units and i think it's fair to say that -- that we didn't expect for them -- for those units to not have stood up to the threat. we didn't -- i don't think -- we certainly didn't expect that level of performance. but again, the president said over the near term we're going to look for ways to help them break the momentum and then we'll do that. >> do you have any concern that perhaps some of the iraqi commanders may have been feeding information to isil or undermining the performance of the units? >> i've not seen any information in that regard, no. >> admiral, as we know, the original iraqi army under saddam hussein was disbanded soon after the u.s. invasion of march 2003. a new army was totally reconstituted and trained over the subsequent years.

is the response of iraqi security forces in the last week or so in mosul or other areas, is that kind of a poor commentary on the training that the united states provided to iraqi security forces? >> absolutely not, no. >> why not? >> when we left iraq in 2011, we left iraqi security forces at a level of competency, particularly on counterterrorism, that we believed was appropriate to the threats that they faced. and i would remind you, not that i probably don't need to, but a lot of -- a lot of blood and treasure that went into giving the iraqis that opportunity. a lot of young men and women didn't come home, giving them that opportunity. and i know secretary hagel

believes that that is exactly what we did, but that was three years ago and to some -- to a degree, the iraqi government has to speak to the proficiency of their armed forces. yes, we have a small group that's stayed in the embassy to help advise and assist but it's not an overt active training regimen. we got them to what we believed was an appropriate level of competency in 2011. obviously, the threat's changed, too, clearly. but as i said earlier, this is a sovereign country, these are sovereign armed forces and while we're going to tee up options for the president to consider for a near-term break in this momentum, ultimately over the long term, this is the responsibility of iraq, iraq's government, iraq's people and their security forces. yeah?

>> did u.s. have requested the iraqi government some sort of inventory or assessment of the equipment that was seized by these people? and how important this could be in order to prepare -- >> i'm not aware of any inventory we've asked. as i understand it, the iraqi government is investigating the events of the last couple of days and as i understand it, they're looking into the scope of captured equipment and systems that belong to the iraqi government, but i wouldn't prejudge how that's going to come out. >> is there enough intelligence now to provide some aerial support? >> i don't understand the question. >> if the person orders some support to control the advance of the people, do you have

enough intelligence to avoid massacres -- >> let's not get into hypotheticals right now. i don't think that's very helpful at this point. yes? most of your policies in iraqnistan are based on models. >> how can you ensure people of afghanistan also the u.s. that -- when you withdraw the troops? >> i think the premise is wrong. the decisions in afghanistan are not built on an iraq model. there's no iraq model. this is a completely different situation. the president has made some decisions about what our force presence will look like in afghanistan after the end of this year, assuming that we get a signed bilateral security agreement and what the mission would look like in both size

and complexity over the next two years. i fail to see a comparison to iraq in this regard and i would remind you that we had remained open to discussing a follow-on presence in iraq assuming we could get the same sort of agreement, legal protection for our troops which the iraqi government was not able to produce. >> what steps are you going to take to ensure the forces are strong enough. twoeers in afghanistan to defend any kind of taliban attack? >> we can stand on the record of our performance over the last two to three years in terms of helping to develop the competency of afghan forces which are in the lead right now and doing quite well. if you need proof, two back and the security of the elections that just occurred. nothing changes about our commitment to that and the nato support mission post 2014, when the combat mission ends, is all

about furthering their competency and their capability and as the president made clear, we're committed to executing that. >> the iraq forces that you running away from fighting against the islamic forces, right? >> three years after our mission ended in iraq. we believed then and i'll say it again, that when we left iraq, we left with iraqi security forces that were competent to the threat that they were facing. that threat has evolved over three years and frankly the iraqi security forces have changed over three years. the iraqi government should be able to speak to their organization, their manning, their resourcing and their training and equipping of their armed forces over the last three years. we're going to provide options to the president to see if we can't help break this momentum in the near term, but over the long term this is an iraqi government challenge and threat

to meet. and as i said, as we said back then, the best safeguard is for continued commitment by iraqi leaders to resolve their differences through peaceful politics and inclusive government and i think it's fair to say that that process is far from mature right now. i'm sorry, mick. you had you arm up a lot. >> the president said it, you repeated in just about every one of your answers, break the momentum. momentum can easily be regained, so are we talking about a long-term military commitment here? >> i'm not going to -- i think the president was clear -- >> what does it mean to break the momentum? stop them from shooting today, tomorrow, next week, then we stop whatever systems we're going to provide? >> i think we just need to -- we need to let this decision making process work its way through, mick.

we're providing options to the president. the president, the commander-in-chief is going to make decisions based on the options that he's provided and it's not all -- it's a whole interagency national security team that are reviewing options for the president's consideration. it's not all about the military. i think the president was clear about what his near-term objective is and we're going to provide options that help achieve that objective. >> it sounds like the u.s. is making a commitment -- would make a commitment to, in fact, support the iraqi government for some period of time in any one of these advancements, reforms that they plan to pursue but in the meantime the enemy forces here, the militants, just aren't going to pick up and leave. >> we're committed to helping achieve the president's objectives and i'm going to leave it at that.

yeah. >> can you say whether -- i've seen some reports that in addition to the isis force there's some other former insurgent groups that are adding to the momentum of this campaign. do you have any evidence at this point that the threat is multifaceted beyond this one particular organization? >> well, look, it's not a monolithic organization. extremist groups rarely are. i don't have any particular insights into their makeup and their manning. clearly there's a lot of foreign fighters involved here. to lida's question about the numbers, it's a fluid number and it's not a hierarchal organized nation state force. and it matters less to us what kind of i.d. card they're carrying or who they think they belong to and more about what

they're doing and what we can do to help iraq's security forces again in the near term. richard? >> is this now a civil war? >> look, what we have is an armed militant group and network threatening the internal security of iraq and i'm not going to put bumper stickers on it. i think everybody is aware of the threat being posed to the iraqi people by these guys and again we're all -- we're committed to doing what we can in the near term. dale? >> does the pentagon have any information you could share it with us, who is funding, who is financing isis? and do you agree with a lot of analysis here in washington, d.c. mainly some think tanks saying that religious movement in saudi arabia are behind funding isis. what could you say to that? >> i don't have a lot of insight

into the way they're funded and supported but clearly as i said at the outset, they are funded, they are getting support, they have resources and i'm not in a position now to quantify or clarify where it's all coming from. and again, back to richard's question. it matters -- what matters is what they're doing inside iraq and that's what our focus is on. yeah, in the back. >> do you have confidence in the iraqi security forces' ability to hold baghdad? and do you have to break the -- >> i'll let prime minister maliki speak for his forces and their capability in and around baghdad. clearly we have a very fast moving dynamic situation, that the whole national security team is focused on and that's -- that's the spirit in which the option, from a military perspective, that we're -- that we're proposing for the

president's consideration. but let's focus on what we need to do right now and i'd rather not hypothesize about what the iraqi security forces will or will not do. as i said earlier, certainly we were -- i'll just say, we were surprised and disappointed by the poor performance of some iraqi security force units there up in the north. i mean, i'd be less than honest if i said that that performance instilled a lot of confidence. it didn't. maliki for the the militaryide in led toe areas that has their poor performance and on baghdad, specifically, there are americans there, so what are we doing, what are you doing to protect the americans

specifically at the embassy? >> this isn't about blaming anybody, justin. i think i've made it clear that there's a lot of factors, i think, have played into where the iraqi security forces are three years after our departure. that's interesting history but we have to focus on what we can do in the near term to help the iraqi security forces meet this threat. on your second question, we know that there are many americans in iraq and certainly we have an operational embassy there in baghdad. that embassy is still operational. there's been no request by the state department for -- to move those americans out of the country and that's obviously for our colleagues at state to speak to. luis? >> i have two questions. one on this topic and another one. yesterday, there was video that

