of palestine's status as a state. it also meant it was able to join international organizations. enhanced the status and standing of palestine as an official third-party state and demanded israeli compliance. in addition to the constitution, palestine has ratified a treaty is, and the most important one -- 1954 the 19 for convention. there was also the convention on illegal trade and cultural property, as well as the 1972 protection convention. to go through them, but they are up there. as i mentioned earlier,

palestine now has an enhanced demand theing to return of artifacts is legally removed from palestine. obligations. [indiscernible] and its need also to do that to deter domestic variations and further its standing in international states and protect against unlawful israeli conduct. as we mentioned, unesco membership, and also the u.n. general assembly resolutions, ability totine the

ratify treaties and it has improved its bargaining position with israel. thatnk it is important palestine may be treating this agreement as an occupied state. that is very important. since the unesco membership and join international treaties, cents 2014, about four months, as we know, palestine identified 50 international treaties. many of these treaties, as i mentioned, have a prediction of human rights -- have the protection of human rights in palestine. treaties will

provide palestine to demand from israel and other states to a baby rule of law. -- a baby rule of law. icj sre parties to the tatute. members of the united nations can also be admitted the generalision of assembly upon recommendation of the security council. -- u.s. is likely to general assembly would not be able to approve an application to join the icj without the security council recommendation.

however there is a way may be to find a way out of this. [indiscernible] if we allow countries to join that accord, when searching the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means. if icj will not hear cases the jurisdiction is not recognized. and israel has not recognize the jurisdiction of the courts or it however it would be difficult to bring cases against israel. however, it might be possible to bring cases against other countries, such as russia. palestine is already a member of government organizations.

fortunately, the security council veto power, which course,to 5 members of agenciesapply to u.n. such as unesco. therefore there are similar u.n. agencies that palestine may seek membership in, and among them, for example the international council for agricultural i am not goingd to go through them, but these are the main ones. theu.s. is outnumbered, by way, in some of these organizations, and therefore there is no risk of cutting funding, like what happened in unesco. that also violated into national law.

order to justify noncompliance with international obligations. there are also other u.n. bodie s. if palestine can get the membership of these organizations, it can also seek membership under that. the international labor organization and many other organizations. move through those in order to be short and leave more time for questions and answers. [indiscernible] already have the president of admitting co->>, which is not a u.n. member. -- they already have the precedent of admitting kosovo,

which is not a u.n. member. it is more powerful economic countries. became, the icc -- it effective in 2002. [indiscernible] contrast, accession to the contract -- there is no [indiscernible] additionally there is a astriction going as far january 1, 2002. -- the9, they organization gives the icc restrictions against genocide,

crimes against humanity, and according, by the way, to the office of the prosecutor, more than 400 communications were received on palestine. in 2012, and to be precise, notl of 2012, they were deceived, citing the lack of the ability to -- were not received, citing the lack of an ability to define the state. [indiscernible] council referred the situation to the icc jurisdiction. criticized bywas many. fact look at the validity of the application. the prosecutor, by the way, also cited the practice of the

general a similar that i mentioned earlier to seek whenal assembly guidance the applicant is a state. failed to note that members of international organizations are automatically permitted to join the icc. however, it should be noted the was issued six months after palestine joined unesco. there really was room for the recenttor -- there was a request by the minister of justice in palestine, as well as the general in gaza, to appeal decision or let the court decide whether the 2009 application was valid or not. theyentally, however,

opened up an examination that they already considered invalid in the past. [indiscernible] legalay it will avoid any 2009s with the declaration. it seems that the palestine or the plo was trying to get consensus among other factions. amnesty also released a report ist week, arguing icc action the only way to free the country and maybe end of the violence in gaza. it also called upon israel to do the same and seek icc annexation of the court. and for the u n security council to look into the situation as it did, for example, in darfur,

sudan. that is probably going to be my last topic to discuss in this presentation. request of thet president of palestine, mahmoud abbas, to seek u.n. protection from israeli aggression, continued occupation, and violation of international law itsn particular bombardments of the civilian population in gaza. this is in effect going back to system. trusteeship watch was to -- which was to -- [indiscernible] after world war ii. that was the main purpose of the council. the trusteeship was also created by the secretary-general and carrying out its functions according to the charter.

also important -- this is the receive -- to to achieve full independence in 1994. without members and we're the only ones here. what is the object under the charter? further international peace and security and promote advancement of its inhabitants. it is to protect human rights. i am not going to go through them. it is very clear in the charter. one other point briefly about going back to the trusteeship totem, or something similar

what it was like under the mandate system. first of all, the legal challenge would be to look on these questions, what state is responsible for the disposition of palestine now? responsibility falls with the state that has the effective patrol over it. the combined power. israel. however, palestine could be and administered states for the purposes of the 1970's i'm -- 1977 charter. another legal obstacle is under there is aarter distinction between strategic and nonstrategic areas. what our strategic areas? it is not defined in the u.n. charter. if it is considered to be a strategic area, it would fall under the mandate of responsibility of the u.n. security council. that distinction was used only

once so far, but that was in the case of the former japanese occupied islands. the u.n. considered these islands to be strategic because they were important to the international security. it should be noted also, that the establishment of nuclear bases, for example, does not necessarily make it a strategic area. that is also important. argued in the past, and maybe they still believe, palestine is under some responsibility of the u.n. general assembly simply because an accessor to the league of nations. however, this is not very by many in favored

decision-making circles. however, the proposal of that agreement, the abjuration of such an agreement is also unfortunate. what would be the extent administered by palestine? would it be a fully palestinian government? what would the entity be composed of? one state? force?teral are they going to be evacuated? if so, where and by whom? who would finance a trusteeship? would it be limited for a limited duration, or open-ended until independence is achieved? these are all very, very difficult questions to answer.

