an informed opinion. only the one from my gut. what is the --host: role of the s&p? if you could answer that real quickly. 500 index is a huge, important index. 12% of allike 10%, ownership of these 500 stocks is index funds. they used to throw you out of the index if the company moved out of the united states. in 2010, for perfectly understandable competitive reasons, they change their policy and you could still be an american company even if they leave the. meeting your stock price does not get a big hit. host: i hate to cut you off like that, but thank you for your time this wanting. thank you very much. guest: thank you for having me. host: now, live coverage of the house. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by

national captioning institute] signed, john a. boehner, speaker of the house of representatives. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to the order of the house of january 7, 2014, the chair will now recognize members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning hour ebate. the chair will alternate recognition between the parties with each party limited to one hour and each member other than the majority and minority leaders and the minority whip each, to five minutes in no event shall debate continue beyond 11:50 a.m. the chair recognizes the gentlewoman from tennessee, rs. black, for five minutes. mrs. black: thank you, mr. speaker. i rise today to honor a friend and an exemplary member of our community, judge tom gray. judge gray has led a

distinguished career in tennessee serving as a judge since 1982 and as a chancellor of the 18th judicial district since 1986. and he will soon step aside from his career in public service to spend more time with his family. i wanted to take this opportunity to highlight just a few of the reasons judge gray has been so important to our community. mr. speaker, tom gray is a tennessean through and through. he graduated from central high school in shelbyville, received his bachelors and masters degrees from george peabody college and received his law college from the national ymca law school. during his exemplary career in the tennessee legal community, judge gray served as treasurer and secretary of the tennessee judicial conference. he's served on committees to improve education and domestic relations as well as to improve work between the bench and the bar. he has hosted student groups at

the courthouse and he's spoken to local civic clubs and churches. as a proud sumner county resident he served as president of the rotary club. his long resume of community activities include work with the sumner county historical society, the rosemont society, habitat for humanity as well as the sumner county museum. judge gray is a proud member of the united methodist church and a proud husband, father and grandfather. mr. speaker, my friends and i in sumner county wish all the best to our friend tom as he retires from the bench. i look forward to watching judge gray begin the next chapter of his life and it's my honor to speak on his behalf here today. thank you, mr. speaker, and i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. schiff, for five minutes. mr. speaker, while

the documentary "black fish" ignited a passionate debate over whether orcas should be held in captivity for entertainment as they are at sea world around the world, many have been engaged in a longer discussion about keeping killer whales in captivity. the documentary focuses on one whale who figured in the deaths of three of his trainers. public displays of animals can engage our children and kindle a life-long interest for wildlife that can sometimes add to our scientific body of knowledge. indeed, these are often cited for keeping them in captivity. the shows often have more in common with a rock concert than -- expo fic ex

significance. here are a few facts that call into question the propriety of keeping these animals in captivity. in the wild, orcas frequently swim 100 miles a day and dive in great depths to search for food. in captivity they will be in pool. in the wild the average life expectancies for males is 30 d females are 50 and while the e orcas die before time they are 25. dorsle fin collapse is rare but all dealt male orcases in captivity have collapsed dorsle fin many contributed to their captivity such as gravitational pull from the spinning of the vast majority of their time at

the surface of the water and dehydration. marine mammals are some of the most intelligent nonhuman animals on earth. they are highly social and live in pods that can be as large as 40 individuals. pod members are interdependent and pods often have their own hunting techniques and communication styles as some argue are akin to language or dialect. orcas in marine parks do not live in natural pods and separation of calves and mothers have been documented on multiple occasions. last month -- excuse me, in the wild, not a single human death has been attributed to an orca but captive orcas are responsible for numerous injuries and deaths. because of this, the labor department's osha office has issued new rules aimed at protecting human trainers and handlers of orcas by prohibiting them by getting them in close contact during the shows.

they have been recently upheld by the court of appeals. last month, my colleague, jared huffman, and i required usda to finalize long-delayed regulations pertaining to the captivity of orcas. it's my hope that usda will do so based on sound science and recognition of the harm these animals suffer in captivity and not grounded in an effort to placate the interests of the industry that showcases them. we cannot be responsible stewards of our national -- natural environment and propagate messages about the importance of animal welfare when our policies and practices do not reflect our deeply held principles. for my own point of view, i believe it's time to phase out killer whale captivity. that means no more wild captures. orcas held captive can -- should stay there until they die. we should dry a law. no more confinement in tiny tanks. no more forced social structures.

no more captivity for our entertainment. gh mortality rates, behavior among orcas, the collapse of dorsal fins and the deaths of trainers point an end of the forced captivity of these majestic creatures. mr. speaker, i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from alabama for five minutes. mr. brooks for five minutes. mr. brooks: mr. speaker, america's deficits have averaged $1 trillion a year for five years. america's total debt has blown through the $17 trillion mark. america's comptroller general warns america that our financial path is unsustainable. last year america's debt service cost roughly $250 billion. that's five federal transportation and 14 nasa programs we can't afford

because we have to pay debt service. if not fixed, what do these deficits and debt mean? on a microlevel, america must learn from detroit and stockton where courts battle over pension funding. on a macrolevel, we must learn from greece and spain where unemployment is 26% and 28%. worse than america at anytime during the great depression. we must learn from argentina and venezuela where inflation rates were 28% and 56% in one year in 2012. closer to home, we must learn from puerto rico the home for 3.5 million americans. in february, puerto rico's sovereign debt was downgraded to junk bond status thereby damaging puerto rico's economy for years if not decades to come. which brings me to the taxpayer cost of today's massive flood of illegal alien children

surging across america. according to customs and border protection data in fiscal year 2012, 24,000 illegal alien children surged across our border. to surge increased by 59% 39,000 illegal alien children in f.y. 2013. that surge increased by another 58,000 illegal alien children so far this fiscal year with an estimated total of 90,000 crossing our borders for all of fiscal year 2014, a startling 132% increase. how should america fix this problem? first, the obama administration must stop enticing illegal alien children to america with promises of amnesty and money. america cannot give free food, free clothing, free shelter, free health care, free transportation, free

entertainment and billions of dollars a year in fraudulent tax refunds to illegal aliens and then wonder why we have an illegal alien crisis. second, illegal alien children from central america and mexico must be treated equally. prompt returns to parents and homes without costly and time consuming deportation hearings. all contrary laws must be repealed or amended. third, america must immediately fly illegal alien children home by the least expensive means possible. cost as little as $258 at cheapflightnow.com from houston to nicaragua with a. and san antonio to guatemala city to $363. and to el salvador for as little as $292. at roughly there are 300 a pop it cost less than $20 million to fly 60,000 illegal alien

children home. that's everyone so far this year. if america use f-5 military aircraft, the cost is even less. now, given america's financial condition, the illegal alien children surge issue must be considered in the context of america's debt threat that risk a debilitating american insolvency and bankruptcy. president obama demands $3.7 billion to spend in just the next few months on a policy that does not solve the illegal alien children problem. think about that. the president proposes spending $3.7 billion to not solve the problem. yet, spending $20 million, wisely, does solve the problem. $3.7 billion, $20 million. mr. speaker, this is a no-brainer. it is financially irresponsible