came out on social media showed very long line of prisoners that have been be captured i guess by isis in tikrit. the reports today that half of those numbers, maybe 1700 of them, were killed in a mass killing. do you have any information to support that information that there was a mass killing of shiite soldiers who had been captured by isis? >> i do not. >> second question. bowe bergdahl returned to the united states last night, around the same time yesterday, there was also a news report that cited two letters that were supposedly written by bergdahl while he was under captivity. do you have any information to verify that those letters were legit? >> i cannot confirm the authenticity of the letters. i mean, we're aware of the news reports about the letters but i

of them. barbara? >> you gave up the opportunity, when asked, to say that this department believes iraqi forces can hold baghdad. you didn't -- you wouldn't answer that. you said you'll let the prime minister speak for that. i'd like to ask again, does the united states military think the iraqi military -- does this department, does secretary hagel think iraqi forces can hold baghdad? >> i didn't give up not to answer, i take every opportunity i can not to answer your questions. look, i'm simply -- we -- >> it's a serious question. >> i know it is, barb. i'm trying to answer it. i'll try it, again. the question about his force's ability to defend baghdad is a question that he and the iraqi government are best able to answer. clearly -- clearly, they are

facing a significant threat and clearly not every unit in the iraqi security forces have risen to meet that threat. and it's not lost on anybody here that the threat is real, which is why the commander-in-chief has asked the military leadership here in the pentagon, the secretary of defense, to provide him some options to review. that's what we're focused on right now and then whatever the commander-in-chief decides, should it include military options to assist them in breaking the momentum that isil clearly has, we'll execute those and then if there's a decision and should there be, when there is, we'll speak to that at the appropriate time but i'm -- they are clearly a force facing a threat and again, not all of them uniformly have certain

places -- let's call it like it is -- have met that threat capably. >> is the u.s. military making any preparations or moving any forces in case the state department does request an embassy evacuation? also, who was moving these contractors that were in northern iraq to other places? do you have any info about that? >> on your first question, look, all regional commanders have assets at their disposal, particularly our central command commander has assets and resources should evacuations be required in any country which falls under his purview. and we have standing plans to conduct those missions should they be required but we're not there yet. and i would also remind you that when we're talking about noncombatant evacuations, the state department makes those

decisions, and military assets are not always first tool of choice for that so general austin has resources and capabilities at his disposal should they be required. there's no such request for that or requirement for it right now. contractors in bilad, they are contractors and my understanding is -- and i don't want to speak for the company for which they work -- but my understanding is that the company is arranging for their departure from the bilad air base and i would refer you to them to speak to how they're doing it. it is not a u.s. government mission. tony? >> you painted the portrait of the isis as not hierarchal, not state military, yet a significant threat. you don't know the numbers, the numbers are fluid, but in the thousands. how does that complicate military options? it doesn't seem like they have, quote, a center of gravity that

air strikes could take out or break the momentum? how does the fact that they're fluid and non-state and in the thousands versus the 600,000 iraqi military force, how does that complicate the options? >> i think the options that are being prepared by the building will cover, as i said at the outset, a wide range of military capabilities. and yes, one of the capabilities that we are tasked to provide options for would be kinetic strikes, which can be incredibly effective and powerful when done the right way to achieve objectives. i'm not going to get ahead of, though, decisions that the commander-in-chief hasn't made yet. i'm just not going to prejudge that. so, look, you're right, they're not, as i said, they're not a nation state army but clearly

they are interested in geographic gains, as well, and we've seen that happen. and, again, i think there's a whole swath of military capabilities that could be useful depending on what decisions the president wants to make. >> gaddafi had a standing army >> gaddafi had a standing army of regiments we went after, set piece army. this doesn't seem like a set piece force that you could apply traditional -- >> no, they are not. but iraqi security forces are, that is an army and again, whatever the thrust of whatever options would be to assist the iraqi security forces in meeting this threat. i think the president's been clear about his intent with that, in that regard, to help,

in the near term, to help break the momentum of isil and to assist iraqi security forces as they continue to meet the threat. >> planning for unilateral air strikes by the united states but in coordination with combined -- >> whatever we would do would be in coordination with the iraqi government and the iraqi security forces and certainly, you know, at the request of the iraqi government. but again, i don't want to get into a lot of hypotheticals or chase the rabbit hole here of exactly what options. our job is to provide the commander-in-chief options. that's what we do, every single day, all over the world, that's what we're doing now. the commander-in-chief has to make the decisions. >> is that unmanned, unarmed i.s.r. or manned i.s.r.? can you say that? >> i'm just going to say that we're intensifying this week our i.s.r. support. i.s.r. support to the iraqi security forces, and i'm not

going to qualify it any further than that. >> i'd like to take another crack at breaking momentum. >> go ahead. >> again, what does that mean? does that mean simply preventing the militants from taking down baghdad? or does it mean reversing the gains that they have made so far? >> mick, i think it's not helpful at this early stage, before the president has even made any decisions, to go into great detail in describing precisely what capabilities will be applied and to what tactical effect. i think, again, he was very clear, in the near term, we're going to try to help the iraqi security forces break this momentum, this momentum that isil has clearly built, in just the last several days. and i think that's what the focus of the planners here in

the pentagon and what secretary hagel is focused on. and we'll leave it at that. >> it implies this is not a short-term fix. it sounds like you're committing to a long-term solution. >> what we have been committed to in the long term, since we left iraq in -- since the combat mission in iraq ended, is a long-term strategic partnership with iraq and iraq security forces. and iraq security forces that are competent and capable of defending their people, defending their territory, defending their country. clearly they're under strain and threat right now and so again the president was clear that -- that we have an interest in helping them in the near term combat this very real threat. but over the long term and i'll go back to -- we said it in 2011, over the long term, what really needs to happen inside iraqi security forces and inside the government is an inclusive

peaceful political process that allows for the competency and capability of the iraqi security forces to be sustained. there's been some challenges in the last few years with respect to that. and, again, that's something that -- that problem, that issue, is something the iraqi government needs to solve. ok, thanks everybody, appreciate it. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute] >> at a book promotion appearance at george washington university in washington, d.c., former secretary of state hillary clinton was asked what the u.s. should do about the growing violence in iraq. >> but i think that it's also imperative that maliki be presented with a set of conditions, if you are even to discuss seriously any kind of

military support for the fight against the jihadists, and that's a delicate and difficult task for our government because we certainly don't want to fight their fight because you'd be fighting for a dysfunctional, unrepresentative, authoritarian government. and there's no reason on earth that i know of that we would ever sacrifice a single american life for that. [applause] it is a, however, serious potential crisis with broad regional and even global consequences. >> we'll show all of former secretary clinton's remarks tomorrow at 8:30 p.m. eastern time as part of "book tv" on

c-span 2 and we'll show you her book signing appearance tomorrow live at 11:00 a.m. next, a discussion about the situation in iraq hosted by the washington institute for near east policy. then a discussion on u.s. border security and after that, hearing withsight homeland security secretary jay johnson. >> the washington institute held a panel discussion analyzing the escalating violence in iraq. formers included the u.s. ambassador to iraq, james jeffery. an hour and 20 minutes. >> a good afternoon.