due to the complexity of the questions, it is unlikely in my view is that the u.n. would actually act on the obligation. thank you very much for your attention. [applause] >> thank you both, very much, for coming. we will have about 10 minutes for questions. we ask that you be brief and weits to one question, so can get as many in as possible. after the questions, you are welcome to stay around and have discussions. phyllis is selling most of her books year. shots," "calling the the book on the u.n. and understanding the palestinian conflict. those will be up at the desk if you want to get them afterwards. we have a microphone coming around.

>> i really appreciate this presentation. i just have a question for both particular, you are a lawyer. israel claims that it has bombed hamas property. there are adjacent houses to the hamas house that they have bombed. i should introduce myself first. .y name is omar shaula i come from gaza. i was born there. in 1997, i bought an apartment house. no one much lived in it. the house next to a cup bombed, and due to the shockwaves, our house collapsed. now, this is just one house. there are districts, complete districts that do not belong to hamas at all that have been

destroyed. and infrastructure and whatnot. the electric bill, water. he was going to pay for this? --ld we sue israel for quite for that? if the answer is yes, it looks like we are in a straight jacket actually, due to the u.n.'s this functional capabilities. is there a way to sue israel, to get compensation for the property? because every time we have a house that is bombed, we have to rebuild it ourselves. is there to compensate us. is there a recourse? and to do i contact to sue these people? [laughter] >> first of all, you can contact president abbas. >> [indiscernible] >> i know. and urge him to join the icc. the icc statutes would give some justice to the the is. >> -- to the victims.

>> [indiscernible] >> what do i use? it is right there. i am not sure. thank you. the problem with international law really is enforcement and where you canrum take your case for very -- for violations of international law. whereybe the only forum cases can be brought is either the icj, where we would have to first have be concerned states before these they could be brought, or the icc for persecution of criminal crimes. , in gaza, the united nations did in fact receive compensation from israel for some of the damages of property in gaza. so technically, technically, there is a way to pursue compensation from -- for these

violations. rum would really be diplomatic, unless you can find a forum that can take these cases and adjudicate them. >> [indiscernible] as longll be diplomatic as palestine does not join the icc as the focus of the icc is more on criminal prosecution. >> i would answer it a little at of a different way. i do not think there is a legal claim to be made. there is a promise, and it is the role that europe has played over and over again. there have been attacks on gaza. europe goes in, puts in a few billion euros to rebuild. israel goes in, bombs it again. the u.n. comes back. there is already talk of a $23 million starting fund to rebuild. the u.s. said they would put money in. most does not show up.

up usuallydoes show goes to corrupt elements on various sides. this is a huge problem. the possibilities for reparationsgetting or compensation, i think, is very slim. that is the reality of it. there is no justice. that is why i think that focusing on ending the requiresn, which ending the u.s. military aid and ending the u.s. impunity, is much more important. unfortunately it leaves people devastated. >> you can make the claim -- >> you can make plenty of claims. um is diplomatic, because usually the protection of nationals is through consular diplomatic protection. stay through state, they do not have the forum to take these cases. at the bottom line, i agree with

phyllis. >> [indiscernible] >> the first wall put up by the israelis that separated the palace online, but now you say that gaza is completely encircled by a wall? where did the other walls come from? is thewall around gaza israeli wall. there is not a wall on the egyptian order. this is not talked about as much of the west bank wall, which i should say also is not dividing palestine from israel. not along the so-called green line. 85% of it is inside the west bank, meaning it is taking -- i think it is a total of 15% of the west bank is swallowed up in that wall, making sure among other things, all of the major water aquifers are on the israeli side.

>> [indiscernible] you presented is very excellent. for me as an activist on this very -- it will be interesting. it will be wonderful. >> i will have to share that -- >> [laughter] >> i've a question for both of the wonderful speakers. , there is anown tremendous support coming from the south american countries. the socialist countries. of course, cuba.

expelled the israeli ambassador in 2009. now, the president from bolivia legally aisrael is terrorist state. i think other countries in south argentina,en chile, brazil. strongna issued a very statement. brazil. anyway -- government, a completely legitimate government, how can it act in the united nations to do something for the palestinian people? thank you. >> yeah, you raise a very -- you raise a very important point. i misspoke when i spoke of the isolation of palestine. certainly it has a level of a civil society, but there are governments shifting as well.

