and we really make two primary points. we make a few, because it's an 800-page book. we have the opportunity to make the energy world more resilient by propagating this technology overseas, by connecting u.s. oil and gas abundance to the international market, making oil and gas markets more competitive themselves, by using our role in international financial institutions to make other countries more attractive to energy investment so they can be more self-sufficient. and that we can leverage the fact that many producers are now also big consumers; saudi arabia for one. and a lot of consumers have common cause with us and price stability. so we have a little bit more diplomatic capital than we did. that's kind of point one. point two is while we have the ability to make this pivot in our policy and to use energy not as a weapon, but as a force multiplier or a tool or at least as part of our kit to make change and help other countries be more resilient, it's unclear whether we will.

it's unclear whether we can manage promoting the development of energy overseas and support for climate change. it's uncertain whether we can utter the words "natural gas" in a policy statement, you know, coming out of the white house and say that we actually want other countries to develop it rather than we want to make the world more resilient because we're using less, and they'll have more. so it's unclear s. so the question as it affects russia and ukraine and i would say europe and the caspian too is are we doing all we can with all that we have to maximize this advantage. and i think the short answer to that is, no, not yet. and what i hope we'll talk about today is what our ageneral da should be for europe -- agenda should be for europe. you can't move gas from point to point. are we doing enough as the united states to move europe in that direction? is europe doing enough for itself? development of shale gas. a lot of the opposition comes from gas -- [inaudible] some of it comes from energy giants who will be unnamed in western europe who conot want --

who do not want to give up the relationships they have with you should russia. are we doing enough to advocate for the promotion of indigenous gas in europe and to deal with the environmental consequences in a direct way, or are we too embarrassed to talk about it? with respect to countries, ukraine, i would say poland and some of the others, are we doing enough as the united states to promote internal economic change in those countries, to leverage market reforms so they have a pricing system that somebody might want to invest in? again, i think we're not doing enough yet. i think a third category that we have to look at is whether or not we are doing enough on our own to connect to markets, you know? exporting lnq or export -- lng, or exporting crude oil, but when we compete with others, we make markets more competitive. we're the only country in the oecd that restricts the exports of numbering, and we spent the last 35 years telling everyone else to develop all they can. maybe this is not sustainable.

maybe we should take a look at this. but i think when we're dealing with these kinds of crises, we have to ask ourselves are we doing enough on on this agenda o promote this? and want the caspian as well? ambassador courtney will address this in his talk, but they're probably wondering where that policy is right now. i think we've done important things. we are helping ukraine with shale gas, with internal reform, we're helping them some on debt. but if the strategic option is to make energy less profitable for russia and investment in russia less attractive and provide diversity of supply for europe and diversity of supply for other countries, there's a whole lot more on our agenda that we could that we're not doing, and hopefully this morning we'll talk about what those steps might be. >> thank you very much, david. and thank you both for keeping to our strict time lames. ambassador -- limits. ambassador john byerly was

former u.s.word to the russian federation and to bulgaria. john. >> thanks, matt. it's great to be back here at the wilson center again, and, like jan, to see so many familiar faces and committed experts. it's always a little daunting to talk to a crowd like this about russia. i think what i'd like to try to do is we'll talk a lot about energy today. i'd like to maybe just pull back for a minute and look at the general context of the relationship, the troubled relationship between russia and the west, russia and the united states, russia and europe. and then hone in on a few aspects that i think make this crisis feel a bit different and then bring it back to the energy side. there's a temptation for those of us who have been doing u.s./soviet, u.s./russia relations for most of our careers to see any dispute between russia and the west as just the latest in a series of

cyclical down turns which are almost inevident write followed by up-- inevitably followed by upturns. and i think more importantly there's always been a tendency or an inclination over the last 20 years, since the collapse of the soviet soviet union, to see the strategic paths of russia and the united states, russia and europe, russia and the west as more convergent at the end of the day than divergent. for many, many decades, those of us who were in the business of writing talking points including bill and david and jan wrote many times the talking point that we want a relationship between the united states and russia where we can contain our inevitable disagreements and prevent them from doing damage to the areas of the relationship where we have common interests, where we haved shared views, where we have good cooperation.

this was never an overwhelming consensus on either side for the last 20 years, but at the end of the day it was usually the argument that won out. and so i think one of the central questions that we need to be asking now whether we're looking at the energy question or regional conflicts in which we'd like russia to work with us is can we still agree that these two countries are on convergent trajectories, or do we see these convergent trajectories as achievable. or some people would say even desirable anymore. for me, this current downturn, this current crisis over crimea, over ukraine feels quite a bit different than previous ones that i've experienced in my time working in the soviet union and with russia. and i would point to three quick factors that make it feel different. the first is the scale of the economic ties between russia and the united states, russia and

the europeans and, more importantly, the willingness of the americans and the europeans to use or threaten the use of sanctions as a policy tool. this is much more salient now than it was even five years ago when we had a downturn over the, actually, a crisis in the relationship over georgia. the u.s./russia trade relationship hit a high water mark in 2012 of about $40 billion, but that's only one-tenth of what the russians trade on an annual basis with the europeans. so the stakes are very, very high at this point. and we used to talk, i used to talk when i was ambassador about how the trade and investment relationship between the united states and russia could serve as something of a shock absorber. it could modulate those inevitable ups and downs in the political relationship that we live through over the years. i think we have to look at that

in a different way now, because the size of the economic relationship makes the economic relationship in a way more of a potential hostage to political ups and downs than maybe we thought before. so the economic relationship, the scale of it certainly makes this crisis feel different than previous ones. a second factor is the very complex political context that pote the europeans and -- both the europeans and the americans are working at as we formulate and implement our policies. here in washington that statesmanlike-consensus that used to exist that foreign policy stops at the water's edge, we need to work together on, especially on special, important countries like russia. that's been gone for so long, it's hard for some of us old hands to even remember it existed or some of the younger people in the audience to even imagine that it existed. .. entire generation of people are

gone or on their way out. i never knew the understanding of realities in russia to be as low or as bad as they are in congress right now. i would say the situation is worse in russia with the duma and the federation council and views on the united states. in brussels, as we all know, the ability of europeans to forge a consensus inside the european

union and commission leads to the lowest common denominator solutions. respectthis engenders in russia. that is the second problem. the third one that makes this crisis field to me less like a cyclical downturn and more like a signal of a fundamental divergence is the growing strength in russia of this persuasive national idea, i don't like to call it ideology, but use that word if you want, that questions the utility of partnership with the west and rejects western values and institutions as any kind of a model for russia. we have seen this happen before as russia turns away from the west and then rapproches with the west at some point, but it has never happened before at a time when factually russia is as integrated into, dependent on, and open to the west as is the case now in russia.

so it feels very much like they are two trajectories inside of russia right now, and it is discouraging for me to see how much of that new national idea is founded on the following to that the west and the united aids want to weaken russia. a weak russia, in my opinion and the opinion of everyone i know who does policy on russia, a week russia is our worst nightmare. but working with russia to make it stronger and find, especially through energy cooperation, a way to have russia prosper and become more integrated into the world economy, is really the name of the game. i hope we will be able to dig deeper into that. >> thank you very much, john. bill courtney was u.s. kazakhstan and georgia. >> thank you very much.

call the three energy baby giants to the south of russia, azerbaijan, kazakhstan and turkmenistan. in the years ahead strategic environment in this region may undergo dramatic change. the first source of change is china. in 2011 its gdp was 4.7 times larger than russia's. the imf estimates that in 2018 only seven years later, china's gdp will be six times higher than russia's. leveraging this economic dynamism, china is investing in energy and in kazakhstan and turkmenistan. china has already broken russia's monopoly over energy export pipelines from central asia. oil and gas flow eastward over long distances to china. last year chinese leader ping visited central asia and signed tens of billions of dollars in commercial deals.

china is challenging russia's security real. xiping, proposed a central mechanism for central asia focused regional organization. central asia and russia offer china sources of energy not vulnerable to interdiction by western navies. in this way the u.s. military rebalanced to the asia-pacific is benefiting kazakhstan and turkmenistan. the second source of change is russia's ebbing relative power combined with tactics that alienate. russia has long abused its control over energy export pipelines, squeezing land-locked kazahkstan and turkmenistan. in 2009 russian saboteurs blew up pipeline which turkmenistan exports bass. the kremlin opposed the construction of the oil pipeline which takes oil from azerbaijan to turkey bypassing russia.

