operations are highly sophisticated and they do have a bureaucracy themselves, too. i will go through how they have been governing these areas in syria. in terms of the law and order side, they have sharia courts. this is where they can throw down their rulings related to somebody getting their hand chopped off for thievery are people getting executions for apotheosizing. we have seen a number of individuals getting crucified, which i'm pretty sure not many people have seen in the modern era. they have a police service that goes around. they have a consumer protection authority which looks at the different markets and places where you can get food in local places in syria and decides whether a food product is edible or not, essentially, in the same way that the fda would do something. they also have a vigilante aspect of their law and order side where they have burned

cigarettes and destroyed tombs. we saw one of the more larger tombs or shrines in iraq being destroyed earlier this year. in terms of public works, they helped build a new market. they have an electrical office which helps train and repair electrical services throughout the town. they have had a lot of road were done in some areas where they have rehabilitated roads, whether it is in terms of putting up plants in the medians, and they have also been able to continue operating the dam. they have set up an office to provide money for the needy. they claim that this helps also with farmers and their harvests. they are now conducting a post office. on the more ideological side of things, they have a media outlet where they pass out dvd's of video releases they put out online. they have a truck which roves

around with a lot of different things related to islam and their ideology. they stop in some areas to talk to children and adults to try to teach them at their interpretations of islam. they set up a number of religious schools for boys and girls. if you memorize the koran, you can get a certificate. they have also provided kid fun days where kids can play around on these inflatable slides and moonwalk type of devices, as well as have food and eating contests. in addition, for older members of society, they have created sessions for imams and teachers to be trained. more regular social services, they have helped run bread factories and provided fruits and vegetables for many people. they have even set up a food kitchen for the needy. they also set up an office for orphans to help register them and then hopefully place them with a family. while the taliban has been very paranoid about vaccinations after the cia operation against

osama bin laden, there have been vaccination programs put out by isis. they even have a cub scouts program which is far more worrying because you have children from the ages of around six to 14 that are now in these housing places in iraqa and that then put into training camps. they are essentially halving child soldiers being set up. so what is next for isis? this is sort of what the potential could be. this is what we're seeing in syria, but this is what the potential could be in iraq now that they have taken over some areas. it is likely they will try to consolidate their strength with the new money from the mosul central bank, and that far exceeds any money that osama bin laden had. there are rumors that they have been buying off people inside of mosul. this will be used to reinforce the front in syria. as many people know, earlier this year, a bunch of rebel groups started an uprising with isis and pushed them out of idlib.

it is likely they will use this to try and push it back into aleppo and idlib. my question is -- are they stretched thin? they have 7000 to 2000 people, but they span from aleppo all the way to mosul. many people do not like their ideology and do not want to live through this. obviously, the type of penalties that they pursue has created a backlash. we have already seen statements by some tribal members in ramadi and mosul about how they will stand up to the maliki government and isis itself. the islamic faith is a reality. it could prove difficult and provide more ability to consolidate the state.

for jihadists worldwide, victories registered by isis in the perception that the so-called will of god is on its side against enemies will only enhance the prestige of joining the group and furthering its goals. this is the state of isis right now. it is a lot different than what al qaeda was up to last decade, but it is a very sophisticated and organized organization. this will be more difficult to dislodge than anything we have seen before. thank you. >> thank you for those sobering remarks. mike, are you with us? >> yes, i am. >> very good. let me open up a discussion session by asking you if you can bring us up to date on the report concerning iranian military involvement. who it is, where they are, what they seem to be doing?