latin america is the center of it. there are things that can be done. in the general assembly, it was a number of latin american countries led by ecuador that played the key role of pushing wearing much stronger position of the general assembly. unfortunately the palestinian diplomatic team did not agree with that at that time, and so it did not go forward. but that convening, for example, the group of 77 within the general assembly, is something be latin america -- the latin america group could play a role in. that would mean things like moving for enforcement of the new calls that have emerged from amnesty international and other parts of the human rights community globally, calling for an arms embargo against israel. a very important statement -- i will just tell you very quickly -- in 2006 during the general assembly when president guatemala, the then

president of brazil said in an unrelieved did -- i really did -- unrelated speech, you said the middle eastern problem suppan decided by the great powers, but they have not been decided so far. would it not be time to call a question marktion when we ask resilience are you serious about this? are you prepared to lead this? they said yes. i think it would be more difficult for a smaller country like libya to play that role alone, but perhaps bolivia in connection with other smaller latin american companies could move for things like a meeting of the contracting parties of the geneva convention. they are all signatories to the geneva convention. that is by palestine -- >> by palestine, but it has not been supported yet, that i know

of, by other countries. so, they could support. >> yes. >> we have one question from twitter, and then we will take one more from the audience. are there any international that specifically provide prevention for children? >> that is the convention for , that palestine has also applied recently. >> also in the geneva convention there is a very specific -- i used to know this, and i am afraid i am forgetting which article this is -- but it speaks specifically for the need to protect children, particularly in the any occupied situation. children must be given specialized access to food, medical care. exactly the opposite of what israel has done in gaza. >> [indiscernible] our president woodrow wilson

palestiniansat will not be dispossessed by their lands as a result of the of thelization government. isn't that bizarre? is it an opportunity to go back to that time? that political reality? and then to go on -- a general feel son proposes that. christians and secularists to live together. >> i wish the king crane commission was a legal, binding document. unfortunately, it isn't. we have enough problem with the legal, hiding documents that are not being enforced and violated directly. but i think your broader point is right.

-- focus should not be particularly again, for people in this country, people in the united states, it is not our call. one state, two states. the call should be for our government to end its policy that is grounded in support for occupation and apartheid and instead move to a policy that is grounded in international law, human rights, whether that is one state, tuesdays, five states, or 10 states. u.s. that to challenge policies that exist today. that means stop the protection of israel at the united nations, tell your members of congress they were wrong to sign onto the support israel, israel can do no wrong resolution they signed onto. two in the house, one in the senate. and demand an end to the u.s. military aid to israel. that is to the tune of tree $.1 billion a year, to start with, and they have added almost $1 billion more.

imagine what we could do with that money back home with our crumbling infrastructure, our need for health care and education. that is where that money should stay. and to rebuild does a. that -- we do not need that money to go directly to the israeli military. the movement for divestment and sanctions that is so crucial in bringing political and economic pressure to bear on israel and israelis so they begin to recognize, yes, there is a price to be paid when you live under a government that is viewed by the world as a rogue states. there is a price to be paid. in southat that -- africa, it was when their beloved springboks could suddenly not play in the world cup. workers artists are not going to israel, we will begin to see results.

[applause] >> thank you both so much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] any of thisssed session, you can watch it online. it is on our website, www.c-span.org. reporting onn post the situation in gaza where bombings continue. killedhe air strikes five palestinians according to palestinian officials. a three-date cease-fire ended friday and militants in gaza fired dozens of rockets into israel. israeli forces responded. high-level talks were held in cairo, but they have stumbled, sending messages that there is little conference that a deal is near. that is from "the washington post." more on the conflict with a special envoy and a former adviser to the palestinian leadership. they discussed the dynamics of possibilityn, the

of a sustained cease-fire, and the u.s. role. this discussion hosted by the brookings institution. >> sure. >> well, good afternoon, everyone. the directorttes, for middle east policy at brookings. thank you for being here, particularly those of you were willing to stand in the back. , as we have the first small glimmer of hope that the horrible violence might be ending after several weeks. there are a lot of factors, i think, one could point to and explain how we got here.

why this round of violence got to where it is. there are causes, but the result is the unresolved conflict between israelis and palestinians. that means however this round ends, there are larger questions we need to delve into about where things go from here. there are questions, i think, for an israeli government, that seemed earlier this summer to be questioning or even setting aside its previously declared support for a two state solution. there is a question for israel of what kind of future it wants for its people and its relationship with its palestinian neighbors. the palestinians and the palestinian leadership, there are questions as well. the palestinian leadership was shunted aside as this pilot --

of violence struggle began. it is struggling to make itself central to the cease-fire agreement. there's a question of what alternatives they can offer to hamas from violence, alternatives that might win back support of the victimized and increasingly frustrated palestinian public. there are questions for governments in the region, where divisions within the arab world helped contribute to the confrontation and to the delay .n achieving a cease-fire so, they face the question of whether resolving the palestinian issue is the real priority, or whether this long-standing conflict has now become just another arena for a proxy conflict between contending regional actors. and i think there are questions for the united states as well. the u.s. is a central mediator,

but it has seen its diplomacy roundly criticized. and it's advised to its closed -- close partner and ally israel led to what "the new york times" terms this morning as dismissal. aere is a question about conference mediated by the united states, driving to a two state solution, whether that is the best means to resolve this long-standing and terrible conflict. those of you who have heard me talk on this topic before know that i have felt a long time that the primary obstacle of the peace agreement was the domestic politics of the two sides. i think there is no doubt where we set after four weeks of horrific violence, there has been a rally around the flag effect on both sides. to some extent, we have seen party lines that have strengthened. i would see that as a temporary

