level of funding for the national science foundation and the nations's history so he will definitely step out and defend those programs from the more conservative republicans who would rather see the money spent elsewhere. >> looking at the cgs debate

.omorrow you can also follow her on twitter. thank you for the update. >> the former afghan interior minister spoke tuesday about challenges with the training of the country's national police force. these comments came from the national institute of peace. on sunday, president obama announced he expects troops are fully withdraw by the end of 2016. after his remarks, experts participated in a panel. this is just over two hours. >> i think we will go ahead and get going. my name is andrew wilder. i'm vice president of the middle east and asia department at the u.s. institute of peace. particularly, thanks to our panelists, many of whom have come a long way to join us for a topic that i think is extremely important. the resident time in my career that i looked at issues around

but itg quite closely was many years ago so i'm looking forward to getting an update. however, i fear that not all the issues have changed from when i papersearch on a published in 2007 called "cops or robbers?" reform thee to afghan national police and i thought i would start this by reading the final paragraph of the conclusion. afghanistan is unlikely to ever devoted tothe levels the police sector it has today. i was actually wrong on that point. this was written in 2007 when in that year alone, there was finally a recognition of the importance of police in the 2006-2007 time in the resources given in 2007 alone was more

than in the previous five years for the police sector. there was a recognition and it actually increased from there. now a unique is opportunity to move away from the multitude of individual police reform projects towards a more coordinated, comprehensive, long-term approach that stand a much greater chance of addressing the complex and difficult task of reforming the afghan national police. it is time to clarify the blurred vision of the role of police in afghanistan. i highlighted in that paper some key areas that i thought were key to success in police reform. first and foremost, the need to develop a shared vision and strategy for the afghan national police. we had a major counterinsurgency operation in the south and

certainly from the u.s. perspective and other troop contributing forces in the south, a desire for more boots on the ground. they wanted more of a civilian police force and then you have the afghan government with its own strategy which was to rarely for police reform and afghanistan. you could arguably say that there was a quite efficient .olice force in terms the competing visions were never clarified. i think that still remains an issue today. the second point was how to make toor assistance conditional

ministry interior reform. the home ministry was addressed and a common mission and if we did not have political well, it would be hard to see a lot of the reform object is moved forward. prioritize quality over quantity. quick fixes, which at that time was the afghan auxiliary police. and some might argue perhaps the afghan local police which i'm hoping we will hear more about today can often undermine achieving long-term object lives. the need to prioritize fiscal sustainability which of course remains a huge issue and one of particular concern as resources for afghanistan are now on a downward trajectory. also police reform is first and foremost not a technical undertaking and that has

remained a fairly consistent problem, the unwillingness to understand the politics in fact to that in the planning. lots more goodet news. there has been progress. i have to say i was in afghanistan last for the election and now observing on iection day north of kabul, think seeing the role of the police in that massive security out ration to protect the elections, we know there was a lot of violence on election day. i would not describe it as a peaceful election but compared to what we anticipated, it was more peaceful and the national security forces deserve a lot of credit for that. i think the out pouring of saw wasresolve -- we quite a testimony to some of the achievements that had been done. the pictures of young girls handing out roses to the afghan national police is not something

i would have predicted four or five years earlier but it was a morale booster and a confidence building measure for their national security forces. policing is hugely important and we are fortunate to have an incredibly gifted panel of experts here today with lots of experience working on this issue both in terms of the afghan national police issue but also around the local bullies. i wanted to quickly do a little pr pitch. someevent is to launch done, that u.s. ip has the most recent in 2015 police and beyond. we're fortunate to have her with us today. prior to that, we did the counterinsurgency and state building in afghanistan, a .loser look at the local police

prior to that, one year ago we is inhed this and dawn the room today and bob is on the panel so we will give presentations on all of these and an opportunity to hear them present and discuss following. now it's my great honor to introduce our guest of honor today, former minister ali july -- the minister of interior from two thousand 3-2005 and has first-hand experience what it was like trying to reform the police sector in afghanistan. he is currently a distinguished assessor at the near east south asia center for strategic eu.ies at and prior to being at the ministry of the interior, he had a 20-year career covering south and central asia and leading that service. prior to that, he served as a