-- no, financial insanity to spend $3.7 billion america does not have, must borrow to get and cannot afford to pay back when we can spend $20 million and get better results and better border security. mr. speaker, i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. gallego, for five minutes. mr. gallego: i ask unanimous consent to revise and extend. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. thank you, mr. speaker. this morning as i continue highlighting places in the 23rd district which comprises nearly 24% of the land area of texas, i'd like to talk about the city of brackettville. with a population of a little over 1,500 people, it is a small town with a big history. located as the county seat in

kenny county, brackettville was once the drive-in movie capital of texas. it was founded in 1852 as the name of a nearby spring and creek that it feeds. the town initially was a supply stop on the old san antonio to el paso road, and it was a supply depot for the u.s. army's fort clark, which was also established in 1852. the town was first called bracket after oscar b. bracket, the owner of the first dry good store in the area and it's a name that still sticks among locals. in 1873 when a post office opened in the town, the ville was added to brackettville in order to differentiate it from a different town. the town expanded the garrison of fort clark during the indian wars and during that time the town's fortune was completely tied to fort clark. for many years, fort clark was the headquarters of the famous

buffalo soldiers made up of african-americans. at that time, brackettville had a large purr portion of black seminoles, people of mixed african-american and seminole ancestry, who originated in florida. the black seminoles were recruited by the u.s. to act as scouts for the buffalo soldiers and they settled with their families in brackettville. during this labor years, the black seminoles began living in .exico in order to escape even still today, african-american seminole creole is still spoken by some in brackettville. after the buffalo soldiers moved out to fort clark and with the waning of the indian wars, brackettville became a cavalry post. in 1914, the seminole indian negro scouts had an amazing history of service. in fact, the seminole cemetery near brackettville has the

highest number of congressional medal of honor winners resting there per capita that any other cemetery in the country. . every unit was stationed or trained at fort clark and many famous soldiers including john pershing and george patton. names like george armstrong ster or phil sheridan near bracketville nearly lost his camancheswar party of i'd id if i owned texas, rent it out. the last horse-mounted unit in the army, by 1944 the second cavalry had been members of the committee andized. fort clark was targeted for

closure. before it closed, it was used as a german prisoner of war camp. because of the families of the soldiers at the fort and the african-american veterans and those who had settled in bracketville, the u.s. government constructed a high school for black students. the school opened in 1944 so the children of these veterans could be educated. at that time, texas was still racially segregated. this high school is believed to be the only federally built of its kind between san antonio and el paso. after fort clark closed in 1946. it was converted to a resort or retirement center and the historic district is lasted on the national registry of historying places. the village is the set for john wayne's movie "the alamo." i invite everyone to visit the city of bracketville to learn more about the culture and

traditions about the incredible 23rd district of texas. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back the balance of his time. the chair recognizes the mr. eman from tennessee, december jar lace. mr. desjarlais: we are a kind and caring nation. many of the successes we have achieved in the fields of science, business and art are directly atribble to individuals with their ideas and ambitions but we are a nation of law. granting amnesty not only erodes the rule of law, it is unfair to the millions of folks who represented our legal system and seeking to gain citizenship in the right way. further undocumented immigration poses a threat to our national security. we have no way of tracking whether these individuals crossing our borders have ties

to criminal enterprises, terrorism or carrying diseases. this is why we secure our borders. the recent surge of illegal immigration at the border is a direct result of the obama administration's failed policies. over the past year, there have been 92% increase in the number of unaccompanied children crossing over our southwestern border. by you supering the legislative process and changing parts of existing laws while refusing to enforce others, the administration has created immigration policy that rewards those who have come here illegally. the president has requested $3.7 billion to combat this crisis. according to the administration's own proposal, only a small portion of that money, roughly 9% would be used to actually secure our southern border. rather, if history has shown us anything, it is that if we give this president a blank check, he

will squander it on furthering his far left agenda. i urge my colleagues to reject the president's request and use our resources including the national guard and deport those who came here illegally. united states immigration policies are some of the most generous in the world but we cannot condone illegal immigration. to that end, i will continue to support means necessary whether legislative or legal to prevent this president from implementing policies that circumvent our rule of law. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back the balance of his time. the chair recognizes the gentleman from, mr. bilirakis, for five minutes. mr. bilirakis: thank you. mr. speaker, i rise today to mark an anniversary that has pained the sipry ate community for 40 years. in a violation of international aw, turkey violently invaded

cyprus. since the invasion turkey has occupied 40% of cyprus. settlers were sent to inhabit homes previously owned by the greeks relocating 160,000. religious artifacts and cultural realics have been destroyed in the wake of the invasion and after 40 years of displacement, are now lost to time. hundreds of churches have been shamefully desecrated, losing all sense of their historic and religious significance. despite the neglect, the republic recognizes them as citizens of cyprus and provides numerous benefits. they are entitled to official passports which allow them to enjoy the benefits of e.u.

membership including the freedom of movement. turkish cypr inch ates receive free medical care and medical benefits. these policies have resulted in cypriates. there have been millions of crossings. why the turkish troops? why the continued occupation despite the increase insight sen level cohesion, the problem remains a diplomatic challenge at the highest levels of every part of government. they need an end to senseless division. in february of this year it looked like progress was being made for legitimate negotiations that would lead to a real solution based on the rule of law. there is potential for significant economic value from the discovery of offshore gas

reserves in the eastern mediterranean which stands to benefit from a unified sigh cyprus is an ally of the united states, greece and israel and other countries will flourish. in the face of financial recovery and other incentives to union if i, the leaders have refused to have confidence-building measures that would be a sign of good faith and atmosphere of honest negotiation. the failure to enact the most basic practical steps continue to impede a process for unfix that is long overdue. inaction is all that follows. today, the united states stands in a unique role as a friend of cyprus and turkey as an honest broker to both sides we can help them see that a unified future is far more promising than the

present. the united states' relationship with all its allies, turkey included, must be based on shared values and mute tall respect. and at the core, the rule of law must be respected above all else, mr. speaker. it is our duty to continually reinforce this message. 40 years of illegal occupation is 40 years too long. it is time for turkey to engage in sincere negotiations and concrete confidence-building measures instead of going through the motions and creating more obstacles when tough decisions are on the table. both sides know a solution will demand compromise and cooperation. the time to talk is nearing its end. the time to act is here. cyprus has long been a strong and faithful ally of the united states and we owe our support for both peace and at the end of

this illegal occupation. thank you. and i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back the balance of his time. the chair leaves before the house a message. the clerk: the honorable, the speaker, house of representatives, sir, pursuant to the permission granted in clause 2-h of rule 2 of the rules of the u.s. house of representatives, the clerk received the following message from the secretary of the senate on july 16, 2014 at 9:51 a.m. that the senate passed senate 517, signed sincerey karen l. haas. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to clause 12-a of rule 1, the chair declares the

>> the fact that it appears that no one was harmed and that there were no releases does not excuse what happened. what happened was completely unacceptable. it should never vice president happened. if i leave you with just one

thought about today's hearing as it relates to c.d.c., it is this, with the recent incidents we recognize the pattern at c.d.c. where we need to greatly improve the culture of safety and i'm overseeing sweeping measures to improve that culture of safety. c.d.c. works 24/7 and our scientists protect americans rom threats like ebola and mrs and manmade threats such as anthrax. but we must do that work more safely, and we will. there's a recap of the recent incidents that summarized in our report, which has been completed and we are just at the outset of our investigation of the flu contamination. i would be pleased to go through the two diagrams that we have provided to the subcommittee

which outline what we know to date but in brief the anthrax incident shows deeply troubling problems, a lack of lack of proper protocol, failure to ensure that we are transferring materials that were sterile when we thought they were sterile. use of a strain when a nondangerous form would have been appropriate. in the flu cross-contamination, we are trying to ups how it occurred and investigating how there could have been such a long delay in notification. the risks to employees from the anthrax exposure was at most very small and the rick of release to the public was nonexistent but that does not change the fact that these were scrun acceptable events. they should have never happened. in the past as the committee outlined, there were a number of

