airworthy. they will have rules for certifying pilots. altitudes be certain that they must be trained for. what will the standards be and how many hours? these are the kinds of things that the faa is sorting out. other than the military, not that many people have experienced trying these things. dead -- entire show was dedicated to the test sites. if you missed that, you can go to www.c-span.org. areer: if the drones getting legalized, what is stopping citizens from weaponize in them to protect their own a property? the drone as part of their property. technicality the for doing that?

guest: it would be easy to buy a drone that has a camera. it would be easy to buy when they can fly 500 feet. to have someone read it with a weapon and fired from remote control, that is a military grade weapon. just like people in the united states can't buy tanks, cap by fighter jets, there would be restrictions on that. this is not the kind of thing that someone would be able to cook up in the garage. i am sure the authorities would have concerned about anybody flying a weaponize drone. there would be a stop put to that very quickly. by the end ofid this year they will introduce proposed rules for flying small drones. they mean it five pounds or less. -- they mean 55 pounds or less. this is where the burst in

market will be. they don't need to fly at high altitudes. aircraft youind of can fly. here is where you can fly them. here is who can fly them. it will take another year or so to take them public comment and finalize the rules. that will be the first days that we will see in the next one to two years. host: we will see more about consumer drones. tonight we will cover the churchill love of california. p.m. east coast time. we are talking with craig whitlock. it we have a caller from lexington, nebraska. caller: sorry. host: go ahead with your question. how are these powered?

guest: that is a good question. .ome have batteries the larger ones that we see the military fly use jet fuel or diesel fuel. , there these things fly isn't a big technological advance in the aircraft. it is how they are operated with these remote control links. they figure out where they are flying and they navigate by gps just like you would if you had a car with gps navigator. they fly of the same thing. that is the technological advancement. it is not the aircraft so much. it is the remote control operations and navigation. host: what is that technology like? guest: it has come a long way. just like your car can figure out where it is based on gps, it is the same way with drones.

tois telling the drone how move in certain directions and slow down or speed up. it can make adjustments. it is just staring at by remote control. it depends on how big the aircraft is. these are things that must be done right. i have to be tested. we are talking about aircraft that range from something they can fit in your hand to something that is as big as a regional jet. you can imagine the range. they all have to be controlled by remote control. host: what is on these military drones? what do people mean when they say payload? guest: what kind of equipment are they carrying? we are talking about the military, they call them censors but they are cameras. they can take full motion video. they have infrared cameras so

they can see at night. sensorse classified that have not been made public. they can listen. they can do all sorts of pretty amazing things from a military standpoint. you also have some military drones that can be armed. it could be missiles or munitions. that is used on the battlefield. host: what is the reaction to your story? guest: the commercial industry rapidly was not thrilled. they thought we were focusing too much on risks and not enough on the rewards. we quoted theme, number of people. they are concerned about this lack of rules and the lack of rules in the sky. -- a collision would set things back.

that there are problems that need to be resolved. the faa has to step in. craigyou can follow whitlock's reporting. him there.low he is a writer >> colorado began allowing recreational marijuana use year and half ago in the marijuana industry recently held a conference in denver. 8:00an see that tonight at p.m. eastern on c-span. right now, a brief look. complex money is one of these things that can really galvanize people. -->> money is one of those galvanizet can people. if you are here for money, that's great. a lot of people come to this because of the

opportunity, the economic opportunity, but that is not what keeps them. them is the passion, the pioneering spirit that we are building. this is different. businesses are not like other businesses so it will be an interesting ride as we look at our different motivations for being involved in the sector. we learned that if you want something done in this world, you have to figure out how to make it affable. keep being right. they were right about renewable energy. they were right about organic food. they were right about cannabis. these are movements that started because people cared about

something. they cared about the environment. they wanted to use renewables. health of about the the farms, the land, and what we put in our bodies. it started out really small and with an activist stored of of flavor but once they figured out how to have profitable business models around those ideas -- boom. is everywhere.d renewable energy is growing by leaps and bounds. i think that is what the cannabis industry is doing for freedom. entirecan see the conference on the marijuana industry with business owners, activists, and policy makers tonight on c-span at 8:00 p.m. eastern. on c-span 2, advocate nuclear weapons and nuclear power. a conversation on the nuclear

arms big associations between president reagan and mikael gorbachev. book,raig nelson on his "the age of radiance," on the nuclear era. and on c-span 3, american history tv. it is the 30th anniversary of president lyndon b. johnson signing the civil rights act. his remarks up the signing ceremony than a congressional commemorative ceremony from earlier this year. and the civil rights bill an author on his book about getting the legislation through congress. >> my first reaction is surprised. i worked for mr. sterling. i coached the clippers. he invited me to his daughter's

wedding. i had no idea exactly what was going on. , iause of my association know what elgin baylor was complaining about. i was confused not exactly which stood facts mr. sterling behind and then when his words came out, it was so obvious, shocking, disgusting. although those things wrapped in one. but the surprise to find that type of sentiment and someone who relies on black americans for so much of his success and public profile was amazing. i just couldn't believe that someone could have that much it was inside and think ok. >> july 4, a look at racism in sports after 11:00 a.m. eastern. red planetoring the

with senior nasa officials beginning at 3:40 p.m. later at 8:30 p.m., discussion including arizona congresswoman gabby giffords. >> now a conversation from earlier today on the syrian war how it is spilling over into iraq. we will hear from the militant declared a new state. this is an hour from the international institute for strategic studies. >> i think we will go ahead and get started. thank you all for joining us this morning at the international institute for strategic studies u.s., the

washington home of the iiss. my name is bryce campbell. i am the managing director. for those of you who do not yet know as well, we are a global think tank headquartered in london. we have offices and bahrain and singapore and here in washington. they grew out of two regional security dialogs. the institute has pioneered over the last decade or more if phenomenal dialogue with the middle east and a dialogue for the agent pacific. -- asian-pacific. the institute also has authored an international journal of international affairs. as well as a book series -- some of which are on display in the back of the room, for those of you here in the room. this office is a critical part of our network. we seek to both bring a global perspective here to washington and to convey washington's perspective to a sometimes skeptical international audience.

