update ofa-123. you are talking about the a, and i for appendix wonder if there are updates i see the effort is now going to be on financial reporting and operations as i'll hold. -- as a whole. as of right now we have no plans for new appendices. we have our work cut out for us for alle the main body, the things coming out of gao. around enterprise risk management, but we thought that involved internal controls.

kind of like a subset of it. he ended up within the structure, the guidance, what we are still drafting. subject to discussion. section three, integrated and roles. that is where we plan to introduce enterprise risk management. one thing i did not speak of, a month ago we updated omb circular a11 to introduce enterprise risk management. youor the audience, could let everyone know what a111 is. guidance,ur budget what we send out to the agencies how they request their budget and how they execute the budget. >> to get things done, you really need to connect the budget process. we wanted to get that first introducedere, and

enterprise risk management. we plan to break that often must right now it is so heavily -- the hold back and meant -- the whole document comes across as financial reporting. that makes sense. appendix b is with charge cards. we are reviewing that. codifiesharge act existing things, but we are working on the first congressional report for all findings. a lot of the findings are largely existing guidance. i do not know if we need more guidance, but more enforcement of the existing guidance. we are looking into data analytics where gsa has access to the banks and all this eta to do -- data to do internal controls.

we are looking into that. that might be in the front of the circular. we have a new appendix c coming out. there are changes to appendix b. >> does the audience have any more questions? yes, sir. >> [indiscernible] we hope very soon. we just sent it last week to agencies. so you have a bootleg version of it. we wanted to give it out before it goes into omb clearance. we have to work on it internally. if you sell that come out, that is it, and now we are working -- i am not holding you to it -- >> the guidance did take longer

than we had hoped for, but one thing we did, the internal controls, the new taxonomy for requirements,15 and we sent out notification earlier in the year, statistics, more accountability around estimates. requirement.4 we have been working with agencies to give them a heads up that that is coming. most of them are prepared for it. we pushed things out that getting too close to the fiscal year. our hope is that you should have it soon. >> thank you. >> and i think that concludes the questions. our panel, ik wanted to remind everybody about the cte ccode. i believe the evaluation will be available 15 minutes after we are done. 8eight.,

if i could have a round of applause for our panel, omb. [applause] thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

institute ofan certified public accountants kicking off a meeting today. a covered a discussion this morning on the role of the inspector general. you can watch that www.c-span.org. this photo from the white house of president obama being debriefed by susan rice. a number of foreign-policy challenges given the present attention while he is on vacation. the ongoing situations between hamas andd between russia and the ukraine. the president plans to make remarks this afternoon about iraq. new steps to force the prime power.r from the president plans to speak at .m. eastern, a little over

a half hour from now. we will keep you updated about that. meanwhile, members of congress are in the midst of a five-week summer recess, and many of them are sending out tweets. a congressman from kentucky says woodard atin rmyra her home market 80 years of s h a building communities through homeownership. also, i enjoyed meeting with the team thisc leadership morning. both the house and the senate are back and return for legislative work on september 8. tonight a debate about what makes america great with bill d'souza.d dinesh

here's a look. >> they started out as a revolutionary -- you started out as in the bin laden mode. he tried to bomb the pedagogue. here's my question -- he sounded totally different today. you talked about teaching about being an educator. my question is what happened to that old revolutionary. is he still alive? >> i feel i am still a revolutionary, if by revolutionary you mean >> if what you mean is having a fully worked-out program by which we can imagine a different world and move forward, no, i'm not that, but if you meet somebody who is willing to dive into the contradictions, tried to fight for more peace, justice,

balance, sustainability, and being willing to live with ambiguity, i still consider myself someone who sees a need for fundamental change. one example. to me, the struggle against , which i invited everyone to join, is a struggle that goes on. it has not ended. it still goes on and it takes different forms. [applause] it is not slavery, not jim crow. the destruction of voting rights, the overrepresentation of black men in prison, that is white supremacy. >> next a discussion about pakistan's efforts in combating terrorism in north waziristan. this area has been a safe haven for militants goods.

