with that said, i would hope that we would be open to situations like have iing an acl kurdistan exist. maybe a belujistan as well. there used to be one and the british decided to cut and split that up. the kurds have always deserved to have their own national identity. until we do, i happen to believe that no kind of leadership that we could put into place in iraq is going to be successful. maybe it's too much. even if maliki was the best. it might not be enough that our british friends gave us aas a present when they exited as world leader. one other issue i would like to mention, when you said that we are watching very closely what's

going on with the mek in camp liberty, it's not enough. it's not enough. we watched as they went in and murdered those people. we're looking for someone to take them. why aren't we deciding to take them? they are vulnerable. they are people who we have had to deal with. is it our government -- i know i have a resolution, mr. chairman, suggesting we take these people in. they're going to be murdered otherwise. so why are we just watching? are we not -- why don't we move beyond that and moving them out? >> we're working, our senior adviser for mek resettlement is

working -- actually he is on a flight tonight on this issue working to find more third country settlement opgs. one particularly, we are hoping that a country that has already taken a significant number will take more and perhaps a substantial amount more. we are working these leads very aggressively. i'm happy to follow up with you on a more detailed briefing on where that stands. >> i would be very appreciative if you would follow up on those details with me but also let me, mr. chairman, just for the record again state it would be better -- these people have relied on us. we made a deal with them. they have provided us very important intelligence information and activities over the years. if other countries will not permit them to come in, it might be in our moral interest as well as our interest of having other people trust us in the future just to take them in to the united states as refugees.

if there is any people in the world that are at risk, it would be these folks in camp liberty. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, mr. rohrbacher. we go now to mr. david sicilini of rhode island. >> thank you, mr. chairman i want to welcome a colleague from across the pond, member of parliament from great britain, who is here today. welcome. he is part of our program shadowing members of congress and we welcome you. thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. i think we must remain mindful

of the sacrifice of our brave men and women in uniform, the sacrifice they've made in iraq but the dangers that surround any further military involvement. it was reported recently that classified military assessment of iraqi security forces show deep infiltration by sunni extremists and shiite informants rely on shiite militia in iran. the situation in iraq is a problem that requires a political solution. and in june, secretary of state john kerry said that the formation of a new government in iraq that is inclusive of all parties and stakeholders is an essential prerequisite to the united states. an active great irresponsibility to order defensive action without a stable government. really, two questions in light of that context and in light of your testimony. first to you, mr. secretary. you spoke about this function of

federalism, which has appeal. what is your assessment of the capacity of the iraqis to proceed with that sort of model, the willingness to proceed, since it involves the devolution of power and what are the key steps that we should be looking for, are we supporting for that to go forward? secondly, would you comment on the humanitarian situation in iraq? we're hearing reports of deliberate targeting of women and girls in iraq, horrific sanitary conditions. and more than 1. million iraqis being displaced. are the organizations or the iraqi government working effectively to mitigate these conditions? if you could, talk about what the current humanitarian situation is. >> happy, to first let me address the humanitarian situation. it gets to the saudis.

they put $500 million into the u.n. organizations that are managing the humanitarian response in iraq. we work very closely with those organizations and that contribution was both welcome and essential. it's a point of how we have some co-lessons. it remains very serious. i can get you all the doings. i don't want to take too much of your time. in terms of a willingness, it's pretty much spelled out in the constitution. i think there's a growing recognition that a model like this is appealing. local, tribal actors will not be able to defeat isil on their own. some tribes have risen up to fight isil and they've responded with tremendous and brutal force, killing sunnis wherever

they go where sunnis disagree with them. one of the oldest mosques in mosul, that was made possible because they killed all the clerics before isil moved in. recognition from the local side that they need support to grow their own security forces and want to be in control of their areas and there's a recognition from the center that the army cannot be reconsequence at a timed. the iraqis are trying, working to and are training about 10,000 of those soldiers who either fled from their post or they were on their r & rs and most of them have come back. they're working to retrain them, put them through a three to four-week training program, something we can help with. everybody recognizes you cannot then reconstitute the.

because it is within the constitutional framework, there can be a fairly broad consensus for that model. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> chairman of the asia subcommittee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for holding this very important hearing. great deal of skepticism in how this administration has overseen the unraveling of iraq. really from the start, i think we're all aware that the president was anxious, desperate to reduce our involvement in iraq. i think there was a scramble to the door from the very start. i've been in iraq a number of times and chaired the middle east subcommittee in the

previous congress and i think we've known -- i mean, it was always the plan, it was always assumed that we were going to have a u.s. military presence there following the war for a number of reasons, principally to secure the gang gains that been made at such a high cost of american blood and treasure. there was a failure to reach an agreement on the status of our forces afterwards. a lot of debate on how much of an effort was actually made in securing that agreement. whatever the case is, there was a failure to secure it. virtually all troops were pulled out. some on this committee, some not. many of us predicted exactly not what would happen but pretty

much what would happen and the unraveling and the chaos and the tumultuous situation we see now was predicted by so many people. what difference would a u.s. military presence there have made? and how much confidence can we have in the very administration that made that decision to pull all u.s. troops out who is now making the decisions to salvage what's left of iraq at this time? mr. mcgurk? or miss slotkin? >> i'll attack a first sttake a. it's important to review the history that both brett and i worked on the original 2008 with iraq that did say by the end of 2011 that we would be out of iraq.

so that timetable was set in 2008. there was quite a bit of discussion and debate about what should happen at that time. i really do think the point that brett made is critical. iraqi leaders could not get it through their parliament. we had iraqi leaders at that time saying i don't think it's necessary. we don't want you in. they're a sovereign country. we didn't have will on the other side. that's a critical factor. >> it's certainly a factor. the united states is a pretty substantial country on the globe and we have a lot of involvement there and our officials were meeting with their officials and there were relationships and, yes, they certainly have to degree with it. the effort that was made and the decision to pull all the troops out, it's mind boggling to

think, looking back, where we are now and how different things probably would have look ed had we done something different. i've only got one minute left. what's happening with the christians especially -- i know there's persecution going on with lots of other people besides christians. but this convert or die mentality that's now in action wherever isil is in control is something you think over 12,000 years ago, these persecutions romans made these kinds of decisions and in the modern world people are faced with those decisions. i would urge the administration to work with any resources we have available to us to push back on that with every fiber we have as a nation. >> i would just say, congressman, i agree with you,

100%. just last week, i saw bishop and the patriarch in baghdad discussing this very question. christian enclaves in northern iraq are looking for resources to provide local security control. they're now in rathers controlled by the kurds. we've discussed this with the kurdish regional government about how we can incorporate individuals from these areas to provide security in their local areas such as a police force, to provide security on the streets. that is something that we are discussing. they've stood in solidarity with the christians in iraq. this is something that reveals who the true isil is. it's not a tribal uprising reflecting legitimate grievances.

it's a vicious terrorist organization with ideology that nobody accepts and has to be uprooted and defeated. i agree with you 100% on your comments and will follow up with you specifically on the christian question. >> thank you. my time is now expired. ranking member of the terrorism subcommittee, brad sherman of california. >> when we conquered germany and japan after world war ii, we were not embarrassed to be occupying those countries. we stayed as long as we needed to stay. we wrote the constitution for japan and we very slowly turned over power to the right people. in afghanistan and especially iraq, we were so -- we were embarrassed to be there, defensive as to whether we were somehow imperialists and we were so anxious to turn over the government that we've got maliki

and karzai, neither of which would sign an agreement with us, just to illustrate one of their many faults. miss slotkin, "the new york times" report on the front page that the iraqi security forces are so deeply infiltrated by either sunni extremists informants or shiite personnel backed by iran that any american assigned to advise baghdad's forces could face a risk to their safety. is that accurate? >> the report is draft classified and that represents a leak of information from someone who seems to know something about it, but not clearly to have read the full report. >> put aside the exact phraseology. how danger oous in aun classifi situation here, how dangerous is it for american service personnel to be advising iraqi

units? >> that's exactly what we went over there to try to assess. those are draft. they're classified and i'm not able to get into the details right now. >> okay. >> it was a threat when we were there with 170,000 troops. the insider threat is always a threat and we have to either work to mitigate it or not work with units if we thought it was an overwhelming threat. >> this idea that we should bomb isis, how important is it that we have reliable ground spotters to make sure we're bombing the right folks and not bomb iing civilians? can we run a bombing campaign with anybody we trust on the ground? >> i mean, the united states does not indiscriminately bomb targets. we have a rigorous procedure that involves having verification of the targets we are trying to hit. >> do we need humans on the ground for that procedure to work effectively? >> it is significantly better if we have reliable folks on the ground to give us verifiable