today's discussion will be very much the former, and we are quite privileged to have our colleague emile hokayem hear from our middle east office to share his insights on the -- here from the middle east office to share his insights on the tragedy unfolding in syria. before i introduce improperly, i should mention that we are a membership organization. those of you in the audience who are interested can learn more. there are flyers on the back table. those of you following us online or on tv can visit our website, iiss.org, to learn more. the structure is simple. emil will provide remarks for 20 or 30 minutes and then i will turn to you to moderate a session. prior to joining the institute, emil was the political editor

for the abu dhabi english based newspaper "the national." he served as a resident fellow at the southeastern gulf agent program here in washington. he has written extensively on iran, gcc relations, regional security, and he has testified in front of the u.s. foreign relations committee. he has spoken in front of various government and nongovernment audiences. he is embarrassed. he wants to cut to the chase and begin his talk. so, i will leave his introduction there and let him take the floor. >> thank you. good morning to all. it is a pleasure to be here. it is a pleasure to run away from the horrid warmth of the

golf. no one wants to be there. but it is also ramadan. i can tell you -- i can report there is a new game in town when it comes to syria. the search for the new and perhaps the more derogatory acronym for isis -- if you are on twitter or read arabic -- that is perhaps the funnest thing happening in the arabic world these days. i encourage you -- there are many ways one can play with those letters, put them together to find something that will make them fume a bit more. that was already a pretty

extreme and insulting from their perspective. what i am going to do in this presentation, because i expect there will be many questions about isis or the islamic states at this point, the regional fallout over u.s. policy, i am going to focus on serious -- syria. when i look at the current debate, syria has fallen off the radar. a racket is taken dominance in public and policy -- iraq has taken prominence in public and policy debates. the public has not well analyzed -- there is not great interest. look at the number of

journalists who have written about that compared to the cover job syria. syria is a lot more dangerous place. on balance, what is happening inside syria is not getting enough coverage and policy attention it deserves. i will spend most of my time doing that, because i think it is fundamental to understand what is happening there. the reasons for the conflict are there to last many more years. we saw in iraq the spillover cannot be contained. containment is not the strategy. it is an avoidant strategy actually. let me start by making a few points of warning. the first one is there is a

tendency to embrace broad narratives when it comes to syria too easily. the narrative was that the rebels were winning and the region was collapsing. in recent months, it has been the opposite. the regime is winning. the rebels are lapsing. both are understandably tempting narratives. they are also simplistic. because they ignore a secondary level, elements that have a direct impact over time on the big picture. when the regime was weakening, it was also reorganizing to push back.

and it did so pretty well. two months ago however, the regime conquered most of a region alongside the border with lebanon, and everyone focused on that victory. which is a very important victory. it secured the highway to damascus and it cuts rebels supply lines. at the same time it people ignored the rebel offensives. and perhaps the largest rebel offensive and the north and west in a year. there is another point of warning. resist the temptation to be intellectually -- my comments relate to the tendency to describe the syrian conflict as a proxy war. i say this for two reasons. first, there is direct uranian intervention. -- iranian intervention. it is not proxy. it is direct. the second is there is a strong regional aspect that exacerbates the violence.

but to only limit one's analysis to that is, in a way, satisfying and convenience because it allows us to do what we like to do, which is engage in geopolitical analysis. if only the russians and americans could get along and somehow things would be much better. in reality, the local and transnational dynamics of the syrian conflict shape events on the ground a lot more than the regional competition. to accept this -- and once you accept this, you accept the limits of our understanding of a lot of those dynamics. it is very obscure. it is much more difficult to understand research on the ground.

it also makes a lot of the tools we have at our disposal much less useful. diplomacy, arming or not arming, sanctions or no sanctions. this is a problem. often our analysis is driven by the tools we have at our disposal, other than the other way around. what has happened in three years in is the emergence of actors who have their own legitimacy, their own way of mobilizing fighters, their own way of building support, acquiring resources, acquiring resources domestically. the conflict today has self-sustaining dynamic send all of the ingredients are there for a long-lasting war. local mobilizations happen along communal lines, but there are also transnational mobilizations, which i will get to in a second. and small and

light weaponry is available in sufficient wanted seized. today it is -- small and light weaponry is available in sufficient quantities. today it is not about whether the weaponry is there. you know, at that level, all of the gradients are present. -- all of the ingredients are present. finally, a few points here. we have to resist the temptation of drawing direct links between rebel groups in particular and regional funders -- perceived regional sponsors. let me give you a specific example. when the islamic front came into control, everyone said this is a saudi croatian -- saudi creation. why is that?

one of the main leaders of the islamic front has a father who is a syrian cleric who has lived in saudi arabia for a long time. therefore it was natural that it was somehow a saudi creation. except the father was actually closer to the website muslim brotherhood saudi affiliate -- was i -- quasi-muslim brotherhood saudi affiliate. it was in fact difficult to get the saudi officials and supporters to come together. of course, there was a quick roque well and the arrangement over time. but there was no direct relationship of control, command, between those various groups. it makes our analysis easier if

you assume that. but the reality on the ground tells us a pretty different story. another example has to do with a cell of this organization and saudi arabia. a pretty formidable force, actually. but that does not mean that they report to saudi arabia. those who are familiar with the ideology know it can be all over the place. in saudi arabia, they accept the monarch rule. they are in flux. they have not decided where they are. again, that simple relationship between these states funder and a perceived relationship and a rebel organization is -- it of skewers more than it helps -- it

obscures more than it helps. today -- and this will be the crux of my recent tatian -- what we are missing is the soft partitioning of syria. and iraq, but i am not going to go there. it is extremely bloody. but over time, it is likely the levels of violence will drop. and of people will have been killed in these areas and there will be a voluntary movement of people, which is already happening. we are talking about 3 million refugees-plus. but this will make a political settlement much less likely. we will probably see quid pro quo arrangements on the side,

but the political arrangement is much less likely than ever before. at present, my assessment is the regime of bashar al-assad is in a better situation since early 2012. let's be honest about this. it's survival is no longer threatens -- its survival is no longer threatened. the pressure on damascus is the least it has been in two years. the june election was a political horizon all along. he saw the election as not only a show of defiance and cohesion and legitimacy to fire up his constituency, but also a way to force the hands of -- there were

people inside serious who had not necessarily taken sides. we like to think it is a totally polarized environment. you had many urbanites, many segments of syrian society in a state of denial, rejection, despair. did not want to be forced to take a stand. in fact, the election was useful for assad in a way that it put pressure on his constituency. for two months, they built up to the elections. visually, banners, it is colorful, people are demonstrating, etc. there was something to get excited about. it has worked in the short to medium term. assad has begun the process of rebuilding on the pretense that he leads the state.

