ideals. thank you, poland -- for your triumph -- not of arms, but of the human spirit, the truth that carries us forward. there is no change without risk, >> god bless poland. bless america. god bless our unbreakable alliance. you very much. >> tonight on c-span, a discussion about china's prodem acy poe testers in tiananmen square to years ago today and then a look the obama administration deal with the taliban to secure the army sergeant bowe bergdahl.llion of the anniversary tiananmen crackdown, tens of thousands have gathered in hong candlelight vigil at

the guardian newspaper reports presence haspolice prevented similar gatherings in mainland china where state censureship prohibits any the 198 protests. on monday, the council on hosted twoations discussions about the event at tiananmen square. includes theel national security advisor at the times"d "new york nicolas kristoff. h two hours and 15 minutes. >> good morning. and welcome to the council on symposium onions the 25th anniversary of tiananmen square. i'm richard haas, president of

the council on foreign relations of i would like to thank all you for joining us on this glorious monday morning here in new york. we have two sessions from theperspectives u.s. and china on the events in 198.nmen square in june of first, to speak to america's perspective, brent. advisorational security at the time to president george bush 41 and nick kristoff whose recording from inside the less than him nothing the pulitzer prize. full disclosure, i work for and every now and then against brent at the time. working on the middle east rather than the far one. also in the department of full disclosure i'm a regular nick chri kristoff's column

again i agreeand with him. the second session you will hear from louis who is in beijing two days out with a new book about the subject of proyou will and a hear from a professor of at the berkeley. and they will look at things more from the chinese perspective happe and the second presided over by orville shell. the first session is designed to the always present tension along what many of us the principle faultline of american foreign policy. and by that i mean the faultline interests and values or realism and idealism. june 1989 are of nowarter of is century old but when they took place it was

less than two decades after the u.s.-china relations. june 1989 was also less than six the 41st president took office. the berlin wall was still up two germanys and it whereclear at the time gore ba chev was taking the soviet useon and to develop over this trajectory of a potentially emerging great still very much in evidence. and the second session this is more aboutaid how things look from the chinese side. times" has"new york a fascinating front page article nose general chi nose general

opposed the use of its military to put down what he described as eceptionly a political matter and the story also reveals the extraordinary confusion and disarray on the chinese side. so what comes through is the intensity in the moment that simply something limited to the square as important as it was but really potentially threatened the entire political order of china. in the the many communist party thought that what was at stake was nothing less than its future and the country's. so today's symposium which looks at both the american and chinese perspectives is illustrative of on foreign relations ongoing commitment to the study hisistory not simply for history's sake but also for deriving policy lessons for today. everything that we are going to tremendousabout has relevance if one takes a second

and thinks about what is going in china despite the many decades of extraordinary economic growth. now slowed has significantly. and what we are seeing is protests mounting in that over official accountability, over the environment, we are seeing in the name ofes anticorruption by the government. we are seeing tightening controls on the internet and on public demonstrations more broadly. kinds of issues that came to the fore 25 years ago are not simply again historical and in in anited states we are constant debate about the trajectory and tropical trajectory of thiscountry's relh china. the pivot and balance introduced several years guy is meant to hedge against or if need be contain chinese power but meant a way that tows not

alienate china. and again there is the question issues of democracy andy hugh man rights, how did how should they figure into the whole of u.s.-china relations. for this morning is he would are going to begin -- we are going to begin the discussions with a brief exceptor of a film from describes theh events of 25 years ago and the aftermath and this can be viewed in full on pbs.org/frontline. begin with a conversation with brent and nick it up toand then open you our members a and then go to the second session. say one other thing about something available to 25erstand the events of that years ago, foreign affairs an e-book entitled

tiananmen. you can get that on foreign affairs.com. you canre a subscriber get it for free. the not so good news if you are subscriber is that it will cost but but it will be modest. we as we used to say roll the film and then we will hereour conversation up with brent and nick. ♪ >> tonight on frontline square june 1989. people started to scream at us take pictures. take video. tell the world what is going on. they are killing innocent people. in the wake of a bloody prodemocracy demonstrators one man defied the power of the state.

>> he went out and said stop and the attack stopped. he?ho was >> he said he stood for the ordinary people. him?d what happened to >> he melted into the crowd and he was gone. >> tonight, veteran film maker investigates the fate of this heroic figure. >> for every year we also every lead. >> and explores the bold gamble leaders to quell the spirit of tiananmen. firew do you prevent the from spreading? >> through the open embrace of capitalism. in 1989.appened >> tough political repression. >> if you have seen security manhandle a chinese citizen, they are brutal. censorship of the media. likeading companies google, yahoo, cisco and compromised their duties as responsible corporate citizens. >> this was not something that enthusiastically or not

something that we are proud of at all. "frontline." the story behind one of the most powerful images of our time. what this young man did was in effect change the world. a search for meaning and the of the tank man. ♪

>> tiananmen square beijing. in thegest public space an inhumaned on scale. buildingsntal public that line the edges and the vast in between speak of the insignificance of the individual before the might of the state. the atmosphere here is edgy. even with permits from minders our filming constantly interrupted. soldiers, police men, men in demand oures all papers. the authorities here are afraid cameras. they know their power. they have hundreds of them square.on tiananmen their cameras. cameras in other hands are dangerous and with

good reason. powder keg.an be a on a june night in 1989, square was a war zone. the people's liberation army its way into beijing from four directions with orders to the square. up a armed citizens and students faced armored personnel tanks and soldiers armed with semi automatic weapons. june 4, 1989 the army's mission had been accomplished. dawn came up.he