>> it is very difficult to come up with categorical information on this without being in country and seeing it with your own eyes. i spend a lot of time studying the militias in iraq and meeting them on many occasions, quite unnervingly. but what i found was that they were -- let's just say, the iranians have been very nervous since 2007 about risking irgc offices directly inside iraq. now, since the u.s. left in 2011, i am sure some of that fear or trepidation is gone. we have seen senior officers killed on the other side of the border over in syria. it is very likely they have got military advisers operating in many ways however like to see

u.s. officers operating. you know, one thing is for sure, wherever you have got these u.s. officers operating, you are very unlikely to have iranian officers operating in the same places. if anything, that is a good reason for having u.s. officers on the front line or at least at the front headquarters to ensure that there are some eyes on what is actually happening. but around samarra, samarra is critical to this. i would recommend to you the work from the institute on shia islamist groups in iraq and syria. samarra is a shrine city, a place where a shrine was blown up in february 2006, providing a final spot in the civil war that lasted for two plus years. isis tried to overrun it on june 5 but failed, thank god. about 800 meters short of the shrine.

they tried again after the major collapse in security forces, and that is one of those nightmare scenarios that everyone in coalition forces and analysts have been talking about for years. what if they take out that shrine again? just as shia islamist militias from iraq have been defending the shrines in syria, in damascus, there have been reports of defending shrines in samarra. they will do the same in northern baghdad and in karbala. where there is one of these iranian-backed shia militia actors, essentially the iraqi version of lebanese hezbollah, there will often be an irgc trainer or advisor not that far behind. >> jim, we just heard mike say

iranians are probably sending irgc guys doing what he would have expected americans to be doing but in a different context. you have been on both sides of this. in baghdad, trying to push the political reconciliation, and in the situation room offering advice to presidents on how to and what sort of military force to bring to bear. can you give us a little glimpse into what you think is happening, both angles here? what are we telling specifically to maliki? the timeframe the president announced today was a matter of days. is it possible to see the type of political reconciliation that he spoke about in 72 hours? on the military side, what sort of preparations do you expect are going on right now for the type of action that you would

like to see? >> when you mine the statement in bits and pieces and you put it all together, there is pretty good outline of what the president will be doing over the next few days. what he is saying is he's going to move assets into place. we just heard that an aircraft carrier has moved into the gulf. he talks about intelligence. that is both -- everything from analysts diverting their focus on this to satellites to drones, the entire network of u.s. intelligence systems will be turned on to this situation at every level. we worked very, very, very good at this when dealing with al qaeda from the period roughly 2004 through 2011, and there is a lot of that reserve capability there. nonetheless, he will also be preparing the military for whatever contingency the

president gives a green light to. it is not unwise or unexpected for the president to link the situation with political developments and re-conciliation. what he really means is we are not going to know for a few days, but it would be on rise -- unwise for him to reveal this by saying -- i can say this from the outside -- we want the maliki to be a new government and a different government and take a different attitude towards the kurds and sunnis. but if isis surrounds baghdad, we're going to hit them anyway. he cannot say that, even if he has decided to do that. i have no indication he has decided to do that. because you always want to leverage what you are doing for an ally or friend with what you want that ally or friend to do for you, particularly when it is in that ally or friend's own interest. we have spent 11 years talking not just to maliki, but to every

political leader, all the political leaders, that if they do not hang together, they are going to hang separately. that is what we are seeing before us today. it is good advice that he has given. in terms of the specifics, vice president biden called maliki yesterday. i am sure having been in some of these calls that the u.s. message was delivered with vigor and with a certain bluntness, and that is good under these conditions. i am sure it included a very strong admonition that maliki has to change his approach towards sectarian issues and towards his political domination of the military. it is one of the reasons the military melted away. secondly, it also would have included the specifics of what america might offer and under what conditions. we do not know that yet. as i said, it is good that the president is not signaling, both to the enemy but also before he talks to congress, what exactly

he is going to do. it is also good that he ensures that maliki feels under pressure to do things in return. again, this is most important, as the president said, in the days ahead if we are facing a surge into the baghdad area, into karbala and the south. that could lead to an extremely dramatic situation, including to our own personnel, and it could lead to a significant iranian intervention or a significant kurdish reaction. if isis is either slowed down themselves, and they are not eight-feet tall as we have seen in samarra, as we have seen with the kurds, people can stand up to them. it's not that many of them. they have momentum on their side, and that is important for the military, but once they are stopped, then people can hold their ground. it is possible that the iraqis will be able to hold her ground and the non-sunni-arab areas. if that is so, we move to the

other scenario. the white house has to be prepared for a longer struggle. remember, the president's statement yesterday was "a permanent presence of al qaeda in iraq and syria will not be tolerated." he has to think about how he is going to do this, along with his commitment to the american people not to but troops on the ground, by which he means 101st airborne, the first army division. they will be deluged by 1001 factoids and irrelevant ideas and other schemes that are instantly torment you. i cannot describe how painful this process is. >> thank you. and then aaron, to complete this circle, you followed isis for quite a long time. given the options they have in front of them, what are they most likely to do, go to baghdad?