specific incidents, and i do believe that c.d.c. staff worked hard to address the specific findings of past investigations but i think we missed a critical pattern. instead of just focusing on those when we issued the anthrax report, we provided not only these two incidents but the prior episodes of what has happened because what we are seeing is a pattern that we missed, and the pattern is an insufficient culture of safety. we're now implementing every step we can to make sure that the problems are addressed comprehensively in order to protect our own work force and to strengthen the culture of safety and continuing our work protecting americans. i have taken a number of specific steps. i have should a moratorium on the transfer of all biological materials out of all 3 and 4 laboratories at c.d.c. i have closed the two laboratories that were involved in this situation until we're

sure they can be reopened safely. i have appointed dr. michael bell, a senior scientist, to be director of laboratory safety reporting directly to me as a single point of accountability. he will review the moratorium and list it lab by lab and will facilitate expansion and use of that safety culture throughout c.d.c. scientists are world famous for their rigor in scientific investigation and we will apply that same rigor to improving the same safety in our own laboratories. i'm convening a high-level working group internally to advise us on every step of the process and external working group to take a fresh look to see what we can do to do better. and we are looking at protocols and improve them as needed. we'll look at future incidents

if they occur with a command structure which should have been used earlier in the anthrax exposure. i will ensure that appropriate disciplinary action is taken as indicated by our investigations and apply lessons learned from this experience to our function as a regulatory agency and our select agents' regulatory program. in behind sight we realize we missed a pattern of incidents that reflected the need to improve the culture of safety at c.d.c. as with many things, recognition is only the first step and we are taking a number of additional actions to accomplish and strengthen a culture that prioritizes the safety of our own staff, encourages reporting of actual and potential situations that may place staff and others at risk, openly assesses those risks and implements redundant systems to keep risks at the absolute minimum. increased reporting of problems

or potential problems. one of the aspects of an effective culture of safety is rapid reporting of problems. so if we do uncover problems in the coming weeks and months, this may be the result of strengthening our culture of safety rather than failing to address it. we have concrete actions under way to change processes that allow these incidents to happen, reduce the likelihood of an occurrence in the future. we will do everything possibly to live up to the high standard that congress and the american public rightfully expect us to achieve. i look forward to your questions and thank you for inviting me to testify today and your interests in this important topic. >> mr. chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today

about the animal and plant inspection services inspection into the release of possibly live anthrax at the c.d.c.'s campus. 'm dr. jerry dick. we conducted a thorough inspection of the incident to learn how it happened and determine appropriate remedial measures. we will continue to monitor the c.d.c.'s response to ensure all necessary corrective action is taken and that when work resumes at the laboratories, it will be done in full compliance with the health and safety of the employees and the public at the forefront. u sda was designated by -- usda was designated as a partner because of our expertise and experience safely working with

select agents over the past entry through our efforts to prevent diseased agents from impacting u.s. agriculture ap the environment. for decades, it has safely operated high containment laboratories that handle select agents including those for concern for human health. our personnel and experts in the effective of high containment laboratories. to ensure objectivity, we signed a memorandum of understanding in tober of 2012, which makes aphus is the lead agency. since the m.o.u. was finalized, it has carried out 11 inspection of the four c.d.c. laboratories. it takes any potential release of a select agent or toxin very

seriously with a goal of quickly ensuring that the release is contained and determining what led to the release to ensure no future incidents. on june 13, c.d.c. officials discovered a potential release of anthrax and notified us. c.d.c. voluntarilyly closed impacted labs on june 16. we made the inspection a priority and quickly began its work to make sure all agents were secured and no other breaches in biosafety or security. the inspection team of vets and a plant pathologist spent nearly two weeks beginning on june 23, conducting a facility review of the laboratories and interviews with c.d.c. personnel. we briefed c.d.c. officials on july 2, outlining deficiencies

so they could immediately begin taking corrective actions. we found that the laboratory did not use an adequate activation protocol and did not ep sure that the protocol was in fact validated. the initial response to this incident by the c.d.c. laboratories was inadequate. both in securing as well as disinfecting laboratories. for example, individuals without approval to handle select agents were able to access space containing or potentially contaminated with anthrax at least four days after the incident was zoofered. we found employees did not have appropriate training in some instances. we found no clear management oversight of the incident at the labs and no clear single manager overseeing the overall c.d.c. incident response, which resulted in employee confusion

about how to respond. in addition, c.d.c.'s occupational health clinic was not prepared to respond to the potential exposure of a large number of workers. we currently have in place a cease and desist order with select agents and the toxins -- at the two impacted select agent laboratories. we will require that corrective actions be taken to ensure the integrity of these research programs. we have directed c.d.c. to provide us with its plan for coming into compliance by july 25. and before allowing c.d.c. to resume select agent work in the laboratories, we will conduct a re-inspection to ensure that all corrective actions have been taken. mr. chairman, this concludes my testimony. i would be happy to answer any

questions that you or members of the subcommittee have. >> please point the microphone very close to your mouth. mic ank you -- bring the really close. is that better? >> thank you very much for inviting us to come to talk to you about some of our past work on biosafety issues. as mr. waxman noted in his statement, we have been doing this work for quite a while. we started with the original anthrax attacks and gone on to a number of other issues over the years. behavingly our past work has a couple of major themes. one of them is a lack of strategic planning and oversight of the whole picture of biosafety laboratories. they are only a part of that picture and since 2001, there have been an increasing number

of biosafety laboratories both within that sector and across the whole government. there are six or seven different agencies involved and no one entity has been charged with developing a strategic plan. we became particularly concerned about that as budgets began to shrink recognizing that the management and operation of these laboratories is an expensive venture and if they are not properly maintained, other problems can arise. we have observed that there is a continued lack of national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning and operating these laboratories. there is guidance. the biosafety and microbiological and biomedical guidance is available, but it's not required and there is no process by which an entity needs to make sure that they are following that guidance. we think this broader government perspective about both how many of these laboratories we need and for what purpose and also a

better framework for oversight is still needed. we have done some work since this episode became -- since the most recent episode became public. we did take a team to atlanta. i thank the doctor and his staff. and 10 days notice is a bit of a challenge for us, but his staff was very good at providing everything we asked for. i'm not going to add very much to that debate. i think the two previous witnesses have covered the details pretty well. the one thing i would add, however, is while we agree there is a requirement to have standard operating procedures that are reviewed at appropriate levels for biosafety, we believe it's important that those procedures be validated, by

that, we mean independently tested so we can be assured if these procedures are followed, there will be no further episodes. so i will add that one thought to the debate about the incident itself. thank you very much, mr. chairman. that concludes my statement. >> i recognize myself for five minutes. dr. doctor, is anthrax a biological agent that could be used in warfare? >> yes. >> and the mishandling of it, if someone was sickened, what would the symptoms be? >> the most severe forms are respiratory anthrax, which can cause severe illness or death. >> i have an image of some workers handling testing for anthrax, et cetera. one sees that -- i don't know if this is a lab but some other workers investigating. when i tour labs the number of levels there what's required for

breathing, covering clothes before and after. i got to ask these questions, a zip-locked bag and i have to think what would go through the minds thinking that a zip-locked bag is enough when you have other incidents of the clothing that someone has to wear. have you talked to these personnel about transporting anthrax and why? >> i have been directly involved in the investigation and i will be directly involved in the remediation of the problem that we find. many of the issues that are mentioned in the findings relate to what was done with the material that was believed to have been inactivated. once the laboratory has say kill the anthrax, it was handled in the lower containment

laboratories as if it were not infectious. it is likely that it was not, but the core there was the failure -- >> this is like saying i didn't know the gun was loaded but somebody got shot. but you should always assume that it is. or someone to say i didn't assume it was live. if you have the ability to not only republicry manned such personnel, but to fire them, suspend them or quite frankly, do they understand the extent to this they could have been charged with criminal negligence or homicide. do they understand the seriousness to the american public health? >> i think first your idea, mr. chairman, of a two-key system as is used in other circumstances is quite appropriate here.