posted by the atlantic council, this is 19 minutes. -- posted by the atlantic council, this is 90 minutes. sorry about that. >> good morning everyone. i am the director of the south asia center at the atlantic council, and on behalf of my colleagues at the center and on behalf of our president, i would like to welcome all of you to this very interesting session on the situation in north waziristan. it is entitled on waziristan.

i also want to welcome part of our audience that is not in the same room, in another room, and we will be taking questions from them, and i would like to welcome the c-span audience, watching us at home or in the office or whatever they are watching from. so thank you all for being here. to be aonly supposed quite season in washington in august, but that is one of those washington myths about like the 30-minute commute everyone has. i am delighted that we are looking at this topic, and i am delighted to welcome two experts ikram sehgal, and hassan abbas.

he is the chair of the department of regional and analytical studies at the college of international security affairs. more details on them are available in the material you have. i do not want to take too much time going into the spirit i want to say that this session is on the records, but it is also a possible by a very generous grant we have received from the carnegie corporation of new york for u.s.-pakistan programs to focus on key issues that relate to pakistan and to the u.s.-pakistan relationship. we are vagary grateful to carnegie for this excellent program and their support. north waziristan, it evokes all kinds of memories, particularly in the last few years. this was the campaign that never came about that led to a break

between the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and -- [indiscernible] this was something that people expected because it was something the allies wanted the polling -- the pakistan allies to undertake him even as they operated in the tribal areas. north waziristan was spared a major operation. over the years, many deals were made and were broken. but the key ingredient in this was the presence of the apollo group which were reported to be seeking sanctuary in north waziristan, using it as operations innch

afghanistan. so this was a bonus contention and betweenanistan united states and pakistan and became famous among other things for repeated road attacks and the frequency of the drone attacks would be something that would eat remarked upon regularly. was an they stopped, it major event. when they resumed, it was a major event. in recent months it was clear that the pakistani colophon were taking the offensive. they mounted spectacular attacks, including the one at karachi airport. public opinion clearly swung -- and their trepidations. the pakistan know that terry found an opportunity and launched this operation. that is what we are going to discuss. not just the operation, but also, what does it mean, what does it mean for the war against

terrorism inside all of active sand, what does it mean for the region in particular he and for the relationship between pakistan and afghanistan going forward. sehgal touest make his remarks. >> one of the questions asked was will that pakistan ever go into north waziristan? i honestly answered, yes, because at that point in time we knew something in pakistan that people did not know otherwise. the commanders on the ground

but for reasons that [indiscernible] political ownership, the blowback, and because of the fact that the hardest fighters that were supposed to be in north waziristan, the pakistan army had decided at that time to delay operations. the pressure was on the military hierarchy from their own commanders. alternately, by the time the change of command to place in november, it was more or less

decided that the operation was going. actually come in the operation two majorto go in fields. the first was airstrikes, and because they had actual intentions, then -- they knew precisely where the militant hierarchy was located, and the the end ofhrough --il, the middle of may, they expected they would be able to capture militants using airstrikes. according to them, the moment there isa provocation, -- who airstrikes went to the end of february. -- the firsttrikes targeted airstrikes by the end

of february. within pakistan come the major political parties talked about overtures for a cease-fire and , and unfortunately, militantsment -- needed to get -- and they knew that they needed time, 60 days, --they kept the government and it was clear from the nature of the talks that they had no talkingn -- they were -- the negotiators were saying something else. the people that asked to negotiate did something else, and -- [indiscernible]

ultimately it is fair to say that that pressure on the government from the military side was if we don't go in now, we do not get a chance, before the american -- by the end of -- i want you to give the democracy of it. of, andthe pink portion they were not really fighters. were -- andhters -- and if you look east from -- you see merely and if you look west from southwest and it does not show on the map, the main it says --

mountain range -- heightsyou an idea, the range up to 16,000 feet. -- so themer season, not going into'm details, but enough to say that a number of columns came in from different directions, and then where -- ando eastward and west and southwest as much side as the column could go into the mountains. the idea was to dominate this area. i am not joking when i tell you zone.- duty-free