information. >> do the iraqis have the technical expertise to be those spotters? have they got good people that can tell us where to bomb and what to bomb? >> there are very capable iraqi units that would be capable of doing that. >> if "the new york times" report is correct, however, they may deliberately give us the wrong coordinates because it may meet the political needs of the sunni or shiite extremists that we bomb civilians. so we don't know, unless we know both the technical competence and political objectives, whether we can rely on those spotter spotters mr. mcgurk, does maliki have to go? >> again, there's an ongoing

process to form a new government. maliki's party won seats. it remains to be seen whether or not he can have enough seats to form a government. were we to take a position thin, it would obviously not be either in our interest or would dramatically affect the process. this is a uniquely, uniquely iraqi process with iraqi political dynamics. the outcome will reflect that process. the new speaker of the parliament, for example, is someone nobody would have picked to be the speaker of the parliament. he came out of nowhere, built a coalition, did the politicking and built a very broad coalition among sunni, shias, kurds, everybody, and won and overwhelming vote. >> has maliki announced positions that would seriously entice sunnis and kurds to believe that they would get a fair shake under a third term for maliki? has he publicly announced a platform that has serious

appeals, makes serious concessions to those other two communities? >> he has a platform that has all of those principles in it. it's just difficult after eight years and given the bad blood that's developed and the mistrust. that makes it very difficult. but a lot of his platform. -- >> so he's got some platitudes in his platform that nobody believes. i yield back. >> we go now to mr. jeff duncan of south carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for this very informative hearing. mr. mcgurk, you commented about the state of u.s. intelligence in advance of mosul and this most recent isis offensive. you said, quote, in the earliest days, we had to acknowledge that we were operating in a fog, end quote. you also say that intelligence collection after the fact has improved, but i'm troubled by the fact that we are -- but that we were operating in the fog in the first place because in

february, you testified here and you told us exactly what isis wanted to do, take control of western iraq, challenge the iraqi government for control of baghdad, and have sectarian conflict. for most of the past year, isis has already been in control of about half of mosul. there were other plenty of clear signs that isis was a rising threat. really over the past year, year and a half, two years. we've had eyes watching what was going on in syria and surely watching the iraqi and jordanian borders. knowing all this and knowing all we did of what you testified in february, why weren't we doing more to collect intelligence all along? please help us understand what led to the decision not to have robust intelligence collection efforts against this terrorist group. >> well, as i did testify, we began to move assets into the

theater. what my testimony was speaking to was immediate crisis response. in the immediate days after mosul, it was fog and rumor and friction and chance as you get into in these circumstances. what i was trying to get at in the testimony was it was very difficult for us to know specifically what was happening. it was difficult for us to know the extent of isis' advance down the river. which is why in a meeting with the president in the earliest hours of this crisis, the decision was made immediately to significantly surge u.s. air assets over the skies of iraq, again, to go from one a month to 50 a day, including manned aircraft. that was something the iraqis also welcomed. in response to an earlier question, i want to say the iraqis, despite what may have happened in 2011, since this crisis we have been embraced. our presence has been embraced from top to bottom. they're actively seeking our assistance. to have u.s. military assets in the skies of iraq is something

that was extremely controversial, even as late as last fall. right now they welcome us there. they want us there. and it's a very different situation than it was even when i was here testifying in february in terms of the iraqi appetite for our direct support. >> here's the thing. folks in south carolina and folks i talk to all over the country are concerned of what's going on in iraq because we lost so many men and women there. not only lost in the loss of lives but lost in their ability to be productive citizens and whether it's ptsd or whether it's an actual physical injury. you know, why did we lose those men and women and turn around and lose control over an area? and we can watch and tell the heat signature, the plume, what rocket launcher it came from and where it shot down a plane in ukraine, but we spent a lot of money, a lot of effort in iraq and yet we're blind, we're in a fog? i just find that hard to

believe, especially with so much going on in the region, with what was going on in syria and isis and isil were doing. huge columns of vehicles headed toward mosul, how did we miss that? so that's a rhetorical question i don't expect you to answer, but i think it is important. i think americans are going, how did we miss this, and why did we spend so much money and loss of life in iraq to see what's going on now? why can't we do more? i noticed in your statement you said we've set up the joc in baghd baghdad. i'm glad we have. i just wonder why it wasn't set up sooner. you said, i think, six weeks ago it was set up. this thing has been going on for a while. why didn't we work with the iraqis to try to thwart that? i'm concerned about our friends in the kurdish region. i'm concerned that they're going to get surrounded. we didn't lose a single american life in the kurdish region during the iraq war. not a single american.

because they're friendly. so i want to ask this about the kurdish region. what's the administration's position on kurdish oil exports and what actions are we advising american energy companies that might be operating with the krg to take? >> our position on energy exports from iraq is very clear. we support getting as much oil out of iraq as possible and on to international markets from north to south. we also support doing that in a way that reinforces the overall stability of all iraqi regions. we have an obligation to say when people ask that there is legal risk for taking oil without an agreement. we work very hard to broker an agreement and actually had an agreement on the table that was a very good one as early as four months ago that would have gotten all of the oil out of the kurdish north flowing and had revenues coming from the south to the krg. that agreement didn't succeed for a number of reasons, and one

of which is that we're in the middle of a high political season in iraq. it was an election season. you had an election april 30th. now you're working to form a new government. i remain confident that in the process of forming a new government, we can work with all sides to have a solution to this very important issue. the budget that's being debated in the parliament right now in baghdad is about $120 billion budget. there's about $17 billion there for the kurdistan region. it's a decision the prime minister made to cut off salary payments to the kurdish north because of this oil dispute. it's completely unacceptable and should be reversed. we made that very clear. so again, we're working very closely with our kurdish partners in the north and the government of baghdad to find a solution to this issue. and through the process of forming a new government, we have a real opportunity to do so. >> my time is expired. i thank -- >> will the gentleman yield for a minute? i wanted to follow up on a specific statement there. what i want to follow up on was

the comments you made about having eyes in the air and the difficulty of that. now, in august of 2013 that is when a request was made originally by the government in iraq for assistance. in march of 2014, they actually delivered an official letter to the white house asking for help. it is certainly true that originally they wanted armed drones to do this work, but that was a negotiating position, and they swiftly fell back to the position of, okay, you won't give them or sell them to us, then can you use them in order to hit these jihadist units? and all of this incurs long before june when mosul falls, right? so i just wanted to put that in context. unless there's something i don't understand here, mr. mcgurk.

but that's from the entreaties or the discussions i've had. that was my understanding through this as we were trying to get these drone strikes on these units even before they came over the border in order to give some kind of cover for the infantry on the ground. >> again, the sequence was helping the iraqis with their hellfire strikes, with the information, and the fusion cells we set up. their request for our direct support came in may. and i think as alyssa has spoken to, our ability to do anything effectively requires a much more granular picture on the ground. we frankly have that picture now. we did not have that picture as -- >> well, as expressed, we don't understand why you wouldn't because you've also got signals intelligence, you've got human intelligence, and frankly you had a green light there for eyes in the air once they delivered a letter to the white house of an official request in march of

2014. so this doesn't add up, but i will go to the gentleman from california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses. i think it's disingenuous for us to lay what's happening in iraq as a failure here in america or as a failure of any particular administration here in america. i think our troops did everything within their power to give iraq a chance. we shed blood. we spent billions of dollars to give iraq a chance. one of my staff members is an iraq war veteran, a wounded warrior. you know, just chatting to him, as veterans all around this country are saddened by what they're seeing in iraq. they did lose their colleagues. they did lose many men and women, as we all did in iraq. but we gave them a chance. we really did. it's also tragic to see what's

happening to some of the civilians that served side by side with our troops, supporting our efforts in iraq and the danger that they live under. so we really do have to do everything that we can to try to ensure their safety and serve their visas as we can. but this isn't a failure of american administration. this is a failure of iraqi administration. and, you know, i think everyone in this body would be consistent that this is a failure of the al maliki administration. there were sunni tribal leaders that fought side by side with us in the surge that were made promises that were broken by al maliki. systemically dismantling some of iraqi's own defense forces in a way we saw what happened in mosul. and they fell apart. now, you know, i think ms.

