you mean to those who considered nuclear weapons. the united states response, i think, can be looked at in two points of time. from the moment the protests were met with a violent reaction, we worked very hard to try to de-escalate the crisis, to bring the parties together, and the vice president was constantly on the phone with then president yanukovych. the president was deeply engaged with his european partners as well as with vladimir putin looking for a diplomatic agreement for a way forward to resolve the crisis peacefully, but once the russians went into shifted, andolicy the president set three very clear directions that we follow to this day. first, we will isolate russia for the actions it is taking in ukraine.

second, we would support ukraine to build support for ukraine in the international community, and reassure our allies and partners, and let me spend a few minutes on those. with regards to russia, the goals were simple and straightforward. we needed to impose costs for the actions russia had taken. we saw to deter russia from taking further irresponsible actions, and we hoped to shape the decision space that vladimir putin and the russian government would take going forward. you all know the litany of things that happened in the immediate weeks following the incursion into crimea. there was the suspension from the g-8, the efforts in the united nations to isolate russia politically, and we saw that with the very significant vote withe security council, china even abstaining and not siding with russia, and then with the general assembly, where

russia found itself with another 10 countries, none of whom i think would be partners of first choice for us in this room. we rejected the referendum that took place in crimea and in the east, and we downgraded our bilateral relations, and even with something like the sink tutors per economic situation, a showcase for russia and its economy, we persuaded many of our senior ceo's not to go. now, this did not just happen. it took incredibly hard, sustained, focused work, to move all of our partners in the same direction, and i do not think people say, oh, they did not get to go to a g-8 meeting, or there was a vote at the u n general assembly, it does not mean anything. it is significant. it matters because one way that vladimir putin and russia were getting power was by the

clinical influence that russia is able to obtain, and isolating it diminishes that power. but then even more significant were the measures that we took to isolate russia economically. the president was determined to adhere to principles that we would do it with our partners, with europe, and with others, fortunately reasons. first, the impact of being able to impose sanctions is much greater. but second, the political effect when ites the isolation is not just the united states doing it, so i think as you all know, we engage in a process that resulted in the bands, asset freezes, suspension of doing business with key figures in russia and ukraine, and we targeted officials, six members of the inner circle, and

expropriated crimean gas company, and the european union, canada, australia, japan, impose similar measures. just as significant, we developed more severe measures targeted at the same time potentially very effective in the financial, energy, and arm sectors. the very knowledge that these measures were out there has, we believe, a deterrent effect, and, indeed, the fact that moveries have agreed to forward if necessary not only deters, but it creates a climate of uncertainty that actually imposes cost without having to pull the trigger. so there has been discussion about the impact or lack of impact of these sanctions and these economic measures. to me, the case is not even close. it is very, very clear.

first, we heard in public from the russian finance minister, it's different you prime minister in charge of the economy, and even vladimir putin himself recognizing the impact of sanctions. and,argest bank in russia in effect, a proxy for the and announced a steep decline in its first-quarter profits and said the particular recent events in ukraine impacted the dynamics of the russian economy. whole host of measures, we can see a dramatic impact that the economic isolation has already had on russia. we side with the financial markets, which are incredibly sensitive to isolation and to the pressure exerted, and we saw in the crisis it go to extraordinary lows. a bounce back, something that was seen to be positive, and, of course, in the short term does markets are volatile, they may

not be the best measure, but we can clearly see the sensitivity. goingen we saw the ruble to an all time low. it also is sensitive to events, but during this. keeper, the central bank of billionad to spend 37 dollars, eight percent of its foreign exchange reserves, to resulting inble, higher costs and decreased savings for russians. even more significant and compelling, capital flow. billion in the first year alone, which was more than all of 2013, and going forward, world bank, private expert estimate that in 2014, the capital flight in russia is expected to be up towards $200 billion. investors look for stability. they look for countries that keep their commitments. they look for a country that is

connected internationally, and in all of those areas, russia's actions sent a message to investors that that is not the kind of environment they want to invest in. rating is cut to just above junk level. russian companies are not issuing bonds to raise capital. economic contraction is already clear. we have seen that in the first quarter of 2014. most experts are expecting to see something close to zero growth. the was a multibillion-dollar , and that ceo is sanctioned. now, some of this was happening before the crisis, before the sanctions, a downturn in the russian economy, but virtually every analyst we have makes it clear that everything we did in response to what russia did in ukraine accelerated and deep into this process.

so those are the measures of what we have done to carry out the unit to isolate russia for actions in ukraine, but i think what is even more important than that when you think forward if i am absolutely convinced that russia's actions in ukraine are strategic for russia going into the future. first, yes, you can say that won crimea, but in doing so, they have likely lost ukraine. they are more unified than ever, and its sense of national unity is deeper. and then there is crimea itself. it is true in the short term the actions that russia took in crimea produced a political bounce for vladimir putin, but i think that is going to change in a significant way. russia is spending about $7 billion this year just indirect costs, budgetary and pensions

for crimea. over the next several years, most of the experts estimate it will have to spend between $50 billion and $60 billion for critical infrastructure, rail, bridges, water, to make up for what crimea has lost due to the russian actions with ukraine. this affects discretionary spending, affecting modernizing the economy. in short, the bloom will come off of the crimean rose as people understand there are real costs involved. secondly, strategically. what vladimir putin has done in hasea more than anything reenergized nato to a point that i do not think we have seen in years. there is a renewed focus on commitment. thing that the very vladimir prudence sought to prevent, nato moving, in effect, closer to rush her best russia

is more likely to happen. and to the extent that we are successful in reversing the decline in defense spending among nato countries, this is probably going to be the most significant catalyst. third, russia's actions in ukraine have done more than anything else possibly could have done to create the potential for real energy reform in europe. it is the biggest single jewel to europe, taking steps to decrease their dependence on supply.to diversify this has the potential, ironically, to kill the goose that lays russia is one golden egg, and then fourth, there are the unintended consequences. what message do russia's actions in ukraine, in the late defense of ethnic rights, sent to non-ethnic russians in chechnya, dagestan?

this could open a can of worms that are profoundly against the interests of moscow, and then finally, and maybe most interestingly, i mentioned a moment ago that when you think about how to define power or how vladimir prudence seize power, it is probably a combination of two things. the russian geopolitical influence and strength. indeed, there was a recent survey taken in russia where the russian people were asked what would be their top two priorities, and it was very interesting with results evenly split, international influence and creating conditions for individual prosperity. by russia's actions in ukraine, both of those priorities are in profound jeopardy, and, indeed, so is vladimir putin's contact with his people to deliver that prosperity. there is a way out. integrate russia's economy with the world, diversify it away

from fossil fuels, play by the rules. to vladimirit is up putin if he wants to pursue it. i have to tell you that my concern is left with few choices in terms of sustaining his power, there will be a strong vladimir putin to continue to play the nationalist a joltn order to produce of short-term support that then evaporates. people understand the costs, and it requires another jolt. that is the danger. certainly the hope of the entire administration is not the course that russia chooses, and i will come back to that in the end. the second thing about what we pursued over these months, and there was an equal effort that was put into building that international support led by the president in a very systematic way, it began with economic support. we produced a package with our

european partners, with the imf, with others of $27 billion. reform, including cutting energy subsidies, improving macroeconomic management, boosting competitiveness, strengthening the banking sector, increasing energy and security. was anchored by a $17 billion imf project. another $4ere was billion from g7 countries, from the world bank, a $1 billion u.s. loan guarantee for low-income families. separate and apart from that, u.s. technical support for political reform, capacity building, anticorruption programming, etc.. and then most recently, we have seen in election support from the united states, from europe, this was ahers, and remarkable achievement,

considering the direct under which it was conducted. and faire most free election in their history. we would often marvel at the irony of people complaining about being disenfranchised because they were the very people creating the disenfranchising. most folks in this room are probably too young to remember this, but there was a wonderful movie when i was growing up saddles,"azing where the sheriff, played by ttle, he comes out holding himself hostage, and he says, you had better stop, or i will shoot myself. were doing byhey complaining about the disenfranchisement. and then complaining about the legend fascists that dominate ukraine. well, if you look at the