you would probably get it in three weeks, minimum. it was a free for all area. i just want to go back a little bit. area -- about -- this in the south, if you see the --ntains this is the area and south, massoud tribes were -- both ofbasically them had signed peace treaties with pakistan in 2003 and basically said we would not take any operations and danced pakistan --

they went and took large portions of this area. you must have heard of people [indiscernible] there was some fighting, basic for control of the monetary resources. clear to step away and one misperception. you hear about you heard about the fighters. , a use patent fighter is someone who came from his pakistan and did not go back. wrong. ago. go back 30 years when the original fighters came in from kazakhstan and

uzbekistan and somalia, each of and and given $14,000 ak-47 to join in the jihad against the soviet union the tribal leaders found it convenient to take the money off the militants -- [indiscernible] uzbekhs were there, the children of original fighters. these people are literally homebase. he had no place to go in that sense. and then unfortunately they were the hardest fighters. they had no other place to go. they were the ones really when , thetrikes took place

s had already been in afghanistan, -- basically most of the people who were killed were basically these foreign -- descendents of the foreign fighters. you can imagine, the children of 20were now in their 's/ in one case alone, just to give idea, they discovered bombs. 1000, almost. thisu can imagine they had

hideout, makeshift hospitals. they had a logistic framework. so what was the intention? what has they -- what have they achieved? what they achieved was they now dominate that area, and by dominating the area they deny s because they have the ability to strike back, but to give them the opportunity to do so with great freedom that they had. you have this situation now, the toughest fighting taking place in the mountains in the southwest because -- there is a ground operation there. the army expects five the end of

august they would nominate this area which is a tragedy by itself. it turned out to be 1.1 million of them who were registered. some of them had gone into other areas of pakistan. some are in camps. unfortunately, there are logistics and we have to live with that. just before i end, i would like to say that they were successful in the sense they will control the areas.

they have not abandoned their posts. they help these people. on the other hand, that particular freedom they had is not there anymore. the good news is the operation should be over by september, going back sometime in the middle of september. they can, crop and operate at will. my own reasoning on this is that

pakistan will not fail in military operations. parkistan will fail in the relief operations, even though the army engineer corps are making these roads, wide-open roads to make communications less difficult. the relief part is something -- you take a person and put him across the road in a camp, you have disrupted him.

you know you have disruption which must be addressed. the rehabilitation is something that must be worked upon. we must give them a means. give them reason to protect that means of livelihood. thank you. >> thank you. let's move on. maybe you can take this forward. what is the meaning or north waziristan, and where does this put the war on terror? >> thank you, first. i appreciate all of the different events and publications produced by the atlantic council.

thank you leading that effort. i will start off, a question, whose responsibility is that? any military operation which fails to take cognizance of what are the implications of a certain plan and what will it mean for the ordinary people and the terrorists for the legal implications, i would look at it skeptically. i want to add to the general view in which i think it is absolutely right, that this operation is not only a major step toward defeating terrorist in that region, but it is going on for all the knowledge that we have that it

is going in the right direction. [indiscernible] it is delayed, but it is the right thing to do. i was in pakistan about two weeks ago. i had the opportunity to meet friends in civilian law-enforcement. i was told about that that it was in this operation that the pakistan military got hold of a very senior al-qaeda leader

and had permission to come out. the al qaeda leader -- happened to be a pakistani. he has a master's degree. he is punjabi by ethnic background. he was caught with his laptop. i earnestly hope that with the interrogations going on that there is an officer who is there and a military and police officer there. it is necessary in that case. however, we have seen consistent

background of failure dealing with counterinsurgency. wherever the police action, political support base is missing, you will go to utter failure. that is why it is important to see the overall of the context and the different stages. they are focused this time. the plan was finalized in 2008, they realized that the first step was to -- ttp. at that time he was the head of a group of militants. the point i am making is to go

