the things that would motivate us. this conversation about tenure is confusing to me. them how to be navy seals, and then hold them accountable. then give them whatever they want, tenure and all of that. >> what can we do to get parents more involved in their children's education? >> as we implicated here are talked about lightly, the messaging outside the school is not great. if you have looked at the studies, those homes, inner-city low income homes are speaking millions of words less per year than high income homes. there are no books on the shelves. we know that. in the data that i had for the book, i did not have enough data to say that changing the home willonment categorically

help us close the achievement gap. i can tell you from being in the trenches and talking and seeing enough data so far to tell you, i guarantee you that will be the sixth one. about to beand it's proven. i will give you an example. project done in north carolina in the 1970's. they did quality early child education. aen done well, it inoculates child for three years. in this one, they went into the home every two weeks and taught the parents how to do homework with the kids. those kids when tracked all the way through high school were graduating at much higher rates, going to college at much higher rates. much less dropout rates. the home environment had

changed. it had been changed. they were inoculated for the rest of their lives. data?ave those pieces of i just don't have enough. i know there will be enough data. only good can come from involving them. can i mandated for the schools? no. this goes under the premise of if the home environment does not change, can you close the achievement gap? the answer to that is categorically yes. >> hollywood has a major influence over young americans and how they view the world. sendlevision and films messages that make students devalue education? how can hollywood use its influence in a positive way? >> hmmm. hmmm.

i have not really thought about this answer. i guess they are two separate parts of my brain, moviemaking and education. in general, we are giving the same messaging as everybody else. how many african-american intellectuals do we see in our movies? we always have morgan freeman as the president. i will give you that. [laughter] -- what is the normal thing? what is the messaging i'm guilty of and everyone is guilty of? we're playing on social norms of, this is what we expect from this group. the messaging is a societal thing and we are complicit in it for sure. i don't know how much we can change it. it's a difficult question. , film has thew-up

power to reflect and influence society. we now see increasing violence in films. where will it end? will movie fans reject this, or will we likely have to see the code reintroduced? thing -- i'm not an expert on violence in films. education gap, that is all have done for five years. when we get our films rated around the country, the u.s. is super prudish about sex. you showed a breast, that is r. world, rest of the sexuality is not a thing but violence is a thing. here you can kill any amount of people, pg. bring the kids. not a problem. [laughter] it's a fascinating cultural thing where we are so desensitized to violence. and even glorify it, to some extent.

it is an interesting thing culturally. it is different in other countries. countries,o other they will have a problem with the violence in my movies. it's an interesting societal thing. >> how did your work with cinematographer on the "sixth sense" and "signs" affect the tonal nature of your films? >> i'm a big fan of japanese cinema and art. we really got along. "silence of the lambs," that is one of my favorite movies. minimalism -- we're both minimalists. the cinematographers i pick are more naturalists. they make it feel like a natural room, not blue lights with fans and things like that. i learned a lot from him. he has done three of my movies.

it's more about the japanese cinema of it being subtle. if you come to our house, everything is very minimal. my brain gets a little bit messed up with too much stimuli. >> >> as a writer, at what point, if at any time, do you collaborate? is it usually a gut feeling when you conceive a new idea? >> you know, it's been fascinating. i tried something different here. if i'm doing an independent film. not trying to assign a pedgetive -- pejorative to any type of film micking -- making. with this movie, i tried to get back to hearing my own voice a little bit.

it was scary and fascinating, and maybe not unrelated to education, because what we're teaching children to do is listen to their voice. artists in their best form are listening to their voices. i didn't have playback when i was shooting the movie. when i shot the scene, i didn't get to see if i did it well. that's normal now, everybody does that. would say, just listen. out of my mouth comes the thing i didn't know. on that line you need to come forward. or this isn't about her anger. just quietly in that vain. even so, like, with the script, i was very quiet with it. i held on to it, and i really thought, hmm, something is wrong. something is wrong. don't go, "hey, what's wrong?" even if she gives me the correct answer, i lost.

i need to go, what's wrong? what's wrong? what's wrong? just like the body, oftentimes your knee hurts, it's not your knee, it's your hip. but as an expert in the field would say, it is not your knee, it's your hip, just to say, ah, that scene is not working. it is not that scene, it is this scene. and to intuitively get to that scene where you are going -- and then finally when you have to make a decision that you know you won't get everybody and have peace about that. and say, i'm sorry, it feels correct. i'm going to let go of this group. to have the courage to do that. to know why you are doing that. not being rebellious, but being, this is true. hopefully when you see the movie, you might sense a kind of a clarity of voice. you don't have to like it, but you will sense a clarity that was president done by committee.

>> we're almost out of time. before i ask you the last question, i have a couple house keeping matters to take care of. june 27 congressman john dingall of michigan. ieda 2nd, dr. thomas fr will address concerns about key health issues. august 1, the president of the republic of congo will discuss peace, security, and stability of the central african region in oil investments in his country. next, i would like to prept our guest with the precisional press club mug. i don't know if you use it for good coffee or good chai, but we thank you for your visit with us today. finally, for the last question,

what is your favorite movie of all time? and why? >> the tough question at the end. gosh. i mean, there is probably a new genra. probably, if i'm being -- taking everything into account, i think the first godfather is the best film ever made on every level. should i tell you why? you asked why, right? >> yes. who, rnalism we teach what, when, where, and why? -- keeping you activated came organically from the piece. originally copolla was hired just because he was italian. and what i find is when artists forced to speak in a little bit

more -- i don't want to say "commercial" because that's pejorative but into a vein that's a little bit more for everybody, end up not letting go of his voice. everybody thought francis was crazy giving it such drama and treating this subject with such clarity, and everyone else followed suit. like al paccino, they were about to fire him because he was so quiet. then they saw the scene where he does the assassination, and they were like, oh, that's what he's doing. they talked about giving humanity to every character, even villains. an empowering >> on thursday, c-span had the opportunity to talk to steven swanson, the commander of the

international space station. included using commercial vehicles to supply it and u.s. russia relations. this is just over 15 minutes. >> joining us on the international space station who dashes stephen swanson who is currently on board. welcome to c-span. >> thank you very much. >> tell us a little bit about the current activities of the space station. how many crewmembers do you have? what are you doing? >> we have six crewmembers up here right now. three russians, two americans, and one german. mostly what we do is science up here. over 170 experiments going on right now, but also we have to

maintain the station and keep it running smoothly and efficiently >> host: commander, with the science experiment you are currently conducting can you tell us a couple of things, generally what areas they fall into and why is it that these need to be conducted in an atmosphere such as yours. >> guest: yes. so, they vary tremendously. we have outside the house of magnetic spectrometer, which is looking for dark energy and dark matter. something we are trying to figure out the basic physics of our universe came to be. from that we go all the way to a human research on our bodies. how do we change in a microgravity environment, specifically our eyes, muscles, bones, and we are looking in detail about that which can have applications on earth with people who have different diseases. we get to see it at a more rapid pace of pier. that is pretty much for all the

science. the idea is that things change appear enough that people can analyze how different pieces or science objectives change in this microgravity environment. it is just different than on earth which gives us another data set to look and compare to, and that gives them a lot more understanding of the problem. >> host: so commander, because you are up there in the microgravity talk a little bit about the extent of the science. are we talking basic research or advanced research? >> guest: well, it is both. i feel advanced research is looking for dark energy. also advanced research in combustion and cancer research, looking at t-cells, but there is also basic science research, trying to understand basic physics properties. it is both. there is just so much science going on. it is just amazing.

>> host: experiments that you conduct, how many are nasa sanctioned, taxpayer funded, how many come from private sources, experiments you take on from other sources? >> guest: you know, i don't really know the numbers, but they definitely come from different areas. we have some nasa ones, some from the european space -- space agency, the japanese space agency, the russians, and a whole group which takes science experiments from all over the u.s. and combines them into a group from that area. they did to the be on board. it is a difference -- the whole bunch of different places. i just not know the exact numbers. >> host: you spoke about life in microgravity. i suspect -- and you kind of address this -- the toll that it takes on your body. can you describe what it is like living there without gravity, and if you could move around a

little bit to give folks a sense of what it is like. >> guest: yes. that is a good thing. first of all, anything you hold just floats when you little of it. that is good and bad. if i don't watch this, and about ten seconds it will float of. that is a negative. moving around is very much fun. i will give you a quick example of something to you can do. it -- [silence] i am not a dynast on earth. this is the only place i get to do that. >> host: do you hit your head? how long does it take to get used to? >> guest: definitely at the beginning it is more difficult. we have competitions. you have to get their rotation

without any side movement, and you can see how many rotation's you can do before you hit anything. >> host: give our viewers a sense of how long gestation is. what are we talking size was? >> guest: it is about the volume of a 747. it is quite big, quite large, about 250 feet long. in certain spots it is maybe 130-140 feet wide. it is actually quite a big. only six people up here, so it is not crowded at all. >> host: you said there were six people, again, from different countries working together on this. what is the working relationship like between the countries? >> guest: it is a very good working relationship up here. we have trained together beforehand as a crew, and so we got to know each other very well. we worked together on a daily

basis and really have no issues. there are always differences, but we have learned those. we are all good friends, and it seems to go quite smoothly. >> host: here on earth there are current issues concerning tension between the united states and russia. you have three russian cosmonauts on board. to those issues it discussed, and do you get any discussions about what is going on on earth? >> guest: yes, they do get discussed, just like any news event. we all discuss it. it is not like there is any negative to it. we understand there are politics going on. we also understand it does not affect our work and relationships. it really does not affect us, but it is discussed. >> host: what are the nature of the discussions like? >> guest: that is a good

question. it varies, of course, on the topic. on the u.s.-russia relations we could build into more politics of the country and more of the details about the culture and what that means in each country. if you break it down that way, you can kind of see what is going on of little more clearly. >> host: on the science side, commander, for instance, if russia decided because of relations they wanted to pull back on work at the space station how is the united states affected by that, and how are the science experiments affected by that? >> guest: well, right now the science is pretty much separated between the u.s. side, which includes the european space agency, canada, all of those, and then the russian side. the science is somewhat separated. however, we do require the russians for us to get up here