i will get to this in a second. the reality is the assad regime has maintained the military edge. it has rebuilt its helicopter force. it has adapted militarily. there are downsides. i will talk about that in a second. but it remains the dominant military actor inside syria. the regime goals were to conquer territories where it matters. these central corridor. but to talk her territories, not people. this is a fundamental principle and it explains the military strategy they pursued. assad's goal was to push people out of important areas. he did not want to commit to the

political, economic resources to regain the loyalty of the people. it may have been impossible to start with. but why spend precious resources at a moment when you are fighting for your survival in trying to win back the loyalty of people who have suffered so much? this is a key point. by doing this, he shifted the burden on rebels, on international agencies, on neighboring countries, on friends of syria, etc., to take care of massive numbers of people and created paralysis on that front. my point here is the humanitarian tragedy, rather

than being the unfortunate outcome of the fighting as often per trade -- portrayed, it is actually a deliberate regime strategy. this is a key point. it it is not well understood. we like to see wars as great events. the reality is that the regime has pursued this as a way to debilitate its foes. that being said, there are challenges ahead for assad. the first challenge -- a necessary condition for the survival of the regime was its transformation from a state into a collection of malicious.

in fact, assad could not have militarily counter the rebels by just operating as a conventional military, deploying its fighting conventionally against all of these rebel forces. he had to build a more loyal, but also less costly units to support the fight. so, he encouraged the development of locally-based militias that are loyal to the regime, but have their own behavior, their own set of interests. and they developed them over time.

they started differentiating themselves from the regime over time. some are more radical. some are less radical. i will give you very specific examples. there is a clash of interest with regime forces. there is a clash of loyalty of organization between those various elements. over time, i suspect this will erode be coherent's and the sense of purpose of the groups allied with -- the coherence of the sense of purpose of the groups allied with assad. let me give you a couple examples that capture this point. you remember in february, there was the u.n. settlement to get civilians and fighters to relinquish their weapons in the city of palms -- homs? the conventional forces, which led to a lot of confusion and military setbacks, including the

army and the village of -- it is not just the rebels and some of the radicals among the rebels. it is the forces supporting assad did not communicate well. they did not have a sense of the battlefield. that was very problematic. the national defense force see themselves as a local protection force. they do not want to be involved in fighting in other areas. and they actually resisted assad's orders. my point is this. in the short term, these frictions are manageable and we should not overstate them. however, this poses a problem as assad tries to rebuild the

pretense of a functioning state inside syria. this is a challenge. assad has to engage in some dimension of stabilization and reconstruction to show all those who look at him as a better alternative than the rebels that he can deliver. well, that necessitates the strategy and resources. if you believe the cost of the fighting was already massive in syria, wait until you see the reconstruction. all of us who have seen civil wars and reconstruction know that reconstruction can be more costly than the fighting in and of itself. lebanon being a very good example of that or iraq, etc..

who is going to provide that? how do you convince the local actors who have risen to support assad in his moment of need to actually accept a centralization strategy here you go -- here? these are groups that expect respect and rewards from the authority. they are weakened. another problem is assad's dependence on foreign supporters -- has block, the iranians, etc. -- hezbollah, the array news, etc. air roads his ability to command a legitimate state. i was looking at some youtube videos from jihadist groups. one shows fighters dancing and saying, we are not here for bashar. these groups need to broadcast their presence, their successes, etc., to mobilize at home, to recruit, to build a narrative that they are fighting or the broader good of the shia community.

the isis phenomenon and how it plays out in syria. it is the best example of local and transnational dynamics at play. isis is not the creation of saudi arabia. it is the product of the failing governments and the polarization in iraq and syria. its growth and its reach were not only predictable. they were predicted. we were not necessarily surprised by this. what we are seeing is the effective merger of western iraq and eastern syria. the constant movement of money, resources across this border, this no longer existent border. the real surprise is that isis, which at first pretended to be a vanguard organization, today has

announced, perhaps too soon, that it intends to be a state. i think this may actually be the down fall of isis. a state is much more vulnerable to pressure. you tell me that you have buildings and you expect to provide services. aid you create expectations. this is one of the very contentious points inside the syrian rebellion. does assad benefit from isis's growth, the growth worldwide of the isis threat? i was talking to a few regime associates recently. they have very mixed views. some say, yes, it benefits assad. first, it validates the narrative assad has broadcast since 2007. there is also the i told you so factor.

if only you had listened to us, we could have avoided that. this is a language that assad mastered. he had done so during the iraq war. his intelligence services can do a good job of it. there is the expectation that there will be cooperation with rebel groups under pressure from isis. you start with tactical cooperation and then you go to those famous truces and cease-fires that we see left and right. i am not sure this is a sustainable strategy or will happen. and the big thing, the problem in the west about what to do about isis is a source of delight. just today, in the new york times, they were arguing about

direct cooperation with isis. this is good for the regime anyway. others argue, no, it is not good news for assad. that actually assad has failed to get westerners to embrace his view of the threat. i think here, we should give credit to john kerry. i have a lot of bad things to say about u.s. policy, but on this specific point, i think some of this is a good centralizing of the problem. when john kerry said, assad cannot be a solution against isis because he is a magnet for terrorism. this word "magnet" accurately captures the dynamics at play. there is a lot of concern that this narrative has not taken hold in the west. there is also the strain on the militias that have to fight on several fronts today.

iran has inherited two failing regimes in iraq and syria. can they do it? the iraqi militias, they have to decide what they want to do. the news is not necessarily good for assad. but these are medium to long-term considerations. in the short term, the regime is on solid ground. i have spoken for much longer than i should have. sorry. but thank you for your attention. >> thank you. that was fantastic. i am sure there are a number of questions in the audience. i will do them one at a time. please welcome for the microphone to come your way. and please be sure to identify yourself and your organization. we will start right here in the middle, the woman. >> my name is -- my question is i want to ask about syria, the amount of movement of the people -- in terms of the total population,

how many out? i mean just to get a sense of the specifics of it? first-time question. >> sure. the numbers are quite frightening. we're talking 3 million refugees, three and a half million refugees, and about 7 million internally displaced people. many of those internally displaced people are located in refugee camps in the north of syria and difficult to access. there is also another set of dilemmas when it comes to you

and provided help -- you win -- u.n. provided help. there is a series of legal considerations that should be overcome according to international two minutes area in law experts. the help is not making it this way. the numbers are just beyond frightening. the magnitude of the crisis is stunning. it is much bigger than what we saw in iraq at its worst. there is another related problem, which is the housing infrastructure has been very, very badly damaged. i mean, again it does not compare to iraq in 2003.