to south, then north warziristan. the first two steps began in unison in a coordinated fashion. there is some reluctance to give them full credit for the success of the operation. i think that there were some successes. the second stage was an operation that was quite successful in terms of pushing out some of the militants. the gap of 40 years, i think we just cannot ignore that delay. i want to mention that the a qaeda leaders, when both the time come for -- [indiscernible]

i don't have the exact answers. i would like to have the answers. at what stage did he got connected with al qaeda? how was the pakistani taliban allowed to expand into mainstream pakistan? look at the operation. in karachi, there are different ethnic groups that lived there. [indiscernible] they were not flying. they must have been going

through the roads or train checkpoints. was there any courting nation between military intelligence and local law enforcement? it led to indirectly -- i think it would be unfair to say it was in any way intended. unless there is an effort to ready -- i am not ready to buy, but to say it was one man and not to delay the operation for four years is a reflection. this leads me to my second point. i am making the case for the lessons to be learned and not always to look forward, but look into the recent history.

the recent history we can't just ignore. the answers are very vague. it brings me to the next point. the policital leadership was reluctant with a heavy heart to agree to this operation. what was the advice given by the pakistan's people party? were they reluctant? no. they were begging, but making a consistent effort, please don't go into north waziristan. there's this disconnect. what were the answers given to

them? in fact, there was a clear effort to show that there were some bad intentions. nonetheless, he was exposed by having some soft feelings of sympathy. maybe he was making a case to negotiate. i want to understand why there was a different criteria to look at the issues. i can be wrong at some of these minor details about the military relationships and this transition from military to democratic rule. the larger point is there is a military disconnect. on other issues, there was an effort to try to shift the responsibility in tribal areas completely to the military.

they were trying to say, it is up to you. they didn't want to take responsibility in case something went wrong. that disconnect, that lack of communication is most certainly at the core of this issue. lack of coordination between civil and military leadership then leads to lack of cohesion, lack of planning, and such issues as problem in -- it becomes obvious. if we had millions of dollars to go for specific strikes and go for deployment of military that is no small job, it would take millions of dollars and lots of courage and dedication. it is missing because i would say there were no

civilian private sector organization. what is your analysis? they have completely failed to realize this. this brings me to almost the end of my initial points. i see disconnect on the long-term impacts. in the short run, there are results of this operation that i think is very good. it must've been planned months before. it must have some linkages. in the last few months and weeks, we haven't seen any of that. there was a bombing of the girls school last week, but no major attacking in urban centers. militants are on the run.

i'm sure that there is a lot of evidence they are really on the run. their infrastructure is being dismantled. one thing that is for sure is no one -- haqqani group is not being provided under the sanctions. previously, they would -- why don't you move? you can go and be the guests. that is to the best of my knowledge an honest assessment. that is not happening. that is a good sign.

haqqani group is now employed in any sanctuary, however, haqqani group has not been delicately targeted. there is skepticism about some policies. i think the new military leadership that is not working around one person, but around four or five people who previously related to the chief of staff. they were the ones who are the architects of the south waziristan operation. i think they are very clearheaded and dedicated. however, what concerns me the most is there is no comprehensive policy. the pakistani police officers have, and i say it with some responsibility, even the leading police officers in these provinces have not been given any major briefing. they are not part of this overall operation.

the consequences of this operation will be seen centers.-- let's say they are incompetent. he should be on the same table when these things are discussed. i mention this to my political friends and military as well. they say we are very incompetent and corrupt. are they not having the same food as you are? the real battle against pakistani terrorists and militants will be fought by the civilian law enforcement. it will not take decades for them to transform. they will have to be on board. i am seeing that element not there. the -- who was running

which was producing these militants. maybe i missed that news item in the pakistani media. unless there is that component which needs political courage and political leadership as as well, that support somehow it is also missing. the kind of energy that we were expecting to see for support of this whole operation is missing some of the media, is running programs trying to go for these patriotic songs, etc. to the best of my knowledge they are all paid by the pakistani isbir. this is not happening from among the people. at the end of the day, that will define pakistan's larger, broader counterterrorism effort which would take five or 10 years to complete whether we are going in that direction or not.

