>> commitments like the ones aplemented contribute in meaningful way not just to the security of individual countries, but to our joint security. while he continued to proceed with implementation of security enhancements, several factors have led us to consider a new strategic approach to addressing a dirty bomb threat. factors that we considered oflude the large number radioactive sources worldwide, the fact that we secure or retire existing sources, even as new sources and new devices are being introduced, the long-term cost for sustaining security forems, the limited options disposal of these sources, and the general constraints within the federal budgets. the grand challenge we should

consider is how we can achieve permanent risk reductions, rather than continuing in the current preventive posture. just as we have demonstrated that highly enriched uranium is not necessary for producing critical medical isotopes, and we can eliminate it from that technology cycle, can we apply the same principle to radiological sources? not only torive further enhance security, but to reduce the size, complexity -- size and complexity of the overall problem. the centerpiece of this strategy is to engage in a worldwide effort to provide reliable, nonradioactive alternatives to the highest activity radioactive sources that pose the greatest risk. we will need to have the

engagement and active participation from the research industry and medical communities, but the potential benefits removing the risk of a dirty bomb altogether are significant. considering a range of incentives for replacement where commercially viable alternatives exist is something we are investigating. we are also collaborating with our research and development office to explore and assess technical improvements that could be developed and transferred for commercialization. we recognize that we may not succeed in replacing the need for all sources, for example, radioactive industrial sources such as mobile well logging and radiography sources may not have an except the bull and viable alternative. in such cases, we are collaborating with industry partners to develop innovative and sustainable security solutions.

we have seen that other countries are willing to go above and beyond international norms and standards for radiological security through collaboration with our programs and through commitments that have made us a nuclear security summit. i've also seen domestically that takengreements have radiological security to a higher level. while we have an important role to play, we also encourage all other states to show the same initiative, to demonstrate leadership, and commit resources to take radiological security beyond minimum requirements. attention andyour i am happy to answer any questions. >> dr. gowadia, we please give your testimony at this time? >> good morning, chairman.

i fully extend thanks for all of you that this hearing. it is a good opportunity to present to you and discuss with to prevent and prepare for radiological offense. i am honored to be here today to testify with my distinguished colleagues. domestic nuclear detection office, we are singularly focused on the makear threat and seek to nuclear terrorism a prohibitively difficult undertaking for our adversaries. enhance thend global nuclear detection architecture which is a framework for detecting, analyzing and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of our regulatory control. although my office focuses on detecting materials once they are lost or stolen, we work very closely with our colleagues at the department of energy and the nuclear regulatory commission

who are responsible for the safety and security of these materials. our approach is based on the iad ofal tr intelligence. the first leg of the triad, intelligence and information sharing is the backbone of our detection architecture. are crucial to the deployment of resources and operation. and bring past cases this knowledge to bear on the development of future architecture and systems. the domestic nuclear detection offices center enables information sharing and provides adjudication support and situational awareness. to increase the awareness of lostinsulin stores is --

.ources the second leg of our triad is law enforcement offices and first responders. domestic nuclear detection office works to ensure that they have the necessary capabilities and are well trained and ready for the mission. since 2005, through many collaborative efforts, we have provided training for law enforcement personnel and first responders. approximately 15 exercises per year while enhancing collaboration and building trusted networks. today, the office has engage to 29 states to raise awareness of this threat. we assist our state and local partners as they develop their own programs.

we work with them to build a flexible architecture that can be integrated into a unified response in the event of a credible threat. will have of 2015, we expanded these efforts to cover all 50 states. we provide mobile detection deployment units. these are designed to supplement existing local detection and reporting capabilities, especially in support of national security. the program was instituted in 2008, and the trailers house equipment for up to 40 personnel. will complete our hundred 50th deployment of detection units. acquiring and deploying centers for the department of homeland security,