russia is asking neighbors to join the your asia economic union. they are grumbling about the higher cost of imports and elsewhere. emboldened by its seizure of crimea russia might conceivably opt to interfere in for kazakhstan where several million ethnic russians live. russian revoltists might see urgency acting before china's growing influence in kazakhstan makes russian intimidation less feasible. another risk to the baby giants is russia's naval buildup in the cast pian sea. in april russia's cast pian sea flotilla called a snap 10-day drill at the same time russian forces are massing on ukraine's border. in both cases russia sought to intimidate. the drawdown of nato forces in afghanistan will reduce the energy security of the baby

giants. they will be more vulnerable to flows of narcotics and battle hardened extremists. it will reduce coalition logistics support from central asia and therefore associated revenues. in early 2012, during a blockage of shipments through pakistan, 85% of coalition supplies traversed the former soviet union on the way to afghanistan. now percentages and volume always are far lower. the fate of iran could become a forth source of strategic shift. iran has swap arrangements with the three baby giants but they would like to ship more energy to and through iran. if iran were to reach a nuclear accord that led to reduced international sanctions, export options for the baby giants would improve. new extraction technologies may create a fifth strategic shift by diminishing the relative

contribution to world energy supplies of azerbaijan, kazakhstan and turkmenistan. illiberal governments and massive corruption characterized the three baby giants since their emergence as independent states 22 years ago. the countries may remain politically stable but the gap between realities and expectations might be rising especially among the younger and better informed. if a social or political explosion were to emerge, this could affect the strategic context for energy development. what might these six potential strategic shifts mean for the region and for the west? as jan and julie point out in the book there is need for quote, stable balance among neighboring powers, end quote. azerbaijan and kazakhstan and perhaps turkmenistan will want the west to remain engaged in their region. this will help them assure a

stable balance among the two neighboring great powers. the west could help them fill the security vacuum that will emerge as coalition troops withdraw from afghanistan. energy alone will guaranty a degree of western support for the independence and prosperity of the three baby giants. this however may not be enough. as europe and america retrench from some of their far-flung commitments they will concentrate their foreign policy energies increasing on countries making progress towards democracy and respect for human rights. we see this already in western support for ukraine and georgia. the main challenge ahead for the three baby giants is to find better ways to couple energy wealth with more freedoms. this will help them build sustainable prosperity and a loyal citizenry that will resist internal and external threats and help the baby giants live at peace with their neighbors, even

ones much more powerful. these countries should also try to offset adversities by improving their energy investment climates. according to the world bank's index of the ease of doing business, kazahkstan is near top one-fourth of countries in the world and azerbaijan is in the top 1/3. the finally the west should realize the strength of its support for ukraine against russian aggression and its support for reforms in ukraine will send a positive and important signal to central asia and the south caucus sass. caulk cast sus. a row bust economic sanctions on russia, will help deter moscow from coercing other neighbors. demonizing russia is not the right policy but deterring it is. thank you.

>> thank you, bill. julian is director of russian and caspian program in inh energy. julia. >> thank you all for coming. what i would like to do spin this in the direction of what we focused quite a bit on shush that. to look how russia must be perceiving some developments not only between itself and ukraine but also broader region when you look at ivan and this whole problem of suddenly the instability for countries that have sizable and oil and gas resources. for russia i think if you think about the u.s. unconventional energy boom, it is putting us on a path to overtaking russia to become the world's largest oil-producing nation.

we're not there yet. russia produces 10.5 million barrels a day. it is the lead oil producer right now. but moscow has been seeking ways to maintain its competitive edge in both oil and gas production and in exports and really its relationship in this area with the u.s. that is important. oil and gas determine russia's economic and national security. i think that is important to keep in mind. you probably all heard the numbers that russia's oil and gas sector contributes about 70% of the country's total export revenues. 50% of its federal budget revenues, 40% of tax revenues. oil and gas contribute about a third of russian gdp and high oil prices contribute significantly to gdp growth. so in order to underpin its ability to keep oil and gas, well actually oil production at competitive levels with the u.s. there is this race for

exploration in the arctic which is one of the areas that we've heard about. in order to basically develop the next generation of oil and gas projects in russia, russia will need the help of the international oil industry. and as a result, it is already lining up with some of the world's biggest corporations like exxonmobil, eni of italy, norway's statoil. each which bring important political and commercial and technological inputs that are essential for russia today. i think while gas program dismissed the need for shale gas technology and its development in russia one of the areas that is important in the discussion today is that neighboring ukraine has vast, unconventional gas resources and these resources are being targeted by again the international oil

industry. shell sign ad production sharing agreement in eastern ukraine which is on hold right now. chevron has an agreement, a production-sharing agreement in western ukraine for unconventional gas. and in a sense, i suppose if ukraine were to stablize you could see these projects moving forward. russia state oil company rosneft has been very supportive of the development of unconventional oil resources in russia and it has team up with exxonmobil. in may it teamed up with bp on a pilot project in the volga, urals, exxonmobil is in siberia. u.s. energy information estimated that russia's technically recoverable shale resources are 75 billion barrels of oil. the largest in the world, the u.s. ranks second. so in a sense, there's this energy competition between the u.s. and russia but for russia

energy is also a lifeline for its economy. now that bring us backs to one of the subjects of today. given its proximity to russia, the e.u. has developed direct oil and gas pipeline links to its eastern neighbor. the level of russian dependence varies by countries in the e.u. but if you see which countries are most dependent on russian gas, it would be germany number one, is the largest importer from gazprom. there is austria and countries of eastern central europe are very dependent on russian gas. when you think about the new pipeline talked about for russia, which would be involving ukraine to the extent that if the south stream gas pipeline were built would marginalize the need for ukraine's gas network. but the countries that are promoting the need for south stream, are austria and latest

one to sign up and countries of eastern central europe because they are very dependent on russian gas and their economies are hurt if gas supplies are cut. and in about half of the 28 e.u. member states russian gas accounts for more than 41% of their consumption. in the end i think what we need to look at as well, if we look at the e.u., i think for russia the european union, e.u. 28, croatia is the latest member and turkey, they comprise its largest trading partner and they take the majority of russian gas exports with over 50% being shipped across ukraine. and for gazprom europe is the largest of its three markets and it's going to try to hold on to this in terms of revenue and profit and, you know, gazprom sells some gas of course in russia which is a very big market. it is the domestic market.

countries of the former soviet union and it has started shipping some lng to asia but we can not forget europe is really the heart of gazprom's market for its gas. i think china will develop over time but, as a result i think what we need to keep in mind as this ukraine and russian relationship develops is that in any case one of the things that russia will look at, whatever happens is that it is determined to build, maintain the relationships it has in europe as we've seen. it wants to build a new pipeline into europe and, it will continue to try and not only hold on to its current gas share in europe but to build the share up because europe, it has determined in the future will probably need more russian gas. thank you. >> thank you very much, julia. i will move to the podium to moderate our discussion and thus

vacate a spot for the ambassador who i think will join us shortly. so think of your questions. who has questions? yes. right there. identify the name and institution for the panel. >> hi. nye name is -- [inaudible] just visiting here. so the discussions about energy in ukraine supposedly but i heard a lot about russia but as far as ukraine is concerned, there was modernization that was used. i heard that ukrainian, ukrainian economy is 2 1/2 more inefficient than russian. so, isn't there a lot of space

to improve the energy consumption in ukraine so it is much less dependent on russia's gas and, well, any comments on this? >> who wants to talk about energy efficiency? go ahead. >> i can take a first stab. getting prices right in ukraine is step one. you can put seven or eight other countries in that category of the in a system where everyone's electricity and gas prices are subsidized, you have demand which is far higher than it need be otherwise. you need governments to change that system and you only don't subsidize the poor and subsidize everybody is very difficult to do and requires creating a subsidy system that targets people. that worked for world bank and imf. that is diplomatic work for the u.s. and leverage we're trying to give to ukraine to promote those kind of reforms.