>> okay. is prologue. let's go to nick. you were there looking at your it was your junior year abroad covering that for the "new york times" as an intern or something. but tell us what it was just set will for thoseu of us who weren't there 25 years ago. >> sure. well, the one thing that agreed in early 1989 was that protests were very unlikely. that people were not interested weren'tics, students engaged and that protests weren't going to happen and

lead huya1989, the leade die. was symbolic of of the reform. >> he was not a wild eyed but had been pushed out being harsh enough in the protests. there pee began to be protest -- protests honoring him on the campuses some signs died. the wrong man and then that gradually leveraged into something broader. protests about corruption, about of opportunities, economic then soon theand gorbachev visit was going to there wereh meant

cameras there to cover the split. thanwas more amazing covering gorbachev was covering the student protests and that limited the ability of the chinese government to crack down on the protests and stop it. taking overents tiananmen. the government tried the hard lynn approach. there was an editorial in the people's daily on april 26th which was over the top harsh that just galvanized people to angry. the government then there was a struggle. they took advantage of this to edge out pong and become the supreme leader. over well with li. or with dung and the others decided they force.se military police had ban unsuccessful. and decided on martial law sent in unarmed troops and the

citizens flocked them all over pay inning. humiliating for the army and the party. then quite soon dung happen ane ousted. they were put under house arrest the way for force with troops opening fire and that actually happened after a of skirmishes in the previous few days on the night 3.june and it -- i guess the other thing i would just say is that we think of it as about square.n it wasn't just tiananmen square. it was all over beijing. the worst violence was -- the westy came in from and n. front of some apartments in which senior party officials lived. and the troops just mowed people down with ak-47's and aimed at

people watching on balconies. we had a friend, a party adored the party, given his life to it, his son on the fourth was bicycling to work four miles from tiananmen square, no protests or nothing around and some soldiers shot him in the back and killed him. were kind ofhat happening not just all around but really in many parts of the country as well. lots of violence in shanghai and all over. move a fewet's thousand miles. you are less than six months no the new administration in your office in the west wing. did any ofent this -- was any of this predicted? did thisxtent, how look if you will, from the vantage point of a new by thetration including way, the fact that this

president probably knew as much anyonehina certainly as who ever occupied oval office since he headed up the u.s. liaison office in china for some time. so what was -- say something initial take in washington? was,ll, the initial take first of all, the president realized we were taking -- he veryaking office at a unusual time. there were stories that the cold was ending. we didn't think so. complicated very period of time. we had been very supportive evolution of the relationship which started really about the soviet union. of theabout the threat soviet union in asia and we agreed to combat that. relationship.

and it wasn't concerned with politics, it wasn't concerned with anything like that. possibly breaking because the soviet union seemed be changed. when president bush came into wanted to really before gorbachev got there to sort of shore up this relationship which time was maybe eroding. but how? a new president can't come in to go visit china. but, fortunately for politics -- my guess is the president never have gone to that funeral if it hadn't been the opportunity to visit china and relationshiphat

before gorbachev came in. so it was that kind of a complicated relationship. >> and just on the more incifics of what happened june, do you recall anything from the u.s. intelligence embassy inr from our beijing or anything else that suggested that something big was coming or even something small was coming? crackdown? as the >> even before it. people were in the square, when, five, six, seven weeks? like was this the idea that might face a major challenge to its own political orientation? was this -- >> no. amazed that the occupation of the square went on and on without the people out. pushed can you imagine that, in example?for in washington?

a major hub of the city being in for two orf students three months? no. striking.it was thought sort of that it was about over -- some of the su students wase wearing town a little and there weren't as many as they were in march and so maybe this was a suddend then all of came the explosion. extent based on your experience there at the time was it -- were the people thinkinguare only about china? or to what extent was there a sense that the whole world was watching? to what extent did they hope that people in washington and elsewhere would react? react in certain ways? >> i think there was a strong sense that the world was that that provided some protection. listening to voa and

bbc. i remember at one point talking to some students on the square some what seemed high some some sort of level intelligence. like military movements or something and getting all of the details and then i delicately said how exactly do you know this. heard it on voa. the goddessw, i -- they of democracy erected there, this sort of international emblem. fair to say the students were and workers who too,asingly joined up, they weren't always incredibly articulate about what exactly they wanted. agenda was unleer. they were -- unclear. obvious whatore they were angrier at than what they wanted to establish. the world might

give them some protection. it is really a two-part question. they were ink that some way safe and did they ever befell them what was going to befall them? were, indeed, protected to some degree. the gorbachev visit, the would have happened much earlier if it hadn't been for the international presence. thei think a lot of students were also a little perhaps misled a propaganda about how great the party is. and this -- and also this huge outpouring on the part of the people to kind of support them and protect them and bring them things and from party officials. liberal faction was sending envoys out. it was clear that some were sympathetic to them and that encouragement. there were plenty of people, not

so much students but sort of oh, this isho said going to end with bloodshed. saying that all along. simon lays, not a chinese but a iina watcher in australia, remember very early on at the beginning of the protest some him, so, yousked know, extraordinary, student protesters demanding democracy. how is this going to end. is democracy going to come to china? will end with a massacre and the interviewer said what? he said no, it will end with a massacre and he was right. don'tl, i think -- i disagree with any of that. but i think there is an element here which changed it all. nick said, the in, firstps that went of all, the bureau had a big -- there was an internal argument on between what we would

call liberals and conservatives. handle this? back and forth for all this time. and then they decided they would the square. and they sent some troops in and will,oops, if you fraternized with the demonstrators. that really panicked the bureau could no longer rely on the troops. theso i think they gave order bring forces in from outside beijing and you just through that square and you kill anybody who is in the to because they wanted restore the sense because they army.by the army.yalty of the >> did -- two questions. did we have a horse in this race? in washington have clear preferences for how

we wanted this to turn out in of outcome? peoplemple, were there saying this is an opportunity for china to become democratic this would happens be better for how they treat their own people and react in the region and the world? states, if you will, policy preferences? good question.ry and i would say yes, but not in about. you are talking what i think we saw we had was a relationship with the chinese of about twenty years that had been steadily getting better, improving. betweenrelationship china and russia was steadily eroding. which washe world very useful to us. it really democracy versus bureau or so on?

not fundamentally. basically.olitics >> did we see the crackdown -- mentioned the first introduction of military and police turned out to be point ofal from the view of the party. they then brought in the mobile we say wasll stunning in terms of scale. hundreds and hundreds of chinese troops were then mobilized. it we at that point say to ourselves wow, a massacre is ought, the united states ou to weigh in on human rights orunds or political grounds both to try and head it off? >> i wouldn't say try to head it it was a quick cleaning out of the square. respond to the brutality of what happened? topreempting it or trying preempt was not a serious option? >> no. >> the question is then we are part?he how to respond

