is a man with extraordinary -- he was placed in one of the most demanding positions on the planet and was forced to operate within a largely incapable government emerging after a generation of conflict, where he found not only difficulty in managing a national government from the palace but also in creating the kind of sub national government necessary to extend the writ of kabul to the people. of kabul to the people. >> he had to coexist. the largest wartime coalition in modern era inside his country while seeking to reconcile with the taliban and foreign fighters and ultimately to bring peace to his people. few men in my mind ever faced larger challenges. for so long with so few real measures and tools to deal with

any one of them individually much less all of them simultaneously. no, he was not demented. no, he was not on meds. none that i nkewknew of. in a few weeks time when the messed president of afghanistan is that man will lead one from a change for the better and the 12 plus, nearly 13 years that harmid karzai assumed his office. while today harmid karzai finds himself strongly criticized. i believe to search and detailed analysis of his administration and his presidency of him as a man will return a balanced appraisal of his legacy. and how it was that after all

these years of conflict, afghanistan could have come so far under his leadership. thank you. >> thank you general. there is a huge amount there that we will be able to engage with a little bit later on. now you have put me in the position of doing something that you wisely have never done which is to ask an afghan what he thinks of president karzai and his legacy. the floor is yours. >> thank you, scott. i'm humbled to be part of such a distinct panel. i wanted to read a few passages from the article i recently wrote called "after karzai." i walked around for an hour trying to find a copy. i could not. so it tells you how well i know d.c. >> it's in everybody's briefcases. they are all reading it. >> so i will read a couple

passages and i will have a few remarks about the president's domestic policy, domestic legacy and his local governance. in providing the context for this passage, i will go back to one of the points the general of the general emphasized and how difficult it is to predict a sitting president's legacy and how challenging it is. so. here is the passage "the afghanistan that karzai leaves behind is a more inclusive and cohesive country than the fractured mess he inherited. among my peers, educated young urbanites connected to the world and provided with free expression, there is a sense of nostalgia. he's largely seen as a man of great personal dignity who despite his shortcomings, tried to minimize the bloodshed that my generation was born into. our afghanistan is shaped by principles karzai saw as nonnegotiable.

but because of the present's style of leadership, these gainess appeared tenuous. under karzai a free press loss and but every time threats against it emerged, they have been blunted not by the institutions or laws karzai put in place but by the president's personal intervention. the same can be said of women's participation in society, which has grown tremendously. bwith few institutional safeguards. even the. future role of the warlords is uncertain karzai's kept most of these men off balance and he reserves -- deserves credit for doing so. yet these men are not gone from public life. they have continued to profit from contracts and investments largely tied to the presence of foreign militaries vested economic interest is a major factor that keeps them loyal to the democratic system. indeed in1 12.5 years, many have

sanitized their images, these warlords. more politically correct language. for better or worse, their sons and daughters who seem more attuned to democratic practices are now beginning to step into their father shoes. karzai's national security advisor says he doubts anyone could have fared better than karzai in such a fragmented society. yet the next president of afghanistan will inherit a broken chain of command, weak institutions, and a variety of local powers that may prove difficult to bring to heel. all the more so because he will let the personal connections that karzai worked so hard to cultivate. the question whether the forces from the past will succeed again or whether modernizing forces will take the country forward this has not been finalized.

almost none of the achievements made under karzai appear your reversible. he lamented. instead, afghanistan remains a place a stop between modernity and its own splintered history. which way it will move next is anyone's guess. so this is, i saw the president about a week after the first round of elections to find a successor to him in april. and it was, the feeling at that time was that he had done a good job staying neutral in elections . there was a sense of jubilation about 7 million people had turned out to vote. and karzai had proved his critics wrong. there are a lot of theories that he would change the constitution. in april when i wrote this all that seemed faults.

and the article went to print and in the one month period until the article came out, a lot changed. to go back to the difficult nature of predicting karzai's legacy. in that one month until the article came out, yet another round of elections, a runoff because the first round did not have a clear winner. and after that runoff, there were allegations of karzai meddling in the election. one of the front-runners alleged that there was a triangle of conspiracy. a bill of villa -- abdullah abdullah alleged there was a tribal of conspiracy trying to steal the election. so a lot changed, and i started questioning some of the things i had written. but i'm glad that most of the questions that i had discussed

in the article deals with his 12 years of leadership and his particularly his style of local governance. and i'd like to make a few remarks about that and what sort of legacy he leaves behind. i think at the end of the day the legacy that matters is the legacy on the ground. yes, the relationship with nato. yes, the relationship with the united states will matter. and it will be a question to history. but what he leaves behind on the ground, especially to my generation a generation that sort of as a product of his 13 years will matter a lot. so if we go back to a sense of euphoria that the ambassador mentioned about 2002. when karzai came to power, there was an enormous responsibility, enormous mandate to build institutions. afghanistan was pretty fractured over three decades of war. and even the palace of karzai

that he came to in kabul, i remember during the taliban days. people could take the shortcut through the palace. there were no institutions. shepherds could bring their herds to the palace to graze on the gardens. because the center of power during the taliban was inn counterpart. -- kandahar. the biggest mandate for president karzai was to build institutions. unfortunately, looking back at it 12 years later, that's been one of his weaknesses. he did not build institutions the way he should have for us. he personalized politics so much that the presidentas as a lea der got involved in local matters. he had a disregard for the chain of command in terms of local governance. he always directly involve himself. sort of undermining the mandate

he had for building institutions. so one of the biggest weaknesses of president karzai looking back was that. and when i asked him that question why did he not build institutions, he had his reasons. and that reason goes t handicaps he had over the past 12 yearso two, which really shape his style of local governance. in 2002, when he took over the government, it was a government that was handed to him. he did not have a say in choosing any cap members any governors, or any local. district chiefs he was put at the helm of the government he did not trust. what he did was develop in formal networks as the general mentioned. informal networks to use for his government.

so the first handicap was that that it was not his government. he did not trust the government. he relied an informal sources. the second handicap i think what -- that he develops towards 2009 was that he started mistrusting internationals. and he started believing that his government was in the pocket of the internationals. so he could not trust his governors because they were closer to the internationals. and the internationals were conspiring against him. these two factors played a major role in why he did not trust his own institutions and why he did not put enough effort into building this institution stronger. i will give you one example of what i mean by relying on, having a disregard for the chain of command. there was a man named - he was a former taliban commander.

very interesting character. this big man. if you look at his history he fought everyone he worked with. he was first with the mujahedin. then he came to the taliban. and he started fighting omar. in 2008, when helmand wasn't a difficult situation there was a consensus that the british troops had made a mess out of helmand. karzai started experimenting in his local government. he reached out to this local taliban leader and he tried to turn him and appointed as district governor. it was an interesting experiment to see if he could neutralize the insurgency locally. but the problem was that karzai directly was in contact with this district chief. going around his cabinet level ministry for local governments

going around his professional -- provincial governor and directly talking to the district chief. the district chief is a colorful character. every time he would come to kabul, and not let the cabinet no. he would call the president's office. i'm here to see the president. in a country where building institutions should have been a priority, he directly involve himself at such a local level. and what happened in the process was undermining that sort of local governmance chain of command. i will read you a couple of quotes. my interview with the president got very philosophical. and one of the yes, karzai is very traditional in his way of talking and in his beliefs. but one of his cabinet ministers told me that when he starts speaking in english he seems as

modern a leader as any out there, because his education was in politics and philosophy in english. when he speaks in english, you do not see the tribal side as much. so my interview with him was in english. it was a friday, a day off in afghanistan. he was in a good mood. i asked him about relying on these informal sources networks instead of his own government institutions. he said, my style of leadership was not in the sense of western president, relying on government institutions. i relied the very least on government institutions. i relied the very least on government institutions. i was more an alliance with and relying upon the afghan people. all my decisions, my statements were based on the information that i received from the people in the country, not his own