colonel in the afghan national army. he has published widely on security sector reform issues in afghanistan and we are probably anticipating the obligation of his recent book on which he's been working for several years on a comprehensive military history of afghanistan. with that, we welcome him. >> good afternoon. i'm pleased to open the session but i'm sure that we have a panel of distinguished experts and you will learn more than -- from them than my opening remarks. i will share a few thoughts with you based on my experience as andster of the interior

later on that i continue to follow the development of national security forces in afghanistan. the afghan national police have come a long way. from the days when it was first established in 2003 to today when we see the successful protection or security of the first round of elections in afghanistan. they have always been very successful in providing security for these major events. for example, the security of the constitution of 2003-2004 and presidential and parliamentary elections later on. these are singular events. tell you about the overall capacity of the afghan , a force thate

will do the kind of job required from them as law enforcement and security of the citizens at the same time. actually, afghanistan national police ceases to exist during civil war. the police actually become a fighting force fighting the insurgents. and then in a police state, most of the function of the police was shattered to the interior service. a tradition of the lease we had in afghanistan was being that,ten and before traditionally in afghanistan, three things help to the police at the intersection of population. governance, security, the rule of law. they all combined together in

the sensory and in the provinces. many yearsk with the of war and violence, they fragmented. governance, security, and the rule of law fragment. the ministry of the interior was also in charge of local and security forces, the border police. a combination of these different categories provided a kind of comprehensive stability. after 2001 when the international committee stepped in and offered to reform the security forces, we saw two major problems. there were many actors that came with different priorities, different

procedures, and on the other hand the development of the lease security forces happened while fighting was going on in the country. fighting and building taking place at the same time. most of the building was influenced by the fighting. problem ine major the beginning. during theen poorlyg process was coordinated resources and at the same time, fragmented. 2003, when all provincial governments, district governments, municipalities, border police, and also immigration, all under the ministry of interior, the budget of the ministry of the interior

was $137 million per year. that is a fraction of what happened after 2009. after 2009, the budget of training afghan national security forces was $1 billion or months. i wish we had a fraction of that . at that time, a police officer was drawing $16 per month as salary. they would get themselves paid by shaking down others and that was the beginning of the major corruption in the police force. at that time, i remember in order to move the police from coupled to the province, we had the lease cars and trucks from others commercially. we did not have enough vehicles. that was a situation where we were trying to build a police

force and at that time, the police developmental reform was in the context of security sector reform, a broken, uncoordinated system. different countries came in to take one part of the security sector and they came in with different levels of commitment, different levels of resources, and also priorities. the afghan national army did very well because it was funded by the united states. the lead nation was germany and they were the godfather of the afghan police. however, germany wanted to build .olice many other donors were looking at the security force. just as the sector was eating bill, italy.

united kingdom, japan. therefore, these different countries, it the system was not coordinated. the police could arrest violators, criminals, but the next days, if they were not working they would go loose. that is why the justice system and building the police force was not coordinated very well. thater, since 2009, we saw there was more interest and investment in the police and that actually helped. whatever you see today of the , that actually started with 2009. now within the context of the itice built in afghanistan,

was such that what we have today has many problems facing the police as a arm of law enforcement. is what isuestion going to be the future of the lease? is it going to become an arm of protect theent to population? or a security force to protect state? the surge of, with violence in 2006, there was a rush to build police as a security force. today.ntinued until today, the police is a security force, however it is not the that will resolve the challenges of insurgency in afghanistan. arm of fighting

insurgency but not as a fighting force but the tech tango protecting-- but by the population and becomes an asset to fighting the insurgency. when i was looking at the challenges facing the police in afghanistan today, i counted to 10 and i stopped. the first one was the number. they say 157,000 police. is an autosort the different categories. force, thee police uniformed police. jeff counterterrorism police. police. border closether, there is no

institutional connection. from day one, instead of reforming the ministry of interior, we went to force the generation of police. each minister who comes makes changes in the next minister who makes moreust changes and there is no continuity in building the institution of the minister of the interior. the second thing that is dominated by force generation, as i said. that started from day one. , before the presidential wereions, the contractors pledged to build 50,000 or 40,000 police officers by