>> good afternoon. welcome to the washington institute. i am the director of the institute. thank you very much for joining us on short notice. this is an event we wish we were not convening at the institute. an event we called on short notice to address the issues of the day. we titled this "iraq's dire situation." my own view is it is an understatement. churchill might have said that this is a debacle wrapped in a tragedy inside of a catastrophe. even that might be only a bit approaching the reality of the situation facing the iraqi

people and more broadly security and stability and american interests. i'm very pleased that we at the washington institute have a deep bench of expertise to bring to bear on understanding the situation in iraq and more broadly today and in offering suggestions to address the situation between the government of iraq and the united states. the united states and its allies around the region. and the messaging from washington throughout the middle east. and i'm very pleased to recognize the ambassador from iraq here today. thank you for joining us. i know you have a lot on your plate and i'm delighted you are with us today. let me introduce our paneslists. and then we will get down to business. first, i'm pleased to introduce jim jeffery. jim is our distinguished visiting fellow here at the

institute. jim, of course, served the united states with distinction ambassador in baghdad. in addition to service as ankara earlier in ambassador in albania. he was ambassador in albania. he was the deputy national security advisor. he has a lifetime of experience in american foreign policy and diplomacy. based on the original foundation of military experience that harkens all the way back to vietnam. perhaps not a metaphor for today's events, but perhaps they are. jim will offer insight into that. speaking later into our program sitting to jim's right is aaron zelen. aaron is the washington institute's richard borough fellow and there are exceedingly few people in or

outside of government who have followed the development of what president obama now called isil. what some other experts call isis. but it is the same radical extremist terrorist group that we're talking about. and aaron through his really minute, detailed exploration of these groups brings extraordinary value added to our understanding of what's going on in iraq and syria. and then joining us from orliey airport in paris is michael knights. the institute's lay for international fellow. who is -- i think as this audience knows, one of the finest observers of political military issues in iraq. has been a voice of incisive

and insightful analysis on this situation going back many, many years. i think because he is under some technical constraints, that we are going to begin our program with mike, then turned to jim, and then to aaron. so, mike. if we could just address that noise. mike, the floor is yours. >> thanks very much. i have certainly transmitted from worse place than this. i should be with you for the hour. i think you have a graphic that you're going to put up.

[no audio] thanks very much. background noise gone. if you look at this graphic -- and i apologize. >> one second. one second. >> just tell me when. >> i don't -- go ahead. >> testing. can you hear me ok now?

i will continue to speak. the map that you see in front of you gives some basic areas of control. the green area you can see is the unoccupiable kurdish areas. the large region in grey is the area that has collapsed. it may be isis in control, it may be local militants, it may be government forces. the lines on this map show a red line or an orange line, which was the forward edge of control just before the june crisis. now you see a light blue line, which is the current forward position. it demonstrates how they have moved forward along the entire disputed line. where you see the loss of

control end and, you see a thin corridor from samarra, where hopefully the tide will be stemmed, in the bottom of the map, the major logistical base for the destroyed units. as can be seen from this -- i will point out two things about the way the battlefield is evolving. first looking at strategic geometry. if you look at it, isis and mosul have great strategic depth in terms of the federal forces would have to travel, tremendous

strategic depth, 350 kilometers of contested terrain. but isis' west/east strategic depth to the east is narrow. the key things they want to hold onto is within very close striking distance of kurdish forces. this is how important it is to get the kurdish forces involved in the fight. the government has to come to the kurds with solutions on oil authority issues. baghdad has to make some compromises. we can all argue about the fine points later. for now, there is a bigger issue to deal with. the kurds are already fighting at a number of points on the map.

likewise, where the kurds moved forward to take control of these disputed areas, the iraqi army buffer between them and isis is now gone. they're taking casualties. you can see martyrdom statements coming up on social media sites. the kurds are in the fight. the kurdish leadership hate radical islamists. they suffered extensively from degradations in the past. they're not willing to have a

major isis control center within an hours drive from the economic capital of kurdistan. no successful emerging economy in the world has been able to have a huge al qaeda presence in a city of 1.8 million people and hours drive a way. the second brief observation of want to make is we need to pay a lot of attention to the moral dimension of this crisis. by my estimation, a full 60 of the iraqi army combat battalions cannot be accounted for. 60 out of the 243 cannot be accounted for, with all equipment lost. this is a mammoth refitting job to put these units back together and arm them properly for combat. this is an area where the u.s. will become the arsenal of democracy. no one likes the idea of having to refit the iraqi army again after the u.s. taxpayer did it the first time. this time iraq will be paying. one aspect of this is the refitting role.

as important as that, turning around a defeated army and enabling it to fight again, very military with a long tradition, a proud tradition. among arab countries, they're one of the best militaries. they have many proud achievements to point to, including the feet of the militia in 2008 and their part in the surge the defeated al qaeda in the first place. these points are laid out in great detail. it is one of the most difficult tasks you can imagine. it would not take them in the u.s. partners at the divisional level and above to insert some wisdom in to their ways the iraqi security can pick themselves up and dust themselves off and get back into

the fight to rid taking baby steps. feeding these units so that they can win small successes, wind -- win small, easy battles. the final thing i will say as well is that the provision of u.s. military assistance on the ground is something that we need to think very seriously about, as i'm sure the president is. ethnic bullying of the kurds. if this is some of the very disruptive iraqi government policies can end, i i hope we all are willing to help out this long-standing ally.

if we put u.s. air power into iraq right now, it's not a silver bullet that will solve everything. put it would have tremendous moral effect in terms of supporting the iraqi military. they know what u.s. air power can do. it's a massive boost to them. whenever they know that there's some u.s. air power at their backs, ready to help them out if things get really, really tough. you don't need to use a lot of it. for it to have a tremendous amount of moral impact. and for people who say but how can we be sure where the strikes are getting targeted? don't we need people on the ground? i have to honestly say yes, we do. we do need joint special forces task force on the ground. it doesn't need to be massive. but we do need eyes on the ground. when we turned around the libyan regime's near destruction of the rebels at benghazi, when the french air strikes and other air strikes turned that around, that had enormous effect. ion on the grou. we do need eyes on the ground. when we turned around the libyan regimes near destruction of

benghazi and the french airstrikes and other airstrikes turn that around, that had enormous effect and there are many instances in iraq where i can imagine a little bit of air power going at very long way. we have already got boots on the ground in iraq. the people on the embassy -- i wish this boots on the ground phrase would leave our lexicon because it just doesn't mean anything. it is an excuse not to do something. we already have boots on the ground. use whatever legal conceit is required to get some u.s. advisers up to the forward headquarters and to get them on the from line. i will say this with a caveat. they could already be there right now. if it is not the case, it is something we should very seriously consider. space for one final comment. it is not hard at this stage to imagine iraq becoming syria. like falluja, just 35 miles from

baghdad international airport. it is not hard to imagine the iraqi government turning to somebody who has a proven track record of protecting their allies and that is the iranians. they have stabilized the regime's defense. it is unfortunate, but when i was in baghdad, in march, what i heard is that the iraqi government feels it needs to use some of the same formula that assad did and maybe some of the same help. so really, this is the time for a desperate lead to the u.s. government on behalf of the iraqis out there who are willing to fight. the u.s. needs to make a

credible gesture at this time. a credible gesture of military support right now. if we are using the withholding of military support to lean on the iraqi government to come up with a political deal, good. i hope there is the baseline determination underneath that to eventually do something to stabilize the situation. it cannot be a cosmetic half measure. there have been too many of them in recent years. we have to commit to the defense of iraq. we cannot leave iraq to isis or the iranians. those are my comments. >> jim, do you want to speak from the podium? >> i will speak from here. >> i put the map back up. >> the map is great. okay.

