tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN June 7, 2014 4:00am-6:01am EDT
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because they are living witnesses of what happened here on the sixth of june 1944. [applause] this ceremony of the 70th anniversary is unique in its magnitude. it is exceptional because of the extraordinary fervor it has created and the exceptional time at which we are meeting together. it is the duty of memory to all the victims, whether military or
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civilian, whether allied or the german victims of nazism. [applause] we wish to convey a message today at the ceremony to the person to participate. it is a requirement for the united nations that intervene wherever necessary for security at is a message to europe to enable these after having been the constant of war throughout the first half of the 20th century. 70 years ago, before this very
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beach, this beautiful beach, thousands of young soldiers, under deadly fire, move towards german forces. they were 20, take or leave a year or two. who could daresay that being 20 was the best time in my? -- in life? 20 was the age of commitment and the age of sacrifice. they were called, they were afraid. the air of today in june, in 1944, it was made of battle and explosions. the waters that we see today
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where phil is a fraud of landing barges -- were filled with the froth of landing barges. what did these men think in the face of this? this trial, they have in mind their mothers, their worried father's, their childhood, which was so close in their lives. the horizon was blocked by a war. the man in the middle of this hell did not hesitate for a second. they moved forward and kept moving forward to free us and
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further down in much higher numbers the third division. they were in charge of taking over the beach. we have the canadian troops that conducted the assault. and our american forces which paid a heavy tribute to the operation overlord when they landed on omaha beach. each soldier on june 6, 1944 on omaha beach was a hero.
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although more here is. all the soldiers they kept moving and moving forward for the sin of our freedom. -- sake of our freedom. [applause] the battle which took place throughout the summer of 1944 was the greatest sea-air battle in history. 5000 ships, 10,000 aircraft, 40,000 soldiers from the british, canadian, and american. 3000 perished. 3000 are killed. the soldiers had succeeded. they had stepped foot on french soil. on june 1984 they started
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liberating france. as the sun was setting on the longest day the bright light of hope rose on an enslaved europe. on the beaches of normandy still lingers the memory of a very harsh and uncertain struggle. a decisive struggle. on the peaceful beaches of normandy still lingers the fighters who gave their lives. on these pieces -- peaceful beaches regardless of the
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passing of time and regardless of changing of seasons still blows the wind of freedom and it still blows today. i wish on behalf of france that the regions be you listed under the unesco world heritage. [applause] we are standing on a global heritage. we want to recall these places and we want to preserve them forever, well, new generations which will [inaudible] and they will want to understand how things happened. veterans, survivors, they are here with us today.
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in the spot where they landed 17 years ago. with their parachutes were they fought. with their struggle. were they were wounded. i want to fraternally welcome veterans who are present city. thank you for being here and being there in the summer of 1944. thank you for still being with us. on june 6, 2014, and you will still be with us here in your mind and soul. you always be on these beaches of the allied landing. i would like to express my
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gratitude for all fighters. american, british, canadian, polish, mall citizenships and nationalities who fought classified with the allies. and you can live in peace today we can leave security if we can live sovereignty protected by the laws created we decided [inaudible] who gave their lives. i wanted to affirm the gratitude of the french republic will never die, will never with her. -- wither. when coming here regardless of how old or young we are, regardless of who we are emma where we come from we are struck are the same emotion.
