the third amendment says soldiers are not allowed to come and sleep in your house if you don't want them to. this is a good amendment. i don't feel like there's a lot of confusion about this one. however reasonable, this is the only amendment that could easily ofswapped into the terms service of airbnb, however. the fourth amendment, we seem to have forgotten about altogether. did someone at the nsa actually spilled barbecue sauce on this one? it does not say "some unreasonable search and seizure." when the closest analog to our government's behavior is billy baldwin in the movie "sliver," something has gone terribly wrong. the fifth amendment is mostly for people to invoke during the second half of "law and order," and basically, five through seven are basically things for people to yell during jury or lawyer shows. the sixth amendment sets up the

founding principles of jury duty. at this point, i think if most people had to choose between jury duty and leading a soldier crash on your couch, we would choose the latter. the eighth amendment protects us from cruel and unusual punishment, which apparently does not include strapping a citizen to a table and murdering them. i guess that is some sort of judgment call. the rest of the civilized world has stopped practicing capital punishment, and meanwhile, officials in oklahoma -- >> we leave the last minute of this and take you lie to a briefing in san antonio, texas, for the latest on the situation on sergeant bowe bergdahl, held captive in afghanistan for years. click the mission lead missionters -- >> the lead headquarters for this, the integration phase. today, we address your questions on the integration of sergeant bowe bergdahl, who is now here

at fort sam houston. our panel today includes the reintegration mission commander southmmander of u.s. army major general joseph e desalvo -- joseph p. desalvo. psychologist from the joint personnel recovery agency, and from brooke army medical dr. colonel ronald wolf. as a reminder, the scope of today's press conference is on reintegration activities here and brooke army medical center. questions about sergeant anddahl's activities before after reintegration will be addressed by the department of the army and the department of defense. major general desalvo will make a brief opening statement, and then we will go to q&a for approximately 30 minutes. .ajor general desalvo >> thanks.

the united states military is proud that we have honored the covenant we hold with all soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen, never leaving a comrade behind, and today, we have one back in the united states. as you are aware, sergeant bowe bergdahl was returned to u.s. control on may 31, transported to the regional medical center in germany to begin his decompression process. he remained there for 12 days, and once his medical providers felt he was able to travel, our army south reintegration team accompanied him here to san medical center. during his stay here, he will participate in reintegration, a process that will aim to equip him with the necessary tools to regain appropriate levels of physical and emotional stability to effectively resume normal activities with minimal physical and emotional complications. isrently, sergeant bergdahl

in stable condition and will work daily with medical and mental-health professionals. i must emphasize how important it is for everyone to respect sergeant bergdahl's and his family's privacy as they go through this process. the reintegration of sergeant bergdahl is a comprehensive process. there is no set timeline for any phase of reintegration. each days sergeant bergdahl participates in is a custom event, fitted to his individual circumstances. this reintegrated process is done in san antonio because the department of defense assigned the department of the army the lead, and the department of the army been tasked u.s. army south with the lead for phase three reintegration. u.s. army south has received tremendous support from the department of defense as well as my immediate higher headquarters united states southern command, and also u.s.-european command and united central command, who

relieved for phase one initial recovery and phase two, initial decompression. i would also like to thank our expert from brooke army medical center. they make our reintegration mission here possible. u.s. army south has conducted this important mission six times previously. i cannot emphasize enough that reintegration phase is a culmination of herculean efforts to have taken place over a long period of time across the united 's interagencyent and combatant commands. this clearly demonstrates from our commander in chief on down our nation is committed to never leaving a comrade behind. to bealso my pleasure joined by two reintegration experts. >> thank you, sir, and with that, i would just remind you that when it is time to have your question, once acknowledged, go to the

microphone, stand up, remind us who you are and your outlet, and please address your question to an individual in the panel. with that, we will start on the left side of the room. the question is yours. >> right here. >> this is for any of you, but especially -- i guess all of you were with him last night when he arrived. i recognize that you cannot talk a whole lot about him because of rules, of rules -- hipaa but nevertheless, i ask you to describe his condition upon landing. be he seem to be happy to home? and how did he appear to be doing emotionally and physically? and the other thing is i saw in the background that you tried to normalize the persons emotions. can you explain to everyone how you do that, especially when you have been in captivity for so long? >> ok, first, i was on the ground when specialist bergdahl this morning.1:40

basically saw him for 60 seconds. that was about it. he was in uniform. we exchanged salutes. an escortng with officer went over to the van, which then was part of the three-vehicle convoy that took .im here he appeared just like any sergeant would when they see a two-star general -- a little bit nervous. but he looked good. he, again, saluted and had good deportment. >> the second part over to you. >> one critical part of communication is psychological decompression. during that process, we try to return a sense of reticular control. in captivity, your fundamental ability to make any choices taken away, so we increased his ability to make choices. we also had him go through healthy storytelling.

telling a story and a healthy, withl mantle -- manner some meaning. we also want to normalize the behaviors, letting them know that the copious skills they used in captivity are both functional in that environment and have to be functional now. finally, we help them develop action plans for the future so they can prepare for and deal with it since in their life as they move forward. >> ok, next question. >> hello, major general. i'm with cnn. two questions -- at what oink do bowe therate with controversy surrounding his capture and release -- at what point? every indication we have is he is unaware of that. also, it has been almost two weeks, and as far as we know, he has not spoken with his parents. is that out of the norm? it seems parents who had not seen their son for five years would have at least talked to

him on the phone by now. >> to address the issue of family support, family support is a critical part of the reintegration process, making sure the family understands the reasons why we do it, the necessity of decompression, that they understand and support the process. overall, it is the return he -- returnee's choice to determine when they want to reengage with folks. >> [inaudible] around hisroversy disappearance? anything surrounding the controversy of his disappearance is not part of the reintegration. that will be done in the investigation done by the department of army after the reintegration is complete. >> just a clarification -- you are asking if he is aware of the media reporting about him right now? i recommend we pass that to brad. >> i will address that, but

again, as we give them a sense of particular control, we exposed the more and more to events that happened around them, so at some point in time, he will be exposed to what is going on in the world, but again, in the past five years, he has had no exposure. >> next question. just a moment. let's get the microphone to use it we can get that on the feed. >> i've got a real loud voice anyway. i am with the abc affiliate here. could you confirm for us because i have heard some conflicting reports -- is his family actually here? >> the question is for? >> whoever can answer that. >> no, his family is not here. >> will they becoming? i also saw a report that they were not planning on coming. >> at this point, the family has requested their privacy is maintained. >> very well, thank you. >> this may be a good time to

share a release that was shared with us by the family this morning. if you like, i will go ahead and read that. it may stave off some of the questions about the family. "on behalf of the bergdahl family, while the bergdahls are overjoyed that their son has returned to the united egg, they do not intend to make any travel plans public. they ask for continued privacy as they concentrate on their son's reintegration." the that, we will go to next question. >> this is a little bit of a repeat, and i was not sure whether it was colonel poppen or colonel wolf who should address this, but can you specifically address his condition now physically, and also his condition mentally, and then i had one other question related to that. if you could talk a little bit expressedher he has -- whether he plans to or wants to return to duty.