government institutions. i said, doesn't that undermine your mandate to build institutions? he said, no, the government has to be built up. it does not have to be fake we admired. and kept weak. he said it was a realization of a true situation on the ground. the facts on the ground were that the afghan government was weak that it had no capacity no means of movement that it could not provide the president of the country with the information that related to the facts on the ground. that is why he relied on these informal sources of information and informal networks. but it think there was a misinformed analysis in his decision to rely on these informal networks and tribal networks. president karzai wrote an essay in 1980 analyzing how the k ing used tribes as a bulwark of

stability for his regime. he kept the tribes at a distance. he had a good relationship and that gave the regime 40 years the stability. he wrote about that, how that was important to the king. the problem was that president karzai ruled on that mentality about 40 years later. and during those three to four decades of conflict, that -- those tribal structures have been completely disrupted. what the conflict did was create a new generation of local leaders who had guns, drug money, and no local legitimacy. karzai comes in in 2002, relies on these what he thinks are tribal networks but in fact, they are a new generation of local leaders that are difficult to distinguish from warlords,

because they have guns, drug money. and they do not have that legitimacy associated with tribal elders in the past. i want to comment on two other things about karzai's legacy. one was an issue with -- the general referred to of his views as a commander-in-chief. the perception on the ground among afghans is that karzai never became commander-in-chief. i asked him that question. i asked him, mr. president when your soldiers die in the line of duty, you do not stand with them. that is the perception. a few months ago there was an incident where 20 something afghan army soldiers were killed. their bodies were brought to kabul. karzai had a trip planned to sri lanka on that day. he canceled the trip using the death of the soldiers as a

pretext but he remained in his palace. building election coalitions rather than attending the funeral of the soldiers. i askedh i him mr. president, the people believe you never became commander-in-chief. he said, yes i never became commander-in-chief for two reasons. one, i'm an absolute pacifist in my heart. so the contradiction here is that you have a president in time of war, 12 years of war who is a pacifist. the second reason is that is that id didn't believe in this war. this was not war. this was conspiracy. it was fascinating to me. i asked him whether you see it as a conspiracy or as a war your shoulders die every day. as commander in chief expected to show appreciation. he said, i do. he pounded the table.

that's western propaganda. which is funny because i was a local asking that question. i was not a western journalist. his views on the war were fascinating to me. the final issue that i would like to dclose with is that the perception of karzai is that he is a tremendous political tactician in terms of building consensus, in terms of if you go back to 2002, the way he came to power, he did not have a militia. he did not have a political network. yet 12 years later he is the most powerful man in the country. that shows he has political genius. in terms of political tactics. but the criticism is that karzai was never a visionary leader. and i asked that question. mr. president, the perception is that you did not have a vision for this country, that you are a great tactician trying

to keep the fragile stability together but you did not have a picture of where you want to see the country 10 years from now. the luxury that president karzai had is sore rare. no other leader would have the amount of resources he had, the international support he had yet he lacked vision. when i spoke to those closest to him,, who worked with him they, they say he never defined of clear vision that this is where i want to see afghanistan 10 years from now, 20 years from now. he had crucibles. -- he had principles. one of the principles was the freedom of press, the freedom of expression. he has been good on the issue of women's rights within the context. that he has to please these tribal parts of the country. but at the same time he has to work towards slow progress, institutionalizing t safeguards for women.

he had principles but he did not have a clear vision. i want to see afghanistan like singapore 10 years from now. like in iran or pakistan. not a clear picture. those closest to him say that if it is one thing to have a vision and not publicized it. it is another to not even sort of paint a picture of that vision to those closest to you who work with you every day in trying to help you move the country forward. i think the question that i try to raise in the piece but a question that is important to me also is to ask whether it is possible to be a visionary in the circumstances that karzai ruled in. i think the general message that we should see this as a learning experience of looking at a leader and his challenges. that is one of the more fascinating questions. that is somebody like karzai is not sure of his physical or political survival everyday,

especially if you go back to 2002. can he afford to be a visionary? i went oto kind of hard -- kandahrar. in september 2002, he was attending his brother's wedding in kandahar. he got pre-close to being killed just a few months into his presidency. he was waiting at the crowds. a young man in police uniform started opening fire at him from close range. he ducked. the governor of kandahar got a bullet in his ear. there was this young man a very big fan o f karzai he jumped on the assassin and saved karzai . i went to kandahar to trace the young man's story and ask his family was that sacrifice worth it?

when you look back at it 12 years later, t his young man made karzai's 12 years ago but it's possible. was the sacrifice worth it? and the young man's brother had a very emotional answer and a very candid answer. he said, sometimes when i think about it we we have at the house. we have a good family. all we want is our brother back. the natural answer. but then his, he said i have a nine-year-old daughter. and yet his second child was asking for his second ice cream. they have a bakery. so i was interviewing at his bakery. he said sometimes when i think about it, my girl is in. fourth grade and sometimes when i think about it, if my brother had not made that sacrifice in 2002, maybe this would not have been possible. there would've been more chaos, more bloodshed, and maybe my daughter would not be in fourth grade right now. so ti'sit's that mixed legacy.

but i think we ought to ask that question that in the circumstances of -- that karzai ruled in a very fragmented society, unsure of his physical and political survival everyday, can a reader afford to be a visionary? >>. they give i-- thank you. i want to ask one question before we open it up. it is fastening especially listening to those who have been in ka recently and have been able to ask the president these questions about what his legacy is? but it think both of you minimize issue that i think is interesting to this audience and important to the future of afghanistan which is the relationship with the

u.s., because afghanistan is a country that depends a great deal on the the resources of the international community, the willingness to support them in pahin theying the salaries of the government. may be a reaction from john. it scenes in the last year or several months, president karzai has gone out of his way to be and histagonistic particular whidbey u -- particularly with the u.s. the release of prisoners from bagram. these things seem to be antagonizing ann ally -- an ally that the next president will

need to rely on. i do not know if either of you have insights. is there something behind it more than a this a reaction? -- a visceral reaction? >> you mentioned the crimea. i discussed that with him. i do not think i will go into the. there is a little of bitter -- level of bitterness in him that has increased the last couple of years. it stems from the very early days. the general mentioned this. he came in not with his own government, cannot the government of his choosing. but what was he facing? he was facing a situation where there was a reluctance on the u.s. to try to regulate or

reduce the power of the warlords. although there may have been an opportunity. there was a clear reluctance. there was a strong hesitation with regard to starting building afghan institutions. there was very little investment in 2002. we lost time. in addition there was from the un, as well as the u.s., because the u.s. attention was on iraq. the on -- they only ones wee re the warlords who could remain where they there. the man no instruments to project power. that was a start. that problem has been with us all the time. then the forces started to come in, what happened? it is inevitable that you have

civilian casualties. it is even more inevitable in the context that you do not know where the information or intelligence that you get from one person can be part of a family dispute with another. land issues etc. it is quite clear that -- some s ay he's now playing to his own audience as if it is a tactic. it's clear that -- in terms of civilian casualties, destruction of property. harmed him in the eyes of his public very strongly. not only the u.s. but there were -- in kabul against the president. there was a governor of a province who said that if this does not stop, we will start a jihad against the americans. it was followed by demonstrations in kabul.

than when the money came in. what did the presidency? -- president see? he saw the u.s. contracting and subcontracting system left little in afghanistan. much money was spent on afghanistan. very left -- very little was letft in afghanistan. our criticism of him for corruption could be hypocritical. they saw it as being hypocritical. i remember in the hague way we wanted to address the question of corruption he said, yes, that is correct. we will carry out a joint audit. the international community and the afghans of the money that has been spent. and international community said no, it does not relate to us. it relates to you. it relates very much to us.