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what still strikes us today when we move from laced a place and sometimes from cemetery to cemetery is actually the courage of the soldiers who fought here. the courage of your troopers who jumped in the middle of the night to prepare the attack. the courage of british soldiers. the general who boosted his men, who were nailed by the violence of german fire. they came from all over the world to conquer meter after meter, inch after inch of the beaches. also the courage of french resistance that we dated the
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existence of the operation. because of the french to join in. and the courage of civilian populations in normandy who suffered the bombing, who suffered considerable losses. the pain of losing their dear ones or the joy of having conquered their freedom. and here want to pay to renew to the courage of the red army which far from here in the face of 160 divisions was able to push them back and defeat them. once again this can never he overstated. i want to emphasize the
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contribution of the people's who are called the soviet union. also mistake knowledge that these people and the erie against -- a victory against naziism. i would attribute to the courage of germans who were victims. they were led into a war that would have been there's and we really want them to pay, as -- an homage. this great epic recalls a very simple truth which we should
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always keep in mind in all circumstances. freedom is not something that should be taken for granted. some people think we shouldn't even think about it. however, freedom is always a struggle. freedom is still threatened in many countries and regimes on this planet. on the normandy beaches a few years ago democracies united
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to fight for just cause. this just cause is still hours -- ours today. today it is no longer the allied forces which should stand up to fight for freedom. it is the united nations which are in charge. they should be up to the mission they were interested with after the war. they should ensure our collective security. [inaudible] courage is something in war but is necessary. courage in peace is just as crucial. soldiers who landed here 70 years ago what motivated them, they were motivated by an idea
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that they'll had common area and when they set foot on these beaches they had the dream it in their midst. this seemed out of reach. it should light what was the dream about? it should be about the promise our world free from tyranny and war. meant a society that would be more just and fraternal. that ambition had been worded two years before i the two heads of war.
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the atlantic charter recalled the point. recalled the determination for complete collaboration in the field of economics in order to guarantee water all economic progress security. a month before the allied landing many had adopted the philadelphia declaration which said that all human beings have a right to pursue material progress and freedom and dignity.
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rights are not violated, are ecially theth, espeicall rights of women. that is a concern for all of us. it is also our duty to ensure all over the world, if [inaudible] wherever it is threatened so that conflicts did not turn into wars. our duty is to fight against extremists, fundamentalists, nationalists. to all of us this is where we stand in society. it is up to us to have the same vision, this encourage, to have the same determination and the same willpower as those who came 70 years ago.
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our evils are terrorism for crimes against amenity. these are terrible evils and we have to find -- fight a humanitarian crisis and the turmoils of the financial system. there is no comparison. these problems certain cohesion in our nation and sometimes cause conflict. a very special thing happened. june 6 is an -- not an ordinary day. it is a day when the living have an obligation to remember the dead. it is up to us as
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representatives to keep the promise. it is up to us to be true to their sacrifice by building and their behalf. yes and i want to pay tribute to the dead. i want to pay tribute to the veterans and tell the heads of state and veterans i am grateful they are here today. what is ahead of us is more than a duty. it is an obligation for the world and an obligation towards all of those who fought on these beaches and they now that we are their followers. thank you.
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>> but there are men and women prepared for the ultimate sack feese fighting nazi oppression. all over europe, belgium, the netherlands, check slovakia, denmark and norway, political and armed resistance is growing. yugoslavia, italy, greece, and france, those who prefer death o submission have joined the
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most of the german divisions are fighting on the russian fronts. in the pacific, the american soldiers are fighting the japanese from island to island in a cruel and atrocious war. after midway in june, 1942, graudal canal in february, 1943, in 1944 the allied forces liberate the philippines. after north africa in july of 1943, the allies land in sicily and begin the liberation of italy. [gunshots]
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>> in tehran, 1943, roosevelt, churchill and stalin decide to open a second front in western europe, operation overlord. it will land allied troops on the northwest coast of france, it will be completed by operation anvil on the shores of the mediterranean. stalin agrees to launch an offensive in conjunction with the normandy landing. general eisenhower is to be named commander in chief.
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it's a crucial gambit. hitler is convinced the decisive cop frontation will be to thes we. the coastline has been con creet over to form the atlanta exwall. from norway to the span herb border, thousands of reinforced bunkers succeed each other along the coast. in france, 59 german divisions, 700,000 men, await the inevitable allied landing.
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♪ >> the french resistance is to play an important role in the landings. by the spring of 1944, the free french forces complies about 100,000 men. the resistance networks supply thousands of pieces of information about the wall, the airports, the german garrisons, the depots. the allied general staff are now familiar with the -- with every detail of the atlanta exwall.
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on june 10, members of the resistance receive orders to go into action. executing the plans that have been agreed, they attack convoys, sabotage railway lines, destroy bridges and electric power cables. thanks to what they have done, the theater of operations is totally cut off. german reinforcement -- [no audio] ♪
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♪ toward mid day, after six hours of fighting, the beach is taken, nearly 2,500 men are either dead, wounded, or missing. on utah beach on the other hand, the men of the fourth u.s. infantry division take the beach in less than an hour. on gold and june divisions, the british 50th division and the canadian third division, after heavy fighting, manage to make their way inland.