>> as far as his medical condition, we received him from the phase two integration team earlier this morning. overall, we are pleased with his physical state. he was able to ambulate and walked into the hospital and in a functional manner. we allowed him to get settled in through the hospital and to his room in his environment, and we are going to be planning more comprehensive testing and consultation, stuff that was not done during phase two. fromgarding mental state, a psychology perspective, we see people in captivity as normal people who have been through an abnormal event, and who have to develop coping skills to live through that situation of captivity. our goal is to help them functionalhow to be now. we do not see them as pathologically damaged, but as a

normal person who survived an abnormal event. >> [inaudible] >> the goal of every integration is to return a soldier to duty. >> over here on the left. i'm from out of houston. can you tell us anything about ofgeant bergdahl's memories what happened? does he have memories of the past five years? also, has he spoken with soldiers he served with? are there plans to have him do so? >> that's a great question. we are trying to go through a process of debrief with sergeant bergdahl to understand his story, but i would add that at this point, it is truly his story, and i would defer to him to answer those questions at a time he may find appropriate. >> in terms of memory, is he

talking to people about what happened? >> as part of the .rocess, yes, ma'am >> has he spoken to any soldiers out there? >> the members of the debriefing reintegration team do consist of some soldiers, so in that aspect, yes. >> but are they soldiers who he served with? >> no. >> ok, next question. on the right side of the room. >> associated press. could you say anything about the reintegrate process -- will it be typical of others who have gone through this? what kind of special challenges will he face, do you think, that are special to his case? >> every reintegration process is unique. brad, let me turn it over to you. >> every reintegration process is unique as is every captivity event. our goal is to find out from hegeant bergdahl how

survived the event, when he noticed airing the event. it's also unique in that we know was the onlydahl ,aptain held in afghanistan thus defeating the possibility of contact with any other service members while in captivity. >> with this challenges be more physical or more psychological-mental? >> we will be addressing all those challenges. integration is focused on meeting the physical psychological needs as well as the briefing process and socialrating to their life as healthy as possible. >> this has been asked a couple of times, but i'm not sure it was answered. i don't know who can answer it. can you tell us more about his demeanor? is he cooperating, communicating? is he excited, sad? >> the fact that he has finished phase two, which is

decompression, means he is ready to do more interacting with the deep refers and also the medical team. slowly but surely, he has been proving an array of progress. >> my follow-up would be -- is he being encouraged to reach out to his family, even though it seems at this point he does not want to speak with them? >> again, the real integration process is driven at the pace of the returnee. the goal is to give him the chance to take control. >> nbc news. colonel, is he anxious to talk to his parents? is there any indication he wants to or does not want to? >> right now, the only thing i need to protect is privacy and let him make this decision on his own. >> major-general, can you describe what goes on in a daily basis and reintegration?

for instance, what will he be doing tomorrow? will he be in a group, or is he one-on-one with people? reading? catching up on history? what is he doing? >> i would be happy to answer that. justu are aware, he arrived here in san antonio early this morning. just like any of us after a long transatlantic flight, we allowed him to settle in, take care of personal hygiene and familiarize himself with his surroundings. he is starting to be evaluated by some of our consulting services. over the weekend, we will synchronize that both with the debriefing process as well as evaluations, some stuff which was not done because the emphasis was to address immediate medical needs, as well as the decompression process. >> i just want to make sure hominy of you gentlemen were actually on the plane with him

from germany to san antonio. >> none. >> none, ok. earlier this week, an army spokesman -- i believe in germany -- said that sergeant bergdahl is emotionally fragile. i guess this is for kernel .oppen -- colonel poppen can you expound at all what that means? >> from a psychology perspective, we see the returnee as a normal, healthy person who survived an abnormal event. i think it's premature to talk about diagnoses or emotional agility at this time. we are trying to get him to recognize that the coping skills he used to survive this long ordeal may not be healthy and functional now and get him to make that transition back to a normal, healthy lifestyle. >> can we get the microphone towards the back? >> i'm from here in san antonio. my question is -- do you believe ptsdif he suffers from

that will affect his debriefing process and the long-term? >> could you repeat that? sergeant bergdahl suffers from ptsd, that could affect his debriefing process eventually. >> i would say it's a very premature to throw out words like ptsd and other mental health diagnoses. again, i emphasize we see him as a normal, healthy person who survived this i've-your ordeal by relying on internal coping skills and resilience -- this five-your ordeal by relying on internal coping skills and resilience. >> was there a follow-up before we move to the next question? ok, next question. in austin. fox there are reports that say he .ived in a box for two years

if that's true, what is that due to a person medically speaking -- what does that do to a person medically speaking? >> first of all, we have no knowledge of any of that information at all. to be clear, there were two parts to your question -- a medical question and a psychological question? >> [inaudible] microphone sothe the other outlets can hear. >> if you have seen someone out of human contact for years in the past, what has that done to that person in past experiences? >> if we could, just an experience of a captive in general terms. >> i will talk in very broad terms about captivity experiences. many times, captives are held by themselves. there are many books out there you can read about people who have survived, and one i found particularly useful was one

called "house in the sky" where she was held in isolation for about a year, and she had developed opening skills to deal with that isolation. if you look at those coping skills in the normal world, they seem pathological. however, when you normalize those, it goes back to were notding that they help you there, but they are healthy now, and she is moving forward with her life in as far as i can tell a normal manner. >> thank you. i have a question about his conditions living here for this phase three. will it be closer to a hospital setting? will it be closer to a hotel setting? will it be closer to some sort of inmates setting? >> currently, sergeant bergdahl is an inpatient program in medical center. part of the process is to bring in specialists and any advanced diagnostic studies or treatments which he may require. as far as anything else, he is

in a standard patient room, and we are trying to protect the reintegration process to allow him to develop harper coping skills -- proper coping skills. patient room -- is that closer to a hospital room? explain to me the situation he will be living in. >> it is a standard hospital room. a hospital bed with a bathroom that was occupied by one of our regular patients until probably last week. >> will he have access to a tv? >> at this time, no. part of this is with the debriefing process, and it is a slow kind of decompression, to bring him up slowly and reintroduce them to what has been transpiring over the last five years. >> if i could just remind you all, please ask for the microphone when you go to ask

your question so that we can all hear it. hi, gentlemen. i'm with texas public radio here in san antonio. you said you had done numerous reintegration's in the past. over what period of time did y'all do that, and is this one different, and if so, how? >> we have done six reintegration missions. .he first one was in 2007 again, every reintegration mission is different. >> is it possible that there is a relationship between the length of time that this ?ndividual was imprisoned i know it will vary from individual to individual, but -- longer aeral, the person is in isolation or captivity, the longer their

integration process would take, but again, each case truly is different. >> just to correct the record on the status, prior to entering into reintegration, sergeant bergdahl was considered "captured missing." next question. >> "wall street journal." i was wondering when you determine when a phase three reintegration is complete, if there are specific targets that need to be met. >> it's a combination of medical indications.vioral >> a lot of that relates again to the psychological decompression so he understands not only what has happened to him, but he starts to understand what is happening in the world around him and he had to make the choices of how and when he wants to engage with family or his public life again. >> again, how do you specifically tell when he is at that point? are there tests?

are there specific -- how do you figure out when you are done? >> the rigid ration team working with him will make that determination internally. >> here in the front, can we bring a microphone, please? >> thank you, again, for doing this. can you talk a little bit about the barriers -- what you would see as the barriers he is going to face? i know you talked about strength and resiliency, but are there traditional ones, but i know a lot of us are curious about unique ones because his case has and ifso much attention there are any unique issues. >> could you please rephrase that question please? >> please return the microphone. >> could you talk about some of the hurdles that individuals who are reintegrating face, in particular, ones that might be pertinent to his case?