development and the question is, what happens after that phase. we are in a moment where i think each of thethat parties involved in this conflict, engage in a some self-criticism and internal reflection. as i was preparing for the event today, i thought this was a fitting day to talk about that today is the day in which juice mark the destruction of the temple in jerusalem and the day that debris be book of limitation. perhaps with that of a bit of a backdrop, made to be answered about where we go from here, questions that we hope leaders on all sides will be asking themselves. delighted to be

joined by three terrific colleagues from the foreign policy program here at brookings to be part of this conversation, of course the vice president for foreign policy at brookings, and we're very glad to have you back on our stage. martin. >> lie to be back. -- >> glad to be back. and another fantastic fellow from the center of middle east policies at brookings. all of these german have been doing great work throughout the month talking about the media, writing very perceptive analyses on our website, helping to understand this as it unfolded. thanks to all of you for being here. let me begin, if i may, with a look at the united states. martin, going back to this article in the "new york times"

this morning thing israel dismissed american diplomacy during the conflict. and suggesting that u.s.-israel relations are under unprecedented strain. that there have been previous instances post up out of this time period rank? is this truly unprecedented? what does it mean for the u.s. going forward? all very much you for coming. i am sorry that we are not in the brookings auditorium, but you have a better user experience a month from now to .ook forward to i am very happy to be back home and grateful for the opportunity.

i will speak today, although the circumstances could not be more poor ethic or more depressing intensive month effort, which i was involved in of course, to try to get peace between the israelis and palestinians. who are yet again in another round of chronic and horrific violence. it is profoundly depressing. theit is depressing because secretary of state, john kerry, without their warning time and time again that the status quo is unsustainable. again, we have conflict.

even though the status quo is obvious, we are heading right back to the status quo, and that thise pathology of conflict. wholeture that makes the situation even more depressing. you asked about the time story and about the u.s.-israel relationship. and the story itself pointed out these infrequent trends. language use on both on thethe united states record criticizing in language that i had not heard before that i can remember, and the israeli government background the the israeli press with vitriolic language about the efforts of

the united states to achieve a cease-fire. that also was unprecedented. at least unprecedented attacking the israeli press on our secretary of state. so that is on the one side. the president signs a bill for $225 million more in security assistance to pay for additional iron dome capabilities for israel, and both the prime thester on the one side and president on the other sing each other's praises as we come out of this conflict, so take your pick. 1982 when i first came to washington to work , when there was another round of this chronic conflict in

which ariel sharon was prostituting a war in lebanon, which produce terrific photos of children being injured and and ronald reagan was very upset. ronald reagan used very harsh words in this sense. in a sense, we have seen this movie before. somehow each time the relationship survives and so on, and that is probably because it and strongots popular support for israel. i am sure it has been damaged to some extent, but that probably will rebound. i do think there is something else going on here.

i also felt in the negotiating room. is ais that israel today different country to what it was in 1982. and for most of its history. today, it is strong economically, strong militarily, and has a range of relationships across the world with other powers beyond the united states. and those are the powers not only as far afield as china, india -- india, for instance, came out in support of israel during the time, which i believe is unprecedented. not just for promised her modi but also for the strategic relationship they built between -- but china and india

and certain countries in , and it is with russia. they voted in the united states assembly condemning the takeover of crimea by russia. inraised eyebrows an russia. what i am saying is that they feel more independent of the united states than they have in the past. more that they can stand on their own two feet. the point i was trying to get to as they feel like they have relationships in the air of world that they never had before, and that manifested

itself very clearly in the way tot israel and egypt seemed have a common interest in taking hamas down backed by saudi , qatar, jordan, the saudi monarchs, plus the regime. extent the palestinian authority, which has long been a rival of hamas. and the alignment that israel feels it was able to play on in .his crisis, conflict it is too early to say what it

will actually mean, but i do think it has manifested itself in this crisis. >> israel and egypt together could essentially say at the beginning of this conflict 3, 4 weeks ago, ok, we do not want the u.s. to be the architect of a cease-fire. we are going to work that out ourselves. does that say something broader about the traditional american mediating role in the process? quite cutting it is possible, but it is a little early to say. now, any arabntil leader who sought to make peace with israel looks to washington. to inoks to washington effect deliver israel or deliver concessions from israel. he famously said the united states gives israel everything

from a loaf of bread to a phantom jail, state-of-the-art in those days, and therefore i am going to washington. and that has been the view of palestinian leadership. they reached the point of negotiations where you had a question mark about whether we could in fact deliver what he was looking for to achieve a solution, and indeed you saw it in the conditions that he sets for extending the negotiations by another nine months. he insisted not just on the release of the prisoners but freeze inconstruction

the west bank and jerusalem for three months while the boards were drawing a freeze. which is something that is impossible for this israeli government to do. and if we can deliver that, then how are we going to deliver what he needs on jerusalem or end of the occupation, or evacuation and so on? so i do think that the length of that it has taken since the , the failureeters to achieve a breakthrough