october. in order to meet that target, they started courses for one week, two weeks, sometimes a few days. who were they? came fromcontractors across the world, the united states, but they were not up to the challenge. they tried hard. many of them were big cops in small-town america. we tired beat tops. it continues to be the case. outsourcing the police or building the police force. one of them is the experience with local police, guards, whatever you call them. wereof the experiences

not, you know, very successful. they would hear about the success of the local police but 2004, 2005, 2006, some of this was not successful. local police, militia, tribal ititia, tribal contributions only works when the state becomes part of one system. when that system breaks, it's not going to work. therefore, wherever the state or some kind of influence the tribes or communities believe in the viability of the state, they contribute. otherwise, they will go on and find around ways. the reason that people in and the instability go to warlords and networks is

theuse they do not see state capable of protecting them. afghanistan, the nightmare is when the state is weak. they want a strong state. during the constitutional, there was thewhelming support for building of a strong, centralized state. to the othert options and i will not discuss that here. the security and the focus on security for police is weak and other capacity of police. islding cases and evidence ,ecoming very, you know

effective because today, one police officer is in charge of a district or police security function in the province. in thet day, he is investigation police. there is no kind of institutional continuity. the coordination of international donors are always a problem. they appreciate the contributions from many countries but it only works when and the a coordination priority of the afghan government and the international committee. future, thein the international police coordination board would become more kind of authoritative in order to bring that.

it is another problem that it is not based on their capacity or competence or their training. one day, a general changes uniform from the minister of head ofand becomes the the police department of a province. and he brings the experience of military to the police force. .his is not something new from the beginning, the ministry of the interior was loaded with army officers. were geared more towards security, not police. there were many other things -- i don't want to get into it, but looking forward, i think the futurey can establish a

in afghanistan only through winning the support of its citizens. that can happen when police function as a community. there is no doubt as long as there are insurgents in afghanistan, instability that police will be forced to do some security jobs. however, there should be conditions established. first, forces that are providing security should, at the same switchinge capable of to normal policing jobs when the need comes. , it is a parent military force -- paramilitary force. they were doing some heavy lifting. but, you are first going to

become a police officer and then they would send you to courses to become a paramilitary force and this is something that we should see in afghanistan. if a person comes from the ministry of defense, a general in the ministry of defense, if i think you have the training to become a police officer. the continued international theort is required for sustainment of the afghan international police. 2014, when the bulk of the nato forces leave afghanistan, this is going to be a challenge, whether the international community will make good on the pledges they have made to support and continue or not. without that kind of support, without the aid of the united

possibilitye is a that afghan national security forces including the police will not hold together. riskyparticularly very because in some units or some parts of the national security forces, the ethnic balance is not there. if that force cannot hold fragment then it can along ethnic lines. be unified inuld the future. priority of the afghan government and the international community. , kind of an do this more empowered international police. is instead ofe continued force generation or focusing on force generation, i think institution building should take precedence.

is regretful that in not -- resisting the decision of the government to take the local administration, the local government from the ministry that took -- interior and give it to another entity. since then, it has been very hard. all these problems between the government and the police force. as i said, traditionally, it is provided by the combination of government, security, the rule of law. int is actually fragmented 2000 six after i left the ministry of interior. is importantrnment

in provincial government. it does not represent the central government because all provinces report to the ministry in kabul. it does not have a budget because the budget of the province is the sum of the budget of the department to get the money from kabul. they do not have authority because all of the departments including police report to the ministry in kabul. that situation should be reviewed. then, i think, there is a vision, all this talk about vision, police, the future, which is good. as long as the capability is not built, as long as the current flaws are not corrected, i don't think the vision will be implemented in the future. unfortunately in afghanistan, always papers. between no connection

the ends, ways, and means. finally, managing the afghan local police. afghan local police has worked very well in some areas. there are two reasons for this, particularly in the south. first, the taliban failed to recover the areas that they lost after the surge. ,hey switched to terror tactics assassination of influential people in communities. . becamethemselves supportive of local police. kandahar,e that in everywhere.

many years ago, i think it was the most unstable, insecure area. today, it is very secure. i have recently spoke with them and it has been an interesting experience. in order totime, re-empower the militia that are .ery popular in afghanistan the local police is good as long as it is managed well. the plan.hould be how to deal with it later on. it becomes powerful to move all

over the country but what are you going to do with local police? or inou integrate it worst case letting go? then there's the possibility of seeing another millichap. first of all, afghan national police have come a long way. it is not comparable today the situation in 2003. it needs to be irregular, civilian police. .t cannot happen overnight finally, the police force is integrated with other elements.

