establish itself? when it comes to power africa, there are billions of dollars floating around the world that are interested in investmenting in power generation in africa. and the countries that are going to attract that investment are the ones where the investor knows that if a power plant is built, that the rules in place are transparent that ensure that they're going to get a decent return. and that some of the revenue isn't sifend off in certain ways so that the investor has political risks or risks with respect to corruption. the more that governments set up the right rools understanding that in the 21st century the power that drives growth and development in the marketplace involves knowledge. and that can't be controlled. the more successful countries

are going to be. >> so just to clarify on the issue of the net new tralt. you're advocating for a open sbrelt which would then have structure to ensure that the platform itself isn't abused. >> there two issues. net newt tralt in the united states one of the issues around net new tralt is whether or not you are creating different rates or charges for different content providers. that's the big controversy here. so you have big wealthy media companies who might be willing to pay more but then also charge more for more spectrum, more band width on the internet so they can stream movies faster or what have you. i personally, the position my administration as well as i think a lot of companies, is you don't want to start getting

a differentiation in how accessible the internet is to various users. you want to leave it open so that the next google or the next facebook can succeed. there's another problem though. there are other countries -- and i think this is what you were alluding to -- that feel comfortable with the ideas of controlling and sense rg internet content in their home countries and setting up rules and laws about what can or cannot be on the internet. i think that is not only going to inhibit entrepreneurs who are creating value on the internet. i think it is also going to inhibit the grotes of the country generally because closed society that are not open to new ideas eventually fall behind. they miss out on the future

because they're so locked into trying to maintain the past. >> thank you for the clarity. i think we're out of time. i'll ask my final question. when we began this conversation we were alluding to the fact that there needs to separate the political function and economic function. in other words, politicals should not get in the way of business. i've gone through quite a big number. i know it's difficulty. where the end deliverable of the entire summit or whatever it is, is that we need to lobby government to create policies that are there. that's usually what you get either trying to get somebody to do something. in turn governments come up and say we promise to come up with this and that and there's a whole political of things. apart from that, what can we as business leaders as the private sector, what can we do sort of

independently to -- what can we do to create this economic environment that forced us for the growth and development of africa as a continent? >> well, look, although this isn't always a popular position here in washington these days. the truth is that government really can help set the conditions and the framework for markets to function effectively. in part because governments are able to initiate projects like roads and bridges and airports that any individual business would find cost prohibitive. it boont make sense to invest in what is a collective goods. it's not going to hep your bottom line if everybody else is using it. so that's part of the function of government. part of the function is to educate a population so you've got a well trained workforce. it's hard for companies to

invest in doing that by themselves. there's certain commond goods like maintaining clean air and clean water and making sure that if you have capital markets that they're well regulated so that they're trust worthy. and small and large investiers know if they invest in a stock that they're not being cheated. so there are a whole host of gunchingses the government has to play. but in the end, what drives innovation typically is not what happens in government. it's what's happening in companies. and what we found in the united states is that companies once they've got the basic rules and they've got the basic platform they are able to create value and innovation and cultures that encourage growth and i think that african entrepreneurs are going to be the trend setters for

determining how societies think about themselves and ultimately how governments think about these issues. the truth ofert matter is that if you have big successful companies or you've got widespread entrepreneurship and you have a growing middle class and practices have been established in terms of fair dealing and treating your workers properly and extending opportunity to smaller contractors and promoting women. and making sure women are paid like men. suddenly what happens is businesses create new norms and new sensibilities. and governments oftentimes will respond. so i think in africa what i would like to see more and more

of is partnerships between american businesses, african businesses, some of the incredible cultures of some of our u.s. businesses that do a really good job promoting people and maintaining a marettocksy and treating women equally and treating people of different races and faiths and sexual orientations, fairly and equally, and making sure that their typical norms of how you deal with people in contracts and respect legal constraints. all those things i think can then take root in a country. hopefully governments are encouraging that not inhibitting that. they recognize that's how the world as a whole increasingly moving in that direction.

and over time, you will see an africa that is driven by individual entrepreneurs and private organizations, and governments will be responsive to their demands. so i think the one thing i want people to understand it's not an either or issue. the government has a role to play nonprofit organizations have a political role to play. but the goal should be how do we empower individuals to work together? and if we are empowering young people like you all across africa if we've got a 21-year-old who has already started three businesses we've got to figure out how to invest and make it eedsier for him to succeed.

if you're succeeding you will hire bauch of people and they in turn will succeed. that's the recipe for growth. i'm confident that africa is well on its way. america just wants to make sure that we're helpful in that process and i know that all the u.s. companies here that's their goal as well. we are interested in africa because we know that if africa thrives and succeeds, and if you've got a bunch of entrepreneurs, they're going to need supplies from us maybe. or they may supply us with outstanding protects. they're going to have a growing middle class that wants to buy i phones or applications from us in turn they may provide us new services and we can be the distributor for something that's invented in africa and all of us grow at the same

time. that's our goal. i'm confident that we can make it happen in this summit. it's been a great start. i want to thank you for doing a great job moderating. i want to thank all the leaders here. there's been great energy, great enthusiasm. i know a lot of business has gotten done. if any of you are interested in investing in this young man let him know. thank you guys. >> >> the united nations willhold a general assembly meeting this morning. we'll have live coverage from new york at 10:00 eastern. in the afternoon the congressional black caucus hosts a discussion with african business and political leaders. live at 2:00 eastern. later president obama will hold a nudes conference at the u.s.-africa summit.

>> next, a discussion on the ongoing israeli-palestinian conflict. this is 90 minutes.

>> good afternoon. i would like to thank you for joining us. flarly those who are willing to stand in the back. and i'm glad you're all here. we are gathering on a day that perhaps offers the first small glimmer of hope that the current round of violence might be ending after several pretty horrible weeks. there are a lot of factors i think that one could point to in explaining how we got here, why this conflict, this round erupted when it did. there are now approximate causes there are broader structural causes. for underlying all of these is an unresolved conflict between

israelis and palestinians. that means that however this round ends there are some larger questions we need to delve into about where things go from here. there are questions i think for an israeli government that seemed earlier this summer to be dwing or maybe eevep setting aside its previously declared support for two state solution there's the question of israel for what kind of future it wants for its people. and its relationship with its palestinian neighbors. for palestinians and for the leadership there are questions as well. the palestinian leadership that was shunted aside as this violent conflict began that is struggling to make itself central to the cease fire agreement. there is the request of what alternatives can it can offer to hamas' violence that might

win bact the u.s. of a victimized and increasingly frustrated palestinian public. there are questions as well for governments in the region where dwins within the arab world help contribute to the confrontation and delay and achieving a cease fire. so they face the question of whether resolving the palestinian issue is the real priority or whether this longstanding conflict has now become just another arena for proxy conflicts between contending regional act trs. and i think there are questions here for the united states as well. it's long been the essential mediator in israeli arab affairs but it's seen its diplomacy roundly criticized in this instance. its advice to its close partner and ally israel met with what the "new york times" this morning dismissive. so there's the question of

whether bilateral israeli palestinian-israel, whether that is the best means to resolve this longstanding and terrible conflict. now, those of you who have heard me speak on this topic before know that i've felt for a long time that the primary obstacle to a peace agreement lie in the domestic politics of the two sides. and i think there's no doubt that where we sit today after four weeks of horrific violence there's been a rally around the flag effect on both sides. and to some extent we've seen harder line voices strengthened over this period. i would see that as a temporary development. the question is what happens after that fades? so we had a moment where i think we can hope that each of the parties involved in this conflict and interesting in this conflict will engage in