what i'm going to say is going to parallel much of what you said. thanks for coming here today. but two months ago, it seems like two years ago, when i was diverted from my main job looking at the middle east into ukraine, i wrote something saying that the crimean situation was the biggest challenge to the united states since 9/11, if not since the and of the cold war. i have changed my opinion. what is happening right now in iraq is the biggest challenge since 9/11, at least. here is why. back in september, president obama addressed the un's general assembly. he said, in the middle east, there are four critical issues that would require all elements of american power, the euphemism for military force. securing the oil lines, combating international terror,

standing by our allies and partners, and weapons of mass destruction. other than the last, at least for the moment, they all three of the others are very much in play right now. the largest concentration of al qaeda we have ever seen anywhere is in this combined area of western iraq and on into syria. they're the nastiest of all of them. secondly, we have already seen oil prices spike. iraq is the second-largest exporter of oil in opec. the iea estimates it could go up to 6 million barrels of production per day, two thirds of what saudi arabia on sundays produces. this is not a recipe for stability. in all kinds of ways i will not get into, if there is instability in iraq,

particularly if we have no government worthy of the name in baghdad, you will month have a -- you will not have a whole lot of development in the oil sector anywhere, except perhaps in kurdistan. our interests are at stake. the president realizes that. let's try to take a look at the fact that he is being briefed on. i will keep it short and i will keep it to what general casey used to call the major muscle movements. speed is of the essence. a lot of the things that i and everybody in this audience could say about iraq are not important at this point. there are only a few things that are really crucially important by the major actors in the next few days. there are six. most importantly, this isil. we will hear more about what

makes them up. they are facing a decision. they have ceased almost all of the sunni arab areas of iraq. the question is, do they carry out their threat and go after baghdad? they certainly can. i know the area to the north and south of baghdad. it still is an area where al qaeda has always had a presence. it is a mixed sunni-shiite area. they have already seized two of the towns this morning in the province to the north and the northeast of baghdad. they could pretty much cut it off. the problem is even if they cannot take the city, known think they can come of the question is, how do you get fuel, food, water, electricity, and all the other things a country, a capital, five or 6

million people needs if they are surrounding you? i'm not speaking theoretically. in 2004, with 130,000 american troops in country, that was the situation we faced some days in baghdad in june, july, august. being hit by the al-qaeda people. it was very tough, even though we had overwhelming air power. they need to make a decision. we will have to see what they're going to do. that is the most important thing. if they do decide to stay in the sunni areas, we will have a classic counterinsurgency. the things mike laid out the need to be done for reconciliation, all true. american troops are not going to liberate the sunni areas of iraq. that will be kurds, sunnis, shia or nobody.

we will provide the logistics, training, and firepower in the months ahead. i certainly would not recommend it. if they are not going to fight their own country then we shouldn't on the ground. because it would be bloody. that's a long-term question, as history goes. if isil is pushing toward baghdad, the president is faced with a very different situation. we have americans right in the middle of this thing. the government, the iraqi army, and some of the shia militias are in this mix, if they can hold, maintain the cohesion, use their vastly superior firepower and extraordinarily large number

of superior troops to hold the territory where the families lived, then we won't have to worry about the siege, they will be able to push these people back and keep the roads open. it will be messy, but they can do it. that is a big if, folks. from what we have seen in mosul and elsewhere. if they cannot, if isis decides to surround baghdad and if the authorities are not able to break that siege, i'm sure they are strong enough to avoid being overrun. a city of 6 million people is not going to be overrun by 5000 people, i'm almost sure of that. but, they may not be able to maneuver, use firepower effectively against people who are very good at this at this

time and the may find themselves essentially besieged. if you get through those two decision points, you get to the other four actors. the kurds are sitting on the green lines, the mixed areas. if there is danger anywhere a kurd is living, that is essentially what we have right now they have two other choices. they are on either side of mosul. there on either side of the fault line where isil is. you can exert tremendous military pressure on isil if they want to. if they see a total mess, disintegration, iranian control

to the south, they are out. they have talked about this for years, they have opened certain options. that is something to watch. they have decisions based upon these other decisions. the next actor is the iranians. if baghdad is besieged, if some of the cities that are so important to shia islam in the south are under threat, it is very hard to imagine the acting if somebody else does not act. the second to the last actor is the turk. they're in an awkward position because they have 80 people in mosul seized by the isil people. that puts limits on what they

can do. they are still in major actor with a major military capability. they have close ties to the kurds. watch them. the final actor is the united states. the most important. you just should the president. he said he would consult with congress to go over options. he ruled out ground forces. it that means major ground forces. there are already military advisers on the ground. he did not rule out airstrikes, but he did not rule it in what he said is, i cannot do anything militarily without a political process. going back to the first of the six actors, if isil stays in the sunni areas, that is an

intelligent, acceptable way to move forward. all they can do is provide aerial firepower for some of these ground forces. unless the ground forces show up for the fight, there is no since sense dropping bombs on these people. if we are facing either a siege of baghdad and almost certainly the iranians coming in in a big way, we have to act quick late just quickly. if he is saying he is going to leverage my decision to use force to get the best possible political deal, that is smart politics, smart diplomacy, and

more power to him. having spent years and set a rack to get this kind of deal of failed miserably -- inside iraq and get this deal and failed miserably, what he is telling us is that until that happens, the planes will stand and iaia is moving forward, then other actors are going to shape iraq and the middle east. that is the question that he is facing today. people will say well, you know, what are we going to hit with targets? the north vietnamese invaded on the easter offensive. it was exactly like 1975 when they overran the country. then the planes came. the f4 is, the b-52s come you could feel the ground rumble and every fiona me soldier -- vietnamese soldier could feel it. but by bit they held the ground.

by the paris peace accords, all but one small town had been taken back in the country. we have forward observers. nonetheless, it was the use of military power, it was the use of real power, sometimes not knowing exactly where the enemy was that turned the tide. in libya, many times we did not have ground reserves. what we were dealing with was cars of mobile army troops. what we are dealing with our pickup trucks of isis personnel rolling around at 30 miles per hour. there are vulnerable to airstrikes. i will stop there. thank you very much. >> thank you. thanks for coming out and for everybody watching online. i am going to be talking about isis, islamic state of iraq, and get into who they are.

what they've been up to. this did not necessarily come out of nowhere, even though it is sort of being portrayed as if it has. there has been a reemergence of isis, which originally is the group that was in control of. they have changed their name and rebranded over recent years. they started reemerging in april 2013. this is when isis decided to extend its control beyond iraq and into syria. this is also the time when they officially broke away from al qaeda itself. al qaeda in early february 2014 confirmed isis was no longer part of the organization. while the movement and surge did push them back, they were not completely defeated. there was still at least 300 people that were killed per month in iraq from around 2008 until april 2013.

what was important about syria was they were able to get resources and money and fighters back into iraq when operating inside of syria. one of the things we have seen in the past six months or so is that there had been a return of foreign fighters into the iraqi arena. many of these originally designed to syria to fight against the assad regime. isis unplugged them and brought them into the iraq so divide as well. since april 2013, we have seen violence rise 3.5 times more than what we saw on average in the previous four and a half years. in addition, one of the things that helped them out is they had a prison break last july at abu ghraib were at least 500 individuals were released from prison. some of these guys were arrested and detained during the surge. many of these had experiences which further provided more levels of competency to isis' operation. of course, we saw earlier this

year that they were able to take over falluja and parts of ramadi. another aspect of what isis has been doing that we did not say last decade and is one of the reasons why people -- the backlash against them originally was they had a hearts and minds strategy, whether it is providing food, medication, religious classes, outreach to tribal figures, as well as allowing people in the safaa movement to repent and join their cause about getting -- without getting killed. therefore, more and more victories have raised the level of prestige for this organization. isis operatives now operate in both syria and iraq and view the border as nothing more than going from one province in their islamic state to another, not going from one nation say to the other. after mosul was liberated, and there are other islamist factions involved in the

takeover, when isis takes over an area, they view it as now under their sovereign control. therefore, every individual within the territory must pledge allegiance to the leader of the group. if you do not go along with the program, you essentially a death wish. this is the backdrop of how they rule. yesterday morning, they released a charter of the city to residents which highlights more prohibitions on actions and things people can potentially do. if you steal, you will get your hand chopped off. you have to perform all five daily prayers on time. drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes are forbidden. carrying non-isis flags and/or weapons is illegal. all shrines and graves will be destroyed since isis views them as polytheist. and women must wear the full body clothing. sunnis within the town, if they worked within the government and institutions, if they repented,