until you do that, you have countries, companies like shell and chevron that want to develop shale bass in ukraine who they hope can export to countries that can make market price. only when you get internal reform in ukraine that the domestic market will be attractive. there is lot of work to be done. absolutely you can do more on energy efficiency and pricing but no one will invest in energy efficiency unless you save money on electricity bill to to invest higher technologies better windows or thermostat, until you pay the for the electricity you're consuming you don't have a price signal. and that is important to do. >> i might add a comment here there's a real problem and challenge in terms of the timing of these issues. when you talk about shale gas development in ukraine, and i hope that there will be plenty available pause if, to the

extent there is, the development of resources also a little bit on the offshore side perhaps, that will make it possible for ukraine to have a more, a less dependent policy on other countries. but, in order to get to that point, this is, this is not something you should do overnight. something that requires years of development, exploration, development and production. so the question is, how do you build that bridge from where ukraine is presently, which is highly dependent on external sources to one that is less dependent. here is where i think the e.u. really has to step up because there is, the possibility of using the pipes that have been taking the gas in, more for european consumption and, been making that gas available to ukraine. where does the u.s. come in? if we have a more liberal export policy as david is pointing out

including exporting lng and obviously that wouldn't go to ukraine directly but it would be going to europe. that requires rigasification facilities in europe. that is an investment. in turn you are able to back in more immediately available gas to the european area which in return will make it possible for europe to be more responsive in this bridge, this time bridge to ukrainian requirements. so how do you justify this in your own mind? obviously all of this is money, right? it is not something that is a free good. i believe it is very important to focus public debate on the investment required to have a safer and more secure neighborhood, european neighborhood in which ukraine plays a key role. and, you know, i don't mind the advocacy on national security ground for taking steps to ramp

up the rigasification, to pending time that might be more available in ukraine's space and certainly won't cover all of ukraine's requirements. very important thing to focus on. i was reminded of that because of the last time that, poroshenko's predecessor was about to sign that european deal, you remember that? there was a $20 billion factor and putin immediately stepped up and said, we'll give you $20 billion in credits and we'll reduce the gas prices overnight. meantime we were suck our thumb i'm sorry to say, figuratively about this. when you think about $20 billion compare that to at

least two trillion and looks like almost four trillion we've spent on iraq and afghanistan, you have to wonder about our sense of proportion in terms of our national security strategy. in $20 billion of investment in the security of europe in my mind is lot more important than the number of expenditures we've had to make because of an ill-conceived iraq policy. and we really have to get into this debate about making the right invests for the right things and not throwing money at the wrong things. i think ukraine is -- of that action. >> subsidies in ukraine of energy have been up to 40% of purchase price. that is one of the most, if not the most energy inefficient economy in the world in the past. at the heart of the imf program which ukraine is now implementing are reductions in energy subsidies as well as eliminating the overvalued

exchange rate. a key internal political issue for ukraine is that some of energy intensive industries in eastern ukraine at realistic market prices for energy will be negative value added producing companies. how the government deals with that economic challenge at the same time it has a security challenge in eastern ukraine will be, will be very interesting to see. of course you have seen prime minister yatsunuk refer to his interim government as kamikaze government because in fact he was planning to implement tough energy price realism. >> let me ask all of you a question about the region on more broadly. seems here in the united states, north america we've been fortunate in many ways. one way despite our various adventures in the middle east we haven't had to think of energy

con chum and production largely in geopolitical or geostrategic terms. it just hasn't had to be a part of our national mindset of energy. yet in the region we're talking about overwhelmingly clear it is vital and essential. there doesn't seem to be connective tissue between points of consumption decisions you were talking about and for example, politics. your cross-section of ukrainian is not necessarily picturing vladmir putin when deciding how much gas to use, how efficient windows to put in their apartment, et cetera. that is just on the efficiency side. you could scale all the way up to, oligarch level production throughout ukraine. there are other economies too where their hand is actually strengthened by increasing energy dependency of neighboring countries and so on. how, what is the smart way to have a region-wide conversation that actually does connect the dots for, not just ordinary people, but people at the point

of the tap and the spigot and investment decisions operationally about energy with the geopolitics, so these things don't continue to exist somehow in relationship to each other but divorced? i don't know if that questions makes sense. thoughts? >> well, a quick comment. read frank's chapter in our book here. nice way of advertising the book, which talks about the politics of energy and how difficult it is, how very challenging it is and you know, there's no easy answer to the very good question that matt puts but it seems to me that when you think of assistance to ukraine, and i think people are in the mood to talk about that, even despite the general anti-assistance atmosphere, certainly in the european context and i would hope also in the u.s. context, i think it is well worth making an investment

in, in inducements, for example, for energy efficiency. here in this country the power companies with the encouragement of the states are inducing us to in fact cut back on our energy consumption for a very good reason. they don't have to build more power plants which are very expensive. well, similarly, if we can build in, and i know that david had a lot to do with that thinking when he was in the state department, build into your assistance program as well as our energy strategy the idea that an investment, multilateral, european-u.s., in helping ukraine cut out those subsidies and, reducing the pain of those, of that cutout, so just not ukrainian burden, that's a far better investment i think than many other things as

i was trying to suggest earlier, that we throw our money around at, because it has intrinsically so much to do with the course of the country in ukraine and, as ukraine becomes more sort of market-oriented and based, it becomes more resilient, both internally and in terms of its relationship with the countries around it. >> i have to agree with jan. politics are really hard in europe. it is probably a mistake to call it region and europeanwide solution. western europe has different economic interests than central east european states and they're not going to change. just like frank's chapter here, it is hard enough in our country but you ever the strategic interest of the country and you have economic interests of entrenched interests. i think the other challenge you have you need a bridge. if you go to bulgaria, you were

ambassador in bulgaria, you say we have indigenous gas and we'll bring you alternatives, their answer is yeah, for the next nine years what are we going to do when gazprom cuts off our gas? you have to have some interim solution country by country. for the u.s. we have to look more bilaterally. but for the e.u. the question is, are they going to look at that broad interests that you have identified and act on it or will it be the lowest common denominator as we have seen? it is hard to bank on that changing but it is only if we see the european union take on that strategic interest and make hard political choices like, being able to move gas from spain all the way to ukraine, to break some of these, these gazprom interests. that is a germany problem. that is a u.k. problem, that is a brussels problem. that's a big lift. so i think that would be the answer to your question. the e.u. would have to lead those changes and drive the countries to it but i think for the u.s. we can't expect that is

going to happen and we have to work in smaller bites. >> right. by the way there are still going to be countries i would imagine, john, like bulgaria will be pr battleground, political battleground where the other parts of this region that have disparate interests will invest in lobbying the opposite way, right? i mean they're doing that to some extent now i guess. >> yes. it's, energy policy is a hard sell. domestically it is hard to get people interested. at one level, at another level you're talking in the united states about a very, very simple equation that most people can understand. we want our country to be less dependent on foreign sources of energy and the europeans can kind of condense it all into, we want to be more diversified and less dependent on gas in particular coming from the east. it would seem to me that with some enlightened leadership, both in brussels and in

washington we could put those two imperatives together today, that would help the united states help europeans. i take your point, david, europeans, we need to differentiate a bit between the bulgarians and the germans but if we were to, let's say, convene a summit which we set a goal of helping the europeans reduce their gas dependence on russia by 25% in the next two to three years i think that would get moskow's attention. it would certainly answer our own and european interests. and interestingly, i think a lot of people in russia would applaud that as well because many of the russian economists, and especially economists i talk to say, only that kind of competition is really going to force the russian economy and russian energy sector to diversify itself and especially to modernize in a way that makes

it a more efficient producer in the end. >> i think one of the thinks to keep in mind, european has majority of dependence on pipeline gas and the pipeline gas is dominated by russian gas and those ties are going to be very difficult to break, when you think, gazprom has about 617 bcm of gas it could produce. it is producing under 500 right now. there is just this enormous quantity of gas in russia that really should be oriented to european markets. so i guess. the question really for the future, to some degree in europe, yes, lng will be option of some magnitude, is how can you get a cooperative relationship that works better? because 20 years from now, i think what you may find is that the other pipeline forces are going to be diminishing. the one that is left really the russian source of pipeline gas. that is not going to go away. so i don't know how you get from

here to there but eventually there has to be a solution because that is where the resources are. >> question here. please wait for the microphone. and introduce yourself. >> my name is elaine. i'm a russian-ukrainian american. so i am ex-ukrainian speaks russia and born in germany and has relatives all over the united states and russia and ukraine and many other european countries. so with globalization of the world, the energy is, having a different, a different meaning for me especially because my family is so multinational. and, right now, we all talk about the strategy for the energy sector and we talk about, that yes, ukraine can do shale gas fracking which we like, don't like here in the united