some self-criticism and internal reflecks. as i was preparing for our event today, i thought this is a fitting day to talk about that because today on the jewish caled bar is the day in which jews mark the destruction of the temple in jerudeslem and it's a day when they read the book of lamentations, which is self-critical but ultimately somewhat hopefully reflections on the destruction of the temple. so perhaps with that as a bit of a backdrop we can develop into the questions that we hope leaders on all sides will be asking them. i am really delighted to be joined by three terrific colleagues from the foreign policy program here at brookings, to be part of this conversation. of course ambath dor martin index vice president for

foreign policy at brookings. we're very glad to have you back on our stage. >> glad to be back. >> my colleague and fellow in the center for middle east policy at brookings. and another fantastic fellow and colleague in the center for middle east policy. all of these gentlemen have been doing great work talking in the media grading very perceptive analyses. helping us all understand this criteria as it unfolded. so thanks to all of you for being here. and let me begin if i may with a look at the yilingts. martin going back to this article in the "new york times" this mortgage saying that israel dismissed american diplomacy during the conflict and suggesting that u.s. israel regulations are under unprecedented strain.

to be they're it points out there have been previous significantance between prime ministers and presidents of both parties. how does this current period rank? is this truly an unprecedented period of strain in and what does it mean for the role of the u.s. going forward? >> well, thank you. and thank you all very much for coming. i'm sorry that we're not in the brookings auditorium but they're renovating it at the moment. so you'll have a better user experience a month from now. so we'll look forward to brick you back home. i'm very happy to be back home and grateful for the opportunity to speak today although the circumstances couldn't be more horrific and more depressing after a

12-month intensive effort by the united states, which i was involved in to try to get peace between israelis and palestinians and have it blow up yet again in another round of the chronic and horrific violence is profoundly depressing. and it's precisely depressing because the secretary of state john kerry was out there warning time and time again that the status quo is unsustainable. yet get we saw how the conflict exploded. yet, even though the status quo is obviously unsustainable, we're heading right back to the status quo. and that is the chronic nature of this conflict that makes the

whole situation even more depressing. you asked about the "new york times" story and about the u.s.-israel relationship as manifest ds in this crisis. and the story itself pointed out these conflicting trends on the one hand language used by both sides -- the united states on the record criticizing israel that language that we have not heard before that i can remember, and the israeli government backgrounding the israeli press with vitriolic language about the efforts of the united states to achieve a ceasefire. that also i think were unprecedented. attack on the israeli press on

our secretary of state. so that's on the one side. on the other side as the article pointed out, the president signs bill for $225 million more in security assistance to pay for additional iron dome capabilities for israel. and about the prime minister fom on the one side and the secretary of state and president on the other. so take your pick. i got back to you asked me -- i got back to 1982 when i first came to washington to work when there was another round of this chronic conflict in which air yl sharon defense minister was prosecuting a war in lebanon which features horrific fotes

of children being injured or killed. and ronald reagan got very upset with bagen and used some fairly harsh words in those days. so we've seen this before somehow each time the relationship survives, moves on. and that's partly because it has deep rootsdz and a strong popular support for israel that i'm sure has been damaged to some extent. but probably will rebound. so in a sense. but i do think there's something else going on here that i also felt in the negotiating room. that is that israel today is a different country to what it was say back in 1982 and for

most of its history. today it is strong economically strong militarily and has a range of relationships across the world with others beyond the united states. and those are the powers not only as far as afield as china, india india came out in support of israel which i believe is unprecedented. a testament not just to the different politics of the prime minister but also to the strategic relationship that is now been built between i will ral and india. but shiner and its indier and its up countries in eastern europe and russia the extension of israel or actually the

absence for a vote in the united nations general assembly condemning the takeover of crimea by russia was something that was really raised eye brows in washington. we never experienced that before. >> so you're saying they don't need us any more. >> no. definitely not saying that. what i'm saying is the fact that they feel more independent of the united states than they have in the past, more that they can stand on their own two feet. and the point i was trying to get to was that they also feel that they have relationships in the arab world that they never had before. and that manifested itself very clearly in the way that israel and egypt seem to p have a common interest in taking hamas down backed by saudi arabia and the other gulf states with the exception of qatar and jordan,

the sunni monarks. plus the crmp c regime in egypt. and to some extent the palestinian authority which has long been a rival of hamas. so there's this interesting alignment that israel feels it was able to play on in this crisis and conflict in a way that it hasn't before. so i think that there's something of a more structural nature, a shifting of the plates if you like in the relationship which it's too early to say what it will actually mean but i do think it's manifesting itself in this crisis. >> so israel and egypt together could essentially say at the beginning of the conflict three, four weeks ago, ok, we

don't want the u.s. to be the architect of a ceasefire arrangement. we're going to work that out ourselves and pick our interlock turs itself. does that say something broader about the traditional american mediating role in the peace process? >> i think it's possible but it's a little early to say. certainly up until now any arab leader who sought to make peace with israel looked to washington and looked to washington to in effect deliver israel or deliver concessions from israel. starting with sadat after the war he famously said the united states gives israel everything from a loaf of bread to a phantom jet -- state of the art in those days, therefore i'm going to washington. he kicked out those and turned

to washington. that was the best example and the most important because it produced the peace treaty. and that has certainly been the view of the palestinian leadership. but i do think that he is reaching the -- reached the point during the negotiations where he had a question mark about whether we could in fact deliver the kinds of concessions he was looking for to achieve a two-state solution. and indeed, you saw it in the conditions that he said set for extending the negotiations. he insisted not just on the release of the fourth tranche of prisoners but also on a construction freeze in the west bank and jerume less for three months while the boards were drawn. and the confluction freeze which he said is something

that's impossible for this israeli government to do. but i think it's a test of the united states government to if we can't deliver that then how are we going to deliver what he needs on jerusalem or end of the occupation or evacuation of settlements and so on? so i do think that the length of time that it's taken since let's say the clinton parameters of 2000 now 14 years later or 20 years from the beginning of the process, the failure to achieve a break through to a two-state solution which we have been the sponsors ofr since bill clinton stood there with his arms yassar air fat and ra been as they shook

hands. the ability has been affected by that. >> not only on the israeli side but the palestinian side. how, with that let me turn to you many of the critics of the secretary kerry's initial attempt at a swift ceasefire said that the danchinger of that effort is it would have touted hamas and at the ex pence of israel who is the recognized interlock tur for israel and who has embraced the two state solution. now, clearly the delay in getting a ceasefire and let's as soon as sume theclearly, the delay in getting to a cease-fire, assuming the cease-fire holds, this delay has come at a horrific human cost. has it successfully avoided a situation whereby hamas is empowered at the expense of

fatah and the plo. if they get to terms on a lasting cease-fire, what do this terms need to include two ensure that mahmoud abbas remains the central player in future negotiations with israel? >> as to the first question, the simple answer is no. basically because i think -- palestinians make inclusions -- palestinians make conclusions on different assumptions from folks in washington. that may come as a shock. [laughter] this is a very washington and israel eight calculation that the longer the war goes on it will weaken hamas. that will never be the case.