especially the afghanistan reconstruction has proven that beyond any doubt. i think he has reason for bitterness. i think he is grateful to see everything that has been invested. but as one prominent colleague or member of his government said, we should be grateful that he would suspended in an efficient way. we have people in the world that know this much better than i. when i was at the un, we found out that between 1/2 and 1/3 of all of the money spent in afghanistan nobody knew where it was going. for what purpose, to what area? we did not have a clue. how can you coordinate? buildings and institutions you mentioned. 1/3 of it was done without

knowledge of the afghan government. how can you build institutions? there had to be a partnership between the two. that simply was not there. finally, i would say that bitterness that is there today. i think, in the beginning the afghans do not have any institutions. and they were spoon feeding from the international community. as one member of government said, you do not bite the hand that feeds you. much was accepted at the time. and then came a different situation where the afghans felt that now we are strong enough to say what we think. and the bitterness increased. and you saw the reaction you had from karzai. even one of those who had spent the longest time in -- abroad,

and came back as a member of the government said, we really had to tolerate a lot at that time that we should not have tolerated. as i said, i cannot quote him. he said, the americans found it very difficult to distinguish between afghanistan as a sovereign country and afghanistan as a territory. i think there is something true and that. -- in that. we did not manage to adapt from a situation where afghanistan was without institutions. relying completely on the international community. to a situation where it had institutions. and we had do demonstrate - to demonstrate that they should not be in control. we talk about afghanization.

but we were very reluctant in and lamenting that. -- in implementing that. so -- i think much of his bitterness today. he also looks back at the last 13 years as we do. much of it is -- his bitterness can be understood. he disregarded the chain of command. put at the head of the government he did not trust. with regard to the informal networks, many of the people who came in and we believe were among the best members of government didn't know much about afghanistan. had been out for 25 years. so no wonder why he would pick up the phone or bring me and others to meetings and say now you will hear what the afghans

really think. those were the ones he trusted. the people he met during the friday meetings or during his in frequent visits to the provinces. being called the mayor of kabul. and criticizing him. it's to a large extent a result of the fact that we did not in the beginning start building an afghan army immediately. we did allow isaf to go outside of kabul. and we did not build a civilian institutions he could use to project power. so we made him also the mayor of kabul. >> i think it's not just, i'm convinced now that it is not tactical antagonism. it's more of a deeper pain. it may have been tactical at times, but so when i framed my

interview to him. he did not know me or trust me. so he asked me to lunch first. so we had lunch. i explained that i wanted to write this story as an afghan, a product of your 13 years. and i explained to him that i am entirely focusing on domestic politics and local governments. which means there will be no questions about your relationship to the u.s. but every couple minutes somehow he would drag the u.s. into it. in very sort of deeply heartfelt anger. i do not think it is tactical. the ambassador mentioned some of the sources for such feelings, some of the reasons. i think he feels that to me there is this hypocrisy. he perceives it as an american hypocrisy. to push him on certain issues

and then say the warlords. some of the warlords that the americans allied with at the beginning of the war. a couple years later they would pressure karzai not to side with the same warlords. these two were the biggest allies of the americans when they first came into afghanistan. a couple years later when karzai was trying to build and lead tour coalition, if you read the wiki makes how much pressure there was on the americans not to side with one warlord. that hypocrisy becomes clear that there is a two-facedness to american policy. he told me there is, i mentioned an episode in the article. there is a meeting between a general, the commander of us. command and president karzai. he complaints to the general that you should, why are you

helping some of these warlords? and the response from the general is interesting. he says, they are one of us just like you are one of us. we are not going to be green on green. it was a term that karzai heard for the first time, a term that had become very common. at the time it was a term that karzai heard for the first time and the general remembered saying something like that to karzai. if you are karzai in 2007, you are not putting all this anger public we. yet you are expressing it privately. but not seeing any actions on it. as the general said, the allies are deaf or not doing enough. if part of it is natural, also, that this perception of hypocrisy that karzai had if someone is in power for 12 years, on the other side of the

partnership there is a change of administration. that comes a change of policy but one part is the same guy. he perceives that change in this hypocrisy. but there were episodes in private that kept triggering this anger. i'm convinced it is no longer technical antagonism. -- tactical antagonism. it goes back to the general. he knows the united states far better than the united states for some of u.s. officials have known him. and i think it proves a point in the bsa negotiation is that the u.s. threatens with a their option that if you do not sign this, we will full out all troops. yet several months later we see that has not happened. so he are to push the u.s. maybe sometimes he pushes the u.s. too far and it is the u.s. -- nto sort jeopardizing 12

years because they know that president karzai will be gone pretty soon. at the same time tactically, we need to give karzai credit that he knows how far to push them and he has done that on the issue of bsa and the funding the military funding and the future of the u.s. presence. >> why were we so deaf? you mentioned the importance of holding up a mirror to ourselves. what share of the responsibility to we have -- do we have? >> i am not sure i want to engage in an exercise of self-flagellation here, but we didn't listen to him initially. i think we did not listen to him because in so many ways we felt we had the answer. i they can so many ways we felt that the exigencies of the operational environment drove us

to make decisions that we would perhaps under other circumstances might have been willing to listen morosely. -- more closely. a couple of things. he and i had a couple of conversations about 70. -- about sovereignty. as time went on, and as we were clearly facing the end of the large-scale international involvement in afghanistan, i think the president rightly saw that one of the most important things he could deliver to the afghans was a sense of their sovereignty a sense of their citizenship a sense that they were as a people bigger than their tribal or ethnic origins. and i told him on a number of occasions that i did not feel any differently about that than

he did. and that it was in fact one of my principal goals and objectives to do all i could for the afghan national security forces to be in the lead in its entirely in the context of creating a stable and safe and peaceful afghanistan. but i also told him on number of occasions, and this is a conversation i had in a couple of places around the world. that sovereignty is not something that exists apart from the in here and responsibility of the people seeking sovereignty to act responsibly. so sovereignty demands responsibility. and to be able to take responsibility for your actions and your words and your vision, such as of it may exist. i think he was more visionary than perhaps some folks have given him credit for.

it also requires capacity. so and frustration that we have often in our conversation was, mr. mr. president --, i do not disagree with you on any of these issues with respect to your ambitions. in order for you to be truly sovereign, you have to take responsibility for the actions of the system of the judiciary or the actions of the finance ministry or the actions of elements within the ministry of interior. you cannot do that unless you have capacity. that is what we are trying to do. if you do not like i capacity building, tell us. he told the issues he did not like. we work closely to lower civilian casualties. we were successful at that. we worked very hard at ultimately getting after the business of war profiteering and corruption. we created the combined joint interagency task force which is

where we brought all of the counter corruption elements, all the contracting, all the spending elements, all the threat finance elements. we rotted together where it should have been from the beginning. we were not properly organized. that is the first thing -- first reflection. if we were to do this again we would have to be properly organized in the context of understanding, organized criminality in the environment in which we are going to operate. understanding it clearly. then being organized ourselves once we understand and see it to ensure that we do not a chevyto-- contribute to it in the course of reconstruction that would have to occur. i'm afraid we did. i'm afraid he came to the conclusion far too late in the process that we needed to be organized in a task force about corruption and the denial of funds. to the army -- to the

enemy. in the end the afghans were moving into the lead. what was going to win the war was less about feeding the taliban thaann it was eliminating the existential threat to afghanistan which i believe is corruption, not the taliban. he was right. we should've organized in that very concentrated manner much earlier in the process. we also did not, in some respects he could've helped us more in this, did not see the enemy truly for what the enemy was. and the enemy in afghanistan was not just the taliban. the enemy was a collective threat of organized criminality that we call criminal patronage networks for whom the taliban worked. the taliban elements. the ideological insurgency. fueled by the narcotics enterprise. we went to war in afghanistan