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>> the battle for normandy is a terrible one. it lasts 80 days. it becomes a tactical struggle for position. the elite german troops, dug in among the orchards of the norman dicouldn't tri-ryside fight fiercely, but the reinforcemented they were promised don't come, blocked by the offensive launched by red forces as stalin promised.
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right up to july 9, allied forces are bogged down outside the town that had had become a field of rubble. 2,000 people have died under the bombs there. allied bombing of norman ditowns causes 14,000 civilian casualties. - or normandy towns causes 14,000 civilian casualties. after the breakthrough on july 30 and the battle with the first pole -- where the first polish armored division excels gates the gates to --
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to paris are open. backed by the fourth u.s. infantry division, the second armored division liberates the french capital. on august 26, de gaulle received nothing short of a popular consecration. on august 15, 95,000 men take part in the oprovens landing. a -- provence landing. further soldiers will follow him, including the first army from north africa. this decisive landing accelerates the german retreat. in the southeast and in the als, the resistance help -- and in the alps, the resistance the defeat
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ofiermans. allied bombs are transforming german cities, in particular cologne, hamburg and dresden into piles of rubble. hundreds of thousands of civilians take to the roads and flee. in march, 1945, allied troops cross the ryan. on april 25 -- cross the rhine. on april 25, american soldiers frat earnize with soldiers of the red army.
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it has caused the death of at least 50 million human beings. civilian populations have suffered horrendously. the opening of the death camps reveals a new image of hell to the eyes of the world. when general eisenhower discovers the human corp.s at buchenwald he declares, we are told the american soldier doesn't know what he's fighting for. now, at least, he will know what he's fighting against.
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>> never again. even before the war is over, the delegates from 50 nations meet in san francisco to lay the foundations of the united nations organization, whose job it will be to prevent and settle any conflicts in the future. a task that is difficult, uncertain, and as yet incomplete. the idea of european unity is born out of the rejection of war. in 1948 a great congress for europe is held in the haig. it's the beginning of a long and difficult process to bring the nations of europe together in a shared destiny. promoted by robert schuman and the other founding fathers, a new europe based on the values of democracy and freedom begins to take place. europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. it will be built through concrete achievements which first creates a de facto
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>> next, former f.b.i. director robert mueller on cybersecurity, then a conversation with john podesta, counselor to president obama. and live at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on washington journal." >> for over 35 years, c-span brings public affairs events from washington directly to you, putting you in the room at congressional hearings, white house events, briefings and conferences, and offering complete gavel-to-gavel coverage of the u.s. house, all as a public service of private industry. we're c-span, created by the cable tv industry 35 years ago and brought to you as a public service by your local cable or satellite provider.
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watch us in h.d., like us on facebook, and follow us on twitter. >> former f.b.i. director robert mueller was among the speakers at this week's bloomberg government's day-long summit on cybersecurity. he focused his remarks on the most effective responses to cyberattacks. this is about 30 minutes. >> i'd like to welcome to the stage robert mueller, the former director of the f.b.i. he's currently a partner at wilmer hale. we're going to talk about exactly businesses can do when they recognize a cyberthreat and the measures that they should put in place. please welcome him up. you've had the opportunity to listen to a few panels this morning and the discussion with the admiral.
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what is your biggest -- >> when are we going to get to cybersecurity? [applause] >> you know, just for you, i'm going start there. what is the biggest issue facing corporate america right now when it comes to cybersecurity? what's the biggest threat? >> a lack of understanding of , and a , the issues policy or practice generally of c.e.o.'s and top management to delegate problems and not recognizing the depth of the challenges and how swiftly a cyberattack can cut your reputation down. and not anticipating, not knowing this arena, it's very difficult for them to come up with an organizational structure that will immediately elevate those facts that could lead to substantial damage in a corporation.