they would be fine and would not be executed. we also already have a case study of how isis does rule in syria. i am going to highlight some of the ways they have been in charge, in addition to the criminal aspects. it is not just all terror. when isis took over a city in syria, they started setting up by putting up a lot of billboards in the city that had themes related to jihad and sharia. other themes related -- they tried to reach out to local notables and tribal figures because they wanted to stay off any potential backlash that could happen in the future, and the same way we saw last decade in iraq when there was an uprising against isis in the mid-2000's and what most people do not realize is that isis' operations are highly sophisticated and they do have a bureaucracy themselves, too. i will go through how they have

been governing these areas in syria. in terms of the law and order side, they have sharia courts. this is where they can throw down their rulings related to somebody getting their hand chopped off for thievery are people getting executions for apotheosizing. we have seen a number of individuals getting crucified, which i'm pretty sure not many people have seen in the modern era. they have a police service that goes around. they have a consumer protection authority which looks at the different markets and places where you can get food in local places in syria and decides whether a food product is edible or not, essentially, in the same way that the fda would do something. they also have a vigilante aspect of their law and order side where they have burned cigarettes and destroyed tombs. we saw one of the more larger tombs or shrines in iraq being destroyed earlier this year. in terms of public works, they

helped build a new market. they have an electrical office which helps train and repair electrical services throughout the town. they have had a lot of road were done in some areas where they have rehabilitated roads, whether it is in terms of putting up plants in the medians, and they have also been able to continue operating the dam. they have set up an office to provide money for the needy. they claim that this helps also with farmers and their harvests. they are now conducting a post office. on the more ideological side of things, they have a media outlet where they pass out dvd's of video releases they put out online. they have a truck which roves around with a lot of different things related to islam and their ideology. they stop in some areas to talk to children and adults to try to teach them at their interpretations of islam.

they set up a number of religious schools for boys and girls. if you memorize the koran, you can get a certificate. they have also provided kid fun days where kids can play around on these inflatable slides and moonwalk type of devices, as well as have food and eating contests. in addition, for older members of society, they have created sessions for imams and teachers to be trained. more regular social services, they have helped run bread factories and provided fruits and vegetables for many people. they have even set up a food kitchen for the needy. they also set up an office for orphans to help register them and then hopefully place them with a family. while the taliban has been very paranoid about vaccinations after the cia operation against

osama bin laden, there have been vaccination programs put out by isis. they even have a cub scouts program which is far more worrying because you have children from the ages of around six to 14 that are now in these housing places in iraqa and that then put into training camps. they are essentially halving child soldiers being set up. so what is next for isis? this is sort of what the potential could be. this is what we're seeing in syria, but this is what the potential could be in iraq now that they have taken over some areas. it is likely they will try to consolidate their strength with the new money from the mosul central bank, and that far exceeds any money that osama bin laden had. there are rumors that they have been buying off people inside of mosul. this will be used to reinforce the front in syria. as many people know, earlier this year, a bunch of rebel groups started an uprising with isis and pushed them out of idlib. it is likely they will use this to try and push it back into aleppo and idlib.

my question is -- are they stretched thin? they have 7000 to 2000 people, but they span from aleppo all the way to mosul. many people do not like their ideology and do not want to live through this. obviously, the type of penalties that they pursue has created a backlash. we have already seen statements by some tribal members in ramadi and mosul about how they will stand up to the maliki government and isis itself. the islamic faith is a reality. it could prove difficult and provide more ability to consolidate the state. for jihadists worldwide, victories registered by isis in the perception that the so-called will of god is on its side against enemies will only enhance the prestige of joining

the group and furthering its goals. this is the state of isis right now. it is a lot different than what al qaeda was up to last decade, but it is a very sophisticated and organized organization. this will be more difficult to dislodge than anything we have seen before. thank you. >> thank you for those sobering remarks. mike, are you with us? >> yes, i am. >> very good. let me open up a discussion session by asking you if you can bring us up to date on the report concerning iranian military involvement. who it is, where they are, what they seem to be doing? >> it is very difficult to come

up with categorical information on this without being in country and seeing it with your own eyes. i spend a lot of time studying the militias in iraq and meeting them on many occasions, quite unnervingly. but what i found was that they were -- let's just say, the iranians have been very nervous since 2007 about risking irgc offices directly inside iraq. now, since the u.s. left in 2011, i am sure some of that fear or trepidation is gone. we have seen senior officers killed on the other side of the border over in syria. it is very likely they have got military advisers operating in many ways however like to see u.s. officers operating. you know, one thing is for sure, wherever you have got these u.s.

officers operating, you are very unlikely to have iranian officers operating in the same places. if anything, that is a good reason for having u.s. officers on the front line or at least at the front headquarters to ensure that there are some eyes on what is actually happening. but around samarra, samarra is critical to this. i would recommend to you the work from the institute on shia islamist groups in iraq and syria. samarra is a shrine city, a place where a shrine was blown up in february 2006, providing a final spot in the civil war that lasted for two plus years. isis tried to overrun it on june 5 but failed, thank god. about 800 meters short of the shrine. they tried again after the major collapse in security forces, and that is one of those nightmare scenarios that everyone in coalition forces and analysts

have been talking about for years. what if they take out that shrine again? just as shia islamist militias from iraq have been defending the shrines in syria, in damascus, there have been reports of defending shrines in samarra. they will do the same in northern baghdad and in karbala. where there is one of these iranian-backed shia militia actors, essentially the iraqi version of lebanese hezbollah, there will often be an irgc trainer or advisor not that far behind. >> jim, we just heard mike say iranians are probably sending irgc guys doing what he would have expected americans to be doing but in a different context.

you have been on both sides of this. in baghdad, trying to push the political reconciliation, and in the situation room offering advice to presidents on how to and what sort of military force to bring to bear. can you give us a little glimpse into what you think is happening, both angles here? what are we telling specifically to maliki? the timeframe the president announced today was a matter of days. is it possible to see the type of political reconciliation that he spoke about in 72 hours? on the military side, what sort of preparations do you expect are going on right now for the type of action that you would like to see? >> when you mine the statement

in bits and pieces and you put it all together, there is pretty good outline of what the president will be doing over the next few days. what he is saying is he's going to move assets into place. we just heard that an aircraft carrier has moved into the gulf. he talks about intelligence. that is both -- everything from analysts diverting their focus on this to satellites to drones, the entire network of u.s. intelligence systems will be turned on to this situation at every level. we worked very, very, very good at this when dealing with al qaeda from the period roughly 2004 through 2011, and there is a lot of that reserve capability there. nonetheless, he will also be preparing the military for whatever contingency the president gives a green light to. it is not unwise or unexpected for the president to link the

situation with political developments and re-conciliation. what he really means is we are not going to know for a few days, but it would be on rise unwise for him to reveal this by saying -- i can say this from the outside -- we want the maliki to be a new government and a different government and take a different attitude towards the kurds and sunnis. but if isis surrounds baghdad, we're going to hit them anyway. he cannot say that, even if he has decided to do that. i have no indication he has decided to do that. because you always want to leverage what you are doing for an ally or friend with what you want that ally or friend to do for you, particularly when it is in that ally or friend's own interest. we have spent 11 years talking not just to maliki, but to every political leader, all the

political leaders, that if they do not hang together, they are going to hang separately. that is what we are seeing before us today. it is good advice that he has given. in terms of the specifics, vice president biden called maliki yesterday. i am sure having been in some of these calls that the u.s. message was delivered with vigor and with a certain bluntness, and that is good under these conditions. i am sure it included a very strong admonition that maliki has to change his approach towards sectarian issues and towards his political domination of the military. it is one of the reasons the military melted away. secondly, it also would have included the specifics of what america might offer and under what conditions. we do not know that yet. as i said, it is good that the president is not signaling, both to the enemy but also before he talks to congress, what exactly he is going to do. it is also good that he ensures that maliki feels under pressure to do things in return.