very well organized to get after the insurgents. but not well organized in a law enforcement says to help the afghans hold in the context of the judiciary the criminal, the organized criminality. i had no authority to go after drug lords and drug enterprises. if we had that authority from the beginning, we could've been striking at those three ledgs of the sudden the triangle from the very beginning. another reflection which i think is really important for us to understand. and in sub national governa nce it was an issue again. the riff of kabul needed to be extended to the people on the ground. i will not name the afghan commanders. this goes back to the unwillingness of the president ultimately to embrace the really vital role of being the moral figurehead to whom his leaders

in the field who were shedding their blood every single day needed to be oriented as a moral compass. and a number of those core commanders, two stars i have spent most of my time with them in the last six month. they could be two star generals in anybody's army. i would welcome them and my marine corps. they were good fighters. they understood their people. they took risks. their observation was we are fighting and dying in large numbers to clear a piece of ground of the criminality of the taliban and when the people finally can lift their heads up and finally ultimately seek a better life for themselves there is no presence of the government there. we had this conversation on a number of occasion where i even suggested your army, not mine, has cleared large numbers, large areas of substantial population

numbers. let's take those areas and seek to insert into those areas your elements of governance at the district or provincial level which represent your insurgent -- of the presence of governance from kabul on the ground to give them a sense that kabul is in their lives. my question would be how often is this minister out of kabul or in other provinces? the answer is, not very often. so there is a lot of responsibility for how we could have done this better. this is not something that either country has done on a regular basis, but i will tell you now that things that i believe we have learned about spending and contracting and countering corruption, the

things we have learned about capacity building, the inherent formula which is if you want to be sovereign, you have got to be willing to take risk on stability and you cannot take responsibility unless you have the capacity. that needs to be driving our thinking on how we would prepare a country that is struggling from being a conflict ridden society to a developing society to a developed society. you cannot get there unless you have capacity and you can take responsibility and truly be sovereign. >> then we have microphones on both sides. we will start over there with you. and that just say who you are, the usual protocol. is try to keep the answer sustained so that we can get as many questions as we can. >> very rich presentations. i think quite balanced. one question i think is, do you feel that president karzai is

during the 13 years was in line with what i agree with the panelists were major changes that occurred. has he evoled during the recent period of transition. in my view he totally misread the u.s. the idea the u.s. does not have a zero option. the may 27 announcement was the zero option. iddid he evovle orleve or did he stay in tribal mentality? on corruption. there is plenty of responsibility to go around but the single biggest picture scandal, kabul bank, it does not involve a penny of aid money. it was afghan's on money that was stolen and misused. ther there needs to be a perspectivee. on his side, more could have

been done. related to the issue of sovereignty. they came out well from the general. why he didn't build sovereignty? the government administrative machinery is an aspect of sovereignty which is obvious. what does a sovereign government do? it raises money. very little evidence that he paid any attention to mobilizing more domestic revenues for the afghan government or the budget process. and it is the armed forces. and that has all ready been said. so what is his use of sovereignty -- some empty term of respect for him personally? because we know what sovereignty means. this already came up. but what does it mean? he ask for sovereignty. is it anything more than personal respect? >> three easy questions. >> in six parts. >> you all want to take, anybody

want to volunteer for the first answer? >> >> a briefer mark on whether he evolved or not. i think he evolved towards the extreme of consensus politics. if there was, if you asked him now and i think voa did in they're interview about some of the choices he made, especially about market economy, he said if he could go back, he would not have agreed to it. if you look at his trajectory of thinking i think it evolved towards the extreme consensus. it relates to the issue of corruption as well. the first five, 6, 10 years, you do not have the capacity to go after corrupt leaders.n= now you have the institutions.

yet every time there is a case of corruption raised, it is dealt with politically rather than through the rule of law. so in my view he eve alt towards the extreme of consensus politics and towards supporting his own institutions. he and he build institutions. to me, until 2009, it was justified that he would do consensus politics. the day after the election, he was the most powerful men in the country. he could've spent the last five years of his administration building institutions and leaving behind strong institutions. one way to do that would be to go after corruption of the elite and deal with them through institutions. but he continued to do with it too political circumstances. 00 political consensus. >> on the kabul bank, i do not have any objections.

there is no doubt that there has been the toleration of corruption that is unacceptable. can i add one thing? in order to systematically go after corruption you need of functioning rule of law. it is just about the most difficult thing to build. you can build an army. you can even build the police. even if that is harder. but to build the road of -- the rule of law is difficult and very expensive. i think we never really got to that. the u.s. had four different programs, on coordinated. but we never got into it. i think during this lead nation responsibilities in the early days -- not much was done. we lost time.

in that kind of security environment and environment of organized crime who dares to go after their criminals? i will give you one example from europe. there's a place called coso, -- kosovo, which is 1.7% the sign of that campus -- the size of afghanistan. everybody can read and write. but the course never dare to go after the corruption cases. for fear of revenge. and there were never any weaknesses -- witnesses who would dare to stand up. it is not an uncommon phenomenon. when it comes to sovereignty. is i more thant karzai himself? i think it is a question of respect for the -- building institutions. i come back to what i said

originally. i do not think we have taken institution building seriously. we have spent a lot of money and capacity building. most assessment of that capacity building as you know better than i sauysys it has not worked. sometimes it even has become an obstacle to building institutions. in 2009, we managed to get in place a real civil service institute. that was going to bring out thousands of people who could then go to the district and so it. what happened? they do not finance it. they do finance young international via a donor agency. contractors from the same country.

finance foreigners to be in the ministry. this person earns $22,000 per month? for doing what? writing reports. capacity substitution. that capacity building. that has been our expertise. he's furious about it. yes, we have built institutions. they are stronger than they were before but they could've been much stronger. can i just mention one other example? when -- i was sitting in my office march, 2009 in kabul. i got an e-mail. from the assistant secretary of state for the region. he wrote to me, -- we will soon have a committee in the hague.

and you will be asked to chair it. ban ki moon will visit. 45 minutes later, the associated press carried a story where hillary clinton had announced there would be a big conference in the hauge. -- in the hague. ban ki moon would be there. i was puzzled and i called the foreign minister. i said, why have you not told me about this conference? what are you talking about? i will check with the president. so he called the president and the president called back and said, what is this conference you are talking about? a conference about his country. and he was not even informed. the debate about the surge. so many troops. was he involved or was he informed afterwards?

he was informed afterwards. about a massive increase of forces on his territory. that is what sovereignty is about. decision-making, consultation. not only the vanity of one individual. >> i think that is very well put. >> one point on the capacity building. i think the overall absence of, it is not going to happen, but the absence o f a coordinating authority, the un tried very hard. but the absence of an overall coordinating authority to bring together all the international efforts really created a great difficulty for us and afghanistan. there is a lot that was built in afghanistan with no tail, no logistics tail, which will in

the not-too-distant future will require the operations and maintenance of these buildings and infrastructure facilities that afghanistan cannot afford. afghanistan does not have the money. i had a sense of this in the period of the insider attacks where i had a couple of my officers killed in the ministry of interior. i hold all of my people out of the ministry, all of the ministries. i took people out of the ministries until such time as we had a better feel for how badly this was going on and how far it might dissent. -- descend. what i did not realize because i've never gone from office to office were just how many international presences, that is floor, how much of an international presence was in that building until they all came running out when we pulled

isaf troops out. consequently, sometimes as the ambassador said, it works against us. we had a country artist only trying to do the very best it could and investing people and money in and out, that i said may have been working and another element within the u.n. or within nato. we work against each other. frequently, we were not building the kind of capacity we wanted to and that is what the president hold on -- honed on. you can point to individual moments of brightness and capabilities that emerged. that is what he pointed to very frequently when he was frustrated with the international community. >> thank you very much. also the panel for the

inside. i have a question for ambassador eide, about karzai being the consensus builder. what he said on the less of two weeks ago, and establishment of a parallel government and it took the u.s. intervention and john kerry's presence. do you see, do you think karzai had the ability and power to avert that crisis? you said that karzai thinks democracy and accept democracy and women's rights and political speech as 2 of his principles while at the same time, the president has kept the first lady hidden from the eyes of the world. do you think he fears it will

ignite the same protest and reaction from the tribal leaders in the conservative sections of the society? >> john kerry -- i -- the best solution would have been if afghanistan -- if they could have solved this themselves. in his speech in 2009, karzai said i want to modernize the election of process. without the interference. now, that did not work. everybody believes the visit by john kerry, i admire and respect that he went there.