both within the high containment laboratories and to verify this stuff coming out safe if it does come out because stuff has to come out of those laboratories to be tested elsewhere. in terms of disciplinary proceedings, what we want to do is strike the right balance. we recognize the need to make sweeping improvements in our culture of safety and part of that means staff need to feel comfortable any time saying hey, there may be a problem here, coming forward. at the same time if our investigation fipeds that there is negligence that people knowingly failed to report or took actions that were likely to or should have been known to endanger themselves or others, then we will take appropriate actions. were. dick said people who not approved were able to access space at least through june 17 four days after the incident was discovered. my assumption these scientists

are pretty smart people but it is extremely disturbing to think they are not thinking -- well, let me ask this, it has been a week since you learned about the march, 2014 of the flu virus and six-week delay in notifying. did you find out why there was a six-week delay and was there a cover-up involved in that or the bureaucratic hurdles too high? what was the cause? >> i only got preliminary information on that but i will make a general point, however. when we look at emergencies in emergency departments or attentive care units in the health care sector, the biggest problem isn't a failure to respond to this activity when people recognize there is a emergency. but we haven't completed our investigation of that and we will look at all possibilities. >> any kind of notification offer alarm system that lets people know when there has been

a release or a problem there? >> there are multiple alarm systems. in this case it was a cross con tame nation of a culture and somehow, and we haven't figured one was t, a low crossed with a high one. >> i get more alarms when you walk out of wal-mart with a shirt that wasn't paid for. is there a cover-up not wanting employees know? >> we do see the need to strengthen the culture of safety that encourages reporting, any time there is a problem or potential problem so we can assess it. >> i recognize ms. did he get for five minutes -- degette for five minutes. >> you testified that there is an increasing number of labs

that are handling these bioagents, correct? >> correct. >> and you say there is no one agency in charge, is that correct? >> correct. today, you said that but in 2007, the g.a.o. testified before this committee the same thing, no single government agency was responsible for tracking all of these labs. >> correct. >> are you aware of this finding by the g.a.o. going back all the way to 2007? >> yes, i am. >> do you agree with dr. kings burgy there are an increasing number of labs handling these bioagents? >> yes. >> do you agree with her there has never been one agency in charge despite the red flags going up all of these years? >> there is a clear division of responsibility in terms of select agent oversight,

inspection and enforcement. several years ago at my direction, we turned over the inspection of c.d.c.'s laboratories to them, which has cuggetted them since that point, the issue of lab safety touches many parts of both the public sector and nongovernmental sector. >> are you saying that they are in charge now since you put that into effect the last few years? >> in terms of the inspection of laboratories which are working with select agents, there is a clear addition of responsibilities between ourselves. >> does that mean they are in charge, yes or no? >> they are in charge of investigating c.d.c. select agent laboratories. they are not in charge of the overall enterprise. >> do we need to clarify who is in charge of the enterprise? we are looking at recommendations. >> would it be helpful to have

one agency in charge of all of the inspections and making sure people are doing things in the right way? >> i have seen suggestions of how we can improve oversight and select agent oversight and my sense is that each of these ideas is certainly worth exploring. >> what do you think about that? do you think it would be useful to have one agency in charge? >> we have said for a number of years that there needs to be some entity in charge of a national strategy, not necessarily in charge of every labt -- laboratory in the country. >> you say in charge of developing the protocols how you are go to go do this? >> ensuring biosafety and biosecurity. how many of these laboratories do we really need for what purpose against what threat. one of the interesting things that i have become a little more sensitive to in the last few weeks is the whole structure that we have that they are

involved in is around the select agent agents and there are a lot of other bugs out there in other laboratories that are not select agents that also need to be protected and there's very little visibility about that sector of this enterprise. >> doctor, i'm going to assume you are going to agree that it would be very useful to have national safety and security stands that would apply to everybody, is that correct? >> i'm not sure i understood the question. >> well, i mean what g.a.o. says is that we don't have one single agency developing national biosafety and security standards and as a result we have all these labs doing this type of research, a proliferating number of labs, but there's nobody developing standards across those agencies. >> there are many aspects of

biosafety and biosecurity which merit careful investigation and if we can figure out a better way to do them, we are open. >> do you think the protocols should apply to everybody? >> the protocols may be specific for the different situations, but they should all adhere to the highest standards. >> dr. dick, what's your opinion of this? > i think that there should be a single oversight body. right now for the select agent program, there is a single oversight body made up of the division of select eakts and toxins at c.d.c. there is a single oversight body in agriculture that makes up the other half of that select agent program. together, we meet on a monthly basis. we have the directors and assistant directors of the programs that are in the two

programs and we have -- >> if that's the case, why are we having all these problems then? >> what we need -- what we have is a single set of biosafety and biosecurity regulations that are followed by both sides. >> but we don't have that now? >> i think we currently do have that. do agree with dr. freeden eventually after we get done with this investigation we hould take a very close look >> thank you very much for being here and providing the subcommittee with your testimony , i have a number of questions for you, in fact, four and i

will get right to those. firstly, can you please describe and advanced technology laboratory in atlanta on june 5? >> we have extensive policies and procedures, but what we are doing now is implementing a moratorium on all transfers out of three and four laboratories while we review each laboratory's policies and procedures to ensure there is appropriate inactivation before any materials are transferred out. >> and you explained that to us last week in an informal setting and that's a good thing and that leads to my second question. of is the impact and cost the laboratory shutdown?

you shut down those laboratories for x number of days. do you have a cost estimate to them being offline for a period of time? >> i don't have a cost estimate for that, the impact is potentially significant and we are working rapidly to assess protocols and where there are situations such as the diagnosis of drug resistant t.b. or beginning work on next year's flu vaccine and will work to ensure we do that in time. but there are real challenges with this moratorium. one of the things that the lab that was associated with the anthrax incident is to provide to the laboratory response network, a network of over 150 laboratories proficiency testing so they can identify anthrax and other dangerous patho agains safely.

>> i would think time is of the .ssence should inactivated select agents be added back to the select agent list? >> i think what we need to ensure that any inactivation is done completely because once something is inactivated, it may be necessary to use that to diagnose knows it and you wouldn't have to follow select agent requirements out diagnose knowsing something out in the lab or in the field but the key is to have that two-key system to make sure that when inactivation is undertaken, it is validated and verified that the materials are inactive. noted last question, you

you only learned of the march 13, 2014 shipment from the c.d.c. influenza lab a virus that was contaminated with h when dvise, march 13 to it occurred or you learned of it july 9. can you please describe how you are going to improve communications of these incidents up and down the chain of command. >> thank you. in fact it was the afternoon of our meeting when i learned about this. what your question gets to is the crux of the matter, which is how do we improve the culture of safety at c.d.c. and that's going to involve a number of steps that we think will succeed but will take time. we need to encourage reporting and encourage all staff to take

responsibility in addition to having a single point of responsibility. we need to have a clear vision. we are, after all, the prevention agency and we want to apply that same rigor that we apply to our work in the field and in disease control. we also want to build on many of the organizational strengths and identify the laboratories that are doing this very well within c.d.c. and identify the practices they are taking that will prevent these incidents. and timely, coming up with ways to monitor progress and track progress and identifying what are called the critical control points. what are the flash points, what are the areas where problems may occur. and then developing redundant, effective, validated, monitored ways to address those critical control points whether it is inactivation or transfer of materials or making sure that

transferred materials only contain those materials. we have terrific scientists at c.d.c. and they are focusing their creativity, their energy, their commitment on improving our culture of safety. >> thank you very much for that. and i yield back my 30 seconds. >> recognize mr. waxman for five minutes. >> doctor, last friday when you released the c.d.c. report on the anthrax incident you announced you are imposing a moratorium on c.d.c. transferring any biological samples out of any b.s.l. 3 or 4 labs until they had conducted a lab by lab assessment and you closed the rapid response and advanced tech noling and announce it i will will remain closed until it is approved to reopen under conditions.