states. in some countries in europe, we say, okay, we will deliver more energy to the european union. however, when i speak to my relatives in ukraine they're worried about winter coming. the utility bills go up. what is your opinion on long-term strategy for ukrainians? and how valuable is the situation of mr. poroshenko right now? if he can not hold on the prices for utility bills and people go into winter and winter in ukraine, believe me, is very, very cold, without a clear policy what happens to the general population, ukraine will not survive this winter. so what is your opinion and how do you think the situation can be solved in -- >> very short term, are we going to see another winter gas war? bill? >> let me broaden it beyond gas

war. if ukraine does not make the energy efficiency changes that the imf is demanding, it will lose western support. it is as simple as that. ukraine is broke. it has no option to continue subsidizing the price of energy and price of gas in ukraine up to 40% or 25% or whatever. there is going to be short-term adjustment. it will be tough in ukraine, there is no getting around that. the most important thing for ukraine is start becoming more efficient in use of energy, consume less of it. that will improve its market power relative to russia. it will reduce potential debt it has to russia and get energy at an efficient market price for the future. then ukraine can take advantage of other economic reforms because only with market prices for energy will investors have a good idea what kinds of investments in industry and agriculture and makes, what kinds do not. it will be tough in the

short-term but liberalizing the economy and bringing a market price for gas are essential. >> we still need to put a finer point on tough in the short term. i think if i understood the question right, the leverage equation changes dramatically, the political leverage changes dramatically when people have to heat their homes. >> that's right. ukraine could survive a shut off of russian gas up to september and it is not true for the winter. diplomatically you need to avoid a shutoff of flows and you need to make sure storage is full and you maximize what you can bring in. no, there is no short-term alternative. you couldn't bring enough goal coal or oil to heat ukraine. >> frack something longer term. >> fracking is longer term. >> could i add to that the short-term alternative is not there for russia either. russia needs ukraine. 84 bcm of gas last year moved across ukraine, of 161 that was

consumed by europe 28 members and turkey. russia also needs ukraine. my impression there will be some sort of agreement on the price. i mean, this pricing issue is up for debate right now and russia has cut supplies to ukraine but there has to be an agreement for russia as well. so short term i think for ukraine the issue is, that there's a need on both sides to find a solution and that there has to be gas this winter. i agree with you. and if, you know there isn't gas flowing across ukraine into europe, then that is issue with the european union i think russia wants to avoid having, any sort of gas cutoff in the winter. >> i would add to that, even though i'm not a great sanctions fan, i am very much struck by the impact of targeted sanctions. at a time that the russian

economy is gdp growth is going down to one or less percent, and before it was in the 7% range the economic consequences of being totally antagonistic, i think are becoming clearer and i think that's having impact on putin and his circle in terms of how they view this. secondly, there is an opportunity as i tried to make the point in my opening of a longer term view in which you take another look at shared ownership of trunk pipeline in ukraine. it was tried before under very different circumstances. but if the possibility is there for the e.u. to, and ukraine, and russia to have shared ownership with the golden share and the decision-making voice

being ukraine's, that could be incentive for shorter-term approach in terms of pricing. after all, pricing of gas for ukraine has always been politically driven in russia. they were doing everything they could to force the ukraine into eurasian union. that failed. ukraine now is moving in another direction. the question is, how can you keep up, as much of a relationship with ukraine in these different circumstances? well the way to do that perhaps, is to talk to, use the prospect of longer-term cooperation in a way that that induces russia to even forgive some of the debt that ukraine owns, owes russia for past gas consumed as part of a deal involving shared equity approaches to the trunk pipeline. it requires a different

political environment to start doing this but i think, each side is beginning to recognize the limits of a zero sum strategy here, and, what we need to do i think, as a policy matter is to come up with ideas like this, that show that there are plus plus solutions that are far better than, you know, continuing this mindless violence in the east of ukraine and, antagonizing the west to the extent that sanctions will be invoked. all of this can be made into a strategy. how you get public support and congressional understanding, that is beyond my my -- i don't know. i do know much more progress can be made strategically if we approach this in the right way. >> jan, you weren't kidding when you said you were an optimist earlier. the gentleman in over there. >> realistic optimist.

>> i will give you that. >> ron davis, former state department. over the past 15 years, gazprom has invested in eu companies, gas systems. has a lot of sub skid airies in the e.u. countries. could you comment on how that factors into this whole matter of reducing dependence, eu dependence on russian gas. >> ukraine and europe. >> let me, a couple of things. i guess, the e.u. antitrust policy would end russia both supplier and owner of the downstream transportation infrastructure needs to be enforced and forcefully. you're right, as long as gazprom directly or indirectly controls transportation in europe, then, then it is going to make it harder for these european countries dependent on those flows to resist them and give

them more leverage. it is the case now. europe bans destination clauses. theoretically you should be able to sell russian gas anywhere you want. that the russia has interest in the europe pipeline and other pipelines means you can't really move that gas unless gazprom says so. so that impedes the ability ultimately to move, reverse flow natural gas from anywhere else from the border of spain or any place else you can get it into europe where you want it to go. that is really the crux of it. they not only need to reverse some ownership that is there but they have to make sure it doesn't go forward. you're right, they have a choke hold. it is just not very visible. >> could i just make a quick comment on that? you know, we all have this view of this gigantic state within the state, gazprom which can do other things to other people.

, in the spirit of realistic optimism, let me point out in russia itself there is increased competition over gas. rosneft is moving into the gas territory. novatek is there. they have all very close associations with putin. if anything i think putin is a little bit fed up with the dysfunctionality of gazprom. so point one. point two, gazprom says, well, if you don't want to have our gas we'll give it over to the asian side and walk off from europe and horrible things will happen. well, if you take a look at the asian theater, it is heavily subscribed by qatar, australia, potentially western coast of canada, if the u.s. gets its act together, ourselves. the idea that the russians simply shift their gas over to the east, or that this deal with china has all of the price issues resolved, you notice the one thing that was kept secret was pricing.

and i think it must be pretty obvious to us why that is because chinese are not going to pay the russians the kind of prices that the ukrainians or anybody else have paid. that's ridiculous. so the room for manuever of gazprom i think has always been overstated in the debate and the degree of competition over gas control in russia is increasing. those are strategic opportunities and we ought to get our act together here a little bit and think how we help ukraine, how we can influence russia, how e.u. can be put into the act in a way that is of benefit. think about again, i apologize to those that think it is idealistic, but there is a plus-plus solution which is far better where we are right now. won't satisfy everybody but far better than what we have now. >> gentleman in the white shirt, yellow tie. wait for the mic, please.

>> thank you. my name is kovar prosper, faculty member at district of columbia. my question, we talk about congressional support and we talk about this lack of congress understanding what is happening with russia. we talked around it. so what would that look like? what would congressional support look like in the current state for ukraine and russia and what could we do and talk to our representatives how to have that conversation? >> john, seems like your wheel house. >> i think on the ukrainian side it would take the form of congressional willingness to pass a special appropriation for ukraine to help with some of these economic problems we described. it would send a signal to russia, moskow, especially people of ukraine that we're putting our money where our mouth is. with regard to russia, i think

there is really a dearth of any contact between the russian duma and u.s. congress, between the senate and the russian federation council. the number of contacts that used to be 10, 15 per year have dwindled to almost zero now. we need to work much harder on our side to try to re-establish the links between the leaders on, in the parliaments in both countries and the staff, especially the staff, to help dispel some of these mythologies that really do nothing to foster a better understanding or better policy making towards each other in the absence of that, you get laws in russia banning the adoption of russian orphans by americans or you get the magnitsky law in the united states, however well-intentioned it might have been was a net negative in terms of u.s.-russia

relations. >> well, we've, we're very fortunate to have been joined by ambassador carlos pascual, the international energy coordinator and head of the bureau of energy and natural resources at the state department. also former u.s. ambassador to ukraine, bill miller in the room. also former u.s. ambassador, i don't know if there are any others but we're certainly well-represented here for state department regional hands and former u.s. ambassador to mexico. carlos, just to give you an overview we of course talked about the impact of the crisis in ukraine. ukraine-russia relations, the acute challenge may come this winter when the bargaining positions get very tough. we talked to ambassador beyrle talked about how different the relationship twine russia and the west is now because of depth of economic ties and fact those are being used in the context of a political crisis. we talked of course more broadly about the region including the sort of southern belt of small