hold tight on current territory? what are the most likely to do? ? what are the most likely to do? >> knowing isis and how they have operated in the past and the excitement i have seen from all their followers and supporters online in the past week is that they are likely to have a big head and potentially overplay them selves in the coming days and weeks. whether they do that or not is obviously the question, but they stopped of past activities, it is likely that they will try and push because that is how they view the world. in addition, i suspect that there are already signs that some of the humvees and other types of military equipment that was all them take in mosul are already back in syria now. it is likely that they will use that as a new infusion in cash and weapons on their front.

they will potentially push back into aleppo city. it is likely that, knowing them, they will try and push on both fronts in iraq and in syria. this probably could provide a great opportunity though to the syrian rebels differ the fight against isis, because they are stretching themselves thin, as well as any forces in the iraqi arena, as well. >> thank you very much. i will turn to questions, starting with andrew right in the middle. >> thank you for great presentation, guys. we have had a lot of prescriptions from all three of you, particularly aaron and ambassador jeffrey on what to do in iraq, but it seems to me that a lot of this is coming out of syria. i mean, isis was born in iraq but metastasized in syria, then come out for a double or nothing game of whatever we have in front of us. we have an organization that does not recognize the boundary that have divided the middle east for over a century. so my question is, what do we do

on the syria end of this equation, and how does it affect the debate we have seen recently with ambassador robert ford's calls to arm the sunni opposition in syria? thank you. >> very quickly, we had a horrible syrian situation which threatened to do exactly this kind of game changing thing for a couple of years, and we did not do very much about it. it metastasized, and it is the mess we have now. we're going to have that mess tomorrow, next month, at least, and into the future, regardless of what we do or do not do. what is different right now is these guys are moving on a path that could be an immediate dramatic game changer to the entire middle east. so there is a difference in perspective. it is very hard to communicate this. i have been trying to do it for

three days. the president tried to do it and was not completely clear. we have a longer-term problem of a wide swath of sunni, arab am a largely desert territory in the middle of the levant that has been taken over by a terrorist group in syria, iraq, and other insurgent groups that are unhappy with the government. it is not really ungoverned because there are a variety of voices governing it, but many of them do not have our best interests at heart. it is a tremendous, complicated long-term problem that will require the president to get everybody lined up in the region, political solutions, reconsolidation, stability operations, and all of that, if we are willing to pay the price and engaged that thoroughly. i do not know. he is moving slowly in that direction. that is the longer-term problem. the immediate problem we have, and he seems to indicate this in his final remarks when answering

a question -- the speech, as i said, if you mine it and sew it together, you can kind of get a sort of way forward. but in being asked a question at the very end, then you basically hear him say, look, this is going to be a few days. i have to get my ducks in order. it comes closer to, he does realize that if isis moves on baghdad or some of these other areas, if the iranians threatened to move in in a big way, he may have to make some immediate decisions. that is how i would separate it. obviously, he knows, because he included it. he knows it is one front. he said, i cannot allow a permanent refuge, a permanent presence of isis, al qaeda, in iraq and syria.

he knows it is a common front. how this fits with the battle but he also is waging, sort of, against assad, is a whole other question. >> ok, thank you. yes, in front here? >> thank you very much. this is one of the very few events that i cannot find anyone to disagree with. you really have nailed the issues exactly right. thank you for the presentations. let's take us back to the other side, how iraqis view this. i think that is very important, because they are mainly interested in it. the ambassador quite rightly said that this has been the biggest challenge since 9/11. i would say this is the biggest challenge to the shia iraqis. 65% of the population since 1991. can the united states afford another perception of a betrayal by the united states, which means this time a permanent gift