the key toecome instability in the country. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, minister jalali. program over to my colleague that has helped with a lot of work with us in afghanistan, pakistan, police reform issues. bobble moderate the rest of the session. >> thank you. thank you, mr. minister, for your presentation. i would like to welcome all of you here this afternoon. 've been here at u.s. ip many times and it's great to be

back. looking forward, if the first transition of the afghan national police. as you have just heard, this is not the first transition that the national police have undergone. is aems the transition distinguishing characteristic of the afghan national police. today, we find ourselves in the situation as the result of a long-term u.s. military training areram, the police basically a militarized counterinsurgency force of around 150,000 members. the question before us this forceg is if it is a afghanistan needs going forward into a democratic future. , we have athe issue very distinguished panel of experts from a number of .erspectives they are authors of new reports

and they are available outside the room if you have not picked them up. you pick up the materials as you came into the room, you have the bios of our panelists. i will limit my introductions in the interest of time. when the panel has finished their presentation and we asked them each to speak for 10-12 minutes, we will open the floor for questions. i recognize a number of people in the audience. this is a group of people who know this issue well. morningt panel was this -- i'm sorry. we've been together since about 11:00 this morning. we got off to an early start. our first panelist is ambassador kathryn royle, former head of the international police coordinating board secretariat and former deputy ambassador to the united kingdom in kabul. is theond presenter

former director of the international security erialtance force ministr advisory group. michelle hughes has been many things regarding afghanistan but probably the most relevant is the former senior rule of law advisor to the national training mission in afghanistan police development mission. and finally, changing subjects in the middle of our presentation here and take a closer look at the afghan local police. very interesting reports. he's a professor of development studies at the university of whoon and his phd candidate is also a co-author of the report and also a student at the

university of london. we will get started. will turn the microphone over to ambassador kathryn royle. >> thank you very much, paul. a great pleasure to be here. although i'm still a serving member of the british diplomatic service, my last two jobs were and as the secretariat an advisor to the ministry of the interior, i have been sick on the dow did my ministry in the foreign office cannot take any of the blame for what i'm about to say. -- i have been seconded from my ministry. i think it did fail for quite a while. it was one of those cinderella subject. everyone would be very happy to having aabsolutely good and functioning police force is vital to any country and the name transition and that is one of those apple pie statements that you can make. it's not just about security. it's about legitimacy.

it really does go to the heart of any state in you saw that again in ukraine. when did they lose legitimacy? when the police left the square. it faded away, the government felt. -- fell. we did not behave in afghanistan certainly in the beginning, and the minister set this out very well, as if the police really we should work on urgently, an important foundation for where we were all going. we think it, but we do not act on it and we find ourselves in the complicated situation the minister described of sort of having to build that ability and institution in the middle of a fight. not an easy time to do it. when you talk to police professionals about reforming institutions and try to get them to imagine doing it in the middle of an insurgency, they just collapse at the thought of

it. we set ourselves on enormous task. having decided it was important but not doing it, we identified all of these lessons out of iraq. we had made all of these mistakes before. when i became head of the secretariat and having to convince that we needed to work together and have a real partnership, civil military partnership approaching this, one of the things that someone drew my attention to was a pamphlet that was done by fort leavenworth, the army center for lessons learned. a very good pamphlet called from zero to blue. i was able to get myself a speaking spot in front of the assembled, slightly hostile military, thethe american military identified 13 golden lessons of what we should do policing in the situation.

we broken 11 of them. maybe we should have another go. we found ourselves in that situation in 2012 which is really quite shocking and explains why there are still a long way to go. three of the biggest mistakes that we made, you need to focus on policing early. there needs to be local ownership of the process that you are doing. that was pretty sadly lacking. it took a very long time to understand that this was someone else's country and maybe we have seriously. and you need to distinguish the police from the army. the relationship that the police population is different than the military and that's the basis of the difference.