and get back down right now. hopefully in a few years we won't need that, but right now we need that to happen. that is probably the biggest deal right now. if we can't keep up here, we can do the science. >> host: commander, you can move around if you are tired of holding that position if you want to take the mike with you. as far as manning and staffing of the station, much of that now depends upon commercial aircraft what has been the experience with these commercial spacecraft stopping and supplying the station? >> guest: right now they are just supplying the station, and we are very happy that we have american cargo vehicles coming up. it is a great advancement. these are good vehicles. it does offload our dependence upon russia and other countries for that. so we are happy about that and definitely looking forward to the next development when we do get to a crew and american

vehicle which will change our dynamic quite a bit. right now it is just cargo coming up. it matter of fact, we will have one here in less than a month to give us new food and science to work on. >> host: as far as -- you said that next step, what is involved in the next step and how did things change? >> guest: yes, that next step is actually proving that the vehicle is safe for humans. we have a few companies who are bidding for that opportunity right now. once they start into that project, the end of that project by 2017, we will have a man to test of an american vehicle at that time, and they will probably do one test flight may be to station, maybe not. from then we will be rotating crewmembers on the american vehicle. >> host: how much input do you and the other crew members have

to these private companies? how is it received? >> guest: i personally do not have employed. nasa does have input. i believe it is received quite well from talking to folks to do that work. because these companies want to of succeed. they want the contracts and want to build a good vehicle, they really do. they do listen and try to make the best vehicle they can. of course it is a cost analysis going on at the same time. they can't build, you know, the most luxurious cadillac out there. however, they build a good vehicle. >> host: commander, you talked about moving forward, 2017 you talked about. as far as the station itself, how long is it going to remain functional? >> guest: that is a good question. right now i believe it is on

paper and tell 2024, and that is just more to certify the life of certain components and also for the resupply missions for certain things. so it could go wonder if we wanted. it all depends upon where we want to spend our money. >> host: what do you mean by that? >> guest: well, if we want to go -- nasa budget is limited, and a portion of it goes to space station and keeping it running. so a different task we want to take on, signaling to the moon or mars or an asteroid or whenever it happens to be, we might not be able to do both at the same time given how big each plan is. >> host: what is the role of the station in future manned space flight pass and then? >> guest: right now future of space flight, the station is a test bed.

we test all sorts of things up here. right now we have a recycling system for water. we recycle our water, everything , and we need that if we're going to go other places. and that is just one example. we are testing out new technologies that will enable us to go farther. >> host: you would say the station is needed past 2024? >> guest: that is a good question. i am not sure. it would definitely be a good test bed for all sorts of things. we can easily get things up and down from here, more than you could from a longer mission. that is why you want to make an update to your product or equipment. you can do that more quickly. it is a great test bed. however, again, a limited amount of money. >> host: say by 2024 nothing is decided, what happens? does it fall to earth?

>> guest: well, that will be a decision for management. consider the politicians and the nasa administration. however, if it is decided it is no longer needed, it will deorbit and burn up on entry. >> host: commander steven swanson, we every day go through our normal lives here in a gravity atmosphere. what is it like on a day-to-day level, in a weightless atmosphere? tell our viewers some of the things you may not expect about living in space and the things you may have to overcome because of the environment you are in. >> guest: year out. it is really the simple things that are much more difficult up here. getting up in the morning, shaving and getting yourself ready. about 20 feet behind me.

i do not have to go for, but things like that in the morning. you do not have a sink to wash up and. brush your teeth differently. eating is a chore because everything floats, again. it comes in packages and wants to go everywhere. all of these little things, and even tying your shoe ends up being differently. you don't have gravity, so you have to be more flexible. all of these little things you did not think about make it a little less efficient to be up here. however, there are benefits. we love it up here. it is a fun thing to do. looking out the window is fantastic. it cannot be beat. >> host: commander steven swanson, though, once you return to earth what happens? how does your body just? >> guest: that is the good

question. we work out two hours every day year to help in that return. the idea is our muscles will be strong and our bones will not lose bone density. that way when we get back we have to worry about our new vestibular system. once that gets back under control, which varies a lot between people. once that gets back under control you are still strong in your bones are good. it takes about six weeks' worth of rehab and you are back up into the 95 percentile, maybe higher than that on how you are feeling and what you can do. >> host: when you return -- how long have you been on board the space station? >> guest: i have been on board about two and a half months, and i return in three months. >> host: your background is in computer science. how do you end up an astronaut on a space station? >> guest: a good question.

i did go to work for nasa, which was a big help for me, and i decided being an astronaut was a goal. it really what i worked on was aircraft control systems. that is what my main work at nasa was on. that played into working on the shuttle and helping out. then i just got lucky on the selection process. there are some many qualified people to try to be astronauts. it takes a little bit of luck to get in, and i happened to get a little bit lucky. i had all of the requirements needed and a little bit of luck, and i made it. >> host: in about 30 seconds tell us about the best experience you have had on board the station itself. >> guest: well, the best experiences always looking out the window, and the best way to look out the window is not have a window in front of you. and that is going on a space walk. it is a good time, a fantastic

feeling. a little pressure on you at the same time, but, boy, it is quite an experience and something am looking forward to doing again. >> host: commander steven swanson, who is on board the international space station talking to us about experiences there. commander, thank you for talking with c-span. >> next, a house hearing on iran pulse nuclear program compliance. after that, president obama giving the commencement address at university of california irvine. one of the things people don't always recognize is that during the war of 1812, it was fought from 1812 until after 1814, early 1815. it was about america reestablishing its independence against the british.

this was our second american revolution. this flag is the object for --ch francis cut key pen francis scott key penned the words that became our national anthem. >> the flag was made to look whole and restored in 1995. there was a section that was reconstructed. when it was moved into the new exhibition space, there was a decision by the curators not to do that again. what we wanted was for the flag to become a metaphor for the country. but it stilltorn, survives. the message is the survival of the country and the flag. we are not trying to make it look ready. we are trying to make it look like it has endured its history and still celebrates its history. >> this year marks the 200th anniversary of the bombardment of fort mchenry during the war of 1812.

flag learn more about the that francis scott key wrote about. sunday night at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. eastern. history tv this weekend on c-span. >> on tuesday, the house foreign affairs committee held a hearing to review iran's nuclear compliance. the current nuclear agreement with iran expires next month. this is two hours and 45 minutes. >> this hearing will come to order. we will ask all the members to take their seats. focused ong, we are efforts to acquire

nuclear weapons capability. international negotiations over iran's nuclear program are coming down to the wire. indeed, an urgent push is going on as we speak. senior ministry officials -- administration officials are sitting with the iranians in geneva. some critical differences remain, including the status of enrichment capability, technology key to developing a nuclear weapon. inc's stated desire is to rease from 19,000 centrifuges to over 50,000. iran continues to stonewall international inspectors. on its past balm i can work. just the other week, the country's supreme leader characterize the requirement that is part of the final

agreement, they limit their ballistic missile program, as stupid, idiotic expectations. we can presume this will be a hard climb. , idiotic expectations i think we can presume this will be hard climb. meanwhile i iraq continues its support for terrorism abroad for regional domination in the abysmal human rights record at home where those who were not of the right to police system are executed. nuclear capable ibm would be a national security disaster. while it may sound far apart the administration will push very hard to reach a deal before the july 20th negotiation deadline. this committee may soon be asked to judge a comprehensive agreement. central to this is evaluating the verification measures needed to ensure

that iran cannot sheets. what types of traditions should negotiators do to mandate? with other elements? how does the of reliance impact its work? some say trust but verify some said there cannot be trust but the question today is can there be verification? they are sharpened by the fact that i iran's leaders have invested massive resources and decades of effort into their own nuclear program there. in richer and facilities built in secret a violation of its agreement with the iaea one even dug into a mountainside on a military base. another violation. when it comes to the iran nuclear program they have a history of deception, a covert procurement and

construction of clandestine facilities acknowledged only when revealed by the government adversaries. the dangerous regime has tied prestige to nuclear ambitions. given the record of clandestine i inactivity clear consequences for violating transparency and cooperation requirements must be spilled out one dash spelled out with a zero tolerance for cheating. an immediate test of the willingness to cooperate with the thames with the international observer group of the potential military dimension it has refused to provide explanation or information to the iaea on

past efforts including the military base where iran has gone to great lengths to eliminate all traces of any clandestine nine activity including demolishing buildings and removing a large areas of soil of the site. the willingness to come clean should be the acid test for western negotiators part we must ask what good is striking an agreement in removing sanctions our only leverage if i read it keeps the capacity to secretly built nuclear bombs? fortunately negotiators have already made a concession to complicate the task the interim agreement would

allow iran to have of mutually defined in richmond program to give cover the covert weapons program as technically speaking the ability to give the enriched uranium is perilously close for a nuclear weapon in. if it left with a capacity to enrich the breakout raises to a weapon is a permanent threat that undoubtedly would increase as sanctions are used and the world turns attention elsewhere. this is especially troubling given how iranian leaders and spoken to israel was the one bomb country. many on the committee are troubled that deal bob administration has us on track to an agreement the leaves a permanent nuclear threat to the region and it to us. today's hearing will be the latest warning against the

ill considered course of action will turn to the ranking member for his opening statement. from new york. >> mr. chairman, you and i have made a of a great deal as other members of the committee about the bipartisan nature of our committee and how we have worked hard to make the most bipartisan in committee in the congress. i must say after listening to your opening statement i agree with it fully. i share your concerns and i think these are concerns of many members of this committee all sides of the aisle. so thank you for calling this timely and important hearing with the potential agreement on the weapons program and we need to carefully examine how it

could be fully verified. one of the requirements what safeguards are needed to give us the confidence to develop a nuclear weapons capability. according to the iaea joint plan of action has pulled advancements to a nuclear weapon but as it became permanent it would be inadequate the status quo leaves too many unanswered questions and it is too close to the nuclear breakout point the comprehensive agreement is needed to end the threat of a nuclear iran. we're just weeks away from the deadline with a joint plan of action set for a comprehensive deal there have already been an extension of what we did last week the head of the iaea made clear his agency could not finish the ongoing investigation of the every

and nuclear program before july 20th that could work in our interest if negotiations are continuing but there is no deal with an extension. the negotiation have taken place behind closed doors so we cannot evaluate those specific details. i hope you'll have an opportunity to give in an open session when appropriate. whenever the final form that this will not be based based on the old acxiom trust but verify but on the contrary another round of mistrust and the iranians deserved every ounce of suspicion they have spent years to develop the covert program that has brazenly violated the treaty. under this cloud of mistrust to carefully examine one of the most important parts of

the deal. how to read verify firebrands compliance? may not make a mad dash for the bomb but everything i have seen tells me they will try to push the boundaries and test the will of the international community to respond. one of my primary concerns even if able to reach a deal we still don't know what we don't know. illicitly for carrying equipment but it is important and to reiterate that congress has an important role in the relief must be approved by congress. and we will have to be convinced that brings us

back to the questions facing the panel today what are the minimum requirements for a good deal? i know secretary kerry said no deal is better than a bad deal but will we agree on what is a good deal? what verification measures are needed to give us full confidence it is not cheating or attempting to break out? . .