the domestic nuclear detection office collaborates with federal research and development partners, as well as industry, academia and national laboratories to bring the right technologies to front-line operators. operators are always included in all of our efforts. recently led the development of the next-generation handheld -- radioisotope detection device. these are regularly used by law enforcement and technical experts in the field. identify keyly to requirements for the design of the system. is a deviceoduct that is lightweight, easy-to-use, more reliable. with your support, we will continue such efforts to develop breakthrough technologies and offer significant improvements and enhance on national detection capabilities. thank you again for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to protect our nations from radiological and nuclear threats. i appreciate your interest and support for the entire nuclear

agency enterprise. your leadership in our collaboration will help provide a safe, secure homeland. >> please proceed. have you served in the navy? >> five years of fact to duty, sir. 18 years of reserve service. >> ok. that means 23 years. a navy p three aircraft commander. we did a lot of surveillance during the vietnam war. he also spent time looking for u.s. submarines without much success. enough,re not stupid but they were so quiet. we found them through sound.

i am very proud of your service there. you are a retired captain? >> yes. >> omi. my son ben calls me captain, my captain. , as you work,y sailor. >> thank you and good morning. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission. radiological source security continues to be a top right party at the nrc. we continue to work with the 37 agreement states on domestic and a variety of initiatives. the events of september 11, two thousand one, changed the threat environment and resulted in significant strengthening of the security of radioactive sources. immediately following 9/11, the nrc, working with other

agencies, prioritized actions to enhance the security of radioactive sources. these initial actions resulted in the nrc issuing a number of advisories to communicate general threat information and recommend specific actions to enhance security and address potential threats. once the nrc identified actions that needed to be taken, the imposeissued orders to legally binding requirements on our licensees. by thetion, as mandated energy policy act of 2005, the nrc convened an interagency task force on radiation source protection and security to evaluate and provide recommendations to the president and the congress relating to the security of radiation sources in the united states from potential terrorist threats. this task force submitted its first report to the president

and congress in august 2006. the second task force report was provided in august 2010 and a third report will be submitted this august. 12, 2007ing held july by the permanent subcommittee on investigations of this committee, a web-based licensing verification system was discussed. in an effort to better track transactions of radioactive material, the nrc developed a portfolio of automated tools to verify licenses and track credentials, inspections, devices and sources, and events. this portfolio includes the national source tracking system, the web based licensing system and a licensing certification system. the nrc also ceased relying on the presumption that applications for a license were acting in good faith. instead, we instituted a policy by which the nrc an agreement

states would verify the legitimacy of act -- of applicants when first dealing with them. we also issued prelicensing various that includes applicant and licensing screening activities to ensure radioactive sources will be used as intended. also has implemented a process called the integrated materials performance evaluation impep.m, or the program provides the nrc integratedstematic, and reliable evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective programs, and it provides an indication of areas in which the nrc and agreement states should dedicate more or management attention. through a significant collaborative effort between the nrc and the agreement states, the agency developed a radioactive source security rulemaking to replace earlier

orders and provide requirements to a broad set of licensees. this rulemaking was informed by insights gained to the implementation of the orders. is ansulting rule optimized mix of performance-based and prescriptive requirements that provide the framework for a licensee to develop a security program for risk significant materials with measures specifically tailored to its facility. compliance with the rule was required for an oc licensees by march 19, 2014. licensees needd to fill compatible requirements .y march 2016 the nrc's efforts in material security has not ended with the publication in him because -- and implementation of our radioactive source security rule. the nrc will continue to assess

its programs to ensure that they promote the secure use and management of radioactive sources. this concludes my remarks, senator. i will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. >> thanks so much. , so nice of you to join us. testimony today discusses the challenges federal agencies face in securing sources in the united states and this depths agencies are taking to improve security. potential vulnerability of the sources was highlighted when a truck in mexico caring a cobalt 60 source was stolen. in our report being issued, we examine two types of sources, mobile and stationary. we have found that both pose security challenges, even when licensees follow security controls. portability, the

transportation of high-risk sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supplier churn. -- supply chain. nrc orders licenses to securities orders, they do not know how to do this by specifying the robustness of locks that must be used or even alarms that must be installed in trucks carrying mobile sources. we visited mets nrc's security requirements, we found great variation in the security measures employed. some companies only use the most basic of lots to secure -- of locks to secure these sources. in addition to these facts -- to and individuals