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i look at what happened to me in the bureau and one of the mistakes i made was in upgrading our information technology, for instance. >> how is that a mistake? >> well, because i didn't ask the hard questions. you rely on persons. on the one hand, you have the technologists. on the other hand, you have the agents and the like. you have to come up with a new case management system. you delegate that. they tell you it's going to happen, it's going to happen, it doesn't happen. and you look back, you reflect and say i delegated an area where i should have been personally involved t. goes back to what the admiral was saying. you have to take responsibility at the top. and i think too few senior management know and understand that particular issue. and secondly, they're uncertain as to how you address it. >> if you're c.e.o. of a company, you might be a terrific manager, you might really understand sales. you might really understand
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your product. but you don't necessarily understand technology. >> but you have to understand it to the point that you can know and understand where the and adopting the new technology, upgrading the new technology. you just cannot leave it to others. you have to be sufficiently knowledgeable in understanding and ask the hard questions. and i fault myself for not asking the hard questions. at a particular point in time, you come in, turn the switch, and this new case management system will work. in my mind, i said i don't really know how that's going to work, and ultimately it did not. so we had to go back, restructure and get it done. we got it done, but it's one of those areas where it should have taken more of my personal time to make certain it was on track. >> there are a lot of questions surrounding just what's the responsibility of business, what's the responsibility of government when it comes to protecting the cyberarena. how does that break down? where do you see it? >> well, a couple of things. i think on one side, the
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federal government has to do -- we're doing a better job, even a better job in sharing information between n.s.a., f.b.i., and homeland security. and then on the other side, the business community needs to do a better job coming up with vehicles for sharing intelligence amongst themselves, but also sharing that intelligence with the federal government. if the ledge lakes that is contemplated occupant hill which gives a safe harbor to companies providing information in the federal government relating to breaches and the like, that would be tremendously helpful. but there has to be an accidenting change of information between the federal government on one side and the private sector on the other side. >> that's a lot of trust though, right? it implies a lot of trust, a company has to be willing to say, ok, i'm going turn over all of this -- >> yes, but they have some control over what is turned over.
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they can protect their intellectual property and still turn over the information that's necessary to determine what the piece of malware that was recently used, if it infected their networks, is it infecting other networks. i was saying that, in the wake of september 11, one of the things we had to do was develop relationships with other partners in order to be successful. principal partners, state and local law enforcement, we could not have been successful without the joint terrorism task forces. in the cyberarena, it's the private sector. we are not going to be successful in get ago head of this kmb without having mechanisms for the sharing of intelligence in the private sector, sharing it amongst the federal agencies, and then having that information shared amongst those two. >> what's your impression of how that's currently working? are private companies sharing enough information? >> episodically. most of it, i would say, is tremendously informal.
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there has to be a more formal process of sharing in sectors, and thanks to the department of homeland security and particular sectors, there is a growing body of capability of integrating the intelligence in particular sectors, particularly the financial sector, for instance. >> why in particular the financial sector? >> because they have gone further than most others in setting up capabilities that allow the sharing of information. comes to you nt and says, i think there's been a breach, what do you advise them to do, the next course of action? >> well, you're on the right side, as was put, post-breach. one would hope they would be taking certain steps prebreach. but post-breach, determine who's in charge. you cannot just say to your c.i.o. or your chief security officer, say, ok, you're in
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charge. a substantial breach implicates, first of all, your own people, your customers. one of the first steps that you have to take is determine what exactly was a breach, how devastating was it, how do you control it? that requires forensics. and too often there is a delay between the breach and getting forensics on board to tell you exactly what happened, and you can't notify or you don't think you can notify until you know exactly what happened. and consequently, you got to address the forensics and the fact that the s.e.c. is going to want to know if it's a breach, perhaps the department of justice. there are five or six or seven entities that have to be looked at in order to determine what the next steps are. and then you have to orchestrate bringing together those particular strains of responsibility in such a way that you move quickly and you have somebody in charge who is not necessarily just a technician, not just a human