if iran comes to the rescue and the united states drags its feet, making conditions -- i would like to see the united states solve the situation, not the iranians or someone else, because that will be bad to the cost to the iraqis into the united states. it is very important to address and for the administration to understand. >> ok, i will take the first stab at that. you hit on a very important point. for those of us -- you may remember, i apologized for 1991 publicly. here is the problem, and i am being very honest, folks -- the united states can essentially take almost any loss and live with it. that is what makes us such an ally for everybody. we can lose vietnam, and did, and live to fight another day in kosovo and in kuwait. so the short answer is, yeah, we can survive with the shia of

iraq, feeling that we totally abandoned them. other people feel we totally abandoned them, tibetans and others. i am sure some others are not feeling too good about us either. but we can move on, because that is the reality. there is another reality, you do this often enough, you develop a patent of supporting people, and then walking away from them and demanding that all the t's are crossed and the i's are dotted before you move and it will be a force more expensive than the next 10 militaries combined. then people will stop organizing themselves in our world differently, and we are not going to like that organization. so the shia have a vote, just like the tibetans and the crimeans and everybody else. in the sunni arabs have a vote. a lot of them are not happy with

us abandoning them either. and the kurds are not too happy. >> yes, barbara? we'll work our way around. >> thanks very much. thank you so much for doing this. my question is about maliki. can he be part of the solution? he has had eight years. he has done nothing but go after sunnis, kurds become increasingly paranoid, corrupt, appointing relatives. can he actually rise to the occasion? >> well, don't look at me -- [laughter] >> mike, what do you think? >> [inaudible] >> let's get the volume up here. >> i will be diplomatic because i travel to iraq quite frequently. first of all, you have to respect the election result, including perhaps a personal vote which is an indication that at least in baghdad, maliki put

all the votes together. but that is ducking the question, i guess. if we look back over the last four years, it has been a dismal failure. there are some bright spots. the relationship with kuwait, the oil production. but everything else has been a dismal failure. really it has been brought about by failures in the iraqi government, rather than how great the bad guys are. one has to wonder when we look back in 2018, 2014 to 2018, whether we see more of the same or whether we see a turnaround. as we saw during 2006 and 2010 -- that is the key for whoever leads iraq next. that is what they should be asking themselves. how are they going to be remembered? as the guy who lost it all or the guy who did whatever he had

to do and dealt with whoever he had to deal with to keep it together? the maliki government, when i was there in march, key leadership explained exactly what they were going to do in a third term. and some of it was encouraging. increasing support for technocrats with streamlined decision-making systems. a good way. not just talking about taking of the power for yourself civililding a real service. many ideas. but there is also real darkness at the heart of the vision for the next four years. if there is engagement with the sunnis, it is about creating a new class of sunnis from the tribal and political groups at low level and trying to completely reduce and eradicate the national level leadership of the sunnis. it struck me that the sunnis

that wanted to support the sense of there being a sunni community who could work together, those people are the ones that the iraqi government were planning to continue persecuting. and if they were going to involve sunnis in future government, the plan was really to create a new class of sunnis that they could deal with and also control. that is an extraordinarily dark vision for the next four years. my hope is, as i recently put in a piece with the institute, that this may be a catalyst. sometimes in iraq, you have to get right to the edge of a cliff or even take a step over the edge before people do the right thing. my feeling is if the electorate had voted heavily against maliki, this would all be clear-cut, and they did not. so let's not focus on replacing the man, let's focus on changing the policies.

>> are we convinced that in maliki's view, he cannot have both iranian support and american support? is there any way for maliki to think that there is a choice here? do we know that? >> i think he feels that he can have both. he knows he can have both, because he has had both for a long time. of course, we know the ironic fact of iraq is that often u.s. and iranian policy is pushed towards the same choices even if they do so for completely different motivations. so he feels like he can have both, and i would rather see far american influence.