solution, which we have been responsible for ever since bill clinton stood there on the white house lawn with his arms and symbolically around isser arafat -- profitability do believe have been affected by that. >> and not only on the israeli side, but you were saying on the palestinian side and the broader arab world as well. with that, let me turn to you. of the creek the secretary kerry attends a swift cease-fire said that the danger of that ative is a would've empowered hamas at the expense others. clearly the delay in getting to a cease-fire, and let's assume -- hasse-fire holds

successfully avoided a situation whereby hamas is empowered at the expense of the plo? what is a cease-fire if they get to terms on a lasting cease-fire, what do those terms have to include in order to ensure that hamas remains the central player for palestinians. quite faster the first question, the simple answer is no. i think the fundamental calculations have somehow -- this is not -- palestinians may draw conclusions on an entirely different set of conclusions that washington will. that's may come as a shock to some people. [laughter] i think this is a very

washingtonian and israeli sort itcalculation that somehow will weaken hamas. but have never been the case. it is actually much less the case now in this conflict. this is the third such conflict in the last six years, and each and every time, the longer it goes on because it is not about military victory. it is about the two programs of the two sides, with abbas' program, he has been compliant, he has committed to peaceful resolution of the conflict. hamas on the other hand, rockets, and the passive suicide bombings and other forms of

violence, what that had gotten them actually was paid attention to and actually produced some results. prison all exchange issue is very notable where hamas had a thousand prisoners, and we all know that the failure to release the last batch of prisoners in the latest negotiations led to the collapse of that process for mahmoud abbas. i think there is a real sense among palestinians that hamas' way, as painful as it is, produces more results, and that is true, i think it is even more true in this conflict because it is coming on the heels of the failed negotiations and because we have been on this road before.

he can't side with israel is another group of palestinians. he was reluctant to openly embrace hamas. this time around, fatah, the plo, the entire palestinian leadership has openly and enthusiastically embraced the hamas and the resistance. >> in the context of a reconciliation agreement that had been reached in month or two prior. >> right. the ink was barely dry when this conflict started. it could easily have torpedoed the whole thing, but it didn't. it worked in the opposite direction and consolidated the palestinian unity.

as far as the -- i think this touch to an underlying -- one of the key assumptions of u.s. and israeli policy that is a failure of the last eight years -- to the extent that the u.s. has had a policy over the last eight year on gaza, which i don't think it has. we've been pursuing a policy of separating gaza and keeping palestinians divided. playing this guy off of that guy. this is not what diplomacy is made of. frankly, this is how colonialism operates. it is not how diplomacy works and peacemaking works. you make peace with a group as it is. palestinians as such. the notion that we could make peace with one group of palestinians and support war against another group was never going to work.

and that has now played out. it was going to drive hamas into the peace camp or drive mahmoud abbas into hamas' position. >> weren't there some who saw the reconciliation agreement, to some extent, hamas joining abbas in a weaker position. where do the to sit today, what is the power differential? how can abbas keep the upper hand? >> hamas went into this very much out of the junior partner, which is unlike where we were two years ago. they come out of this as equal partners, at least. one of the positives, probably the only positive out of this, is the motivation of palestinian unity. in fact, you have a unified palestinian leadership negotiating in cairo.

as a practical matter, not a matter of show or expediency. it is a practical matter. hamas needs fatah as much as fatah needs hamas. hamas understands their is no chance to open the border in gaza without a role for the palestinian authority. at the same time, the palestinian has been desperately keen for a role in gaza and mahmoud abbas has been trying to reassert his relevance in things related to gaza. there is a win-win situation in terms of the relevance of both sides. hamas' position now is very firmly embedded into the palestinian landscape. in a way that a month ago it was not. it was much more precarious. like that of the muslim brotherhood in egypt. now, they are, you have got this broader palestinian safety net

around hamas that has cushioned it. >> perhaps that presents an opportunity for later negotiations, if later negotiations are an option. with that, we should take a look at the israeli side of the equation. if we look at the israeli position three weeks ago and the way the cease-fire came about, it seems as though the israeli government got everything it said it wanted. it got an opportunity to go and destroy the tunnel networks on the ground. it got a degradation of hamas' rocket capability. now, it was able to withdraw ground forces and get a cease-fire without any preconditions. without making any concessions to hamas or anyone else upfront. a couple questions, first, within the israeli debate, we saw support for the government, netanyahu, is there any questioning in israel today about whether the games were worth those additional three

weeks of conflict. and the lives lost, and the international censure and everything else that came along with it. how do you expect this experience to shape the political dynamics, particularly for this israeli government going forward? >> the israeli position from the start was to support the conflict in gaza. the hope was to contain the west bank. netanyahu was very eager to avoid conflict. the first move was to try and reach some kind of understanding before the official name for this operation. the second, looking at the 2012, the last round.

the third stage, after another cease-fire -- dramatic images that we saw. all of these conversations. 2008, 2012, and now, are seen as three rounds of the same war. there is what you do, it is very close to the center, rockets reaching tel aviv. close to the center of israel. govern by an organization that makes no qualms about its position about israel and tries to put on the best face to the cease-fire. it is very clear what they are facing.