wearing a jacket with a logo of his state. this person gained access to the truck, so detailed information about the source, and left with two accomplices only after the crew had made calls to confirm his identity. regarding stationary sources, these typically involve manufacturing plants, storage warehouses and panoramic radiators used to sterilize food. facilities met our security requirements, some still appeared to have vulnerabilities. an exterior had rolltop door that was open and unattended, the walls of the cage inside with the cameras were stores did not go to the ceiling. another facility had no radiator on wheels in a loading dock that was secured with a simple padlock. in addition to the xfone her abilities, we found that some facilities secure their high-risk sources such as logging companies you do not have to comply with nrc security requirements.

it is required by nrc before an employee was given on the ax -- unlimited access. it is intended to mitigate the risk of an insider threat, which nsa have stated that the primary threat to facilities is high-risk radiological sources. under nrc's security control, it is left a licensee to decide whether to grant employees unescorted access, even in the case where an individual has been convicted of a violent climb -- a violent crime or making credible threats. one example, the individual had been arrested and convicted multiple times of assault, forgery, failure to appear in court, driving while intoxicated, driving with a

suspended license and twice for terroristic threats. the two convictions for threats were not included in the background information provided by nrc to the licensee. this person was not convicted of threats against united states, but of making violent verbal threats against two individuals. stepsport examined the agencies are taking to better secure industrial radiological sources. both nsa -- in addition, at the time of our view, nrc was preparing a guide for licensees. our reporting includes recommendations to review and consider revising the project and re-examine the cap. thank you, i will be happy to answer any questions you might have. >> thank you so much. i think we have a couple of photos here.

i will ask mr. trimble to respond to a few questions. you report included in it and number of visuals that were especially interesting. we have taken three of those photos and put them on these large charts. these present each of three to you in sequence. i want to ask you to describe the photo and a security concern that it represents. here is the first one. what is the photo of? >> this is one of the sites we visited. it is a warehouse storing radiography cameras. the potential vulnerability here is the large doors openly left -- is obviously left open and unattended. >> all right. what is inside that might be of interest? >> these are the radiography cameras that you had the earlier picture of. centraluse would be the

location where these cameras would be stored when they are not out in the field being used. >> could be two or three or maybe a couple of dozen? >> in this case they would be in a storage room behind a locked container. because they were in a locked container, they are meeting security requirements. open doornding the and the unattended nature of that door. >> any idea how many of those handheld devices would be required if someone knew how to handle radioactive materials? to whatnk i would defer my colleague said was the table here. >> ok. let's look at the next photo. please.

what do we have here? >> this is inside one of the storage warehouses for those radiography cameras. while thereee here, is a cage locked on the door, the door and the wall next to it don't go all the way to the ceiling, which is rather an imperfect barrier. inside of the cameras were locked in a container. notwithstanding the vulnerability, they still meet the requirements of the nrc. >> janet napolitano used to be secretary of homeland security as you will recall. i remember sitting here at this table talking to her about border security. alongked about building the mexican border with the u.s. defense or fences and walls.

she said she does a 20 foot fence and someone would come along with a 25 foot ladder. this reminds me of that. let's have one more photo that has been enlarged and place it on the chart. let's have a look at that and maybe you can tell us about that photo. this is a picture of a skylight. at nine locations revisited visited, we had unsecured -- we identified unsecured skylights at the facility. these facilities range from warehouse storing radiography cameras to scientific research facilities to large panoramic you radiators -- large, radiators. in the nsa program or the go in on a voluntary basis and beef up

security, skylights is one of the areas they were targeted terms of closing the means of ingress or securing the skylight. where the tell us building with skylights exists? were the devices we're talking about here, worthy locked up in theyure facility echo >> are still meeting with nrc requirements because they would still be in a locked container inside the facility. provides another way of getting inside the building to gain access to that container. >> as we all know, there are lots of containers and there are lots of containers. some of them are not for secure and others are quite secure. could you elaborate on that, please? >> i think was pointedly, looking at the trucks, some of

these trucks were secured with very simple padlock's. some at high-security locks and inside the darkrooms are these cameras would be stored, sometimes people would just have an army surplus container with a cable securing it to the truck, which provide a second lock required under the requirements. some took the mission much more and use reinforced steel containers and bolted down and did much more of a job to secure those containers. there's a great variability in the field. >> let me ask the panelists to react to what mr. trimble has said. ptain satorious.