election results, the two parties each got less than two percent. so much for domination by the far right. assistance,economic besides the assistance for the elections, we have also pursued security. $23 million over the past three months to help the ukrainian security forces deal with their immediate needs, to sustain themselves in the field, to defend themselves against the armed separatists, and a better armed border. people laughed at that. but they had last, meals ready to meet, and they could not have been sustained in the field without them. helmets, night vision goggles, vehicles, disposal robots. those are all short-term measures to address what was most immediate in this crisis, but now, with the new government, and cooperation with europe, we plan to engage on

comprehensive security reform. some would have us sell or provide ukraine with all sorts of complicated weapons systems starting yesterday. that is exactly the wrong thing to do. --is vitally a point important that we evaluate things and understand the necessary reforms, establish actual needs and establish priorities. until ukraine begins to address with europe's help and our help insufficient resources, institutional capacities, and gross corruption, systems will not be effective, but there is a real opportunity with the new government is determined to remedy the shortcomings of the past, and we are determined. finally, reassuring our allies and our partners. the president was determined hearing from many of our allies, listening to the deep concern russian based on

actions in ukraine to take immediate steps to reassure them, to bolster the article five commitment that lies at the heart of nato, and what he set out to do, and what we have done, is to produce a virtually continuous air, land, and sea presence in the eastern reaches of nato. sent 12 additional f-16's to: for training missions, six additional and the baltics, and we rotated ships into the black sea. deployed four character first two baltic countries for training and exercises. this week, as you may have heard, the president announced a new commitment with a $1 billion tod that will allow us expand exercises and training, to increase the number of u.s. personnel into loosely rotating through central and eastern europe, and to increase assistance to ukraine, moldova,

and georgia. that theiously vital usa not be engaged in enterprise loan. we have taken many steps to encourage our partners to do the same him to take part in rotations, and we expect over the coming months, we will be able to say that all 28 members of nato participated, and then by september, we expect to see steps to reverse the decline in defense spending that has affected the alliance in recent years. ironically, all of this again was catalyzed by russia's actions. so where do we go from here? first, it is very important that we get a grip on and resolve the situation. what we have seen in recent weeks are two things. there has been, on the surface, at least, a russian de-escalation, pulling back of troops from the border, ratcheting down the rhetoric, maybe even some positive statements about the ukrainian election.

steps werehese designed principally to try to take some pressure off of russia and possibly divide europe from the united states and the europeans from each other, to create some confusion, because, unfortunately, this change of tactics, i don't think, indicates a change in heart. russia still seeks to intimidate ukraine into giving russia undue theuence is sowing chaos in east through covert support, separatist fighters, and overt support, with the referenda. and weaponsilitants across the border, and this is maybe the most striking development in recent weeks. i think you have all seen it. numerous videos of armed militants admitting they came from russia, including many chechens. convoys of vehicles to cross the border, armed men and weapons. recently, there was an incident at the airport, where

separatists sought to take over the airport, and the ukrainian military responded in that battle. some 35 were killed, and they were russian. russian passports. separatists, unfortunately, have become increasingly violent, increasingly heavily armed, and targeting security forces, so you cannot have it both ways. you cannot on one hand take steps to de-escalate the crisis that at the same time under the surface actually take steps to so it is vitally important that we continue to keep the pressure on russia to change course, and that is exactly what happened this week in europe at the g7 and in the president's meetings with his european counterparts. at the g7, president obama secured commitments from our about the onyx etc. russian interference in ukraine -- intensifyfy

measures to impose further costs on russia if it proves necessary. been making clear what it is russia needs to do and what it must stop doing in order to immediately de-escalate the crisis and provide an opportunity to move forward. it has to recognize the results of the election and engage directly. it needs to completely withdraw its military forces from the border area, stop the flow of militants and weapons across the border, exercise influence on separatists to put down their arms, leave buildings, resolve their differences peacefully, and, of course, in terms of what it cannot do, no military invasion, no bogus peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. steps, it ishese equally important that ukraine respond in an appropriate manner. as a planent-elect

for what he calls peace, unity, and reform. it includes resuming the national dialogue, amnesty for those who put down their weapons, and drawing separatists into the process. ukraine should avoid having to pursue martial law, a disproportional use of force, or full-scale counterterrorism measures, if, of course, russia takes the steps i outlined to de-escalate. ukraine is to continue to pursue reform, especially anticorruption, because, gimp, let's not forget what we started with. what is truly at the root of so much of the turmoil in ukraine is as profound sense of disenfranchisement from the country that is fueled in large part by what we have seen over and a reformdes program that is so critical for success. let me conclude with just a couple of words about relations

with russia. crisis,ut this diplomatic relations with russia did not cease. we remained in contact. the president spoke with vladimir putin number of times, and, indeed, they spoke in normandy. we have tried to make it clear repeatedly that our plan is not to weaken russia or curtail russia. rather, uphold a very basic printable. be future of ukraine must decided by the people of ukraine, not by russia, not by the united states, not by europe, not by anyone but them in ukraine. thancan attest better anyone that led recruiting tends to see the relationship with us and the west on the basis of decades. a legend broken promises regarding nato and the treaty, theyse of force in libya.

seem to believe that nato is aimed at russia, that we want to keep russia weak and divided. from our stance, none of this is true, and not our objectives. ironically, there are things that vladimir prudent claims that are likely to be precipitated by the actions that russia has taken, fulfilling his own prophecies. the president was very clear in brussels in march. since the end of the cold war, successive administrations have worked with russia and the international community, not as a favor to russia but because it is in our national interests, and we continue to believe it is in the world interests for russia and the united states and all to work together. it is hard to imagine most of the major 21st-century challenges the effectively addressed without cooperation, and already, we have clearly demonstrated cooperation through

through the iran sanctions and the nuclear negotiations. through the effort to remove chemical weapons from syria. the transit of troops and and cooperation after the boston marathon bombings and in advance of the sochi olympics. there is a wayd, to get back to a more productive path if russia will de-escalate tensions over ukraine with the steps i discussed previously, if they were to find a diplomatic way forward that respects and restores ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and works on the relationship. there is a basis for a way forward. we can continue cooperation that is in our mutual self-interest, i chemical weapons, in space, and we can work together to try to overcome old, outdated

suspicions and rebuild trust. that is certainly the past the united states prefers to take. the question is, is that the path that vladimir putin wants to take, and in the coming weeks and months, we will find the answer. thank you very much. [applause] >> as tony is getting miced up, we have a little time. here, and in over will get over to you, as well. do you mind taking a few questions? >> no. >> thank you, tony. i feel very comfortable with what you sketched out in terms of policy approach.

i have one question on how we should deal with russia. when i was in ukraine, as you know, for the last several weeks, i heard ukrainian leaders say to me repeatedly that ukraine should not be left alone in facing russia, that they felt to face futurek negotiations with russia alone. obviously, the questions came up all of the time, what about geneva two? what about this international effort, and should that happen, and if so, do you think it could be turned into a process to accompany ukraine on the way forward? >> thank you. this gentleman. identify yourself. >> i am with the russian news ass, and president obama

traveled to europe on tuesday, and he took part in a number of very important events there, just to mention a few, with the european countries with the , thedent elect in warsaw g7 summit in brussels, and the particularlytings so the question is, do you see any changes in the situation around ukraine and dealing with russia with all of or is it the same as a week ago? >> thank you. i will try to take as many

questions as we can and then give you time. >> a $1 billion question. biden in yourself, with assistance for georgia, it was very clear, and it was crucial for georgia. recently, the $1 billion security fund for europe. fund will be dedicated? thank you. >> thank you. and we will come down here. >> thank you. actually following up on the ambassador's question, i understand that the it ministration will request $1 billion of extra appropriations from congress. will the administration also

request a new appropriation for security systems for ukraine, as was done for georgia? >> thanks. thank you. >> elizabeth, american correspondent in berlin. would like to ask you, just to say a few words about how you in respondingtion to vladimir putin's reactions -- actions. >> thank you. and then we will go back to tony. >> thank you. this follows up on the last question. , howerms of cooperation concerned are you that you have five months until the weather gets cold? because you talked about a jewel so in five jolt,

months time, what can you do? >> thank you. i think you have plenty of questions to respond to their and five minutes or less. >> well, thank you. first of all, it is good to see you, and i want to thank you for the remarkable service you performed, which made a big difference. and with regard to pursuing the geneva track, we are certainly open to that. we have heard the same thing from the ukrainians, the desire to have as they engage with russia the support of the united states and the european countries and the european union. define to decide and what the best process will be, but we are prepared to continue to engage in that process, if that is the best way forward. from tass,gentleman

my answer is i hope yes. we have to judge this not on words but on actions, and so i think there have been some positive statements that have been made. i think there was a statement that came out of moscow today from the government that referred to the president elect, which would be some sign of recognizing the president elect as the president of ukraine, but the bottom line is this depends on the actions that are taken and not the words that are spoken, so we will test this in weeks ahead, and, again, our strongest desire and our strongest interest is to de-escalate and find diplomatic resolution that we believe profoundly not only can sustain the interests of ukraine, europe, and the united states, but also russia. that is what we would like to achieve. to ambassador, with regard the fund for the european security. there are a number of things that we would aim to support through this fund, and they are critical.