giants, little giants, i guess bill courtney called them. >> baby giants. >> as per buy january -- azerbaijan, kazakhstan and turkmenistan. i like to give you a few minutes to talk about your perspective and we have time for a few questions before we wrap up. >> thank you. my apologies i could not be with you throughout the entire discussion. i'm glad i was able to join. i was going to join at the lunch and jan twisted my arm and asked me if i would come on a few minutes beforehand. thank you for my tolerating jumping in at the last minute and all are good friends and colleagues. i think one of the starting points we have to look at this issue from is the radical change that's happened in the european gas market because as you look at the tensions between russia and ukraine you can't take that out of a wider context what's happened in europe. so after the last gas crisis

between russia and ukraine in 2009, europe has taken some extraordinary steps to put in place a much more competitive gas market. it put in market rules under the third energy package so not one single company could own the gas, own the transit systems and own the distribution systems. in effect it has begun to enforce a competitive environment. it has taken away a small thing called destination clauses which has huge impact. previously when a country bought gas, for example, germany or gas, it would have to get permission from gazprom to export that gas. the e.u. made that illegal in the european market. once germany get the gas they can sell it to whomever they want to. that is absolutely critical of whole concept of reverse flows going back to ukraine. europe also put in place very extensive infrastructure investments that are still not complete. countries like bulgaria are not

part of the network. you can physically move gas west to east, north to south, in ways you previously could not. they have made massive invests in regasification facilities. the other big impact we've seen in the marketplace is caused by the united states. the united states now is producing much more gas than was ever envies saninged. we increased natural gas production by 35% over the last five years. as a result of that we're importing about 5 bcm. billion cubic mighters of lng a year but it was previously envisaged we would import 80. particularly in 2011 and 2012 a lot of supplies were redirected toward the european market. those changes, increased availability of supply, the infrastructure, the policy changes, have allowed every single major western european utility to renegotiate their contracts with gazprom to lower the price and extend the

financing terms, principally in 2011 and 2012 when that took place. the reason that is so critical is the importance of that market power has created in the european context. and the critical objective for ukraine is to be brought into that community of european energy, european energy so they are part of the strength of a community of 400 million consumers and not just left alone. if they can be part of those rules and be treated in the same way as that market is treated, they are in a much stronger position than they are otherwise. that has been the foundation of where we've been trying to move. one of the things that we just got a note about, energy in ukraine it is at heart of economic and politics since independence, right, bill? who controlled gas system and money won elections. that is reality of the past.

one of the things of this government is change that and cut a link to the past and bring greater transparency to the energy system and bring greater efficiency to the system that ukraine consumes three times energy than production of unit of gdp than any other country in europe. what are we trying to do? let me give you a perspective. let me run over numbers. apologies if you done this already or just stop me. ukraine consumes 50 cubic meters of gas every year. 28 comes from russia. they produce about 20 and get two in so-called reverse flows. in effect using the european market that takes advantage of limited pipeline capacity that currently exists to move gas in a sense backwards through the system, from poland and hungary. and so one of the challenges is how to work with ukraine to be able to change that equation in order to create greater energy

security. so in the short term one of the things that we've been working on is expanding those two billion cubic meters of gas to something that could be much larger. poland is at a maximum level of about a rate of 1 1/2 billion cubic meters a year. hungary could be 6.1 billion cubic meters a year. they're currently at just about three. they recently increased a little bit. we're working with both the ukrainians, hungarians and gas suppliers to try to understand how they might be able to take that further. slovakia has not had an interconnection but they have recently reached an agreement with ukraine to complete the building a physical interconnection that would al 3 billion cubic meters, 3.2 billion call big meters to flow starting in september and that could be expanded with compression to between eight to 10 billion cubic meters a year. so in effect if you take those

possibilities, what it means by the end of 2014 more or less ukraine could potentially have 5 billion cubic meters of gas when you take into account amount of time it is available to flow. by the end of next heating system which would be april 1st of next year, they would have an additional 10 billion cubic meters or total of 10 billion cubic meters of gas that would become available to them through these reverse flow mechanisms. the other critical thing to look at is storage. right now ukraine has 14 billion cubic meters of gas in storage. they have to keep five in the system and not use to maintain the structural integrity of their wells. there is a potential for them to build that up a little bit more because right now in the summer they're producing more than they're consuming. they're bringing some in from reverse flows. so if you take that into account, ukraine potentially sufficient gas between reverse

flows, production and storage to keep them in reasonable shape till about december. and that becomes the timeline in which they have to reach this agreement with russia in order to be able to restart gas flows. the sooner that they do it the better. one of the reasons that it is important for ukraine to be able to do it is that there's a limitation on the size of the pipeline that can actually move gas from russia to the west. and so at a certain.during winder when russia is consuming, europe is consuming, ukraine is consuming, if there aren't already prepositioned supplies in ukraine you will end up with gas shortages right? you have to have a certain almost already there. look at what this could be like in a year if there is some measures taken on energy efficiency. ukraine continues to produce at 20 billion cubic meters. they have 10 billion cubic meeters in reverse flows. so at 30 billion cubic meters. they reduce consumption by about

five. then they're in a position where the amount that they would have to import from russia would be decreased to say, 15 billion cubic meters as opposed to the 28 that they're doing right now. that becomes a realistic, a doable scenario. there are at love things that have to happen to make it possible. what is really interesting if you look out a decade. there what we see is that first ukraine has signed production-sharing contracts with shell and chevron. it has extensive shale gas capabilities. it also has great capabilities from the redevelopment of existing wells where they can produce more conventional gas from fields that have stopped producing. they have been using the same seven yet technology since the 1970s. with those changes in technologies, realistically ukraine could double its production of gas to a range of 40 to 45 billion cubic meters in the course of a decade.

it could expand its reverse flow capabilities. 10 is the minimum that it could do without trying really hard. it could potentially bring that up to 15. just between those two things, production and reverse flows, ukraine could be in the position of producing or having access to 50 to 60 billion cubic meters of gas. remember its total consumption right now is 50. if it puts in place energy efficiency measures, depending on how efficiency balances off with future economic growth, you crain realistic i -- ukraine realistically could be in a position within a decade it could make a choice whether it imports gas from russia. if it is commercially advantageous for it do so it can and if it's not it won't. so part of what we're doing is not only trying to help ukraine work through these short-term scenarios but be able to put in place the mechanisms that are going to allow it to work with private investors to be able to

boost its production over time. that is something that the united states is engaged in working with the ebrd, the european union, the ifc is interested. the world bank has been another important player. so all of us are engaged in that process. the final thing i just wanted to say is on the negotiation process between russia and ukraine. and here the e.u. really has been absolutely critical. i think they have done an outstanding job. they have been lead by the european energy commissioner. essentially the approach that the e.u. has taken is to say that we have tried to create a competitive gas market in europe. we are extending that gas market and rules of that gas market to ukraine which is part of the european energy community. as part of that gas market there are a few basic things you have to do. one you abide by market prices. so the e.u. put on the table a

proposal that gave a number of options of what prevailing market prices would be. the second piece of that is if you buy the gas you can trade it. so that there's a freedom to trade and have reverse flows, something that gazprom has contested but the e.u. has supported. and the third is that if you consume the gas you have to pay your debts. and here ukraine has faced a real problem because they have significant buildup of debts to gazprom but what they have also agreed in a proposal that the e.u. put on the table they would immediately make payments if in fact there was a package agreement around all of these efforts. russia walked away from that proposed agreement for one basic reason. i think. there were issues that were related to price. there were issues that related to debt but what was really a sticking point, was the ukrainians and e.u. sported them on this, said they needed a

mutually agreed contract that was not simply a russian adjustment to an earlier negotiated contract where russia decides to give a discount. what is the reason for that? well the prevailing earlier contract is from 2009 during the period of -- the earlier discount was for the black see fleet. . .

>> thank you. that was extremely helpful and, i think, a fantastic complement to what we've heard. jan and i have negotiated. what we have decided to do is take one round of several questions, and then give the panel a chance to very briefly close, and then we hope we won't run too far over. there was -- right there.