we have a new security rule which i mentioned. we will look at that rule and see if there are things that we need to beef up. we put regulations in place that are risk informed and performance-based. you typically have a one rule itself. -- a onethe license is rule fits all. we let the licensees ensure they are requiring -- if they are complying with the rules. we provide guidance that will instruct licensees and how they can construct and operate their program in a manner that will comply with our regulatory requirements. we leave it to the licensee to

put their program in place, to document a written security plan . i have had to understand the security zone on some of these pictures to understand completely how all the details. i want to provide that short perspective. >> is this an honor system that is in place? should we self -- is itself policing compliance? >> no. we have an enforcement program that can issue violations and civil penalties, orders that will modify or revoke their license if necessary. we have a very robust enforcement program. like i say, we inspect these periodicity that aligns with the potential danger that might befall a member of

the public if they were to be exposed. an inspection program is quite robust. i am a former inspector myself. it is about a year program. it is formal classes that have to be taken and passed successfully. there are many on-the-job type accompaniments were you are under construction as you perform his inspection activities. , you're qualified as an inspector through a world board. is a rigorous program and only inspectors can perform these sort of reviews of licensees. >> did you say the regulation has been updated recently? >> yes, can you give us a reason of how it has changed? >> i mentioned in the 2005

timeframe we had done an at whatnt and looked things we needed to make regulatory requirements and what we typically do is issue orders that modify their license and has them perform certain activities. longer to gotake through the rulemaking process, which is a 2-3 year process. it involves outreaches to stakeholders and as of the public to help us in that rulemaking endeavor. that process took place and we issued that regulation in march of this year. it involves, as you have heard, a background check to ensure that individuals that are allowed to have access by , that they are trustworthy and reliable. the licensee performs that and makes a determination

as to whether the individual meets the trustworthy and ,eliable -- we have issued which my colleague had educated, which issued a guidance document of best practices for performing these types of reviews, so the individual that is responsible for making that call has guidance on what to look for and what things -- the other thing ing withres is liaison local law enforcement. if you have a plan that takes , you have the course to lay out a plan with local law enforcement so that they can .espond they are required to inform the .rc they call the local law

enforcement first and then they are required to call us. we get early notification so that we can outreach to our federal partners and make sure that is lost or stolen source with.en absconded >> can you give us an idea of come in? these reports >> i would say several a month. >> the vast majority of those -- 2005, i am sorry, two thousand 10, 11, 12 and 13, there has been no category one source lost. or stolen.

the iaeaory two, standards and their code of conduct identifies category one source is as if not a fee , securely secured protected, were likely to cause --ermanent injury to person to a person with improper shielding. these sources are used in a radiators and they are very strong sources. they tend to be cobalt 60. then, category two is one step down from that. if you are in close contact for behour or two, it would serious injury and possibly a fatality. >> i would assume that for

devices that the level of risk would be higher than the requirement for security a device would be greater and maybe inspections would occur more often. often does to us an idea of how often inspections would occur. other counties? >> it varies. it depends on the strength of the material is i will say also sources, ourone any timerequires that the source is removed from its storage container, it sets off an alarm. .hat is a new requirement ists.t's ask our panel

would you comment on the rule which the captain has just described? any of you, please. 537 didn't kick in until this year and it will roll out four states until 2016. manyi would highlight is of the problems identified in our report titled believe would be addressed. of:example, the issue location where some sites are not subject to the security requirements because they are separately stored, therefore -- some of the specific -- ity, thehe specific

issue of trustworthiness and reliability, i do not believe is addressed. situation is still being left to the licensee and there is no process or criterion which would disqualify someone from being given such a certification. youe's no process by which had a conviction or a red flag that would trigger a greater nrc involvement. -- dr. gowadia, you would you react to what the doctor just said? i think this is one of the places where we can play a special role. reaching out to law enforcement can often be very complicated.