to be honest, i think it is a bit of a zero-sum game in terms of the more we do, the less of a vacuum they fill. you know from everything we have done at the institute that the iranians will always fill a vacuum and if we create this vacuum to an even greater extent than is exists today, if we gasping nodeis torgasping need forsupport righd track record in syria where they have, frankly, been rather successful and that going to be rather powerful to the maliki government. one final thing which was shocking to me personally when i was over there in march in baghdad, these are some of -- speaking to senior sunni leaders, i started to hear things that i had not heard before, such as -- do you think we should go to iran and negotiate with them? to you think -- if they are going to run everything, shouldn't we just finally make our peace with them? i heard that from some leaders i

never believed i would hear that from. because they were starting to vote with their face. >> ok, thank you very much. pollack?te and dave murray, turn around. just talk. just talk. >> can we expect any support at all from any of our allies, britain and france? do the saudis have any role to play here? >> jim, what do you think? allies? >> allies -- well, we saw what happened with the brits in syria. it would be a further complication. the president has talked in his speech about this is a regional issue and he is royalty and he needs to -- he is right and coordinate with and have support from the sunni

allies. jordan. turkey, jordan and particularly the gulf states and when you states youthe gulf start with saudi arabia. dide was a piece that simon in the policy watch just yesterday and the foreign policy the issue of how the saudi leadership sees this. to some degree, and i have had experience with some of the top leadership in saudi arabia and can attest to this, they see things in a very stark sunni, shia, control of the middle east way. not everybody thinks that way. the leader of jordan does not think that way. manythough he doesn't have arabs in his country.

many of the sunni arabs do not think that way in iraq. so the saudi's, on the other hand, are extraordinarily worried about the al qaeda threat. you see how actively they combated in yemen, directly and indirectly, through helping us, and now they will have a major al qaeda presence on their border. province borders saudi arabia. so welcome to the war on terror. >> dave pollock? >> thank you. i wanted to just pick up on a number issue. i think aaron said that there were 7,000 to 10,000 isis fighters. is that a pretty solid estimate? is it possible that, because of this momentum, as several of you put it, that they will pick up lots of new recruits, either by intimidation or by cash bonuses

or by zeal or whatever and the next few days even? thank you. >> yeah, a number of analysts believe that it is sort of in the 7,000 to 10,000 range. the majority of those are probably actually in syria. they have been governing the era. i believe probably about 5000 of those are actually inside of syria. to 3,000 have been in iraq. in the past week, they have had some prison breaks again, and that has let out a couple thousand individuals. whether these individuals are just criminals or whether they were previously in the group or whether they are just in prison for political reasons, you know, there are stories that some of them have joined up with isis. c obviously i can't confirm it, being in washington. it is definitely possible that more people will join up. plus, people do not want to get their heads lopped off. if somebody does not necessarily

with the iteology, if they are being protected and not killed, you can see people joining up. >> so it is this 2000 to 5000 that is marching hundreds of kilometers and taking town after town after town? >> there are also baathists and other forces as well. it also helps that the iraqi up forts didn't stand much of a fight. >> there was a small flying columns of people from hindu and spain that were carrying the flags. >> yes, sir? right behind you. sam, go ahead. sorry. >> i am from the center for middle east policy at the brookings institution. i wanted to ask the panel, the

head of a force said he runs iran's iraq policy. he no doubt is obviously probably in baghdad. i wanted to ask if the pace of these developments reveal that he may be is not as strong as he is projected to be or that this basically fluke that surprise?everybody by >> i will take the sulamani question. the larger scheme of things, as long as we weren't a iran out of iraq, which by 2004-2005, they ranluded we weren't, they an economy of force operation there because they had bigger fish to try with their internal situation with the nuclear count and, of course, for the last almost three years syria. and spreading their revolution shia areas.owi

lot ofi bears a responsibility for this. a, because he was the guy who not press people who he urged to play roles to reach out population. and i was always bit surprised generally iran policiesl in its towards iraq. it has not told iraqis to stop oil production. you're making possible the sanctions against iran, which is exactly what is happening. they are very careful and reasoned and prudent in what they ask of their friends, which is not always what the american government does. so i spot that sometimes, in theng when i was government.