the positioning of equipment and material in europe, support for more exercises and training missions in europe, including in central and eastern europe, and direct support to georgia, two moldova, and to ukraine, among other things. we also hope this is a catalyst for other countries in nature doing more themselves, and it is not that we expect everyone to miraculously get to two percent --gdp on defense than thing defense spending, but if we can reverse this negative trend, that would be helpful, so hopefully we can capitalize that, and then in regard to new appropriations, we are looking very carefully at what the needs are, what the means are that we have at our disposal, and whether we need further assistance. i think it is significant that as a result of leadership that we have exerted together with our european partners, the

amount of money that is being made available to ukraine is very significant, $27 billion. from the international community, starting with the imf, but we will be prepared to look at the gaps that need to be filled on specific types of assistance going forward. emphasize though that this assistance is not going to work if it is not met by a clear dedication to reform on the part of the ukrainian government. we have been down this path before with previous ukrainian governments, when the international community proved itself quite generous, but they did not produce any lasting results because the reform that was required did not happen. thatve a strong feeling this is an exceptionally critical moment but also a moment of opportunity. because of everything that happened, because of the commitments that have been made, and, again, we have seen with the force that this represents, i profound desire for change that is putting pressure on

ukraine to deliver, but we will see if that happens. it is great to see you here today. cooperation in general and germany in particular, i have to say from our vantage point, it has been exceptional. one of the things that people don't see on a day-to-day basis, because it happens behind the scenes, is the coordination, communication, cooperation between president obama and his european counterparts. throughout his presidency, he has been on the phone for hours on end, particularly with chancellor merkel or, with nde, with the eu leadership, and with many others, and that process of constant mutation, starting with the president but then throughout the administration, throughout the department, i think it has produced exemplary cooperation. now, none of it is easy.

there are competing interests among european countries and within european countries. desires obviously the for a positive relationship with russia, profound economic interests at stake, but at least despitevantage point, all, we have managed to remain remarkably united, and that has given even greater power. chancellor merkel has been an extraordinary leader in this, and her voice and everything ,hat she has done with russia with her european colleagues, and with us i think in this situation has been exemplary, and i also think it is fair to say that we would not be in the positive position we are in absent her leadership along with that of other colleagues in is, canand the question this be sustained? there is a good question about going into winter, different pressures being exerted, and that is a great question.

yes,lieve is the answer is but it also requires countries to take significant steps in the coming months to put themselves in a position to sustain and to also be able to resist competing pressures and influences. you're are exactly right. we have had energy jolts before. will this be different? my sense is it will. we had a meeting with the g7 countries weeks ago in which they agreed to a series of steps , including basic stress tests in all of our economies to gauge the extent of our energy efficiency, and independence, and the results will hopefully be translated into concrete action to diversify forces of energy, routes, connections to the u.s. and elsewhere, and i would

technology that the jury is out on that, so maybe next time i can answer your question. we have lots of witnesses, including c-span. we are very pleased that you could join us today. i know you have got a very busy backa, and you have to go to the executive office. thank you so much for joining us. >> good to be with you. >> thank you. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] president obama is in poland today as part of his european trip. this morning, the president attended a ceremony in warsaw, marking the anniversary of their first election. we will have live coverage, about 10 minutes.

>> thank you. i'm a fellow here with the international order and strategy at brookings. and i'm particularly delighted to be able to chair the first panel. i'd like to thank fionna and jeremy shapiro for asking me to do it. and it's a particular privilege to do it at a conference in honor of clara who i knew for the past two years here, was really a wonderful colleague. and she's sorely missed. and i know several people here knew her and on the panel.

i think she would be very interested in the topic today. not just because of the events in ukraine, but also because she has such a strong passion for european union foreign policy and europe's role in the world. we're very fortunate to have three excellent panelists for the topic of really what's going on inside europe. the second panel looks at europe's role in the world. and we're trying to lock out not just europe's economy, but really everything that goes on inside the box. is europe about to get out of the financial crisis? and the phase has past and about to return to robust growth and take on a greater role in the world and complete the project of monetary integration by adding sort of fiscal federalism and all of the things that economists and others over the last decade said they need to do in order to be that stable and competitive? or are we in the beginning of a japan-style lost decade where at the worst of the crisis is over,

but it's going to be very hard for europe to get the political support to do it as necessary to really fix the fundamental flaws of monetary integration? and after the parliamentary elections of last week, what does that mean for the future of european federalism? are we seeing a populist backlash whereby the politicians and the famous phrase, know what they need to do but don't know how to get reelected once they do. and maybe they won't be able to get the reforms through. and what are we looking at in terms of the commission president and some of the key positions. so what i'd like to do is to turn to each of the panelists and to offer us their initial thoughts on this. and then we'll have a conversation and then open it up for a conversation for about half an hour. so, simon, if i could start with you. could you begin by talking about

europe's sort of economic prospects? are we really out of the worst of the crisis? and where do we go from here in terms of, you know, ensuring there isn't a new crisis and we see some sort of growth, and getting out of deflationary sort of spiral and europe can, you know, sort of begin to punch its way economically in the world again? >> i'm sorry, i should add, as well, i apologize for not introducing properly, simon, but simon is the deputy director for the center for european reform that specializes in the euro zone and european fiscal policy. >> thanks, tom. and good morning, everyone. thank you very much to brookings and to kings for inviting me to speak today. i think it's a lovely gesture to dedicate this conference to clara and see all of us are very, very grateful to brookings and kings to all of the help you've given us in setting up the fellowship which we hope

will run for many years. to the subject, i used to argue about this point a lot with clara. she didn't disagree with my analysis. but i think for clara, it was close, almost a heresy for a colleague to argue that the euro, which is a huge symbol of europe and integration could actually become a threat to the eu and a threat to european integration. we would have lengthy discussions about this. i'm going to start off by outlining why i think the economy, the eurozone economy in particular is in poor shape. why this situation poses a threat to the eu as a whole, and why the choice really does now come down to more or less europe. now, despite the talk of economic recovery that one hears a lot of in europe, and despite claims by eurozone policy makers that the crisis is over, the

eurozone and by extension, the eu remains in a very serious mess. it's worth remembering that the eurozone economy is still 3 percentage points smaller than it was in the beginning of 2008. now, even the u.s., which is supposed to be pretty more abundant at the moment is six percentage points bigger. and if one breaks down the eurozone into the constituent parts, we see truly, truly terrible numbers. the spanish economy is 7% smaller. the irish one, 8%, the greek one over 20% smaller than it was six years ago. now, eurozone unemployment has come down a touch, largely because of people withdrawing from the labor market and emigrating, but it's still 12%. and much, much higher than that. in places like spain. youth unemployment, this is the number that shocks people on this side of the atlantic is that about a quarter, over 40%

initially, over 50% in spain. so we're seeing truly shocking numbers, still. now, the myth persists that these are the result of countries mismanaging their public finances. this was the case in greece, but aside from greece, it wasn't the problem. the central problem in europe was huge capital flows from the core of the euro zone, places like germany to places like spain in the periphery of the eurozone. this was interbank lending. that combined with the absence of so-called adjustment mechanisms in the eurozone is the crisis, not mismanagement of public finances. basically, interest rates in the run-up to the crisis were far too low to the likes of spain, ireland, other countries and too high for germany's economy. inflows of all of this money led to booms in those economies,

pushed up their wages and costs. when the financial crisis hit, the capital inflows stopped overnight. resulting in bank crises. the capital stopped, economies bombed, the public finances hit the banks because the banks were sitting on all the government bonds. and then that depressed economic conditions and rebounding on the banks. the so-called sovereign bank doom loop. now, the failure to predict this was forgivable. no one spotted this. this link between governments and banks on what it could do. but the weakness of adjustment mechanisms within the eurozone was predicted. this is a very large and very diverse currency. it comprises very, very different economies. so a shock, the economic shock will hit some of them very differently to others.