this is the third such conflict in the last six years. each of her time -- each and every time mahmoud abbas is weakened, the longer it goes on. it is not about military victory or casualties. it is about the two programs of the two sides. mahmoud abbas' program, he has been compliant, he has committed to peaceful resolution of the conflict. that has been ignored. hamas, on the other hand, rockets and suicide bombings and other forms of violence. that gets attention and has actually produced some results. the prisoner exchange issue is one notable example. hamas got 1000 prisoners and we

all know that the failure to release the prisoner in the latest negotiation led to the collapse of that process for mahmoud abbas. there's a real sense to the palestinians that hamas' way, as painful as it is, produces more results. and that is true. it is even more true in this conflict. it is coming on the heels of the film negotiation and because we have been down this road seven times before. mahmoud abbas has moved closer to hamas' decisions rather than the other way around. in previous conflicts, mahmoud abbas was reluctant, he could not side with israel against

another group of palestinians. he was reluctant to openly embrace hamas. this time around, fatah, plo the entire palestinian leadership has openly and enthusiastically embraced the hamas and the resistance. >> in the context of a reconciliation agreement that had been reached in month or two prior. >> it -- the ink was barely dry when this conflict started. it could easily have torpedoed thanks. but it didn't. it worked in the opposite direction and consolidated the palestinian unity. as far as the -- touching to one of the key assumptions of u.s. and israeli policy that is a failure of the last eight years -- to the extent that the

u.s. has had a policy over the last eight year on gaza, which i don't think it has. we've been pursuing a policy of separating gaza and keeping palestinians divided. playing this guy off of that guy. this is not what diplomacy is made of. frankly, this is how colonialism operates. it is not how diplomacy works and peacemaking works. you make peace with a group as it is. palestinians as such. the notion that we could make peace with one group of palestinians and support war against another group was never going to work. and that has now played out. it was going to drive hamas into the peace camp or drive mahmoud abbas into hamas' position. >> weren't there some who saw the reconciliation agreement, to some extent, hamas joining abbas

in a weaker position. where do the to sit today, what is the power differential? how can abbas keep the upper hand? >> hamas went into this very much out of the junior partner which is unlike where we were years ago. they come out of this as equal partners, at least. one of the positives, probably the only positive out of this is the motivation of palestinian unity. in fact, you have a unified palestinian leadership negotiating in cairo. as a practical matter, not a matter of show or expediency. it is a practical matter. hamas needs fatah as much as fatah needs hamas.

hamas understands their is no chance to open the border in gaza without a role for the palestinian authority. at the same time, the palestinian has been desperately keen for a role in gaza and mahmoud abbas has been trying to reassert his relevance in things related to gaza. there is a win-win situation in terms of the relevance of both sides. hamas' position now is very firmly embedded into the palestinian landscape. in a way that a month ago it was not. it was much more precarious. like that of the muslim brotherhood in egypt. now, they are, you have got this broader palestinian safety net around hamas that has cushioned it. >> perhaps that presents an opportunity for later negotiations, if later negotiations are an option.

with that, we should take a look at the israeli side of the equation. if we look at the israeli position three weeks ago and the way the cease-fire came about, it seems as though the israeli government got everything it said it wanted. an opportunity to go and destroy the tunnel networks on the ground. it got a degradation of hamas' rocket capability. now, it was able to withdraw ground forces and get a cease-fire without any preconditions. without making any concessions to hamas or anyone else upfront. a couple questions first within the israeli debate, we saw support for the government netanyahu, is there any questioning in israel today about whether the games were worth those additional three weeks of conflict. in the lives lost, and the international censure and

everything else i can along with it. how do you expect this experience to shape the political dynamics, particularly for this israeli government going forward? >> the israeli position from the start was to support the conflict in gaza. the hope was to contain the west bank. netanyahu was very eager to avoid conflict. the first move was to try and reach some kind of understanding before the official name for this operation. the second looking at the 2012 the last round. the third stage, after another cease-fire -- dramatic images

that we saw. all of these conversations. 2008, 2012, and now, are seen as three rounds of the same war. there is what you do, it is very close to the center, rockets reaching tel aviv. close to the center of israel. govern by an organization that makes no qualms about its position about israel and tries to put on the best face to the cease-fire. it is very clear what they are facing. you have the clause i political and quasimilitary really a region and waging war from it.

one option, you take it over completely. in 2012, he suffered from not going further. to go back to this in a couple years. game -- netanyahu was criticized. the second is to basically hope for the best. given the israelis' way they understand hamas, the chance of that happening is nil. the experience of this conflict, to the extent of the tunnel

system, makes this much less likely. the third option is a very grim status quo. the reality where we see small things, supposedly inadvertently, causing this huge conflagration. the two yahoo! going in -- netanyahu going in, he had no authority. they said go in all the way take down hamas, this is the chance to do it. the foreign minister is competing with the leader of the right. another minister to look for is the education minister in the likud cooper to the right. most people in the small security cabinet which is

legally in chief. the prime minister, the minister of defense is very hawkish on peace issues. and tzipi livni, who is very dovish compared to this government on peace issues. their position was on the one hand, a very heavy-handed one in terms of confronting hamas and of course the horrific human cost we are seeing. we should not mince words about this. also, an unwillingness to try to change the reality from the ground. there is one silver lining. we have seen a dramatic shift, a small shift, it is quite important. the role of abbas in the gaza strip. the israelis have seen the

palestinian authority security forces as quite reliable and much better than in the past. now that they are talking about bringing forces to the crossing, allowing some opening of the gaza strip, some mitigation of the human condition, and giving a sense of victory to the egypt position. that is backtracking from the very staunch israeli position against the reconciliation government, which is the democratic government. yesterday, the foreign minister criticizing this idea saying we cannot trust abbas. the israeli public is split down the middle. support for netanyahu is quite high.

viewed as very cautious, not going very far. in a sense israel had no clear goal. the tunnels were not the goal in the beginning. they try to get a cease-fire before a soldier entered the gaza strip. the tunnels were not the main goal. israel was dragged along by hamas. they cap insisting on having this until the conditions were met. notwithstanding the human conditions in gaza. it also suggests something about how israel is approached the whole thing. a genetic event that will change its position was really jog along by this organization.

>> and i think your description of the long-standing standoff with hamas and the developed it confronts -- the dilemma it confronts with hamas reinforces the point about seeing west bank and gaza as two different problems. has the 10 yahoo! rediscovered abbas -- has netanyahu rediscovered abbas. >> in a small sense, small sa abbas. abbas that can take care of the border. we sought reports that fatah was taking responsibility for firing ammunition at israeli forces. these were fatah forces, not pa ones. pa forces have remained steady

not getting involved. in that regard yes. has it changed dramatically in the way they see the peace process in general. it has reinforced strong trends among israelis. the first, the feeling that they cannot win. the fundamental question that they asked, a very famous author and famous vocal voice of the left wing in israel, one of the voices of peace now he posed a question saying what would you do? if there was a region in your area firing rockets on you. if there was someone holding a baby on his lap and shooting at a nursery, what would you do? this is strong in the israeli position, given that is gaza and hamas on the other side. israelis have no illusions as to what it is. from the israeli position, which they withdrew.