sat down and came to what for me is the only obvious solution when it comes to the counting. if you disagree, count it all. kerry's hands on diplomacy and respect, it is admirable but it is sometimes criticized. in 2009 home all when he came and we had a problem with the second ron -- 2009, when he came and we had a problem with the second run. he spent a few days with him. afterwards, karzai said, john kerry is the american politician i trust the

most. through that answer, i have have answered your question but avoided the other. [laughter] >> i think the question of the first lady is -- it intrigues me for a long time also. her sort of absence in the public sphere. if you go back to 2002, there are some interviews of her with the media. which shows that at least back then, president karzai was not against her speaking out or being publicly seens. she had said she wanted to be sane and health care for women and education. what i know from her involvement now is that she does meet people. she is not publicly involved.

it is unfortunate. i think she's a very well educated woman. she is a medical doctor. one thing afghanistan has lacked in female role models after a long blackout on women in society, especially after 2002, the morale was very low for women to get back involved in the public sphere. she could have been a great role model for her education. it is unfortunate it has not happened. i do not have a clear answer but i agree with you it is probably being sensitive to the tribal realities and is sensitive to history. in the early part of the 20th century, he -- we had a role as that involved their wives and it did not go so well. that was one of the reasons why the coup was against them. social coups. he is sensitive to that and because he is a tribal person

or rules in tribal manner, it plays in her absence. what intrigues me is how she was once involved and is not but i do not have an answer to that. >> i have a couple of questions. general, you are a real american hero. and there is enormous respect in afghanistan for you. even president karzai has a lot of respect for you and he to me personally you were the one who

fixed the broken relations between afghanistan and the united states. and afghanistan gives you credit for created the civilian casualties. the question i would have for you is, afghan is really bothered by the daily shelling pakistani forces. a providence and that is happening under the watch of the nato, more than 100,000 soldiers are being there. i want to know your perspective. and i'm sure you have had meetings with your counterpart in pakistan. i know the terrorists and clinton al qaeda and isis and taliban, seven shelling the american embassy -- they have been shelling the american embassy. how come eu as an american

superpower is not able to tell pakistan to slow down? the others for the ambassador of pakistan, everybody loves your book. i was told in 2009 it was not because of ambassador eide, it was because of your assistant, and holbrook. could you tell us a little bit about that? what was going on in the background and in the context of today and and not the 2009? it was just you and your assistant. and of course, you were the one trying to bring peace. karzai was able to manage

before 2009. we even call him a hero. the best president and then he became a zero. the reason he told me, i asked him, what happened? he said because i do not get respect from this administration and it comes back to sovereignty. i took a group to karzai and was so impressed, he said those americans are such a nice people. he said they do not behave like google and youtube. [laughter] >> the border with pakistan is

a very difficult piece of terrain. momand, some of the federally administered tribal areas or profits is on the eastern side of that frontier is very difficult. i am going to say something about the border shelling and i want to be very, very clear about what i am going to say because i do not want to appear to be diminishing the importance of dealing with it. i know my success for as bit -- successor has been a great deal of time working in an attempt

to deal with this. part of the shelling was a reality and some of it was not. there were reports of thousands of rockets and artillery rounds, creating a real panic in kabul. and at one point, i got one of my helicopters and the minister of defense and interior and director general and one of the leading members of the parliament got on the bird and we flew where we met with the border troops and we flew over the villages that have been so badly shelled according to reporting. and found there was no shelling at all. there was no shelling at all in these villages. no craters or dead animals. it did not mean there was not shelling. we had to understand the problem. that was my point back to kabul and the security forces and back to the legislature. make sure we clearly understood the problem. what we was doing was creating a crisis for ourselves. the border trace, if you do not know it, follows 4 different border traces.

you have a one which i never mentioned in public for fear of the response it would get. you had the border trace that pakistan recognizes and the one afghanistan recognizes and then the soviet. none of those are the same. they all go back and forth. consequently, pakistan, no excuses being made for pakistan, consequently, they freely shell areas and the rounds were landing on afghans. the afghans could argue it included them. we worked very hard with both sides to create measures by which pakistanis saw tpp elements across the border, we could work in close conjunction

with afghan forces and go up and get after some of these. bad reporting and intelligence on both sides made it much more difficult and really tough terrain to be able to solve this problem. but i think in many respects a while that was a major issue before and is still an issue of a single round, it is a serious issue. i believe much has been done to solve that. to the point of cross-border movement of terrorists and insurgent elements, we worked very hard with pakistan to create an environment by which we could get pakistan to take action primarily against the hakanis, we can solve a lot of the problems that eastern provinces to include u.n. -- kabul. it is a very sad moment, the 24th and 25th of november and

2011, i spent the better day with the general working out the way in which we will cooperate across the border. he would drive them across the border along with afghan presence and deal with them as they came across. i woke up the next morning to find out that 24 troops had been killed overnight on one of my special operations. that broke the russia with pakistan and they close the line of communication -- they broke the relationship with pakistan and they closed the line of communication. they had bigger issues to deal with the taliban.

while we have had excellent partnership across the border in 2009, 2010, that partnership ended and it did not pick up -- and actually has not up. we cannot get pakistan to attack the insurgent elements on the eastern side of the frontier that we really need for them to go after. i ran, i do not spend a lot of time talking about it, we ran a very concentrated operation called knife's edge. we committed a large number of operations. they really proved themselves to be quite good as troops and he gave mrs. we could accelerate. -- and he gave me the impression we could accelerate. it is a major security issue that will have to be resolved. my concern is the comment we had a zero option that is playing out by the end of 2016. the next president will have to take a real clear-eyed realistic look of what the

american policy in respect to our advisors and the amount of time we will stay in the country and consider if he needs to speak directly to the president of the united states about changing the policy given the realities in pakistan. i would applaud their president to undertake that very measure. >> in a 30 seconds, what happened in 2009? >> it started because president obama decided to discontinue the conferences. and bush writes in his book, i made a point to keep in touch with him and not teaching but advising. the only way was to treat him

as a leader. that was the right approach. it was an acrimonious debate. and then came holbrook. we have a slightly troubled relationship. we met at the u.s. ambassador's residence. the first question holbrook asked me was, when does your contract expire? [laughter] that started the hunt for somebody running against karzai. it was over. karzai called me up to the palace and we talked about the meeting. i cannot really remember who

said it, but one of us said, holbrook is after both of us. [laughter] that was the feeling that was there from the very beginning. that suspicion became stronger and stronger. for out the election process unfortunately. i had established quite a good relationship with karzai because [indiscernible] when he was going to choose his vice president, he asked me to come up to the office. [indiscernible]

i want to bring in -- i said it lets me think about this on till tomorrow. i came back and we had six meetings. i did not succeed obviously. what did he want to bring him back? he can see the turnout would be low and he needed alliances to win the election. very simple. there was a turn of more reliance on that. that was 2009. when he came to the real crunch towards the end, we work very closely. less panicky, there is something called the constitution and their institutions created and we

must allow them to do their work as we must try to assist them to make sure they do their work properly. that had to be there. in spite of all of the criticism they came from some, john kerry came and i remember this period. second day kerry was there, i saw the president before. i said, mr. president, can we go down to your small office downstairs instead of sitting and visiting office because you never know what is being listened to? we went to downstairs. i said, it was a very emotional meeting. i said, if you do not accept a second round, i will resign. because if the president does

not follow the constitution, there is no role for me. it was a meeting that i thought would last 10 minutes but it lasted 45 minutes. there is a sudden kind of intimacy when you can talk about these kind of things. kerry came back. he said he will go for a second round. the president continued for a second term. you said he had all the opportunity during his second round. i do not think president karzai suffered due to the fact he had this 50%. he never hit that mark. he felt he did not quite handle legitimacy that the constitution required from a president. and he blamed that on the obama administration.