>> now what do we do? on saidpresident early we have to react. outrageous. react.ot not but i don't want to destroy this budding relationship with the chi nose because it is extremely -- chinese because it is extremely important to the united states in the long run. to?hat to you >> so what did we do? thehe first thing he said, president loves -- he was the first president i have seen who telephone tothe talk to people. so he said i want to call the leaders. put in a call and the answer came back the chinese theership does not talk on telephone. [laughter] >> so, the president said we had imposed -- we had a relationshipry

aimed at theese soviet union. we cut all that off. to demonstrate our alarm with what -- military toour military relationships? >> yes, we had pretty much ended ha relationship. the president didn't want to go any farther. so he said all right, you go and talk to the chinese am bass tore. ambassador. it. i knew him quite well because he chinese delegate for the advanced trip for nixon's first trip i the ever took to china. i knew him and i went over there said said you know, you you won't talk on the telephone. sendresidents prepared to somebody over. said who would it be? or no, he called and said who be?d it and i said well, we will send

scowcroft and they said fine, we'll do that. and that brought about the trip. talk about the trip in a minute. youre go back to nick in perspective was there a sense killed inle were large numbers and i have seen from many, many hundreds to low thousands. be in thes seem to square a little bit uncertain. >> uncertain. is 400 to 800 killed. some people think it is more than that. there a sense there real bitterness that somehow the had been watching and the world then let them down? was there a feeling that the didn't do nearly enough? >> there was to some degree, but i mean so much of the outrage directed at the party itself that there wasn't all that much the rest of the world nor was it obvious what the rest of the world could do provide outrage and

there was, indeed, a lot of outrage. >> -- brent is going to talk about the u.s. reaction and all ha. do you remember at the time the reaction in china to the u.s. reaction? there a sense that we had gotten it about right? been gettingd involved in what they saw as their sovereign ear internal matters? have any rico election of how u.s. policy looked from beijing? particularly focused on u.s. policy or japan policy. were -- everybody was focused on internal chinese political issues. if you were -- you know, if you were a student you were trying to figure out how you were going to get through the inspections and examinations that followed. everybody was in the party was examination, an

every -- to see who could stay party. and from the point of view of the leadership, they certainly relations ands. about economic relations but what was paramount was the dynamic and figuring going to lead thet party and so on. that youyou mentioned and secretary of state larry dispatched was several weeks later. how would you describe your mission? bit about whate unfolded. it all didn't come out for months.six or seven say something about the june visit to china. mission was to preserve fundamental u.s.-china relationship. a other words, not to have break because the -- we were ones to put first

on some kind of sanctions, the military. the europeans ended up with more we had but we had reacted fairly strongly and the not want tod destroy this gradually budding relationship. so what do you do? decided on sending us. would do this publicly have been right in the face of and everything else. >> i assume also there was a lot of press and congressional down eveno come harder? >> absolutely. absolutely. so it was a dilemma for him. >> and? decided to send larry eagleberger and i. cargo plane.n a we went in a cargo plane because

it was equipped for aerial refueling so we wouldn't have to land in alaska and refuel and be discovered as going there. so we went all the way over and all the way back without landing. >> some day we look forward to planell story of that ride. wait. will have to >> one little story about the plane ride. there was to beijing, one meeting i had with them and who was aent of china military man came up to me and lucky. you are pretty he said you know, when you were ourng in i got a call from air defense forces in shanghai that there is a plane approaching should they shoot it down. >> boy -- in which case today's event would have been a little bit different on multiple

levels. nick, you sort of take you out of the square for a second. this column and you have got a powerful voice about rights several times a week. when you look at the u.s. try to respond but yet preserve what brent called a and i wouldtionship say probably the balance that administration chose was the towards preserving relationship than it was doing symbolic or nonsymbolic sanctions. is it your sense that the u.s. right, or that we should have done things deflected rently and if we had gotten the mix differently it would from your point of view salutory effect? sympathetic to the

approach we took for other reasons. in that case, i think we had very little leverage once it happened. conundrum we faced is that anything we did to human rights tended to strengthen the hardliners. even later on for several years was a dynamic where we would raise individual human rights cases and those people would be released in theory to treat some illness and that helped individuals. on the other hand, it did on balance strengthen the the 1992 tripil to the south. was a real -- there was a real push by some of the after tiananmen to have a much tougher crackdown that would have made things rights anduman u.s.-china relations including ofe talk by the hardliners attacking u.s. embassy

dissident where the and haul him out and put him on trial. and if that had been ton that a -- done that would have been a catastrophe for u.s.-china relations and rights and everything. >> brent, what was the debate like? you mentioned what the president wanted. serious debate within the u.s. government over exactly to be respond, what ought the mix, whether people, for opposed you and larry being sent at that time or wanted you to go with a very different message? was it pretty much consensus? >> there was basically consensus. a part of it was because the president was mr. china. he knew more about china than anybody else in the because he had lived there. so he decided, he said this too important to

respond to theto aspect.cratic so even if i get caught in a way wallfirst of all, i want to tos because this relationship is too strong. but, of course, i want to do it, it is i can do it quietly a lot better. so it was that sort of thinking. wasn't a long debate. indeed, what i remember of it president called jim bakker and said i would like to thatbrent over and he said is fine but larry who was the deputy secretary ought to go him, which was just fine. and we were to who could go and missed, if you will. >> i love straight lines like that.