nonetheless, the core goal of iran and iraq, as far as i understand it, apart from not having an american army poised to go across the border, is not to have iraq fall apart and jihadists from one direction and a turkish-kurdish alliance in borders.e on their that is what that guy has delivered. somebody should be asking questions about how he has handled his account. >> i know we are going to lose mike shortly, so i will ask him first about the kurdish-turkish angle of this. mike, you laid out a couple of possible routes that the kurds may go. what do you think is the most likely of these alternatives you laid out? jim, you made reference to the

turkish conundrum right now because of its people being held hostage. broadly speaking, do you expect the turks to be an assertive actor in this sort of squeezing of isis, working perhaps with the united states in this effort? mike? want to go first? can we get the volume? mike? ok, well, then, jim -- >> it is very hard to fathom exactly how the turks view radical islamic groups like al qaeda, isil, essentially the salafas. we know how they view the muslim

brothers, and that is as their allies. this is the top turkish government officials, not necessarily others in the turkish state. but they see those as their brothers. i think that there is an ambivalence, but it is not necessarily an enmity. here is the question -- why did they not pull their people out of mosul? half a million refugees got out of there. there were kurdish positions not just not east and west of the but in the city. between thelations ankara couldn't be better. and every embassy of any country in the world has an evacuation plan. even here in washington i bet the embassies have an evacuation plan. >> where are you going to go? [laughter]

>> but it would have involved hopping in a vehicle and driving for 10 minutes into a kurdish area. they did not take that decision. somebody needs to ask why, but turkey right now is not the kind of democracy that will lend itself to a review of that. so i think that, first of all, when you have 80 hostages, that becomes as we learned in 197 -- that becomes job one. there are all kinds of options, including military action which was not off the table with desert one. by and large, they are fixated on that problem and everything else fades. the turks have lived with al nusra and isil for some time in syria. they really don't have a border with these guys in iraq, essentially the entire turkish, i would have to look at the map

and look at what developments have been in the last few days, but by and large the bulk of the isder with turkey and iraq in the hands of the peshmerga. the tiny bit that runs west to syria i will bet is under the control of the peshmerga right now. therefore, they do not have an immediate problem beyond the hostage situation, and that is a big one for them. that is going to divert their attention to anything of a strategic nature until they can fix this. >> ok, thank you. yes, stanley, on the left? >> iran, according to recent reports, has boots on the ground in iraq now. according to a report today, it is making overtures to the united states to work together on this issue. should we respond to that? should we try to work with the iran? should we attach some

conditions? and then, what should those conditions be? >> jim? >> if we want to maintain our vision of a unified iraq, and that is what president obama laid out, and we want to be able to deal with the kurds and the sunni arabs, we have to be very careful about any appearance of dealing with the iranians. now he would have talked to them petraeus era and met with baghdad.atives in ever it is not totally an on-off situation with the iranians, but it is pretty close to it. the other thing is you're going to have a hard time but i can see some of the looks in this audience, i imagine the rest of the american public -- you will have a hard time selling any kind of bold military operation, which is a hard sell in this

town and in this country right now anyway if it involves, you know, making an alliance with the iranians of all people. so my recommendation would be they are iranian boots on the ground and always have been. we have sometimes grabbed the iranian boots on the ground. they are going to continue to be boots on the ground here and there. it is like scorpions all over the place, too. you just have to deal with a threat, something unpleasant that is out there. but the idea of a u.s. condominium to save iraq from being overrun by sunni warriors, that would be a hard sell in riyadh and a hard sell in washington, i think. >> mike, are you with us? let's proceed. any further questions? i will close with this last question. i know it is not fair, but why not?

jim, a week from now, do you expect the use of american force in iraq? >> yes. before i elaborate, i want to say the scorpion analogy was not to the iranian population or ethnic group, it was to the irgc guys. they have earned it. but in terms of that question, i think almost certainly, unless isis somehow is stopped in its tracks by an iraqi army that showned little ability to do that other than in samarra. i think the situation will get sufficiently desperate, that we will have military action. >> friends, thank you very much for joining us here today at the washington institute. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> president obama says the united states will not be sending troops to iraq. national ask his security team to prepare other options. he spoken to questions about white house before he left for north the code and california. >> good morning, everybody. wanted to take some time to give you a quick update about the situation in iraq. yesterday, i convened a meeting with my national security council to discuss the situation there and this morning i received an update from my team. over the last several days we've seen significant gains made by isil, a terrorist organization that operates in both iraq and in syria. in the face of a terrorist offensive, iraqi security forces have proven unable to defend a number of cities which has