>> teresa, national war college. i wanted to ask a question about the storage. ambassador pascual, you noted that there's 14 billion cubic meters in ukraine right now. as far as i know, their storage capacity is 30 billion. i want to understand the ownership of that storage. does -- is there a transparency problem? is there a part russian ownership problem? in what sense is the storage in ukraine usable, and in what sense does it continue to be county. >> okay. and right there. >> thank you. i'm from russia. what are the u.s. policy goals in the energy field in ukraine, and what are the instruments to achieve those goals? my question is for ambassador pascual and others who want to comment. because we've been talking about anything, about managing ukrainian affairs, managing european affairs but not about

u.s. interests. so that's my focus. and then secondly just technically, ambassador, i listened very intensively to your presentation, i still do not understand. do you support the ukrainians paying their debts to russia? because everybody agree around this table that they do not have any other short-term options before this coming winter. other than restoring the flow of the gas if it's interrupted. >> okay. >> and that demands debt payment. thank you. >> and last question right here. >> david goldwyn spoke about pop gating natural gas -- >> your name, affiliation. >> my name's mariah blake, i'm with mother jones. pop a gating unconventional natural gas production in other countries, and i'm wondering what has been done on this front so far, whether the united states is stepping up these efforts in light of the cry ice

in concern crisis in crimea, and there was also, i believe he said not enough was being done on this front, what more would he like to see be done on this front. >> okay. great. why don't we just go from here down to carlos. is that, does that work for you, jan? >> yeah, although we don't -- i think most of them are for carlos. >> defer from one ambassador to another. >> okay, on storage, you're correct, ukraine has 30 billion meters of capacity. that is gas which is within ukraine's ownership. whether there are specific entities within ukraine who own portions of that gas is not completely clear. that's one of the things that still needs to be confirmed. but one of the things that has been a great step forward is that the european union maintains a system for realtime

reporting of gas stores of gas movements and gas supplies. ukraine is thousand participating in that. -- now participating in that. they're posting it online on a weekly basis, they're not doing it daily, but that has been a very important step forward in actually promoting transparency about what gas stores they have available. so we have a pretty good feel for what they have to work with. in terms of what u.s. policy goals are in ukraine, i think they're really goals that are almost universal, which is to be able to see within ukraine and within europe an environment for the development of natural resources and the consumption of national resources which happens in a context of competition and diversification of supplies. that's good for consumers, to have that kind of competitive environment. all of us seek to have multiple suppliers to satisfy our energy needs, that's a source of greater energy security. we want to be able to have an environment that allows us to develop our own energy resources, and creating the right kind of environment that

attracts private investment to the that, because that is absolutely key, it is fundamental. and it's those basic things that have been at the heart of u.s. policy, and they're not that different from the way we would explain the way that we would deal with other countries throughout the world. in terms of ukraine paying its debt, i think more important than what the united states thinks is that ukraine has said it should pay its debt. and the negotiations that they had with russia, one part of that proposed agreement was that the day after the package was agreed to is that ukraine would make a payment of $1 billion. and the critical issue here is that ukraine has put on the table and the e.u. has been supportive of this, is that you should have a package arrangement that deals with the whole set of issues. what's the price of gas going to be in the future, how do you handle debt, what are the rights in arbitration, and everybody should have that and have it transparent so that the week, the following week that you don't just get into another

dispute over another issue, and you really have a foundation to be able to move forward. i'll just say one thing about natural gas in the region, but david goldwyn started a program called the shale gas technical exchange program. it's now focused on unvex algas. -- unconventional gas. the united states has been engaged with many countries throughout the region to exchange best practices on the development of shale and on convention algas resources. the final thing i just want to say is the importance of recognizing that the issues that we're dealing with here on energy fundamentally involve both, fundamentally involve commercial players and private players making investments on the basis of what they think is going to be commercially viable and sustainable. and so what we all need to try to do is to work together to help the countries that are involved in these disputes to be able to create an environment

that allows commercially-sound decisions to be reached that are in the economic interest of all of the countries and not have geopolitical factors and influence be the driving factors of those commercial arrangements. the foundation for those arrangements really needs to be what makes commercial sense, and that's one of the things that we're trying to get to. >> thank you. >> i think i'll defer to david, because it's really the shale gas question that's the next. yeah. >> thanks for the question. actually, i said i thought that the u.s. was, i understand, stepping up its support for ukraine. but in ukraine and all these countries, really the point of what was then the global shale gas initiative, now the unconventional gas technology exchange program is for our government to help other governments learn how to regulate properly. the real challenge in most of these countries other than what is the local benefit, are the governments sharing the revenues in a way that will help local development, is how do do you

get regulators comfortable that they can protect groundwater, that they can mediate between agriculture and the locality, that they can avoid seismicity issues, and that's are intro to regulation. it's also leveraging all the things we've learned in the last three years about the need to require baseline testing of water, baseline testing of emissions, distance to aquifers, setbacks, disclosure. all these things which we learned kind of the hard way need to be the starting point for these european cups. but while they -- countries. but i think the conversation in the european union and the conversation between the united states and the european union ought to move from the whether we should do this to the how we should do this. and i think there's just a discomfort sometimes, you know, with u.s. policy not really at the state department with ambassador pascual's program, but it's this discomfort with how do we support development of gas at the same time we're promoting a climate change agenda?

you can do both especially if you're backing out coal safely. i think i'd like to see us do more because i'd like to see europe do more. ultimately, you can only get so much lng in these countries that you're going to be relying on russian gas until they get to the renewable future for us and for them is probably a decade off. gas is the bridge, and they need to build it quickly. >> great. we're so far over time, maybe if there are any final burning comments, we can take them, otherwise i think, wrap up? jan? >> well, i just endorse very much the idea of a package giving incentives to develop both short-term and longer-term approaches. and one of the things here to keep in mind is that competition is not only a matter of the european space, but there's more and more competition in the russian space. a point that i made earlier about how novatech and gas prom are competing themselves, so the

notion of encouraging a market-based approach should not be dismissed out of hand. the critical challenge is to develop a political environment in which a stabilization of the crisis in ukraine makes it possible to talk sensibly again about how it's in the economic interest not just of the west, but frankly, of the east to adopt these approaches. everybody will be better off. and i think that's the opportunity. through crisis, you get to an opportunity. >> well, let's thank our panelists for this fantastic discussion and all of you -- [applause] thank you for joining us. >> next, a memorial service for

journalists killed in 2013. following that is federal reserve chair janet yellen. are in endowment is healthy. it is just shy of $600 million. groupbilt is in our peer and they are $6 billion. harvard represents the pinnacle of the nation's endowments is at 24 billion. if we are going to aspire to have that type of excellence and those facilities to produce that type of excellence on a campus than we have to have that kind of investment. to gomy responsibility

out and show that we expand those revenues. frederick tonight on c-span's "q&a." shouldinternet content remain free from regulation. susan crawford has said it is like confusing the conversation there in we want the conversation to be free and unregulated. business regulating content online. we have a regulated phone system there is the fcc does not regulate what i call you. openmake sure that it is and available for everybody to use. think aboutcial to if those platforms remain open the way they are historically.

anyone can communicate. anyone can get online. a tiny company can get access to the internet and become a huge business. it is vital that that not change. >> opinions on the fcc's open internet all at sea. eastern ont at 8:00 the communicators. >> 10 journalists died in 2013 while covering the news. their names were added to a memorial at the newseum in washington, d.c., during a recent ceremony. it included remarks by the executive editor and senior vice president kathleen carroll. this is 30 minutes. >> good morning, everyone.

i am ceo here at the newseum. i want to welcome you all for today's rededication of the journalists' memorial. since the newseum opened in 2000 eight, more than 4 million visitors have seen this soaring memorial behind me which pays tribute to over 2200 journalists worldwide who have died covering the news. around the world, generalists -- journalists placed himself -- themselves in journal every -- journalists place themselves in danger every day. although some may be in the wrong place at the wrong time, most are professionals taking calculated risks, and they pay with their lives for doing their jobs. the journalists memorial bears the names of milk -- journalists, photographers, broadcasters, and others who have died in a line of duty. each year, this dedication renews the newseum's commitment

to make sure those brave journalists are remembered. this year, we have the regrettable task of adding new names to the memorial and it represents all journalists killed in 2013. we welcome all families and friends and colleagues who have traveled thousands of miles to join us here this morning for this remembrance of their loved ones. we also welcome back family and friends of journalists who are added to the memorial in previous years. i spoke this morning with vicky horton. this is her fourth time visiting with us on this occasion. she drove from wichita to honor her father, joseph. we thank all of you for helping us pay tribute to these journalists. they are truly among democracy's heroes. i would now like to introduce our chief operating officer here at the newseum institute, who will introduce our guest

speaker. >> good morning. kathleen carroll knows the dangers facing journalists from at least two perspectives, as executive editor and senior vice president of the associated press and as vice chair of the board of the committee to protect journalists. as the top news executive of the world's largest independent newsgathering agency, she is responsible for the news content in all formats from the ap's 280 two bureaus across 110 countries. we gather today to rededicate this memorial and recognize those who died in 2013, but we should note that in april, a photographer for the associated press was killed and a reporter was injured in afghanistan. miss carroll has been a leader on many journalism friends, challenging government moves to limit press freedom.