the perception of gaza was very central to the way they approach the whole thing. it might weaken a distinction between gaza and the west bank. it strengthens the israeli view of what happens if you unilaterally withdraw from the gaza strip, this will have implications for plan b in the west bank. as khaled said, these have been dramatic weeks from kidnapping of the teenagers and the hardening of positions, the rallying around the flag has been very dramatic. inside is really society, there has been a very strong consensus and even a shutting down of people who are not supporting the troops. >> can i --? >> yes, i would like you to respond to the idea that the u.s. has treated the west bank and gaza as two distinct issues in diplomacy. >> you said it makes it harder

it also makes it much harder for plan a, a negotiated solution. prime minister netanyahu, before this latest round of war in gaza , had begun to articulate the position that the fear of tunnels in the west bank into israel proper amount -- meant israel have to keep israeli security forces and shin bet in the west bank for a very long time. that was a position articulated in the press conference. correct me if i am wrong. that resonates a lot as a result of this conflict with the israeli public. the whole concept of a two state

solution, which requires an end to israeli occupation of west bank, the actual withdrawal of the idf, and the shin bet from the west bank, becomes really questionable. if the prime minister of israel is saying we have to stay there for a very long time. he says 30 years. it used to be, during our negotiations, along the jordan river. so that means -- those palestinians from abu mazen to his security chiefs, have justified security coordination on the basis that there will be an end to the occupation, not in 30 years, but in five years. that has become justification but that is not the case. if the israeli view is we are going to have to stay there for 30 years.

for the palestinians, that is equivalent to forever. that puts another nail into the coffin of the two state solution . for those like me, who have always looked for the pony in the pile of shit -- [laughter] >> that is a diplomatic term of art. >> there is a hope that israelis will see that abu mazen is much better, even a partner because of the way that he behaved during the kidnapping process and the way hamas has behaved since. so maybe they will be supporting israel to help abu mazen eventually take control and gaza and that will unite the palestinians. and abu mazen's leadership will

form the basis of negotiations for a two state solution. it seems to me that the right wing in israel is going after abu mazen for a reason. that is why lieberman has come out against him. before him, another right wing member of the likud came out against doing anything for abu mazen. they consent that israelis are taking abu mazen more seriously. but to build up abu mazen means to strengthen the idea of a two state solution, which they do not want. >> it is very true and very dangerous but we should remember that this is the got reaction. immediately after the war we see this. even among the troika there was differences. huge differences. it is true and very worrisome

i'm not sure it is as long-standing as the lessons israelis have learned for unilateralism or on hamas. >> it might be more dynamic and it appeals. >> the pony is still there. >> don't worry. i want your thoughts on the idea that now bibi sees there is something he wants from mahmoud abbas. he wants him as a policeman and a border guard, precisely the roles that have generated resentment and opposition within palestinian society. how does this play out for him? >> i don't think it plays out very well for him if that is going to remain his role. we have to make a distinction between empowering abu mazen at the stones of hamas which is a failed policy, that has been the policy of the last eight years and is still the israeli approach. that is a zero sum, it is futile

and self-defeating. the other way is to empower abbas by including hamas under the umbrella of the plo to have a share in power, to have a stake in the political process so that it is less inclined to torpedo it if it is on the inside than it is on the outside . this points to another fundamental failure in u.s. policy, which is, oddly enough very much unlike the previous administration. in fact, it is the reverse. here we have an administration focused almost exclusively on conflict resolution. negotiations, final status, that is it. to the total neglect of any sense of conflict management. in any real, viable peace process has to have both.

george w. bush gets criticized for doing too much conflict management and not enough conflict resolution. we can criticize this administration for focusing exclusively on conflict resolution and ignoring conflict management so that -- part of that disconnect relates to gaza and hamas. we do not have a policy for gaza and hamas. we have to wait for that to play itself out. obviously, where a lot of people in washington say, it was only 1800 as gazans who diesd, palestinians see it as 8000 brothers and sisters that were killed. in terms of how israel conducts warfare, the whole, if we come out of this with anything other than why it is important to avoid these kinds of violent conflagrations in the first place, when they do start, there has to be rules to the game.

the notion that israel's military doctrine of overwhelming distortion of force is somehow acceptable -- we need to reconsider that. i do not think this is a legitimate way to conduct a military operation, by deliberately inflicting as much pain on the other side. that is the central tenet of the dahiya doctrine, to be disproportionate. there is a reason that portion now that he is part of humanitarian law. when you have something that flies in the face of that and you see the destruction in the gaza strip out of proportion to any threat hamas may have, this has real consequences. it has human consequences, moral consequences political consequences. mahmoud abbas is not going to be

in a hurry to grace any israeli leaders or even to his security bidding, israel's security bidding in the west bank. the next his position more precarious. there are also security ramifications for this. when you have that much human misery gaza was not a happy place to begin with, you throw on top of that 400 children who are killed 10 thousand homes destroyed, four hundred thousand displaced. that is really outrageous. this is where american leadership comes in. once upon a time, there was something called the roadmap. the logic of the roadmap, not that i'm a huge fan of that document, it had logic in terms of conflict resolution. when there is death on one side and bidders that side and makes

them want to inflict death on the other side. that is basic common sense. the notion that you can only have a deterrent for israel and that somehow palestinians will just be deterred quietly, and go quietly into the night, is really not a sound idea. we need to think about how to prevent these conflicts in the first place. and when they do happen to make sure that there is a degree of reasonableness to how they are conducted. otherwise, we have completely destroyed, in addition to losing our humanity, we have completely destroyed our credibility. part of what you are getting at is the iterative nation of this confrontation. and the dilemma for israel and confronting hamas. the fact that this has recurred three times in the last six years. it generates an ongoing impact

that undermines the prospects for conflict resolution. ultimately, conflict resolution will eliminate or, ideally eliminate the prospects for another round. there are things you have to do in the meantime as well. >> i would just add that since we are probably going into a period where we are not likely to see renewed permanent status negotiations, we are in a long-term conflict management situation. we ought to have a policy to prevent these kinds of atrocities down the road. >> is a good point. i want to give you a chance to weigh in on whether the u.s. had a gaza strategy in these negotiations. i want to make a plug on this question of deterrence and personality -- and proportionality and doctrines. there was a discussion on foreign policy a couple weeks ago that i would recommend to

all of you interested. martin, and then i will open it up for questions. >> i understand very well khaled's criticism and his passionate conviction on this matter. and i share his view that it is unacceptable that over 400 children could be killed in this conflict. but, we do have to put it in context will stop context is one in which hamas was targeting israeli civilians. the only reason the casualty rate was not higher on the israeli side was because they had a means of protection for their civilians. whereas, hamas does not have a means of protecting their civilians. if they were paying any

attention to protecting their civilians whatsoever, is not as if they built air raid shelters for them. instead, they were firing rockets from civilian areas. we all know that. you cannot just condemn the israelis without putting into context the circumstances that they face. now, the criticism of the administration, to add to your question the effort to resolve the conflict that the secretary of state and the president undertook. and that i had the honor to be involved in. came out of a belief that you needed to find a way to break out of a chronic nation of this conflict. you needed to try to resolve it. it is not as if the resolution

was any great mystery. it was a question of trying to find a way to get the two sides to break out of this and actually make the difficult, gut wrenching, politically risky decisions that would make it possible to resolve this conflict. obviously, in terms of resolving the conflict, you have to address raza. -- address gaza. that was an issue that was to be addressed and both sides agreed to this in the final status negotiations. the palestinian authority, the plo, that was an issue that would be addressed once the agreement had been struck. because then it would have to involve the opening of gaza