>> could i add a little bit to it? the legitimacy question is interesting. we had a conversation. i think in terms of public perception, one thing i have noticed is that karzai was not challenged for his legitimacy. the opposition has done a very easily. any of the opposition politicians put up. we would throw that out there publicly he did not get challenge for the past five years. it was a personal payment to him i'm absolutely. in the public perception, he was not challenged. it was a personal payment to him, absolutely. >> it brings us to our end. for me, the discussion even though i live through some of it and seen others, it is fascinating and revealing so i

want to thank our three panels and all of you for coming and your questions. maybe this will not be the last time we host this kind of discussion. for the first draft, it was extremely good. thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> it is still not known who will succeed president karzai as the election is being examined. the u.s. official said that the audit began thursday, and 23 now,000 ballot boxes have to be checked. >> next, remarks on the downing of the malaysian flight. and after that, president obama. >> 40 years ago, the watergate

scandal led to the only resignation of an american president. throughout this month and early august, american history tv revisits 1974 and the final weeks of the nixon administration. this weekend, opening statements from the house judiciary committee as members consider articles of impeachment against president nixon. >> selection of the president that occupies a very unique position within our political system, it's the one act in which the entire country participates and the result is binding upon all of the states for four years. the outcome is accepted, the occupant of that office stands as a symbol of our national unity and commitment, and so it's a judgment of the people to be reversed, if the majority will is to be unknown, if that symbol is to be replaced to the action of the elected representatives, then it must be for substantial and not trivial offenses supported by facts, not by surmise. >> watergate 40 years later, tonight at 8:00 eastern on american history tv on c-span3.

>> now admiral john kirby speaks about the malaysian airlines flight. this is 30 minutes. >> good afternoon, everybody. before i take your questions, just a couple of comments. first about malaysia airlines flight 17. as you know, this morning the secretary spoke with the malaysian defense minister, who offered his deepest condolences and those of all the men and women of the department of defense for those who l loved ones aboard flight 17. our thoughts and prayers are with everyone affected by this secretary. the secretary reat rated that the united states is prepared to assist in an investigation, and they agreed that the investigation must be credible, transparent, and unimpeded.

all parties in the vicinity of the crash site, russian, pro-russian separatists, and ukrainian must agree to an immediate cease-fire, which is the only way to ensure safe and unfettered access for investigators. the integrity of all the potential evidence and, of course, the recovery remains. we are still collecting the facts and international investigators need to be given the time and space to do their jobs. but clearly as the president noted just a short while ago we see strong evidence that malaysia airlines flight 17 was hit by a surface-to-air missile at an altitude of 33,000 feet and that it was launched from a location near the border controlled by russian separatists. this incident obviously occurred in the context of a conflict fueled by russian support for ukrainian -- or for these russian separatists and that support has included arms, material, and training. as we investigate who did this and why, this terrible tragedy underscores the need for russia to take immediate and concrete

steps to de-escalate the crisis in ukraine and support the ukrainian government's plan for a cease-fire and peace settlement. and i have one update on the crew aboard the break continue their work to neutralize material, a chemical stockpile, using the systems. as of this morning, the crew has neutralized just over 13% of the d.f., which is a sarin precursor. with that, i'll take your questions. >> just a few days ago the head of the u.s.-european command, talked about the transfer that you have seen of russian heavy weapons across the border into ukraine and the president spoke about training and all of that. can you go through this and tell us the latest u.s. assessment of what the russians have been doing in transferring

heavy weapons surface-to-air missiles, other heavy weapons across the border, to separatists on the ukrainian side and the training and the assistance that you believe russian elements, the russian military is giving to these separatists. >> i see no hint that russian support for the separatists has ceased. in fact, we believe that russia continues to provide them with heavy weapons and other military equipment financing as well, and they continue to allow these russian fighters to enter ukraine freely. there have been, as you know, we've acknowledged that some tanks, armored personnel vehicles have made their way across the border. it has been a steady concerted campaign by russia's military to continue to support and resource, advise these separatists. have you seen -- there's some

video out there, i don't know if you've seen the particular video, have you seen evidence that an sa-11 or missile system crossed the border from russia into ukraine, and what can you tell us about that system and the sophisticated and training that would be needed by russian separatists to actually be able to operate it effectively? >> i don't have any specific information about a system making that transit. we're not ruling anything in or out at this point. it is a sophisticated -- it is a sophisticated system, the missile itself, the sa-11 which is the one we believe was used to down flight 17. it's a sophisticated piece of technology and it -- it strains credulity that it can be used by separatists without at least some measure of russian support and technical

assistance. >> they just do it on their own? >> it said it's strange to think they could do this without some measure of support and assistance. >> do you have evidence of that? >> look, there's a lot that's going to be investigated and i think we want to let investigators do their work. i don't have an indication now that a system was brought over and we don't exactly know who is responsible for firing that missile or with what assistance. what i'm saying is that that system is fairly sophisticated. >> what is the level of their training and assistance? does it include russian forces going across the border into ukraine to work side by side with the separatists? >> well, there have been russian -- there's been incursions across the border by russian aircraft so i mean, we don't have any reason to

suspect that they haven't provided some measure of support on the other side of that border. i mean, paramilitary forces that we don't talk about as much anymore, certainly didn't act or behave or won't organize or resource like some ragtag militia. so nobody is suggesting that the russian military advice and assistance hasn't somehow crossed that border. it's just unclear exactly how much and when and who. again, that's what the investigators are going to look at, and we got to let them do it. >> are we to believe it was just a coincidence that the president announced sanctions directly on the maker of this system just a day before? app i won't get into the thought process behind the president's specific decisions but clearly these are another round of targeted sanctions

designed to change the calculus and president putin's behavior and his decision making. but i seem to think what you're suggesting is that -- i have no information that that's the case. >> second question what's the working theory about the intent ? was this an intended military target gone awry or was this simply an act of terrorism perhaps? >> we don't know. again, that's what we got to let investigators figure out. we don't know what the motive was here. >> and what is your theory? what is your working theory? >> i don't think we have a working theory at this point. i mean, this just happened yesterday. there's teams of investigators now trying to get to the site and pore through this. we just have to let them do this jobs. >> people have said before there are troops inside the

russian side of the border, which is a buildup from a couple of weeks ago. is that still your investment? have those forces changed since this attack yesterday? can you tell us about what they're doing in terms of potential incursion? >> yeah, that's a great question. i don't know of any major change to that presence. it's roughly still about 10,000 to 12,000, and it fluctuates from week to week but the point is that it has been, over time a steady increase of combined arms tactical battalions but to the southeast of ukraine. and they are close to the border. in many cases, closer than those forces who are more aligned along the east. if you remember, we had tens of thousands that were along the eastern border with ukraine, but not as close as these units

appear to be. all they're doing is further escalating tension. it's difficult to know what the intent is. that's a question you should ask the russian ministry of defense. but they're there. they're growing in size, week by week, and they continue to just do nothing more than escalate the tension. >> was this providing the weapons and support you described a meant ago to the separatists, or is that process separate from these regular -- >> i haven't seen any indication that they're actively involved in the provision of support to the separatists. i haven't seen that. but they are continuing to mass alongside that southern part of the border. >> that mapping of forces, does that include air defense artillery systems like the sa-11 that was used in the malaysian? have you seen air defense equipment on the russian side of the border in that buildup? >> yo an inventory behalf they've got with them, but as i said we assess that these are combined armed units.