a so i welcome the testimony of our panel of expert witnesses to help answer these critical questions. as far as i'm concerned i want to see a dismantling of iran's program not just a point where they have nuclear breakout capacity and not the point where they perhaps push it back a few months. i want to see them dismantle their program and i think thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. engel. we go now to ileana ros-lehtinen of florida chairman of the subcommittee on middle east and north africa who has been focused on iran for a very long time. >> thank you very much chairman royce and ranking member engel

for holding this vitally important hearing. while the administration continues to negotiate a bad and weak deal with iran while keeping congress in the dark it's important for us to continue to highlight the menacing nature of the iranian regime and the flaws in the administration's approach to this deception. we are almost at the end of the six-month agreement yet the administration has failed to properly consult with congress about important parts of this deal. where are the details? congress has been steadfast in our mission to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and it was only because of our efforts on implementing iran sanctions that iran has even agreed to negotiate. i authored authored with the support of so many members of this committee the strictest sanctions against iran and now we see all of that work undone by the administration that

misguidedly and dangerously trusts iran despite stiff gates of evidence that tells us mullahs are untrustworthy. time to wake up. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. we go now to representative ted deutch of florida the ranking member of the north african subcommittee. >> thank you mr. chairman. this morning's hearing is on verifying compliance. i fear the hearing topic might be a bit premature. we are now coming up on july 20 the end of the six-month period and before talking about the clients we find yourself asking what meaningful discussions are taking place on the number centrifuges? what is the plan to mothball iraq? has there have been any access to parching at all and finally and i think most importantly when will iran complete the

military dimensions of its program? these were the fundamental points we had to deal with during a six-month period and as we approach the end of the six-month trade the notion that we can simply extend for another six months because we don't have a deal yet is not an acceptable one. we need to have some sense that there is movement on the part of the iranians toward a resolution rather than only delay and i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we might do that. thank you mr. chair. >> thank you mr. deutsch. now we go to mr. to ted poe chaired the subcommittee on nonproliferation and trade and. >> since the giant planet direction was signed by around the p5+1 in november the administration has been negotiating with the iranians for it a final deal. i hope our negotiators are not the same ones that worked in the big deal with trading for bowe bergdahl.

it seems the white house would rather have any agreement even a bad one than no agreement at all great iran is insisting on the right to enrich which will allow them to cheat and come up with a romp. this could take a few months or maybe a few years. they could develop a bomb so fast that we would not be able to detect it or stop it and then saudi arabia turkey and egypt will want to develop nuclear weapons. we must insist on absolute dismantling of nuclear weapon capability in any agreement. we are not dealing with nice people. we cannot believe they will be honest about nuclear development. we must remember the ayatollah still insists on destruction of israel and the united states and we must remember the iranians are still still developing intercontinental ballistic missiles which can be used against united states so i have a lot of questions to ask. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. we go to brad sherman of california the ranking member of the subcommittee on terrorism

nonproliferation and trade. >> i greet with the -- that this committee was pushing for strong sanctions on iran over the objection of three administrations and iran was brought to the table only because congress imposed sanctions that were resisted by the executive branch. in these negotiations a lot of the focus is on whether iran will enrich and equally important is whether they will stop file. iran's persistence enforcement mechanisms betrays an interest in invasion. it is easier to reactivate a centrifuge cascade that it is to reassemble international sanctions. accordingly we not only need to negotiate with iran but mechanisms there will be to detect invasion that we negotiate with their european and asian partners on automatic sanctions reapplication will

apply if any violations is detected. finally our experience with the soviet union illustrates that you can negotiate a deal and enforce a deal even with an untrustworthy partner and even if that partner has capacity for invasion than iran. i think a deal is physically possible. the question is whether we will reach one. >> thank you mr. chairman. we are joined to help us think through these critical issues we are joined by a distinguished group of experts here. mr. lauder, mr. john lauder is a senior adviser to 2020 strategic consulting and served as deputy director of the national reconnaissance office for national support and was director of the dci nonproliferation center. we have mr. olli heinonen at a senior fellow at the harvard

kennedy school of government center for science and international affairs. previously he served 27 years that the international atomic energy agency in vienna where he was deputy director and head of its department of safeguards. we have ambassador detrani. prior to assuming his role of president of the intelligence of national security alliance ambassador joseph detrani served as a senior adviser to the director of national intelligence and he was director of the national counter proliferation center. and we have mr. stephen rademaker. prior to joining the policy center is a national security project advisor mr. rademaker served as assistant secretary of state for the bureau of arms control in the bureau of international security and nonproliferation. friday that he served as deputy staff director and chief counsel of this committee and we welcome

him back. so let me say without objection the witnesses full prepared statement will be made part of the record. that is to encourage you to synthesize this and give us a five minute. the members will have five calendar days to submit statements and questions and any extraneous material for the record. mr. rademaker if you would summarize your remarks we will begin with you. >> thank you mr. chairman and congressman congressman engel. it's a real pleasure for me to appear before the committee. it's always nice to come home to an office building. i joined the committee staff in 1993 and one of the foremost issues of concern of the members of the committee in 1993 was the risk that iran might acquire a nuclear weapon and to me is really astonishing here we are more than 20 years later and

this remains one of the foremost threats to national security. i just want to observe at the outset that i think this committee has consistently paid attention to this problem for more than two decades and he provided extraordinary leadership to our nation and i think the american people are very well served by the leadership that this committee is provided under a number of chairman over the last 20 plus years. i'm glad to see you're continuing to pay attention to the problem is demonstrated by today's hearing. i have submitted a prepared statement and so perhaps i will just summarize the key points that i make. the first i make in my prepared statement is that iran is not like other countries that say they want to develop civil nuclear energy. they have a track record of

deception covert procurement of the totality of the evidence strongly suggests that iran is interested in building a nuclear weapon. they can't be treated like a normal country and that is why the question of verification of any agreement that is reached with iran is critically important and that is why this is a timely hearing we are having today. the second i make and i say if you only take away one point from my testimony today i wanted to be this. today we are very much focused on verification of the joint plan of action in the so-called comprehensive solution is being negotiated now between the two sides in vienna and a lot of the focus, most of the focus in verification discussions is how do we verify their compliance with the jp a eight and had we verify their compliance with the

conference of solution. i think that's important given iran's track record and i'm joined by experts that will have deep insights into how you go about trying to detect cheating by iran on those agreements. my critical point to you is the focus of verification has to be broader than just compliance with the current agreement and the one that's being negotiated right now. it has to -- verification has to look at what has happened in the past and answer questions about the past. it also has to and this is even more important, think we need to be worried about permanent verification because as i explained my testimony the framework of the joint plan of action in the conference of solution is that there is to be a long-term agreement here but it's not a permanent agreement. it needs to be time-limited and that is agreed by the obama administration and the p5+1. what is being negotiated now

will be in agreement that applies for some period of time. my understanding is the iranians wanted to be in effect for five years. others are saying at least around 20 years. i don't know what the p5+1 is at seeing that the duration of this conference of solution is going to be somewhere between five years and 20 years. that remains to be negotiated. all of these discussions you are hearing now about limits on the number of centrifuges and the amount of bridged -- and rich material goes will apply well a conference of solution is in effect that the gba is crystal clear that when that term expires when the agreed duration of the conference of solution is reached all of these limitations and then iran comes like any other country. everything goes away and let me read the language. this is following successful implementation of the final step of the conference of solution for its full duration for period

that they agreed to the program will be treated in the same manner as that of many nonnuclear weapons state party. what that means is after five years or after 20 years or whatever the period is nuclear sanctions in iran go away. that's the u.n. sanctions on iran have to go have to go way, our sanctions on iran have to go away. all of that will end at that point. restrictions on nuclear commerce with iran and so iran can be singled out and treated differently than other countries. we can't have export controls that treat iran differently than other countries. nor can the rest of the international -- iran becomes a legitimate partner so the idea of a conference of solution is for a period of time if iran behaves if they are not caught cheating and they uphold their commitments of the conference of solution at the end of the

conference of solution they go from being a nuclear pariah to in the rear partner. and at that point they are subject to the same verification that germany or japan or any other country subject to and that basically consists of two things. it consists of iaea verification and the comprehensive safeguards agreement and secondly the additional protocol which is an enhanced verification that iran is committed to ratifying and implementing under the gpa -- jpa. there will be more robust verification agreed to under the conference of solution and the parties are talking about that but the more robust verification will and when a comprehensive solution and then we revert back to the additional protocol encumbrance of safeguards. the same verification at every same verification of every other country in the world is subject to and i think it's a critical question with a committee to ask whether you are prepared today to agree that iran behaves for

certain period of time then we are prepared to end in their sanctions. we are prepared to end special scrutiny of iran and treat them as if they were -- i point out in my testimony there are other examples of countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons programs and we have accepted that. once they abandon their nuclear weapon program which become like a normal country. brazil and argentina are examples but what was different in those cases was not only did they say they were banning the nuclear weapons programs and taking steps in that direction but in those cases as it was a fundamental change in government in south africa the apartheid regime ended and military governments gave up our and elected governments. it was logical in those cases to accept that there had been a fundamental change and the government perhaps was no longer interested --