and can undertake a comprehensive safety review and ensure that the proper procedures and protocols are in place moving forward. how long do you anticipate this moratorium lasting? and the brat lab being closed? .

at the c.d.c. i'm impressed with everything that is happening there. for the high containment biological laboratories, to have these lapses is not acceptable. so it's really troubling that although numerous government agencies over the past few years have warned c.d.c. about problems at the high , it appears bs

c.d.c. has not heeded those warnings. h.h.s. nchtor general that documented a series of safety lapses and lack of oversight c.d.c. high containment labs, dr. kingsbury, your testimony is invaluable here. can you tell us more about the concerns g.a.o. has regarded at the high containment safety labs? you've said someone has got to ok at the number of labs across the country as well. who is that? what entity is that? what are your recommendations? >> i wish i was in position to knew. the suggestions is when you look around the government, because they are -- they are being built and managed across multiple agencies and each

agency has its own mission and its own focus, it's difficult to think about who would be the single agency. we have discussed the issue with the office of science and technology policy at the white house, but they -- while they have some overarching responsibilities, they don't have staff and management officials that would permit actually doing it that way. so we don't really have a good answer to that question, but we think it's worth just keeping the issue on the table, particularly in tight budget times. >> right. and you mentioned in your opening statement that you have heightened concerns because of budget cuts. talk a little bit about that. is there a particular area we should be focused on? >> well, it's just, as i said in my statement, the management and the building and management and upgrade of these kinds of laboratories is relatively expensive compared to just building ordinary buildings. and so if we're going to have x

number of laboratories, i would like to see the strategy that going to at was permit us to continue to upgrade them when necessary and to manage the biosafety and biosecurity programs that are necessary to keep them safe. so that total picture just isn't available now and that worries us. >> ok. dr. dick, do you think this has anything to do with budget uts? >> i don't believe it has anything to do directly with budget cuts. we've been able to accomplish our mission in support of the select agent program over the recent years and provide the funding that's necessary. >> and before the june anthrax incident, they conducted at least six investigations at the campus facilities in 2013 and 2014. can you summarize your findings in those investigations? >> yeah. i think there were a number of

findings some of which were found in the recent finding, some of which were not. some of the things that people would maybe think are simple like unlocked refrigerators, those kinds of things, up to and including more serious incidents, if you will, around validation protocols not being up to date. >> and dr. frieden, it's troubling. this has gone on for years now, g.a.o., the inspector general, outside experts calling attention to these issues. i'm encouraged because you've been forthcoming in your statements. you have not been defensive. what is your current action plan going forward in detail? is there a culture among researchers? get specific for us. from this day forward with these recommendations, what are you going to do in the time frame? thank you. >> well, first, i think for

past incidents, the staff at c.d.c. and the scientists did take the reports seriously and did respond to those individual reports. what we missed was a pattern, and you're absolutely right. that that pattern was an inadequate culture of safety. so the overarching challenge now is to ensure that we establish and strengthen a culture of safety in all of our la are aers to throughout all of c.d.c. and there are a number of steps we are beginning to do that. the first is the moratorium so we can stop and think about that particular procedure of an activation, make sure it's done right. the appointment of a single point of accountability for laboratory safety throughout c.d.c., the establishment of a working group that that person and mr. henderson will lead, the invitation to an external advisory group -- and i intend to invite some of the leading independent experts of the country by the end of this week to serve on that advisory for c.d.c. a hard look at all of the

critical control points where there may be a problem with lab safety and reviewing to make sure that we have prote poe calls in place that are -- protocols in place that are validated and verified. it gets back to that trust but verified approach. we need to make sure we're empowering our laboratory staff to report and to identify ways to improve safety and security. we also need to verify that hat's happening. > thank you. the gentlelady from tennessee, mrs. blackburn. > i want to go back to the investigation. this started 10 days after the event. there was 18 days after possible exposure. you had a lot of really awful

basic errors. even you admit there's not a culture of safety. there's not that double check system. and it is something that when you look at worker safety, how it was compromised and then the management, lacking the basic information on what substances to use to have the contamination cleaned up. so looking at this tab and that investigation, i want you to detail for the committee what new policies have been designed as a result of this and how did c.d.c. guarantee that the new policies are followed immediately -- effective immediately. you know, our hospitals and organizations get all sorts of new rules from h.h.s. on friday afternoons at 4:00. they're effective immediately. so i want you to detail for us how you implemented that and what the new policies are.

>> so effective immediately, all transfers, not just from these two laboratories but from every single bsl-3 and bsl-4 laboratory at c.d.c. have been stopped. effective immediately, these two laboratories, the bsl-3, part of the influenza laboratory, and the brrat lab for the bioterror response, have been closed. those two laboratories will not be reopened until both aphis and i are confident that they can be reopened safely. we've also appointed a single point of accountability to look at this and to review before we reopen, before we begin any more transfers, procedures that are in place to ensure they can be done safely. >> how could it possibly have transpired that your management team couldn't even decide on the formula of bleach to use to clean up the contamination or

see whether the onsite clinic was thorough and consistent in examining staph, potentially exposed to the anthrax? >> in the first week after the anthrax potential exposure was identified, we did not respond in the way that we would respond to an outside emergency and that's one of our fter-action findings that when we deal with ebowla or fungal meningitis, we act rate our emergency center or if we do not activate it, we use the resources to have a systemattic, structured, intensive immediate response. that wasn't done for the first week after the anthrax potential exposure and that's something that we'll be sure to do in the event of such internal event in the future. >> let me ask you this -- did the mappingment team get preferential treatment to the point that they were unaware that the -- did the management

team get preferential treatment to the point that they were unaware? >> no, they did not. >> why were they expressing concern to their managers so they could get adequate treatment? >> i'm not sure what's behind that. i do know part of encouraging and strengthening the culture of safety is making sure that people are encouraged and in fact reinforced and rewarded for bringing forth problems if they think they are problems and potential problems. >> do you think it had to due to the existing work culture at the c.d.c.? >> at c.d.c., scientists are so used to risk. they go out into dangerous prayses that they're not sure where the risk will be, if you work year in and year out with pathogens that are scary, you get used to that danger. >> ok. let me ask you a question. once the june incident was discovered, why, why did it take you so long to track down the anthrax? and why wasn't there a record

of where this was stored? >> well, as soon as -- june 13, as soon as we identified there was the potential that any of the plates that were sent out of the containment lab were not sterile, we immediately recovered those plates and put them back in the secure facilities. that's the best of my understanding. >> why wasn't there a record of where it was stored and why was it stored in unlocked refrigerators stuck in an unposted room and hallways? >> my understanding -- and we'll have to confirm that in the coming days -- is that those findings relate to primarily the materials that were believed to have been sterile and sent out of the laboratory. it's not as if there was an anthrax cultures being left in an unlocked, unsecured place. i think the point there, once that initial error was made of thinking something had been activated when it -- may not

have been inactivated, then that material was then out of the containment space. that's my understanding. >> thank you. r. chairman, i yield back. >> all right. i now recognize mr. green of texas for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first, of all our panel, there are a number of federal agencies that handle some of these substances, not just corrected. is there a general protocol that all the agencies look at and coordinate handling these substances, dr. frieden in >> when it comes to select agents, then both c.d.c. and aphis establish standards and then inspect and enforce those standards. other than select agents, there are agency-by-agency or entity-by-entity approaches that may be with respect to the

agency. >> so there is an umbrella type of standard? >> for select agents there is. >> ok. dr. kingsbury, can you summarize your recommendations for you us and can you elaborate which of these recommendations would require ongressional action? >> fauble knuckleball if you're talking about our recommendations, i think resolving this issue of whether there is a national strategy probably can't be done without congressional action and it will take some thought to get us there. >> ok. dr. frieden, do you agree with these recommendations? will you be implementing those that you can within your control? >> in terms of laboratory safety recommendations for c.d.c., we will do everything to implement these recommendations. the report that we released on july 11 has a number of steps that remember already beginning to agreement. >> ok.