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resources person, but somebody like the c.e.o. >> what does a company need to do to inform the people that have been insnect you look at target, and target did not immediately come out and tell customers. in fact, there's no law on the books that requires them to do so. the banks need to let the customers know that their credit cards may have been violated, but target doesn't need to do so. any guidance there for corporate america in terms of communicating with the people affected? >> i think one of the things, circumstances you see is when there is a substantial breach, one of the first things that comes to me is litigations coming down the pike, which is an aspect of it. but the litigation is not as important as reputational damage, particularly if somebody has products or sells things. the reputational damage can way outweigh any considerations related to the inevitable
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litigational coming down the pike. so prioritizing, to preserve that reputational damage by notification, but notification with a fairly firm understanding at what happened, is tremendously important. and then assuring your public, your customers that it's not going to happen again, you resolved it takes leadership from above. it can't be leadership two or three levels down. >> so leadership basically, it sounds like overall, defining the person who's in charge, and that person who's in charge really having a firm grasp of the technology space overall is critical. >> yes yes, but again, like developing the i.t., you need the technical aspects of it. that's part of it, but you also need the people aspects of it, particularly when the most serious contemplative breach would be the insider threat, the snowden threat. >> well, that's -- you bring up an important point, because
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corporate america deals with that, just as the n.s.a. has to deal with something like that. >> but you don't find -- we talk here today, and you'll continue to talk about protecting networks. there won't be a tremendous amount of emphasis placed on the biggest vulnerability, that disgruntled employee who has administrator's rights, who is unhappy, and then can do the damage from within. that you have to identify very quickly and address it from the human resources point of view. >> are there mechanisms to do that? >> well, there's an extreme in the government, for instance. everybody in the f.b.i. has to take a polygraph periodically. >> how periodically? >> every five years. >> every five years? >> wow. >> you look at your financials. you look at what admiral rogers indicated was happening at n.s.a. in terms of the
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structures. and so on one end of the spectrum, you have the auditing of the downloads. you have the focus on individuals or financial situations, the polygraphs for n.s.a. for the secrets that they keep. and on the other end, you have companies that say, well, we trust our employees. if we instituted anything along those lines, it would indicate a distrust, and not only would our employees be unhappy, but they'd sob unhappy they'll go to some other employer where it is not required. and in between, you've got to draw the line. >> uh-huh. it's a challenging balance. let me ask you about something that the admiral and i spoke a bit about, and that is the concern that we're getting ourselves into a protectionist environment as far as our global economy is concerned. china accusing us of spying on them, we're, of course, saying
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china is spying on us, and it's this back and forth. the net result, and the fear among many in the tech community, is that we are going to lose business opportunities, you know, as a result of all this worry. how do you see that playing out as we're in this sort of infantile stage of cyber hyper aware science >> i think in the short term, the disclosures will affect the relationship, and i would say affect the relationship -- i'd like to think that our technology is such that it outdo everybody else, and certainly in europe and west, re, europe and the ultimately we will prevail despite the efforts of companies to bolster developing internal corporations to take over some of the -- some of the information capability. in china, it was inevitable in
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any event. china wishes, wants our technology, and to the extent they can get our technology and build their own, that has been their goal forever and a day. this may be a little bump in the road, but again, i think it was either inevitable or our technology is such that a large communities of persons are going to gravitate to it, and this will be, as i say, a bump in the road. >> is it naive for other countries to say, oh, you know, you guys are looking at us, or is it naive of us to say, oh, you're looking at us? >> i think as the admiral said -- there are a number of countries out there, some of whom have been our greatest critiquers, who have their own internal capabilities that are not necessarily known to their population, often not known and understood by their parliaments. the one thing that has been missing from the coverage of this is the fact that we are the only country that i'm aware
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of where we have a court that passes on the request to intercept an individual in the national security realm, and that being the fisa court. that provides a protection that no other country has, whether it be scandinavia, the u.k., the home secretary, france, or elsewhere. there is not a court between the prosecutor and the investigator and the interception that passes on the probable cause for that particular interception. and so we have safeguards that i think are in some ways very much much more advanced than you would find in many of those countries who have criticized us so heavily. >> but at the same time, is our technology so advanced that assuming we checked off all those boxes, we can gather much more -- >> well, not so much different. in fact, there are countries ound who have far less