in focusing attention and action on security issues for journalists in war zones and other hostile environments. from the associated press, kathleen carroll. >> good morning. i'm glad to be here with you, but i suspect that most of us would prefer that we didn't need to be here. instead, we are gathered because we must be here to salute the men and women named in this memorial and the a diet -- and the ideals they died to uphold. too many are dying over and over -- are dying. over and over, we are called together to grieve. nearly 100 died last year, more than 1000 since 1992 according to the committee to protect journalists. the numbers are growing so fast that the newseum now offers 10 of the fallen as the representatives of the many

others killed in the last year. killed in russia and syria and egypt, mali, india, brazil. killed for doing what so many journalists, particularly those in the comfortable confines of the united states, can too easily take for granted. killed for being a journalist. why then do these men and women keep going? why keep reporting on the actions of the cartels in mexico, despite the blunt messages to stop that are left with the butchered corpses of their brave colleagues? why keep going back to afghanistan as the troops withdraw and the world's attention begins to drift away? here is what one photographer said to that question -- because it is what i do. within a few weeks of saying that, she was dead, shot by an

afghan policeman as she shot in the -- sat in a car with her ap colleague and friend who was badly wounded. why did the policemen shoot? we don't know for sure and probably never will. the irony, of course, is that they were covering the distribution of ballots for afghanistan's presidential elections, by any measure, a hopeful sign of empowerment for the afghan people. that hope was why they wanted to be there -- to bear witness to the good after so many years of covering strife and conflict and pain and death, all among the people they had come to care about a great deal, bearing witness. whether journalists are covering a distant land or their native soil, the root of their calling is to record the world around them and to ask westerns, to expose what others would prefer to keep hidden -- to ask

questions, to expose what others would prefer to keep hidden. why do we do it, and why should anyone care that we do? because journalists are proxies for citizens. we ask the questions and seek the answers on behalf of citizens. journalists are also the proxies for threats to those citizens. if there is a desperate handbook, the first page must say silence the journalists and the citizens will get the message -- don't talk back, don't fight, don't challenge, submit. but across the world, journalists are not submitting. they fight for the right to freely chronicle the actions of the powerful and the humble. is that a lonely fight? it must be. but it need not be. we, all of us, we owe them our support and our attention and the attention of our audiences,

because indifference only empowers the killers. indifference -- the drumbeat of death being met with a selective societal shrugged. you've seen it. people feel bad for a little bit and they offer a tweet or two of morning, heartfelt, but they are soon back to posting selfies. and what would you rather do here at the newseum -- get filmed doing a practice newscast or come warn a bunch of journalists whose names you cannot -- come mourn a bunch of journalists whose names you cannot pronounce and homes you may not be able to find on a map? this makes people uncomfortable. let's look for a minute and why these journalists died. they took pictures that somebody didn't like. they shot video that somebody didn't like. they asked questions that somebody decided were out of line. they wrote things that somebody thought shouldn't be written. they expressed ideas that

somebody disagreed with. now, you take a look at that smartphone glued to your hand. how many times a day do you post something? how many photos do you share? how many snotty remarks and bad jokes and critiques? so, what if your critical comments about a local restaurant or a sports team earned you a visit from thugs who knocked you around and threatened your children? what if your unflattering photo of a lawmaker got your business license revoked? what if you were on your way to lunch one day, you took a quick video of a street protest, and suddenly guys in uniform stashed your phone and hold you to jail? -- and hauled you to jail? you think it couldn't happen. it happens every day, hundreds of times. when might it happen to you? there will always be people who believe that they have the right to tell others how to think and what to believe and how to behave.

too many of them try to enforce their view of the world with violence. and there will also be people who disagree and citizens who try to change things. it is the job of the journalists to report on all of that. even when it is much harder to do than any of us in this room can imagine. why do we do it? longtime journalist and journalism professor terry anderson posed the question in a recent essay for "cpj," "is covering the news worth the risk?" the question has some residents -- resonance for him. he explored that has exposed the topic often since he was released two decades ago -- he has explored the topic often since he was released two decades ago. "many times, the truth hurts, but we have to keep going and hope that what is good in people prevails over what is evil."

"hope that what is good in people prevails over what is evil." these are not new issues, as this wall attests. those who recall their u.s. journalism history know the john peter singer was part of a legal case that laid the groundwork for truth as a defense against libel. singer had much more in common with today's web aced business is been crusading -- web-based businesses than crusading journalists. he was called to account for putting ink on paper, not for writing the anonymous columns that called out the governor for being crooked, for offering sweetheart deals to cronies, packing judicial benches, using the law to intimidate anyone who opposed him or his pals. the law of the day was on the governor's side. the seditious libel was writing or printing anything in opposition to the sitting

government. this was 1732 and new york was a bustling colonial hub for great britain. the u.s. constitution and the protections of its first amendment were nearly six decades in the future. six decades, three generations. a long way into the future. the idea that his attorney's voiced, that you cannot libel someone if what you say is true, were not forgotten. it was one of the many rights that all mists -- colonists fought the american revolution to enshrine and preserve. on this wall and among the faces you will see our men and women who have planted the same seeds of those same freedoms in their own countries. they and their colleagues carry on despite threats that you and i may never understand. they carry on in the face of torture, years in prison, threats to their families,

despite grief, intimidation, and fear. these men and women deserve a few minutes of your time. this display of photographs is not a quilt of portraits that we gather once a year to remember with solemn speeches. each one of these photos is a son or daughter, father, brother mama mother, sister -- brother, mother, sister, a beloved friend, someone who chose this terrifying and wonderful profession because they believed in facts, in truths, in the cleansing power of truth. remember them and what they stand for. remember them every time you pick up a newspaper, turn on the newscast, watch a live video. remember them every time you pick up your phone. remember them, and whisper a word of gratitude, and vow that you will never forget what they have sacrificed and why.

thank you very much. [applause] >> the individuals we recognize today were brought together in a fellowship that none of them would have chosen. a fellowship created by their commitment, their courage, and, ultimately, by their sacrifice. they spoke different languages, they worked in different spheres of newsgathering. some of them were known to millions on the nightly news. some of them worked in anonymity. some of them reported from their own communities. some of them were on assignment far away from home.

some of them knew of impending danger, but too many of them were surprised. the common thread that united them all was their commitment to journalism and the fact that they left us all too soon. if a journalist's mission is to shine light in places where there is darkness, then let the light that emanates from this journalism memorial be a testament to these journalists and to all the others whose company they join today. we will never forget them. in their memory and in support of journalists working in dangerous places and in difficult situations all over the world, we will now read the names of our colleagues who represent all the journalists who were killed in 2013. in russia, akhmednabi akhmednabiyev.

his news organization, novoye delo. his killers were waiting for him when he stepped into his car outside his home in the volatile republic. the newspaper editor, akhmednabi akhmednabiyev. he had just shot that started the engine when he was shot in the head in an ambush. he died in the same spot where he had survived a previous assassination attempt six months earlier. despite being targeted on a death list and receiving threatening phone calls and text messages, akhmednabi, 53, reported relentlessly on government corruption and human rights violations. at his funeral, mourners held signs saying, "who will be next?" it is one of the most dangerous places for journalists in russia, where deadly attacks

have become a common way to silence reporters. in syria, yasser faisal al-jumaili, a freelancer. iraqi cameraman yasser faisal al-jumaili didn't tell anyone where he was going when he borrowed money to buy a new video camera and headed to syria to cover the civil war. days later, he was shot to death by rebels at a checkpoint in northern syria. his footage was never recovered. al-jumaili, 35, cover the iraq war for international broadcasters, then places to dangerous -- places considered too dangerous for foreign journalists. a friend said al-jumaili wanted to capture the untold stories of misery, violence, on justice, and war -- violence, injustice, and war.