again, this is most important, as the president said, in the days ahead if we are facing a surge into the baghdad area, into karbala and the south. that could lead to an extremely dramatic situation, including to our own personnel, and it could lead to a significant iranian intervention or a significant kurdish reaction. if isis is either slowed down themselves, and they are not eight-feet tall as we have seen in samarra, as we have seen with the kurds, people can stand up to them. it's not that many of them. they have momentum on their side, and that is important for the military, but once they are stopped, then people can hold their ground. it is possible that the iraqis will be able to hold her ground and the non-sunni-arab areas.

if that is so, we move to the other scenario. the white house has to be prepared for a longer struggle. remember, the president's statement yesterday was "a permanent presence of al qaeda in iraq and syria will not be tolerated." he has to think about how he is going to do this, along with his commitment to the american people not to but troops on the ground, by which he means 101st airborne, the first army division. they will be deluged by 1001 factoids and irrelevant ideas and other schemes that are instantly torment you. i cannot describe how painful this process is. >> thank you. and then aaron, to complete this circle, you followed isis for quite a long time. given the options they have in front of them, what are they most likely to do, go to baghdad? hold tight on current territory? what are the most likely to do? >> knowing isis and how they

have operated in the past and the excitement i have seen from all their followers and supporters online in the past week is that they are likely to have a big head and potentially overplay them selves in the coming days and weeks. whether they do that or not is obviously the question, but they stopped of past activities, it is likely that they will try and push because that is how they view the world. in addition, i suspect that there are already signs that some of the humvees and other types of military equipment that was all them take in mosul are already back in syria now. it is likely that they will use that as a new infusion in cash and weapons on their front. they will potentially push back into aleppo city. it is likely that, knowing them, they will try and push on both fronts in iraq and in syria. this probably could provide a great opportunity though to the syrian rebels differ the fight

against isis, because they are stretching themselves thin, as well as any forces in the iraqi arena, as well. >> thank you very much. i will turn to questions, starting with andrew right in the middle. >> thank you for great presentation, guys. we have had a lot of prescriptions from all three of you, particularly aaron and ambassador jeffrey on what to do in iraq, but it seems to me that a lot of this is coming out of syria. i mean, isis was born in iraq but metastasized in syria, then come out for a double or nothing game of whatever we have in front of us. we have an organization that does not recognize the boundary that have divided the middle east for over a century. so my question is, what do we do on the syria end of this equation, and how does it affect the debate we have seen recently with ambassador robert ford's calls to arm the sunni opposition in syria? thank you.

>> very quickly, we had a horrible syrian situation which threatened to do exactly this kind of game changing thing for a couple of years, and we did not do very much about it. it metastasized, and it is the mess we have now. we're going to have that mess tomorrow, next month, at least, and into the future, regardless of what we do or do not do. what is different right now is these guys are moving on a path that could be an immediate dramatic game changer to the entire middle east. so there is a difference in perspective. it is very hard to communicate this. i have been trying to do it for three days. the president tried to do it and was not completely clear. we have a longer-term problem of a wide swath of sunni, arab am a largely desert territory in the

middle of the levant that has been taken over by a terrorist group in syria, iraq, and other insurgent groups that are unhappy with the government. it is not really ungoverned because there are a variety of voices governing it, but many of them do not have our best interests at heart. it is a tremendous, complicated long-term problem that will require the president to get everybody lined up in the region, political solutions, reconsolidation, stability operations, and all of that, if we are willing to pay the price and engaged that thoroughly. i do not know. he is moving slowly in that direction. that is the longer-term problem. the immediate problem we have, and he seems to indicate this in his final remarks when answering a question -- the speech, as i said, if you mine it and sew it together, you can kind of get a sort of way forward. but in being asked a question

at the very end, then you basically hear him say, look, this is going to be a few days. i have to get my ducks in order. it comes closer to, he does realize that if isis moves on baghdad or some of these other areas, if the iranians threatened to move in in a big way, he may have to make some immediate decisions. that is how i would separate it. obviously, he knows, because he included it. he knows it is one front. he said, i cannot allow a permanent refuge, a permanent presence of isis, al qaeda, in iraq and syria. he knows it is a common front. how this fits with the battle but he also is waging, sort of, against assad, is a whole other question. >> ok, thank you. yes, in front here? >> thank you very much. this is one of the very few

events that i cannot find anyone to disagree with. you really have nailed the issues exactly right. thank you for the presentations. let's take us back to the other side, how iraqis view this. i think that is very important, because they are mainly interested in it. the ambassador quite rightly said that this has been the biggest challenge since 9/11. i would say this is the biggest challenge to the shia iraqis. 65% of the population since 1991. can the united states afford another perception of a betrayal by the united states, which means this time a permanent gift if iran comes to the rescue and the united states drags its feet, making conditions -- i would like to see the united states solve the situation, not the iranians or someone else, because that will be bad to the

cost to the iraqis into the united states. it is very important to address and for the administration to understand. >> ok, i will take the first stab at that. you hit on a very important point. for those of us -- you may remember, i apologized for 1991 publicly. here is the problem, and i am being very honest, folks -- the united states can essentially take almost any loss and live with it. that is what makes us such an ally for everybody. we can lose vietnam, and did, and live to fight another day in kosovo and in kuwait. so the short answer is, yeah, we can survive with the shia of iraq, feeling that we totally abandoned them. other people feel we totally abandoned them, tibetans and others. i am sure some others are not feeling too good about us

either. but we can move on, because that is the reality. there is another reality, you do this often enough, you develop a patent of supporting people, and then walking away from them and demanding that all the t's are crossed and the i's are dotted before you move and it will be a force more expensive than the next 10 militaries combined. then people will stop organizing themselves in our world differently, and we are not going to like that organization. so the shia have a vote, just like the tibetans and the crimeans and everybody else. in the sunni arabs have a vote. a lot of them are not happy with us abandoning them either. and the kurds are not too happy. >> yes, barbara?

we'll work our way around. >> thanks very much. thank you so much for doing this. my question is about maliki. can he be part of the solution? he has had eight years. he has done nothing but go after sunnis, kurds become increasingly paranoid, corrupt, appointing relatives. can he actually rise to the occasion? >> well, don't look at me -- [laughter] >> mike, what do you think? >> [inaudible] >> let's get the volume up here. >> i will be diplomatic because i travel to iraq quite frequently. first of all, you have to respect the election result, including perhaps a personal vote which is an indication that at least in baghdad, maliki put all the votes together. but that is ducking the question, i guess. if we look back over the last

four years, it has been a dismal failure. there are some bright spots. the relationship with kuwait, the oil production. but everything else has been a dismal failure. really it has been brought about by failures in the iraqi government, rather than how great the bad guys are. one has to wonder when we look back in 2018, 2014 to 2018, whether we see more of the same or whether we see a turnaround. as we saw during 2006 and 2010 -- that is the key for whoever leads iraq next. that is what they should be asking themselves. how are they going to be remembered? as the guy who lost it all or the guy who did whatever he had to do and dealt with whoever he had to deal with to keep it together? the maliki government, when i was there in march, key leadership explained exactly

what they were going to do in a third term. and some of it was encouraging. increasing support for technocrats with streamlined decision-making systems. a good way. not just talking about taking of the power for yourself civililding a real service. many ideas. but there is also real darkness at the heart of the vision for the next four years. if there is engagement with the sunnis, it is about creating a new class of sunnis from the tribal and political groups at low level and trying to completely reduce and eradicate the national level leadership of the sunnis. it struck me that the sunnis that wanted to support the sense of there being a sunni community who could work together, those people are the ones that the iraqi government were planning

to continue persecuting. and if they were going to involve sunnis in future government, the plan was really to create a new class of sunnis that they could deal with and also control. that is an extraordinarily dark vision for the next four years. my hope is, as i recently put in a piece with the institute, that this may be a catalyst. sometimes in iraq, you have to get right to the edge of a cliff or even take a step over the edge before people do the right thing. my feeling is if the electorate had voted heavily against maliki, this would all be clear-cut, and they did not. so let's not focus on replacing the man, let's focus on changing the policies. >> are we convinced that in maliki's view, he cannot have both iranian support and american support?