>> never mind. never mind. [laughter] >> showing restraint. i will open up to the members in a second. one last question for each. nick, you have done a lot of thinking about how journalists events of tiananmen. american and otherwise. what is your sense of how would you grade your collective colleaguecolleagues, if you wiln this? a lot right. did i think we got important things wrong. what we covered we tended to cover pretty well but there were some really important didn't cover.we we tended to have much better than toreformers hardliners for some what obvious reasons. self-selection on the part of the hard liners. we had good insights to what the reformers were thinking.

so whenout may 25 or people were put under house arrest, we didn't really have was happening.at we also i think there was some -- i think we sometimes over romanticized the protests a democracy movement and we tended to use that as a short very, very was complex and there were all kinds of things going on. corruption in particular enraged people. overemphasized -- i think when we look back at history they will think we overemphasized what was beijing and not enough what was happening in the rest of the country. there were protests in just about every county see the in the country. extraordinary. we exaggerated the degree of the a civil war during the crackdown and there was a line anda few tays at the 27th 38th army were going to start

fight. in retrospect was completely wrong. and i think he would didn't talk kind of the peasants andwere filling the army saw it getting better and feared chaos, the notion of one, chaos for anybody who went through that period is kind of a terrifying and i think -- i remember going out to interview peasand thes and asking what they would have done army in the square and the and they said oh, shoot, of course. i think we didn't, you know, that aspect off china. of years after tiananmen, i think we overdid costs to the regime. became part of the

tiananmen narrative rather than acknowledging there were many, narrate ivesatives on.g i guess that would be my self-criticism. some resonance. brent, last question and we will open it up. here it is 25 years later and we ensuing 25 years of u.s.-china relations. you look at how we -- how the united states responded of 1989 fenceune backdrop of thee following two and a half decades is it that we got it essentially right? over aere to have a do historical mulligan we would not do it or should not do it fundamentally different than the way we did it? >> i think basically that is correct. but we didn't know what was going to -- or what would happen relationship with

russia. and -- >> still the soviet union at the time. union at thesoviet time. wei think if we had -- if had been negative -- more negative about china and the sense of the chinese that we had turned our it might have relationshipsoviet for a certain period of time, but i don't know. speculation. >> okay. let's open it up. a microphone and give your name and affiliation. best behavior because we have c-span covering us today. yes, ma'am, in the back. my glasses on.

i can't see that far. warden from human rights watch. i would like to thank the council for commemorating what happened in 1989 and just reminder that this type of session could not actually take place in beijing or, frankly, anywhere across china other than hong kong. so it is a reminder that it is and just to mark it how much that big lie around tiananmen is still crippling the today. i think we all want to see china wanted to ask mr. scowcroft if there was ever an effort to get the chinese government to reverse the the number release forward?nd move >> there were suggestions that that would be the best thing to do, but having made the basic decision on

tiananmen square that we would the chinese and try to preserve the relationship, we didn't want to risk it, if you will, to that extent. i understand what your question is saying. no, we did not. of you, was there a sense, imagine the united states had pressed harder along mickey had said given anda's own calculus decision making whether it would have been wise or not from our itnt of view, do we think would have worked and china would have been susceptible to of treatess or pressures? >> no, we thought clearly they would not. would have paid a price. if. >> it was obvious there was an struggle going on. >> there will be a reverse atal some point but it will come internally. >> yeah, sure. >> ken?

>> kenmore rice. nick, you mentioned some underreported things going on and i think one of the lesser mentioned protest forces today movementvironmental because it so remote and per vasive. were 6,000 documented cell phone photos of mini riots two ago. does the current leadership take it seriously? aware that the political marches that brought down the berlin wall started as movement in the angelat of churches like merke l's father's church? >> i think the government is aware of that risk. one of the reasons they put dichung in prison is because she was using environmental issues at the time seemed to be

quasilegitimate way to raise public concerns and galvanize people and they didn't of civil society. and you are right that right now in rural areas when there are protests, you know, in villages, communistuse the party village chief has stolen land or whatever else from people but very often it is because a factory is dumbing poisoninto -- dumping into the water supply and the villagers are fighting for their lives. those protes protests are happg all over the country. i think the government is very aware of it but trying to also balance the economic growth that.t >> yes, ma'am? >> thank you. is fortion mr. scowcroft. june 4, 1989 especially

when looked at historically in andsight was a day when literal historic shift has taken place. horror on -- of tiananmen square on one side but there was anime election in poland which voted communism out of office and it was only appreciated a little bit later how incredibly important that moment was and that started this easternffect in all of europe. and my question is i remember spirit of something schizophrenic because i worked and on oneghts watch hand it was the horror of the handcres and on the other it was this great hope and joy in the communist bloc. you talk about how the right after the massacres or day, june 4 was perceived in the white house? theher it was anything of eastern europe beginning there?

yes., yes, clearly in eastern europe and we were very much attuned to that. well.inese were as initial -- their wasonse to tiananmen square reserved than the general reaction, for when chou was assassinated. goinge chinese what was on in eastern europe they saw liberale little gorbachevs in eastern europe but the faith,t true to

the communist faith anyway. shesku was a pillar of the old communist regime. when he goss assassinated you see theyost visibly were shocked and clamped down on our relationship as well. them to death. >> just generalized, though, at remind me if my dates are wrong, we also had the that point with panama. >> yes. >> what people often forget is historically you take things out of context. june 4 in china. but at the white house at that time you have 14 other things on.g and this didn't necessarily jump out of your in box and say pay me.ntion to >> exactly. because eastern europe was in a ferment at that top story timed shortly after june the president europe which was really quite a remarkable trip. awakening of eastern

europe. >> i mean it is also true i that china had real options in a way that eastern europe did not in that the party could have moved toward greater democracy. >> yes. >> and it could have held elections and actually won them. you know, controlling the news manipulating things to some degree but could have theally took on some of trappings of democracy and gained legitimacy in a way that was not an option in poland or romania for example. >> but that leads to the same either one whether of you think that the world or somehow missedes something of an opportunity? if the outsiders had a reformist agenda with china, were there things that might have been done that could have made a and maybe the answer is yes or no, but then it would have had a tremendous cost, i is brent's argument with the strategic relationship. or not? i mean whether the two were

that way.y juxtaposed >> well, i think this was an internal -- there was an internal relationship inside not true of, for example, the soviet union. and ping had made some dramatic know, typified by i a cat is black or white as long it is a catches mice. it was the fundamental decision abandon economic marxism in favor of national interests. we don't know what would have happened but my guess is it slowed down -- well, there had been remarkably little evolution in china but would down anded that perhaps brought back the earlier morese regimes that were

bloody. >> i think china could have -- i can imagine a counterfactual in which china went a different direction. similar in eastern montor mongolia. died imagine if they had might have8, then he triumphed and had an entirely of history inse china and we wouldn't have heard of any of these people. think that that is something that we had the leverage to achieve. that was a knife edge that it was leaders in china who determining. >> steven? >> steve orland, national committee on u.s.-china