euro members cannot devalue their currencies as everyone knows. and they don't have what economists have a lender of last resort. they essentially borrow in a foreign currency. there's no bank that will step in and buy their debt in the way you see here in the u.s. so without a currency and without a fully central bank, something else has to be flexible. now, this means that markets for goods and services, capital, labor have to be highly integrated. so resources move to where they can be moved most productively. within the eurozone, there is a market, a market for goods. there wasn't much integration when it comes to services which comprised most of economic activity. capital is very slow to be allocated or to be used in the

most productive fashion. so it's very slow, productive capital. frankly, slow to move from one part of the eurozone to the other. labor mobility is very low. we have seen a lot of people emigrating from spain and ireland, portugal in recent years. but a lot of those people, the majority of those people have gone to countries outside of the eurozone. so the irish have been to britain, here, australia, canada, spanish have gone to latin america and british america. very few have gone to other members of the eurozone. the second factor is that the european central bank has hampered adjustment by allowing inflation to collapse in the eurozone. the inflation rate is 0.5%, which makes it hard for countries such as spain and italy to engineer declines in the real exchange rates while getting on top of their debt burdens.

why this is such a risk. european central bank has also acted in a nakedly political manner. for example, by backing fiscal austerity in a slump, which ignores economic theory and history. and for exaggerating the likely impact on economies of structural fault. three, the eurozone lacks any mechanism to transfer resources between constituent members. so with no federal budget to smooth asymmetric shocks, fiscal austerity has been the weapon of choice. the problem with this, it's so-called pro cyclical. what it does is exacerbates, makes everything worse. now adjustment based on austerity and internal devaluation, which is what europeans now call deflation is dangerous. first, low inflation, let alone deflation makes it hard to

reduce real wages. take spain, they need to reduce their real wages. but if inflation's very low, that's hard to do because nominal wages do not fall. it's almost impossible to cut nominal wages. you need a bit of inflation. two, deflation increases the real value of debt both public and private. raises real interest rates. and this -- can lead consumers and businesses to delay purchases if they expect prices to fall further. and third, fiscal multipliers the impact of cuts in public spending. very large when interest rates are close to zero. so spending reductions by governments tend to have a very big negative impact on demand. now, what is needed against that kind of backdrop? well, in the short-term, looser management policy and accommodative fiscal policy. so asset purchases basically

quantitative easing, big program of quantitative easing and i would argue higher inflation target at least temporarily. >> what would you put that on? the inflation target? >> temporarily 4%. this would help prevent countries sliding into insolvency and facilitate the exchange rate adjustment. more investment, more government investment by countries that have the fiscal scope to do so would also help underpin demand. that's the short-term. in the longer term, it's hard to see how this can work without a proper banking -- rather than the truncated one that's been agreed. but a proper one that includes fiscal backstops. so making the banks, removing the responsibility from banks from the national level to the federal level. the backstop at the federal level and a common deposit insurance system for bank depositors across the eurozone. another safe eurozone asset,

some kind of bond. this would help break the doom loop between the banks and the government by making it easier for governments to restructure sovereign debt. problem they can't do that at the moment because the banks are sitting on so much of that debt. and by restructuring solvent debt, they threaten to implode the bank. you need this kind of safe euro zone asset. and i would argue an element of fiscal union beyond what is implied in a fully fledged banking unit. upon eurozone unemployment insurance system could form the embryo of such a fiscal union. and finally, more democratically accountable central bank for the broader mandate, something akin to the mandate of the u.s. fed. so responsibility for price stability but also growth and unemployment. the problem with everything i've just said is that that requires more, not less europe. as time goes on, it's becoming harder to make the case for more

europe. anyone following europe and political scene can appreciate that. europe increasingly is now defined by the constraints that it places on governments. rather than the opportunities it provides them with to improve the lives of their electorates. and the longer this continues, the greater the likelihood that we see a serious european backlash, not just europe but the eu more broadly. i think there are two solutions. one is to jump forward to a more federal politically europe within the euro zone with politics resuming at the federal level. or a return to a european union without a single currency and let individual countries manage their economies as they see fit. the problem is that the latter option will be hugely destabilizing. it would require capital controls, defaults in several countries, measures to deal with

the ensuing financial crisis, and an agreement about how to deal with legacy debt and contracts. hugely complex stuff. it'll be a very big crisis. but if a more federal europe is impossible, it will be better to get on with this before the politics turn seriously nasty. thank you. >> thank you. fascinating. simon, you said that, you know, you outlined what i think is a good sort of solution for europe's problems in a number of areas. everything from the monetary policy to fiscal policy to some of the politics. and you said that one of the reasons that can happen is because there's not enough support for more europe. another reason maybe it can't happen is because germany in particular, but also the ecb and many of the leading thinkers in europe want more europe, but they actually disagree with those steps.

so they disagree about a eurobond and disagree about quantitative easing. and there's been this significant philosophical gap in economic policy that's opened up between germany on the one hand and the united states and some other countries on the other hand. so i think it's a -- it's a tough question. even if there is support for european integration and even if there are people in key positions who want to be forward leaning, there is this deep philosophical, you know, disagreement about whether or not you can do these things. and so i'd like to turn to randy henning, a professor of economic governance and really try to put this question to you. that if -- if we -- we are where we are in economic terms. there are these solutions out there that many people believe would have sort of a big bang effect of really being game changers and kickstarting growth. but they're exceptionally

unlikely because of german opposition and also because of rising sort of populism and the difficulty in getting it through in terms of treaty change. so what does that mean for the next sort of decade in european economics? i mean, if we can't do what simon sort of outlined and there's unlikely to be a collapse of the currency union for all of the reasons that, you know, people are afraid of what the alternative would be, what is the middle sort of muddling through option? how bad is it? is it not quite as bad as we think? and what can they do within the constraints they have? >> well, thank you, tom. i'm pleased to be in part of this panel and happy to celebrate the life and work of clara o'donnell in this way with you. let me approach the questions

you've posed to me in three bullet points, right? and preface this by saying on the 2070th anniversary of the landing in normandy, the united states is tied to the fate of europe, albeit thankfully in a different way in this country, i think has an abiding interest in the success of european integration. and a supporter of european monetary integration, in particular. and i want to see it succeed. i say this at the outset because we're going to talk about the problems associated kind of with europe and the barriers to -- to success and how these -- but we do this in the spirit that it's in our mutual interest across the atlantic to overcome them. so i have three main points. now, the first is as the jumping off point, shapiro suggested i make this comparison to japan.

so i'll begin with that. europe is not japan, but the stagnation displays some worrying similarities. and the second point i'll make is the european central bank shows the path that differs from the federal reserve in monetary policy. ultimately going to its institutional context. and the third point would be that europe will need to do more than it has yet agreed if it is to stabilize the euro area permanently. in the long run, you will need to find a way back to the no bailout clause in the treaty. and i'll use the american example to explain how and why that should be. so with respect to the comparison to japan, there are important differences between europe and japan to be sure, but the parallels are ominous. and europe wants to avoid them.

so in japan, we saw the bursting of an asset price bubble, imposed losses on the banking system, regulators exercised forbearance, monetary policy behind the curve, deflation was allowed to settle in which created further losses for the bank, kept perpetuating a downward spiral. italy has already suffered a lost decade in terms of growth, low inflation makes its debt deeply problematic, and italy has at best only 1 1/2 of the famous 3 arrows that prime minister -- japanese prime minister abe has use d. the one arrow it has at its disposal in the future. and the reform in italy progressed to yield kind of increases in growth over the long-term.

now, ben bernanke warned japan about this downward spiral that i just talked about early in the process. and his advice was not heated. the european central bank also shows a path different from the federal reserve. yesterday's announcement doesn't change that picture. the constitutional context is the reason for that different choice. that's the subject of the second point. the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities was famously modeled by sergeant wallace three decades as a contest between fiscal dominance and monetary dominance. high, maybe very high under the fiscal dominance scenario.

whereas their low under monetary dominance. in the euro crisis, this game took the form of chicken. creditor governments could create a financial facility and bail out the debtor, or the ecb could buy sovereign bonds. the two actions were close substitutes at least over the short and medium term. and each side was better off if the other made its concession first. and each had a incentive to wait. so the upshot is that the ecb delayed taking aggressive measures much longer than the fed and the bank of england did. the ecb won this contest, right, monetary dominance prevails. inflation is extraordinarily low. perhaps too much of an overachiever.