is there any way for maliki to think that there is a choice here? do we know that? >> i think he feels that he can have both. he knows he can have both, because he has had both for a long time. of course, we know the ironic fact of iraq is that often u.s. and iranian policy is pushed towards the same choices even if they do so for completely different motivations. so he feels like he can have both, and i would rather see far american influence. to be honest, i think it is a bit of a zero-sum game in terms of the more we do, the less of a vacuum they fill. you know from everything we have done at the institute that the iranians will always fill a vacuum and if we create this vacuum to an even greater extent

than is exists today, if we gasping nodeis torgasping need forsupport righd track record in syria where they have, frankly, been rather successful and that going to be rather powerful to the maliki government. one final thing which was shocking to me personally when i was over there in march in baghdad, these are some of -- speaking to senior sunni leaders, i started to hear things that i had not heard before, such as -- do you think we should go to iran and negotiate with them? to you think -- if they are going to run everything, shouldn't we just finally make our peace with them? i heard that from some leaders i never believed i would hear that from. because they were starting to vote with their face. >> ok, thank you very much. pollack?te and dave

murray, turn around. just talk. just talk. >> can we expect any support at all from any of our allies, britain and france? do the saudis have any role to play here? >> jim, what do you think? allies? >> allies -- well, we saw what happened with the brits in syria. it would be a further complication. the president has talked in his speech about this is a regional issue and he is royalty and he needs to -- he is right and coordinate with and have support from the sunni allies. jordan. turkey, jordan and particularly the gulf states and when you states youthe gulf start with saudi arabia.

dide was a piece that simon in the policy watch just yesterday and the foreign policy the issue of how the saudi leadership sees this. to some degree, and i have had experience with some of the top leadership in saudi arabia and can attest to this, they see things in a very stark sunni, shia, control of the middle east way. not everybody thinks that way. the leader of jordan does not think that way. manythough he doesn't have arabs in his country. many of the sunni arabs do not think that way in iraq. so the saudi's, on the other hand, are extraordinarily worried about the al qaeda threat. you see how actively they

combated in yemen, directly and indirectly, through helping us, and now they will have a major al qaeda presence on their border. province borders saudi arabia. so welcome to the war on terror. >> dave pollock? >> thank you. i wanted to just pick up on a number issue. i think aaron said that there were 7,000 to 10,000 isis fighters. is that a pretty solid estimate? is it possible that, because of this momentum, as several of you put it, that they will pick up lots of new recruits, either by intimidation or by cash bonuses or by zeal or whatever and the next few days even? thank you. >> yeah, a number of analysts believe that it is sort of in the 7,000 to 10,000 range.

the majority of those are probably actually in syria. they have been governing the era. i believe probably about 5000 of those are actually inside of syria. to 3,000 have been in iraq. in the past week, they have had some prison breaks again, and that has let out a couple thousand individuals. whether these individuals are just criminals or whether they were previously in the group or whether they are just in prison for political reasons, you know, there are stories that some of them have joined up with isis. c obviously i can't confirm it, being in washington. it is definitely possible that more people will join up. plus, people do not want to get their heads lopped off. if somebody does not necessarily with the iteology, if they are being protected and not killed, you can see people joining up.

>> so it is this 2000 to 5000 that is marching hundreds of kilometers and taking town after town after town? >> there are also baathists and other forces as well. it also helps that the iraqi up forts didn't stand much of a fight. >> there was a small flying columns of people from hindu and spain that were carrying the flags. >> yes, sir? right behind you. sam, go ahead. sorry. >> i am from the center for middle east policy at the brookings institution. i wanted to ask the panel, the head of a force said he runs iran's iraq policy. he no doubt is obviously

probably in baghdad. i wanted to ask if the pace of these developments reveal that he may be is not as strong as he is projected to be or that this basically fluke that surprise?everybody by >> i will take the sulamani question. the larger scheme of things, as long as we weren't a iran out of iraq, which by 2004-2005, they ranluded we weren't, they an economy of force operation there because they had bigger fish to try with their internal situation with the nuclear count and, of course, for the last almost three years syria. and spreading their revolution shia areas.owi

lot ofi bears a responsibility for this. a, because he was the guy who not press people who he urged to play roles to reach out population. and i was always bit surprised generally iran policiesl in its towards iraq. it has not told iraqis to stop oil production. you're making possible the sanctions against iran, which is exactly what is happening. they are very careful and reasoned and prudent in what they ask of their friends, which is not always what the american government does. so i spot that sometimes, in theng when i was government. nonetheless, the core goal of iran and iraq, as far as i

understand it, apart from not having an american army poised to go across the border, is not to have iraq fall apart and jihadists from one direction and a turkish-kurdish alliance in borders.e on their that is what that guy has delivered. somebody should be asking questions about how he has handled his account. >> i know we are going to lose mike shortly, so i will ask him first about the kurdish-turkish angle of this. mike, you laid out a couple of possible routes that the kurds may go. what do you think is the most likely of these alternatives you laid out? jim, you made reference to the turkish conundrum right now because of its people being held hostage. broadly speaking, do you expect

the turks to be an assertive actor in this sort of squeezing of isis, working perhaps with the united states in this effort? mike? want to go first? can we get the volume? mike? ok, well, then, jim -- >> it is very hard to fathom exactly how the turks view radical islamic groups like al qaeda, isil, essentially the salafas. we know how they view the muslim brothers, and that is as their allies. this is the top turkish government officials, not necessarily others in the

turkish state. but they see those as their brothers. i think that there is an ambivalence, but it is not necessarily an enmity. here is the question -- why did they not pull their people out of mosul? half a million refugees got out of there. there were kurdish positions not just not east and west of the but in the city. between thelations ankara couldn't be better. and every embassy of any country in the world has an evacuation plan. even here in washington i bet the embassies have an evacuation plan. >> where are you going to go? [laughter] >> but it would have involved hopping in a vehicle and driving for 10 minutes into a kurdish area. they did not take that decision. somebody needs to ask why, but

turkey right now is not the kind of democracy that will lend itself to a review of that. so i think that, first of all, when you have 80 hostages, that becomes as we learned in 197 -- that becomes job one. there are all kinds of options, including military action which was not off the table with desert one. by and large, they are fixated on that problem and everything else fades. the turks have lived with al nusra and isil for some time in syria. they really don't have a border with these guys in iraq, essentially the entire turkish, i would have to look at the map and look at what developments have been in the last few days, but by and large the bulk of the isder with turkey and iraq in the hands of the peshmerga.

the tiny bit that runs west to syria i will bet is under the control of the peshmerga right now. therefore, they do not have an immediate problem beyond the hostage situation, and that is a big one for them. that is going to divert their attention to anything of a strategic nature until they can fix this. >> ok, thank you. yes, stanley, on the left? >> iran, according to recent reports, has boots on the ground in iraq now. according to a report today, it is making overtures to the united states to work together on this issue. should we respond to that? should we try to work with the iran? should we attach some conditions? and then, what should those conditions be? >> jim? >> if we want to maintain our

vision of a unified iraq, and that is what president obama laid out, and we want to be able to deal with the kurds and the sunni arabs, we have to be very careful about any appearance of dealing with the iranians. now he would have talked to them petraeus era and met with baghdad.atives in ever it is not totally an on-off situation with the iranians, but it is pretty close to it. the other thing is you're going to have a hard time but i can see some of the looks in this audience, i imagine the rest of the american public -- you will have a hard time selling any kind of bold military operation, which is a hard sell in this town and in this country right now anyway if it involves, you know, making an alliance with the iranians of all people. so my recommendation would be they are iranian boots on the ground and always have been.

we have sometimes grabbed the iranian boots on the ground. they are going to continue to be boots on the ground here and there. it is like scorpions all over the place, too. you just have to deal with a threat, something unpleasant that is out there. but the idea of a u.s. condominium to save iraq from being overrun by sunni warriors, that would be a hard sell in riyadh and a hard sell in washington, i think. >> mike, are you with us? let's proceed. any further questions? i will close with this last question. i know it is not fair, but why not? jim, a week from now, do you expect the use of american force in iraq? >> yes. before i elaborate, i want to

say the scorpion analogy was not to the iranian population or ethnic group, it was to the irgc guys. they have earned it. but in terms of that question, i think almost certainly, unless isis somehow is stopped in its tracks by an iraqi army that showned little ability to do that other than in samarra. i think the situation will get sufficiently desperate, that we will have military action. >> friends, thank you very much for joining us here today at the washington institute. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] weeke house returns next to work on federal spending bills. here is a look at the house agenda.