>> i want to talk and a general sense, but i do want to protect sergeant bergdahl's privacy is much as we possibly can. everyone who comes out of captivity will have hurdles to face. again, making choices -- every one of us decided what to put on today, what to have for breakfast, where we go for lunch. those decision-making processes were fundamentally removed from him, where he was told when to eat, what to eat, where to eat, where to go to the bathroom -- although sorts of things. having ae concepts is sense of predictability and control of his environment. >> i know his family is not here right now, but what type every integration process do they have to go through, to make sure they do not jeopardize him during this time? >> again, u.s. army and army

south have a family assistance team with the family from additional notification of someone who is in captivity to help them understand what the reintegration process is about, how it is important for their son to go through a proper decompression and give him the choice to make those choices of who, when camera -- when, what he wants to engage with socially. >> ever since sergeant bergdahl was captive, there have been liaisons with the family to explain the process of reintegration, so they understand and support it, and right now, they are exercising great patience and trust with the system that we are now executing -- with the mission, excuse me, that we are now executing. >> back up front, can we get a microphone. thank you. >> looking at how the colombian hostages were cared for when they came here, in their book, they talk about how they were separated from everyone for a wild.

they were kept in a separate wing, so that raises a question -- is sergeant bergdahl being allowed to see anyone else in the hospital, or is he being isolated from other personnel, including fellow soldiers? when he was in phase two of decompression, he was interacting with the decompression team, the soldiers that comprise that decompression team. his interaction is determined at his own pace right now. >> [inaudible] anybody other than this team, or was he being kept away from other folks? >> right now, he is just seeing soldiers within the team. having us.nk you for i represent the fox news affiliate here and the nbc affiliate. during his time in captivity, he would have experienced several evaluations had he been in the military in the united states or

anywhere station, but he would have received a higher rank. during this process of integration, will this happen at an accelerated rate? >> know, now that sergeant bergdahl is under u.s. control, his next promotion will be just as any other sergeant going for the next rank, staff sergeant -- no, now that sergeant bergdahl is under u.s. control. >> there have been reports that he was having difficulty speaking english. since you had a conversation with him this morning, do you think he has trouble with the english language because he was surrounded by only pastel speakers forashtal the last five years? >> the conversation we had could not even be characterized as a conversation. it was just an exchange of military salutes.

,"ello, sir," "welcome back and the like. he could fully understand me and i can fully understand him, but it was less than 30 words. right, toward the back. >> "new york times." can you talk more about what he saw the moment he stepped off the plane this morning? who was there to greet him? honor guard? what was the environment like the moment he stepped off the plane? 40 inain, it was around 01: the morning. he stepped off the plane, was looking at an open hangar with me to greet him and also the officer escort with him. they just went straight to brooke army medical center. that was it. camera.by the

go ahead, in the front, since you have the microphone, and next question will be the individual by the camera. >> you mention he is allowed to talk with other soldiers in the reintegration team. are they allowed to talk about what happened to them, and are the conversations supervised? >> the conversations are not supervised, but they only focus on his health and welfare. his exposure to things in the -- they will gradually reintroduce him to the world overall. >> yes, in the back. >> can you elaborate s'more -- is he speaking in english only, or is he speaking more than one language through this reintegrating process? ofagain, the 30 seconds exposure i had with him was just in english, so from my point, it is english.

had a littleually bit more time with him, briefly, when he arrived on the hospital introductions,f any needs that he had, and very limited physical examination, again, purpose being to let him settle in. he spoke in english. as far as any earlier reports, i was not there for that, but overall, he did not have the opportunity in the past five years to practice and speak english. .> ok, second row can we get the microphone there please? major-general, can you talk fort the needs he has asked ? has he requested anything? has he requested any special food, things like that? >> i have no knowledge of it.

>> as far as any special food, we started off land on his diet in consultation with a registered dietitian, and we on thatn communicating and continuing the treatment plan -- we started off bland. he has actually been advancing his diet nicely and making choices. part of his reintegration is allowing him to make those choices. he has not had that control in five years. >> has he requested anything in particular? >> i will tell you peanut butter is a favorite. >> we have time for about two more questions. yes, sir. >> john sullivan with time warner cable news in new york. what can you guys say about his captivity? there were reports he had been tortured. what can you tell us about his physical well-being? the second question is what can you tell us about his military contract?

?asn't expired has it been extended? where does he sit with the government? >> we cannot comment at all as far as conditions of captivity. he is considered active duty, just like any of us sitting here right now, to answer your question. >> but you sign a contract, you signed for three, 5, 6 years. >> yes, his reenlistment time period eventually will come. i have no idea what it is now. >> ok, final question. >> fox 26 in houston. is there a timeframe -- i know he is controlling the process, but is there a limit on eventually trying to get him a time frame where his next step would be getting back into normal life? is their average from the process before that you could tell us? it to be three months, six months -- it could be three

months, six months? >> i would love to tell you it's going to be a certain amount of time. the reality is we do not know. there is no average time. each case is unique and different. i think this case is particularly unique for its length. we know he did not have any contact with u.s. service members during captivity. so he will proceed at his pace. >> ok, i want to thank you all very much for your time this afternoon. just a reminder -- if you have follow-up inquiries or responses phaseek for integration three, which is u.s. army staff, please reach out to my team, who is here supporting the press conference today, or refer to my contact information in the press kit. thank you very much. >> this briefing in san antonio, the latest on the situation on sergeant bowe bergdahl, who just arrived in the u.s. today a capitol hill reporter tweeting the capital affairs committee will plan to hold a bergdahl

hearing on june 18 focusing on national security implications of the release of guantanamo detainees for sergeant bergdahl. a lot going on in washington, d.c. we heard from president obama on the situation in iraq after recent attacks by sunni militants and how the u.s. might respond. here's a look. >> good morning, everybody. i want to take some time to give you a quick update about the situation in iraq. yesterday, i convened a meeting with my national security council to discuss the situation there, and this morning, i received an update from my team. over the last several days, we have seen significant gains made a terrorist organization that operates in both iraq and in syria. in the face of a terrorist offensive, iraqi security forces

have proven unable to defend a number of cities, which has allowed the terrorist to overrun part of iraq has territory, and this poses a danger to iraq and its people, and, given the nature of these terrorists, it could pose a threat eventually to american interests as well. this thread is not brand-new. over the last year, we have been steadily ramping up security assistance to the iraqi government with increased training, equipping, and intelligence. now, iraq needs additional support to break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the capabilities of iraqi security forces. we will not be sending u.s. troops back into combat in iraq, but i have asked my national security team to prepare a range helpher options that could support iraq security forces, and i will be reviewing those options in the days ahead. i do want to be clear -- this is not solely or even primarily a

military challenge. over the past decade, american extraordinaryde sacrifices to give iraq is an opportunity to claim their own an opportunitys to claim their own future. unfortunately, leaders have been unable to overcome too often the mistrust and sectarian differences have long been simmering, and that has created .ulnerabilities any action that we may take to provide assistance to iraqi security forces has to be joined by a serious and secure effort by iraqi leaders to set aside sectarian differences, promote stability, and account for the legitimate interests of all iraq's communities and to build an effective security force. we cannot do it for them. in the absence of this type of political effort, short-term military action, including any assistance we might provide, won't succeed.

this should be a wake up call. iraq's leaders have to demonstrate a willingness to make our decisions and -- make hard decisions and compromises. in that effort, they will have the support of the united states and our friends and our allies. iraq's neighbors have some responsibility to support this process. nobody has an interest in seeing terrorists gain a foothold inside of iraq and no one has any benefit from seeing iraq to send into chaos. united states will do our part. understand that ultimately it is up to the iraqis to solve their problems. we have redoubled our efforts to build more capable counterterrorism efforts. we will continue that effort through our support of the moderate opposition in, our support for the opposition

security forces, and our partnership with other forces across the region. we are also going to pursue intensive diplomacy throughout this period, inside of iraq and across the region, because there is never going to be stability for the region unless there were political outcomes that allow people to resolve outcomes peacefully without resorting to war or relying on the united states military. we will be monitoring the situation in iraq very carefully over the next several days. our top priority will remain -- will to be remain vigilant. we will consult closely with congress as we make determinations about appropriate action and we will continue to keep the american people fully informed as we continue to make decisions about the way forward. i will take a question. >> are you reluctant to get involved in iraq with the recent u.s. history? >> i think that we should look at the situation carefully. we have an interest in making sure that a group like isil, a

vicious organization that has been able to take advantage of the chaos in syria, that they do not get a broader foothold. i think there are dangers of fierce sectarian fighting if shia sites are overrun. that could trigger shia-sunni conflict that could be very hard to stamp out. we have enormous interest there. obviously, our troops in the american people and the american taxpayers made huge investments and sacrifices in order to give iraqis the opportunity to chart a better course, a better destiny. ultimately, they are going to have to seize it. as i said before, we are not going to be able to do it for them. given the very difficult history we have seen in iraq, i think any objective observer would recognize that, in the absence