slotkin, you indicated the iraqi people must do the heavy lifting on their own. can you expand on that and tell us what you think that heavy lifting would be? >> well, i think brett has spoken to some of the ideas that are currently being batted about to get towards that political solution. i think the point i would make, you know, as we look towards any potential decisions the president makes for future action is, you know, we couldn't solve the iraqi political problems for them when we had 170,000 troops. we couldn't have solved them if we had kept in 10,000 troops in 2011. and we're not going to be able to solve them through our military support today regardless of what we decide to do. the iraqis have to get at the underlying political differences in their system. isil is extremely capable, extremely dangerous, but they are getting tacid support from the sunnis on the ground in these areas. it's critical the central

government solve those problems so the sunnis turn away from isil and towards their government. >> and mr. mcgurk, in your assessment, if a new iraqi government was a more inclusive government that gave equal say to the kurds and the sunnis and g gave them a voice, do you sense some of our former allies and some of these tribal leaders would, you know, take a different view on isil? >> we have to be very clear that isil is a military force. so we have seen tribes try to take it on and they failed. we trained about 1,000 falu shans in three months of training. in their first engagement trying to move into the northern reaches of fallujah, they lost. that's because isil is a highly sophisticated military organization. it's far better than the al qaeda in iraq we fought. in order for the awakening to

really get moves in those days, it took a lot of effort on our part to degrade that everett, which allowed the tribal networks to rise. a up and fight it. there will have to be some military pressure. statement, there has to be a new government with political accommodations to isolate isil. >> if we're thinking this through strategically, new government forms in iraq that is much more inclusive. the sunnis within iraq become much more open to not supporting isil. our allies in the region potentially from the sunni side can also provide some support as well as, you know, looking at ways to cut off the funding and support of isil. would that be ascenario? >> yes, and i don't think sunnis support isil. there was an election on april

30th in which isil said anyone who votes, we're going to kill you. they were very clear about that. we had almost a record turnout of 1.1 million people, all sunnis, voting for new leaders. isil threatens, they intimidate, they rule by brute force. and so that is one reason why they need to be confronted and isolated. but yes, that is a sequence. first, we have to continue to find ways to pressure isil, but a new government providing a new platform and also with new regional engagement and we'll hope very much when there's a new government, and there will be, that the regional capitals fully embrace that capital so we can make end roads and regional integration which has not made many end roads over the last couple years. >> thank you very much. mr. kinzinger. >> thank you, madam chair. i just want to point out i'm a veteran of iraq. it's sad to see this gone now. i'll be honest with you all. i think -- i mean, everybody

east kind of not saying it, but what it seems like is the administration is just paralyzed. they just don't know what to do. there's this fear of getting involved in iraq again and getting sucked into iraq with this reality that the worst-case scenario in the middle east is playing out right before our very eyes. frankly, this administration bears some responsibility for that. i'd also like to remind folks that in america, we threw out the articles of confederation. we had articles of confederation. we threw them out and drew up our constitution. political solutions are not something we can put in the microwave and expect to happen in a short amount of time. this takes time. what we're seeing right now with the enroacroachment and growth isil is the worst-case scenario. therefore, this kind of narrative that we have to have a political solution before we do anything, i would much rather see a flawed iraqi state in which we could then work a political solution than to see isis in a capitulated iraqi state. mr. mcgurk, the chairman touched

on this. does a march 2014 request exist to the white house for what could be included as air strikes? >> i will go check on all the correspondence we've had. >> you would know if a march 2014 letter was hand delivered to the white house requesting assistance for the iraqi government. >> i have a letter from may in which there's a very clear and specific request. i think a lot of correspondence before that was not as -- >> so you're on -- you don't know of this existing. so you can get back to me if it exists, in fact. >> i'll get back to you and go chapter and verse with all the correspondence we've had. >> okay. and another question, you know, we talk about, we didn't have the intelligence picture. as something that flew isr, it's fairly easy to get that quickly. we should have had an intelligence picture from when the iraqi government was asking us for assistance in august. that should have been the time at which we said, let's get this granular picture. now we have it. so we have the official request in may. we have a granular picture now. what's the hold up?

i think what the answer is, is not so much that we're still waiting for political solution. again, i think it's this idea that the administration simply is paralyzed and doesn't know what to do. meanwhile, that vacuum is being filled by iran, by russia providing equipment to the iraqi government at a time we're sitting around saying, i can't believe they're taking this assistance. but they're fighting for the survival of their very way of life. this is time where we have to say, you know, look, we're the united states of america with a very robust military capability. surely we can have the intelligence if we decided may was the time we were going to start looking at this. surely in three months we could have figured out a picture and begun to get engaged at that point. i also want to talk about the issue of hellfire missiles. it has a warhead of 20 or 18 pounds depending on what kind of missile it is and what its target is. these cessnas that have been retrofitted in iraq. an apache helicopter carries 16

of these hellfire missiles. the idea of an apache helicopter, one, taking out an entire camp of isil is unrealistic with 16 of these missiles. the idea of a cessna with one, maybe two hellfire missiles being the thing that destroys these camps in syria and in iraq is crazy. i think we need a robust military -- a robust air strike campaign on behalf of the united states. when our troops on the ground get engaged in combat, we're very good. the marines and army are very good at fighting off the enemy. but the first thing they do is call for robust air support to help them win that engagement. this idea that the iraqi military melted away or that the iraqi military can take background with a hellfire missile is unrealistic when our own troops who are very well trained who have a great background and know how to fight wars call on a-10s, f-16s, b-52s to come in and do close air support in order to retake

ground. so i just am saying that i'm renug the call of the administration for massive manned military air strikes to push back this very, very bad cancer that's encroaching on the middle east. and also to target those in syria, to understand that the syrians, they are a very good fighting force, isis, and they're getting their training in syria and spilling it out to the rest of the place. so i do appreciate you all service to your country. i appreciate you being here. i know it's a tough time. at that, i yield back. >> thank you very much. ms. frankel of florida. >> thank you, madam chair. or thank you to the panel for being here. i think two or three questions. first, could you explain what makes the isil terrorists such a greater threat than the other terrorists we hear about all the time? and what is the most immediate threat to the united states and to our allies? second, you know, i've heard a lot of questions which i think

are appropriate as to, you know, what did we know, what could we have done maybe to have avoided the threat of isil in iraq and syria? my question is, how far back should we go? could you give me your opinion, if you have, is what our war in iraq, the invasion of 2003, how that relates to the rise of isil? because i think many of us in this country think that was an act of malfeasance by our current president at that time and by our congress to send our country to war in iraq. so i would like you, if you could, answer those two questions, and if you have time to explain to me the difference between what might be -- some people say is paralysis versus first doing no harm. >> sure. so i can speak to the terrorist

threat and why isil is particularly different, why we're paying such close attention to it. i think, you know, it's the territory they now hold, the self-financing that they are capable of. not getting donations and living off of donations but the self-financing, self-sustainment. the span of control, the capability of some of their fighters. they are very, very experienced and war tested. and then the number of western passport holders we know have travelled to syria and are engaged with both isil and other groups there. isil's stated intent, we're coming for you, barack obama, rhetorically. and what we know to be active plotting in europe. so all those things in combination make them, i think, probably, it's safe to say, one of the most capable and the best funded group in the region right now and that's what makes it such a particular concern.