allowed the terrorists to overrun part of iraq's territory and this poses a danger to iraq and its people, and, given the nature of these terrorists, it could pose a threat eventually to american interests, as well. this threat is not brand new. over the last year, we have been steadily ramping up our security assistance to the iraqi government with increased training, equipping and intelligence. now, iraq needs additional support to break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the capabilities of iraqi security forces. we will not be sending u.s. troops back into combat in iraq but i have asked my national security team to prepare a range of other options that could help support iraq security forces and i'll be reviewing those options in the days ahead. i do want to be clear, though, this is not solely or even primarily a military challenge. over the past decade, american troops have made extraordinary

sacrifices to give iraqis an opportunity to claim their own future. unfortunately, iraqi leaders have been unable to overcome, too often, the mistrust and sectarian differences that has long been simmering there and that's created vulnerabilities within the iraqi government as well as their security forces so any action that we may take to provide assistance to iraqi security forces has to be joined by a serious and sincere effort by iraq's leaders to set aside sectarian differences, to promote stability and account for the legitimate interests of all of iraq's communities and continue to build the capacity of an effective security force. we can't do it for them. and in the absence of this type of political effort, short-term military action, including any assistance we might provide, won't succeed so this should be a wake-up call.

iraq leaders have to demonstrate a willingness to make hard decisions and compromises on behalf of the iraqi people in order to bring the country together. in that effort, they will have the support of the united states and our friends and our allies. iraq's neighbors also have some responsibilities to support this process. nobody has an interest in seeing terrorists gain a foothold inside of iraq and nobody will benefit from seeing iraq descend into chaos so the united states will do our part but understand that ultimately it's up to the iraqis as a sovereign nation to solve their problems. indeed, across the region, we have redoubled our efforts to help build more capable counterterrorism forces so that groups like isil can't establish safe haven and we'll continue our effort through the support of our moderate opposition in syria, our support for iraq and its security forces and our partnership with other countries across the region.

we're also going to pursue intensive diplomacy throughout this period both inside iraq and across the region because there's never going to be stability in iraq and the broader region unless there are political processes that allow people to solve differences peacefully without resorting to war or relying on the military. our top priority will be remain being vigilant to any threats to our personnel serving overseas. we will consult closely with congress as we make determinations about the appropriate action and will keep the american people fully informed as we make decisions about the way forward. i'll take questions. >> recent u.s. history there, are you reluctant to get involved with iraq? >> i think we should look at the situation carefully. we have an interest in making

sure that a group like isil, which is a vicious organization and has been able to take advantage of the chaos in syria, that they don't get a broader foothold. i think there are dangerous of fierce sectarian fighting if, for example, the terrorist organizations try to overrun sacred shia sites which could trigger shia-sunni conflicts that could be very hard to stamp out so we have enormous interests there and obviously our troops and the american people and the american taxpayers made huge investments and sacrifices in order to give iraqis the opportunity to chart a better course, a better destiny. but ultimately they're going to have to seize it. as i said before, we are not going to be able to do it for them and given the very difficult history that we've seen in iraq, i think that any objective observer would recognize that in the absence of

accommodation among the various factions inside of iraq, various military actions by the united states, by any outside nation, are not going to solve those problems over the long term and deliver the stability that we need. anybody else? >> mr. president, is the syrian civil war spilling over the iraq border? >> i think that's been happening for some time. isil has been able to gain a foothold in syria. that's part of the reason why we have been so concerned about it. that's part of the reason why we have been supporting the syrian opposition there but it's a challenging problem. in iraq, the iraqi government, which was initially resistant to some of our offers of help, has come around now to recognize that cooperation with us on some of these issues can be useful. obviously that's not the case in syria where president assad has no interest in seeing us