there are many different layers. you might be in a tribal area. be a university campus with its own security police. it could be an environment where you have local, county and state police. part of what we do was above andy beyond the actual rule, is to organize tabletop exercises that involve all elements of the .ommunity these exercises really help bring together the different elements of the community that would be involved in response to any kind of incident. so far, in collaboration with departmentues at the of energy who do counterterrorism and counter proliferation, we have well over 100 of these exercises all over the united states. g i

if you were to try to regulate that sort of exercise come i'm not sure exactly how you could do it, but this is one of the steps by looking together at how we can collaboratively improve the security posture, we have come up with some approaches like that i think we feel are very positive contribution to the overall security. >> speaking for it the officer, i can tell you that the collaboration is critical, because the trusted networks, by virtue of these exercises and all the work we do in our trilateral meetings and our government coordination council, etc., they help us ills and

ability to get the early indicator, the early warning, so that law enforcement assets with the detection capabilities can respond and help them find the lost or stolen sources. we certainly support the regulatory work at the nrc and the additional work. it definitely enables our and the mission spectrum, the detection, to find and locate these. >> how do this if cards are been described here compare with other countries around the world? how does our work compare with that of other countries? >> this really is a global challenge. it is to the credit of the countries involved in the

nuclear security summit process that they really have brought radiological society security to the four since the 2012 summit when it was added to the list of active targets for collaboration. thattioned in my testimony the 2014 summit, in the country's made a commitment that by the time of the 2016 summit, we would have taken steps to secure all category one sources. that now is on our collective plates in the united states, to deliver that. we will work collaboratively with other countries, but i would venture to say that the photographs that we saw here representd reasonably

similar challenges within the international community. in fact, i was at a conference in southern africa earlier this year, and, as you know, very rich in natural resources. the countries are extremely worried about the dirty bomb the number of of sources, the lack of regulation, the lack of secure procedures, lack of a strong independent regulator to provide a framework . thosewill work with countries collaboratively to try to help them improve their profile. when i was governor of there is a clearinghouse for good ideas. i remember many a cabinet discussingn we were

the particular challenge in our -- they areg to my the gold standard. we are associated as a clearinghouse for good ideas. we had the ability did find out what other state -- contact people and how to get to them. to have the kind of capability? on and off we look from state to state, but it is not from state -- orte to see who is maybe from country could -- from country to country who has them most pages. >> i will speak from an agreement state respect of what we have 37 states within the united states that have signed an agreement, the governor has

signed an agreement with the chairman of the nrc where they want to take over the responsibilities for the safety and security of certain radioactive sources. we have a process that we reviewed our program and ensured that it has the right staffing and the right training. >> why would a statement to take over that responsibility? >> the principal one that i hear we charge fees for licenses and for doing our regulatory act verities. we are a 90% fee recoverable agency. we charge fees. they oftentimes can do it for less money, so that as a service to their constituents where they are able to provide those industrial users or medical users to use the sources safely -- come alliance with our

>> whether it is within this country or outside this country, please. >> you mentioned senator iacocca before. he was truly a leader in this hard -- >>ork very wiki supposed inspired him? -- what do you suppose inspired him? she worked very closely with the senator and the state of hawaii to bring them into full compliance with all regulations. as far as i know, they were the first state to do that.

>> ok. can you step a bit closer to the microphone, please? i think the senator -- >> my .ame is yana i think the senator was truly a visionary and cares about a lot of post-september 11 threats. there were a lot of indicators in the early days post-september 11. we posited that the gao look into the area. audits, whichhe

were painful and federal programs, but waste and visibility of some of the vulnerabilities we have, both the mastech lee and internationally, he was a clear advocate of if it can be done in my state, i have medical facilities, i have u.s. dea base, iors, i have navy have a lot of things right in my own backyard. it can be done in my state and we can increase the security posture, that could serve as a model going forward with other states. it was a push on our part. we had to focus on hawaii and major areas. his foresight and his advocacy clearlyissue articulated the need for others to step up and step forward.