>> i can talk a little bit about the history, although the questions you ask are really questions i think the historians will sort out. but isil is a group that we know. it's al qaeda in iraq. the first leader was in iraq before the war. he was kind of the leader who really focused on this effort to spark sectarian conflict. if you go back to their writings at the time in 2004, it might have looked preposterous at the time, but his plan has always been, and i testified to this in some detail in february, to establish a state. a state in iraq and syria. that has always been his focus. he said, we're going to do it three ways. we're going to attack the shia majority in iraq consistently. we're going to attack their marketplaces, their mosques, their playgrounds until they respond. then he says we will unite the sunni ranks behind us. that has always been his strategy. he also will attack any sunni who disagrees with him.

that's very clear in his do doctri doctrine. also, he'll attack kurds to tear open that very narrow fabric which exists in the territories in iraq. that his stated strategy in 2004. it's now the strategy of al baghdadi. we know this organization. we fought against it. we now their ideology. what's particularly scary about it now is that it basically effectively controls the state. it has ambitions to take the mantle of the global jihad away from al qaeda central. so that is why it is a significant threat. that is why we're here and we thank you again for the time to testify about the situation today. and that's why we look forward to consulting with you to get a handle on it over the weeks and months ahead. >> not sure if you answered my question about the war in iraq. >> i have to say, congresswoman, i'll let the historians sort out what happened over the last 12 years. >> thank you very much.

i waive the rest of my time. >> thank you. mr. cook of california. >> thank you, madam chair. once again, ms. slotkin, i apologize. i'm usually the one that asks the question about the role of qatar. you give me the same answer. i understand what's going on. i did -- i'm very, very concerned about maliki and his credibility, which to me is absolutely zero. we got the folks that are representing camp liberty, ashcraft, and what has happened in the past. you cannot overlook that. what scares me even more was isil, isis and the fact that they went in there and they defeated four divisions. you know, in the history of the united states marine corps -- the marine corps has never had

four divisions in one place at one time. they had six in world war ii. they had three on iwojima. you had four divisions and you have a group that had pick-up trucks, ak-47s, what have you. it just shows that in terms of at least from a military person the total lack of credibility in the maliki government. obviously, they don't have any trust, the military in the lack of federalism. so i'm very, very pessimistic on the future in terms of reconstructing the military, particularly when maliki, whoever is in there, if they're going to continue to go to the iranians for the revolutionary guards, et cetera, et cetera, et

cetera. and with hellfire missiles falling in the wrong hands, i'm just very, very nervous about this whole thing. it's been touched on a little bit, but i think from the united states that once again we have to recognize the changing geopolitical situation. you're absolutely right about jordan. if we're not ready to defend jordan or be there for them, we're in serious trouble. i'm a strong, strong supporter of kurdistan. the point has been made that not one military person was killed there. the other one -- and i've been believuating, but i want to get your take on turkey, on how in the past they might be influenced because they surround this area. and turkey lately -- and obviously turkey is a big, big player where they are also a

member of nato and the fact that some of their behavior with the muslim brotherhood is very, very scary. could you address that, please? >> turkey remains a close partner of ours, and yesterday, in fact, at the state department we had almost an all-day dialogue with a very senior delegation from turkey about a whole host of issues, including isil. we recognize broadly that in order to really squeeze isil -- i mean, when we focused on al qaeda in iraq in the 2007 time frame, we called it an anaconda strategy to squeeze their finances and everything. it's really three prongs. first, you have to shut off the infiltration networks. turkey plays a big part of that, but turkey will remind you a lot of the source countries in which global jihadist fighters are coming in. we have to stop these people before they get on the airplanes and stop them if they make it into turkey before they get into syria. that's critical. secondly, denying them a safe

haven in syria. that's why we're focusing in on training the moderate opposition and finding a way to control space to isil in syria. and then helping iraqis control their sovereign space in iraq. that's extremely difficult, but that is the three-pronged approach that we have to try to take against this. and the conversations yesterday with the turks led by our deputy secretary and their undersecretary were focused upon that. i think we have a fairly common understanding of the way forward with the turks on this. >> i don't think i have much more to add other than i think they are -- they've been living with the threat emanating from syria for a long time. they are extremely focused on it. they're extremely focused on what's happening in iraq. as a nato ally, we're talking with them every day. so i feel confident we know what they're focused on. >> okay. playing beat the clock. if you could comment again on the revolutionary guard and their influence right now and whether they have replaced the

american military completely. >> we remain the part aner of choice for the ike i craqis. no question about that. $11 billion into the reserve and $193 million just last week. again, i was there during this cris crisis. there was a major vacuum, and iran has stepped up in some ways to fill the vacuum in ways we made very clear to the iraqis are not particularly helpful. >> thank you very much. >> i yield back. >> appreciate it. mr. conley of virginia. >> thank you, madam chairman. and welcome to our panel. i have to have say that in listening to many of your answers, i hear a lot of aspirations, and i share them too, but i'm not quite sure whether they're realistically achievable anymore. for example, ms. slotkin, you made a pretty forceful statement in response to one of my colleague's questions that there's no substitute for a strong central government

located in baghdad. well, ms. slotkin, we've been there for 12 years. we've poured $1 trillion into the country. we've lost precious men and women in fighting there. what -- how does one achieve this strong central, effective government in baghdad? >> thing is what the iraqis are grappling with right now. and as they form their government, they will have some fundamental questions that they have to answer about the future of their state. brett has talked about some of the ideas that are on the table. >> i know, but i guess my question carried with it the inference that maybe we need to reassess. the vice president of the united states wrote an op-ed piece before he became vice president dismissed at the time in which he said, frankly, what ought to happen in iraq, what's likely to happen as well, is the sort of segmentation of iraq into three

autonomous zones. a sunni dominated zone, a shia dominated zone, and a kurdish dominated zone. well, looking at the map today, that may be looked upon in retrospect as a view that was accepted at the time. maybe we have to give up on the idea after 12 years of trying on a strong central, functional government that holds sway over the whole country based in baghdad. >> yeah, i can't speak to the retrospective piece, but i can speak to, you know, what it would mean right now if somehow we decided to give up on a strong government in baghdad, centered in baghdad. who is in charge in that sunni-dominated area? some very, very scary people. while i think the idea may be interesting on paper, i just think in reality based on who is in charge in these large swaths of the country right now, it's just a -- it's a much less

favorable option than having a strong government in baghdad. >> of course. i take your point. but i mean, the question is whether we should continue to pour blood and treasure into that hope. at what point do we recognize we're going to have to at least modify that hope because it's not going to happen or not going to happen any time soon realistically. because if we continue to pursue policy however noble and desirable that is not realistic and is going to get us in a lot of pain and difficulty, that's not a good foreign policy. mr. mcgurk? >> i think what i laid out in my opening testimony is a way forward that is focused upon the hard realities we face on the ground now. that's within the fabric of the iraqi constitution.

that can harness their very significant national resources to empower local communities in order to deny space to these terrorist groups. and that is a model in which recognizes the principle of authority. were iraq to wish to develop more regions, such as the region that exists in the kurdish region, there's a process for doing that through the iraqi constitution. >> but mr. mcgurk, again, i agree with you. that ought to be how it works. the maliki government has significantly alienated huge swaths of its own country. and in the process has opened the door for reseptivity to isis. but they've lost a huge amount of political goodwill, if they ever had it, amongst their own

countrymen. how do you restore that in a time frame that stabilizes the situation and forcefully push back isis? >> we had to make sure the election happened and happened on time. that's something we focused very hard on over the last eight to ten months. the election did happen. it was a credible election. again, 14 million iraqis turned out to vote. they're now forming their government on their constitutional timeline. they chose a speaker. that kicked off a timeline for 30 days to choose a president. once there's a president, there's a 15-day clock to name a prime minister, then 30 days to form a cabinet. the iraqis will get through this process along their timeline and will come out of it with a new government. again, we remain hopeful that that government will reflect a fairly broad consensus among the principle groups. right now the presidency, for example, is a choice the kurds are coming up with their nominee for the presidency. we hope to have that done soon. that will kick off the timeline to choose the prime minister. they happen to be in this period they have to form a new

government. once they begin a new government, it'll be a process of a very genuine dialogue about these very important issues you face. i hope with this committee we can be a part of that dialogue. >> my time is up. i just hope that the the state department and the pentagon both hear bipartisan skepticism, goodwill, hope you're right, but the skepticism in this committee today is very bipartisan. >> thank you. and now we turn to mr. perry of pennsylvania. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. mcgurk, in violation of u.s. and u.n. security council, what support is the maliki government receiving from iran that you know of? >> the question of sanctions under those provisions is something we're looking at very closely. it's a very complicated question, actually. >> all right. well, then just tell me what kind of material support you know of and then we'll try and figure it out from there. >> it's another question i think i'd like to follow up with you

in a closed session. >> all right. ms. slotkin, do you know? >> sir, i really do think in a closed session we can much more specifically answer your question. >> all right. i get your point. well, knowing that iran is supporting the insurgency in yemen, is the yemen model sponsored in some sort by the president, is that realistic or viable for iraq? didn't that -- isn't that fairly complica complicated, knowing that iran is essentially an adversary, an enemy of the united states that we're barely working with on a treaty regarding their nuclear program, which many americans, myself included, disagree with? what position do we put ourse ourselves in, and how can we move toward trusting the maliki government, knowing they're r y relying on iran? can we expect the folks in the camp to receive better treatment