that is because of the nature of the fighting. entire neighborhoods have been leveled. 50% of the housing infrastructure in hamas, aleppo, etc. is totally gone or very heavily damaged. look, syria is a conflict that has erupted at the worst possible time. you talk to in gao's -- ngo's, and actors providing relief, and they say they are meeting 20% of their needs. it is just heartbreaking. but my fundamental point is, the humanitarian tragedy is a deliberate regime strategy. it is not the unfortunate outcome of the fighting. until we totally accept this, we're not going to make much headway. the u.n. resolution was adopted several months ago. practically, nothing has been

implemented. and there has been no progress in terms of the direct delivery of rebel held areas where you have millions of displaced people. >> what is the total population there you go -- total population there? >> 22 million. >> so we are saying -- >> 50%. >> [indiscernible] at this point, what are the two sides fighting for? do the sunnis expect the aloe was to -- [indiscernible] what is the near term goal and what should be u.s. over four as a solution? -- hope for as a solution? >> i think the groups have adjusted their expectations.

i think assad and his allies do not hope they can retake all of the territory that has been lost. and anyway, why waste of those resources covering land that is aaron and where you have millions of refugees? the point is to secure this area, make it economically viable. because it is not necessarily economically viable. those who know the geography of syria know that wheatfields are in one place, oakfield's or somewhere else. people talk about the sunni state. it is difficult and this is why i say what we are witnessing is a self-partition of syria. none of these are viable on their own.

there will always be a degree of trading between all of them. i think that assad has a pretty realistic vision of what he wants to achieve in the short-term and midterm. his problem is maintaining coherence among the various groups that support him. you cannot take this for a given. we have spent time describing, analyzing, and disparaging the factionalism and fragmentation of the rebellion. we should spend an equal amount of time looking at the factionalism inside the regime. i give you examples. we should not overstate that. this is a medium-term challenge. the second issue is, -- look, there is a lot of ab and flow among rebel groups. i gave a presentation that the

big groups that i was in touch with. they have taken very heavy losses from the fighting against isis. i was talking to -- a few months ago -- to an official who told me that, in two months of fighting against isis, they took 500 casualties. dead fighters. just how many -- guess how many they lost against assad forces? 2100-2200 fighters. in two months, you lose 500 and in 2.5 years, you lose -- so, the fortunes of these groups very considerably -- vary considerably based on support and they do not have a clear angle about what they want.

they are fighting for their survival and they need to secure territory and resources inside the territory to sustain the fight. they become very self-involved. it is all about their own survival. this is the opportunity that was lost early on. there was a more positive spirit to the rebellion. you know, a forward-looking east coast -- ethos. that has been lost and this is problematic. it is hard to imagine a coherent rebel entity in syria. >> great. the gentleman right there. >> thank you. my name is edward joseph.

this is an excellent presentation. you made the point that was excellent about the need to be precise. i would like to ask you for a bit more precision when you talk about the local character of the conflict. the reason i ask is twofold. first, the implications. if it is so fragmented, it seems hopelessly complex. why do we even dare do anything about it? it is fragmented so much. so, that is the first. the second is, it doesn't it imply that assad is more attractive? you have assad. i would ask you to be precise about that. whatever difficulties these

local units present to assad, they do not switch sides. this is not like somalia. there is one plan here and there. -- clan here and there. who is the enemy? they are not jumping sides in a fragmented way. there is a coherence, to the extent that it is sectarian. i would ask you to respond to that. >> let me start with the policy implications of your question. as someone who is advocating arming since 2012 of the rebels, today, arming comes at a higher cost and higher risk. it comes with lower returns than

it would have had two years ago. i understand the elements that policy makers are facing. at the same time, these are the policymakers who turned down the opportunity because of faulty assessment or because of a total reluctance to take the fight seriously. i have many bad things to say about u.s. policy in the last couple of years. here is the one word, bankrupt. i understand the current dilemma. it is not -- the current dilemma should not excuse the policy paralysis and the wishful thinking that happened. yes, it is unbelievably difficult to maneuver and navigate those dynamics. but, guess what? if you want to address the isis challenge. we all realize how big a

challenge that is. the best strategy is and the only effective strategy is to work with the local actors. because of the size of the threat. because they have the legitimacy. because they have the human intelligence to do something about it. these groups have an opportunistic way of doing things. today, you know, they look at, at, foreign actors and say, where were you in our moment of need? make a case for why we should actually help you. it has become a transactional relationship and we have to be honest about it. at the same time, describing the complexity should not lead one to overstate what assad can offer. i do not understand what,

operationally, he can offer. he has limited resources and is focused on his survival. someone saying that assad will send some of his forces to rebuild ties with the west -- does one really think that he has a better understanding of jihad he forces -- jihadi forces than the rebel forces fighting isis? at the political and strategic level, working with assad validates the suspicions of many sunnis, and including moderates, that reluctance to helping rebels is linked to a preference for a side and a strong secular

dictator. "secular," let's qualify what that means here. it will be difficult to undermine the legitimacy. if we go down this road, this applies to iran. in a rock the best ally is a run -- iraq, the best ally is iran. if we had not realized what matters is the local actors and the legitimacy of the intelligence. the rationale to stand up to radical actors, perhaps, we should not be in that business altogether. the few successes that were scored in yemen and iraq are due to local actors taking on the responsibility. can you create a set of incentives and disincentives for local actors to join the fight? the reality is, the level of

casualties is massive and there is no recognition by us in the general discourse about that fundamental point. >> an attorney to isil or isis, whatever, part of the problem with the name is what do they mean. do you see, at this point, any indication that there is groundwork amongst the palestinians? >> actually, i was -- it was very interesting to see that groups and salafi jihadi figures welcome the call for the caliphate. in lebanon, you have a group

that actually welcome the call. aside from that, very few actors. they attacked a couple of has below convoys. -- hezbollah convoys. the success is the brand that is going up 1.5 years ago. these are franchises. they announced their allegiance to or loyalty to because they hope to get something in return. it is sexier to say you are isis. as i said, it is opportunistic behavior. precisely because it is opportunistic, the response should be political. a number of groups have joined al new straw -- al nusra because

they were getting more funding and scoring middle terry victories. -- military victories. they left or switched. can you build incentives or disincentives? it is a huge bet. the announcement of the caliphate. this is high expectations. secondly, it is hegemonic behavior on his part. many other jihadi groups are resisting that and are not necessarily convinced about the caliphate or the modell it he -- modality or timing. they see it as vulnerable.