it's not just infancy troops, but they have artillery capability. i mean, they're combined arms, and they're very ready. this is a very capable force smaller than what was there before but i don't have a complete artillery. >> you have an estimate of 12,000 russian troops on the russian side. the u.s. has been tracking the work of forces, russian advisors, russian intelligence forces in ukraine. inside the eastern ukraine by russian forces, is it a handful? is it 1,000 guys? >> that's less important than the fact they continue to do it. and we continue to see this

support and resourcing and advice given to these separatist groups. we have every indication that that support is russian, coming from the russians. >> in ukraine? >> we believe that there are -- there's russian support for the separatists inside ukraine, yes. >> when general breedlove was here, he said specifically that ukrainian separatists were receiving training on russian territory on using what he calls vehicle-borne anti-aircraft systems. how much training can you elaborate, has that intensified in recent weeks, and was he specifically referring to an sa-11 type system? >> well, i don't know exactly what system he was referring to, but we would agree with his assessment that some separatists have received some training and these vehicle systems, there's no question about that.

but i don't have an estimate of how many or who's doing it. i just don't know right now. >> wouldn't it raise particular arms? you know vehicle-borne anti-aircraft systems, that's pretty serious. >> it is pretty serious, and we've been monitoring the situation there as closely as we can and we've been -- nobody in the pentagon has been shy about talking about the continued threat in the ukraine or frankly, by the combined armed forces that continue to amass along the border. >> has the pentagon or increased its surveillance of the area along the border in the wake of this disaster? >> i would just say we're monitoring events as closely as we can, and i really don't have any more to add than that. >> do you want to say whether it's increased or not? >> we're monitoring events as close as we can. >> going back to the comments.

were there any warnings given to commercial airline companies or any civilian airline authorities about the existence or this level of training for them? >> i think you guys know that that lone civilian aircraft to fly, to take care over the skies of ukraine and to fly at higher altitudes, it's not an expert on that, but there was an international notice to civilian air carriers about that. >> was that prompted by what general breedlove said was the training of vehicle-borne -- >> you'd have to talk to the f.a.a. and other agencies that handle that. if you're going to issue a warning like that, it's based on concerns that you have about surface-to-air missile activity and keanlts. >> yeah. >> you said that you don't know what the intent was of whoever fired the missile yet, but

there were any indications that there were other airplanes perhaps military planes, ukrainian military planes in the sky at that time, and also is there any concern -- the president keeps saying if putin wants to stop this, he can. are there any concerns that perhaps this is a situation that is poised to spiral out of control and perhaps russia doesn't have the control, and if so, how are you preparing? >> on your first question, i don't know. this is ukrainian airspace controlled by ukrainian authorities, and i'd refer to you them to speak about what else was flying in the air at that time. we wouldn't have that level here. on your second question, i think the president has been very clear about what the responsibilities are right now, which is to de-escalate the tension and respect the territorial integrity of ukraine and cease the support for the separatist activities, which as i said at the outset continues, and in some cases, is intensifying.

>> since yesterday's snint >> just yesterday. i don't know any anything about the support between yesterday and today, but we haven't seen any sign that it's stopping. >> after yesterday's tragedy there had been two or three at least ukrainian transport planes shot down. does your intelligence and knowledge indicate that the system that shot down the plane yesterday was a more powerful more sophisticated system requiring more training, or was it similar to the system that was used to shoot down the ukrainian transport planes? >> again we're investigating this right now. it's unclear exactly what brought down the other ark you're talking about. i mean, we know they were shot down, but those not are still

being looked into and i don't have any great visibility on what brought them down. i'd like to just bring you back to the larger point here, that these aircraft are being shot down. while it's unclear exactly who's pulling the trigger here, it's pretty clear that it's doing nothing to de-escalate the tension inside ukraine and to bring to this crisis a peaceful resolution. and now innocent people simply flying from one city to another have been killed brought into this. so let's not lose sight of the big picture here. it matters a lot less, you know exactly what system it was, and a lot more than it happened than needs to stop. >> do you believe that whoever shot this plane down could have mistaken it for a ukrainian military transport? >> i'm not going to get into the motivations, the intent, the reasoning that went into

this. that's for the investigators to figure out. we simply don't have that level of detail at this point. >> are there friend or foe measures like this and if in fact it was an accident, would that reveal a dangerous lack of training on the part of whoever was using it? >> i don't know yet. i don't know. i'm not an expert on that system. i wouldn't begin to get up and here try to dissect it for you. again, investigators are going to pile through this and figure that stuff out. >> who are these investigators? >> it's an international investigation, but i don't -- >> the u.s. government. does it include the d.o.d.? >> there's -- there's no transfer right now for a d.o.d. representative on this. i won't speak for other federal agencies, but i believe there will be some other entities from the federal government, individuals going over there to participate in it, and i don't have the makeup of the team. it will be an international investigation. >> do you anticipate --

>> i have no expectation right now there will be a d.o.t. representative on this team. >> the president said he saw no role for the u.s. military in responding to this, but whatever happened to that list of requests for equipment? that the ukraines sent at the beginning of this. ? >> we continue to review requests for ukrainian -- requests for military assistance. the focus of that remains on the nonlethal side right now, and some $33 million that the president has authorized of material has been getting to ukrainian -- the ukrainian armed forces and border services. so the support continues to flow. we continue to take a look at their needs and addressing each in turn. >> last i remember, it was

m.r.e.'s. is there any -- you have a more complete list? >> yeah. there's been -- there's been more. >> recent deliver riis include radios, body armor and first aid kits. over the next few months, we'll move through the process to include night-vision goggles kevlar helmets explosive ordinance disposal robots and some additional radios. and there's been some other equipment given to ukraine's barbed wire, alarm systems. that kind of thing communications gear. and again, all this is part of

a package of more than $33 million now that the president has approved, and that stuff continues to flow. >> it's working through the procurement process. i don't have a ticktock on exactly where it is or when it entered the process, but it's working through there and will get there soon. >> is there concern this would evolve into a proxy war between the u.s. and russians if, in fact, the u.s. were to provide lethal aid? >> look, i'm not going to get into hypotheticals here. the concern is that the territorial integrity of ukraine has been violated and continues to be violated by its neighbor and that needs to stop. >> to your knowledge, who has the black box? >> i don't know. >> is there a concern that evidence may be tampered with? >> i said at the outset we want all sides to agree to provide investigators safe and unimpeded access to the site

site to do the work they need to do to include the black box to find out all the circumstances surrounding this downing. >> have the ukrainians asked for assistance, weapons ammunition things beyond the articles? >> i think i've said it before, they have requested a lot of material some of it lethal in nature, but the focus has been and remains on the nonlethal side. >> do you have extra weapons -- >> i'm not going to detail everything from their requests. we continue to evaluate the requests. it was a request that included lethal and nonlethal, the focus of our assistance to date has been and remains on the nonlethal side. >> when general breedlove talked about the training, are you guys seeing this training and support for separatists, particularly the training taking place on the russian side of the border? is that where you see some of