and deflation is a palpable threat. but ecb behavior is important to understand was a function of the strategic interaction with governments and the political fragmentation of the euro area. so this takes me to the point about fiscal policy. the euro area has chosen to apply fiscal discipline in a centralized fashion. and i think this path is fundamentally unworkable. needs to find discipline in a decentralized way to be politically sustainable in the long run. so to think about this, consider how different the u.s. rules are from the fiscal rules of the euro area. the fiscal compact in europe has been introduced into national law. but the process was initiated by the center, by the community institutions. and in some cases, under duress.

in the united states, rules eliminating debt accumulation were adopted automou eed autonoe states. and second, community institutions play a leading role in enforcing the rules whereas the u.s. federal government has no central role. congress cannot legislate fiscal rules for the states. so the u.s. model of fiscal rectitude for the states rests on multiple layers of rules kind of at the state level combined -- and this is really important, with a no bailout norm in the united states. by contrast, member states have been bailed out. so the next generation of proposals in europe for dealing with fiscally dysfunctional states is likely to embrace more intrusion into domestic politics and policies. the rescue fund, like the size of the rescue fund in intrusive

fiscal rules can go hand in hand. >> can you just -- when you say intrusive fiscal rules, you mean, you know, going into a country and basically trying to determine their tax policy or spending or structure reform? that's pretty serious interference. it's not sort of the technical stand back, you need to sort of fill out this performance sheet at the end. it's really, you know, people, in capital cities, you know, writing the budgets of these countries. is that correct? >> so, yes. absolutely. it's not just the size of the fiscal deficit that's coming under scrutiny from brussels in particular, it's the elements of the budget that achieved those deficit targets as well as, of course, the debt kind of targets, as well. so a good example of this is of

this next generation of proposals that i see on the horizon was jean claud's proposal which is a couple of years old where he advocates federal governance by exception. and in the -- which would apply in a case where the recommendations of the commission and council are not implemented by a member state. in that case, proposed that the institution should be able to propose an increase for a specific country or they should be able to oppose an internal devaluation, right? and so the important thing to recognize, okay, in the comparative context is this represents the degree of intrusion, okay, in complexity that could never possibly work in the united states. arguably we have a more favorable environment for this kind of thing than we do in

europe. so there's no support for it in the u.s. history, there are not good examples in other federal institutions, and i think it's a little more likely to succeed in the euro area. so there are a couple, two or three logical implications that come from this that i'd like to fill out and rest my case. this approach that europe has taken, risks repeat of the epic showdown of the union on the one hand and the member states on the other that we saw ten years ago. and we already see this conflict looming again between the commission on the one hand in italy on the other, followed soon by france and possibly spain, right? in my alternative to this strategy, i would call get back, article 125 of the treaty which contains the no bailout clause. the u.s. experience kind of teaches that strengthening of the federal institutions protects the union from

contasion when the center denies request from a bailout from the member states or, say, from greece, right? a robust kind of fiscal role for the center established credibility for the no bailout norm here. if california, right, were ever to come to the federal government and ask for a bailout, this would be out of the question. fortunately, california's running a surplus now. but two years ago, didn't look so good in california. such a request for a bailout would be out of the question because california's a wealthy state partly. but also because the union, the rest of us have protected ourselves from contagion arising from a california default through a couple of different mechanisms. and because of this protection, the other states in the union are less vulnerable than say germany and austria are to a

default on the part of their periphery. so the implication is that europe should put a more robust fiscal union in place in order to restore kind of the protection that many, especially germans thought they had in the no bailout clause of the treaty. this is paradoxical. a stronger fiscal union contributes to decentralized fiscal discipline. but that's kind of why this is interesting. from this perspective, the european stability mechanism isn't an anomaly among federal systems. right? other federations bail out their states from time to time. but i'm not sure if there are any that maintain a very large standing fund for this purpose. right, and the esm is supposed to be permanent. so arguably, rules are needed more for the center to protect against the temptation to

indulge requests for bailouts more than they're needed for the states, right? and so this is the last point, and i'll end on this. if the euro area kind of succeeds in moving to a deeper fiscal union, right, the institutional solution should be first to convert the esm from a sovereign support facility to a union fiscal backstop, right? separating the sovereign from the banks, which simon emphasized. and second, to reestablish the no bailout clause. and i think this, right, is the formula for solving the problem of maintaining defenses for the union against blackmail from the periphery without creating fiscal moral hazard for the states. so let me leave it at that. and we'll come back to some of these other points in discussion. >> great. that's terrific. thanks. i'd like to move on to the political aspect now. because obviously the economics is highly political. you know, we have had what five or six years, five years of this

crisis now, very low growth throughout europe. very, very low inflation heading toward deflation. at the end sort of the robust growth or dealing with some of these issues. and that sort of brings us, i think, to last week's, you know, elections that we saw rise in populist movements. but it was a strong sort of signal. and so i'd like to turn to david renne. but prior to that, you were the brussels bureau chief for the economy. so you've seen it on both sides. what is your sort of assessment, you know, of the elections. and if you could also speak a bit about this drama we're

seeing unfolding about the commission president. how significant is that in terms of europe's future? does it matter? or is it sort of the brussels personality game where we're all sort of focused on this, you know, battle between the commission and the governments where it was actually, you know, the real substance goes somewhat neglected. >> no, i think what's happening at the moment is very serious. and my bias as a political reporter, foreign correspondent political reporter is it's always been about the politics. the economics, the flaws in the economic systems are the result of political disagreements. before i get to kind of what happened last week, i mean, responding quickly to some of the things on the panel here. i remember when i was writing a column, running the -- in brussels. people used to have this line, the problem with euro, it was created back to front. we created this monetary union without a fiscal union or political structure behind it as

if it'd been an oversight. the reason they created this thing back to front was because they profoundly disagreed about what the political union might look like. and let's not forget, i mean, to my mind, the european union and to some extent the euro, the single currency, they can be understood as kind of epic tussle between two visions of how to run an economy. and you can call one kind of competition and one solidarity. and i think that, you know, we need to understand why, you know, why does the euro have all of these incompatible countries? why did greece get into the euro? spain get into the euro? if you talk to sort of the germans, that was never their intention. never their intention. how did it happen? well, in part it happened because france and germany at that time are representing, if you like, competition versus solidarity. one of my favorite stories about the creation of the euro. it's so emblematic of what happened. just after he got elected to president of france. and he had run on election

platform attacking the strong franc. and had this idea that you let inflation run to boost growth. and he came to a summit in italy. and this was the time when it looked as though countries like italy were not going to be in monetary union. and france is anxious about having countries in the monetary union. one, they didn't want to be locked in the deutsche market. but he started attacking the italian prime minister. he said since time in memorial, every springtime, there's a place in the alps between france and italy, and the french alpine farmers raise these beautiful calves, and then they are driven over the high passes into italy where they are fattened to turn them into italian veal calves for the italian veal market. but because it was devalued twice against the french franc

in the last year and a half, the veal calves cost too much. so for the first time in living history and he was very emotional about calves. for the first time in history, the calves have not crossed the high pass into italy because they cost too much. and thus, italy had to join the currency union because for france, the fear was the competitive devaluations in the south would make it impossible for the richer countries in the north to sell goods. and that was the pitch, you know, made to the germans. you want to sell a bmw in spain, make sure they go to your currency union. and so that kind of political thinking did not really contemplate sort of the elements that simon talks about in terms of currencies. that was the kind of thing being done. at the same time, people didn't predict what was going to happen. and my own newspaper magazine if you want, we supported the creation of europe because we thought precisely because these countries could no longer devalue, they would have no

alternative but to undertake the reforms that were sort of crying out to be done. and we missed the problem of these huge capital inflows that made the structure reforms impossible. how does this connect to the present day? i think one of the biggest misunderstandings that you see among the kind of small handful, probably most of them in this room, people in america who really care about what happened in europe last week, there's a tremendous misunderstanding, very, very bad column in the washington post last week that said this is all about silly germany not understanding how bad austerity is. and, you know, wicked, wicked germany, imposing this wicked austerity on europe. and now europe is quite understandably kind of rebelled. and behind that is the kind of lazy kind of apolitical keynesianism. and if we can correct that by restoring the demand, everything will be right. i think that's, a, never accuse the germans of forgetting the