of policing by consent, the community the minister also spoke about absolutely vital and not at all central to the work we have been doing on the police in afghanistan. would thoroughly agree about the disjointed mess. we had a policy that was fundamentally, adopt and different nationalities picked up different forces and took them forward. how did it relate to anything else? that was a bit of a mystery. how it related to this integrating closely to a justice system and following in that way but it just did not. fundamentally, we have not that. created you did not join the anp but you joined the border police.

actually don't even have an group where you feel your loyalty is to the anp because it is just a name. as the minister said, 2009 was an important phase in all of this. it was absolutely extraordinary. when i arrived in kabul first in 2010, they were saying that it just could not be done. you did not even generate the force and the timescale we were talking about. an awful lot of hard work went into that. we would not be able to have a discussion now about where to go and how to turn this into a proper police force attacks -- if it had not been done in the first place. there inthe foundation numbers and the force that could

start us off and give us something serious to build on. i also think one of the most important things they have done for afghanistan as a whole is put literacy at the forefront of training and development. meet young guys who would join in the afghan national police in we would talk to people at the helm and police training college. it's a death sentence -- we did not quite put it like that but it was in the back of my mind and a number of them said to me, because i know that in the course of my service, i signed up for three years but i will be taught to read and write and that will allow me to go back into the civilian world and i will be able to look over my family better. not only has the force generation but also literacy. that is something to look or

word and it is an angle that recruits people, gets them into the police and a huge stimulus for that. all of that is good but on the other hand, we did not build a police force. extraordinarily good reasons for that. we need to start preparing for the future. we were talking about this and he said that he always recognized that there needed to be a proper eye out for a tipping point in the need for agreety diminishing and i with him to a point. the problem is there is not really a tipping point. you have to start preparing for a rule of law force. you have to sort of have your priority and do it all. then you just shift the balance

of what you are doing depending on what the activity is and it's , different priority balance in different places in the country. ,ne of the things you could say and somewhere like iraq for example, less problems of insurgency and having the real focus on the rule of law and the ability to start doing better earlier gives the flagship a pilot for other places to look to and look at what the police force might look like. perhaps because we were doing it so late in the day and under some much pressure, we were not able to do these two capabilities that once and run the parallel. that's what we need to get to and that's what we need to keep doing now. i became the head of the secretariat. as the military says, i was voluntold. natoe run-up to the summit, this issue that the minister also spoke about, creating a rule of law force or

a paramilitary came to a head. it came to a head because the non-american donors were being asked for one billion euros per year for the next 10 years to finance but they could not influence what it looked like and it was not going to be what they wanted the rule of law force. said theyough, they would not pay and that facilitated the discussion. result of that was we needed a proper discussion and we needed to tackle some of these really difficult issues. we grapple with the generating the force and now we really need to look at what sort of police force is going to be. for once, we managed not to invent a new institution. fortunately, someone finally said we have some thing with me right mandate. let's not reinvent the wheel. let's just bring it back to life.

pretty limited aims which was just as well because i did not have a budget and had to do things like begged for furniture. made up ofa staff voluntary national contributions which meant i had some absolutely excellent people and some people i needed to entertain. that's the way of the world and international organizations. we gave ourselves some fairly limited goals. one was to actually agree on a vision. discussions have started on this but it had not really gotten us anywhere. there were a lot of people who are putting forward their vision saying this was what the afghans wanted. it struck me if we were ever going to coordinate international support at that stage in the game, the only way to do it would be to say we would coordinated and find what the afghans want. anything that is ours, it's too late.

in 2002 or 2003, we probably could have got a consensus but at that stage, it had to be the afghans decision. first thing was to get that to happen and have the internationals align their support behind it. i was trying to hold their feet to the fire. the other thing was to come up with some implementable plans so we did not just have something what we were aspiring to but what we were going to do. those were my aims for the work thei managed to help afghans produce a vision during that time. produceds finally been sometime later, a plan that looks vaguely and lamentable -- implementable.

vision is genuinely afghan. i'm asked about it all the time. between the bodily international community and the afghans and let them have space to do it themselves. space,ey were given that one of the rules that i am posed and was much criticized for, we were not going into any discussion with a piece of paper . then it would be put on paper after the discussion. we want to hear what you want to do and here's our suggestion. that completely close down the debate and we ended up with nothing. you have no idea how upsetting it was to a culture dominated by powerpoint to say you could not put anything on paper. we proved to them that you could do it.