relations. surprised you didn't true in terms of journalist coverage, today there peopleeat journalists who such as yourself who gave us great coverage and then there inaccuracies. the being taken out to dinner when there are reporting that he hunger strike and not reporting that i thought was pretty bad. really kind of all journalists in the future in terms of reporting china. six,, this went on for seven weeks. we didn't make any representations to the chinese peaceful way was a to clear the square? we knew they don't have riot andpment and fire hoses things we would have used? there were no representations that he would made? that we made? >> i think the answer is no, we did not. not.d

i -- did we think they were going to do what they did in square?n i don't think so. havenymore than we would chineseeptive to the advice on kent state you know, it is just very affair.ir internal wrong, but no, we to not try to tell them how do it. >> i also think, you know, at the end. tore was the earlier attempt use just unarmed soldiers to clear it. june 3 by the night of that dung basically wanted to spill blood and wanted to terrify people and end what he chaos.this

he saw china as a loose end and crush it absolutely ambiguity. and i -- you know, even if they had had riot control equipment, by that time i -- i don't know dung would have used it. >> but they had made an internal at the bureau by that time any way and the hardliners out before the attack on the square. >> roger? is a fascinating full-page documentary in the times this morning showing the life stories of a of the leaders of the square, student leaders of the out.e who got and in it, it revealed that they withable to get out along

people00 of the senior in the square with the help of u.s. and british intelligence, people, some party leaders and underworld money and extraordinary cinematic ways. you,uestion i have for general scowcroft, is were you and the national security initiativet of the of that innocentbystanders to that? because it really is an story.dinary success >> if you -- pardon me, i think i won't talk about that. sorry. the back? yes, sir? brief, i was in the countryside. >> introduce yourself. herlock.w

many aa lawyer. i was teaching english in the condition fryside. students were marching in my town, a town of 50,000 by the river. told not to march with them because it would compromise their movement. interesting detailsng it happened to be the birth place of the author of mau's redbook and when the students were marching an old woman stood them up and said stop, i want to encourage you arestudents because you reviving the spirit which is the what they were doing but gives you the idea of chaos. the christmas i was in isolated dormitory because it antiafrican riots. it was a chaotic time and the you always heard is china is not ready for democracy and that was the basis in chaos on which dung was reacting. my question to you both since you are not speaking for the

administration is 25 years later itse have all been ignored, is still all there. democracyeady for now? what perspectives would you have on that? >> ile venture something -- i will venture something. to me tochinese seem fearful oftally anduption, civil war, chaos so on. that deep down they know they problems with the political system. is that they are suspicious of democracy because chaotic and they exactly what to do. and they solved their economic problems in a dramatic and for the time being successful way, they haven't dealt with

their political problem and i honest that-- it is the chineserful of structure breaking down as it historic times more than once. and they don't know what that's just my opinion. >> it would be manipulated by various elements. mongolia, indonesia can do it. chinese leaders very early on were calling for freedom of the press. they saw that it would be a way to relieve some of that steam. administrative measures just don't work. the only way is to provide more

outlet. absolutely, i think that china is looking at some other countries and what they've done is absolutely ready for major steps towards freedom and .emocracy importantbe in an position rather than prison. >> do you think the event of the middle east have had an effect on political opening in china? >> i think chinese leaders saw the protest as something the u.s. had a role in. they thought the u.s. was aspiring to start some kind of

revolution in china. there's a lot of paranoia about the u.s. trying to undermine or overthrow the party in some ways. whyink that is one reason xi jinping has taken such a tough line on just about anything political. it's a deep insecurity about the risks of unrest. >> i met something different. what happened in the middle east have given democracy a bad name in china. they want no part of it. >> i don't think ordinary chinese have reacted that way. ist they see close to home corruption. isbut the chinese government paranoid about interfering in the internal policy of states.

vote in the security council all the time on that issue. >> there's a reason they abstained on the crimea vote. it went against their strategic interest of supporting russia because they do not want to set the precedent of breakaway within a country. >> gilly and sorenson, harvard university. tank man, thehe unbelievably courageous person, is burned into our brains. do you know who he was and what he, him? what become of him? >> there are all kinds of theories. we don't know who he was or what happened to him. there were extraordinary act of courage all over china that night, the next few days. some of it had to do with people

who risked their careers to help others escape in this underground railroad to china. i remember the night of june 3. some of them were coming in on all airport road. there used to be a highway there. a working-class bus driver parked his bus across the airport road to block the troops coming in. the first truck load of troops arrived and demanded that he moved aside his bus. he refused. the officer pulled out his test all and demanded that he drives the bus off. he threw them into the grassy verge there. was not executed immediately. i don't know what happened to him. to block the troops from going

i amananmen square incredibly admiring of the displays of courage i saw that night that i have rarely seen that may never be surpassed. >> in the back. >> alpine capital advisors. if the tiananmen square movement started up today, what do you think would be the response of the chinese government? i would inc. and much more delicate hand, but maybe i'm wrong about that -- i would think a much more delicate hand. >> i can only guess. i think it would be more .ophisticated i think china has come to terms with itself in a way it had not

when he first took over. i think that the real question is how much experimentation the leadership is prepared to undergo. i don't know what the answer to that is. in aan active issue with how they deal with their own situation where the state of the industry. i think they are actually internally looking at what they might do but i don't think they will come to any kind of conclusion. sense, theyay, in a

begin all the time the what happened in the first night of the protests, they go in and they detained the students and they cut it off. when they see people who are potential threats organizing commemorations of tiananmen, they arrest them. they are careful to avoid letting it had to the state where anyone is anywhere near the square. >> gary rosen from "the wall street journal." we tend to think in the u.s. that ultimately china must know the way of modern nations, democratize, liberalize. been 25 years now and i wonder how serious they are such discussions had in china. is it something we tell

ourselves or is it something that has any sort of resonance there? abouty nathan has written what he calls resilience offered terry and is in. are we kidding ourselves about some kind of political revolution there or are there serious people in china looking ahead a few decades saying here is how chinese popular government in some way will unfold. >> why don't we come back to that in the second session? >> there were absolutely chinese leaders thinking that way. there was a vision where you would have village elections leading to township elections, maybe county elections. they would be somewhat controlled, manipulated elections but ways to create a certain amount of legitimacy of ocular feedback to some degree corruption. likewise, there have been leaders who thought about freedom of the press as the way