second world war. if that's your argument, you're wrong. b, the people say they're against austerity in europe, the parties that have been doing so well in some of these countries, you know, spain, this new kind of essentially -- latin america has done quite well in spain. when they talk about austerity, what they really mean is reforms. what they really mean is keep the money coming. i mean, look at syria's election platform, it's raise the minimum wage, enlarge the welfare state, nationalize major companies that's -- that's not a rejection of austerity in terms of, you know, fiscal discipline coming through some sort of monetary mechanism. that is these undisputably painful economic circumstances in the south of europe leading to a sort of wholesale rejection of globalization of openness, of structure reforms. and so, you know, people who

sort of lazily assume this can be fixed with kind of tweaks to the monetary rules, i think they're missing the whole point. this is a serious moment. look at my own country. now, the vote winning the european elections is mostly a process vote. you know, they will not do as well in the national elections next year. but let's understand what's happened. the reason that the european debate is becoming so dangerous in my own country is europe basically means integration. that's kind of the crude version. but it's gone beyond the kind of complaints about, you know, excessive rule making. it's about immigration now. and i think american audiences -- and i know there's a lot of europeans in this audience and americans that know europe, as well. but there was a congressional meeting, and a bunch of congressional staffers and people. and i said, listen, you need to understand, europe has done some incredibly bold and liberal things over the last few years in terms of responding to globalization with sort of openness and embrace of

competition. imagine it would work if you said to the u.s. congress under the new nafta rules, there's going to be free movement of labor. any mexican who wishes to move to america to find a job can do so tomorrow. and the american government will have no legal ability whatsoever to control the numbers of mexicans or canadians who wish to move to america. you can tinker with things like welfare rules or the nafta court of justice would have the ability to tell congress not to give state aid to a factory in detroit to keep it open because it was against nafta competition rules. and a canadian judge could order congress not to give state aid to an american company. you could never in a million years get away with that. so we need to understand that europe has done some incredibly radical things in terms of open border, open movement. the response to globalization that tried to offer sort of solidarity through fiscal transfers, but also a sort of extraordinary embrace of

competition. things that the economists, my employers, we whole heartedly supported. but i think we need to understand, if we whole heartedly support this stuff, we need to understand how much danger it's in now. how these election results are a bellow of rage, a bellow of kind of contestation from voters in europe. will these specific members of the european parliament start taking specific votes in unison that start doing bad things. someone on the panel on monday that said, oh, you know, 70% of the vote went to the mainstream parties and they'll have a grand coalition of the center left and center right and it'll work fine. well, sort of purely kind of mechanical level, that's right. and one of the terrifying things about the mood in brussels is people are proposing the former finance minister to be the president of the european commission because, you know, he

was chosen by, you know, the european parliament wilted. understand what that means for a second. they're essentially saying we hear this cry of kind of populist rage, and our solution is to offer you more of the same. our solution is to offer you the past. our solution is to offer you an old guy who stands for smoke-filled rooms, opacity, who boasts about how important it is not to tell the truth to european voters and who believes in stitching up deals behind the scenes. and that's their response in brussels right now to what's happening. and that's kind of terrifying. if that's their response. just a final point of responding to some of your -- simon makes this sort of economically perfect argument that the logical next thing to do is either have more federalism with the eurozone or end the single currency. the problem is, i think neither of those things is going to

happen. >> i agree with that. >> so we're into something else. you talked about sort of fiscal discipline rules, i think you understood. you also sort of indicated you suspected these were going to be hard to pull off if they meant intrusively going into a country -- still further. just a find kind of thought based on my time in brussels, it always seems to me that people misunderstood why germany -- and there are plenty of very distinguished germans in this room. i'd love to hear from them. but it would seem to me that people misunderstood why germany was so insistent on a no bailout clause and fiscal discipline as it was somehow sort of an economic preference. again, it seems to me to be even more than a political preference. seemed to be to me the problems in the eurozone when the crisis first broke out, it was worse than a clash of economic policies, it was worse even than a clash of political positions. it was, in essence, a clash of social contracts. the fundamental democratic

social contracts that bind collected governments to their electorates. the germans have a social contract since the second world war, entirely informed by, the prewar hyperinflation, vital importance of monetary stability. that social contract, you know, work hard, don't ask for excessive pay raises, maintain sort of labor markets, flexibility, have a labor market settlement with limited sort of inflation. don't spend too much, be thrifty, prudent. and in exchange, the government will guarantee you lower inflation and a stable currency. a rock solid currency. that was the kind of fundamental social contract, prudence and thrift and stability. and you then bolted that on to countries whose fundamental social contract was something different. in greece, when people talk about wicked austerity in greece. i know greece is a special case. take the example of the national broadcaster.

they closed that down as part of the austerity package. had 10% market share for tv audiences in greece. it had an annual budget of 300 million euros a year for a country of 10 million people. there were over 100 employees earning more than 1 million euros a year. all of whom were political appointees. every new government came in and plugged in some people into the sort of director's cabinet who could never be sacked. so closing that down, is that austerity? and keeping that going, is that a kind of keynesian stimulus? that's the problem, you're asking in a country, you know, in a monetary union which doesn't have a political union, you are asking german voters to carry on funding things like that. that's what they see in the newspapers. you're saying to them, you've agreed to extend your retirement age to 67. but you're going to have to fund greeks who want to retire at 55. that's politically impossible. a clash of social contracts. it's politically impossible. and the problem with election

results last week was the bellow of pain from southern europe, which is they have these appalling economic numbers, appalling youth unemployment. we should be sort of, you know, very alive to the human agony of that. but the problem was that those votes were saying keep the money flowing, germany, stop the world, we want to get off. we want to have, you know, a higher minimum wage. a european wide minimum wage. the politics just is not there to ask countries like germany to improve much, much larger fiscal transfers. and on the fiscal discipline point, it seemed to me that the fiscal discipline was actually a german response to the democratic deficit. the single most painful thing about a political union with this monetary union is what happens if german, dutch -- finish voters send money south and then are no structural reforms and there is still endemic corruption? we're going to break all of our

promises. that's politically totally unsustainable. and because german voters have no say on the o government that is elected in greece or spain or in portugal, it seems to me that the fiscal discipline rules, clumsy though they were, were essentially an attempt to kind of fix that democratic deficit, to make it impossible for them to turn around and say, so long, suckers. so i think we need to be much more, much more sensitive to the incredibly tough politics that, i think, explains why the economics is so broken. and be very worried about last week's election results because there is sort of -- there are smoke -- sort of clash of social contracts as bad and deep as ever. >> thank you. i particularly like the -- [ applause ] i particularly like the image of nafta immigration. i'm wondering what fox news would do with that. if we have a nafta court of justice -- >> explaining it.

>> the congress, yeah. it would be quite interesting. i think one of the -- one of the -- you talked about the periphery. and i think it's important to be sort of clear and germany sort of narrative of success. it's sort of missing on the panel. but there is a view we make here in the questions and answers part in terms of how this works. and it's largely based on structural reform that, you know, the structural reform that's occurring doesn't have payoffs now because it's sort of a slow burning thing. but it will have payoffs later and that will cause a return to growth and competitiveness in the periphery. and you don't need this great leap forward on monetary policy or quantitative easing or on the fiscal side. but one of the problems that's arisen is almost because of draghi's actions, we've seen the cost of sovereign debt come down

quite a lot. i think yesterday, irish sovereign come down quite a bit. all of the privilegeries costs have been coming down over the last 12 months or so. they're all pretty manageable. and that has taken off the pressure or structure reforms. you know, germany's case was that the problems in the bond markets would lead to pressures where governments had no choices except to reform. because that pressure is off, it's harder to do so because of the political opposition. they're against aus tearty but they're mainly against tough reforms and cuts that are taking place in their countries. and so i guess my question to all f you is, if we see this rising sort of populism and

opposition to sort of the status quo of the last few years, and if we see that governments find it very hard to initiate structure reform, what is the case as to how this will work? i mean not going back to they really need to do this or that, but is there any sort of scenario in which sort of the jeremy or the ecb's position will prove us wrong and in three or four years' time, you know, the situation is a lot rosier if they just stay the course. or is there just no way this is actually going to work? simon, do you want to -- >> i think it's bearing in mind how difficult it is to push through structure reforms through a backdrop of slum. that is very difficult which is why when any country faces the need, it does so through the backdrop of some kind of stimulus. in greece or portugal had been

under a program, they would imposed fiscal discipline. but it would have provided some offsetting stimulus. the problem that we have is that there was nothing to offset the austeri austerity. it leaves them trying to do to continue districtry things. one is trying to rebuild the trade competitiveness. bare inflation rates have been higher. while at the same time ensuring that their debt burdens don't rise. now that is an impossible thing to ask them to do. the result of that has been a huge increase in debt relative to gdp since the onset of the crisis. we hear a lot about, particularly from this sort of the right on this issue that basically, look at their debt burdens. they're still not serious about

reducing their debt and austerity. the greeks have cut more than any developed economy has since the 30s. they have made huge, massive cuts in public spending, far greater than anyone thought possible. but the net result is that their economic is 25% smaller than it was. what you're going to engineer is a slump. the burden of debt relative to gdp rises dramatically. and that's what's happened. we saw a writeoff three years ago. we're now back above to where they were prior to that debt write off. they're now running pretty close to a budget surface before the payment of interest and outstanding debt. it's because the economic has continued to contract.