>> billy house is the national journal congressional leadership correspondent. house republicans will hold leadership elections necks hurt elections next thursday. are there any other hall lengthers to kevin mccarthy? any other challengers? >> yes. a late entry, representative raul labrador from idaho has decided he wants to challenge mccarthy for the host in the leadership. he and mccarthy will be making pitches on wednesday morning in a closed door session, kind of candidates for them. and on thursday the full conference, 233 members will vote on that and the house whip's position if mccarthy moves up to the number two post. >> how about the race for house majority whip? who are the candidates running for that?

>> right now, three candidates. the current chief deputy whip, peter roscum from illinois. challenged by steve scalise. a group of 177 conservative members which gives him kind of a heavy lift in the race. and then a late entry marshall marvin set stetson from indiana. >> the house and senate are scheduled to debate spending bills next week. which ones are they? and do you expect congress to get all 12 spending bills passed by the end of the fiscal year? >> looking more and more doubtful. another break on july 4 and come back prosecutor a few weeks and take the august break and then out for most of september. on tuesday the senate will debut spending bills on the floor for the first time. then tension is throw bills wrapped into one.

a mini-bus and sort of the version of transportation housing and urban development bill and science criminal justice bill. they may have a third bill but that is not certain yet. that would be their debut of bills. in the house this woke they are planning on doing -- next week, planning on doing the defense spending bill. that would be their fifth bill. so they are a little ahead. as time ticks away it looks like neither chamber is going to complete all bills. probably see as the start of the fiscal year approaches is some sort of hurry up carryover bill or continuing resolution for those that haven't finished. >> the g.m. c.e.o. will be back to testify wednesday and she will be test foyeing on the g.m. ignition switch recall. she was there in april before this same committee. now, what do they want to hear from her now? >> i guess they want to hear why aren't things going a little better over there. and you know, she came in with the reputation she was going to fix things and instead things

seem to be puttering a bit. i think they will want to know detail whats she has planned going on from now. >> you write about other esche somehows congress will be looking at including the release of sergeant bergdahl and the benghati investigation. what is the status of those investigations on capitol hill? >> the status is they will be long-running and never-ending until 2016 to tell you the truth. the benghazi investigation is already the focus of a special committee create. bergdahl in interviewing members this week is seen as a long-running effort on their part, the house republicans' part anyway messaging another i'm and shot at the administration for ill-conceived foreign policy. the issues there are whether we

should make deals like this with terrorists and low temperature release of five taliban members from guantanamo sort of a cam el's nose under the tent that the obama administration hopes to shut down that cuba-based prison all together. >> you can tweet billy house @ house in session. billy, thanks for your time today. >> i enjoyed it, thank you. >> next, a discussion about u.s. border security. after that, a senate oversight hearing. then another chance to see discussion on the situation in iraq posted by the washington is to for policy. on the next "washington journal" michael rubin from the american enterprise institute talks about what policy options the u.s. could use considering the violence in iraq. studentcrisis.org.

and space news reporter talks about 2015 federal funding for science research and space exploration. we will also take your calls and your tweets. "washington journal" live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. one of the things people do not always recognize is that during the war of 1812, he was fun until after 18 fort team an 1814-1815. it was about america establishing its independence day against the british. object fors the which francis scott key penned the words that became our national anthem.

the flag was made to look: restored. restored.k there was a decision not to do that again. what we want it the flag became a metaphor for the country. it is torn and still survives. the message is survival of the country and the flag. we are not try to make it look for deep. we are trying to make it look like it had endured its history. >> this year marks the 200 anniversary during the war of 1812. tour themore, we star-spangled banner exhibit sunday night at six and 10 p.m. eastern part of american history tv this weekend on c-span 3. >> c-span's new book "sundays at

eight." >> there is something that drives them to this idea that -- there are so many people i knew who served in war. it is the intensity of the experience. that intensity of the relationships that they felt with their combat buddies. it is so strong and so pure and true that they look back on urning.imes with mo i have always asked them, do you wish that this never happened? they said that they would do it again in a heart beat. i think that there is something else that goes on as well. going through a near-death

experience sometimes seems to give them so much strength and that i and optimism think that is why they would do it again. >> other featured interviews from our book notes and "q&a" in c-span's "sundays at eight." it is available at your favorite bookseller. >> the new head of the customs and border protection has pledged a more transparent and open border patrol agency. speaking at the senate for strategic and international studies, he call the recent influx of unaccompanied children attempting to enter at the u.s. southern border a humanitarian crisis. this discussion is an hour.

>> good morning, everyone. welcome to csis. i'm kathleen hicks. i run the international security program here. it is my pleasure to be introducing our speaker today and our discussant along with him. first, of course, is the honorable bill kerlikowski here as the economieser of the customs and -- commissioner of customs and border protection. he has an extensive history within the law enforcement community and now runs the largest federal law enforcement agency in the country. and we are looking forwad to his remarks this morning. customs and border protection has been in the news of late, and he is going to have some good questions put forth to him by our discussant adam iles who is the managing director at the chair top group and has had plenty of his own experience over the years on homeland security. let me turn it over to commissioner kerlikowski and let him give his remarks.

>> it is a great pleasure to be here and back at csis. especially o be in the beautiful new facility. i think well over a year ago i had the opportunity to deliver some remarks on another noncontroversial topic, drug policy at csis. so to be back and have another noncontroversial topic such as immigration, border security, et cetera is just a delight. thank you again and let me go ahead and start with a few things. i had about 100 days as commissioner. the tough questions i will be able to dodge some if they are particularly difficult. i think it is a perfect time to talk about an evolving vision for cbp and talk about the pressing concerns that we fisa

-- that we face and where our agency is headed. let me first talk about the workforce because i think that is actually the premier part. soon to have 62,000 employees in 40 countries. a wide range and diversity of people and skillsets and as many of you know from the federal employee survey we don't do particularly well when it comes to the morale in the department. and so working on that is particularly critical for me. i'm the first commissioner to be confirmed by the senate in now over five years. they did a tremendous job.

it certainly have the full support of the administration. i think it is also critical that you have the support of the senate in these issues. obama struck policy advisor, i have the opportunity to work closely with people on the hill. to me vacation and having the support -- communication and having the support of members of congress is good for this large and diverse workforce. border wasce on the very much divided and very independent among federal agencies. borders, air operations were all serving different agencies. since 2003 and since the 9/11 had oneon, we have unified border agency.

that has allowed us to really work and try to craft a comprehensive border strategy to not only secure those borders, but also to support our economy. many of you know we have this dual mission with the facilitation of lawful trade and travel and the security of the borders. they are not mutually exclusive. that me to be some idea about people do on ae daily basis. to process one million passengers and pedestrians. they make 1000 apprehensions a day. this is all on a daily basis. bases about 12,000 pounds of narcotics. about $300,000 in undeclared current sees. almost $5 million worth of product's out violate intellectual property. addition, -- i'm being a good

fed by giving you all of these numbers. it requires aren't keen to protect our agricultural industry. i would be happy to discuss those in depth. we rely on our employees for our success. when you look at the budget, the mass majority -- the vast majority is in personnel costs. it is vital that we do everything we can to support that workforce. to enhanceany ideas the workforce. they involve recognition, support, but