to deal with some of these social issues. their vision is singapore where you have alternative points of view but your party stays in power. who knows where things will evolve, but there is a real debate among chinese leaders about these issues. >> i think there is one aspect that makes china unique. that is that it is a different civilization. is built on the nationstate system and that is instinctively how we respond. .he chinese don't have that it is the central kingdom idea. there ischina and then everybody else. if you're not chinese, you cannot become trainees. there is a different fundamental

converting someone who was already part of the nationstate system. go ifave a longer wait they are going to adjust to a democratic system. >> general, after when you took that trip to china, the new york times and other media showed you toasting with chinese leadership . i wonder if you've had a chance to think about that toast and if you might have done it differently and if you think it's necessary for the geostrategic relationship you have maintained that. second question -- >> it was not on that trip though. i went back again in december to explain to the chinese what had in the meeting we had

member iniet union malta. it just so happened that there was a report that came from the u.s. news link in china during the time i went at. that was not a secret trip. we were about to start a dinner, in came the reporters. i had a choice. i could either preserve my dignity as a democrat and throw or ilass to the floor could try to complete the mission i was on to advance u.s.-china relations. chose, at some risk to some of

, i decided tods go through with the toast. >> with that comment in mind -- sorry, stephen blankenship. with that comment in mind, could you comment on the current state of u.s. china relations and whether the same instinct should primary goal now? have a unique problem with the chinese. it goes back to the comment i made a little while ago. deep down inside of us, we have a different structure we are looking out. about the same things.

sometimes we mean something very different when we talk to each other. take a it's going to long while for both of us to educate the other. and look around the world how complicated it is, i don't say yes, there i u.s. and chinese are fated to disagree on this issue. i don't think it's that kind of a world. i think many of the fundamental instinctively have the same ideas, but we are operating a very different way. we've got to treat this relationship as the unique relationship it is while we work our way through the image of different worlds. going to have net comment on that and then we will wind up. is implicit in that relations

between the u.s. and china or through today, as 25 years ago, over ourtake priority attempt to reshape china in that image? >> not necessarily but we have to be aware of when we do things but it is likely to mean chinese.lly to the are we project in the same ?essage that we think we are is that being received by the chinese in the same way? >> we have a certain amount of leverage them he may have the capacity to prevent something that would be disastrous for u.s.-china relations.

i think that we can probably up the margin slightly reduce the risk that it would happen. eventually to leave for medical conditions, for example. i guess i'm a little skeptical sorte idea that china is of fundamentally different than 70 of the neighbors that have struggled with these issues whether they be indonesia, china, taiwan, mongolia. i remember covering taiwan areng maybe chinese people not appropriate for democracy. he is now a democratically

elected president of taiwan. there is a demand for political participation. i would not want to predict when of china itself. >> when we use the word democracy, you can imagine a chinese version or myth swing -- version or mix where they have competing unity and the like. i have two angst to say. we will reconvene in about 15 minutes with a panel on china's louisa lynn.ith i want to thank these gentlemen, neck christophe, one of the thoughtful people and brent, one

of the wise men of american foreign-policy. thank you both. [applause] >> i think we should begin. i'm horrible and i run the china for nashville u.s. china relations for the asia society. i want to thank our guests today on this panel. louisa was in beijing for the longest time for npr and has

just wrote an interesting book "the republic of indonesia," about tiananmen square and what happened outside beijing as well with reflection on its meaning and its failures to sort of that mayts meaning in portends for the future. berkeley school of information and he has found it about a decade ago the china digital times, an online publication that really follows china in a many different ways with a particular focus on its digital activities. a great firewall, the efforts to

control the media in the digital media. you know, just listening to the , i think this moment in chinese history in 1989 was probably one of the most significant moments of the 20th century. if you look back to may 4, 1919, the first big student , it had an effect on history. it was relatively small and one person died. in 1989 wasd significantly larger. for those of us who were in the , it was at spring moment we will never forget. in many ways, we misread many of the signals. it was unthinkable, impossible that the chinese communist party

would never managed to restore itself power, managed to get the genie back in the bottle. it seemed like it was all over. was a reflection point from which there would be no recovery and yet, exactly the opposite happens. it raises a lot of very interesting questions. and it would be great to hear your response on, 1989, the six or seven weeks of demonstrations, what were they about? >> what were they about? >> what was going on? why did they happen? china in thein 1980's. i went to university in 1979 i was one of the earliest students

to after exams went university right after the revolution. i have boys embodied the spirit of the 1980's -- i have always embodied the spirit of the 1980's. , the university of technology that had a renowned astrophysicist there. and i was actually a student. , wethat young generation optimistic about the

more and moreng liberal. the country is on the right direction. china, 1982-1986, we were talking about these things. we were talking about the soviet bloc. eastern european we talk about south korea, north korea, taiwan, china. foras obvious we should go democracy. that was the time in 1986 that my university started a demonstration and it went nationwide. me, even at that time studying at the united states already, but when i heard there were student demonstrators on

the streets, my thoughts were they should have done it long ago. democracy.e are for in 1989 in the spring, that was not a surprise. sense of the mix of things. and openness were on the mind but other issues as well. >> there were a bunch of different issues bringing people onto the streets. useful shorthand that really disguise the whole complexity of what was happening . originally, the demands were for more freedoms.

a very significant portion of byple were angered profiteering. in liberal party leader at the time, his sons were a target of the protesters because they were seen as having profiteer and or got into business. nepotism is a big issue. when i was looking at what had theyned in chengdu where had the student protest that went almost unnoticed in the west but also ended in a crackdown, it seemed according to people who were there, freedom and democracy were some of the issues. towards the very end of the , some were driven by all .inds of other issues

at that time, that was almost 30%. also, people beginning to see the disparity emerging between those making money and those who were not. the real sense of panic and fear ,hat i think the uncertainty the beginning these reforms were producing but also led to some of the protests. issues thatconomic were also overlooked. some of the issues were incredibly small. students at university wanting more say. >> when you look at what the people in the square wanted, they were relatively discrete.