he was one of many journalists killed in syria, the world that list country -- worlds deadliest country for journalists. >> mikhail beketov, khimkinskaya pravda in russia. on a frigid november night, the newspaper and editor, mikhail beketov, was attacked outside his home by men who smashed his skull with a metal bar and left him to die in the snow. he lost a leg, several fingers, and the ability to speak. nearly five years later, he died at age 55 of complications from his injuries. before the attack, the former

war correspondent had used his newspaper to campaign against government corruption in suburban moscow. he was threatened, his dog was killed, and his car was firebombed. no one has been charged in his death. russia has one of the world's worst records for prosecuting the killers of journalists. mick deane, sky news in egypt. helicopters circled overhead and clouds of tear gas enveloped the streets of cairo as british cameraman mick deane raised his camera to film clashes between security forces and supporters of former egyptian president mohamed morsi. he was shot by a sniper and killed. dean was 61. for nearly 40 years, he covered wars and major world events for

cnn and britain's sky news. described as courageous but careful, never rash, he filmed china positively cracked down on the 1989 tiananmen square protest and reported undercover in north korea. deane was one of six journalists killed in 2013 in egypt, where violence between police and protesters made it one of the deadliest countries in the world for journalists. >> ghislaine dupont, radio france internationale, in mali. the french army warned them not to go, but radio france internationale journalists

ghislaine and -- were determined to shed light on the violence in northern mali. after interviewing a rebel leader, they were abducted by gunmen. an hour later, there -- their bullet-riddled bodies were found in the desert. dupont was 57. a fearless reporter, she covered conflicts in angola, the democratic republic of congo, and sierra leone. she was expelled from the immigrant record public of congo in 2006 because of her reporting. northern mali has become a stronghold of islamic stream us since the 2012 military coup plunged the country into political turmoil. rodrigo neto, radio vanguarda and vale do aco, in brazil.

crime reporter and radio host rodrigo neto refused to share details of his work for his -- with his family out of concern for his safety. the aggressively covered police corruption and was working on a book about suspected police involvement in a local murder when two men on a motorcycle gunned him down as he left a restaurant in southeastern brazil. neto was 38. a colleague said, "those who thought they were silencing rodrigo neto are going to realize that, on the contrary, they have given birth to a rodrigo neto inside each one of us." several police officers were arrested in connection with neto's death, however, brazil has one of the world's worst records for prosecuting the killers of journalists. sai reddy, deshbandhu, in india. newspaper reporter sai reddy was

leaving a market in central india when maoist rebels armed with knives and an axe attacked him, leaving him to die in the street. he was 51. for more than 20 years, reddy reported on families caught in fighting between police and maoist rebels, who have led a rebellion in india' region since the late 1960's. his reporting earned him the wrath of both sides. the police accused him of being linked to the maoists. the rebels torched his house. the international press freedom organization, reporters without borders, ranked india among the world's five deadliest countries for journalists in 2013. >> fernando solijon, dxls love

radio, in the philippines. the day he died, radio commentator fernando solijon received an on-air death threat from a caller warning, "your coffin is already made." that night he was shot multiple times by a masked gunman who fled on a motorcycle. solijon, 48, was known as a courageous commentator. he often criticized local politicians, linking some to the drug trade. a local police officer was arrested in connection with his death. deadly attacks against journalists are common in the philippines, where warring factions battle for power and murders of journalists often remain unresolved. claude verlon, radio france internationale, in mali. sound engineer claude verlon could set up a sound -- studio

anywhere. when he was taken to a remote saharan town, he jumped at the challenge. hours after the interview, verlon and dupont's bullet-riddled bodies were found in the desert. an al qaeda linked group claimed responsibility for abducting and murdering the journalists. known for his caution and meticulous technical skills, verlon had worked with some of the worlds deadliest countries -- world's deadliest countries, including afghanistan, libya, and iraq. olivier voisin, freelance, in syria. olivier snuck across the border into syria. days later, he was hit by shrapnel while covering fighting between rebels and government

forces. he died three days later at age 38. voisin had worked in some of the country's most dangerous countries for journalists, including libya and somalia. french president francois hollande said, "his death is a tragic reminder of the risks taken by journalists to inform our fellow citizens regardless of the dangers." syria's civil war has been deadly for journalists. more than 60 journalists have been killed since the war began in 2011 according to the committee to protect analysts. -- protect journalists. >> as kathleen carroll noted and as you heard from some of the accounts this morning, all too often, the death of a journalist is met with in deference -- indifference or even official

collusion. it is important to note that this morning in moscow five individuals who were charged with the death of ana, who died in 2006, were brought to justice. they were convicted last month. they were sentenced this morning, two to life terms, three to lesser terms, including a police officer who furnished the weapon. it is important to note that the person who ordered her death is still at large. but when someone is brought to justice, we need to take note. this memorial exists to remind the world of the sacrifices made every year throughout the decades and centuries by journalists. but we are but the caretakers, guardians of this memorial.

on behalf of those who ultimately require no such construct really to confirm their courage and self-sacrifice, we cannot add to the laurels that these men and women have earned themselves. each stands on their own accomplishments. each has made the ultimate sacrifice as journalists. we do gather here every year to acknowledge that sacrifice and to encourage future generations to recognize that sacrifice and to remember it. it is to that duty and that task that i will -- all those watching around the world will pledge our continued effort. thank you for being with us.

>> janet yellen speaks at the international law -- monetary fund. washington journal is at 7:00. he will discuss talks in paris next year. 10:00 today ont c-span.

>> the aspect of my identity is a threat to israel. muslim,r is male, i am my citizenship is american and my background is iranian. offything about me sends all the warning signals for israel. and experience of an iranian american single man trying to in an airport in the 21st century is a minder that despite the way globalization has brought us closer and has diminished the boundaries despite all of that all you have to do is spend a few minutes trying to get to the airport to divisionshat those

and things that separate us are still very much alive. reza aslan will be with us on book tv on c-span two.

>> [applause] it is a momentous occasion to welcome the chair of the u.s. federal reserve. indeed, all of your distinguished guests are also recognized collectively and very much welcome. i applaud you. [laughter] this lecture is at the heart of what we do. the fund has a core mandate of overseeing the global financial system, and over the years, the mandate has evolved with changing global conditions.

we initiated this lecture series to meet two important goals. the first one is to reflect on the current crisis, what we have learned from it. the second goal is to build stronger bridges among those preoccupied with central banking, and that includes central bankers indeed, but it grows beyond that circle. let me start with why we need to reflect on the recent crisis period and take stock of the lessons learned. at the global financial crisis has been a bit like an earthquake. it has shaken the financial system, afraid many of our assumptions and traditional policy prescriptions. it has changed the policy landscape. the central banking world was formerly flat. little bits of about 25 basis

point at a time, but otherwise, no major changes. on this new terrain, central bankers are quickly learning to be mountainous. they've been busily developing new ideas and new tools. central banking has suddenly become a very exciting sport. so much so as to attract a global audience. not as much as what the world cup is attracting at the moment, but still. you would be very surprised to hear that whenever you give a press conference in this institution, you have a group of total aficionados who get together in front of the screen, watching with great impatience -- i'm even told they bring coffee and popcorn. monetary policy and central banking has come to the forefront of the policy

landscape because of the role they have played in fighting this crisis and returning us to stability and because of the role they continue to play today and the role they will probably continue to play in the future because it will not be business as it was. the fund's global membership, 188 countries, recognize this. they recognize this, and they question us more and more regularly on those issues. the questions are getting more and more technical and sophisticated. we need to provide answers. we need to provide directions on paths yet untrodden, which brings me to the second objective of this lecture, the need to bring stronger bridges between those who have a stake in the important issues of central banking. we need to re-examine, refine, and modern -- and modernize our policies.

this is a task that is too large for one single institution to undertake alone, and this applies as will to the imf, notwithstanding the fact we have those 188 members. the knowledge on these issues does not exclusively reside in one central bank, however big it is. it doesn't reside in one single institution, even though it is the vis or fsp. it results in multiple conference rooms altogether. it is all of those with knowledge about it that need to be together. certainly, we can bring our cross-country expertise to bear, our experience and collaborating international efforts and our expertise at looking at the big picture of economic policy. at the same time, our goal is to join hands with academics, to join hands with central bankers, to explore together, and to move forward together to build stronger bridges.

this lecture series is intended to be a pillar on which these bridges will rest by creating space for avid fans of monetary policy, a meeting that would bring the central banking community and the fund closer ogether year after year. before i leave you to the wisdom of our speakers, allow me to highlight three of the main questions on the future of monetary policy. first question -- the crisis as a stark reminder that price stability is not always sufficient for greater economic stability. should central banks put more weight on growth and employment? hould central banks mandate to cover not only price stability but also financial stability? what role should monetary