there was the territorial issue with the question of control of its borders. that would have to be part of the final deal. and then gazans would see they had an opportunity to have freedom in their own independent palestinian state. that would put immense pressure on hamas to go along with it. so, that was essentially the theory of the case. we never got to test it. to say that it would have been better off engaging in conflict management, it is essentially to say that we are not going to be able to resolve this conflict so we should just manage it and try to keep it contained. there was a fundamental decision made by the secretary and the president that that was only going to lead to more conflict. >> you thought, and the israeli and plo delegations thought that

you could push resolution of god issues down the road, that you had time -- resolution of gaza issues down the road, that you had time? >> we did not have a choice hamas is not interested in peace with israel. therefore, you cannot construct a peace negotiation with hamas. maybe, as a result of this, it becomes possible that the palestinian leadership under abu mazen will somehow convince hamas that it should go along with a two state solution and acceptance of israel. there is no indication that hamas is prepared to do that. it is fine to say we should have conflict management. it does not treat the problem it just ensures we are going to

have outbreaks of conflict. there is nothing that we could do to prevent that from happening. >> you've been a very patient audience, i want to give khaled a minute to respond. >> my point is not either/or conflict resolution or management, but that we conduct the two together. that is what a peace process ought to do. so there is a safety net for when negotiations collapse. rather than just drifting towards the abyss from as we often do, whenever negotiations collapse. all i am saying is that there needs to be some thought put into conflict management when negotiations are not happening are possible. >> what does that mean? >> something like the roadmap there is extremism on the palestinian side. >> putting a knife into the roadmap? [laughter] >> compared to what we have today, which is basically just a

vacuum i think the roadmap is fantastic by comparison. there was a sense of mutuality. yes, hamas rejects israel and there are herbal things in its charter. there are horrible things in the likud charter. horrible things that the deputy speaker of the knesset says about ethnic cleansing. that is the definition of a conflict. so we cannot resolve the conflict of we have resolved the conflict. >> as a practical matter, israel had a conflict management strategy for gaza, whether the u.s. egg knowledge it or not which was to have a close alliance with the egyptians to keep hamas and abbas and go after them if necessary. i will open it up for your question. i am going to request that they

be questions and that you get one of them. wait for the microphone to get to you, identify yourself, and ask your single question. why don't we start with the gentleman next to the microphone. >> my question to ambassador indyk, what is your opinion on the egyptian initiative? >> which initiative? >> the palestinians and israelis are now in cairo. >> what do we expect out of that? let's take a couple more. young man in the back with the white shirt and tie. >> my question is about the humanitarian situation in gaza. palestinians in gaza are pretty pessimistic about the status

quo. do you see any potential for movement, either in the israeli position on the siege or the american political will to force some sort of change, either in what appears to be the expanded buffer zone or the coastal waters, anything that relates to the humanitarian? >> how might these negotiations in cairo play out in terms of gaza? i will give you the last of this section. >> i'm a palestinian journalist. my question to ambassador indyk how do the sale negotiations that just concluded play into this conflict. are these talks frozen forever? and then -- >> you've violated my rule. thank you. martin, why don't you start?

>> do i have to? [laughter] >> you knew that was coming. >> the egyptian initiative, from the outset, there has been almost universal support for the egyptian initiative, which was a cease-fire in place for a limited period of time, it is now 72 hours and started at seven days. during which time the issues of concern to both sides would be negotiated. the issues since the egyptians first came out with the initiative, that is the only part that has been contentious what are the issues on the agenda? the cease-fire proposal that secretary kerry put in place was essentially an operationalization of the a the egyptian initiative. in terms of the things that needed to be addressed. issues of freedom of movement of

people and goods in and out of gaza. whether the fishermen could use the waters out to the limit. whether the farmers could operate in what was referred to as the buffer zone. i believe that all of those questions are on the agenda in cairo, together with, although it is not mentioned in the latest version of the egyptian initiative, there is a general reference to security. i believe the israelis will bring to the table there demand that in return for conceding some of these issues, the egyptians themselves are going to have to agree to open, which they have been more restrictive than the israelis in the past year, the israeli demand is that

the palestinian militias and terrorist organizations -- not just hamas but palestine islamic jihad and other groups -- disarm. that is the agenda, those are the issues that will have to be addressed. whether they can do it in 72 hours, i am deeply skeptical of that. 72 days or even 72 months, i am skeptical, having seen how dysfunctional negotiations are. but, it is necessary to try. it is necessary, in particular in my view, to take advantage of the fact that hamas agreed in its reconciliation agreement with fatah to resign its government in gaza, to have the palestinian authority take

control in gaza. that was agreed before this conflict broke out. that should be the basis upon which the issues are resolved, that the palestinian authority should take control in gaza. that it should start in the passages, which i think everybody is ready to agree to. that it should also extend to gaza proper. that starts with working with the u.n. and the international community on the emergency humanitarian aid that needs to go in. then, working with the international community, with u.n. monitors on all the construction material that will have to go and to reconstruct gaza. in that way legitimizing the palestinian authority, which has already been legitimated politically in the fatah-hamas reconciliation agreement. finally, as proud of that

process -- as part of that assess, to uphold the principle abu mazen has repeatedly advocated. one government, one law, one gun . the guns can only be in the hands of the palestinian authority. they cannot be a lebanon solution with militias and terrorist groups retaining their guns. that would be the ideal process. one in which israel should be able to accept that in the process of disarmament there is the full opening of the passages. finally, to the journalist's question. if i compare it to the end of the clinton administration, when we tried to get a comprehensive deal and failed, that led to huge disappointment that contributed to the circumstances that caused the outbreak of the

intifada. i do not see that as a comparable situation. nobody on either side seems to believe it was possible in the first place. both sides did their best to reinforce that opinion in the public. there was no sense of letdown or failure. everybody accepted it. oh well, they could not do it. more importantly than any of that, hamas did not believe it was going to work. hamas did not try to disrupt the effort. nor did hezbollah, or iran, who had always done their best to prevent the breakthrough to a peace agreement. they did not lift their fingers because they did not believe it was possible. the dynamic that led to the outbreak of this conflict was

unrelated to what we were trying to do in the peace process. that was the dynamic that finds its origins in the deposing of morsi, the rise of sisi, the suppression of the muslim brotherhood and the determination of the egyptian government under sisi to choke hamas, the bastard child of the muslim brotherhood, cut off all the titles and all the revenue to hamas, which put it in a desperate situation, leading to the reconciliation agreement with fatah, which led the israeli government to suspend negotiations. that dynamic, independent of anything we were trying to do, came in from left field and basically upended the table. that is what then resulted in the effort in the left bank

which contributed to the explosion in gaza. >> israel is not at all sorry to see sisi and the egyptian government take that attitude, cut off the smuggling tunnels and repeatedly declared of last months that their relationship with this egyptian government on security issues in gaza is the best they have had in years. all of this begging the question of how ready are the israelis, we can talk about the egyptians, too, to loosen the closure of gaza where the pa might come in on the borders. given that this is a week pa even if it manages to police the border. the idea of the pa disarminga other militias in the gaza strip seems a long way down the road. >> that is the crux of the