one wonders what would have happened. >> the counterfactual's are always amazing. i think we did see in some instances the party did yield for just a few weeks. one of the earlier demands was for more press freedom. you were there. being able to read about actually what was happening. claxton was complete press freedom for a few weeks. >> all the journalists were out marching in the streets with their banners. some of the demands were yielded on and then the government

panicked and clamped down entirely. >> last session, the question arose what would happen in china at the demonstration succeeded? think, xiao qiang, it would have ended up like so many things we see happening in the middle east? >> many students on the square where much younger, early 20's. had the best experiences in china. we were very sheltered, idealistic, enthusiastic. whatd not have any clue

the real political structure and politics and how things were really run in china. we will decide from there. that does not mean that it will be the destiny of china forever. it was the first generation of communists who went through the civil war. two people like that grabbing .ower is the absolute

they do not shy away from killing dozens, hundreds, thousands of people. to that generation, they do not see that as a problem. >> why is it then that so many assumeemed to so naïvely for so many weeks. in fact the party might not do that? in the square at that time, there were very few people who such dark thoughts. >> it is the illusion of the square. when you're there, you're out of .he fear you have celebration, youth, passion, hope. in the same time, the troops are gathering. the result is already decided.

>> the mixed messages emerging meaning many people, even officials, did not really know what was going to have on. you look back now and perhaps it seems as if it was inevitable, but at the time, because of the power struggle, so many people the armyhing, even foreign ministry were all out with their banners. there was a survey that was done 1989.-may back in 95% of the people that replied to that survey thought the student protest was patriotic. they did not agree with the editorial from april 26 saying that it was turmoil. illusion, perhaps the

that the students may have had a chance. use the illusion such a way illusion ofhe politics really unfolding in china. it is something extremely rare in chinese history and in chinese people's lives that happens. people are suppressed so much. 1960's, 1970's, 1980's. nobody anticipates that there is a moment where they had a sense of freedom. there was the power struggle in the official media began acting very differently but from the square to the beijing city, people suddenly had a sense of freedom.

there was so much being oppressed and it came out. that is not an illusion. that was real exposure to something they had never felt before. there were many incredible, her rome attractions. .et me share one story i went back to china on june 6. to go there. i was in the united states already. masker time, i saw the and i wanted to do something. i did not know. when i came back to beijing, , are i went to high school classmate came to see me. he heard i was back.

we were in the same class in high school. .e was a soccer player .e always got into fights anyway, he came to see. he said, you came from the united states, you saw everything. i said yes, i saw it on tv. so he said, were students really wrong? i said they were not. you are the academic star. you've got into university. i cannot even get into the college of physical education. i always had done something wrong with this time i help students. i defended them. only time i felt i

did something proud of my life and now it is a rebellion? the students were wrong? that will always be there. something being completely heart. to the people's at the same time, i don't think it's the end of the story. >> let me ask you a question. it's perfectly possible for people to be right in the sense of morals but to be tactically or strategically wrong. i wonder as you two look back on , was there a point where if

the students had acted friendly they might have been able to sort of preserve the legacy of political reform which sadly ended after 1989? you inflection points do see at a moment when things might have turned out somewhat friendly? >> from the students were demonstrators point of view, there is no tactic, no strategy. nobody possibly anticipated things getting so big. ms. ram plan by any strategist. no one knew what to do with it. if anyone has a strategy, those are the people in the higher power structure.

deciding to push things in one direction or the other. >> you think it is an illusion to imagine these 20-year-old student leaders could have actually led in a way that would have been able to attack? they said they wanted to leave and go back and the radicals would just or the malay. this is the protesters movement and that's the way it's always been. >> it is a matter of much controversy and discussion, whether there was some point at which they could have acted differently then there's a fantastic amount of regret on decisions and whether it could have changed anything. he said the hunger strike was

tactically wrong not that it should not have been held but the timing was wrong. many of the other student whatrs have talked about happened on may 30 mary and there was a vote on whether they should leave the square and they even announced it. according to versions that i've heard, but the one that a lot of say is that they then changed their minds so the students continue to stay in the square. i think the point that many of the student leaders make is whether it is morally right to blame their own bad decision-making for what happened. have thether they decision-making power to do anything differently. the right-handy

man in many ways actually believed that the students were really being used as a tool. it happened, they became a for them toretext play out this power struggle. if that reading is right, it would not have made a difference what they did. >> an interesting question i wanted to ask you both. in your view, what are the thatquences of society undergoes an extraordinarily traumatic incident like this and yet is then not publicly able to digest and deal with the? are we in a new world where we can just say, forget history.

why torment ourselves with something in the past? both view this thing as some kind of a wound that has yet not healed. hashe chinese government made as many accounts as they possibly can to just move on including all of the slogans, look to the future and also rewriting what happened and trying to delete it from the history books. this year we have seen the extraordinary attempt to stop any kind of commemoration whether it he public or private with even groups of people meeting behind closed doors in a without beingent detained on charges of creating a public disturbance. i think when you try to suppress

all discussion is that you locked into a cycle of towards people who try to remember. we are increasingly seeing that with the attempts to stop any discussions. >> if you look throughout history, chinese massacre and they want the people to be suppressed and just forget it, this is happening in many other places. have engaging in human rights work all these years. of course it's always a question of where the experience goes. like this friend of mine who

asked whether the students were important toas so him. whenould be celebrating china won the olympics so where does that go? onlineu can see that where there are certain circumstances where people still talk about it. in government the fear that 25 years later, there is no less fear than 10 years ago, if anything. you can also see something that is not so obvious but also important. chinese students like me studying in america.

abc investor going is aina looking for this different story. demonstrations, trying to do but when her china, was in china talking to other chinese entrepreneurs, they're trying to make a deal funding a company, the biggest business deal and he does not know if they can do it or actually have the money. it's a very early thing about funding a business with a lot of money and ambition. one day they said, where were you in 1989? i demonstrated. you demonstrated.

deal. we do this for china. that's where the company was founded. that is something that you never talk about. it's there. >> how are we to assess the balance? tiananmen square ended as we know and then we have this enormous economic growth. way the assets and liabilities of what the party did? it failed in this way but then it succeeded. one is the balance sheet as you look at it now?