any of them require congressional action or is that something you control within your agency? >> at this point i am not aware of anything that would require congressional action for us to take appropriate steps. >> dr. dick, do you have any recommendations for congress or c.d.c. that congress needs to deal with? >> at this point in this investigation, we don't have anything that can't be controlled through the select agent program and our work with c.d.c. >> ok. dr. frieden, does c.d.c. base on the findings in their report have any recommendations to congress? you have none for us? >> we're focused at this point on doing our jobs as well as possible ensuring that we strengthen laboratory safety throughout c.d.c. and use the findings from this experience to strengthen our regulatory function through our division of select agents and toxins which inspects and regulates hundreds of entities around the country that works with these materials. >> let me ask you about the

c.d.c. budget and, again, i heard questions from my other colleagues that this wasn't a budget issue as much. has c.d.c. received adequate funding from congress to conduct its safety mission? period. obviously you have other missions. >> i think the challenges for safety are more than just funding. there are a variety of issues in implementing safety policies and procedures, and i don't think the primary issue here is a lack of funding. >> ok. some of the witnesses we've been hearing from today have stated c.d.c. employees need better training and there needs to be better standard operating procedures but that overall there is a problem with the culture at c.d.c. dr. frieden, how do you -- do you agree with these assertions? >> i do agree with them. i think that while we have scientists who are the best in the world at what they do, they have not always applied that same rigor that they do to

their scientific experiments to improving safety and that's why we're taking a number of steps to strengthen the culture of safety at c.d.c. part of that is to encourage reporting of potential or actual problems. and because of that, it is possible. i don't know anything at this point that i'm aware of. it's possible that in the coming weeks and months we'll hear of other things in the past that occur and that may be a reflection that we've strengthened that culture of safety rather than we failed to address it. >> well, if it's an issue of culture, and, again, like you said, you said you have some great labs and i'm familiar with some of them, is it just because they teal with these dangerous substances -- deal with these dangerous substances so often that they get lacked and they're not dealing with the safety they're dealing with it? >> i think that's a significant part of it. if you work with something, en if it's a dangerous

microbe, you get to a familiarity of doing things you normally shouldn't do. we should have protocols, training and a culture of safety with a vision that we will work to minimize risks such that no worker and the public are never exposed to the risk that could have been prevented in our laboratories. >> and i guess that complacency, it needs to be monitored every day because of what you do. is that part of what you're trying to do at c.d.c.? and with the guidance for other agencies. >> absolutely. that's what we've done of establishing a single point of accountability for laboratory safety and empowered working group that will work with that individual but emphasizing even with that individual and even with that group, laboratory safety is really something that everyone who touches a laboratory needs to be conscious of and think of ways to continuously improve. >> mr. chairman, i'd hope we would have a follow-up in a few minutes to see the success and, again, it's almost like retraining some of the smartest

people in the country to be, you know, certain what they're doing with the substance they're dealing with. and i yield back my time. >> i think that's a good idea to follow-up. i do want to also -- dr. kingsbury, when you were responding to mr. green's question about other congressional authorization could be required, could you give this committee details on what that would be? >> i don't actually have -- [inaudible] i don't actually have a basis on which to be specific about what might need to be done. i think we probably need to continue to work with your staff to talk through what some of the options might be going forward. >> thank you. now, mr. harper is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this hearing on a very important issue. certainly some agencies can be dysfunctional and there's no concern or no real harm in that, but the c.d.c. is one that cannot be dysfunctional.

so we're very keshed concerned about safety within the labs for obviously the workers there and -- concerned about safety within the labs and obviously the workers there and how we can address that. if i could, dr. frieden, refer you to tab 7. that's a letter that you sent in september, 2012, to the committee responding to concerns about c.d.c. lab safety. in that you stated, a senior official was designated to report directly to you about safety issues and those things there. who was that senior official? >> i'll have to get back to you to get you the name and details and what was done pursuant to that letter. >> ok. obviously the question would be, and i would have hoped you could have answered, who was that senior official and what were the results of that action? and then the question that perhaps you could answer now, how is the appointment of dr. michael bell as the new c.d.c. point person of lab safety when we don't even know who the old

point person was, how is that going to be more effective other than we know his name? >> what i believe to be the case is that we did in 2012 similar to what we did in other incidents is we did address comprehensively the specific problems that were identified. so there were concerns about some airflow issues. there were concerns about some of the security issues in our laboratories. and while i would never say that we're 100% resolved on those things, we really focused on those particular problems. what we missed was the broader pattern. that's what dr. bell is overseeing now. >> so does this mean that dr. bell -- there will always be a point person, is that your plan? >> yes. dr. bell is the person now. we'll transition that to a single point of accountability for lab safety. one of the things that dr. bell and his group will do is to recommend where that entity should sit within c.d.c. to be

most effective. >> dr. dick, the c.d.c. reported since 2007 there have been two surprise inspections of c.d.c. both performed by c.d.c.'s select agents and toxins before aphis took over of inspections of labs. since 2012, i'm showing that aphis has conducted 11 inspections of c.d.c. labs. i'm wondering why hasn't aphis conducted inspections? >> we conduct surprise inspections to enforce compliance between renewal inspections which is every three years. we, as we stated, we came on in -- late 2012 as the oversight entity for c.d.c. at roybal lab, we've actually been there six, seven, if you include this last incident in time in the last year and a

half so we have not had an opportunity to do a surprise inspection since we're there regularly. >> so the last time a surprise inspection was done was when? >> we have not done a surprise inspection prior to taking over in 2012. i'm not familiar with before that. >> and obviously i won't ruin the surprise by asking when one is planned but it does seem like we -- >> we intend to follow-up -- >> that's a great tool to have. >> absolutely. and certainly first and foremost, we're going to be following up on the current incident with them in making a revisit when c.d.c. indicates that they are ready for us to revisit. and then we will be doing surprise inspections after that point. >> let's say that -- and this is for you, dr. frieden, or for you, dr. dick, if it's determine that a dangerous biological agent has been stolen, who do you report that to? >> sir, we have a protocol for dealing with theft. there has been no theft of

biological agent reported from either c.d.c. or any of the regulated facilities in the 10 years of the program, to my knowledge. when there are concerns for potential theft or misplacement, we work with law enforcement, including the f.b.i., to do a joint investigation. i would just mention that our expansion of surprise inspections was something that we erected over the last few years at c.d.c. because we felt it was important to do. >> so you say there have been no reports of stolen agents? >> yes. >> what about loss? >> there have been losses at certain facilities and in those circumstances we also coordinate with the f.b.i. usually it's an issue of inventory control. so earlier we were talking about critical control point, uch as inactivation of pathogens. certainly inventory is a

critical point. >> i yield back. >> i do want to ask clarification of mr. harper's question. when he asked about theft of an item. your inventory control is not so tight so that someone could not walk -- someone could take something, replicate it and walk out for something, am i correct on that? >> inventory control is one of the critical controls to prevent loss or theft. but there have been, to my knowledge, no thefts reported from any of the select agent regulated labs, including c.d.c.'s, over the past decade. >> well, there was one -- army one in texas i believe a few years ago. >> i'm not familiar with that. >> mr. tonko, you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chair. welcome to our panelists. the c.d.c. is responsible for registration and oversight of all laboratories that possess, use or transfer select agents that could pose a threat to