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strictures on what their national companies can do. whenever n.s.a. picks up an american citizen, they either drop it or i'll get a memo, if there's some criminal conduct and the memo will say we intercepted individual a or individual number one who appears to be involved in this criminal activity, don't indicate the name of the person. we look at it, see if it's something we would investigate, and then we have to send another memo back to n.s.a. saying yes, we're interested in investigating, give us information. now, when the cyberattacks were a substantial concern day in and day out, this somewhat burdensome procedure was frustrating in terms of getting the information you may need, but nonetheless, we have that protection there, we have that wall there that protects the surveillance of american citizens that you would not find in any other country. >> i spoke to the head of a company the other day who had been working closely with the f.b.i., and as a result of the
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sort of intel that they were gathering in the cyberworld, they were able to basically figure out the $500 million had been siphoned off from various bank accounts across the globe. and one of the things that this individual was siting was the corporation there between a private company and, in this case, the f.b.i. is that the way of the future? is that how the f.b.i. -- and you were the director of the f.b.i. i mean, is that the future for going after these cybercriminals? >> yes, and anticipating cybercriminals. one of the things we tried to do was take a particular sector, the financial sector. you take the exchanges, for instance. one would think they would be targets. what we want to do is, as we've done in other areas, go out and develop relationships with the security individuals in those
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particular, whether it be exchanges or financial institutions, so that they know who in the f.b.i. has proficiency in this area and a name -- a face with a name, and so if there is a breach, then they know who to call, and the f.b.i. agents who do it know what they're doing, know what evidence they'll need, so develop that relationship in anticipation of the probability at some point in time that there would be a breach. we're doing much more of that. we are also understanding the responsibility for disclosing to victims the fact that they have been breached or hacked into by the chinese, russians, iranians or others, and we had several thousand last year knock on the door and say did you know that the chinese or the russians were in your networks? a full majority of them did not know that, but it's our responsibility to alert persons to that. >> in terms of the f.b.i.
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personnel that you have now, is there much being done in terms of training them to understand technology? >> yeah, yeah, one of the things, in the wake of september 11, one of the priorities was that the organization be able to know, understand, and utilize the digital arena. in the wake of september 11, we also understood that our traditional hiring patterns of lawyers, accountants, former military and former law enforcement was inadequate to the new world, and so quite obviously we opened up the language in the wake of counter terrorism. we have opened it up to language, area specialists. in the wake of the anthrax attacks, we found we had almost 1,000 interviews to be done, persons who had in some way been utilizing. we didn't have the chemists or biologists to be able to do that kind of interview, so we have hired chemists, biologists and the like. likewise in the cyberarena, software, persons from software
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firms, hardware firms, computer scientists. over the last 12 years, we've been hiring up in that arena. but also we have a number of persons that are not at the top level of quality in terms of capabilities, but just under it around the country. we have, over 1,000 individuals around the country that are capable of doing these investigations. but let me make one point when i say that, and that is we focus on protecting networks. we focus on the cyberaspect, but we cannot forget that behind every cyberattack there is a warm body sitting behind the keyboard. and part of understanding and addressing this is identifying those persons who are them in e, indicting certain cases, convicting them, as we have throughout the years. one of the problems in this area is you don't know at the outset of an intrusion whether it's a chinese, the russians,
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whether it's organized crime here or in russia, or it's that 18-year-old sitting up in a bedroom someplace who has the capabilities caush >> what is it primarily? i mean, can you say there is a particular part of this world where we're seeing the majority of cybercrime originate? >> i wouldn't -- i don't think i talked about it in gross terms. i would say on the one hand, you have -- i divided it into five sectors. the first is the hack to this, the anonymous lulsec. those individuals are tremendously capable, but aren't necessarily stealing information for stealing information's sake, but want to embarrass you. secondly, you have the criminals, the targets, and the like. thirdly, you have the theft of intellectual property and the espionage. fourth, you have the terrorists and potential use of cyberby terrorists. and fifth, you have the military using cyber as several years ago when the russians sent the tanks into georgia,