interested in nuclear weapons. ahmadinejad can be the leader of iran when the conference of solution lapses and ahmadinejad will be treated as if -- this country will be treated as if it is japan. so when we talk about verification i think yes absolutely we need to focus on verification of the jpa the conference of solution because for a country with iran's track record we have to be suspicious that there'll betrayed cheating that we have to get to the bottom what happened in the past. there are lots of unanswered question and the jpa does not compel to iran to answer these questions. it it sets up an mechanism for discussion but there are no consequences attached if iran fails to cooperate. if the questions remain unanswered jpa goes forward nonetheless and something needs to be done about that to make sure we get answers to the degree to which they pursued a

military nuclear program and even more important in the future. i think the committee needs to consider are you satisfied with the standard safeguards and additional protocol is the only verification that will apply to iran's nuclear program upon the expiration of the conference of solution. >> thank you mr. rademacher. mr. lauder. >> thank you very much chairman rice ranking member engel and members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to be here today to help address this vital national security topic long-term iranian compliance with a potential nuclear agreement. i appear before you today in my capacity as someone who was monitorinmonitorin g and verification over several decades. the views that i will be presenting are my own and are not intended to represent the views of organizations with whom i've been affiliated such as the intelligence community the

department of defense and the end science forecast on the assessment of nuclear treaty monitoring and verification. my statement draws in part on those experiences and on the defense science forecast report as well as the work of a the nongovernmental task force on verification requirements for nuclear agreement with iran. neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether compliance with any particular nuclear agreement is verifiable. indeed we do not yet know the details of the monetary provisions that will emerge in the iranian agreement under negotiation or if such an agreement will be concluded. the defense science forecast report underscores that monitoring nuclear programs is very challenging and that the technical capabilities that do so are limited. what the report suggests is the number of steps that can be taken to make monitoring more effective to develop additional

tools and approaches and to mitigate but not entirely eliminate the risk. mr. chairman i've submitted a statement for the record that outlines key elements to facilitate compliance monitoring elements that i would suggest should be part of an agreement with iran and cord to the way in which the united states and the international community approaches monitoring and implementation of the agreement. the implementation of the monitoring regime should be sufficiently rigorous to determine whether iran has made a fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and toward a culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. i believe that the monetary -- monitoring provisions will be the main determinant of the agreement success and established the essential foundation for all the other provisions.

effect of monitoring needs to be able to detect a rapid breakout from some facilities known to us in a slow sneak out from covert facilities. in agreement with iran should hence provide one a full explanation of past iranian nuclear activities with possible military preventions and to iran's atomic energy agency about such such activities explains who is involved, what actions were taken and where they took place. there can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities has ceased. second a complete data declaration and robust inspection of iran's nuclear activities and material and equipment. critical parts of iran's nuclear programs are still not well understood by the international community. a final agreement must allow access to sites persons and records sufficient to make

iran's nuclear program transparent. third and effective means of monitoring all of iran's procurement activities with possible nuclear activities. a final agreement must prevent iran from continuing to import illicitly materials. the best way to accomplish this is to set up a channel for nuclear imports that might be allowed by the agreement. imports outside the channel should be permitted which would reduce ambiguities detected by the monitoring process. successful monitoring regimes in the past have achieved effective verification of compliance for a combination of measures which may be held up as a standard by which you judge the adequacy of the regime to be applied in iran. based on past experience in iranian monitoring regime should include a combination of negotiated data declarations and

inspection measures and national and international monitoring as well as the consult of the body for anomaly and dispute resolution. the key to all these measures working effectively is the synergy created among them. data declarations tell us where to look and retained inspections audit the declarations. national and you know black robe intelligence detect anomalies and challenge inspections to gather more information relevant to the resolution of those anomalies. i recognize that not all of the measures that i recommended my statement will be easily the go shevell or ready for rapid implementation but our goal should be to bring iran from its prior pursuits of nuclear weapons capabilities into what i called earlier culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. we should seek to do this in negotiations with iran by seeking agreements and securing

agreement to affect agreements. we can also reinforce the culture or compliance by vigorously implementing the monitoring regime. some of that implementation will fall in the international atomic energy. others will be busy carried out by the p5+1 itself including u.s. government agencies. the congress can play a positive and strong role in insisting on effective verification providing the resources necessary for monitoring and being attentive to compliance issues that may emerge. thank you again to the committee for the opportunity to present some of my ideas on this vital topic and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we go to mr. heinonen. >> chairman rice ranking members thank you very much for inviting me to talk here today. in my testimony i am focusing on

the verification aspects of a comprehensive deal. i am basing my remarks on implementation of safeguard agreements and security resolutions in iran and complement them with experiences drawn particularly from verification activity and monitoring activity in south africa after its demand pulling up its nuclear program and some experience drawn also from safeguards in syria and north korea. timely detection of prevention prevention of the development and acquisition for states capability to produce -- development of weapons of mass destruction is one of the closest interstate. there are things which we know in their aspects which we can perhaps use but also those which we don't know.

due to the fact that iran has been running parts of its program without satisfactory applications to the iaea and disregarding security council resolutions is -- david albright has recently made compromises with negotiators drafting the conference a final agreement. i will now highlight some details which would be included to a final agreement. the strength of the iaea verification system is access to monetary equipment and people. however the safeguard is not cheering everything. no system can provide absolute

assurances that it fully comply with its undertakings. this is especially the case when applied to states that are noncompliant like iran. throughout the history of discussions of the nuclear program of iran iran has always brought transparency, transparency to build the governance of the international community for the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. president rouhani has recently offered again transparency is one of the tools. such transparency should be implemented in a meaningful and systematic way. even if iran decides to show limits such limits can bear substance only of substance discussions take place explanations are provided and those are verified.

hence openness should be clearly defined and become legally binding undertaking to be granted when problems arise. the state has to declare all nuclear material in its territory. thus military sites do not form sanctuaries but they iaea has to break the safeguard agreement and complementary access under protocol when appropriate. the purpose of the verification in the nonproliferation records. in order to assure that iran has fully complied with its safeguards obligations under the safeguards agreement and fully implemented the verification and clarification of the requirements made by the aia board of governments and u.s.

security council council but in addition to those measures additional measures are needed. iran has to provide all aspects of the past and current nuclear program including military issues. iran has to provide information on and material up source of -- resources like yellowcake. in addition to that iran has to provide informatiinformati on on all imports and domestic production on nuclear items as specified in the guidelines of the nuclear supply. this access including short notice in all areas with regards to people and material as required to the iaea and finally a few words regarding a possible military diagrams. why does it matter?

there are -- in 2003. on the other hand iaea has asked in his reports that some of this work has -- is important to understand the statements of iran's military related efforts noting that one of the last duties of people and organizations involved was to document the work they have done. one possible reason for such effort could have been to save information for further use. unless properly addressed it would be difficult to -- it would also render it difficult for the iaea to determine an ear nuclear activities are not ongoing. without answering those questions the iaea will not be able to come to conclusion that on all nuclear -- thank you.

>> thank you ambassador. >> thank you chairman rice ranking ranking member and go distinguished members the committee. thank you for inviting me having this important hearing. let me say effective monitoring of any agreement with iran will be exceptionally challenging. iran has demonstrated record of violating its safeguards agreement with the iaea the lack of transparency into iran's nuclear program was cited and i committed by iaea numerous reports from the director general to the board of directors. iran was negligence or land clearing the dash in 2002 the original plan in 2009. in fact iran acknowledged both facilities after they were exposed by an opposition group and reported by the press. one has to be very cognizant as was indicated by the chairman

and the others this morning. the director general report of november 2011 i think a very important report provided disturbing details regarding iran's nuclear warhead development effort so would allow iran to acquire the expertise necessary to produce nuclear weapons. although there was previous reporting on weaponization this report was in stark in its concern about the military dimension of iran's nuclear program. this is a very central part of it, the issue here. it's not only covert facilities but the militarization of their nuclear program. director general in june 2014 a few days ago said the iaea needed needed time before they could provide credible assurance of a the absence of undeclared nuclear material in iran. a robust monitoring and

verification protocol will be necessary to deal with iran's nuclear program. this will be very difficult, difficult program to implement effectively. at a minimum it will required unfettered and i emphasize unfettered access to people and places. indeed if iran were in compliance with the u.n. security council resolutions offer betting iran from enriching uranium for monitoring and verification process to be easier and indeed iran as they say was interested in a peaceful nuclear program not only through enrichment of uranium that one could achieve in the choir the peaceful nuclear program. since iran reportedly will now be permitted to enrich iranian iranian -- uranium the test will be more difficult. some of the monitoring issues are an accurate baseline of iran's nuclear program meaningful him monitoring program that will attempt to verify come points with safeguards agreement. iran is declared 15 nuclear facilities in nine locations.

this is the totality of their program? insurance of the undeclared nuclear iran. assurances that there are no covert nuclear facilities in iran capable of enriching uranium are necessary. locating covert uranium enrichment facilities is difficult since spinning centrifuges is silent with no signature or signal. a iran announces intent to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities and to build approximately 60,000 additional sophisticated centrifuges. again monitoring the declared facilities employing sophisticated centrifuges with greater capacity and confirming the nonexistence of additional facilities will be a real challenge. the comprehensive decoration from iran on their program is necessary first step.