of accommodation among the various factions inside of iraq, various military actions by the united states, by any outside nation are not going to solve those problems over the long term and not going to deliver the stability we need. anybody else? >> is the syrian civil war spilling over the iraq border? >> i think it has been for some time. isil has gained a foothold in syria. that is one of the reasons we have been concerned about it and supporting syrian opposition. but it is a challenging problem. the iraqi government, which was initially resistant to some of our offers of help, has come around to recognize that cooperation with us on some of the issues can be useful. obviously, that is not the case in syria, were president assad has no interest in seeing us

involved there and were some of the governments that are supporting assad have been able to block u.n. efforts and humanitarian aid. this is a regional problem and it is going to be a long-term problem. what we're going to have to do is combine selective actions by our military to make sure we're going after terrorists who could harm our personnel overseas were eventually hit the homeland, we will have to combine that with what is a very challenging international effort to try to rebuild countries and communities that have been shattered by the sectarian war. that is not an easy task. >> what are they willing to do? >> we are in contact with them now. we will have a better sense by the end of the weekend after

those consultations. we will be getting a better sense from them of how they might support an effort to bring about the kind of political unity instead of iraq that bolsters security forces. the united states has poured a lot of money into these iraqi security forces and we devoted a lot of training to iraqi security forces. the fact that they are not willing to stand and fight and defend their posts against admittedly hardened terrorists, but not terrorists who are overwhelming in numbers, indicates that there is a problem with morale, a problem in terms of commitment, and ultimately that is rooted in the political problems that have plagued the country for a very long time. last question. last one. >> can you talk a little bit

about u.s. concern of the disruption, potential disruption, oil supplies? >> so far, we have not seen major disruptions in oil supplies. obviously, if in fact, i s i l was able to get control over major output, significant refineries, that could be a source of concern. as you might expect, world markets react to any kind of instability in the middle east. one of our goal should be to make sure that in cooperation with other countries and regions, some only are we creating some kind of backstop in terms of what is happening inside iraq, but if there do end being disruptions inside iraq that the gulf producers are able to pick up the slack. that is part of the consultations that will take place during the course of this week. just to give people a sense of the timing.

although events on the ground have been happening very quickly, our ability to plan military action or work with the iraqi government is going to take several days. people should not anticipate that this is going to happen overnight. we want to have good eyes on the situation. we want to gather all of the intelligence necessary so that if i do direct in order actions there, that their target, precise, and will have an effect. i want to make sure that everybody understands this message. the united states is not simply going to involve itself in a military action in the absence of a political plan by the iraqis that gives us some assurance that they are prepared to work together. we are not going to allow ourselves to be dragged back

into a situation in which, while we're there, we are keeping a lid on things and then after enormous sacrifices by us, as soon as we are not there, suddenly people in the past thing -- acting in ways that are not conducive to long-term prosperity and stability of the country. all right? thank you very much, everybody. >> the president greeting -- on facebook, we are asking the question -- should the u.s. intervene in iraq?

the president's remarks, we will be showing them again tonight at 8:00 eastern time here on c-span. we heard more about iraq from the washington institute for near east policy today. the group called -- talked about the discussion of recent developments and the escalating .iolence in iraq >> good afternoon. good afternoon and welcome to the washington institute. i'm the director of the institute. thank you very much for joining us on short notice. we werean event we wish not convening at the institute, that we called on short notice to address the issues of the day. diretled this iraq's situation. my own view is that is a bit of an understatement. churchill might've said this is a bit of a debacle wrapped in a tragedy inside of a catastrophe,

ad even that might be only bit approaching the reality of the situation. facing first and foremost the iraqi people, and more broadly security and stability in the region and american interests throughout this area. i am very pleased that we at the washington institute have a ep bench of expertise to bring to bear on iraq today, and offering some suggestions to address the situation between the government of iraq in the united states, the united states and its allies around the the messaging from washington throughout the middle east. in that regard, i am pleased to recognize the ambassador of iraq who is here today. thank you for joining us. i know there is a lot of your plate, and i am delighted you are with us for today's session.

let me just introduce our panelists, and then we will get .own to today's business first, i am pleased to introduce our distinguished visiting fellow here at the institute. the of course, served united states with distinction as an ambassador in baghdad in addition to service as ambassador and opera -- in ankara, much earlier in his career, 12 amy up. experienceifetime of and american foreign-policy diplomacy. based on the original foundation of military experience that hearkened all the way back to vietnam. perhaps not a metaphor for today's events, but perhaps they are. jim will offer insight into that.

speaking later in our program is aaron zelling. i think it is fair to say that there are exceedingly few people inside or outside of government who have followed the developments of what president obama now calls isil and what other experts call isis, the same radical extremist group that we are talking about. aaron, through his minute, detailed exploration of these groups brings extraordinary value added to these groups and what is going on in iraq and syria. joining us from orly airport in paris is michael knights.

he is, as this audience knows, one of the finest observers of political-military issues in iraq, has been a voice of incisive and insightful analysis on this situation going back many, many years. i am delighted that he can join us. i think because he is under some technical constraints, that we are going to begin our program with mike, then turned to jim, and then to aaron. so, mike. if we could just address that noise. mike, the floor is yours. >> thanks very much. i have certainly transmitted from worse place than this. i think you have a graphic that

you're going to put up. thanks very much. background noise gone. if you look at this graphic -- >> one second. one second. >> just tell me when.

>> can you hear me ok now? i need you to speak. the map that you see in front of you gives some basic areas of control. the green area you can see is unoccupiable kurdish areas. the large region in grey is the area that has collapsed. it may be isis in control, it may be local militants, it may be government forces. the lines on this map show a red line or an orange line, which was the forward edge of control just before the june crisis. now you see a light blue line, which is the current forward

position. it demonstrates how they have moved forward along the hired this -- entire disputed line. where you see the loss of control area and, you see a thin cord door from samarra, where hopefully the tide will be stemmed, in the bottom of the map, the major logistical base for the destroyed units. as can be seen from this -- i will point out two things about the way the battlefield is evolving. first looking at strategic geometry.

if you look at it, isis and mosul have great strategic depth in terms of the federal forces would have to travel, tremendous strategic depth, 350 kilometers of contested terrain. but isis'strategic death to the -- depth to the east is narrow. the key things they want to hold onto is within very close striking distance of kurdish forces. this is how important it is to get the kurdish forces involved in the fight. they have to come to the kurds with solutions on oil authority issues. baghdad has to make some compromises.

we can all argue about the fine points later. for now, there is a bigger issue to deal with. the kurds are already fighting at a number of points on the map. where the kurds of moved forward to take control of these disputed areas, the iraqi army buffer between them and isis is now gone. they're taking casualties. martyrdom statements coming up on social media sites. the kurds are in the fight. the kurds hate radical islamists. they suffered extensively from degradations in the past. they're not willing to have a major isis control center within an hours drive from the economic capital of kurdistan. no successful emerging economy

in the world has been able to have a huge al qaeda presence in a city at one point -- one point million people -- 1.8 million people and hours drive a way. the second brief observation of want to make is we need to pay a lot of attention to the moral dimension of this crisis. by my estimation, a full 60 of the iraqi army combat battalions cannot be accounted for. 60 out of the 243 cannot be accounted for, with all equipment lost. this is a mammoth refitting job to put these units back together and arm them properly for combat. this is an area where the u.s. will become the arsenal of democracy. no one likes the idea of having

to refit the iraqi army again after the u.s. taxpayer did it the first time. this time iraq will be paying. one aspect of this is the refitting role. as important as that, turning around a defeated army and enabling it to fight again, very military with a long tradition, a proud tradition. among arab countries, they're one of the best militaries. they have many proud achievements to .2, including the feet of the militia in 2008 and their part in the surge the defeated al qaeda in the first place. these points are laid out in great detail. it is one of the most difficult

tasks you can imagine. it would not take them in the u.s. partners at the divisional level and above to insert some wisdom in to their ways the iraqi security can pick themselves up and dust themselves off and get back into the fight to rid taking baby steps. feeding these units so that they can win small successes, wind small, easy battles. the final thing i will say as well is that the provision of u.s. military assistance on the ground is something that we need to think very seriously about, as i'm sure the president is. listening to his remarks, i'm hope what i'm detecting their is that we play hardball with the iraqi government about coming out with a political deal, about ending all of this sectarian

nonsense, ethnic bullying of the kurds. if some of the very disruptive policies of the government can end, i hope we are willing to help out this long-standing ally. if we put u.s. air power into iraq right now, it is not the bullet that will solve everything, but it will have tremendous moral effect. it is a massive boost to them. you don't need to use a lot of it for it to have a tremendous amount of moral impact. and the people who say, how could we be sure the strikes are getting targeted? we do know. we do need a special task force operation on the ground. we do need eyes on the ground.