>> all right, thank you very much. >> mr. trimble? we look at the issue of orphan sources and how they're handling this issue in france. they have some innovative ideas. cross --ot looked at a it would be understandable that if other nations,r other ,ather, have these devices whether they are mobile or stationary. if other countries do not secure those materials were obtained, they could be used for that purpose is in this

countries or maybe anywhere. what do we have two reduce the likelihood of another country not securing their material well? we protect our own borders and ports of entry, that we may not be able to detect or intercept any of that material coming in. >> at dhs, we believe in a multifaceted layered approach to our community. begins well overseas. in my absence, we work very closely with the international atomic energy agency. all 159 member states now have access to best practice guides

and building national architectures, exercising, training and awareness, and we are even beginning to teach some of the courses that the international law enforcement academy. that is our first outreach. we also work with our nations, certainly to encourage them to have layered approach is within their nations. i guess as i go to my answer, you will see me building a layer after a layer after layer so that we can make a nuclear terrorism harder and harder undertaking for the adversary. such asnformation manifests and data to focus our efforts. and certainly collaborate with our intelligence community partners so that they can get the early indicators in the early intelligence warnings. themselves, we have a very robust capability, almost 100% of the containerized cargo is scanned at our

seaports. 100% of the nuclear traffic is similarly scanned. we have well trained law enforcement officers in customs .nd border protection every boarding party in the united states coast guard carries detection. general aviation flights are met by customs and border protection officers who have the right equipment, and scan the incoming aircraft. these are just some of the examples i can think of. to make theinue right investments and appropriately balance capabilities to build strength after strength at our borders and with our international partners. >> all that is encouraging. so we are grateful for the work that is being done. i would like to say that , i say the road of improvement is always under

construction. the knee give some examples of what we are doing better today and what we have done in the not-too-distant past. name some areas in which we could be doing better still. >> i guess i will start. one of the things we do better today is informal our efforts based on a more holistic look at the risk. in these fiscally constrained days, we have to balance our resources to get the maximum bang for the buck. we are now analyzing risk informed schemes, building better feeds from information so that a mobile, agile, architecture can be the response to a credible threat. >> that is something we are doing better. . could not agree with you more

no matter what we're doing, we can always do something better, a lot better. with the adversary being adaptive, we have to continue to grow and stay ahead of their capabilities as well. you are the administrator talk , illicitrcising nuclear materials are not something a law enforcement officer sees in day-to-day basis. we must practice and keep our skills up to speed. we do that was some of our exercise, field exercises for reuse on, and sources to expose our officers to things they don't see on a normal day. since these are some of the activities integrated, exercising is something we can do better. functionnications always can be better. >> anyone else?

dr. claudia mentioned the global nuclear protection architecture. it was a white house review of and within the context of that review, some very specific areas for the programs that we run as the department of energy were identified as necessary to fill certain gaps, for example, our second line of defense program works very carefully and closely with dhs. we installed radiological detection devices in ports where there is a lot of outgoing cargo traffic to the united states. we try to catch things before they even are headed to the united states. we are particularly interested in nuclear material, but radiological sources are also a

very big concern. a large number do get caught through this system, identified, isolated and then handled trope really. -- and then handled appropriately. we celebrated the 10 year anniversary of our global initiative. we have done an enormous amount of work internationally to both secure sources, identified disposition pathways, work with countries to develop test , work on an international code of conduct for the security of radiological sources. this is an extremely active area of programming for us. one where we will continue to be extremely active. i think one of our biggest accomplishments was first identifying and then retiring

the radiological thermoelectric toerators used by russia in veryghthouses and remote locations. .hese were massive sources one of them could have been used for many dirty bombs. as a user congressman over multiple years, but we have had similar kind of work going on across the globe for the last decade. >> let me just add that one of the things we're doing better past we were doing in the has to do with a source of security rulemaking event. focus areas within that rulemaking that makes us more if. checks,ludes background fbi for printing --

fingerprinting. significant resources are being stored. documenting security programs. how licensees will safeguard these sources, cord knitting with local law enforcement to have a plan in place in case there is a version. coordinating and tracking radioactive source shipments such that if they become lost during shipment, there is a manner to be able to find them. think the international efforts we have discussed today in terms of protecting the country highlight in an indirect -- as is pathways become more and more difficult for anyone to navigate, easiest path is domestic.