it is important to be sober about the military capabilities of this group. i am not sure they can sustain victory. the point is, they can mount spectacular attacks and have done it in mosul. we will see, during ramadan, if they can pull off something in baghdad. again, it's -- the debate within jihadi circles is heated. there is no massive consensus that the caliphate under baghdadi's leadership is the right way to go. i would not espouse an alarmist assessment. everything depends on the response. if the response is purely counter-terrorism, isis will

thrive. they will present themselves as persecuted by the right enemies. >> i am tricia johnson. you talked about how the war does have the possibility of lasting another 5-10 years and isis operates in syria. how do you think the length of the syrian war will affect isis activities in iraq? >> i am no iraq expert. i have to quickly develop knowledge because of the effective merger of these two battlefields. my colleague has written an excellent book on iraq and is in

the lead on that. look, isis has been good at mobilizing local resources. whether it is true extraction, violence, racketeering -- they have proven very good at co-opting or entering alliances with some tribes and some elements. it is difficult to believe that the events in iraq oh nothing to local groups. -- owe nothing to local groups. there is savvy on his part and his lieutenants. the announcement of the caliphate, in a way, changes the game because of the hegemonic ambition. i think that, in the medium term, the backlash against isis will be massive. debilitating? i do not know.

will isis be able to hold a territory the size of jordan on the border of turkey, that kurdish areas, i am doubtful. i worry about i sent -- isis becoming a model to other al qaeda franchises in the region. we see this in aqap. they are saying, perhaps, he is right. there is a different way of doing business and that is his territory. but -- it is taking a massive risk to announce the state.

>> the locals i refer to deal with the regime where iiss provide crude oil and get refined product. they need gasoline for the trucks and they call -- i'm not sure if it's a viable model. >> hi. >> you spoke earlier about the -- with the u.s. government engaging with the opposition. in your opinion, from a policy standpoint in terms of moving forward in the best possible way, how or if the opposition really is -- will play or could -- excuse me, could play a larger part? >> i mean, i see rebel groups as

an essential element. but this also means you have to accept the other priority. you cannot rebel factions and tell them we will provide you weapons and first and foremost and iiss. most displacement, et cetera, are still done by forces. as bad as the jihads are, they can be worse, the balance is still needed. there needs to be a recognition of the simple fact and not create a full equivalence at that level. the thing with the rebels today,

they are under enormous pressure. when i talk to a few of them just a week ago, and i told them, what is your top priority. they said preventing the circle. if the u.s. needs to do one thing, it's precisely that. this is a terrible humanitarian tragedy. i don't know what the exact numbers are. they say between 100 and 50,000 are still there. it would be a symbolic blow to the revolution than lots of hamas which was the capital of the revolution. in the place where the rebels hope to gain in 2012. they need to continue holding it

and there was a question of what the rebels need to do in the south. there was a lot of hype of the southern front that rebels were organizing in jordan and other places and push from the south and conquer territory and add pressure on do mass cus -- damascus. it's not bad to materialize, i don't see how it would have been sustainable. without air cover, you cannot make sustainable gains in urban and shift the loyalty or maintain the loyalty of civilians. something that is key. and that lesson has been learned the hard way in there. politicians need to encourage rebels to seek massive military victories. it should be about protecting

what they have. protecting the population against more uses and establishing local governments in as many places as possible. it should not be an aggressive, offensive strategy because they don't have the means or the strategy to put it off. i'm not talking about the margins. i'm talking about the more for strategy. the time for ambitious adventures is long gone. >> we are just about out of time. we had two primary objectives. one was for emile to share his ideas. we avoiding incrime nateing the iiss. i thank you all on that.

i ask you to thank emile for his remarks. [applause] and thank you all for coming. you can >> right now, a brief look. >> money is one of these things that can galvanize people. if you are here, you will mainly for money, that's great. and i think a lot of people come to this industry because of

because of the lack of opportunity. what keeps them are the people, the passion, the change that we are making. the pioneering spirit that we are building. and because, you know, this is different. this is not -- your businesses are not like other businesses. i think it's going to be an interesting ride as we look at our different mote -- motivations for being involved in the sector. we learn that if you want something done in this world, you got to figure out how to make it profitable. i would like to say that hippies keep being right. they are right about renewable energy. they are right about organic foods and right about cannabis. these are movements that started because people cared about something. they cared about the environments. they wanted to use renewables. they cared about the health of

the -- of farms and the land and what we put in our body. >> it started out small and with an activist sort of flavor. but once they figured out how to have profitable business models around those ideas, boom. organic foods are everywhere. energy is growing by leaps and bounds. i think that's what the cannabis industry is doing for freedom. >> this was for business owners and policy makers. seen tonight on c span. and on c-span 3, american history tv. a look back at the civil rights back of 1964 which lyndon

johnson signed 50 years ago today. >> book tv sat down with former secretary secretary of state hillary clinton to discuss hard choice. >> you make it with people who are your adversaries who have killed those you care about, your own people. those who you are trying to protect. it's a psychological drama. you have to get into the heads of those on the the other side. you have to change their calculation enough to get them to the table. talk about what we did in iran. we had to put a lot of economic pressure to try to get them to the table. we will see what happens. that has to be the first step. and i write about what we did in afghanistan and pakistan. trying to get the taliban to the table for a discussion with

afghanistan. in iraq today, i think what we have to understand is that it is primarily a political problem that has to be addressed. the ascension of the sunni extremist and the isis group is taking advantage of the breakdown in dialogue and the total lack of trust between the government and the kurdish leaders. >> more with hillary clinton on c-span 2's book tv. >> two officials booking washington today about the conflict in iraq and what it means for the sunni autonomist region in northern iraq. this is an hour and a half.

>> ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon and welcome to the washington institute. i'm rob satlof the director of the institute. i'm delighted to host today's event to welcome you to this very special gathering. i'm hearing -- i see that the audio isi a little bit low. if we could raise the volume in the back. let me try that again. is that better? all right. let me just first begin by asking everyone if you could

please turn your cell phones to mute. today's event is being live streamed out. since our last major event with guests from kurdistan, the president was the highly watched live stream in history. we expect today's event to break that record. [laughter] >> perhaps there's a presidential directive that you have to turn your television sets and computers to this event if you are in kurdistan. friends, we are here today because the topic of the future of kurdistan is at the top of the global issue. it's one of the key issues that is swirling around the entire set of issues triggered by

events in iraq. the issues regarding the kurdish people are not new. they have been a sub text to politics in the middle east for many years. and america's connection to the people of kurdistan is not new either. it's a story that has its ups andd downs over the years. hopefully our government and the government in northern iraq, the government in the kurdish regional, is entering a new era. we will hear more about that from our guests. i do want to before we begin, i do want to acknowledge the guidance here at the institute

on all things iraq related offered by ambassador jim jeffrey. i'm delighted to have jim offering his wisdom on all things connected to this issue. today's program will be moderated by my colleague dr. davidll pollack. d is a man of many hats. one of those hats is a kurdish hat where he spent quite a bit of, time, many years not just mastering the language, but understanding the intricacies of kurdish politics. with that, i'm delighted to turn the codeium -- podium over to him to introduce our special guest. dave. >> thank you very much, rob. and thank you all of you for attending and especially thanks