when we turned around the libyan regimes near destruction of benghazi and the french airstrikes and other airstrikes turn that around, that had enormous effect and there are many instances in iraq where i can imagine a little bit of air power going at very long way. we have already got boots on the ground in iraq. the people on the embassy -- i wish this boots on the ground phrase would leave our lexicon because it just doesn't mean anything. it is an excuse not to do something. we already have boots on the ground. use whatever legal conceit is required to get some u.s. advisers up to the forward headquarters and to get them on the from line. i will say this with a caveat. they could already be there right now. if it is not the case, it is something we should very

seriously consider. space for one final comment. it is not hard at this stage to imagine iraq becoming syria. like falluja, just 35 miles from baghdad international airport. it is hard -- not hard to imagine the iraqi government turning to somebody who has a proven track record of protecting their allies and that is the iranians. they have stabilized the regime's defense. it is unfortunate, but when i was in baghdad, in march, what i heard is that the iraqi government feels it needs to use some of the same formula that assad did and maybe some of the same help. so really, this is the time for

a desperate lead to the u.s. government on behalf of the iraqis out there who are willing to fight. the u.s. needs to make a credible jester at this time. a credible gesture of military support right now. if we are using the withholding of military support to lean on the iraqi government to come up with a political deal, good. i hope there is the baseline determination underneath that to eventually do something to stabilize the situation. it cannot be a cosmetic half measure. there have been too many of them in recent years. we have to commit to the defense of iraq. we cannot leave iraq to isis or the iranians. those are my comments. >> jim, do want to speak from the podium? >> i will speak from here.

>> i put the map back up. >> the map is great. thanks for coming here today. but two months ago, it seems like two years ago, when i was diverted from my main job looking at the middle east into ukraine, i wrote something saying that the crimean situation was the biggest challenge to the united states since 9/11, if not since the and of the cold war. i have changed my opinion. what is happening right now in iraq is the biggest challenge since 9/11, at least. here is why. back in september, president obama addressed the un's general assembly. he said, there are four critical

issues that would require all elements of american power, the euphemism for military force. securing the oil lines, combating international terror, standing by our allies and partners, and weapons of mass destruction. other than the last, at least for the moment, they all three of the others are very much in play right now. the largest concentration of al qaeda we have ever seen anywhere is in this combined area of western iraq and on into syria. they're the nastiest of all of them. secondly, we have already seen oil prices spike. iraq is the second-largest exporter of oil in opec. the iea estimates it could go up to 6 million barrels of production per day, two thirds of what saudi arabia on sundays produces.

this is not a recipe for stability. in all kinds of ways i will not get into, if there is instability in iraq, particularly if we have no government worthy of the name in baghdad, you will month have a whole lot of development in the oil sector anywhere, except perhaps in kurdistan. our interests are at stake. the president realizes that. let's try to take a look at the fact that he is being briefed on. i will keep it short and i will keep it to what general casey easter call the major muscle movements. speed is of the essence. a lot of the things that i and everybody in this audience could say about iraq are not important at this point.

there are only a few things that are really crucially important by the major actors in the next few days. most importantly, this isil. we will hear more about what makes them up. they are facing a decision. they have seized almost all of the sunni arab areas of iraq. the question is, do they carry out their threat and go after baghdad? they certainly can. i know the area to the north and south of baghdad. it still is an area where al qaeda has always had a presence. it is a mixed sunni-shiite area. they have already seized two towns this morning in the province to the north and the northeast of baghdad. they could pretty much cut it off. the problem is even if they cannot take the city, known

think they can come of the question is, how do you get fuel, food, water, electricity, and all the other things a country, a capital, five or 6 million people needs if they are surrounding you? i'm not speaking theoretically. in 2004, with 130,000 american troops in country, that was the situation we faced some days in baghdad in june, july, august. it was very tough, even though we had overwhelming air power. they need to make a decision. we will have to see what they're going to do. that is the most important thing. if they do decide to stay in the sunni areas, we will have a classic counterinsurgency.

things might play out the need to be done for reconciliation, all true. american troops are not going to liberate the sunni areas of iraq. that will be kurds, sunnis, shia or nobody. we will provide listings just logistics, training, and firepower in the months ahead. i certainly would not recommend it. if they are not going to fight their own country and we shouldn't on the ground. because it would be bloody. the visit long-term question, as history goes. if isil is pushing toward baghdad, the president is faced with a very different situation. we have americans right in the middle of this thing. the government, the iraqi army,

and some of the shia militias are in this mix, if they can hold, maintain the cohesion, use their vastly superior firepower and extraordinarily large number of superior troops to hold the territory where the families lived, then we won't have to worry about the siege, they will be able to push these people back and keep the roads open. it will be messy, but they can do it. that is a big if folks. from what we have seen in mosul and elsewhere. if they cannot, if isis decides to surround baghdad and if the authorities are not able to break that siege, i'm sure they are strong enough to avoid being overrun. a city of 6 million people is not going to be overrun by 5000 people, i'm almost sure of that.

they may not be able to maneuver, use firepower effectively against people who are very good at this at this time in they may find themselves essentially besieged. if you get through those two decision points, you get to the other four actors. the kurds are sitting on the green lines, the mixed areas. if there is danger anywhere a kurd is living, that is essentially what we have right now they have two other choices. they are on either side of mosul. there on either side of the fault line where isil is.

you can exert tremendous military pressure on isil if they want to. if they see a total mess, disintegration, iranian control to the south, they are out. they have talked about this for years, they have opened certain options. that is something to watch. they have decisions based upon these other decisions. the next actor is the iranians. if baghdad is besieged, if some of the cities that are so important to shia islam in the south are under threat, it is very hard to imagine the iranians not acting if somebody else does not act.

the second to the last actor is the turks. they're in an awkward position because they have 80 people in mosul seized by the isil people. that puts limits on what they can do. they are still in major actor with a major military capability. they have close ties to the kurds. watch them. the final actor is the united states. the most important. you just heard the president. he said he would consult with congress to go over options. he ruled out ground forces. that means major ground forces. there'll already military advisers on the ground. he did not rule out airstrikes, but he did not rule it in what he said is, i cannot do anything militarily without a political process.

going back to the first of the actors, if isil stays in the sunni areas, that is an intelligent way to move forward. all they can do is provide aerial firepower for some of these ground forces. unless the ground forces show up for the fight, there is no since dropping bombs on these people. if we are facing either a siege of baghdad and almost certainly the iranians coming in in a big way, we have to act quick late just quickly. if he is saying he is going to leverage his decision to use force to get the best possible political deal, that is not politics some of that is not diplomacy, and more power to him. having spent years and set a -- inside iraq and get this deal and failed miserably, what he is

telling us is that until that happens, the planes will stand 3and isis is moving forward, then other actors are going to shape iraq and the middle east. that is the question that he is facing today. people will say well, you know, what are we going to hit with targets? the north vietnamese invaded on the easter offensive. it was exactly like 1975 when they overran the country. then the planes came. the f4s, the b-52s come you could feel the ground rumble and vietnamese soldiers could feel it.

bit by bit they held the ground. by the paris pizza courts -- peace accords, all but one small town had been taken back in the country. we have forward observers. nonetheless, it was the use of military power, it was the use of real power, sometimes not knowing exactly where the enemy was that turned the tide. in libya, many times we did not have ground reserves. what we were dealing with was cars of mobile army troops. what we are dealing with our pickup trucks of isis personnel rolling around at 30 miles per hour. there are vulnerable to airstrikes. i will stop there. thank you very much.