i think in greece, it's not just a question of people wanting to hold on to their benefits. this is a poorly governmented country. no doubt about that. it should not have been in the euro zone. the question is how to do about doing that and whether you can pull that off politically in an economy that is being pushed into this kind of slump. structural reforms, these are not a panacea for all problems. structural reforms, if accompanied by a recovery in investment, will in the medium to long term deliver some benefits. but there isn't a particularly strong correlation between economic growth and, say, very flexible labor markets. for example, everyone is touting germany has an example here. they do not have a flexible labor market. they have u.s. or british

standards, a very highly regulated market. no correlation there. it's not just the south who needs to push through structural reforms. spanish markets for goods and services are far more competitive and contested than german ones. this is a problem across europe of structurally very weak demand. we cannot all do what germany does, which is run a huge surplus savings and a massive trade service. that means it's dependent on foreign demand to close to gap. >> that is the plan, though. >> that's my point. but we can't all do that. if you're going to find a sustainable solution to what happens in europe, yes, there needs to be adjustments in the south but there also needs to be changes in structural reforms in countries in europe who are running huge unsustainably high surplus savings.

>> can you also just address this sort of german surplus issue which is quite extraordinary. is there any prospect of internal rebalancing where some of that surplus would be used for investment? when people talk about, you know, a rebalance or, you know, change in sort of the stimulus, what they're really talking about is that that should occur in germany. >> yes. >> so what is -- is there sort of a prospect of that on the horizon? >> so it's essential that we are rebalancing within the euro zone. now we have the situation where to answer simon's question, there has to be something to offset austerity, and this would be german growth, increase in wages, some kind of german inflation, right? because we can't expect relative improvements and competitiveness on the part of the periphery

without the periphery undergoing deoperations if a german inflation is a half a percent or 1%. we need to get that into the higher ranges. one of the under reported events over the last couple of months is that the commission actually cites germany for excessive surplus under the balances procedure. where this goes and how it develops is unclear. it doesn't appears a if this is going to be a strong discipline on germ man policy to produce a stimulus of some sort. but this is essential, right? and in fact this is in part where the rest of the world comes in. it's essential, it's important from the standpoint of u.s. interests that the euro zone as a whole doesn't become just large germany in terms of the macro economic imbalances and running continuous large current

account services, right? the way to -- you know, one of the ways to think about this problem in very specific terms is to think about the situation of italy again, right? so in italy we'd like to see structure reform, of course, but this needs to come in the context of growth in order to be affective. italy's solution for this, renzi would like to see room in the fiscal rules for greater investment in infrastructure, for example, as a way to provide this. and indeed, italy needs this. this is a structural policy for italy that could compliment reforms in the -- liberalizing reforms. but of course this could require

a change in the rules and that's part of the italian agenda for its presidency and the council of ministers in the second half of this year. it's important that that goes forward. >> thank you. david, before we go to the audience, i would just like to raise a big question that i'm sure it will come in the q and a but it's the role of the uk. we've seen sort of cameron, you know, really lead the charge against the commission president. but, you know, there are sort of huge issues on the agenda for the uk and europe over the next sort of four years. it poses very difficult challenges for chancellor merkel because how does she make the concessions necessary to come ron feels that he has enough of a victory to be able to keep the uk in, you know, while also deepening integration within the

euro zone and doing the things that are nood needed to fix the monetary union. what is your assessment of, not so much uk and the referendum, but on the diplomacy between cameron and merkel and how that plays into europe's future. is it possible for the chancellor to pull off this balancing act and keep cameron happy while deepening immigration or is there a tradeoff there? >> there's a lot of mechanisms that have been set in motion that will have unpredictable effects. you have this odd situation that chancellor merkel does not want britain to leave and she's willing to do quite a a lot to keep britain in. although people say not any price. the leaders of the political parties in britain all of them are committed to the idea that britain should stay in the

europe onunion. and still just about the majority of the brits want to say in. on the one hand it looks find. the problem is a lot of mechanisms have been set in motion, in particular this a a idea of a referendum on europe should the conservatives win the next general election next year. and i think the problem with that is -- i remember when i was in berlin by chance, when david cameron was elected prime minister and it was a group of european correspondents and we were invited to see chancellor merkel for this kind of very, very off the record sort of meeting that they do every year for europe an correspondents. the basic germ man position was pretty clear. it was germany does not want to be left alone in a tight euro

zone union with just the club med union ps they would rather have the reform minded countries as a balance. my impression of german man's policies -- germany likes to have the deciding vote. so she was definitely open to the idea of doing a lot to keep britain in. the problem is expectations on the british side and the british analysis. the fundamental problem with britain's membership in the european yuan, they never loved the european union. it was a cost benefit analysis begun when we joined in a kind of state of gloom and misery in the 1970s. but the constant looked much more economically dynamic than britain. they were at the end of an experiment that reached the end of the road and we'd kind of

reached -- just remember the cause that britain was produce in the 1970s and that's all you need to know. we joined in kind of a fit of, well, they seemed to know better than we do. it was cost of a cost benefit analysis. what has fundamentally changed, the short version, is once the prit tish public looked at europe and thought that looks like an economic basket case, if you never loved it and now it looks like an economic basket case, what's left? and the single sort of biggest driver, you know, conservatives used to hold their noses and go we like the single market but we don't like any of the other stuff. and the dangerous dynamic in the last couple of years was the number of conservative mp's, saying is it really worth that much? shouldn't we be this globalized

anglo sax on power nation trading with the emerging powers. at the moment we're tethered by rotting ropes. and if only we had the kurnl to cut the ropes and zoom forward, we could be a super global trading power. we have an island 23 miles off the coast of france. that is a problem. the other problem with the analysis is that germany, which obeys all of the crushing european rules as we do has a much more dynamic economy than we do. the problem that david cameron faces, is britain going to lose the european union? on the one hand, the grownup answer is no, i don't think so. but the thing that slightly worries me is when you map out how we stay in, here's how it works. this sort of seems the conservatives win the next

election outright, which seems very unlikely, here's how it seems to work for me. for us to stay in, this is us staying in 2018. here's the british election. here's the intervening steps where there are forks in the road. david cameron goes to europe and said i want to have a renegotiation where i'm going to hold you hostage and extract things you don't want. and the others have to go okay, we ale let you do that. they might just go, you know what, we don't particular fancy that negotiation. so he then has to secure the negotiations and secure concessions that actually mean much from europe. he'll get some stuff. he then has to come home and say to the conservative party, these are concessions that you wanted. they basically want cut price membership in the single market with nothing else. they want an a la cart

membership is what they want. he has to get the concessions, convince his own party that these concessions mean a thing and then the british public have to be disciplined enough to vote on what's on the ballot paper. the referendum is do you approve of the deal that the prime minister just secured in europe. the history of referendums is that voters vote on what they feel about the economy or how they feel about the government of the day or other stuff. and if we think we're going to tear up the immigration rules, that ain't going to happen. all of those things have to go right for us to stay in. this kind of strange position, my gut instincts is, you know, most of the big powerful forces in british politics want us to stay in, the big business community and the three main party leaders. i don't think we're going to walk out. but i think we could trip and

fall out and that does kind of worry me. >> very interesting. if you were a betting man, then, you would -- >> the only bet i have ever done in european politics made me a huge amount of money which is when they were choosing the new president under the new system -- i probably shouldn't even admit this. it was the council summit where they were discussing who was going to get it. everyone was talking tony blair and there was this irish betting set. i oddly looked and they were offering odds on the count till sill president and tony blair was odds on favor. it was one of those rare circumstances where you know more about the book maker than what's going on. and rum foye was 33-to-1. they need a small country, a christian democrat, i think i'll stick some money there.