in addition to all related facilities a list of scientists and technicians were working at these facilities and is necessary. monitors will require unfettered access to these individuals and the relevant records. the right to take -- was taken in every facility would send samples to iaea e. labs. the issue of weaponization must be pursued with access to known and suspected sites in relevant records. information dealing with the miniature -- nuclear warhead to an iranian missile must be pursued for obvious reasons. access to all nuclear r&d work and sites will be necessary with and i emphasize this anytime anyplace access to facilities that manufacture assemble and test centrifuges. technical coverage of inspectioinspectio n will be necessary 24/7. technical monitoring of iraq

plutonium facility are pushing completion will be required since his facility has one purpose. one purpose using plutonium for nuclear weapons. if iran is committed to the peace for -- peaceful maker program iran should be dismantled. those are some of the issues that a protocol will have to address on the task will be massive especially if iran is permitted to instruct enrichment plans requiring improved centrifuges with greater capacity. determining that enrichment does not exceed 5% is so critical are low-enriched uranium level will also be a challenge if iran is permitted to enrich uranium at numerous facilities. indeed determining there are no covert uranium enrichment facilities will be a principle challenge for any verificatverificat ion protocol. thank you. >> thank you ambassador. you say the issue of weaponization must be pursued and we have all said iran has to sit down and come clean growth in the reasons enumerated at the

head of the iaea says we are we are not getting any cooperation from iran on this. >> that's a fair point mr. chairman absolutely and you mention in your opening statement the high explosive test sites. they have to come clean on all these issues no question. >> what if they are not forced to come clean? what are the implications of that? >> i think there are consequences if they are not coming clean. that is what the monitoring protocol is all about. >> anyway let's go back to mr. mr. rademaker's key focus on his testimony. the last line of the interim agreement notes that after implementing the final step of the conference of solution for an agreed amount of time then

iran is treated quote the same. the same as any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the npt. i think mr. rademaker in your written testimony he said this is a giant get out of jail free card from iran because means at that point in time for no more, no more restrictions on nuclear items. no more restrictions on the number of centrifuges against spin or the level to which it may enrich uranium. at that point in time under the interim agreement we have already conceded the that whatever the timeframe after that you treat iran like you treat japan or germany, completely legitimate. and what does that mean them for verification?

what is the consequence because it really just is a question of trust is in that? we begin with the argument referring to trust but verify but it is completely a question of trust if at the end of the agreement everything is lifted and there is no more verification. mr. rademaker. spain mr. chairman i think you put your finger on what i see as the biggest single challenge before us and that is it's really a conceptual challenge. the concept of the joint plan of action is that there is this workout period where iran needs to behave to fulfill its obligations. if they are not caught cheating during that time than all the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record the clear evidence for decades the

current government has been in concerted effort as has pursued a concerted effort to pursue a nuclear weapon. if they behave for 510 or 15 years are we prepared at that point to say okay we will let bygones be bygones and going forward to be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest to my testimony is logically for the iranians that's incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave so if what they want is a nuclear weapon they have been struggling. they have been under national sanctions under restrictions on their ability to report components. it's been a slog for them to get to where they are and they have been very persistent and they have stood up only with help from the a.q. khan network.

otherwise they procure things but it's all covert. if they behave for it period of the conference of solution they will be able to move forward with a civilian nuclear program with international cooperation. that is promised to them in the gpa. the logical thing for them with to be to take that deal, behave then once the conference of solution expires then very aggressively stand up a far more robust civilian infrastructure than they have been able to stand up now. tens of thousands of centrifuges much larger quantities of enriched material and then if you choose to break out do so with a much larger infrastructure in place with a much larger stockpile of 3.5% of enriched material or even 20% enriched material because once the conference of solution and

they can produce as much as 20% material as they want. >> one of the arguments to me by one of the ambassadors was if this comes to pass and iran of course is continuing its effort to destabilize other countries in the region and he listed country by country where they were you now from yemen where they tried to topple the government and were very close to doing so to their efforts throughout the region. we exhausted all the examples. you said a regime without intent and also having the intent to obtain nuclear weapons capability. you're in danger of leaving them with the hegemon for the region. and with their ambitions intact both in terms of their capability of this weapon and knowing right now that they can

destabilize other regimes and knowing when you lift sanctions that's going to be hard currency that they will use to destabilize their neighbors. the argument he was making i think was the veiled threat that other states would do the same thing attempts to rush to a nuclear weapon in order to try to offset the aggressive nature of this regime. what do you think this portends for proliferation concerns? >> are you directing that question to make? >> yes mr. rademaker. >> i think we have some history here that's instructive. in 1995 iran announced they wanted to build a civilian nuclear power -- and russia signed a contract with them to hell. for 10 years it was a policy united states under the untended administration and probably the first half of the push of administration to oppose that and say iran an oil rich country

and ample energy resources what do they need a nuclear power reactor for? we need to solve this. it was a high priority for the u.s. diplomatically to turn off the bushehr reactor. one of the reasons we wanted to turn it off was because we were afraid it would provide a justification for setting up an enrichment capability to fuel the reactor and that is what the iranians did covertly initially and when they were caught the facility was revealed and they justified it because the set was fuel for their reactor. the focus of our diplomatic activity shifted to their program and by 2005 the push of administration decided to give up in the losing effort to prevent completion of the busheir civil power reactor. i was in the push of administration at the time. talking points change. we stop talking about how they shouldn't have a nuclear power

plant and start focusing on the enrichment facility. the moment we did that what happened? suddenly it turned a lot -- it turned out a lot of middle eastern company -- countries were interested in having nuclear civil nuclear power. they think upon administration is proceeding on the assumption that we can change policy again and we can sign off on enrichment in iran and say okay we are prepared to accept enrichment capability. and the other countries in the region are going to immediately say guess what we need in richmond too. and then how do we say how does the united states say to saudi arabia actually we only trust iran. we don't trust you our ally and we only trust iran. >> my time has expired. thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. let's continue on that.

i am troubled as i said in my opening statement that while we are talking with iran they continue to enrich. i still don't understand how that happened. i just don't understand it. you mentioned mr. rademaker the one, two, three agreement with the uae. i had the uae ambassador in my office and he mentioned that agreement which does not allow the uae to enrich for peaceful purposes on their soil. canada has nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes and they are not allowed to enrich on their soil. if we sign an agreement with iran that of sensibly says they can enrich on their soil but only for peaceful purposes how do we ever get any of the other countries do not enrich on their

soil? i we been opening the door to you name it saudi arabia, turkey, egypt? why should any of those countries negotiated deal where they will not be allowed to enrich on their soil for peaceful purposes when clearly we are giving it away to iran and? >> i agree entirely with your question and that was the point i was just making. think once united states says we are prepared to accept enrichment in iran this whole effort over the past decade to stem the spread of that technology to other countries becomes untenable because how do we explain to every other country especially allies and friends of the united states, you are our friend so we are not going to let you have this technology. now iran, we are prepared to let them have it. i couldn't write the talking points for diplomats to explain to our allies when we don't trust them to have something that we trust iran to have.

i think what happens when we permanently accept enrichment in iran is by default we have to accept it anywhere else that wants it. you can try and make it a financially attractive for them to not go in that direction but if a country that's determined to have it to tell them it's a matter policy of united states that only iran gets to have it and not you i think it is not the case that you camp persuasively make. >> rouhani has said to cnn that iran won't dismantle a single centrifuge. the joint plan of action calls for a comprehensive solution that says "would ensure iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. is there a way to ensure that iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges?

>> i think the number of centrifuges is extremely important. certainly for the monitors. especially if they are more sophisticated and spinning and putting out that much more capability absolutely there's no question that numbers are important. >> let me talk about an editorial that was in the "washington post" a few weeks ago, three weeks ago perhaps. the editorial argued and i said this in my opening statement of that we can afford to wait, that perhaps time is on our side if the date comes up in july and they don't have a comprehensive agreement that might be in the

best interest of the united states to put it back another month or two or three or four that iran is still undergoing a lot of at is focus the sanctions and they might have more leverage if we let the date laps beyond the july 20 date. that was essentialessentially a "washington post" editorial. anybody have any thoughts on that? mr. heinonen? >> first of all we should not forget that the joint plan of action is very limited area today we don't know how many centrifuges iran has. it has not cut the number of centrifuges through do so is still likely building additional centrifuges. it's manufacturing components for the reactor and it maintains

maintains -- in addition to producing additional enrich uranium so in my view one should put a cap on this and not wait. the program -- problem does not come easier by waiting. >> you disagree essentially with luppo "washington post" editorial said about the fact that iran is still being hurt with sanctions and if we wait they will continue to be hurt and time will not be on their side. you essentially disagree without? >> i think it's a little bit of wishful thinking. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. engel. we will now go to ms. ileana ros-lehtinen. >> thank you so much mr. chairman pair had been on the record as approving the interim agreement and any subsequent agreement that does not require iran to cease all

enrichment activities and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. we know that iran can't be trusted. we have decades of covert activities related to its nuclear program to back that up. yet we are now relying on two things. number one that iran his honest with us on disclosing all of its nuclear activities and two that the verification monitoring and transparency programs that we have in place are strong enough to detect when iran is cheating but all of the verification and monitoring systems operate under the framework that is presented to us by iran. only what iran has declared as part of the program. last month's iaea board of directors report on iran's nuclear program the director general stated that the iaea cannot provide credible

assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in iran unless and until iran provides the necessary cooperation with the agency. they are all familiar the pentagon report that stated that the united states does not have the capability to locate undeclared or covert nuclear facilities or programs. so it's still very possible that iran could be continuing its covert activity and either the iaea nor the u.s. would have any idea and this joint plan of action did nothing to strengthen verification and monitoring programs or force iran to abide by the additional protocols. mr. heinonen thank you. you testified to our middle east and north africa subcommittee in january and he stated the gpo a

provides iaea inspectors access only to surveillance records not anywhere else at the facilities that the surveillance measures are designed to cover only certain activities how comprehensive are the surveillance records? is it possible that we are only getting access to what iran wants us to see and not getting the full picture that the cameras perhaps only focus on the door and that's what's going on in the room and also bad state actors that seek to acquire nuclear weapons and i'm thinking of north korea and iran and obviously libya and syria do so surreptitiously so what we now have is the administration and the p5+1 negotiating on the basis of only what has been declared. doesn't the success of any iaea

verification and monitoring program depend on access to all sites, all programs, all of the information and people and equipment in order to get the full picture? one other major area of concern that we should all have and which goes largely unaddressed many times as possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. the 2010 u.n. security council resolutions on iran ordered the regime to fully cooperate with the iaea on all outstanding issues particularly regarding the possible military dimensions of the program. that is not happening in the latest board of governors report states that not only is iran not complying but they have been extensive -- there have been extensive activities that may have taken place especially seriously undermined the iaea's ability to conduct effective verification.