doubt that no people's lives in china have improved since 1989. people are richer. their lives are freer, for the most part. you no longer have to ask for permission to get married, travel overseas, get a passport. there has been all of this progress. for me, one of the very problematic issues is the idea that the government are obligated that there could have no other way. this is the only way this could have happened in the government did what was necessary. of the years of economic progress has allowed that retrospective justification to gain more potency in the eyes of

many chinese people. it is quite a mainstream opinion now. what happened in 1989 was regrettable but necessary. ma, chairman of alley "cruel butsaid it was correct." >> what was the other way out? we have much talk in the first panel about china never not being particularly sort of right for democracy. what are your views if not then now to embrace? if you want to say tiananmen

massacre is the last of the china ruled, you can never challenge the ruler. if you do, you cut him off. .hat is the message because there is a lack of equivalent or something. there is the absolute message driven and people's mind. i was there in june. i saw the soldiers with a very clear uniform, white gloves, gun .oaded on the street

fear that spread right there to tell you to not ever again challenge the ruler. that page of history in china is still there right now but eventually, in the coming years and decades, it will be over. later, they're clearly going in that direction. the middle class will have more participation they will see what happened in taiwan and other countries is the natural the government. those ideas compared with 25 years ago are much more common a threat now. since moving towards that thection, it does not mean

transformation will be happening tomorrow but chinese society is democratic to a structure. mayhe middle class people be ready for more political participation that the communist party, no. why i don't think it will be an immediate ring. >> even the elections that nick kristof spoke of, you saw the ways those played out and there any of thoser being elected even in city elections, one or two .ndependent candidates the local authorities will go to all kinds of lengths to stop them from being alike did -- being elected.

any kind of minor threat is immediately stop and i think it's getting waste and waste. when i asked about what had happened to the reform wing of andparty, he almost scoffed said they had been bought with the spoils of war. whether there is much of an appetite under the hearty ruled sure.jinping, i'm not >> how much appetite is there? you could say after 1989 where the parties appetite to even toy with the idea of reform sort of banished because it became too frightening, too dangerous. we have seen 25 years when they have not been able to revisit this question in a meaningful way. ofdoes raise the question

how it will happen in china. how can it happen in china particularly after this? thanks that is actually a real question. -- >> that is actually a real question. that sense, you could say, right or wrong, whatever your moral judgment, it was counterproductive. >> in my view, whoever started the massacre was responsible for that. did is the legitimacy of the party scene -- party so they cannot reverse a verdict. >> on the other hand, he did

reverse the verdict on all of the intellectuals. >> that's different. responsible for basically everything, the whole party. if you reverse this one, if you , china will change. >> do you agree with that, louisa? there is no way for the party to revisit the verdict of 1989? >> it seems to be a prospect that is further away than ever before. when he came to power, xi jinpin g, even to the extent that he was even embracing the maoist legacy refusing to repudiate anything that happened in the first years of communist rule let alone the most recent. it seems extremely unlikely when you are detaining people for signs inlfies with "v"

front of tiananmen square. >> before we open it to you all, let me ask one final question. given this rather rigid posture ,f the party towards reform given the fact that americans and the american government certainly has on its agenda the whole notion of democratization worldwide, what is the proper posture for the united states , very this kind of new rigid, and sometimes quite muscular government in beijing? >> the chinese government is mainly because of the rising economic power. it's also very fragile. it is extremely fragile

internally. you can see those signs all over about how they are so preoccupied in the control of any of those smaller protests or unrest. there are many issues that goes on in china now about economic slow down, you name it. many other things. then you have this on the , and muchlicy side more muscular china. >> much more susceptible to pressure. more resistant to pressure. >> yes. they are related. some of this is clearly a step diverging the internal

attention. i could even imagine the scenario in order to control the domestic unrest, simply set up an x terminal conflict to make the control. to me, that is almost a natural assumption unless they want to completely addressed the dish you -- issue differently. >> there has been some disappointment of the dissident's with the way the u.s. is dealing with china. whene within china said human rights went off and became a separate dialog, they believed but they had been let down what other way is there to deal ?ith a rising china

that is the question that i can answer. -- that i'm not sure i can answer. has done a pretty effective job erasing the memories of 1989. >> they've done a remarkable job of erasing memories. when i took that picture of tank man and i went to the beijing beenrsity, those that have most instrumental, only 15 kids could actually identify that it had been taken in beijing. people were saying it was an coast of though, south korea, and i was surprised because these are the smartest kids in the country, the ones with the most access to technology. they could certainly find a way if they wanted to. the cautionary tale of tiananmen

is that this generation has no interest in politics, no curiosity and that has helped this whole strategy of state-sponsored amnesia. >> what is the price of amnesia? >> the price of the massacre, one is the moral crisis in chinese society. what is right and what's wrong? what's good and what's bad? is this highly competitive environment. look at chinese society today. the context of rapid economic transformation. , the question was always there. what's right and what's wrong?

were the students write? -- were they right? what is good and bad anyway? anything goes. .hina today society where people can make fake milk powder and not worry about the consequences even though they know it will kill babies. there is a huge loss of values and of morality. the act of watching the government using weapons to then the people and hearing the different stories,

watching as they change and wondering. >> that is what stands in people's psychology, what impact it is. >> let's have some questions from you all. .ight here on the aisle please identify yourself and keep your questions short. >> my name is craig. in other countries like south africa where i did my own doctoral research or brazil or poland, there were workers and students movements that were crushed but became extremely potent when they converged and came together. in this amountm of labor fermented in china today. ofthere is a large amount

labor ferment. >> i have not seen that. yes, there is a labor movement. , there is not much student back to visit. students are curious, yes. the books they're reading, lectures they're going to their very pro-democracy. i have not seen students taking more action. >> i think this was one of the lessons that the government learned never to allow these disparate sources of discontent to join up together and isolate any kind of protest. if you look what happened where

the workers were treated worse .han the students around sixterms were six or lessess -- thomas sometimes life. one of the guys that through the accepted statue, the portrait of -- chairman matt. -- mao. they have used different tactics. they are very careful.