human health. while aphis is responsible for those select agents that pose a threat to animal or plant health. select agents that pose a threat to both human and animal health, like anthrax, are regulated by both c.d.c. and aphis. so that being said, dr. kingsbury, can you tell us what g.a.o. has found with regard to the increase in the number of igh containment biolabs? >> i'm not sure i understand your question. i think within the select agent program, i think there is information about how many laboratories there are, and they are regularly inspected, as these gentlemen have just been saying. our concern about the national strategy is that there are a lot of other laboratories that deal with highly infectious pathogens that are not considered select agents and nobody knows how many

laboratories there are. >> but with the high containment biolabs, is there in that given category a given increase that's been measured by your review? >> i didn't hear the word. >> is there an increase in the number of -- >> there has been an increase since the anthrax attacks in 2001. the last time we actually tried to count them was two or three years ago and i think at that point it looked like there were slightly fewer than there were the year before which we think is just a budget problem. but that, again, is the only ones that people are actually aware of. i think there are private entities and perhaps state government entities that have bsl-3 and bsl-4 laboratories that are not overseen in the same way and that is of little concern to us. >> well, is -- what accounts

for the growing numbers of these labs that you suggested are out there? >> well, following the anthrax attacks in 2001, there are a number of agencies whose missions touched on the issue of biological weapons and whether pathogens could be used to attack our country. and so each within their own sphere developed a program to counter those possible threats. and each got funded by the congress to build additional laboratories and so forth. so it's just a fragmented program that had a very strong rationale at the beginning but right now i think there's perhaps a different rationale that might be articulated but nobody is in charge of doing that. >> so are there -- with this

increase in the number of labs in these vary -- and these various missions associated, what would your recommendations be? >> well, we made recommendations there should be a single entity that has responsibility for developing a national strategic plan and national standards for the operations of high containment laboratories. the delay is figuring out how to do that in the current environment with competing interests among the agencies involved and so forth. it's quite -- there's even a competing issue in congress since different committees of the congress have different jurisdictions over these different agencies. so it's a tough problem to solve, but we think it would be worth spending some time even at a theoretical strategic level to begin to address this issue and think through how we would go about doing it in the future. >> and dr. frieden, what are your views here? terms of the growing numbers of these labs and just what -- how

to move forward with the activity here in the u.s.? >> i do think this is a complicated topic for which there's probably not a quick and simple solution, but just logically, the more places work with dangerous pathogens goes on, the more possibility there is of accidents or -- accidental releases. so ensuring that the work that happens is happening in a safe environment is critical, and the key concept i think we have to apply is risk benefit. i don't think we can ever guarantee zero risk for some of the things that are done that we can do everything humanly possible to get that risk as low as possible, but we have to ensure that the benefit is something that's reasonably likely to occur. >> thank you. thank you very much. with that i yield back, mr. chair. >> thank you.

i now recognize mr. griffith for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate that. appreciate you all being here today to testify to us. dr. frieden, if i could get you to turn to tab 5 in the booklet. you look at that tab 5, there is h.h.s. inspector general report regarding the c.d.c. roybal facility which says it was sent to you. have you seen this before at some point? front page says it was sent to you. ok. if i could direct you to page 5 and on page 5 it says that the inspector general's office could not verify that 10 out of 30 samples approved individuals for select agents had received the required training. and do you see that on that page? >> yes. >> and likewise, it says that the -- that select agent inventory records are incomplete and you also acknowledge that that's on that page? >> yes. >> and then if you go over to page 6, the report says that

agents stored in areas -- that there were agents stored in areas not listed. you see that on the top page, page 6? >> yes. >> and one example given is a scientists found a vial of select agent in a drawer and another found 16 in an unsecured freezer. do you see that in that paragraph? >> yes. >> and the report on page 6 also states that there were unauthorized transfers and packages received by unapproved individuals. now, my concern is this. this is at the roybal facility. weren't these the same kind of violations that then popped up and were found in subsequent inspections by the usda in 2013 and 2014 and then revealed again in the matter that brings us here today in the anthrax influenza incident of 2014, aren't they the same types of problems? >> the answer is yes and no.

the specific problems that were found led to a specific response. for example, on security we implemented layers of security. we strengthened the systems. we locked and improved personal background checks and security checks. so in each of these -- >> let me ask you this question. did you all do a systemwide after these problems were discovered -- because we have 2010 and 2013 and earlier in 2014 -- did all ever do a systemwide recheck? >> not adequately. not adequately. we addressed the specific problems, i believe, with a sincere effort to rectify them. but what we missed was the broader pattern that we are now addressing by strengthening our culture of safety in our labs. >> all right. do i appreciate that. i know you are having to answer a lot of tough questions and i do thank your demeanor here and

it's appreciated. let's look at page 7 and on top of page 8 there are five recommendations there. if you could read those out loud that take place and then let me know if they were followed up on. >> i can shorten this by saying the key one is the fifth and e fifth has to deal with -- rming that actives are agents are transferred and if we applied this broadly -- this incident would not have happened. to give you a specific, in 2006, the same laboratory, the brrat lab, had a pretty similar incident. that's why i directed that it be put into our july 11 report. and after that incident, they implemented a standard operating procedure for that particular type of biological material leaving the laboratory. but when they had a different type of biological laboratory -- excuse me -- biological material leaving the same laboratory they didn't apply that standard operating

procedure that would have inactivated it. i do think it's the lack of adequate pattern recognition that has led us until these last few weeks not to undertake the kind of comprehensive sweeping change in our -- and improvement in our laboratory safety culture that we're now implementing. >> i do appreciate that. what about the other four? number five may have been the most important but what about the other four. >> security measures and i believe we have taken a number of steps there. there are steps we need to do better on in that area having to do with staff coming in and not swiping in every time. >> you indicated you'll do training. what about number two? >> yes. i think we've made a great deal of progress in ensuring that nly approved individuals are ble to do select agents.

inventory, given the recent incident at anyway and the fact that -- that n.i.h. and the fact that inventory is a flashpoint, we are working on inventory. it's a massive job but we'll do that as well. >> well, i appreciate that and the safety american public rests in your hands. thank you and i yield back. >> thank you. >> thank you. now recognize ms. schakowsky for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses. as you can see from the tone of this hearing, there is complete bipartisan concern about what happened here. and what i wanted to concentrate on is not the incidents themselves but then the response, in particular, to the anthrax release. the c.d.c. report described delays in identityification of potential exposed vizz -- identityification of potential expos -- identification of

potential exposed individuals and the possible release of anthrax to all c.d.c. staff that may have been exposed and that there was no clear lead for response to this incident in the first -- in the first week. so, you know, i know you discussed a number of these things. but it's the management piece. once a problem was discovered and so i wanted to ask you, dr. frieden, what was your response to this finding? >> this was our finding, and we indicated that when we deal with outside events and we're currentry dealing, for example, with ebowla in west africa where we have the largest outbreak ever, we activate our emergency operating center. center mes we use the to manage our toness more effectively. e should have -- and what we

do is break down the bigger problems and deal with communications, employee safety, clinical care, decontamination, scientific evaluation, investigation. so instead of doing that in a systemattic way it was done un systematically. in those first few days which i remember vividly we were really focused on the employees who may have been exposed and making sure they got into care and got on treatment. >> it took a while teen identify who those people were -- a while to identify who those people were. >> yeah. we didn't have the systems that were needed or the systems we had in place weren't used promptly. for example, viewing security camera coverage who left facilities on time. that wasn't done because one part of the agency didn't know or didn't use those resources.