>> thank you. thanks for coming out and for everybody watching online. i am going to be talking about isis, islamic state of iraq, and get into who they are. this did not necessarily come out of nowhere, even though it is sort of being portrayed as if it has. there has been a reemergence of isis, which originally is the group that was in control of. they have changed their name recently. they started reemerging in april 2013. this is when isis decided to extend its control beyond iraq and into syria. this is also the time when they officially broke away from al qaeda itself. al qaeda in early february 2014 confirmed isis was no longer part of the organization.

while the movement and surge did push them back, they were not completely defeated. there was still at least 300 people that were killed per month in iraq from around 2008 until april 2013. what was important about syria was they were able to get resources and money and fighters back into iraq when operating inside of syria. one of the things we have seen in the past six months or so is that there had been a return of foreign fighters into the iraqi arena. many of these originally designed to syria to fight against the assad regime. isis unplugged them and brought them into the iraq so divide as well. since april 2013, we have seen violence rise three and a half times more than what we saw on average in the previous four and a half years. in addition, one of the things that helped them out is they had a prison break last july at abu ghraib were at least 500 individuals were released from prison.

some of these guys were arrested and detained during the surge. many of these had experiences which further provided more levels of competency to isis' operation. of course, we saw earlier this year that they were able to take over falluja and parts of ramadi. another aspect of what isis has been doing that we did not say last decade and is one of the reasons why people -- the backlash against them originally was they had a hearts and minds strategy, whether it is providing food, medication, religious classes, outreach to tribal figures, as well as allowing people in the safaa movement to repent and join their cause about getting killed. therefore, more and more victories have raised the level of prestige for this organization. isis operatives now operate in both syria and iraq and view the border as nothing more than going from one province in their islamic state to another, not going from one nation say to the other. after mosul was liberated, and

there are other islamist factions involved in the takeover, when isis takes over an area, they view it as now under their sovereign control. therefore, every individual within the territory must pledge allegiance to the leader of the group. if you do not go along with the program, it is essentially a death wish. this is the backdrop of how they rule. yesterday morning, they released a charter of the city to residents which highlights more prohibitions on actions and things people can potentially do. if you steal, you will get your hand chopped off. you have to perform all five daily prayers on time. drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes are forbidden. carrying non-isis flags and/or weapons is illegal. all shrines and graves will be

destroyed since isis views them as polytheistic. and women must wear the full body clothing. sunnis within the town, if they worked within the government and institutions, if they repented, they would be fine and would not be executed. we also already have a case study of how isis does rule in syria. i am going to highlight some of the ways they have been in charge, in addition to the criminal aspects. it is not just all terror. when isis took over a city in syria, they started setting up by putting up a lot of billboards in the city that had themes related to jihad and sharia. other themes related -- they tried to reach out to local notables and tribal figures because they wanted to stay off any potential backlash that could happen in the future, and the same way we saw last decade in iraq when there was an

uprising against isis in the mid-2000's and what most people do not realize is that isis' operations are highly sophisticated and they do have a bureaucracy themselves, too. i will go through how they have been governing these areas in syria. in terms of the law and order side, they have sharia courts. this is where they can throw down their rulings related to somebody getting their hand chopped off for thievery are people getting executions for apotheosizing. we have seen a number of individuals getting crucified, which i'm pretty sure not many people have seen in the modern era. they have a police service that goes around. they have a consumer protection authority which looks at the different markets and places where you can get food in local places in syria and decides whether a food product is edible or not, essentially, in the same way that the fda would do something.

they also have a vigilante aspect of their law and order side where they have burned cigarettes and destroyed tombs. we saw one of the more larger tombs or shrines in iraq being destroyed earlier this year. in terms of public works, they helped build a new market. they have an electrical office which helps train and repair electrical services throughout the town. they have had a lot of road work done in some areas where they have rehabilitated roads, whether it is in terms of putting up plants in the medians, and they have also been able to continue operating the dam. they have set up an office to provide money for the needy. they claim that this helps also with farmers and their harvests. they are now conducting a post office. on the more ideological side of things, they have a media outlet where they pass out dvd's of

video releases they put out online. they have a truck which roves around with a lot of different things related to islam and their ideology. they stop in some areas to talk to children and adults to try to teach them at their interpretations of islam. they set up a number of religious schools for boys and girls. if you memorize the koran, you can get a certificate. they have also provided kid fun days where kids can play around on these inflatable slides and moonwalk type of devices, as well as have food and eating contests. in addition, for older members of society, they have created sessions for imams and teachers to be trained. they have helped run bread factories and provided fruits and vegetables for many people. they have even set up a food kitchen for the needy. they also set up an office for orphans to help register them and then hopefully placed them with a family.

while the taliban has been very paranoid about vaccinations after the cia operation against osama bin laden, there have been vaccination programs put out by isis. they even have a cub scouts program which is far more worrying because you have children from the ages of around six to 14 that are now in these housing places in iraqa and that that ended training camps. they are essentially halving child soldiers being set up. so what is next for isis? this is sort of what the potential could be. this is what we're seeing in syria, but this is what the potential could be in iraq now that they have taken over some areas. it is likely they will try to consolidate their strength with the new money from the mosul central bank, and that far exceeds any money that osama bin laden had. there are rumors that they have been buying off people inside of mosul. this will be used to reinforce the front in syria. as many people know, earlier this year, a bunch of rebel groups started an uprising with

isis and pushed them out of idlib. it is likely they will use this to try and push it back into aleppo and idlib. my question is -- are they stretched thin? they have 7000 to 2000 people, but they span from aleppo all the way to mosul. many people do not like their ideology and do not want to live through this. obviously, the type of penalties that they pursue has created a backlash. we have already seen statements by some tribal members in ramadi and mosul about how they will stand up to the maliki government and isis itself.

it could prove difficult and provide more ability to consolidate the state. for jihadist worldwide, victories registered by isis in the perception that the so-called will of god is on its side against enemies will only enhance the prestige of joining the group and furthering its goals. this is the state of isis right now. it is a lot different than what al qaeda was up to last decade, but it is a very sophisticated and organized organization. this will be more difficult to dislodge than anything we have seen before. thank you. >> thank you for those sobering remarks. mike, are you with us? >> yes, i am. >> very good. let me open up a discussion session by asking you if you can bring us up to date on the report concerning iranian military involvement to read it

is, where they are, what they seem to be doing. >> it is very difficult to come up with categorical information on this without being in country and seeing it with your own eyes. i have spent a lot of time studying the militias in iraq and meeting them on many occasions, quite unnervingly. but what i found was that they were -- let's just say, the iranians have been very nervous since 2007 about risking irgc offices directly inside iraq. now, since the u.s. left in 2011, i am sure some of that fear or trepidation is gone. we have seen senior officers

killed on the other side of the order over in syria. it is very likely they have got military advisers operating in many ways however like to see u.s. officers operating. you know, one thing is for sure, wherever you have got these u.s. officers operating, you are very unlikely to have iranian officers operating in the same places. if anything, that is a good reason for having u.s. officers on the front line or at least at the front headquarters to ensure that there are some eyes on what is actually happening. but around samarra, samarra is critical to this. i would recommend to you the work from the institute on shia islamist groups in iraq and syria. samarra is a shrine city, a place where a shrine was blown up in february 2006, providing a final spot in the civil war that

lasted for two plus years. isis tried to overrun it on june 5 but failed, thank god. about 800 meters short of the shrine. they tried again after the major collapse in security forces, and that is one of those nightmare scenarios that everyone in coalition forces and analysts have been talking about for years. what if they take out that shrine again> just as shia islamist militias from iraq have been defending the shrines in syria, in damascus, there have been reports of defending shrines in samarra. they will do the same in northern baghdad and in karbala. where there is one of these iranian-backed shia militia actors, essentially the iraqi version of lebanese hezbollah, there will often be an irgc trainer or advisor not that far behind.