try to bring something in from overseas if you just go to the local hospital or go to the warehouse to get the source? this underscores the importance of the -- of making sure the nrc requirements for domestic, medical and industrial use our robust. identified,es we the points i would highlight looking at the definition of collocation so that all formal facilities are subject to the how we domproving better background checks. examining what the nrc should be paying a role in that process, providing more specific guidance to companies and licensees who are not security professionals. these are commercial companies doing business heard they may have some's health and science backgrounds, but they're not security professionals. they would need more help than

we are giving them right now. >> let's go back to those cameras. one of the questions i would ask is, are the category one or category to? and theyre category to have a source that needs to be because ofirly often its half-life. i we aware of any effort to attack using aan dirty bomb in this country or another country? we are aware when someone has actually attempted. unfortunately, to use pressure cooker to hurt and kill and maim a lot of people. ofhave seen the use

substances in the air to try to kill people in subways. actual demonstrated uses of technology to hurt people. we have any documentation about , maybe triedted and failed. >> there is a general threat that we make every effort to safeguard against. i'm not sure of my colleagues are aware of any attempts to produce a dirty bomb using our resources. with you want to follow up a classified briefing on the topic, we could go into that in more detail. >> good enough. i went to ask a follow-on question.

people can go on the internet and learned all kinds of things, including how to build weapons. pressure cooker bombs and i presume dirty bombs. given the access to that kind of information, why suppose no one has done it or at least to our knowledge? maybe it is because the security measures we are talking about, maybe it is true in other countries. maybe it is not as easy as it sounds to do. maybe people are deciding it is just too dangerous. they find some way to do it that is less damaging to the perpetrator.

they don't really seem to care whether they live or die. but why? why do you suppose we have not seen it attempted more? >> i think >> that is where our report is coming from and it is that itsed on the idea only takes one to make a really day. >> others please. like to say, i believe it is some of our putting together regulatory programs, as well as iser programs, that certainly one of the drivers. we made it hard for people to

these things.s on whatwould echo a lot of you've said. in a different setting we can go specifics. doctor'sort the statement about taking this up environment.t >> does the industry have any underscoredo review licensee.e by be made aware of this action and take immediate action? to inspect be able it in our next scheduled activity. that is when we review the by the licensee

on trustworthiness and readability. >> my understanding is what is reviewed is considered but is left to the licensee. prescription if someone has convictions for certain things, they are not have access. satisfactory,ound ladies? myi respectfully defer to regulatory colleagues. advocate for his mission because, again, the more secure these sources are the easier it becomes in detection. think it would be helpful to require that the a second opinion from their respected state or

then.r.c. regarding trustworthiness of an individual? itsenator, i don't think would. as a regulatory body, we expect to perform these activities. we give them good guidance so can follow and they will repeat the right decisions. would say it is not within be consultants. we review what the licensee has done and make a decision on whether they comply with our regulations. n.r.c. express licensees to those making terroristic threats? do not. >> ok, maybe one more question and we'll start voting in a few minutes. thank you.

will be one for mrs. harrington. i understand the national securities initiative works with the nuclear regulatory commission licenses, state, local, and tribal governments and other federal agencies by providing voluntarily security enhancements. let me just ask you, how many enhancements has the administration put into place on industrial and construction facilities? whatlow-up would be, obstacles stand in your way for radiological sources? these numbersw if break out strictly the facilities but according to our analysis, there

thebout 3,000 buildings in united states containing radiological sources. we have worked in 650 buildings providing our security upgrade program. we intend to complete another 45 year.s fiscal is, i think a reasonable accomplishment but it only gets to 700 out of 3,000. recovered -- >> what about the other 2,300? year plans. yea with the budget the way it is, to extend the target date for completion farther than had originally thought would