knowing the government is the collaborating with iran? >> so i would say -- i want to make sure i understand your question about the yemen model and whether -- it seems like you're implying that the iraqi government is completely under the sway of the iranians. >> no, i don't think it's completely under the sway. i think that considering the yemen model is viable and iraq is myopic and irresponsible and knowing that we're working at cross purposes, even mentioning that is kind of indicates cluelessness at the point of the administration, in my estimation. i just want to get your feeling on it. >> again, i'm not -- i'm sorry. i'm not sure i'm completely understanding your question. if the question is, could the yemen model work in iraq, if that is what you're asking -- >> is it viable? could it work? yeah, it could work if we had different people in iraq in power and a different circumstance, in my opinion. but that's not the circumstance. so is it viable now? do you see the yemen model as

viable now in iraq? >> i think, if i understand what you mean by yemen model, meaning working very closely with the central government -- >> yes. >> -- on a program, i think that first of all right now we are working with the iraqis on the ground. we have people there that -- our own people that need security and we rely on the iraqis to provide part of that security. i think what we're trying to figure out is the answer to that question. by sending folks out and understanding the iraqi security forces and whether they are a viable -- >> seems a little irresponsible to come out with those kind of statements with hen you're tryio understand the circumstances. but moving on. so japan and germany essentially defeated by coalition forces, including the united states, probably didn't want us to stay, if they would have had their choice. i wasn't around then. i suspect you weren't either. let me ask you this. what responsibility does the administration have, understanding they disagreed with the united states government's actions in iraq, and i'm respecting that, but

what responsibility do they have to secure the gains of the previous or any administration? do they have any? it's an opinion question for you. >> do the iraqis have a -- >> no, what is our administration -- >> what is our responsibility? i mean -- >> do we have any? >> i mean, we have invested incredible amounts of blood and treasure. my husband is an army officer. we met in iraq. as a country, we have invested so significantly in that country, so of course we are invested in making sure that it continues as a viable state and doesn't become a breeding ground for terrorists. >> so having spent time there as i did, do you believe circumstances on the ground would be different had we maintained a s.o.f.a.? using the excuse -- and i see it as an excuse -- that the government couldn't get itself together enough to get support if it, we get that. they didn't want us there. that's a big surprise. didn't we have some responsibility to make sure it

happened? i mean, the president's got a pen and a phone. if he'd have said, we're staying, what are you going to do about it? would things be different? do you think things would be different now if we would have stayed in some fashion, providing some security prorks vieding some intelligence, providing some oversight of a fledgling government in a very difficult circumstance that we earned a victory for and literally almost installed piece by piece? >> i think that things may have been different, but i don't know that we wouldn't be in a similar situation to where we are today based on the fact that we still lack political accommodation at the heart of it in baghdad. >> thank you very much, mr. perry. we turn to mr. weber of texas. >> thank you. mr. mcgurk, you said, quote, our objective is to ensure that isil can never again gain safe haven in western iraq, end quote. in your opinion, has isil, isis, whatever we want to call them, today operated with lightning

speed? >> depends how you characterize lightning speed, congressman. >> in your opinion, would you characterize that as lightning speed? >> their advance through mosul caught them off guard, frankly. >> so baghdad, you cough taught something about blitz kreeg, wouldn't you agree? >> again, not sure quite how to answer that question. >> okay. >> isil's proven to be very capable. >> you remember how ted deutsch asked you today, how confident are you the shiites can withstand repeated attacks? in your exchange with him, do you remember that question? >> i believe so, yes. >> okay. here's my question for you. how confident are you that camp liberty can withstand more attacks? >> again, i want to mention i visited camp liberty a number of times. >> have you ever stayed there? >> well, i have not stayed overnight there, but i have lived in trailers under repeated

rocket attacks, so i know what that feels like. i have discussed that with them. >> do you think they'll all be killed before or after baghdad falls? >> again, congressman, i think that's a bit of a hyperbolic question. >> but you don't think it's a real threat? >> they're located on the airport facility. they're located very near where we're located. >> you don't think it's a real possibility? >> i'm not going to -- again, i'm happy to come address the specific security apparatus we have at the airport. >> okay. do we just write them off? >> certainly we don't write them off. it takes a substantial amount of time and energy focusing on the question. we have a senior adviser at the state department that does this full time. >> earlier you said, let me tell you why this matters. does camp liberty matter? >> yes, of course it matters. that is why, again, we have a senior official at the state department dedicated to this issue full time, reporting to the secretary and he'll be on a

plane tonight -- >> does it seem odd to you that we've got some -- in the current calamity on the border, we have some 60,000-plus crossing our southern border and getting, quote, refugee status or asylum over here but we can't get the same thing for camp liberty. is that odd, ironic? >> the administration's made a decision to bring in -- >> oh, they've made a decision all right. >> up to 100 residents of camp liberty into the united states. we believe that's a significant decision, which also should enable other countries to do the same. >> you see all the yellow jackets behind you? have you seen those? okay. you think that's an important issue for them? >> again, it's a very important issue to us. >> well, the actions don't seem to follow up that idea. you and i talked back on february 5th about t-walls and they began to put in place for a

short time. seemed like they ended quickly thereafter. i would say not only is it an important issue for those who are here to support some action on the administration's part to help camp liberty but obviously it's also important for camp liberty. i think the administration has let them down. somehow we need to make that a priority. what is the answer for those camp liberty residents? how do we make this a priority before it gets so bad that there's no hope for them? what's the toons that? >> we're determined to do everything we can to get them out of iraq. their safety will depend on their getting out of iraq. that's why we have to find third countries to take them. we have made the decision to take in 100. >> should we encourage them to go over to mexico and come up to the southern border? >> again f t, if the mexicans a willing to take a number of them, that's why we have a

senior adviser focused on this question. he's gone to countries throughout europe, scandinavia, east asia, everywhere. we are making some progress, but we need to keep at it and need the support of the international community. that's why we've put $1 million into a new u.n. trust fund so even countries who may no have the resources are able to take them in. >> ms. slotkin, i have 30 seconds left. what do we need to do? >> sir, we're trying to figure that out right now, and that's -- >> you're trying to figure that out? how long have they been over there? >> they've been over there since late -- mid to late june. i believe it is important to have a prudent, thoughtful, responsible approach before we just jump in, as someone who's worked on this. >> it's not going to be very prudent if they all get killed before we do something, now is it? >> sir, i think that it is critical that we have a thoughtful regional approach to this problem before we jump in. >> well, i hope you will encourage the administration to get real thoughtful real fast.

i yield back. >> thank you very much, mr. weber. i'm pleased to yield to our new member of our committee, mr. claassen of florida. >> those from camp liberty, thank you for coming. you've made your point with the newest congressperson here. the two of you, thank you for coming. and thank you for your service to our country. and i'm sure this is not an easy moment for you. it's never easy to be at the point of the spear in this kind of situation. so i respect you for coming and speaking straight and ask you to speak straight to me too. to use your words, mr. mcgurk, there are some hard realities here, right? i cannot overestimate those realities people are dying. and these are people that don't deserve to die. and we've been there for a while. it feels like a perilous situation to me as our enemies

consolidate friends, allies, and territory, which will certainly some day threaten our friends, israel, and maybe even us, if i'm getting the drift of what's going on here as the newcomer. and in that backdrop, it feels like we have bet on a team that is divided, right, maybe artificially put together, and a coach that we and you as an administration don't have full confidence in. that sounds like a bad situation for us to be in. as i hear the talk today, it also feels that this lack of leadership, therefore, causes a deterioration in safety, and where there's a deterioration in

safety, there's also a deterioration in culture. people losing lives and their own culture feels like a bad situation. and it threatens us in the longer term. if i'm capturing correctly what's going on here. and so in that vacuum of chaos, you all are making decisions that will affect us eventually and people on the ground immediately. for my constituents, i think what would be good would be two things. number one, each of you give me a very brief summary for those that aren't experts that don't know all the missiles, that don't know all the things involved here, what is your summary way forward? where is the administration taking us? i don't want to get into partisan bickering. i just want to understand where we are going and where we will be six months from now.