>> we just heard mike say iranians are probably sending irgc guys doing what he would have expected americans to be doing but in a different context. you have been on both sides of this. in baghdad, trying to push the political reconciliation, and in the situation room offering advice to presidents on how to and what sort of military force to bring to bear. can you give us a little glimpse into what you think is happening, both angles here? what are we telling specifically to maliki? the timeframe the president announced today was a matter of days. is it possible to see the type of political reconciliation that he spoke about and 72 hours? on the military side, what sort of preparations do you expect

are going on right now for the type of action that you would like to see? >> when you mine the statement in bits and pieces and you put it all together, there is pretty good outline of what the president will be doing over the next few days. what he is saying is he's going to move assets into place. we just heard that an aircraft carrier has moved into the gulf. he talks about intelligence. that is both -- everything from analysts diverting their focus on this to satellites to drones, the entire network of u.s. intelligence systems will be turned on to this situation at every level. we worked very, very, very good at this when dealing with al qaeda from the period roughly 2004 through 2011, and there is a lot of that reserve capability there.

nonetheless, he will also be preparing the military for whatever contingency the president gives a green light to. it is not unwise or unexpected for the president to link the situation with political developments and re-conciliation. what he really means is we are not going to know for a few days, but it would be on rise for him to reveal this by saying -- i can say this from the outside -- we want the maliki to be a new government and a different government and take a different attitude towards the kurds and sunnis. but if isis surrounds baghdad, we're going to hit them anyway. he cannot say that, even if he has decided to do that. i have no indication he has decided to do that. because you always want to leverage what you are doing

for an ally or friend with what you want that ally or friend to do for you, particularly when it is in that ally or friend's own interest. we have spent 11 years talking not just to maliki, but to every political leader, all the political leaders, that if they do not hang together, they are going to hang separately. that is what we are seeing before us today. it is good advice that he has given. in terms of the specifics, vice president biden called maliki yesterday. i am sure having been in some of these calls that the u.s. message was delivered with vigor and with a certain bluntness, and that is good under these conditions. i am sure it included a very strong admonition that maliki as to his approach towards sectarian issues and towards his political domination of the military. it is one of the reasons the military melted away. secondly, it also would have included the specifics of what america might offer and under what conditions. we do not know that yet. as i said, it is good that the

president is not signaling, both to the enemy but also before he talks to congress, what exactly he is going to do. it is also good that he ensures that maliki feels under pressure to do things in return. again, this is most important, as the president said, in the days ahead if we are facing a surge into the baghdad area, into karbala and the south. that could lead to an extremely dramatic situation, including to our own personnel, and it could lead to a significant iranian intervention or a significant kurdish reaction. if isis is either slowed down themselves, and they are not eight-feet tall as we have seen in samarra, as we have seen with the kurds, people can stand up to them. they have momentum on their side, and that is important for the military, but once they are stopped, then people can hold their ground. it is possible that the iraqis

will be able to hold her ground and the non-sunni-arab areas. the white house has to be prepared for a longer struggle. remember, the president's statement yesterday was "a permanent presence of al qaeda in iraq and syria will not be tolerated." he has to think about how he is going to do this, along with his commitment to the american people not to but troops on the ground, by which he means 101st airborne, the first army commission. there will be 1001 factoids and irrelevant ideas and other schemes that are instantly torment you. i cannot describe how painful this process is. >> thank you. to complete this circle, you followed isis for quite a long

time. given the options they have in front of them, what are they most likely to do, go to baghdad? hold tight on current territory? what are they most likely to do? >> knowing isis and how they have operated in the past and the excitement i have seen from all their followers and supporters all mine in the past week is that they are likely to have a big head and potentially overplay themselves in the coming days and weeks. whether they do that or not is obviously the question, but they stopped of past activities, it is likely that they will try and push because that is how they view the world. in addition, i suspect that there are already signs that some of the humvees and other types of military equipment that was all them take in mosul are already back in syria now. it is likely that they will use that as a new infusion in cash and weapons on their front. they want to potentially push back into aleppo city.

it is likely that, knowing them, they will try and push on both fronts in iraq and in syria. this probably could provide a great opportunity though to the syrian rebels to fight against isis, because they are stretching themselves thin, as well as any forces in the iraqi arena, as well. >> thank you very much. i will turn to questions, starting with andrew right in the middle. >> thank you for great recitations, guys. we have had a lot of prescriptions from all three of you, particularly aaron and ambassador jeffrey on what to do in iraq, but it seems to me that a lot of this is coming out of syria. i mean, isis was born in iraq but metastasized in syria, then come out for a double or nothing game of whatever we have in front of us. we have an organization that does not recognize the boundary that have divided the middle east for over a century.

so my question is, what do we do on the syria end of this equation, and how does it affect the debate we have seen recently with ambassador robert ford's calls to arm the sunni opposition in syria? thank you. >> very quickly, we had a horrible syrian situation which threatened to do exactly this kind of game changing thing for a couple of years, and we did not do very much about it. it metastasized, and it is the mess we have now. we're going to have that mess tomorrow, next month, at least, and into the future, regardless of what we do or do not do. what is different right now is these guys are moving on a path that could be an immediate dramatic game changer to the entire middle east. so there is a difference in perspective. it is very hard to communicate this. i have been trying to do it for

three days. the president tried to do it and was not completely clear. we have a longer-term problem of a wide swath of sunni, arab largely desert territory in the middle of the levant that has been taken over by a terrorist group in syria, iraq, and other insurgent groups that are unhappy with the government. it is not really uncovered because there are a variety of voices governing it, but many of them do not have our best interests at heart. it is a tremendous complicated long-term problem that will require the president to get everybody lined up in the region, political solutions, reconsolidation, stability operations, and all of that, if we are willing to pay the price and engaged that thoroughly. i do not know. he is moving slowly in that direction. that is the longer-term problem. the immediate problem we have, and he seems to indicate this in his final remarks when answering

a question -- the speech, as i said, if you mine it and sew it together, you can kind of get a sort of way forward. but in being asked a question that the very end, then you basically hear him say, look, this is going to be a few days. i have to get my ducks in order. it comes closer to he does realize that if isis moves on baghdad or some of these other areas, if the iranians threatened to move in in a big way, he may have to make some immediate decisions. that is how i would separate it. obviously, he knows, because he included it. he knows it is one front. he said, i cannot allow a permanent refuge, a permanent presence of isis, al qaeda, in iraq and syria. he knows it is a common front. how this fits with the battle but he also is waging, sort of, against assad, is a whole other question.