issue, the monopoly of forces. hamas, being extremists, there are extremists on the israeli side as well. who do not control an area, they do not have an army and engage in war against jordan. they do not constitute a second state. hamas, it is not just about when they took over the gaza strip. they have been -- what brought down the government, and association by an israeli extremist, the loss of elections precipitated by the hamas bombing, that is what brought it down. the refusal of arafat to do what israel is considered to be the heraldic move early on was to open fire on the major opposition groups. the one that now became the li

kud. ben-gurion and another young officer opened fire on it, because of the idea of a unity of guns. the lesson israelis learned, if you let them in the gaza strip, it is not going to build shelters hospitals for civilians, it is going to build tunnels. the chance they are going to be more lenient -- >> even if there is international monitoring, pa control, egyptian assistance. >> even today, you call it a that is not the case. ach is an attempt to draw the population to submission. the situation is her read this and the gaza strip. israel shares blame. do not take it the wrong way. it is not a siege. it could be delineated -- it

could be alleviated if there were forces israel to trust on the palestinian side. the fundamental truth that has been true from the beginning when there is no unity of guns on the palestinian side, it is very unlikely that israel will be able to deal with the palestinian side. this is on a deeper issue. israel is the stronger power and the u.s. is a superpower. it is worth remembering that there is another side to the conflict. their role in this conflict for the last six decades has not just been of passive victims to other people's mouths. they have been agents, they have made political choice. the choice of political resistance is a choice. the abu mazen-fayad position has taken the feet. resistance has had such a resounding doctrinal defeat in

the past seven decades that the palestinian choice to go for it, because seemingly there are no other options, is a terrible choice. this does not mean that conflict of war is unemployment. it does mean that the choice to engage in this conflict and many others, to avoid the same egyptian cease-fire that was offered, it is the same thing that was offered before the full thing happened. now, it is being taken 1400 days later in the gaza strip. this was hamas' choice. we should be discussing palestinian political choices as well. >> thanks, natan. khaled, i want to give you a chance to weigh in. would the egyptian government trust mahmoud abbas and the pa on the border? they would like to support mahmoud abbas do they trust the ability of the pa to guard the

border. >> i'm not even convinced they would like to support mahmoud abbas. i think there's a great deal of ambivalence towards mahmoud abbas. weakness is self reinforcing and self advertising and self perpetuating. mahmoud abbas, everyone thinks he is weak because he is weak. and he is weak because everyone thinks he is weak. these are self fulfilling dynamics. mahmoud abbas came to power with two objectives. one was to unify all palestinian factions and bring them under one umbrella of the plo which arafat had neglected to do. you have free agent groups outside the context of the plo. he had the foresight to understand this was a bad idea. 2005, para declaration, the first palestinian -- intra-palestinian agreement to bring one set of political decision-making, which is

essential to any nation or government. his second goal was to reach a conflict ending deal with israel. both of those were dashed. they are interconnected. yes, palestinians have agency. there have been a number of decisions that are highly questionable by both the palestinian authority and by hamas. one of which is firing rockets when you know the response that is going to come. from hamas' standpoint, they are dead either way. rather than go quietly into the night, they might as well go out with a bang. this is how i interpret their rationale. they at least were able to reassert their relevance -- cynical, terrible, yes. on the other side of the question, if somebody is hiding behind children and they are completely reckless, you do not

have to kill them. you, as israel, the most powerful military in the region, you have other options. you have many choices. anyway, put that aside. the question of disarming -- i agree with martin 100% that there has to be an opening of the blockade. if what happens next is to go back to the status quo -1800 people and 10,000 homes and all this displacement. not only are we going to have a humanitarian disaster, there will be a security disaster on israel's border. i have never understood how having a young, angry, hungry, frustrated population on israel's border was ever in their security interest. much less, badly battered by bombs. sorry for the alliteration.

the notion of disarming, outside of the context of the occupation, is not realistic. we have to look at incentives. there's a reason why hamas disarmed, even after so-called deterrence they got better rockets with longer range and more of them. so, deterrence is not a deterrent if you do not address the incentive for arming. occupation and siege are those incentives. simply addressing symptoms is not going to be possible. from a conflict resolution standpoint, if hamas has to recognize israel and disarmed and go along with everything that the international community wants, essentially they have given israel what they want. israel is not in a position to

establish a palestinian state in the homeland of judea. these are things that will be very difficult for it to do. if recognition and disarming are the standard, then we are never going to get -- there is no incentive for a palestinian actor to want to go along. arming is the counterpart to the occupation. israel has a great deal of leverage. it is only logical that palestinian actors will seek leverage. it is not a matter of choice, it is not a matter of saying we want to do this. it is a reality that when you have no other choice, people want to resort to arms. even when it is self-defeating. >> let's stop there and take

three or four more questions from the audience. we will start right here in the front row. a couple questions down front. for the sake of the camera, go ahead. >> i have so many questions, it is hard to ask one. i would like to ask about the gazan people themselves, who have suffered again so terribly. i have a son who lives in israel and lots of friends, i am aware of what the mood is in israel. clearly the gazan people, civilians have been used by hamas for their own affairs and are paying a terrible price in human suffering. we also have seen hamas manipulating the international media to create one image coming out of gaza. you do not see images of hamas fighters except what little the

israeli media is portraying. that does have an effect on world opinion of who is doing what to whom. you do not see images of hamas rockets that go awry and hit a target, not intentionally, in gaza. assuming that, god willing, that there is a cease-fire that holds and maybe goes beyond 72 hours and that there is movement to end his round of the conflict do you have any hope that the gazan people themselves will realize that to continue their own status quo is untenable for them. that it does not allow gaza to achieve its potential, it could be the palestinian riviera. i have seen the beaches, they are beautiful. what do you think about the gazan people demanding a change in terms of hamas running the

show in gaza? >> if my next question or can be very disciplined, we can get in one more. gary question mark >> this is a seven part question -- [laughter] i would love to ask ambassador indyk if he could stretch his remarks about the extent to which israel has built a stronger set of relationships around the globe. is that a function of seeing the u.s. is less important in its ability to develop relationships? secondly -- >> i'm going to stop you at firstly. >> does not enhance the

prospects for israel being successful in doing this with less american help? >> a final question here. >> i just heard a number of things that would not satisfy hamas. quick question --what question would satisfy hamas? >> good, thank you for that short, sharp question. [laughter] >> martin, the global politics. there are contrary trends. israel has developed relationships with other major powers and yet it is facing in the wake of this operation tremendous international censure . can you balance this out. is it about american decline jacob? >> i do not think he used the word "decline."

i would use the word withdrawal. there is an american withdrawal under way from the greater middle east. we fought two long wars in iraq and afghanistan. one a decade, one more than a decade. the american public wants to end those wars. that necessarily means that our posture of dominance in the region is shifting. when that happens, when you have a dominant force that is in effect leaving militarily that is certainly the perception. then the powers in the region are going to make their own calculations. and develop their own relationships. that comes on top of the air

revolutions and the way that has caused realignment. you do see, and that broader context, and alignment of interests between the sunni monarchies led by saudi arabia and egypt, jordan, the palestinian authority, and israel. these are the common adversaries. as they see that the united states is less engaged than it was before, it's natural that they look to each other quietly under the table in most respects to find a way to help each other, as it were.