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they knocked out georgia's command and control before they sent the tanks out. those are the five vectors of threats in the bureau that we deal with. >> lots. >> it is, but in order to be successful in addressing those threats, you have to know who's behind the keyboard. is it somebody from anonymous, or is it that russian hacker out of russia or the ufment k.? >> and can you identify that? >> yes, you can, yes, but it takes a combination of investigative skills, which we have traditionally had, coupled with the use of this new medium in the cyberarena. so you can't dismiss the necessity of identifying the persons, identifying where the servers are, identifying the building that person is in, tracing an i.p. address to a particular building, to a particular apartment, to a particular individual. >> let's go back to preventive measures again. i think target had to have been every retail c.e.o. and every
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c.e.o.'s nightmare. you know, i can remember talking off record with some people that said, you know, look, in some ways, therefore, that could have been me. you know, there's no reason that that -- now, forgive me, we're going to see a little bit on target coming up, and we've got the "business week" team that did the investigation into the story. as it turned out, there were actually a number of things that that company could have, should have done to prevent what eventually happened. but, you know, it's 20/20 hindsight, right? it's easier to look back after the fact. what is it that corporations, especially corporations that are dealing with consumer information, and you talked about it earlier, once you lose that trust on the consumer, that's a very, very hard thing to regain. what do they need to be doing to make sure that they don't
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become like target? >> well, you have to, again, think beyond just the technology. you have to -- do you have another insider that is a threat? it's human resources. how do you identify that? how do you monitor downloads of your information? you have to map the networks and determine whether the vulnerability -- vurkts in those networks, and then identify a particular tool to address those vulnerabilities. the vulnerabilities in company a may be far different than the vulnerabilities in company b. and develop a structure and a strategy that identifies those vulnerabilities and closes those vulnerabilities, and at the same time understand that you will be breached at some particular point in time. what is going to happen when you get the email saying, hey, look, we've got a breach here, what are you -- who are you going to turn to and who is
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going to be in charge of orchestrating the various elements in the corporations to make certain that you're addressing this? >> the c.t.o. is a pretty important job. >> it is. it's a very important job, and it also is a specialized job. >> let me segue into state concerns. i mean, we've talked about sort of corporate america and their concerns. what about state concerns? i mean, we keep hearing of all these cyberthreats. we've seen this huge improvement in technology that people are able to access. what's the danger for us? i mean, if you were still at the f.b.i. today, what would be your concern for the country from a state perspective? >> well, there are a couple of cyberissues that rise to the forefront, actually probably three. first, and this is in terms of enhanced capabilities of the cybercriminals, and that is the
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use of a wiper virus to wipe out information on hard drives. in 2012, as i'm sure you're aware, the saudi arabia oil company was infected by a virus, wiped out 30,000 hard drives. that's the first large-scale incident we have seen, but i think anybody who's in this business who's responsible for the corporate security is concerned by what would happen if you -- it's not just a denial of service attack, which is a problem. it's not information, it is wiping out information that you may or may not have a backup for that can disrupt wholly, disrupt your company. that is a problem. second is the financial arena and the ability to address service hat would -- attacks were there for a substantial period of time, but if it increases in terms of the capabilities and the effect on
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information, that's tremendously problematic. the last is internally the stems that run much of our industrial complexes and the fact that those systems were built at a time where the internet was open, and there are very, very few precautions, and it is very difficult and expensive to tighten down the system to the point where you could totally preclude individuals from getting in. >> what does that mean? i mean, what could they do? >> well, there have been displays on what can happen if you get in, into the computer system, and with a couple of shifts of controls, have a -- what water station blow up. the power grid adversely affected. there was an attack on a power station in california several months ago. i think you probably are aware,
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it was actually more of an on the ground firing of weapons at the power station, but it is worrisome in the sense that someone took it upon themselves to understate, to undertake an orchestrated attack on a power station. if you had a hacker with sufficient skills, i think that would be a substantial threat to us. >> well, here we are talking about what corporate america needs to do better to prevent themselves from being in a bad situation. what does the country need to do better to prevent anything such as what you just described? >> well, you know, on the one hand, as i said, it's important for us to recognize that, as we learn in september 11, so we have to apply here, and that is the best defense is sharing of information. we did not share information before september 11. there were walls between c.i.a., f.b.i., and even within the f.b.i. until those walls were removed.