you have the political and quasimilitary organization and waging war from it. one option, you take it over completely. in 2012, netanyahu suffered from not going further. to go back to this in a couple years. netanyahu was criticized. the second is to basically hope for the best. given the israelis' way they understand hamas, the chance of that happening is nil. the experience of this conflict,

to the extent of the tunnel system, makes this much less likely. the third option is a very grim status quo. the reality where we see small things, supposedly inadvertently, causing this huge conflagration. netanyahu going in, he had no authority. they said go in all the way, take down hamas, this is the chance to do it. the foreign minister is competing with the leader of the right. another minister to look for is the education minister in the likud cooper to the right. most people in the small security cabinet, which is legally in chief.

the prime minister, the minister of defense is very hawkish on peace issues. and tzipi livni, who is very dovish compared to this government on peace issues. their position was on the one hand, a very heavy-handed one in terms of confronting hamas and of course the horrific human cost we are seeing. we should not mince words about this. also, an unwillingness to try to change the reality from the ground. there is one silver lining. we have seen a dramatic shift, a small shift, it is quite important. the role of abbas in the gaza strip.

the israelis have seen the palestinian authority security forces as quite reliable and much better than in the past. now that they are talking about bringing forces to the crossing, allowing some opening of the gaza strip, some mitigation of the human condition, and giving a sense of victory to the egypt position. that is backtracking from the very staunch israeli position against the reconciliation government, which is the democratic government. yesterday, the foreign minister criticizing this idea saying we cannot trust abbas. the israeli public is split down the middle. support for netanyahu is quite high. viewed as very cautious, not

going very far. in a sense, israel had no clear goal. the tunnels were not the goal in the beginning. they try to get a cease-fire before a soldier entered the gaza strip. the tunnels were not the main goal. israel was dragged along by hamas. they cap insisting on having kept insisting on having this

until the conditions were met. notwithstanding the human conditions in gaza. it also suggests something about how israel is approached the whole thing. a genetic event that will change its position was really jog along by this organization. >> and i think your description of the long-standing standoff with hamas and the dilemma it confronts with hamas reinforces the point about seeing west bank and gaza as two different problems. has netanyahu rediscovered abbas? >> in a small sense, small a abbas. abbas that can take care of the border. we sought reports that fatah was taking responsibility for firing ammunition at israeli forces. these were fatah forces, not pa ones. pa forces have remained steady,

not getting involved. in that regard, yes. has it changed dramatically in the way they see the peace process in general. it has reinforced strong trends among israelis. the first, the feeling that they cannot win. the fundamental question that they asked, a very famous author and famous vocal voice of the left wing in israel, one of the voices of peace now, he posed a question in deutsche welle saying what would you do? if there was a region in your area firing rockets on you. if there was someone holding a baby on his lap and shooting at a nursery, what would you do? this is strong in the israeli

position, given that is gaza and hamas on the other side. israelis have no illusions as to what it is. and second from the israeli position, which they withdrew. the perception of gaza was very central to the way they approach the whole thing. it might weaken a distinction between gaza and the west bank. it strengthens the israeli view of what happens if you unilaterally withdraw from the gaza strip, this will have implications for plan b in the west bank. as khaled said, these have been dramatic weeks, from kidnapping of the teenagers and the hardening of positions, the rallying around the flag has been very dramatic. inside is really society, there has been a very strong consensus and even a shutting down of people who are not supporting the troops. >> can i? >> yes, i would like you to respond to the idea that the u.s. has treated the west bank and gaza as two distinct issues in diplomacy.

>> you said it makes it harder, it also makes it much harder for plan a, a negotiated solution. prime minister netanyahu, before this latest round of war in gaza, had begun to articulate the position that the fear of tunnels in the west bank meant israel have to keep israeli security forces and shin bet in the west bank for a very long time. that was a position articulated in the press conference. correct me if i am wrong.

that resonates a lot as a result of this conflict with the israeli public. the whole concept of a two state solution, which requires an end to israeli occupation of west bank, the actual withdrawal of the idf, and the shin bet from the west bank, becomes really questionable. if the prime minister of israel is saying we have to stay there for a very long time. he says 30 years. it used to be, during our negotiations, along the jordan river. so that means -- those palestinians, from abu mazen to his security chiefs, have justified security coordination on the basis that there will be an end to the occupation, not in 30 years, but in five years. that has become justification

but that is not the case. if the israeli view is we are going to have to stay there for 30 years. for the palestinians, that is equivalent to forever. that puts another nail into the coffin of the two-state solution. for those like me, who have always looked for the pony in the pile of shit -- [laughter] >> that is a diplomatic term of art. >> there is a hope that israelis will see that abu mazen is much better, even a partner because of the way that he behaved during the kidnapping process

and the way hamas has behaved since. so maybe they will be supporting israel to help abu mazen eventually take control and gaza and that will unite the palestinians. and abu mazen's leadership will form the basis of negotiations for a two-state solution. it seems to me that the right wing in israel is going after abu mazen for a reason. that is why lieberman has come out against him. before him, another right wing member of the likud came out against doing anything for abu mazen. they can sense that israelis are taking abu mazen more seriously. but to build up abu mazen means, to strengthen the idea of a two -state solution, which they do not want. >> it is very true and very dangerous, but we should remember that this is the got