i think that's the phenomenon that is going on. i think it is not in israel's interest for the united states to be seen as not being able to get concessions from israel because of our strong support for israeli security. if they undermine -- the perception of their best friends -- and we are israel's best friends -- if it undermines our ability to influence their adversaries or their belief of their adversaries and our ability to influence them, then they will face a much more difficult situation. then they may find themselves comfortable in the embrace, the silent embrace, of their arab neighbors.

as you referred to, they will find themselves more and more isolated in the international community that will not accept the continuation of the occupation for a very long time. while i think a lot of this is natural, i think it's important that israel be able to stand on its own two feet. i think the disrespect for the united states that has crept into the language of the right wing in israel is a folly for israel's best interest. >> thank you. please weigh in on that point in a minute but here are a couple of questions for you. >> i will try to be brief. on the gaza and hamas -- there is a palestinian people, there is no gaza evil. they live in the gaza strip. it's important to place yourself

in the shoes of palestinians in gaza. they don't see hamas as an alien organization committed to destruction of israel and an evil terrorist organization with horns and tails. they see it as one of many palestinian actions on the political landscape that espouses some things they agree with and some things they don't. the vast majority of palestinians do not subscribe to the hamas ideology. the vast majority of them do not even -- they did not vote -- even when hamas won a majority of it was not because people bought into their ideology or rejected -- it was simply because the other guys were failures. you vote for the new guy. the other aspect is that hamas is no different than fateh was

30 years ago in almost every way. i would argue -- what does hamas want? hamas wants an active patient. i don't believe hamas is throwing rockets at israel because it is trying to destroy the state of israel. if that is their objective then they are on the long plan of israel's destruction. [laughter] i don't mean to make light of it because these are terrible things. their objective is primarily to be taken seriously internationally and to be relevant politically among palestinians. they have said on a number of occasions various hamas leaders have said that they're willing to accept a palestinian state in the 1967 borders.

the same formula that we accept minas recognition of israel. in their view, recognition of israel was offered by the plo in exchange for nothing. yasser arafat recognized the plo -- recognized israel but still has no palestinian state. recognition is not what is missing. that happens 25 years ago so there has been lessons learned. i believe hamas is looking to create -- is not looking to create from the river to the sea but they want to end the israeli occupation and their resistance is seen in that context for palestinians. even if we don't accept that, you make peace with your enemies and not with your friends. you cannot expect people to jump through these hoops that you want them to and say in order for you to qualify for a peace

process with me, my enemy, your enemy, you have to do x,y and z. that paradigm does not exist anywhere in the world. you make peace with your enemies as they are and you hope that enemies don't remain enemies afterwards. >> i would note that even for the united states, it took the 1988-1989 declaration to open talks -- factions have learned lessons for that and i take the point. it strikes me that the israel-plo mutual recommend -- recognition of 1993 is the one thing from the process that has not been dismantled, rolled back from all of that experience. therefore, it seems to have a

pretty significant value to both sides. it changed the paradigm. how do we understand the unwillingness of hamas to buy into that isaac mutual recognition? >> many people are critical now of the arafat recognition that you recognize israel's right to exist. in exchange for recognizing a palestinian reality which was the plo is representative of the palestinian people. had it been a recognition of israel's right to exist or self-determination or whatever the phraseology would have been in exchange for a server -- a reciprocal right for salt of termination of palestine that is a two state solution then it would've been different. hamas and many others, they say arafat was establishing the plo relevance as opposed to

establishing a palestinian right. let me quickly add one last point -- let's say we don't believe them. if they are lying and underhanded and deceiving individuals and we don't trust them as a movement -- that's what you would expect the conflict setting. the reality is that they have given these indications of a willingness to accept the jewish institution and we have an israeli government that includes members who openly oppose and who are not shy about it and nobody says this is somehow an obstacle to his two state solution. -- 282 state solution. there is a fundamental contradiction. it is not only one side that is extremists or that has -- you make peace with your enemies and

not with your friends. >> thank you. >> about the israeli global situation, the strong perception is that they will add another state in the region. it's a very strong perception but now it is cemented. my perception is that it is attributed to the administration of israel. i think there is a lot of questions of what might happen next whoever becomes the next president. it's unfortunate it's early in the second term that there is this giving up. but it is limited. the latest withdrawal with the regional conflict, israelis see this conflict in gaza as its own thing but also a proxy for a regional -- several regional

conflicts between the traditional nni powers in egypt and it is seen in that regard of some of the comments was so the other day. it was popular in israel the cause the u.s. does not get this. the israeli relations across the world with russia and china and india are very different. its long-standing and starts before this administration. i don't think it is necessarily a mirror. given everything i just said you will not find people in the israeli elite that the number one consideration is our most important asset and that is our close allies with united states. they will all say it. i will say one more thing -- israelis under estimate the cost

of public opinion of this operation. they say leaders who are privy to the diplomacy. i don't think they appreciate how bad the image was in public opinion worldwide. there are were even interesting results inside the u.s. things are not as they were in the past. from the israeli-american relation perspective, this is troubling. >> thank you. i want to thank all three of you for a frank exchange of views in the diplomacy business and we look forward to what you will have coming out in the coming weeks and we have raised a lot of broader issues about the emerging landscape in the arab world and the middle east that will set the context for this next phase of arab-israeli

relations i hope you'll join us for future events as are look into those dynamics. thank you all for coming. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> friday night at 8:00 eastern watergate 40 years later with a cbs special report and president nixon's address to the nation. saturday at noon eastern, live: program with author and journalist john farrell on the watergate scandal that ended nixon's administration. on sunday, gerald ford becomes 38 president of the united states this weekend on c-span and-3's american history tv former president bill

clinton took part in discussion on business opportunities. >> good morning, everyone. i would like to begin by thanking secretary pritzker and mayor bloomberg for the enormous amount of work they and their teams have done to bring us together. i am very grateful to president obama for sponsoring this. this is probably something we should've done a long time ago. there are many heads of state from africa here and political and business leaders from both continents. i do want to say that our thoughts are with the leaders of liberia, guinea, and sierra leone who could not be here because they had to stay home to deal with the ebola outbreak. we wish them well. i told a analyst before we came out today that i hate panels. they are over directed. i do not like ones where members

filibuster. i do want them to say what they have to say about this issue. we all want more trade, more investment. it is generally known that africa is going to grow as it has somewhere between 5% and 7% as the continent. six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world are in africa. it may go to seven in the coming decade. the middle class is growing, but in spite of the $80 billion in foreign investments and the $400 billion in exports we will see this year, three quarters of those exports are still in oil and gas and diamonds. the potential for economic diversification is great. there is 650 million cell phone users on the continent of 900 million people. only 300 million people with electricity.