to our distinguished guests who ares coming here as rob said ia critical moment as the history of the region as iraq and kurdistan and the kurdish people. >> i will be extremely brief in my opening remarks. i want to begin with a shameless plug for thewa blog. it's called ficra forum. this week as some of you might have seen in your electronic inboxes, we have special issues about the iraqi crisis. two of them wrote by in the region. and one written by me about the kurdish issue that we are here to talk about today. we would be delighted to have

contributors frombu kurdistan writing for us. and we have had a number of kurdish contribute -- contributors over the years as well. it's in arabic and english. some day, as your president said, some day, we will have a kurdish language of the book. >> it'se. time. >> i know. [laughter] rob was generous that i mastered the language. that's an edge race -- exaggeration. let me introduce the guests. we this is chief of staff of the government. we have the head of the external relations department of the kurdistan regional government.

they are just coming to us today from meeting with secretary kerry following on the heels of secretary kerry's recent visit to the capitol of the kurdistan region. i look forward very much to hearing what they have to say about the situation. in their own region and in the regionn as a whole and the u.s. policy. we have an understanding that he will speak primarily about internal developments related to iraq and his region and that mustafa will talk about external issues. kurdistan issues with the nation and further field including the

united states. they have graciously agreed to speak briefly. probably only about ten minutes each. they even asked me to stop them if i have to. so that all of you will have more than in uh time for questions and comments for discussions. i freedom -- i'm grateful to them. they have been great hosts since my visits to kurdistan. delighted to have them here and delighted to have all of you here as well. i'm going to turn the floor over with that. please. >> david, i would like to thank you -- oh. >> stand there?

>> thank you very much for inviting us to be here also on behalf of my colleague of mustafa. it's great and important to be with all of you and thank you for coming to this event. i think the situation in iraq and the change which happened the last two or three weeks in iraq invite us, all of us to think about the current situation and analyze it and also to think about the development and the future of the country and when i'm talking about country, i'm talking about iraq. and also kurdistan. i have been asked to talk about

the internal situation in iraq. usually nowadays i'm talking about the current events in iraq, i'm talking about -- event. what do i mean? before the events that started on 9th of june, iraq was different.ff and after event, that means 10th of june, we got a country. what was before this event or primo event? we had officially one country. we had an army. the terrorist, they were active in various places. but they didn't announce their fate. there was so-called disputed area and there was checkpoints

in some areas between the iraqi army and kurdish forces. what happened after it is the following. we got a new state. a new state was borned -- born. we have a terrorist organization which became a state now. because groups acting here and there, but now they announce it and they became a state. 80% of iraqi army has collapsed. there were six division of iraqi army and area -- and they collapsed. we are talking about six, four of them they were.

they belong to iraqi army and two of them to the other one. all of them were controlled by isis. they call iso. islamic state. they control them. and they control this in the area. they have similar representatives who were presenting sunni blocks. now most of them, they don't have basis in this area. so they are presenting let's say certainly community. they don't have bases in this area because they are under the control of islamic state. in baghdad is different than this event.

we have got officially militias. when we are talking about, we are talking about a better army. so they are officially active in baghdad and around baghdad. and there's a disputed area because of the collapse of the iraqi army, our kurdish fighters they fall in vacuum. that means that disputed area now, disputed area according to the iraqi constitution is completely under the control of kurdish. this is a new reality. we have got, in fact, three states within one. three states within a different

system. is islamist. and specialist because they don't recognize the border. and they are targeting baghdad. they are targeting damascus. they are targeting beirut and targeting jordon and kuwait for the time being. and later on, i think they will target kurdistan and other areas. that's their program. that's their plan. we have got kurdistan which is secure which tries to build a democratic process. believed in multiette inic society -- multiethnic society. believes in women's rights. this is next to so-called islamic fate. our border is with islamic

state. and not anymore with iraq. we have got a border of about 1,000 with islamic states from 1,050-kilometer. there is a state between us and baghdad. and then we have got nonfunctional government or a failing government in baghdad. you have government in baghdad is not functioning. you have islamic state which is against kurdistan and baghdad. and you have kurdistan. this is a new reality. how are we going to deal with it? fore us? the kurds? what are we going to do? the first target is to defend our border. to depend the border.

they are on the border of kurd stan to defend. kurdstan. the second is to protect our population. people that -- the third command, the syrian and some of us are there. but also the muslims, the christians. so our society is multicultural. we areet protecting those peopl. this is our second one. the third one is to help those refugees who are coming by thousands to our area. thousands of people are running from and coming to kurdistan. thousands of people are running

and coming to kurdistan. and we had people coming to kurdistan. almost all christian and also they are trying to reach kurdistan. all of them, they are leaving their area. leaving their homes. coming to kurdistan. we areng following an open door policy. we are trying to help, but our cap is also limited. are talking about -- if we will add syrian refugee, we have 250,000 in our area. we are talking about 1 million people in this place in our area. and this also we now we have got the population of the puted, -- disputed area. we are responsible to take care

of 7 million kurds in that area. some of them are refugees. some are displaced. this involves managing the management and managing the local government and also managing the security. this is a new reality in kurdistan. but there is also a new reality in baghdad that has to do with the new political process. are we going to give their once again to a new political process in baghdad? is that possible? are we responsible to do that? can we lead that because people are asking us to lead that? because there is a lack of leadership in baghdad? if we lead the process, can we succeed? the last ten years we tried. we tried to keep the energy of

iraq. but the others, they were destroying the unity of iraq. the others, they were against it. we tried to tell everybody the solution for this country is to have a federal structure in iraq. the sunnies can have their areas, the shiites can have their area and baghdad can be for all of us. but they rejected that and on the contrary. instead of going in the direction of -- they were going in the direction of dictatorship. instead of going in the direction of gradually the federal direction, they were going in the direction of system. so we ended up with these states and they are different from each other. so with the new process, i mean

giving a new -- new political process, we from going to be part of -- we are going to be part of it. yesterday, the parliament tried to have a first meeting. they failed. next week they will come together. next week, they will come together to choose the speaker of the department and the president of the country and the p.m. -- prime minister of the country and, of course, the new government. seems yesterday they didn't reach a new government. many people they think the kurds went out. but the sunni community, they didn't among themselves, they didn't reach out to the speaker of the parliament. first, you must choose a speaker of the parliament. i hope that next week there will be an agreement about the speaker of the parliament and i

guess the kurds will also nominate somebody to be prisoner ofmi their country. that's their position. that is to have position of prisoners for the kurds and the prime minister is for the sheer block. when we are talking about prime minister, then we are talking about a new prime minister. there must bemi a new governmen. thea policy has failed. the current government, people who are now in power, they are responsible for the collapse of the army. i don't put the blame all of it on them. but they are responsible. and big part of the country has been hijacked by terrorists. and then the question for all of us, i mean, for the kurds, for the government of iraq future government of iraq, but also for

neighboring countries, for the united states, how are we going to deal with this threat? it is a threat for baghdad and syria. it is a threat for jordan. threat for middle middle eastern countries. they are now business with establishing themselves in the area. they have sophisticated weapons. they have money. they have ideology. and they have some international support. this new state, it doesn't belong to the area. it belongs to a terrorist organization.