reaction. immediately after the war we see this. even among the troika, there was differences. huge differences. it is true and very worrisome, but i'm not sure it is as long-standing as the lessons israelis have learned for unilateralism or on hamas. >> it might be more dynamic and than it appears. >> the pony is still there. >> don't worry. i want your thoughts on the idea that, now bibi sees there is something he wants from mahmoud abbas. he wants him as a policeman and a border guard, precisely the roles that have generated resentment and opposition within palestinian society. how does this play out for him? >> i don't think it plays out very well for him if that is going to remain his role. we have to make a distinction between empowering abu mazen at

the expense of hamas, which is a failed policy, that has been the policy of the last eight years and is still the israeli approach. that is a zero sum, it is futile and self-defeating. the other way is to empower abbas by including hamas under the umbrella of the plo to have a share in power, to have a stake in the political process so that it is less inclined to torpedo it if it is on the inside than it is on the outside. this points to another fundamental failure in u.s. policy, which is, oddly enough, very much unlike the previous administration. in fact, it is the reverse. here we have an administration that is focused almost exclusively on conflict resolution. negotiations, final status, that is it.

to the total neglect of any sense of conflict management. i think any real, viable peace process has to have both. george w. bush gets criticized for doing too much conflict management and not enough conflict resolution. we can criticize this administration for focusing exclusively on conflict resolution and ignoring conflict management so that -- part of that disconnect relates to gaza and hamas. we do not have a policy for gaza and hamas. we have to wait for that to play itself out. obviously, where a lot of people in washington say, it was only 1800 gazans who died, palestinians see it as 1800 of their brothers and sisters that were killed. in terms of how israel conducts warfare, the whole, if we come out of this with anything other than why it is important to

avoid these kinds of violent conflagrations in the first place, when they do start, there has to be rules to the game. the notion that israel's military doctrine of overwhelming disproportionate force is somehow acceptable -- we need to reconsider that. i do not think this is a legitimate way to conduct a military operation, by deliberately inflicting as much pain on the other side. that is the central tenet of the dahiya doctrine, to be disproportionate.

there is a reason that portion now that he is part of humanitarian law. when you have something that flies in the face of that and you see the destruction in the gaza strip out of proportion to any threat hamas may have, this has real consequences. it has human consequences, moral consequences, political consequences. mahmoud abbas is not going to be in a hurry to grace any israeli leaders or even to his security bidding, israel's security bidding in the west bank. the next his position more precarious. there are also security ramifications for this. when you have that much human misery, and gaza was not a happy place to begin with, you throw on top of that 400 children who are killed, 10 thousand homes destroyed, four hundred thousand displaced. that is really outrageous. this is where american leadership comes in.

once upon a time, there was something called the roadmap. the logic of the roadmap, not that i'm a huge fan of that document, it had logic in terms of conflict resolution. when there is death on one side, and bidders that side and makes them want to inflict death on the other side. that is basic common sense. the notion that you can only have a deterrent for israel and that somehow palestinians will just be deterred, quietly, and go quietly into the night, is really not a sound idea. we need to think about how to prevent these conflicts in the first place. and when they do happen, to make sure that there is a degree of reasonableness to how they are conducted. otherwise, we have completely destroyed, in addition to losing our humanity, we have completely destroyed our credibility. >> i think part of what you are getting at is the iterative

nature of this confrontation. and the dilemma for israel and confronting hamas. the fact that this has recurred three times in the last six years. it generates an ongoing impact that undermines the prospects for conflict resolution. ultimately, conflict resolution will eliminate or, ideally, eliminate the prospects for another round. there are things you have to do in the meantime as well. >> i would just add that since we are probably going into a period where we are not likely to see renewed permanent status negotiations, we are in a long-term conflict management situation. we ought to have a policy to prevent these kinds of atrocities down the road. >> is a good point. i want to give you a chance to weigh in on whether the u.s. had

a gaza strategy in these negotiations. i want to make a plug on this question of deterrence and proportionality and doctrines. there was a discussion on foreign policy a couple weeks ago that i would recommend to all of you interested. martin, and then i will open it up for questions. >> i understand very well khaled's criticism and his passionate conviction on this matter. and i share his view that it is unacceptable that over 400 children could be killed in this conflict. but, we do have to put it in context. context is one in which hamas was targeting israeli civilians.

the only reason the casualty rate was not higher on the israeli side was because they had a means of protection for their civilians. whereas, hamas does not have a means of protecting their civilians. if they were paying any attention to protecting their civilians whatsoever, is not as if they built air raid shelters for them. instead, they were firing rockets from civilian areas. we all know that. you cannot just condemn the israelis without putting into context the circumstances that they face. now, the criticism of the administration, to add to your question, the effort to resolve the conflict that the secretary of state and the president undertook.