my last question is we are nearing the end of the six-month timeframe. there is no -- been no access to parchin. does this undermine the credibility of the deal and the so-called monitoring and verification measures that we have in place? that question and mr. heinonen are we only seeing what iran wants us to see? how comprehensive are the surveillance records? >> iaea has several measures in place. iaea pass inspections between one or two weeks. there are additional measures so we are not relying entirely on the -- but it's important that it actually covers the

centrifuges and exit and entrance routes. more importantly is that it goes to the monetary mode so we don't use the iaea inspection resources in reviewing computer screens. >> we should modified to include all this. >> this is what i say in my written testimony. and one small remark whenever we verified the declarations and items we need to remember that this is a very time-consuming process. it's doesn't come in one month or even half a year. i give an example. we started this verification 1993 and the task force in the south african nuclear program ran many years without any iaea surveillance so it took until

2010 when the iaea was finally able to say that all nuclear material in south africa is in peaceful use. so it took that long of a time to come to this conclusion based on the practices and procedures of the iaea. iran would be something very similar. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> lets go to mr. brad sherman of california. >> thank you. mr. lauder i'm interested in your analysis that we have to look at breakout possibility and sneak out possibility. i'm not sure i understand what you mean by culture of compliance and i think the culture -- let's face it nelson mandela's not taking over in tehran. i think the culture will always be to try to maximize their nuclear capacity. mr. rademaker you brought to our attention what we knew and that

is after some period of time iran will be at least according to this agreement just like any other nonnuclear states except they will have signed and presumably ratified the additional protocol. let's say that's a situation. let's say everything they have now is frozen and de-thawed 10 or 15 years from now and they are subject to the additional protocol and that's about it. and they want to sneak a breakout. how long before they have a bomb? how long before they have --. >> i think my personal concern is that will be up to them. >> assume that they make an all-out sneak out effort subject only to the additional protocol. how difficult is it to sneak out if you are subject to the additional protocol?

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>> >> just does you indicated did your question mr. chairman, if iran news that a slower pace club facilities that we don't

know about, it could continue down that path to nuclear weapons in ways that normal iaea procedures would not be able to detect. >> would they be able to put together without being detected subject to zero the protocol five bombs in the five years after this agreement is eclipsed? >> go back to testimony director clapper gave before the hill where he said the fundamental constraining element or the fundamental point is what decision and iran will make stannic the decision would be to develop a nuclear capacity and don't get caught. work hard does anybody have an answer choose the

question? >> in the timeframe? >> yes. five bombs in five years? >> yes. >> i just take that number to a better estimate of what they could do subject to additional protocol assuming they don't want to be caught ? >> but with the strengths and the weaknesses with the nuclear facilities something that is and declared so it needs the federal analysis how it is set up.

>> that is why with the additional protocol. >> you don't agree? >> with the additional protocol it is the possibility because you still made unfettered access >> i agree but i have a slightly different concern. not how a quickly or effectively to break out or sneak out but if they choose to become a nuclear weapon state radio to have nuclear weapons if they can do that today and maybe two with three nuclear weapons if

they have the vastly robust infrastructure after the expiration of a comprehensive solution and then decide we will abandon the nuclear weapons state what will they have? it is not two or three but dozens what they will have upon breaking out with the much larger infrastructure. >> my time is expired but i think they will seek out than break out because if they have five nuclear weapons our response to their announcement and breakout will be considerably more similar to how we treated number three as they and gadaffi or some of his save. i yield back. >> i yield back with this extraordinarily time the hearing for our distinguished witnesses.

last week to forth we recognize the 25th anniversary of tiananmen square. bill clinton on may 261994 dealing human-rights with trade newspaper as her phyllis adjoint talking point no real consequence but i am concerned fast-forward to the plan of action that when iran looks into the eyes to get major concessions and they have already achieved that and how we put that back together this could be analogous to the infamous'' meeting with the germans. these are gave changing days and i am very concerned your services have been

extraordinary reminding as iran has a history of deception and clandestine facilities acknowledged only when exposed with day catch me when you can mentality of reminding me of traveling around iraq looking for a mass destruction we know what has six binding resolutions to expand trade and enrichment it has now changed of what we have demanded and they persuaded the united states and others to set aside its policy of no rights in richmond also the biggest concessions the ill-defined time period and at that point if you elaborated that a few times dangerous statement a moment ago. my questions is human rights

are the canary in though coal mine with conversations of the foreign minister says you can do a stroke to release the political prisoners then to say they may be in business with a sense of sincerity it is almost laughable in the preamble witnesses of members 24th iran reaffirm said under no circumstances will it ever developed in a nuclear weapons. if you believe that i will sell you the brooklyn bridge. trust and verify their all required but we are setting ourselves up to fail and russia is the friend or colleague your partner or what kind of friend will they be? the whole idea of the

generation if you could elaborate that further 25 years ought to be forever that iran could be construed to be japan and to make a very good point about the whole idea of argentina that matriculated to south africa , the examples are very well taken and you also said something that you need to anticipate that executive branch will be deeply invested in the success like the mission accomplished mentality with the threats to the region and the world that that to kill every if you could respond. >> i am happy to respond. it is conceptual.

space insists in a changing and government or your guiding philosophy but just looking at your behavior for a set period of time. if you behave as you promised it is york get out of jail free cards. you can go for word essay fully excepted legitimate member of the nuclear club. and making that promise up front all they have to do is comply with whatever is in that agreement. nothing more. but to me the american people don't know who is the leader of firebrand we don't know what they will be doing to promote a terrorism or

medellin syria or iraq we just don't know but we make this commitment you be hated here are the benefits that you get. i would suggest the judgment whether considered rehabilitated that is premature to make today may be to be made much closer to the event we make a judgment today if they behaved for 10 years or whatever then they will be deemed rehabilitated? congress will have an important role because i believe you will need to enact legislation to waive some of the sanctions in place. legislatively you will address this and in that context you ought to be thinking to what extent can we except the concept of

extraordinary verification ends they become subject only to the verification others are subject? that trust but verify that is the wrong concept floor iran it is verify but verify at a know how trust is a part of the equation with their track record. >> mr. chairman think you for this important hearing. after a long time i haven't worried about iran getting a nuclear weapon. one thing everybody on this committee and to hear the president say also it is unacceptable for iran to

have a nuclear weapon. and i was just thinking of your statements that concerned me that on your return here we're still talking 25 years later from the threat to in 1982 about iran getting nuclear weapons and unfortunately here we are today 2014 with the same concerns. and i would believe various administrations democratic and republican and have had different strategies to make sure we can assure ourselves i ran not having a nuclear weapon. here we are still at this juncture and this president

has proposed trying to see what we can do to talk with every and not only by ourselves but of unprecedented lovell's with our allies because you have to have every bet the there with the p5 + 1. as a year the dialogue go back and forth the question i asked sometimes when we were successful is when it became all bilateral not just unilateral. if we want to make sure we contained iran to not have a nuclear weapon and if they violate or don't allow the

iaea to get did then if we have to ramp up sanctions we would want to do that's with other nations because it seems that is when it is successful. so given iran's history from what i have heard that so far that makes sense to me that they will lot of follow-through we need to make sure we have unity to make sure those sanctions are not just done by the united states but also done by the p5 + 1 countries with is very important. i am going back and forth but the effort to at least initially that is made to have negotiations with the

p5 + 1 to make sure the iaea has access to whatever they're doing seems to be tremendously important because we have not been there before but to verify what they're doing or not doing. i am trying to get a sense that the effort made thus far in regards to the conversations taking place we don't know the end results to make sure we have them successful should've make the effort to buy the administration? to anyone? >> that is why the of monitoring and verification protocol is so point -- important unfettered access because we're concerned on

whether the station absolutely. u.s. security council resolution speaks to this that they should cooperate fully on all else to the issues that give rise to military dimensions of the nuclear program. so the u.n. security council comes forth with the resolution to say this. it is a very robust meaningful regime. >> anybody else? >> i have said some critical things but you should not infer from that that i oppose the idea to negotiate with iran and the nuclear weapons program to the risk of proliferation to iran.

as opposed to continue rain with 6 inches with a continuous nuclear development? that is not a good solution so that a negotiated solution is ideal if you can get it but it has always been possible to negotiate an agreement with ivory and we just have to agree to their demands and we have a deal. obviously that is not acceptable. >> you want to get a deal. >> we know it is not easy if it was we would have done a net. we know it is hard. this is hard stuff. that is why the hearing is stood and listening to you with this dialogue is good to hear sides from other countries because this is not easy.

thank you for your testimony about a time -- i am out of time. >> thank you for calling today's hearing and one of the great foreign policy challenges we face are preventing a nuclear armed dictatorship in their ran one of the things that has been lacking in this discussion so far today is the fact that we would not care as a fundamental difference if this was brazil, ireland's with the nuclear facilities that could result in a nuclear bomb.