and then secondly, i would like to understand what can this committee do to help save lives and protect people. i am not interested in assigning blame. i think, mr. mcgurk, you said it best. history will sort that out. i think it's more helpful if you tell us where we're going, and if we like that path, how we can help to get there. in layman's terms, so i can understand it and therefore take it to my constituents. i know this question is a little different than most, but does it make sense to you two? >> yes, congressman. i thank you for the very thoughtful question. again, i think explaining this to your constituents is critical about why this matters. a lot of the history on iraq, i think it can have a clouded view upon why this really continues to matter to the united states. >> but i want you to look

forward with me. >> so let me just say three things. first, when this crisis began, as i stated in my written testimony, we immediately had to get a very precise, very accurate eyes-on picture on the ground. and i just want to speak from my own firsthand experience, president obama immediately ordering a surge of intelligence assets, moving an aircraft carrier into the gulf, that was all done -- there's been a lot of talk about the 2011 s.o.f.a. that was all done under another permanent agreement we have with the iraqi government called a strategic framework agreement. that's a permanent framework, agreement, which allows us to assist the iraqis in ways that protect our interests. we had to get a clearer picture of what's happening on the ground. we're getting that now, and it'll become clearer in the days ahead. second, we had to get the political process on track. iraq just had an election. 14 million iraqis turned out to vote, almost a 62% turnout. that showed the democratic

aspirations. of the iraqi people. we can't let them down. they want to see a new government formed, a new parliament has just convened in iraq can 328 members. they're now working to form a new government. we have to be behind them as they do that and encourage them to do so. as soon as that new government is stood up, and it will be set up, we need to embrace it and give it every chance to succeed. it is in both their interest and ours and it is also in the interest of all that we have sacrificed in iraq. so that in a nutshell, we have to get a better picture on the ground, better eyes can on to know exactly what's happening. we're going that. secondly, we have to et get political process on track, which reflects not just the political elites but the aspirations of 14 million iraqis who voted. once that government is stood up, we need to embrace it and give it every chance to succeed. >> thank you very much. >> so in summary, we wait until the new government is formed and then give that government full support. >> we're not waiting. we have people on the ground now doing significant things under the strategic framework agreement, which exists with the

future iraqi government and the current one and the one before that. >> thank you very much. now we will turn to mr. morino of pennsylvania. after that, mr. collins of georgia. >> thank you, chairman. good afternoon, the two of you. thank you for being here. unfortunately, and i don't mean to be facetious, but you two have drawn the short stick to be here and put up with us. as i tell individuals that come and testify, you should be accommodated for that in your reviews. it's a tough group here. but i think we all have one intention in mind. it's just a different way we seem to want to go about it. there's no question, complex is not enough of words to explain what is going on over there.

and i understand the two of you have been over in iraq. so you know first hand what things are like. i visited there twice in short periods of time. ms. slotkin and mr. mcgurk, you can respond to this if you'd like to. several moments ago, you stated that there would be no difference if troops were left in iraq, 10,000, pick a number, but troops left there. it would have no impact on what's taking place in iraq now to repel isil. did i understand that correctly? >> so let me clarify because this just came up a couple minutes ago as well. so it's not that there'd be no difference. i don't know exactly how it would have been. but i know that it wouldn't have forced the iraqis into a political solution that only they can make. >> okay. none of us know how it would

have been, but i'm glad you clarified the political statement. >> the political piece. that's critical. >> it is critical. but i somewhat disagree with that assessment because i've read and studied this extensively. probably not nearly as up to date with it as the two of you are, but i've been reading military reports, listening to experts from generals to commanders to tacticians, et cetera, and they disagree with that assessment. if there would have been troops left there -- and make no mistake about it. a lot of this is maliki's fault. but i was reading an article in "the new yorker" that said if troops would have been left there, first of all, it would have had an impact on maliki. it probably could have -- they probably could have clipped his wings on preventing him from doing what he should have done

and didn't do. but it also would have an impact on isil as well. so could you please tell me what the difference is now since president obama has sent some troops over there now. if sending the troops over -- if not leaving troops there would really not have made a difference, what is the intent then behind sending troops now? would that not make a difference? do you understand my question? >> i believe so. >> thank you. >> first, i just want to clarify that we have sent in an additional, i think it's up to 775 troops. 475 of that total are for the security of our people and our facilities. >> the airport, et cetera. >> exactly. the other 300 are there to assess and answer those very questions, right. and i think the important thing that has changed since even just

a year ago is the threat from isil, that that poses to us, our allies, to our partners, and the importance is that puts on pushing back on them. so i think if your question is, you know, what more could we do, we should have left troops, and now we're considering putting them back in, we're trying to figure out whether additional folks on the ground would help in that fight. >> i'm ambivalent on this as well because i don't want to see another american come home in a body bag. i've been on the ramp and saw the ceremonies where two people were sent back to my state. it's something that i do not want to experience again. but we did have the civil war under control by the time the troops left iraq. do you agree with that assessment? >> i agree that the sectarian violence that had been raging in iraq at the height of the war was significantly diminished, significantly, by the time we

departed. >> mr. mcgurk, do you have any comments on my questions? >> i just want to say first it's a tremendous honor to be before this committee all the time. the breadth of this committee and the veterans and everything else, it's a tremendous honor to be here and discuss this with you. >> thank you. >> i think 2011 we just -- the requirements to get something through the iraqi parliament was not possible, but we still had the strategic framework agreement. and where we are now is that we have been fully embraced to do training, to do advising, to do all sorts of things. what we are undertaking at the direction of the president is a very careful review of what we can do to be most effective. so i think hopefully in our feature conversation we'll have more concrete way forward in terms of what we have decided will be the most effective because that is the conversation that's ongoing now internally. >> thank you very much. and mr. collins of georgia is recognized. >> thank you, madam chair. i appreciate it. looking back, i'm not going to

do that, especially with my experience. but i will just say this in reference to my friend from pennsylvania. i've been there when they were put in body bags, and i'm appalled we did the fact so little in the s.o.f.a. agreement. and do not accept the political answer that politically we couldn't have gotten through. also, there was a political issue here at home in which the president had made a promise to get out. so there's political aspects on both sides. let's not kid each other. at least in this committee that we're doing that. i'll be honest about that. i won't go back, but i want to go forward and look at this. that is a very much of a concern for me for the price that you shared. we spent a lot of blood and treasure, and to leave it like it is now is very, very concerning for those of us who were there. going forward, it is a concern for me and iran is used as a close relationship with iraq and it was growing toward the end anyway. to use the air space to fly

weapons to hezbollah and other partners in their fight in syria. the u.s. has time and time again asked iraq to stop allowing iran to use their air space. what's the most recent activity the obama administration has taken to have iraq cease >> we continue to discuss in some details with iraquis. it is unclear in terms of what is on specific flights. iraquis won't shut down airspace. an ongoing conversation that could send sensitive information which i'd be happy to follow up in a new setting. >> i agree. there's a lot of conversation that may not need to have here. i'll also say a lot of things dealing with the iranians on in pressure points on other sides. i'm very concerned about their continued involvement in this basically messed up soup of

syria. >> i want to move to 475 there for additional embassy and advisers to the iraqi army. under what authority is the president deploying this force? >> so as part of the 775 in total were notified in the three war powers notifications that came over to the hill. >> okay. all right. >> so article 2 war powers resolution, been here 30 days, after the 60-day mark which authorizes the course will president will use iraqi amf or g 1 amf? which one is -- which one are we looking to use. >> military close conversation

with the congress and obviously one of those issues to be discussed will be specific legal authorizations through which the administration determines the president has that authority. >> okay. so at this point in time, though, the question that had to have come up that we're about 30 days away from using this, so the question would have had to at least be we thought about this. which are you going to come back and ask for a new authorization? this at some point in time has to be asked. basically saying we'll think about it in 30 days frankly is not satisfactory to me. >> congressman, there's a number of legal authorities through which the president is able to play military force around the world. specifics are something to be determined within the administration and close consultation. >> lets discuss the iraq amf for a second. if he intends to use this, at what point without congressional repeal or sometime not using it, when is -- this administration chose to withdraw in 2011 the

authorization still valid or are we going to keep it for add in finite um. >> a legal issue to defer to the lawyers. >> i'm sure they are not fog to beat down our door to come talk about. that's why you're here for that. like i say, this is concerning, again, i believe we left with no real strategy. we're now having to deal with it. for those of us who did deal with it on the ground are frustrated about it. one last thing, appreciate you coming up the hill, a difference of opinion, you're limited by what you can or cannot say, which is understandable but not satisfactory. but to the supporters in iraq, looks secretary of state

department, any other agency, united states needs to continue to employ all means to protect everyone there. it is our obligation, our right. studying it forever is not the option. that needs to stop. the next time someone comes to this committee, they are actually saying this is what we're doing, not we're looking at it. that's very disingenuous in a lot of ways. we've been looking at it for a long time now. with that, i think there's a lot of big questions here, madam chair, that are left, especially concerning use of force. i would like to have a healthy discussion about that and not just, well, we'll get to it later because there's a lot of legal options. i'm an attorney as well. there is a lot of legal options here but we need to decide what are we going to do it under and not make it up on the fly because we're not sure what to do. >> thank you so much, mr. >> returning to capitol hill to the senate foreign

relations committee. he will be joined by a former cia analyst and an army general who served three tours of duty in iraq. live coverage at 10 a.m. eastern. >> the 9/11 commission has released a new report to update their initial findings from 10 years ago. this report calls for reforms on how congress oversees the homeland security department. tom ridge was part of a panel that discussed the commission's proposal. from the bipartisan policy center, this is one hour 15 minutes. panel is going to focus on one of the last major i never lamented recommendations of the 9/11 commission. that does not sound like the sexiest topic but it is one that is important and if addressed solves real needs facing the country.