visions.e differing i think it's a false dichotomy whichn community policing is not helping little old ladies across the road but getting the community to tell you where the are buried. that got us into trouble and that's a debate we are still unfortunately having and we need to get out of. the lack of afghan capability is still there. i will not go through all through the institution because bob will kill me but i will say a few things about the problems coming up. we've made huge progress. the problems and doubts i have in my mind and my successes, afghan commitment, what's the next minister going to do?

to we going to get it passed the next minister? that's vital. to stovepipe been no anp has be resolved. cutting across of personal interest, building an institution that is not there to serve the personal interest of various people in it that also serving the afghan state. call it anticorruption. the political threads. that is very worrying and it shows you how hard it is to undo . to know what a proper police force looks like. there is a whole generation of people in afghanistan and need from told what to expect police. you need to understand their duties and that civic education has to be done. budgetyou share the

between the army and police in a way that creates the sort of security you want in the country? make no bones about it, we are part of that problem. there is a real issue there. bodiesgoing to be the there on the ground discussing things? up until now it has been nato isaf. the president has come up with a number and that's fantastic news, but unfortunately, there are still a lot of discussion about what the mandate will look like and where policing fits into that. nato decides not to do that and then we are all in deep trouble. then we thrown away a lot of money. i sing to myself the daily bravery and the phenomenal people who are really doing their best in doing extraordinary things and taking

casualties at twice the rate of the army. they deserve our support for that alone, but also we invest and we need to not lose that investment. >> thank you very much. that's a lot to cover. our panelistsl of to keep in mind the time limit because we do want to get to the audience. also do a quick preface to my comments. all of my observations are based isaf role serving in nato and working in the ministry of interior advisory group there. i'm not a law enforcement professional at all. at best, i'm a bureaucrat. i have budgeting experience, experience with organizational change, but not policing either in afghanistan or elsewhere, really. inave done two tours there

2000 11 and most recently in 2013 and 2014. i've been back here for about 10 days now. bitbservations may be a aided given the change that occurs there. informed byo interactions with over 40 plus international stakeholders who also donated or sought influence within the ministry of interior. afghan leaders within the ministry and within the provinces of the provincial police. these are also based on my observations of police performance in such recent issues such as the islamic celebrations, especially those inviting international leaders into the roundarea and of course one of the presidential elections. mentioned, nato and

isaf originally focused on force generation. what a chairman this effort occurred there. in less than three years, the size of the police force went from 67,000 two what is really personnel right now. they are the largest of the afghan national security forces. 157,000 members of the afghan national police but also the afghan local police, 30,000. the 20,000 members of the afghan public protection force, 10,000 civil servants. u.n. site security, central prisons director for the nation, and the judicial security units. if you add it all together, it's 230,000 members who fall within that moi

infrastructure. it is a resilient, capable, and increasingly credible force. credible with both the coalition operationally and with the people of afghanistan. especially in the wake of the election security. that is a key aspect in ensuring security and credibility of the government of afghanistan and the coalition's efforts in supporting them. they havee time, plenty of challenges. paramountinfluence is throughout the anp and moi. it is seen as one of the most susceptible to political all of then government of afghanistan. high personnel turnover, especially in leadership meanings, turnover not

that but rotating in and out of positions but it is a fragmented command and control structure. you heard the minister mention even within the 107,000, -- 157,000 it's not homogenous like the army but it's broken up into the afghan uniform police which provides half the force but also the border police. it is given the task of securing the nation's borders for the first if the kilometers from the border and linda. they are met by a foreign invader, whose role is it to stop them? the first 50r kilometers. you have the afghan national metal --er police , aeled on the gendarmerie police force with military capability but still tasked with law enforcement. theafghan anticrime police,

counter narcotics, the afghan local police, public protection force, general directorate of police special unit, basically swat. forces, theyse answered to a centralized police force, but to provincial governors, district governors, a tought is organization to try to manage. they seem to make it work somehow. multiple variables, complexities that we often do not understand. need tol that, we also focus on institution building and reform. this is really the underpinnings of all of that operational capability. thatf those police forces, 200,000 person force relies on pay,