we have one of the world's worst human rights abusers and the dictatorship has jails filled with people who want to get along with the rest of the world. perhaps the only way to succeed imagine permitting the dictatorship from having a nuclear weapon but frankly the only way we will succeed is to get rid of the blood dictatorship iran. if we cannot convince them we will not be able but just take their word for it with the new capability, i don't believe we can convince them through coulter of compliance they will change

their ways. [laughter] because they want to fit into the culture. when they have the bomb they are fanatics session we be supporting instead of relying on negotiations shouldn't we support those elements to over throat to establish a real democracy? anyone want to go on record? [laughter] i guess not. >> but if i could i use that phrase culture of compliance as aspirational coal in the sense ultimately what we are trying to do through negotiated measures or sanctions is to do bring

about a more open and modern iran the inspection and process itself just to the soviet union. >> but i don't believe the mullah want to be cool to go along with the culture i have two minutes left are the russians still engaged in the technologies going on the centrifuge to make weapons possible? are they engaged in this? >> actually the iaea knows very little about the iran nuclear program correctly

because of the limitations therefore it cannot fully investigate. >> for the russian and engineers still engaged in this project? >> there has not been direct engineers involved there is some with the weaponization part. >> so the actual building of this facility was a russian project? >> no. it was up power plant. >> that is what i am talking about was it built by the russians? >> yes. >> does this review should not make a difference if they have the nuclear power

plant? >> did indeed the centrifuge to start. >> i and a stand that but the point is when the russians came on board i remember going to the ambassador 1999 the american ambassador suggested we give the russians an alternative place to build several nuclear power plants because it would lead to this moment and nothing happened i said the same thing to condoleezza rice would year later and nothing happened. when they first started building the power plant we were leading up to this day and i would hope i'm sorry it looks like the cooperation level has gone down since this moment and perhaps it'll show a side of good faith on their part if

they would cooperate with us to do with the iranians indulge me for one more question. to any of you know, of an offer of the rusher and -- russian government to withdraw from the project early before the nuclear power plant was done? any offer made that could have prevented us from this point? >> i was told there was an offer we did not pay attention to its under george w. bush administration. think you very much. >> mr. rademaker you referred back to the two decades ago and and looking

at the panel with a comprehensive agreement so how confident were weighed there was not a facility? but certainly that there were not other enrichment facilities beyond that time? let's start with that. >> the answer to your question we have never been confident that there is a secret facility then for a long period of time that is all that we knew of even

more secretive underground facilities so is there a third underground facility somewhere? i don't take anybody could say we are confident there is not that is why the question is critically important in does near-term and the of a comprehensive solution betty van after words because when that comprehensive solution it will go way down. >> anyone know some of the panel confident these are the of the enrichment facilities? >> one of the reasons why all of us has been strong proponents of additional monetary measures that are comprehensive to go beyond

certain facilities is to at is the wing onainty about elsewhere -- going on elsewhere that is why it is important to get the precise and detailed accounting about past activities to be a part of the agreement.>> thatf most. no a little more away from the exploration and we have been talking for how long? and when was the first report? >> the first time was during 2004. >> so we negotiate during the interim period to get to the comprehensive agreement

for a decade. a decade we have worried about possible military dimensions that is striving congressional action and why we have been engaged in the deliberations over several decades but for 10 years we have 480 and known about this but yet what access have we been given during this initial period and what have we been given to the a other areas to richer iran has come clean on those military dimensions? >> bet is one of the robust regime as we go for it knowing what you just said. >> i appreciate that but it

is the chicken and egg situation a. how do we agree to the comprehensive agreement with a adequate lovell of verification if to date the most concerning issue the iranians have not been willing to provide any access at all? . .

>> the gpa, there is one session the jk that talks about the history. it does not use the term military dimension but that is what they are talking about. this is how this question is addressed in the j pa. would created joint commission of the two sides, the p5 plus one and the radiance. .t would work with the iaea there is a mechanism that works with the iaea to try and figure this out. nothing in the jp depends on it being worked out. it actually being worked out. in other words if this mechanism utterly fails to achieve satisfaction for the iaea that's unfortunate but it doesn't stand in the way of the rest of the jpa.

what's going on here? i have to say i think regrettably what happened was our negotiators found this to be a very hard issue because i think the iranians have a lot to hide. there's a lot of history that i want to talk about so this became a sticking point in initial discussions and the answer of the negotiators the p5+1 altima we settled on was we are going to shift this issue to the iaea. it's going to become the iaea's problem to get to the bottom up. we held a joint commission to try to work with them but if we don't get to the bottom of it that's too bad. >> i might of time that mr. chairman i appreciate that and i just hope given that it's now more than a decade that we have worried about military dimensions of a rainy nuclear program. the iaea longer for the rest of us at a bare minimum congress should be informed of the very detailed nature of whatever talks have taken place surrounding that issue before we should be asked to budge an inch

on any sanctions and in fact whether to extend beyond six months. mr. deutsch a thank you and i should talk after this hearing on that very subject. let's go now to mr. steve chabot of chicago. >> thank you mr. chairman. last year the asia subcommittee which i chair and the middle east subcommittee chaired by iliana ros-lehtinen held a joint hearing to discuss the linkages between covert and illicit activities in i ran and north korea and syria. it's been reported for some time that north korea has been assisting in supplying iran's missile program. given the history of north korea and the failure of the u.s. in the international community to stop pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons what lesson should be applied to the situation with i ran moving forward? and what provisions of any in the agreement prevent i ran from

outsourcing their nuclear program to another country as was the case with north korea. icu nodding so i will go to you first. c. i'm sure mr. detrani will have something to add to this point as well. one of the reasons i read in my statement that it's very important to have an effective means of monitoring iranian procurement particulaparticula rly if they are going to be allowed to have a peaceful nuclear program as part of whatever agreement emerges is to make sure that in the noise of those procurement efforts that i ran is not able to outsource significant parts of its nuclear weapons development program to other states or to nonstate actors the a.q. khan's of the world and are north korea and to get a good handle on the

procurement they are taking because there has been this long track record of i ran looking for various sources throughout the world that could aid its nuclear developments. the ambassador. let me in note in north korea we have a real example of how important verification and monitoring is. in 2008 when we were proceeding with the dismantlement programs to dismantle yongbyon there was a bare negation particle that they agree to orally. when we asked for them to put it in writing because that was a very robust verification protocol it required if you will unfettered access anywhere anytime samples taken out of the country and they refuse to put it in writing. since then they have not come back to the table so it shows how important verification piece of the equation is with north korea. i would think the same with iran with a very robust meaningful

protocol that insists on a unfettered access and samples and so forth. i will be critical as we move forward in this example we got from north korea. >> thank you. let a shift gears for just a moment. where does israel fit into all of this and their views on iran compliant issues and just what attention is being paid in that area? mr. rademaker? >> israel is obviously concerned about the iranian nuclear program and with good reason. iran and iranian need leaders have made comments about how israel should be wiped from the face of the earth or wiped off the map of the earth. so for a country like israel that's obviously alarming that

you have those kinds of statements coupled with technological activity that seems aimed at producing a nuclear weapon which would enable them to do precisely what they are saying they would like to see happen. so the united states has a lot to be worried about and iran's other neighbors in the persian gulf region have a lot to be worried about. israel has a lot to be worried about. israel is paying a lot of attention to this problem. my understanding is there's a great deal of apprehension and israel about the current course of the diplomacy. as i said earlier its eyes been possible to negotiate a deal with iran just agree with what they're asking for and we can have a deal. i think the israelis are concerned that the deal that was struck last year leans too far in that direction of iran's

negotiating objectives. they are allowed to continue enriching. they get sanctions relief momentum in the direction of tightening sanctions has all been reversed and then they are promised this get out of jail free card and they can continue to enrich at a level that is being negotiated right now and when that period expires they can do all the enrichment they want. they can do other reprocessing they want and none of that will be limited. the israelis are deeply concerned about that and my sense is that is going to rise to some tension in the bilateral relationship between united states and israel. >> my time has expired. >> we will go to karen bass of california. >> thank you mr. chairman. b-52 on the administration has intimated that a final agreement that leaves iran with the breakout time of six months to a year may be acceptable. i wanted to know from the panelists whoever chooses to answer what you think of the

idea if a six-month breakout window would be a sufficient period of time to detect and counteract and iranian breakout. go ahead. >> certainly six months as a short period of time with diplomacy and it depends how iran will deviate from the agreement. there are several options available there and if it goes for example in such a way that the only evidence the iaea has on the results it normally takes about three months to get it. six months is much too short a time because you need to take examples and you can perhaps analyze them but it has a lot of vulnerabilities and it's also very difficult to estimate the

unknowns what kind of perimeter you have there are and how long it will take to find out. you need to prove it etc. so six months is a very short and. see if i could just add i think some of us feel that there may be too much emphasis on a timeline because it's hard to say for sure iran is six months away from a weapon or its 5.5 months away from a weapon or even react to that time and i think that's why several of us have been advocating that the really important thing to get right in this agreement is to layer on sufficient monitoring system so you have the sense of what that attack status of iraq's -- iran's program because everything else falls from a. >> forgive me if i sound like a

broken record but that six-month breakout time is fine but let's bear in mind that six-month period will only apply during the. period of a comprehensive solution. when the conference of solution and some that will be in five or 10 years than all of the things that give us that six-month window go away. they will no longer be limited in the centrifuges and the amount of enrichment so the moment that solution expires it won't be six months. it will be six weeks. >> i heard you say that earlier so what do you think it should be? it shouldn't be five years it should be 10 or 15 years? what are your thoughts about that? >> on the comprehensive solution? >> right. >> i think the enhanced verification requirements, the restrictions -- given the history don't think iran should we permitted to enrich at all.

i think they should not be permitted to enrich but the restrictions on what they can do and the enhanced verification that applies to that should be indefinite until the international community can reach a judgment that it is satisfied that iran is not like south africa. they have turned a corner and they are no longer a nuclear proliferation. i think it's going to take more than good behavior before i will feel comfortable. >> you and several of the other panelists mentioned several countries south africa and brazil. are there any other examples internationally where it's been without a specific timeline? you know what i mean? in other words we continue --. >> i think they also gave up

their program. >> thank you. i yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you. now we go to adam kinzinger of alumni. >> thank you chairman and thank you all for being here and helping to educate us and talking about these important issues. as i look around the world and i look around especially at the middle east i guess i'm excited the administration is so giddy about the prospect of negotiations with iran. i think a lot of the pending negotiations we heard yesterday from the administration about how they are hopeful that the situation going on with the release of five taliban will help lead to a reinvigorated taliban to come negotiate with the united states. i reminded some folks in the administration that in fact pakistan is in negotiations with the taliban right now and a day or two ago 18 people were killed in an airport in the fight with the taliban. we look at the situation in

israel the israel-palestine negotiations and all the effort that the administration is put into that which while we would all of love that to be solved this questionably regional conflict in the smaller conflict on the basis of conflicts that surround the developing middle east. in negotiations with russia and how well some of those of don and syria and the situation we find ourselves in there. i don't have a lot of hope in the future of negotiations from this administration. and i would ask and i will assess rhetorically and feel free to comment later if you can think of any success we have had with negotiations with an enemy of the united states under this administration. we had her boot on the throat of iranians at a time when we really could have i think ended the question of nuclear arms in iran. it's always interesting to me how the iranians feel they they can be in any position at all to have any bargaining power the

table or have any demands from the beginning. we determined they should not have the right to an air weapons program and i think that pretty much says it. but that said i want to go an issue that has been touched on it very briefly. i can asks for the level of your expertise. can you talk about the iranian ballistic missile program? they are developing the ability to deliver nuclear weapons through the ballistic program. i'm curious whoever wants to go first talking about the situation where iran finds itself with ballistic missiles. mr. lauder? >> there are raining ballistic mullahs -- missile program is a capability that is of concern and in fact if it would be difficult to negotiate at this stage given what has transpired already but

i would think it would be very important to begin to find a way to add additional constraints on that program and to add additional monitoring against the program. you may recall in the heyday of arms control agreements between the united states and the soviet union we chose to focus on delivery vehicles because they were easier to to monitor in some ways than an air weapons themselves or the nuclear programs themselves and i think constraints and monitoring of the uranium ballistic missile program would be a very useful complement in the types of things we have been talking about safari. >> but do we have the ability to do that? when you're negotiating with the russians and you have arms limitation agreement and you have two superpowers those with a vested interest in trying to calm the situation this is an asymmetric situation. iran is no soviet union.