every nonpartisan group that has looked at this issue has come to the same conclusion from hart to groups on the left and the right at heritage and brookings. everyone who has looked at this said the same thing. this is a problem and we need to solve it. the most recent group to address sayings other groups and the country is not as safe as it could or should the because we have not reformed oversight. we aired an ad, he placed an ad using that quote from congressman hamilton that not only did the past dhs secretaries support reform but so too is a who's who of national security commission. the problem looks like this. the solution will be discussed i this distinguished panel. introduceleasure to

siobhan gorman. she will moderate our panel. >> thank you and thanks for joining us for our officially unsexy panel. congressional reform is probably the most high-profile reform that has never really been embraced. in their tenure report looking forhe current state of play national security, the commission cites that there has been a proliferation of committees that are responsible for counterterrorism, homeland security types of issues from 1988 to 1992. i guess that is some kind of

accomplishment we will discuss here. the report highlights another congressional oversight problem in another round which is too little congressional oversight when it comes to certain types of programs like sensitive intelligence programs. chicken early as we have seen recently, those that were highlighted in the snowden revelations where we saw -- we have seen and we are toing congressional low back the way that some of those programs have been conducted and the secrecy around them. discussing problems of too much and too little oversight. he managed a range of issues between the countries including technology transfer, counterterrorism to my and nuclear energy. he is known as a former six term

congressman from indiana and a former member of the 9/11 commission. he served as resident for the center on national policy and is senior director and strategic counselor and serves on the national commission on the future of the fbi. is the formeridge governor of pennsylvania and he served as the first homeland secretary. he oversaw the merger of 22 agencies and 180,000 employees. he went on to serve for six terms and is no ceo -- now ceo of ridge mobile. -- we also have

homeland security advisers. thepent 19 years at justice department. and assistant attorney general. general counsel at the fbi. he is of the white-collar and defense investigation group and as a member of the directors advisory board on the national counterterrorism center. a member of the public interest declassification board, the external advisory board and chairman of the legal panel of the national security agency

advisory board. i think everyone wanted to start with opening thoughts. >> thank you. i am delighted and joined -- honored to join with secretary ridge and can who served in his capacity as homeland security advisor. that is the fact that this is a boring and unsexy topic. the 9/11 commission said the was linking red. hair was on fire, something terrible was about to happen. and then we outlined why mistakes were made and they be how things could have been wasprevented. we now have seven different commissions and groups that have told congress, you need to

change and reform the way you oversee our homeland security or else something bad might happen. five and 10 and 13 years later congress has refused to act. they have acted to reform other other executive branch departments and they have steadfastly refused to change themselves. that must change. we say other executive branch departments and they than this report. secondly we say it is important because the work that members of congress -- the work that they do, the men and women that work up their work on committees that oversee the department of agriculture or education or the department of homeland security. and now with things changing so rapidly in the world, with isis

taking over large swaths of territory, cyber security coming at us like a speeding bullet every day, we need a department that can act quickly and has vision and a budget to take on these new threats. 92 still congress has different committees and subcommittees to oversee this. that is unsustainable. we need a smaller committee and an integrated committee, committee with experts that can help set the budget and the vision for the department of homeland security as it enters these new threats and the challenges of these new threats. thirdly it is important because as congress makes all these different people come up to 92 different committees and subcommittees we waste their valuable time.

we waste the resources. inwaste millions of dollars taxpayers money and we hear congress all the time talk about waste, fraud, and abuse. how bad that is. here is a great example of waste, fraud, and abuse. and how congress could do it better. we are hopeful by talking about it in these terms and having people like especially secretary ridge talk from his perspective on homeland security why this must be done now. not five years from now. not 10 years from now after an attack create white it must be now -- why it must be now. difficult to add much to which my colleague just said but let me try to supplement his observations with a few of my own. this is the bipartisan house he

center so i will take a leap of faith and on behalf of secretary johnson, secretary napolitano i'm a secretary chertoff, and yours truly, my plea today is not to you but to the leadership of the house and the senate. do something with regard to the massive, inefficient, procedures oversight dealing with the department of homeland security. we speak with one voice across the board. republicans and democrats on this and it will require some leadership in the house and the senate. structural, it is organizational, it is not sexy -- in mynot imagine wildest imagination can i only come to one conclusion. the unwillingness of congress to reconfigure itself so it can be in theeffective partner

maturation of the department so it can be more effective leader in dealing with the escalating threat environment from the physical to the cyber over which the department of homeland security has so much control and jurisdiction. it is about turf. proud to have done it. lame halma -- lee hamilton will tell you. after we vacated hearings people would be expressing their profound this taste and displeasure. there are too many committees and i go in for half an hour, 45 minutes. especially when c-span is there, do my thing and i move on. there are not enough people to develop centers of excellence.

the connective tissue is in 16 different countries. one could argue that the terrorist threat is greater than it was on september 11 and september 12, 2001. it is a matter of turf on the hill. to maximizeerative the efficiency and the effectiveness of this department given its escalating role within the safety and security of this country to just think not about the turf that you sit on and the committees that you sit on but the turf you are obliged to do to secure and that is

the turf of to secure and that s the turf of the united states. it is not that it cannot be done. it is about generating the will to get it done. there are peolple who were asked incredibleether an board, give us your recommendations, tell us what needs to be done. i have reiterated it time and time again. we had four secretaries of the department and you had the , militaryce community leaders and the law enforcement community. there is a consensus, or publicans and democrats across se responsibility is to secure america, congress saying

you need to change the jurisdiction of your committees. it is too diffuse and disparate. it is time that they accepted belief of people on both sides of the aisle, change the oversight and the [inaudible] task and demand. if you want to make america more secure, one of the most important things you can do is create a relationship between congress and the new department. it is still a new department. it is still maturing. they have a lot of work to do.

oversighto change her and your committee structures. thank you. assemble this committee. tell us what we need to do to make america safer. i suggest you read the report and do what they recommended you to do. it is not that difficult. i am sorry,i am sorry, guys. >> would you like to add something? >> video -- ditto. that --is not nearly and it. >> ditto! an important event and

it is an honor to be included up here. with asked to come out number of the folks who were here to a meeting last year in palms -- palm springs to talk about this issue. i am on about 35 different advisory boards and everything else. i routinely get together with folks and we talk about things and there's always some high-level consensus but when you get down into the granularity there is a difference of opinion. you are able to hash out differences and come to some common ground. this is the first time i went that and weon like ended up with absolute unanimity on every granular point we talked about when it comes to this issue. it was no difference of opinion. we had different ideas but in terms of the need to make this

happen it was across the board. as for this group i am the executive branch guy so my ireer in the executive ranch, would usually be the last person to be demanding or asking for congressional oversight that was effective. that is the plea i am making as an executive branch person. i came out of the justice department where you have a pretty simple oversight structure. you have intelligence committees and it is straightforward. you know who the overseas -- overseers are. you had people like sheldon whitehouse who knew what you are dealing with down to a granular level. that meant effective oversight and follow through and a deep understanding on the part of the members about our mission, us as

individuals. that was real oversight. i do not see that with the dhs situation and i get it that it is not easy to rectify this problem. we have heard about the turf issues. there are turf issues in the hills -- in the hill that my co-panelists can speak to. they have such a wide range of activities that it is understandable that the oversight is not only the challenge of pulling together live to see -- legacy jurisdictions but there is the subject matter. we are not trying to diminish the difficulty of this challenge but we do want to emphasize the need to meet the challenge. just to tick off some of the issues. i can tell you firsthand when i house,at -- in the white the difficulty of answering

them. oversight demands. telling event. when he got to the point where he said i cannot appear, i have to do my day job and we need to get your shop in order that was the shot across the bow to congress and we hope they heard it. beyond the demands on time there message thatiffuse the executive branch gets from so many different committees of oversight. you are getting -- not getting a