involved there and where some of the governments that are supporting aside have been able to block, for example, u.n. efforts even at humanitarian aid but this is a regional problem and it is going to be a long-term problem. and what we're going to have to do is combine selective actions by our military to make sure that we're going after terrorists who could harm our personnel overseas or eventually hit the homeland. we're going to have to combine that with what is a very challenging international effort to try to rebuild countries and communities that have been shattered by sectarian war. and that's not an easy task. >> what are they willing to do -- >> we're in contact with them now. we'll have a better sense by the end of the weekend after those

consultations and we will be getting a better sense from them of how they might support an effort to bring -- bring about the kind of political unity inside of iraq that bolsters security forces. the united states has poured a lot of money into these iraqi security forces and we devoted a lot of training to iraqi security forces. the fact that they are not willing to stand and fight and defend their posts against admittedly hardened terrorists but not terrorists who are overwhelming in numbers, indicates that there's a problem with morale, there's a problem in terms of commitment, and ultimately that's rooted in the political problems that have plagued the country for a very long time. last question. last one. >> thank you. can you talk a little bit about

u.s. concern of the disruption -- potential disruption of oil supplies? >> so far, at least, we have not seen major disruptions in oil supplies. obviously, if, in fact, isil was able to obtain control over major output, significant refineries, that could be a source of concern. as you might expect, world oil markets react to any kind of instability in the middle east. one of our goals should be to make sure that in cooperation with other countries in the region, not only are we creating a backstop in terms of what's happening inside of iraq, but if there do end up being disruptions inside of iraq, that some of the other producers in the gulf be able to pick up the slack so that will be part of the consultations taking place during the course of this week. to give people a sense of timing here, although events on the

ground in iraq have been happening very quickly, our ability to plan, whether it's military action or work with the iraqi government on some of these political issues, is going to take several days so people should not anticipate that this is something that is going to happen overnight. we want to make sure that we have good eyes on the situation there. we want to make sure that we've gathered all the intelligence it's necessary so that if, in fact, i do direct and order any actions there that they're targeted, they're precise and they're going to have an effect and as i indicated before and i want to make sure everybody understands this message, the united states is not simply going to involve itself in a military action in the absence of a political plan by the iraqis that gives us some assurance that they're prepared to work together. we're not going to allow ourselves to be dragged back

into a situation in which, while we're there, we're keeping a lid on things and after enormous sacrifices by us, as soon as we're not there, suddenly people end up acting in ways that are not conducive to the long-term stability and prosperity of the country. thank you very much, everybody.

>> next, we will take your calls and comments live on "washington journal." then a discussion about barry goldwater's influence. and coverage of the iowa state republican party conference in des moines. speakers include bobby jindal and rand paul and rick santorum.

when i started covering on chris, you had people like senator russell long, wilbur mills, danny rostenkowski, howard baker. people who were giants in their own way. a couple of those guys got themselves into trouble. but, overall, these were people who knew -- they were all very intelligent. they knew how to craft legislation and do a deal. they all knew who the president was. whether was their party or the other party. at the end of the day, they usually found a way to come together and make decisions for the good of the country. today, you just do not see that anymore. first, the quality of the members of congress in terms of their intelligence and their work ethic -- it has diminished.

they are still great people and i should not malign. there are wonderful numbers on both side. i think they are a minority. increasingly, people are driven by the politics and their own self survival. and, i think that the part of what they do is raising money. not learning the issues or crafting deals. it is making speeches and positioning themselves to get reelected. journalistrd-winning lisa myers is leaving washington, d.c. behind. find out why on sunday night at 8:00. this morning, michael rubin from the american enterprise institute discusses policy options the u.s. may use concerning the violence in iraq. hen, the cofounder of student debt crisis.org. she offers a reaction to the president this week.

and dan leone talks about 2015 federal funding for science research and space exploration. we will take your calls and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. "washington journal" is next. host: in the papers this morning. fightg on shiites to back. iran's president is offering assistance to the country as well. here in the u.s., president obama says he will put no boots on the ground in iraq but his advisers are weighing the options. airstrikes could be a likely strategy when dealing with what is going on in iraq. when it comes to the use of airstrikes, would you support it? (202) 585-3881