and that i had the honor to be involved in. came out of a belief that you needed to find a way to break out of a chronic nation of this conflict. you needed to try to resolve it. it is not as if the resolution was any great mystery. it was a question of trying to find a way to get the two sides to break out of this and actually make the difficult, gut wrenching, politically risky decisions that would make it possible to resolve this conflict. obviously, in terms of resolving

the conflict, you have to address gaza. that was an issue that was to be addressed and both sides agreed to this in the final status negotiations. the palestinian authority, the plo, that was an issue that would be addressed once the agreement had been struck. because then it would have to involve the opening of gaza, there was the territorial issue with the question of control of its borders. that would have to be part of the final deal. and then gazans would see they had an opportunity to have freedom in their own independent palestinian state. that would put immense pressure on hamas to go along with it. so, that was essentially the theory of the case. we never got to test it. to say that it would have been better off engaging in conflict management, it is essentially to say that we are not going to be

able to resolve this conflict so we should just manage it and try to keep it contained. there was a fundamental decision made by the secretary and the president that that was only going to lead to more conflict. >> you thought, and the israeli and plo delegations thought that you could push resolution of gaza issues down the road, that you had time? >> we did not have a choice, hamas is not interested in peace with israel. therefore, you cannot construct a peace negotiation with hamas. maybe, as a result of this, it becomes possible that the palestinian leadership under abu mazen will somehow convince hamas that it should go along with a two state solution and acceptance of israel.

there is no indication that hamas is prepared to do that. it is fine to say we should have conflict management. it does not treat the problem, it just ensures we are going to have outbreaks of conflict. there is nothing that we could do to prevent that from happening. >> you've been a very patient audience, i want to give khaled a minute to respond. >> less than a minute. my point is not either/or, not that we have conflict resolution or management, but that we conduct the two together. that is what a peace process ought to do. so there is a safety net for when negotiations collapse, rather than just drifting towards the abyss from as we often do, whenever negotiations collapse. all i am saying is that there needs to be some thought put into conflict management when negotiations are not happening are possible. >> what does that mean? >> something like the roadmap, there is extremism on the palestinian side.

>> didn't you write an article -- putting a knife into the roadmap? [laughter] >> compared to what we have today, which is basically just a vacuum, i think the roadmap is fantastic by comparison. there was a sense of mutuality. yes, hamas rejects israel and there are herbal things in its horrible things in its charter. but there are horrible things in the likud charter. there are horrible things that the deputy speaker of the knesset says about ethnic cleansing. that is the definition of a conflict. so we cannot resolve the conflict of we have resolved the conflict. >> as a practical matter, israel had a conflict management strategy for gaza, whether the

u.s. acknowledged it or not, which was to have a close alliance with the egyptians to keep hamas and abbas and go after them if necessary. i will open it up for your question. i am going to request that they be questions and that you get one of them. wait for the microphone to get to you, identify yourself, and ask your single question. why don't we start with the gentleman next to the microphone? >> my question to ambassador indyk -- what is your opinion on the egyptian initiative? >> on which egyptian initiative? >> the palestinians and israelis are now in cairo. >> what do we expect out of that? let's take a couple more. young man in the back with the white shirt and tie.

>> my question is about the humanitarian situation in gaza. palestinians in gaza are pretty pessimistic about the status quo. do you see any potential for movement, either in the israeli position on the siege or the american political will to force some sort of change, either in what appears to be the expanded buffer zone or the coastal waters, anything that relates to the humanitarian? >> how might these negotiations in cairo play out in terms of the closure of gaza? i will give you the last of this section. >> i'm a palestinian journalist. my question to ambassador indyk, how do the sale negotiations that just concluded play into this conflict.

are these talks frozen forever? and then -- >> you've violated my rule. thank you. martin, why don't you start? >> do i have to? [laughter] >> you knew that was coming. >> the egyptian initiative, from the outset, there has been almost universal support for the egyptian initiative, which was a cease-fire in place for a limited period of time, it is now 72 hours and started at seven days. during which time the issues of concern to both sides would be negotiated. the issues since the egyptians first came out with the initiative, that is the only part that has been contentious, what are the issues on the agenda?

the cease-fire proposal that secretary kerry put in place was essentially an operationalization of the the egyptian initiative. in terms of the things that needed to be addressed. issues of freedom of movement of people and goods in and out of gaza. whether the fishermen could use the waters out to the limit. whether the farmers could operate in what was referred to as the buffer zone. i believe that all of those questions are on the agenda in cairo, together with, although it is not mentioned in the latest version of the egyptian initiative, there is a general reference to security. i believe the israelis will bring to the table there demand their demand that in return for conceding some of these issues, the egyptians themselves are going to have to agree to open,

which they have been more restrictive than the israelis in the past year, the israeli demand is that the palestinian militias and terrorist organizations -- not just hamas but palestine islamic jihad and other groups -- disarm. that is the agenda, those are the issues that will have to be addressed. whether they can do it in 72 hours, i am deeply skeptical of that. 72 days or even 72 months, i am skeptical, having seen how dysfunctional negotiations are. but, it is necessary to try. it is necessary, in particular, in my view, to take advantage of the fact that hamas agreed in its reconciliation agreement with fatah to resign its government in gaza, to have the

palestinian authority take control in gaza. that was agreed before this conflict broke out. that should be the basis upon which the issues are resolved, that the palestinian authority should take control in gaza. that it should start in the passages, which i think everybody is ready to agree to. that it should also extend to gaza proper. that starts with working with the u.n. and the international community on the emergency humanitarian aid that needs to go in. then, working with the international community, with u.n. monitors on all the construction material that will have to go and to reconstruct gaza.