it happening and then they're coming in to you? we continue to see support for the separatists, which does include a measure of training, and again, i don't have the details on exactly who's doing it, when on exactly what systems, but we do believe this support -- and it's not just training and advice, it's actual resource and equipping, it continues. again, i'd like to take you back to the larger part, that support has got to cease. >> i know you may not be able to say this, but the fact is you are then seen in some fashion russian military equipment, including surface-to-air missile systems, crossing the border into ukraine. that is what the intelligence shows you? >> i'm want going to speak about intelligence matters from the podium. what i've said is we continue to see support for these separatists, to include the

things that general breedlove talked about, we continue to see that support, and it continues to be escalating and dangerous, and again, it needs to stop. i won't talk about all the measures in which we believe we have this information. >> i'm not going to talk about specific intelligence. >> we have seen some equipment going across the border, yes. >> you also said you were not aware of any multiple vehicle systems going across. >> that's correct. that's correct. >> admiral sanctions included a russian defense firm. absent from the list was the largest arms exporter. was that at the request of this department that it was left off? >> i'm not aware of a specific request from the department to keep that company off the list. >> i go back to the question whether it came across the

border. smith powers at the u.n. laid out that there's no evidence that any ukrainian air defense systems have been compromised in this area. that would be one alternative. would that be viable in your opinion that it could come across the boreder? >> it's a possibility. i just don't have any -- as i said right at the beginning, i don't have an indication that that particular surface to air system or a particular system was moved across the border into ukraine. i just don't have any specific indication of that. i wouldn't talk about it right now. i just don't have it. >> was there any belief in this building that the separatists present this kind of uncertainty? was there any belief that the separatists possess this kind of weaponry?

>> well, without getting into -- first of all, we don't have perfect vizzblet into every capability that the separatists have. we certainly knew that this was a capability that -- we had reason to believe this was the can't they aspired to having access to. i would say both. >> have you seen any anti-aircraft weapons cross the border to ukraine? >> i have no information about specific anti-aircraft systems crossing the border into ukraine. what we have seen is we've seen tanks go across, armored vehicles go across, trucks of all sorts. we have seen major equipment move across the border into ukraine from russia. i don't have any specific indications of air defense systems. >> not two months into the room of hypothetical, but these kinds of systems could have crossed the border potentially

covered up the satellites coorks they not? >> it's not out of the realm of possible but i don't have any more information on that. >> yeah. >> at the height of the tension between ukraine and russia there was a lot of shifting of u.s. forces, nato forces to that region, and nato sent me an email earlier saying it's review its defensive posture. i was just wrneding, do you have some sort of list, or can you give me an idea how many forces do you plan on shifting if possible in the future, how much could you allocate extra to that region? >> i would have to get back to you on a list of what european command and they have in the region, and they're actually a better place to go than here for that. but more broadly, as secretary hagel has made clear, we're going to constantly review our posture there in europe and look for opportunities to make

our interaction with our nato allies and partners more robust. we've already done that with the air policing mission, with any number of exercises and operations to include in the black sea. since this crisis began, the secretary has been very clear that he wants the staff and he wants general breedlove to continue to look for ways to bolster that effort, so i think you'll see consistently, as time goes on we're going to keep doing that. and when we can announce it, we certainly will. but exactly what's over there, that's a better question put to general breedlove's staff. >> can you clarify? the president said he did not see any role for the u.s. military in responding to this. that seems to suggest that forces there are being reassessed and related to that you know, you described the kind of lethal can'ts in the supplies that are being given to the separatists from the russians, but then you describe what we're providing, you know

sleeping mats, etc., but you mentioned that lethal has been requested. is that something that's also being reconsidered in light of this? >> your first question, the president has been very clear from the outset, there's not going to be a u.s. military solution here to the crisis in ukraine. what we've been doing has been efforts to bolster and reinforce and support our nato allies to look for ways to improve our capability to demonstrate our commitment to article five of the nato treaty. and that's what you're going to continue to see us do. but there is no effort right now, no plan and the president has been very clear, no intention to have a u.s. military solution to the crisis inside ukraine. on your other question, and i've said this before, that ukrainians have asked for various items of military assistance.

some of it's not lethal, some of it is lethal. the focus of efforts to date has been on providing nonlethal assistance. that's where that focus remains right now. we've also said that we continually review those requests, and it's a constant process of taking a look at what ukraine needs and what the interagency, what the united states is willing to provide. and right now, the focus remains on nonlethal. >> as of now there's no consideration of possibly expediting more lethal types of aid. >> we're constantly reviewing it and right now the focus remains on nonlethal. >> just to sum up, ambassador powers said very plainly that it was operated from a location in eastern you're -- in eastern ukraine. was it the russians who fired it? was that the only question outstanding? >> well, i'm not an aircraft investigators, so i don't know

all the things they're going to look at, but yes, we have very strong evidence, as i said too, that it was a surface-to-air missile, sa-11, fired from a leeks controlled by russian separatists near the border, most likely on the ukraine side of the border. that's where all the strong evidence leads us to now. beyond that, exactly who, whether it was russian military unit that it did it or it was a separatist unit that did it, we don't know. whether it was a system that was driven across and handed off, we don't know. we just don't know. and i think in answering some of those questions is going to be what the investigators get at. >> next, remarks on the downing of ma labor airlines flight 17 -- malaysia airlines flight 17. after that, president obama.

then live at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on "washington journal." the u.n. security council held an emergency meeting to discuss the malaysian airliner that was shot down in ukraine. u.s. ambassador to the u.n. samantha power, said there were separatists in the area who boasted about shooting down the plane. the russian ambassador to the u.n. blamed the u.s. for escalating the tension in ukraine and said ukraine should have alerted the aviation industry about the dangers of the area. other speakers at the session included the malaysian and ukrainian representatives. this portion is about 40 minutes. >> thank you mr. president. yesterday we were all shocked by the downing of malaysian airlines flight 17. all 298 people aboard, 283

passengers and 15 crew, were killed. as we stared at the passenger list yesterday, we saw next to three of the passengers' names, capital i. as we now know the letter i stands for infants. to the families and friends of the victims, it is impossible to find words to express our condolences. we can only commit to you that we will not rest until we find out what happened. a full, credible, and unimpeded international investigation must begin immediately. the perpetrators must be brought to justice. they must not be sheltered by any member state of the united nations. let me share with you our assessment of the evidence so far.

we assess malaysian airlines flight 17 carrying these 298 people from amsterdam to can you you will alum purr was likely downed by a surface-to-air missile, an sa-11, operated from a separatist-held location in eastern ukraine. the airliner was traveling at a cruise altitude of 33,000 feet, and its speed was typical for an airliner along an established flight corridor frequented by commercial traffic. the flight was transmitting its assigned transponder code with its flight plan, and data was publicly available on the internet. there was nothing threatening or provocative about mh-17. of the operational systems located near the border, only the sa-11 sa-20, and sa-22 systems are capable of hitting an aircraft at this flight's altitude of 33,000 feet.

we can rule out shorter ranges known to be in separatist hands, including man pads, sa-8 and sa-13 systems, which are not capable of hitting an aircraft at this altitude. early thursday, an sa-11 sam system was reported by a western reporter, and separatists were spotted hours before the incident with an sa-11 system at a location close to the site where the plane came down. separatists initially claimed responsibility for shooting down a military transport plane and posted videos that are now being connected to the malaysian airlines crash. separatist leaders also boasted on social media about shooting down a plane but later deleted these messages. because of the technical complexity of the sa-11 it is unlikely that the separatists could effectively operate the system without assistance from knowledgeable personnel, thus

we cannot rule out technical assistance from russian personnel in operating the systems. the ukrainians do have sa-11 systems in their inventory. however, we are not aware of any ukrainian systems in the area of the shootdown, and more importantly, since the beginning of this crisis, ukrainian air defenses have not fired a single missile despite several alleged violations of their airspace by russian aircraft. .