about 170 million people with generally good internet access. 23% of the people have a bank account, thanks to cell phone banking and 5% have a credit card. there are lots of obvious options here. to those of you, the small number here, nor interested in this subject but have not had a lot of contact with africa, i think it is important to say that our african panelists will not have to say the obvious -- it is a continent, not a country. the laws of countries matter. the practices and the coulters and the opportunities will be different from place to place. all these panelists have a lot of experience on all the relevant issues. this conference is well organized. this is supposed to be about how business-to-business context can increase, investment, and

economic activity. then there is a panel on infrastructure. then there was one on finance which is a huge deal. then there is one of government action. i told her panelist not to worry too much. they will have to say some things about the constraints and opportunities in these categories. with that as a background, i would like to start with jeffrey immelt because general electric has been involved in africa for 116 years -- since 1898. they are about to get the hang of it. [laughter] so, i want to add you. -- i want to ask you -- in spite of ogoah and all the things that

have been done since, it strikes me that we only barely scratched the surface of what we could and should be doing there. we are missing the boat. we should understand this is a massive opportunity for american business. based on your experience, what do you want to say to the americans here and what do you want to say to the africans here about what one or two things each of us can do to accelerate this process? >> thanks, mr. president. thanks again to penny and the president for doing this. it is a great step that shows the commitment and the potential that the region has. i would say to all of the fellow ceos, the number one thing is give local. too many of us consider this earlier in our careers to the europeans, mainly because the u.s. market was so good. at my age, for long time you didn't have to travel much.

we gave the europeans first into the chinese later. -- we gave africa to the europeans first and the chinese later. today, it is wide open for us. you have to give local. -- but you have to get local. i think financing is the number one cap, at least in the businesses we are in. what is lacking is investable strategies that governments pay to put forward. there was a right way to do a power purchase agreement and a wrong way. if you want people to invest in it. we need more convergence around good standards on behalf of the governments. we need more risk capital. there is probably $25 billion of infrastructure investment in this room alone, but you all want to be the second person in after somebody has taken risk? we need a good coordination of the government, world bank people like that along with real investors were willing to get that first investment in.

let us not kid ourselves about financing. it has to be flexible. it has to fit the african standard. we need risk based financing. get local. the third thing i would say -- this is a small thing -- i think all of us would benefit if there were some regional integration in africa. a southern african alliance, neeson african alliance that would add some more countries. four or five countries we can invest behind. that is what i would put forward. >> let me ask you one follow-up question. we don't want to get in the middle of the political wars. how important do you think it is in getting more financing in africa for american businesses to renew the export import? >> there are a lot of things to be critical about big businesses. there are a lot of things that

do not work in government, but exporting is not one of them. the xm bank is not one of them. the fact we had to sit here and argue is just wrong. there are 53 export banks around the world. the u.s. on a relatively small basis is less than a lot of what europe does or what china does. more poorly than anything is is that shows the u.s. cares. i am not asking ge, caterpillar, gm -- we are not asking for favors. these projects need the hand of the u.s., the underwriting of the u.s. risk capital will come back if that happens. we punch way above our weight with xm. it speaks to a country's interest in the region that is a competitive weapon and creates jobs here. you creates jobs in the countries we go to.

>> thank you. phuti, you have established some remarkable partnerships with iconic american brands. we were talking backstage that you have some very clear ideas of what should be done. from the african side, what can be done to celebrate the business partnerships and foreign investment and creation of jobs? >> thank you. mr. president, i think more than just looking at what we as africans can do. together, what we can do is look at the area of challenge as african countries. the key area for us is around the young people that we have in africa. 15 to 25-year-olds make up 20% of the population of the continent today. a key issue is making sure that we have those people being

educated to be able to contribute towards the continued growth of our economy. in looking at our partnerships we have been able to great partnerships with mcdonald's and coca-cola. that is a key area for us. with mcdonald's today, we saw 11,300 people in africa. -- we employee that many people in africa. what we have done is focused on educating and empowering young people coming into our business. what we do is we have a significant focus on them. from a business perspective, it is important that we focus on education and empowerment of young people so that as we go forward, we have the resources that we require to push the economy moving forward. from that perspective, we will have the capability to be able to continue to grow our

economies in the matter we need to do. >> do you think it would be helpful for these major american companies to do more in the education area? to design programs tied directly to the job market? this is a problem in america and not just africa and all over the world. there is a job shortage for young people everywhere. it was part of what triggered the arab spring and tahrir square and cairo. they were producing 400,000 college graduates a year but there were no where near that amount of jobs for them because they were not trained to do the jobs that were brought there. is this something we should do together? >> absolutely. i think we definitely need to be focusing on pushing for more education of young people.

it is a critical issue for us to focus on as we move forward. what is the one critical resource we need to move our continent forward and grow? it's to develop our young people. from that perspective, to then be able to continue to focus on other areas and we know the other challenges we face. we know that there are a number of things that require significant investment. from that perspective for american investors coming into the african continent, the one thing that we need to look at is you cannot be looking at coming into the african continent with the perspective of being able to invest immediately. you have all been investors in the african continent. it's the issue of making sure that we are willing to invest in infrastructure he requirements

of the country you are investing in. whether it is investing in the people of that country or investing in the infrastructure, it is important to be able to do that prior to the actual investment and the business. without that, you will not have the continued growth of your business and you will not be able to support the country that you are in as well. >> thank you. doug congratulations on your assuming the presidency of walmart. you made your move into africa partly by acquiring a company. and you are successful in this country and around the world in no small measure, not just because you source from people

who give you a good price but because you have a brilliant supply chain operation. based on my own experience working on trying to get aids drugs and malaria drugs and tuberculosis drugs to people and to help small farmers become part of a competitive market that these supply-chain issues are quite profound but they should create an economic marker. talk to me a little about why you went into africa by buying another company first and what is your take on the supply-chain issue and whether it is an opportunity and an obstacle to future investment. >> it is the issue for us and i would love to talk about it. thank you for having us. i am excited about africa. i started going a few years ago leading up to the acquisition we made. as we look at what we are trying

to do there, we are simply trying to provide customers access to fresh produce and other items at a great value. to do that, we've got to have a great supply chain. in the case of africa, we are taking some of the learning we have experienced from latin american and other parts of the world to invest in supplement -- and supplement areas. we want to be able to take fresh produce, for example and reach small and medium holders and enable them to be more productive in their yields and provide packed houses were they need them and put the pieces in place to create the system that supplies the store which also creates great jobs for both value added goods as well as more commodity type items and lift the whole thing and have a system that works. for us, it's a long-term proposition and we invested 2.6 and dollars in 2011 and that's just the beginning -- we invested 2.6 billion dollars in 2011 and that's just the beginning.

we think the whole region including nigeria and kenya and other countries around the continent are going to do the right wing to create the right rules and transparency and some of the infrastructure investment so the whole thing works. we want to do our part. one of the sad benefits we have seen already as we are tapping into the sources of supply for produce and even things like wine and exporting them out of ever again selling them in places like the united states and the u.k. one of my favorite stories is about a couple of sisters who came back after apartheid and form the winery called seven sisters wine and we are selling it in 500 u.s. supercenters and have sold 500 cases so far. we never would have found them if we did not have a presence in africa. >> andrew, what is your take on the future of manufacturing in africa? it is one of the things worth pointing out. while manufacturing is the

single most rapidly growing section of the economy in terms of annual productivity growth, therefore if we get better infrastructure and if we do better with the supply-chain, we should be able to build. as jeff said, one of the things that has not happened within africa is that the original africa, the original promises to have basic multinational, continental marketing in open markets and

more free trade within africa i think is slowing down a lot of manufacturing investment that might otherwise come. what do you think we ought to do about that and what can this conference do to help implemento?r. thank you. i add my thanks. dow does not have fight a pedigree as ge. in the many decades of south africa's for process that big companies like dow, walmart and ge also have to face the continent's philosophies and practices beyond governance and that governments, how to address poverty. there is still a high that is expanding but leaving people behind. income inequality, youth employment in general is the