so it means working together with various countries so that they will be defeated. but defeating the terrorist can start from iraq. can start from kurdistan and from baghdad. we are going to follow two paths. one path helping the government to bee established in baghdad. the other path is to establish ourself, to have an independent economic life. to strengthen our forces. to protect our area. to protect our people. so these two paths will continue. this is our policy. we hope that people in washington understand that these two paths, they are not contradicting each other.

but at the end, the people of kurdistan has a right to decide of the future of kurdistan and future of them. we hope we can reach that understanding here, but also reach that understanding in baghdad. and this is our policy and one of the reason why we are here to talk about the current situation and talk about the new reality. iraq is not one iraq anymore if you wantaq to bring here togeth. then it must be a new structure in iraq. a different structure than it was. and you cannot bring all of them while you have islamic state betweensl kurdistan and baghdad. thank you veryh. much. [applause] >> a little more than ten minutes, but well worth it.

thank you very much. >> ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be back here. i would like to focus on the situation here today. and also what has happened on the ground and how do we communicate that message to the outside world. ofha course, in kurdistan, we believe in interacting with the outside world. we have suffered from isolation. we want to interact with the outside world and communicate our message. as a result of isolation, we would be blamed and accused of things we have not done as there are some who try to accuse the figure of iraq. we are the only ones that have weighted heavily for the success of iraq. there are people who are trying to cover their own failures by blaming the kurds and letting the kurds be the scapegoat.

from isolate to interaction, that is one of the principles of our foreign policy of k.r.g. we have tried to reach out to the international community. we tried to benefit from the opportunities that we were given to tell the confrontation that we had into cooperation. so that has been a strategy from the k.r.g. in order to have understanding with the regional powers, the international community. if we make any comparison between what the care has been and what baghdad government has done, we will see we have been most successful in building relations with neighboring countriesre with the internatiol community at large. although we have not been in states like iraq, iraq has all of the establishment of a state. they were not able to benefit from b it. for us, a new democratic experience, we have been able to benefit because b there's a clarity of mission, also clarity

of vision from the kurdistan mission. some of the problems they go back to the constitution and noncommitment of the constitution. so, therefore, we the kurds are not to be blamed for the failure in baghdad. why did it happen? it happened for a number of reasons. political challenges. we have security challenges and we have economic challenges. these are the main three challenges that we face today. we would like to international community to appreciate the situation we are in whether we talk about kurdish or iraq as a whole. we have to continue on the two tracks of kurdistan so we will not lose whatever we have achieved so far. it's the only success story.

it depends on the compression. but statement, we will be international community to view kurdistan for what it stands for. we don't want to pay a price for the failure of background -- baghdad or all of them -- kurdistan. the international community has to recognize that there has been a big change in iraq. so the era is different from the previous era. kurdistan region now is in charge of an area which is larger than what it used to be before june 9th and in terms of security challenges. the security is the islamic state which is a neighbor having 1,035-kilometers and the

challenge is the refugees adding to that fills the beginning of the year. the federal government did not fulfill the constitution commitment. therefore, it's not only the refugees, but also commitment to give budget which is legitimate government for the people of kurdistan. could the anticipation in the process of the iraqis conditional. conditional that it has to be in light of the change that has taken place. we do not want to go back to the same stories of ten years ago. either we would be respected for who we are because iraq is the two main nationalities and the national minorities. either we would be equal partners or partners in the decision making or we have to revisit the nature of the

relationship that exists between baghdad. i call upon the united states, the international community, the neighboring communities to look at kurdistan and our government in the last decade or two. if we go back to 1991, we have proven to everyone that we are a factor for stability. we have proven to everyone that in spite of all of the challenges that we had external and internally, we succeeded in introducing a new democratic experience. and the last cabinet that was formed recently is a broad based cabinet which we were expecting there would beex challenges. we have waited longer than expected. when we arene in baghdad, we wil speak with one voice and speak unitedly. there is a vision and therell ia plan how to deal with the challenges that we are facing.

for us, what we want to see is that we do not want to go back to a failed experience. an experience that has failed. we do not want to go back to unfulfilled promises. iraq had the constitution. it was a constitution that the majority of the people of iraq have voted for. unfortunately, not implemented. shall we go back and see that non-implementation of the constitution. we also want to -- these changes require a new track from the international community. not only focusing on baghdad. baghdad will have to be seen equally. because today there's public opinion in kurdistan. who have been born in freedom and democracy. they have not seen good intentns baghdad. it's not only the occurred --

kurd dish has to be satisfied. going back to history, iraq is an unofficial state. it was a state put together to keep balance between the shiites and the sunnies and anything built on wrong foundation will not survive. unless it's through an understanding in the community. establishment of the iraqi state, we have never felt that we are partners in this country. we have never been treated as partners. the national community has to realize that, we have paid a huge price in the past. today, time has come for the occurreddish aspirations to be respected. we have not gone beyond what the limits of the constitution ask

for. what we wanted for identify and characteristics to be respected so that we can focus on rebuilding kurdistan. a region we inherited by villages of the saddam regime. we expect them to go forward in order to help with the rebuild. we inherited 5,000 people who were killed. we were not expecting that the federal government come forward to compensate them. 182,000 people that were lost on the final operation, we were expecting that baghdad to come forward. these have not happened. we have seen the iraqi army to be moved against kurdish people. that is a reminder that baghdad has no taste. that tragic history shapes our

policy. it's a feeling of uncertainty that we have in iraq that we want the national community to understand. we hadha a tense relationship wh turkey, few years ago. we were opposite mistake that we will be able given the opportunity to communicate our message, we will be able to establish a relationship. we are pleased to say that to date we have a good relationship with turkey. we are optimistic of the future of these relationships and we see them as long term and strategic. it needed interaction. it needed a platform in order to communicate the message. likewise, we have good relations with iraq. we have been able to reach out to the arab countries, with jordan and kuwait and other arab countries, we enjoy good