>> ok, thank you. yes, in front here? >> thank you very much. this is one of the very few events that i cannot find anyone to disagree with. you really have nailed the issues exactly right. thank you for the presentations. let's take us back to the other side, how iraqis view this. i think that is very important, because they are mainly interested in it. the ambassador quite rightly said that this has been the biggest challenge since 9/11. i would say this is the biggest challenge to the shia iraqis. 65% of the population since 1991. can the united states afford another perception of a betrayal by the united states, which means this time -- if iran comes to the rescue and the united states drags its feet, making

conditions -- i would like to see the united states solve the situation, not the iranians or someone else, because that will be bad to the iraqis into the united states. it is very important to address and for the administration to understand. >> ok, i will take the first stab at that. you hit on a very important point. for those of us -- you may remember, i apologized for 1991 publicly. here is the problem, and i am being very honest, folks -- the united states can essentially take almost any loss and live with it. that is what makes us such an ally for everybody. we can lose vietnam, and did, and live to fight another day in kosovo and in kuwait. so the answer is, yeah, we can

survive with the shia of iraq, feeling that we totally abandoned them. other people feel we totally abandoned them, tibetans and others. i am sure some others are not feeling too good about us either. but we can move on, because that is the reality. there is another reality, you do this often enough, you develop a patent of supporting people, and then walking away from them and demand in that all the t's are crossed and the i's are dotted before you move and it will be a force more expensive than the next 10 militaries combined. then people will stop organizing themselves in our world differently, and we are not going to like that organization. so the shia have a vote, just like the tibetans and the crimeans and everybody else. the sunni arabs have a vote.

a lot of them are not happy with us either. and the kurds are not too happy. >> yes, barbara? >> thanks very much. thank you so much for doing this. my question is about maliki. can he be part of the solution? he has had eight years. he has done nothing but go after sunnis, kurds, become increasingly paranoid, corrupt, appointing relatives. can he actually rise to the occasion? >> well, look at me -- [laughter] >> mike, what do you think? >> [inaudible] >> let's get the volume up here. >> i will be diplomatic because i travel to iraq quite frequently. first of all, you have to respect the election result,

including perhaps a personal vote which is an indication that at least in baghdad, maliki put all the votes together. but that is ducking the question, i guess. if we look back over the last four years, it has been a dismal failure. there are some bright spots. the relationship with kuwait, the oil production. but everything else has been a dismal failure. really it has been brought about by failures in the iraqi government, rather than how great the bad guys are. one has to wonder when we look back in 2018, 2014 to 2018, whether we see more of the same or whether we see a turnaround. as we saw during 2006 and 2010 -- that is the key for whoever

leads iraq next. that is what they should be asking themselves. how are they going to be remembered? as the guy who lost it all or the guy who did whatever he had to do and dealt with whoever he had to deal with to keep it together? the maliki government, when i was there in march, key leadership explained exactly what they were going to do in a third term. and some of it was encouraging. increasing support for technocrats with streamlined decision-making systems. not about taking the power for yourself but building a real civil service. many ideas. but there is also real darkness at the heart of the vision for the next four years. if there is engagement with the sunnis, it is about creating a new class of sunnis from the tribal and political groups at low level and trying to completely reduce and eradicate the national level leadership of the sunnis. it struck me that the sunnis

that wanted to support the sense of there being a sunni community who could work together, those people are the ones that the iraqi government were planning to continue persecuting. and if they were going to involve sunnis in future government, the plan was really to create a new class of sunnis that they could deal with and also control. that is an extraordinarily dark vision for the next four years. my hope is, as i recently put in a piece with the institute, that this may be a catalyst. sometimes in iraq, you have to get right to the edge of a cliff or even take a step over the edge before people do the right thing. my feeling is if the electorate had voted heavily against maliki, this would all be clear-cut, and they did not. so let's not focus on replacing the man, let's focus on changing the policies.

>> are we convinced that in maliki's view, he cannot have both iranian support and american support? is there any way for maliki to think that there is a choice here? do we know that? >> i think he feels that he can have both. he knows he can have both, because he has had both for a long time. of course, we know the ironic fact of iraq is that often u.s. and iranian policy is pushed towards the same choices to make even if they do so for completely different motivations. so he feels like he can have both, and i would rather see far stronger american inclusion. to be honest, i think it is a bit of a zero-sum game in terms

of the more we do, the less of a vacuum they fill. you know from everything we have done at the institute that the iranians will always fill a vacuum and if we create this vacuum to an even greater extent than it exists today, we do not fill this gasping need for support right now. they can point to their track record in syria where they have been rather successful, and that will be very powerful to the maliki government. one final thing which was shocking to me personally when i was over there in march in baghdad, these are some of -- speaking to senior sunni leaders, i started to hear things that i had not heard before, such as -- do you think we should go to iran and negotiate? do you think -- if they are going to run every thing, shouldn't we just finally make our peace with it? i heard that from some leaders i never believed i would hear that

from. because they were starting to vote with their face. >> ok, thank you very much. next -- >> ok -- can we expect any support at all from any of our allies, britain and france? do the saudis have any role to play here? >> jim, what do you think? allies? >> allies -- well, we saw what happened with the brits in syria. it would be a further competition -- the president has talked in a speech about this is a regional issue, and he is right, and he needs to coordinate with and have support from the sunni allies.

that means turkey, jordan -- he did not say sunni allies, he said friends, but we know he is talking about turkey, jordan, and the gulf states. and that means saudi arabia. in the policy watch yesterday, foreign policy picked it up on the issue of how the saudi leadership sees this. to some degree, and i have had experience with some of the top leadership in saudi arabia and can attest to this, they see things in a very stark sunni, shia, control of the middle east way. not everybody thinks that way. the leader of jordan does not think that way. others do not think that way. many of the sunni arabs do not think that way in iraq.

so the saudi's, on the other hand, are extraordinarily worried about the al qaeda threat. you see how actively they combated in yemen, directly and indirectly, through helping us, and now they will have a major al qaeda presence on their border. so welcome to the war on terror. >> dave pollock? >> thank you. i wanted to just pick up on a number issue. i think aaron said that there were 7000 to 10,000 isis fighters. is that a pretty solid estimate? is it possible that, because of this momentum, several of you put it that they will pick up lots of new recruits, either by intimidation or by cash bonuses or by a deal or whatever and the next few days even?

thank you. >> yeah, a number of analysts believe that it is sort of in the 7000 to 10,000 range. the majority of those are probably actually in syria. i believe probably about 5000 of those are actually inside of syria. so maybe 2000 to 3000 are in iraq. in the past week, they have had some prison breaks again, and that has let out a couple thousand individuals. whether these individuals are just criminals or whether they were previously in the group or whether they are just in prison for political reasons, you know, there are stories that some of them have joined up with isis. it is definitely possible that more people will join up. plus, people do not want to get their heads lopped off.

if somebody does not necessarily agree with the ideology, it there being protected and not being killed, you could see people joining up. >> so it is this 2000 to 5000 force that is marching, marching and taking town after town after town? >> there are also baathists and other forces as well. >> there was a small flying columns of people from hindu and spain that were carrying the flags. >> yes, sir? right behind you. >> i am from the center for middle east policy at the brookings institution.

i wanted to ask the panel, the head of a force said he runs iran's iraq policy. he no doubt is obviously probably in baghdad. i wanted to ask if the pace of these developments reveal that he may be not as strong as he is projected to be or that this is a one-time fluke that basically caught everybody? >> i will take that question. he, solomani, by 2004 to 2005, they concluded we were not out of iran or iraq, they ran an economy of force operation because they had bigger fish to fry with the internal situation, nuclear account, and with syria.

and spreading the revolution in various shia areas. he bears a lot of the responsibility for this. a, because he was the guy who did not press people who he urged to play roles to reach out to the sunni population. i was always surprised about that because, generally, iran is careful in its policies towards iraq. it has not told iraqis to stop oil production. you're making possible the sanctions against iran, which is exactly what is happening. they are very careful and reasoned and prudent in what they ask of their friends, which is not always what the american government does.

nonetheless, the core goal of iran and iraq, as far as i understand it, apart from not having an american army poised to go across the border, is not to have iraq fall apart and jihadists from one direction and a turkish-kurdish alliance in another. that is what that guy has delivered. somebody should be asking questions about how he has handled his account. >> i know we are going to lose mike shortly, so i will ask him first about the kurdish-turkish angle of this. mike, you laid out a couple of possible routes that the kurds may go. what do you think is the most likely of these alternatives you laid out? jim, you made reference to the

turkish conundrum right now because of its people being held hostage. broadly speaking, do you expect the turks to be an assertive actor in this sort of squeezing of isis, working perhaps with the united states in this effort? mike? jim? >> it's very hard to find them exactly how the turks view radical islamist groups like al