message. when you hear a lot of voices you do not hear any voices. that is true. i think it means it has had to cap the department by not having that clear direction from congress and that is critical when you have a relatively new department. also issues of lack of having a champion on capitol hill. it is important when the department has one committee or to committees that are the champion for that department. that is important when it comes to an agency like dhs which is in its adolescence when you think about it. there is legislation that needs to get past. authorizingave legislation. haveact that we do not clear lines of authority dealing

with the issue, that has led to what has been a problematic delay in getting legislation which will go a long way to meet what is a real threat to national security now and in the future. sound terribly sexy but it is fundamentally important to our government that we get this right. >> have we convinced you this is a dynamic issue? >> it is clearly dynamic. getting a little bit more granular how would you reshape the congressional oversight, are we talking -- how would it look and how would you get there? recommendedave through the leadership on the 9/11 commission we have recommended a certain set of changes for congress. basically

this is going to be congress's decision. they set up the rules that would be voted on sometime in january. whether they reduced us to one or two committees in the house and senate. they have to reconcile how that would work in their jurisdictional systems. we are not prescribing directly where they should remove it. >> what do you think it should look like? >> it should be a lot smaller. it should not be 92. it should be a handful of committees ideally down to one or two. it should have a number of people on it that are experts to that built expertise on homeland security and cyber issues as all three of us have talked about. the changes are coming at us very quickly. people are in syria as we speak training, radicalizing.

there are scores of people coming back into the u.s. with this radicalization and bomb making skill. dhs' role in this and what is the intelligence community's role in this and if congress is not over saying this and giving dhs authorities and budget, no one is over -- overseeing this so america is vulnerable. we do not have anyone committee that is passed legislation that our new homeland security department exactly what their role should be in this effort to protect the u.s. experts people on the committee wouldre devoted to this spend hours every week ending to know these issues and going down to the department of homeland security and having the appropriate oversight hearings

and then the final point i would make is this is so critically important not only in its oversight role but because there are so many secret things involved in this, this is not just like the education committee that i sat on where most of your oversight is done publicly and we all know what reforms were we working on, what amendments need to take lace, we talk about very secret things. very sensitive things to our communities that have to be protected. and so if we do not have the appropriate people getting to know those issues and doing the architecture that is put together in space or wherever it might be at the nsa, if those people are not doing their jobs and serving on these committees year to year and knowing what

questions to ask, knowing how old the executive -- how to hold the executive branch accountable, having tough hearings when they overextend privacy issues, nobody out there is doing his job. it is important that we get going now on it. if they vote on a resolution in january with the new membership to take this issue on. that process has to start now including key senators and congressmen that sit on some of these committees that are willing to give up jurisdiction and oversight. we have our kings that is -- has endorsed this on the left and we have heritage on the right that has come together and endorsed this concept. if they can do it in the thing tank community why in the world can our congress not do this? there are no excuses for not acting to do this.

>> a couple tanks. my successors have been endured the same challenges. while i was secretary we were >> a coupleconducting to wars in afghanistan and iraq. i was up on the hill probably a factor of three times in four times more than donald rumsfeld was. in terms of interacting, the executive ranch had been narrowed down. making a general observation. we have a congress with which i was privileged and honored to serve with a committee structure operating out of the 20th century. the challenges related to the united states federal government and the 21st century not just within homeland security but across the board cry out howerately for rethinking

the legislative branch exercises its constitutionally delegated authority and responsibility to oversee the executive ranch. i will focus on homeland security. i am stand there are different jurisdictions because of the multitasking nature of the department. if i could wave a magic wand i would have no more than two authorizing committees in one -- and one primary committee. i would have a couple of sub , -- sub committees. because of the nature of the overlapping and jurisdiction again the structure is archaic. if i coulduated. have my way i could have a

couple of those subcommittees and where you had overlapping jurisdiction with justice, somebody from the justice committee with the primary responsibility would be a member of that subcommittee. it will take some thinking about who should serve where but at the end of the day you could interlock these other full committees into the subcommittees of the department so you would have the advantage of that multiple jurisdictional all embedded in the same structure. if i could -- my preference would be one fairly large committee, multiple subcommittees but you make sure that part of those subcommittees and the real committee you had some overlapping jurisdiction so you could have a more comprehensive look at the totality of the responsibility of the department. >> there is a president for that.

precident for that. whatep in mind oversight is. it is committees, members who know how to ask the right questions and follow-up. and find out where there are issues and where things can be improved. you cannot just do that as a thatr with talking points were drafted by a staff member. you have to be immersed in the substance of what it is that agency does. sheldonentioned whitehouse because i dealt a lot with him when i was in the justice department especially about surveillance. he knew that area. when he asked the question in a i would gives and

a response i would get a follow-on question that would follow up what ever issue i did not address in my question. if you had to prepare and respond to someone like him, someone who would be a part-time oversight person, that person will not know to ask those questions. i want to take you back to what oversight is. it is asking the tough questions to help agencies improve. max given the difficulty that congress has had organizing itself to pass legislation are we surprised that he has not embraced measures that would not require [inaudible] and what it happened in the time frame you outlined? rex it is realistic to ask

the peoplerex it is realistic tk the people that represent our -- we do notle need these massive bureaucracies here in the u.s. overseeing the committee structure, overseeing a terrorist group, a cell of people that can get into our country and get into the country as we speak. we know they are targeting the aviation system here. they are coming here, some of congress, whatnd does it take for them to realize we should not have 92 different

committees overseeing this threat of a few dozen people coming into this country? there is no excuse for this. there really is not. if theshame it would be next 9/11 type of commission right to report that says ok, 10 years ago, we saw the failures in the executive branch and our intelligence agencies. today it is the failure in congress that resulted in scores of people. the 911 commission has warned about that. what does it take. it is realistic and as tom said earlier, it is realistic to expect our democrats and republicans to work together on national security issues to protect our country. it may not be realistic for us to think that they will come up with a ill -- a bill and agree on an abortion issue or agree on the definition of marriage but

it is realistic to expect them to do this kind of job. we are hopeful that members will start to meet in august and said amber. maybe talk about their ideas for condensing the oversight, share their ideas with different committee heads, they will, with some plans, maybe that circulated sometime in the fall and new members would vote on it in january. maybe there is a way to hold new members accountable on something like this. it is a national security vote. not just simply a vote about how congress is organized. >> what do you see as the role of the executive ranch and pushing ahead on this issue? tried to articulate the executive branch has a strong interest in having a rationalized oversight program. arejohnson, his folks

spending a lot of time said hearings that they think are duplicative and not necessary and they would love to do something about it. it is incumbent on the administration to make this a priority to use the bully pulpit to you -- pushed congress. leaders have to embrace it. unless the leaders recognize publicly this is an important issue it will not happen because they have some people pushing back real hard. it has got to be a public effort. armed in turne with a push from the president and the white house to say that this is important. the securityto see apparatus and the president on inn making this top priority all the conversations in congress. >> you mentioned the role of the congressional leadership in pushing this ahead. what should they be doing? rex it is -- my colleagues have brought up two very important

points. it is a national security issue. think anyone would argue that the restructuring of congress after world war ii and hasequent restructuring provided more aggressive oversight. that needs to be understood. this is not a management and organizational issue. this is a national security issue. no one is arguing from my perspective from the executive branch about the need for thatight. we all believe the oversight should be comprehensive and would be a lot more effective if the prison was narrowed and you develop experts that could help the maturation and development of this fledgling new department. and rid large i would wager that ofyou took a private poll

535 members of congress and ask them in their heart of hearts if they truly believe the committee structure vis-à-vis the executive branch was as effective as it needs to be even the range of issues and the size of the government, i have to it ise most would say not. we are going along to get along because that is the way it has been. we're hearing -- we are here saying if you want to make changes in the 21st century infrastructure overseeing a 21st-century government that is ,r more complicated and complex regard the threats in the we are saying it is a national security issue. do with that in an effective way

and that is changing the jurisdiction. on reorganization. it is a vote on national security. you wonder whether or not whether they are incapable or unable to do this. it will have to call from the -- for the leadership of the white house and leaders of both parties. >> i want to take a moment to refine the point. tom stated it and his eloquence drives home the point. let me look of the department of defense and special forces, army, navy, marines, coast guard , all of the special programs and defense we have a handful of committees overseeing roughly a $500 billion budget? then we have the department of homeland security with a $60 billion budget, $80 billio