the root cause of that problem was not activated our incident command system. >> ok. dr. dick, can you elaborate on the finding, on that finding about response? >> yes. i think our findings were very similar to dr. frieden's. we had an independent team that came in during -- there was still ongoing investigation by c.d.c. and their staff and our select agent group was interviewing employees and workers from the various sections that were responding to this. we found very similar findings to those that he just indicated. >> ok. you know, i wanted to follow up for a second what the chairman was saying about the possibility of even stealing something that is a threat. you know, in the smallpox incident, it turned out that the vials were discovered at

n.i.h., but they could have been somewhere else. nobody seemed to know and that's really disturbing too. that, you know, who knows, somebody could have taken them out. i mean -- so i'm not sure when you say that nothing has been stolen that it also says that nothing could have been stolen. will you respond to that, dr. frieden? >> well, we have taken a number of steps to strengthen the security aspects of select agent registration. those steps include suitability assessments for all people who work with tier 1 agents. they include looking at cybersecurity issues and personal reliability, ongoing access of personnel who have access to tier 1 agents, increased physical security standards, incident response plans and ongoing training. o i do think the concern for

theft is real. some of these organisms still occur in nature and ensuring where there are laboratories, not just in this country but around the world that do tests on them -- >> well, let's worry about this country right now. smallpox, of course, would be a big concern. let me just end with this, if i could, mr. chairman. whenever i hear the word culture and a cultural problem, i know we have a real challenge on our hands. you know, hand washing changed the face of medicine. it's not sexy and people don't win nobel prizes over that kind of thing, but it really, as part of the culture, has made our medical system much more successful. huge advance. and so these kinds of small things that deal with culture and attitude and awareness of these kinds of very simple

things, we need to really figure out -- you need primarily to figure out how to make them part of the everyday thinking of your staff. we're willing participants here. i yield back. >> thank you. thank you. now recognize mr. johnson of ohio for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i, too, want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. dr. frieden, it looks like you're the guy on the hot seat. you're getting peppered with all the questions and i got a few for you as well. you know, the mission of c.d.c. laboratories, as you well know, includes caring outwork to protect the american public against bioterrorist activities. now, critical lab activities are shut down pending the outcome of your remedial evaluation and reform. so how will c.d.c. be able to address any bioterrorism or other emergencies which might

occur before they reopen? >> there's one particular laboratory that is -- there are multiple other laboratories at c.d.c. that continue their operation that would be able to respond to bioterrorists or potential bioterrorist incidences. >> ok. there is no concern on your part that we may be limiting our ability that we might be able to protect the public? >> no, i'm confident that the incidents that we saw did not cause any release of agents into the community. they most likely didn't cause any actual exposure to c.d.c. staff, but they really are a tipping point in our recognition of the need to improve our laboratory safety. but we're still fully functional in terms of being able to respond to an event. it's just that step of sending something out of a high containment space no a lower containment space that i've issued a moratorium on, and we'll lift that laboratory as soon as we're confident we can

do that safely. >> ok. is the c.d.c. planning to use the national science advisory board for biosecurity as the external committee to advise c.d.c. on laboratory quality and safety? >> what i intend to do is to invite an external advisory group to look at c.d.c. and tell us every way we can do better. >> what about the national science advisory board for biosecurity, are you going to be using them? >> that is not our current plan, to the best of my understanding. >> ok. because n.i.h. on sunday purged almost half of their members from that -- from that board. i was inquiz tiff about whether you knew -- inquisitive about whether you knew about this action and whether or not n.i.h. consulted. do you use that advisory board for anything? >> i have to get back on that. it's primarily managed by n.i.h. so i'd have to defer to them about the management of that group. >> all right.

well, that's good. that eliminates one question for you then. or dr. dick, in light of the anthrax incident investigation, aphis recently completed, do you think that prior inspections of c.d.c. laboratories were sufficient? >> do i. >> ok. -- >> i do. >> ok. >> given that agents were stored in undesignated places, shouldn't such problems come to full light prior to inspections? >> yeah, i think the important thing to recognize is when we review their protocols, the protocols were in place. and because of the primary cause of this incident, and that was that these -- this bacteria was not inactivated, it was transferred to a laboratory that was not

necessarily would have a locked cabinet. so therefore when we provide our report on select agents, as was indicated earlier, we also report on those laboratories were that select agent went. in this case, not deactivated. >> ok. all right. well, that concludes my questions, mr. chairman. i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: thank you. now recognize mr. long for five minutes -- >> thank you. now recognize mr. long for five minutes. > thank you, mr. chairman. dr. frieden, are you familiar with this picture? >> i certainly am. >> well, i'll turn 59 years old in less than a month and this vial was dated 17 months before i was born. and apparently it was located in a cooler where? >> on the n.i.h. campus. > last week. >> a little over that. >> recently. >> yes. >> so this vial of smallpox

that's older than i am had been in a cooler, am i given to understand, in one location? i can't imagine a cooler running for 60 years, 61 years. >> my understanding is it was a walk-in cold room that was used for storage. >> and someone walked in and discovered the smallpox? >> what happened was that laboratory, as i understand it, was transitioned from n.i.h. to f.d.a. many years ago. when f.d.a. took over some of those functions. f.d.a. is moving into its new facilities. in the course of moving, it was doing a complete inventory of everything in its facility and the workers there discovered a large box that had this vial and others in it. >> workers like moving workers? >> laboratory scientists. sorry. laboratory scientists. >> ok. well, recently, there was a case of someone that wanted to remove information from n.s.a. and he got in position to do

that. and with a $1,500 thumb drive he was able to take all kinds of severe government secrets with him with his position he worked into. does it bother you that people, if they had cruelty, meanness in mind, they could not get into a cooler like this and take a 61-year-old vial of smallpox? >> we're certainly concerned that smallpox, which should not have been there, was there for many years. and we want to ensure that on our campus and n.i.h. is looking at their campus and f.d.a. at theirs, there are not other examples of collections. because this was a collection of organisms that are in place -- in places where they shouldn't be. this particular box was clearly created by a scientists who was very experienced. a group of scientists. the materials were essentially freeze-dried.

d then sealed in that ampule in the picture you held up. that was done before smallpox eradication was taken. it was not done for malicious intent. >> this laid around for 61 years, i can't conceive of that thought. let me take you to the press conference now we moved from 61-plus-years ago. at a press conference last friday you independent indicated that c.d.c. does research to figure out how better to treat people if they're exposed and prevent it if they're exposed and how better to prevent it through vaccination. you also stated the fact that anthrax continues to occur in nature. anthrax had been used as a weapon. my question is this, how many c.d.c. laboratory workers received the anthrax vaccination prior to the anthrax incident last month as recommended by the c.d.c.? it's an advisory committee on

immunization, since 2002? >> i have to get back to you on the exact number, but we offer anthrax vaccine anyone for whom anthrax vaccine is indicated. we don't require people to get vaccinated but we offer it to anyone who might be exposed through their laboratory or epidemiclogical work. >> do you have any idea? i know you have to get back to me, which is fine. i appreciate it. >> i'd have to get back to you. >> ok. because -- excuse me -- it's reported you told reuters on june 30 the fact that anthrax exposure was even a concern or it might have happened is unacceptable. employees should have -- should never have to be concerned about the safety from preventable exposures. as you note to date, more than 12 million doses of biothrax, the vaccine, had been administered to more than three million individuals. so if you can get back to that

-- >> just to let you know you can continue watching this at c-span.org. the u.s. house is coming in to finish up work this afternoon. they're expected to wrap up work on the $43 billion spending bill for financial services, providing funding for the treasury department, the i.r.s., federal courts and the district of columbia. live coverage here on c-span. votes later this afternoon. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] the prayer will be offered by our chaplain, father conroy. chaplain conroy: let us pray. lord god, we give you thanks for giving us another day. for all of us, some days are better than others, some tasks more difficult than others, but you have shown grace and favor to our country since its inception. please guide our nation's leaders to make wise decisions in the best interests of citizens everywhere.