unfortunately the website wouldn't bet me put on more than 50 euros. but then the odds immediately changed. i shouldn't admit that should i because that was deeply corrupt. but it didn't affect my reporting. but it made me a serious amount of money. >> we'll watch very carefully the odds for little known sort of leaders. i'm sure both of you want to come in on this britain question but we might go to audience because we've got about 25 minutes left and we have lots of questions. let's start uf near the front is the microphone. over here on this side. >> two quick questions, one to

david. you portrayed the elections as a referendum on european issues but the conventional wisdom on european elections is they're second order elections because european voters don't care about the issues that the european parliament deals with. you could make an argument for them caring about the euro but they don't deal with the euro. why should we care about what the voters said in this elections and why should we expect policymaker to adjust to it given there's in electoral connection between voters and european issues. to randy, so you've tried to sort of make, you know, the euro dilemma not lack quite so bad saying if they were more american they could get out of this dilemma. doesn't that depend on them being more american in two ways? the first is they would have to accept american standards of social welfare pro vision and depravation in the face of

economic problems. not european ones so assuming we don't create a social welfare system at the european level that's fully adequate, they would have to be willing to accept a greater level of depravation if there were really a no bailout clause because economic circumstances would get more difficult adds they adjusted. and secondly, the way america really adjusts to these macro economic differences is by factor mobility which was brought up before, right? when michigan goes through a decade of low per capita or negative per capita negative population growth for an entire decade, other americans say move to arizona, right? that's the american system of adjustment. we can't say that to italians. we can't say that to spaniards. so would that really work in

europe? >> we'll take a few together and come back to our panel lists. just the gentleman right in front there. >> thank you. just a quick point on what great panel. i agree with a lot of what has been said, including simon. a quick couple of points about david's story. it was a great story. he never forget that he was first minister. it's 600 nights away from italy. so the guests travel not by buses but in trucks which they cannot do in the uk because little old ladies, whistle the truck to save -- and sadly, more

sadly, it doesn't mean fallon cause but thousand springs. but the question i think was an important one which is how can you have a single market if countries engaging in competition. there were two main reasons to go to the euro, one was a political one, counter balance and the other one was completion of the single market at the time. also a major issue and still at the heart of the project obviously. >> we'll take one more. go in the middle here, lady in the middle. yeah. >> thank you. i'm from the eu delegation. two remarks and a question. the eu hasn't started with the

runup to the euro. it started much longer ago. i always have the impression that faced with a panel such as this that everyone starts with the euro and the euro crisis. this is not true. many more aspects of policy areas have been put in common and together since the buildup of the euro. we started in the aftermath of the second world war and then we agreed on a certain putting together of policy areas. second, fiscal rules, i've heard interesting ideas coming from randy on this with the centralization. this is certainly an idea this that is interesting in pure suing physical integration. with that said, member states have set these rules themselves and it's not as if brussels was setting rules out in a vacuum.

member states agreed to these fiscal rules. so the parallel with the u.s. has its limits because members or the equivalent of u.s. states agreed to those rules in the beginning. my question is ap little bit in line with david's remark about simon's intervention. why are number one and number two solutions not feasible, probably. i'd like to hear one constructive proposal from simon that has a chance of success, of succeeding politically in europe. thank you very much. >> one more, i think the gentleman right behind had a question and then we'll come back. no, no. sorry the gentleman -- yeah. the person who had the microphone was the right person. >> sean cline. i used to be the bureau chief in

brussels. i was in berlin just before the elections which made some interesting gains in the new party in germany. they were suggesting a kind of two-speed euro zone. i'm interested to know what the pnl thinks of that. they were saying it would be an act of mercy to let greece go and let greece leave the euro, and others like it. would that the halfway house solution? >> thank you. we've a lot of questions still to come as well. if you could all pick and choose in terms of the ones that were directed to you and try to be brief so we can go back and get another round. simon, let's start with you. >> this isn't about making life harder for the countries struggling most with that. this is about correcting a situation in which unsustainable levels of debt are being maintain, rather than written

down. what's happened in the euros in the recent years is countries haven't been bailed out. they've been lent lots of money to pay back their creditors. their creditors are the big banks in the countries who have been lending them money. this has affected a way of per pech waiting unsustainable debt in countries and requiring them to pursue unsustainable levels of austerity. so this isn't about bailing countries out. this is about a bailout, a no bailout clause combined with some kind of automatic stabilizers, perhaps a banking union of transferring money. probably i'd argue the best way. it's not about making life even harder for particular governments in the south.

>> the one constructive idea. >> i'll come on to that. in terms of comet tif evaluations, devaluations when you went up to the euro were undertaken by countries that had higher levels of inflation. now if you can make all of these member states so similar in their structures, their inflation rates are very similar, then the risk of getting rid of national currencies can be addressed. if you can't, you've just removed an essential tool of macroeconomic adjustment. real depreciate is as much of a problem as nominal depreciation. so if it cuts the real exchange rate, it imposes far greater costs on them than italy ever did in the run up to the euro. devaluations of the pound took them back to where they had been

prior to the pickup in their inflation rates. you can change the real exchange rates back to 1980 and italy and britain were not the problem. in terms of something positive, i've said what needs to happen. there needs to be in short order some significant military similarly. there needs to be an acknowledgeable that there has to be some demand creation from some source. there has to be a big investment program, perhaps under the auspices of the eib. it needs, i think, an acknowledgment -- the problem is, if we could get to the point where people acknowledge that this isn't just about countries breaking the rules. most of this would fall into place. but in terms of what could be done, it's an investment program for the eib. it's a pretty radical change on

the part of the european central banks, a big program of military stimulus. i think those two things are possible. we're going to get more action by ecb. the question is where they can do enough. quantitative easing is only effective if they believe that the central banking question will go the distance. ecb action and a big, big investment program. >> thank you. >> well, let me respond to the questions of andy and valerie with respect to this proposal for decentralized federalism, decentralized physical discipline that i have. let me stress that this is in fact a long run vision and nothing that we're going to be able to implement tomorrow. but i'm going to argue that it is likely to have more political traction over the long run than

this strit gi that we've had so far of committing large resources through an esm which is challenged within the germ man political context and at the same time tougher rules to go along with them. it does require that there is a larger fiscal center in europe. it doesn't have to be the same size as the u.s. federal government. 4% or 5% of gdp could do it. nonetheless i acknowledge that requires a stronger commitment to central, you know, to mutualization of fiscal policy than we have now. it's important -- it requires also a large fiscal backstop to the banking union. and here i think this is more important than the transfers that take place through the social safety net in the federal

system in the united states. we've looked at the economic states, a lot of economic stays is done on the importance of the transfers. but the transfers that take place in the midst of a banking crisis through the fiscal backstop and for the banking union and bank recapization are huge compared to the transfers that that place in the social safety net. quantitatively speaking, this is for more important for maintaining the cohesion of the monetary union through crisis sort of like this. for that reason i think we can accomplish what we need to do with a modest fiscal center in europe. on valerie's point that we have kind of member states agreeing to these rules in the form of

the fiscal compact. and i acknowledge that we've done this through the council, through kind of a succession to the treaty changes, some of which have been voted on through referendum within member states. but we're now testing the domestic political ownership of these rules. i think we have to admit in some cases, particularly in the southern pro livery, there's been agreement to these rules under duress. so this case of italy is very interesting. italy signed up to the debt rule in the fiscal compact and now its adherence is being tested. and while legally the rest of europe might be on solid ground and arguing that italy had agreed to it so it should follow through, i'm not sure we want them to do this economically speaking. and in fact i think we don't.

i think we want to create some mechanism by which they can make the investments, kind of that they need in infrastructure and defer the adjustment. and i think inevitably this accommodation is going to happen. one of the big political questions in terms of fiscal rule enforcement will be how that happens. i have great sympathy for the position that the commission finds itself in because i think the commission is torn between, frankly torn between the literal application of these rules on the one hand and economics, economic reasoning on the other. now, there's additional problem in the administration of these rules that's worth pointing out. and that is that the rules under the fiscal compact apply to a budget deficit which is defined in structural terms that is