relations. five of them are the five members of the securit from theb countries and the others from the europe, united states and elsewhere. they are making progress. we do not want that to be put on hold. we want the international community to understand that. we have done everything we have to help the political process in iraq. we want to be helped so we continue building our democratic institution. the empowerment of womenner participation -- we cannot do it alone and we do not want to live isolated from the rest of the world. and we have given enough to baghdad. we have contributed positively to protect iraq in terms of the army, in terms of the political

process. that was not reciprocated. what we want to see is that a new foundation if iraq were to succeed, then there has to be a neerw foundation. a new basis of this relationship. we cannot go back to prejune 9th. certainly, we have aspirations. we want to have more sovereignty. we want to have more economic autonomy and more political autonomy. this is the least that we can do. other people, weis have the rigt to serve the termination. but that doesn't spoke where we have to live under the mercy of baghdad for baghdad to cut our budget. it's over thatnd time. if there is will in baghdad, we are ready to be good partners. good partnersgo to build a new d a better iraq, but also to have a better kurdistan to enjoy good relations with the international

community. with that, i would stop and welcome any questions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. i'm going to be looking for questions. i see a few people have already expressed a lot of interest. i'm going to take the prerogative of the chair and ask question that picks upr and ask on an interesting comment about the new border between the kurdistan region and the united states especially in your newly expanded territory, you have a border of kilometers not with iraq, but with a terrorist state as he put it. i want to ask you what in your view should be the next steps in defending yourselves against that threat and in confronting or defeating, if possible, the

threat from the islamic state and what do you see as the desirable and realistic american role in that? thank you. >> the threat is real. it's not only threat against kurdistan. it is a threat to baghdad. it's a threat to turkey. it's on the border of turkey and trying to reach the border of iran. anerd the statement that has ben given to the leader yesterday, they are certain to everybody. what can we do? we the kurds, we try to protect our area. but, of course, this is not enough. if this threat were to stay, we need cooperation. we need cooperation from

neighboring countries that help us support from the united states. it is a threat to all of us. not onlyca a threat to the territory, it's a threat to the values. a threat to the individual group. it's a threat to others than people who belong to islamic state. the leader, yesterday or the day before yesterday, when iraq is a statement, he divided the world into two. the world of islam or peace, he call it. he had the world of nonbelievers. the only world that belongs to him is his -- history. the world of war. when they start, they start with ther neighbors. we are on the other side. turkey is on the north.

and baghdad south and they are trying to reach iran. on the other side, they have syria and jordon. in the first place, they are a threat to us. later, they will be threat to everybody. when we are talkingbe about this threat, we are realistic. in the long term, we need support and health. and the united states can help us. we don't need united states forces to be there. we need equipment. they have the most sophisticated weapons in their hand. and they s are all american. they are all all american weapons that has been given to iraqi army and now they are in the hands of terrorists. >> this ask -- is a new reality. the iraq army doesn't exist or is very weak. the kurds are there.

the kurds can defend their territory. they cannot liberate other areas. so if we want to liberate other areas from those, we need international cooperation. helps the kurds to sends them their militaryeq power. giving them their weapons. that's allowing them to sell their oil. because we can have our money, but not receiving money from baghdad anymore. since january, baghdad is not sending even the budget, the federal employees of the government. weem need financial resources. we have got our oil. we can sell it. besides that, we must take care of seven million people. how can we do that?

we are not asking others to pay us money. we are asking others of the united states to allow us because they are putting pressure on various government so that our oil will not be sold in the international oil market. that's all. we can find these people because we believe in our cause. we can find those people because we have resources, we are defending the morality and defending our country. we need support and health especially from the united states. thank you. >> i want to recognize our executive director with a question first and then i will movee on. >> gentlemen, thank you for your very candid remarks. i don't want to cause difference between the two of you, my ear heard something very

interesting. first, we had two principle policy. we are going to stay in baghdad. and we are going to build our nation in kurdistan. but then we heard that staying in baghdad is conditional was youron term. if i could ask you, what exactly triggers the end of that principle? or tond put it differently, what triggers independence, a word that neither of you used in your opening remarks? >> generational change. [laughter] >> we believe our generation. we believe in democracy. wemo allow our generation to sea different way. but we t are not in -- on

different paths. this is the same. it is to be in baghdad, of course. there must be a baghdad that believes in these values, which i mentioned. we must build a democratic era. a democratic system. if they don't believe in it. and so now they didn't believe. they didn't do that. is it possible for them to do that? us. is a question for when my colleagues is talking about conditional. it's not about a person to have a person and a prime minister and to remove him and somebody else. it's about the systemg i that y believe in if we are not going in the direction of restructuring iraq radically to federalism, then we cannot be part of that system. we cannot be part of that

system. at the same time, weat are talkg about second part. second part, we mentioned both of us. we were talking about determination the right of determination of the people. when we are talking about that right, our people will decide whicrih kind they will exercise. we are talking about having referendum. i don't know wrehen. my president is going to the parliament tomorrow. the kurdish parliament. we are going to ask our people what do they want. that doesn't mean we will -- the result directly. but then our people will vote and they will say, we want that. when are we going to implement the -- let's say, the result of the referendum, that depends on the situation, the process in

baghdad. we are heading towards a different direction that kurdish people have the right. and we will implement that right and the desire of all the people. >> thank you, that was helpful. on my list, i have in this order order -- michael and dennis ross. i will get to -- in just a moment. let's start. >> i was going to ask you a question very similar to rob's, let me pursue it more deeply. what are the specific things that you have to have in the way of automatic payments or in the way of relative independence,

autonomy, whatever you want to call it from baghdad in order to stay -- what do you think you could sell to the people of kurdistan to allow you to stay inside of iraq and where are the red lines that would force you out? >> we are not going back to the old situation. the old situation when i'm talking about old situation, going back before 9th of june. that's impossible. it was difficult to have a common path with baghdad. risking everything that has to do with the constitution. they were not implementing the constitution. they were violating the constitution. so that means we cannot go back. second, if this islamic state

will stay between, between us and baghdad, we can bring not risk factor. we don't have border anymore. we must try to work that. nowadays, they are flying as if we are going to another country. if baghdad wants us to stay, it is not that we must change, it is baghdad must change. we can't have different relation with each other. when i'm talking about right -- the kurds can have their own independent country and state. but, but, when we have a government in baghdadt and they can have also their territory, we can combine and have a consideration between two states. having said that, i'm talking about the state between us. it i