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when chief alexander was in harge of the, we met to make certain we understood the lanes in the road and how we can share information with with understanding the structures you have in terms of those sharings. but again, on the other hand, the success is going to be in large part dependent on finding ways to utilize and harness the talents, the capabilities, the intelligence of the private sector to address terrorism in the cyberarena. >> what have you seen from the private sector? have you seen a willingness to do that? at the same time, as i've talked about, people are worried about turning over information. >> there are models out there where in a particular area, 60, 70, 80 corporations will come together to step up and exchange -- you can exchange particular intelligence and then throw that intelligence over the tronsom to the f.b.i. there are models out there that
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are beginning to grow that we can follow. the only other point i'd make is you have to take into account that the american public wants to understand and know what information is going to the federal government and what that information is being used for. and so it's important to have trance pearns a in terms of the architecture that is established for this information sharing, but you have to have the information sharing. >> right. i mean, i'll give you a recent example. you had eric schmidt and mark zuckerberg and reed hastings, all big tech players, at the white house recently meeting with the president, and they were voicing concern that, you know, that basically the privacy of their users were being threatened by all of this. so how do you reach that balance where, you know, you have c.e.o.'s that say, ok, i'm willing to turn over this information because maybe it's critical to our national security, but at the same time i need to protect my customer in all this. >> well, you don't turn over
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necessarily the personal identifiable information. what do you is you take the patterns that are established, you may see it as an i.s.p., particular patterns are established that indicate wrongdoing, and you can cordon off that information that should not be turned over, but there's substantial information that can and should be turned over, and it would not be to the detriment of the particular company, because a company can put persons in places where you establish this kind of connectivity to assure that that company's information is used appropriately. and by the same together willing, to the extent they join that, they get the benefit of the intelligence that comes back, and it may enable them to avert an attack. >> it doesn't seem like we're there yet. >> we're not there yet. >> it seems like there is this resistance. how do you work through that? >> well there, has to be something in it for them that
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outweighs the downsides and their perception of the threat of their intellectual property or identifying them as a breacher in advance of the time that they want to do it. but you structure it in such a way that it's beneficial to them in terms of the intelligence they get, and by the same token, they control the personnel and the information that's put into this unified intelligence structure. >> ok. so we'll get there? >> we'll get there. we'll get there. >> when? >> as the admiral said, you just hope we get there without a catalyst along the lines of a september 11. >> is that something you worry about? >> yes. >> from this side of it? >> i think everybody does. >> i brought up that termerier, and it's a hard thing to think about, because 3,000 lives were lost on 9/11, but are there events that you worry about that could happen from a cyberperspective that would be catastrophic like that? >> there could be, in looking
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at the power grids, looking at our infrastructure, yes, financially it would cripple us if there is a substantial attack on wall street, on the exchanges. it also could lead to a loss of lives to the extent that we can be, our command and control knocked out in afghanistan or iraq or someplace, and somebody is ahead of us in terms of open intelligence, as well as technology, so that they are able to eliminate our command and control and leave us defenseless when our enemies are moving against us. >> it's a brave new world. director mueller, thank you very much for your time today. >> thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> next, a conversation with john podesta. and live at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on washington journal."
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>> c-span's new book sundays at 8:00 include a financial journalist. >> what role should the government play in housing finance? if up to the subsidize housing in this sandri we want to talk about it and the populace agrees that it's something we should subsidize, then put it on the balance sheet and make it clear and make it evident and make everybody aware of how much it's costing. but when you deliver it through these third-party enterprises, fannie mae and freddie mac, when you deliver the subsidy through a public company with private shareholders and executives can extract a lot of that subsidy for themselves, that is not a very good way of subsidizing homeownership. >> read more of our conversation with gretchen morgenson from our programs in c-span's "sundays at eight," now available for a father's day gift at your favorite book
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seller. >> john podesta now on issues facing the obama administration -- the epa recently announced power plant emissions rule, the release of bergdahl, and hillary clinton. mr. podesta served as white house chief of staff from 1998 until 2001. his comments are an hour. >> our guest is john podesta, his fourth visit of the group. the last was in 2009 when he was president and chief executive officer for the center for american progress. he grew up in chicago, earned a bachelor's degree from knox college, and is an alumni from georgetown. he spent his early career on capitol hill. he worked with ted kennedy and
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