be possible. of this is the disposition pathway for these sources. that is often a challenge because you either have to find a secure storage facility for long-term storage or some other way to safely dispose of those sources. it is the licensee's responsible do that unless the source they have has no clear dispose zigs pathway, in which case we assist. in and >> if you have something to add do so briefly, otherwise, i'm going to bring us to a close for now. anything else you want to add on this point? >> not on this point. said itmy colleague carefully. these are enhancements and we compliance with adequate

public.on for the i do need to correct one statement i made earlier for the record. not all category one sources are basis.ed on a yearly the periods of the inspection is anded on the safety robustness of the device and sources are not -- periodiculed for a inspections than one year. years, five four years. clarification.he as we come to a close, let me thishat our job in oversight.s to do we have responsibility for homeland security and we also responsibility for broad oversight for the whole federal government. other committees have that aretees responsible for investigation, some take it seriously, others

do not. is hard for one committee, really this one, to over theoversight entire federal government. people ande 15, 16 tooood as we are, it is much for us to handle. one thing we can do is partner g.i.o. and have them look at particular issues, in case, threats. how are we downing? well?re we doing what are other countries doing better that we can learn from or particular states? the subjecty that of today's hearing is something of aalways be the subject speculation and what

or inconvenienced in any way. know.ver we have to try to make sure we're doing everything we can to the best, prepare for the worst. i'm encouraged today to hear there is a fair amount of work going on to protect our people share that information with other nations so they can folks. their own i certainly don't want to hear or i will ask the question, why didn't someone do something to protect against it? us to be able to say, well, we worked hard to protect and our country from the threat of this nature. earlier, everything i do i know i can do better. of us andue of all every federal program. our goal is perfection.

probably hard to reach but it is a good goal for us. so i conclude by saying how much not you just, being there and not just but also my questions appreciate the work that you do our country to our nation. the hearing will be at 5:00 p.m. and submissions record. our majority, minority staff, to prepareor helping for this hearing. with that, this hearing is ed.ourn

returns this for a look at the spending bill. here's a look at the house agenda. >> billy house is the national correspondent. house will hold elections next replacing eric cantor. challengers? other >> yes, there's is a late entry idaho has decided he wants to challenge mccarthy for the number two post for the house leadership roster. and mccarthy will be making their pitches on adnesday morning in closed-door session.

then on thursday, the full conference, 233 members will the houseat and position if mccarthy moves up post. number two >> how about the race for the majority, who are the candidates? >> there is the chief deputy from illinois. challenged by the head of the republican study committee. a group of 177 members, which gives him a heavy lift into the race. entry fromlate indiana. said to maybe eyeing his chairmanship if he does not win this race. senate aree and scheduled to battle spending bills. does it look like they will pass all 12?

>> it looks more and more doubtful. break for fourth of july then they have their august break. the intention is to do three one, criminalinto and sort of their version of a andsportation, housing, urban development bill and bill.e, criminal justice they may have a third bill but that is not certain yet. debut ofd be their bills. in the house, they are planning the defense spending bill. that would be their fifth bill. a little bit ahead but as time ticks away it looks like completehamber will all 12 bills. october 1, fiscal carry over for those not

finished. >> g. m.'s c.e.o. mary barra testifying on the ignition switch recall. want to hear from her now? to hearss they want why. littlethings going a better? she came in like she had a reputation that she was going to fix things and things are sputtering. has want to know what she planned. >> you also write about other will be looking at, including the release of the benghazi investigation. what is the status of these investigations? stat susthey are long running and never ending until 2016. benghazi investigation, of course, is the focus of a has beenommittee that created. bergdahl is interviewing members

as seen as a long-running effort on their republicane house part anyway, messaging another theand shot at administration for ill conceived foreign policy. is to make deals like this with terrorists and is the or not this release of five taliban members nose under camel's the tent. the obama administration hopes cuba-basedn that prison all together. house atn tweet billy house in session. billy thanks for your time today. >> i enjoyed it. thank you. >> next a house oversight hearing with f.b.i. director. that, q&a with former reporter.ive