do we really believed we could put in place a way to monitor? are there ways to put in place to monitor what they are doing and deal with the assurances that they are not hiding anything in the mountains are underground? or underground? >> one of the challenges we face is this is very much an asymmetric relationship. this is not where the united states is concerning some of its capability. we are asking iran to stop doing what it has been doing illicitly against international norms and international agreements and we are trying to trade off of sanctions against that. we know how to monitor missiles and we certainly have a track record of things that we could put in place if we could bring iran to that position. >> but your your point is right on. we are talking about weaponization and

miniaturization of the delivery system for ballistic missile program. they continue to develop it so is a central piece and an meaningful monitoring verification protocol the missiles have to be very much a part of that. spain mr. chairman -- >> we go to mr. william king of massachusetts. >> i would like to thank the panel for their very important discussions this morning. i think it underscores to me and many of our members the reforms fully before the agreement is to go forward and many of the issues you brought up for critical ones. my role is also as the ranking member on europe and asia and the emerging threats there so i would like to shift more into european perspective of things and how do you assess the role of our european partners in the pf plus five especially if

catherine ashton stepping down. will that have an effect at all in what you comment on that? our partners and how they are feeling the situation and give this your expertise in that area as well. >> my only comment on that would be the europeans are extremely concerned in your last question about ballistic missiles that north korea has the capability and they're working on that to touch europe with their ballistic missile systems and if there's a nuclear program so i think the european nations ought to be extremely concerned about the nuclear program, no question. >> do we have any comment on the effect of the u.s. dealing with the partners as well and this? with things could raise potential conflicts and what things could we do to ameliorate things going forward? >> sir on your question about --

she has been a central player. i think her departure will make a difference although we don't know exactly what the difference will be because we don't know who her replacement will be. we can depend on the personality of her successor. more broadly speaking the observation was made earlier that were sanctions policies to work we need cooperation of our economic gardeners and there have been plenty of hiccups along the way but by and large in recent years the cooperation is in pretty good. i think congress has provided incredible leadership in the sanctions area. the shorthand that is applied to this is the menendez-kirk amendment to the defense authorization bill. there have been two of them but the way they impose financial sanctions in a creative way designed to discourage the importation of iranian oil but

it was done very cleverly and in a calibrated way that has actually worked and there's a lot of conversation about frozen iranian assets in foreign banks. these are not funds that are frozen but funds that are being held in the banks and being briefed he. to in cash form to iran because of the sanctions policy that congress mandated and other countries are cooperating on. the partnership has worked pretty well. in terms of the actual diplomacy it's interesting. i was involved in it to some extent when i served in the bush of administration and there are times that some of our european partners take a harder line on iran than the united states does for example the current french government has been pretty firm in its stance on the iranian so

it's gratifying to see sometimes some of our allies take a harder line on the iranian nuclear program in the u.s. government. >> the pf plus one moves forward there is some kind of flop turned -- long-term agreement and some of the ambiguity and the lack of robust -- what are the concerns as a group? what would happen if lifting of sanctions unilaterally or as a group. do you see that is a concern going forward. that kind of disengagement? >> lifting sanctions like that would be that would be a terrible move and move us in the wrong direction. i think we have to be united on something like this. >> and then lastly i just want to touch base a little bit on russia. the u.s. and e.u. imposed

sanctions what implication of any will increase european demand for gas and our ability to sustain international consensus regarding sanctions on iran? >> the that's a pretty complex question having to do with the functioning of global energy markets. both iran and russia are major energy exporters and so i guess they both benefit from higher prices and they both benefit from the diversions of shortages so it is one of the challenges that i believe the united states faces in dealing with russia and the fact that something like 30% of european gas consumption is russian gas. there is an effort now to build a pipeline across turkey and to southern europe but ideally to be filled with gas and i think

the iranians would be happy to put their gas in the pipeline if they were allowed to do that. we don't want that to happen but the energy equation is a complex one and iran as the government is guilty of gross financial mismanagement so their energy resources are relatively undeveloped compared to what it could be with that or management. >> we go now to mr. randy weber of texas. >> thank you mr. chairman. our colleague mr. meeks said that negotiating with iran is not easy and i thank you mr. mr. rademaker would -- negotiation would be easy and my words if we roll over and play dead in every -- give them everything they want. was either said that? >> my opinion is that if we are not careful in these

negotiations we will get what we got in the guantánamo trade. we get to keep unconventional weapon. they get five nuclear weapons so it turns out adam kinzinger was correct. negotiations have not been kind during this administration. if we don't realize there's a danger of negotiating with iran we are fooling ourselves. anybody here on the panel remember when the first time iran referred to the united states as the great satan? anybody? >> november 5, 1979 but ayatollah khamenei so for 35 years. i don't know what time it was said israel was a smaller state so should we be saying when we

talk about negotiating with iran and the terrace here we are negotiating with the group of people who are radical is fundamentalist terrorists who the jihad is believed in exploiting terrorism to the extent that they will strap explosives on young boys and girl's to kill other foisted girls and we think we can negotiate with them? i believe it was you mr. lauder who said we need a list of all of their scientists who are working on their program? i don't know if you saw "the wall street journal" article on may 27 where there's a group of opposition leaders who have identified motion foster is our day i think is his name as the father of a nuclear weapon. would you agree with that? and mr. chairman by the way

mr. chairman if i may have would like to get this letter into the record. >> without objection we will include that. >> would you agree with that? >> i think it's very important that we have access as part of the regime of the key personnel on the part of iran's nuclear program. >> you agree that he's the father of the nuclear program? >> i don't know. most nuclear programs probably have multiple fathers. >> but do you know this gentleman? mr. ambassador you are shaking your head. turn your mic on please sir. turn your mic on. >> i've heard the name before sir. he's affiliated with the nuclear program. >> would you give this credence versus something you heard in passing? >> i think there's something to it. >> okay.

>> you mentioned also mr. lauder that the facility first of all that we should get that list of those involved those scientists. we should have anytime anyplace access for 24/7. i think it was you that said that in today's hearing which i can't agree more on. if we keep it in the context that we have terrorists who will kill innocent children men and women and who had been lying and doing such for over 35 years. how long do you think we have to give them a chance to prove themselves? trust but verify 24/7 anytime anyplace access? should it be 35 years? should they stop their exporting of terrorism or i should say supporting syria right down the list afghanistan and iraq all the terrorists they are supporting should be 35 years or is 35 months long enough or not long enough? we will start with you mr. mr. rademaker.

>> the question is how long should we expect to be compliant before we can trust them? >> i have a hard time answering that. it's sort of like the supreme court. i will know it when i see it. i don't think you can measure this by a timeline for it i think the measure of whether you can trust iran will be the totality. >> okay i've got you. >> who is in power there and what policies are they pursuing. >> what do we catch them with if we are diligent enough? i'm almost out of time. let's go to mr. lauder for a minute. >> i agree with some of the comments mr. rademaker made earlier that we have to be about this monitoring and verification regime for the long-term. >> six months karen bass bass asked the question six months is long -- not long enough for great?

>> has to be longer. >> very quickly because i'm out of time. what do you think the length of time out to be? >> more than six months but it's how the compliances dealt with. what kind of process will have in place when something comes up when we see iran has not complied. the track record is fair. >> forgive my. >> i would say this is going to be indefinite. the part of the npt is fair. you're going to have to have those launches and they have two have the protocols and the unfettered access is going to have to be there indefinitely. >> thank you mr. chairman. i yield back the. >> we go to mr. david cicilline from rhode island. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you to the witnesses for this very useful testimony of very serious issue. the principle challenge we face

as a country is how we reach agreement with the party with very serious consequences that has been deeply untrustworthy and deceptive and i think in part our success depends on our ability to monitor effectively and to respond effectively to any failings to any agreement. i want first asked the witnesses, the joint plan of action calls for a conference of solution that and i quote that would ensure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful end quote. we have also heard of president rouhani say that iran will not dismantle a single centrifuge and so my first question is, is there a way to ensure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuge is? ..

just a year ago, they had 20%-30% levels that would have given enough new leader weapons. what they have for now is sufficient, no question about it. >> you were about to say something? say their nuclear program is exclusive. they will say, we do not have to do anything because it is exclusively a program. we do not accept that. if your question is how many centrifuges can they be operating and we can be isfident, my personal answer

a with the current government, the history, everything we know was where they have been, the to say i am for me confident their program is explosively peaceful, my answer is zero. we are in a situation under the number ofwill be some operating centrifuges. that trouble me because i do not andrstand why they need -- i think it is a logical conundrum. their argument is, we are developing infrastructure for our civil nuclear program. do needuy that, as they a lot more centrifuges than they have now. are going to negotiate some number that will be lower than what they have now and that is evidence of