thank you. >> thank you very much. i think both of you raised some very interesting points. the may be some statements i may want to challenge in terms of the assertions that have been made. let me, if i may, ask both of you a question. after all, what mr. sehgal identified, was the center of this operation. it was also the headquarters of the seventh division of the pakistan army all these years. they were one kilometer outside of the city. how is it that despite having something approximating 42,000 troops in north waziristan that these operations could take place from bases with training being provided, with equipment being brought in, and the photographs show some very heavy

equipment, how is it possible that this was ignored or that this happened? was it because the military was confined to barracks? or was it simply because there was no national strategy? that is my first question. >> i think what you ask is relevant. it goes back to -- the seventh division has been in the forefront of this operation. it is the one which is headquartered in peshar, basically for the last 10 years or so it has been in the field. >> its traditional operational area is kashmir.

>> a conscious decision -- i agree when he says there is criminal neglect. the commanders on the ground who are actually in knowledge of the situation tell you that the time is now to keep the momentum going. i want to disagree with hassan on the strength of the army chief. like it or not -- the last time there was collective responsibility -- was ruling pakistan. then he had a coterie of generals that were hawkish. ultimately, they kept on driving him till -- ultimately he came to the famous

decision. in bad faith under the site, he came to a decision to the famous 25th march thing. i was there as a helicopter pilot in eastern command. i know firsthand what was happening. there was some bad faith involved. the army chief was finally overruled. that was only when all the chips were down. as long as he is the army chief, he is what he is. his word is law. to expect that the collective leadership of the dg, all will convince the army chief, otherwise, i don't think that is possible in the pakistan army, at least what i know of them. i wanted to digress on one thing. i think we tend to mix up -- and counterterrorism. pakistanappening in today and all these areas is dr.

insurgency, which is cementing terrorism within pakistan. that terrorism within pakistan can come with an insurgency. so when the army is quite equipped to do counterinsurgency, but really no army in the world can do counterterrorism particularly in the hinterlands. you have to have a specialized force to do that. to be involvede with the law enforcement. to give you an idea of that is -- was the's greatest's in the world. at that point the united states topped set up the anti-narcotics force, and they gave the -- and today pakistan is not even on 15 list of -- this is been

years they have managed to keep that thing going. derivedce has to be within law enforcement agencies as major stakeholders, but this has to be a separate force -- available. coordinatedhave intelligence and for all forces. those powers, now they are trying to -- who act like they are acting in front of the army, -- acting under article 245 so i think that is a major issue. unless we get that dichotomy, and you mix up counterinsurgency with counterterrorism, you are going to have problems. you appear to be agreeing on this point. i want to pick up on the point you are making, the absence of

an greed upon national counterterrorism strategy. securityional strategy, which to give it credit, this government put it together with an initial frame and. it was socialized with the military or other parts of the nation. >> that is true. --re was this one very clear they asked experts give feedback. at one point, and i am sitting between two leaving experts. major -- that looks at military issues -- [indiscernible] making any comment i have to be

extremely careful. i would point to these experts. i have a slightly different view of this idea that the pakistan army chief remains in a position that is dictatorial. i would like to say i do not -- in 1988, whether there was military involvement. nexte say there was the army chief might have to do something. i am not sure that musharraf's ouster was only because of the political departments. there is now growing concern among some experts in pakistan and outside whether it was something that -- had done things which should have stayed in the presidency almost impossible. i think the commanders now are

very powerful. leave themef can military without the generals being on the same page. it is impossible to say something that is not popular for does not have the majority of the commanders on their side. a changingthere is dynamic. there is a changing issue in of thef political impact societal norms that we see. --e conservatism at time within those elements of the pakistan armed forces as well. add is having an impact on the command and control system. i believe the cohesion can be the most important factor for pakistan's survival.

i am seeing some changes. just to complete the point of national security, also, is that the political leadership are still not really clear. i think at the heart of the larger point, and also the counterinsurgency, which the army never liked. [indiscernible] which is this function. i am told they never met for the last three years. at the heart of the larger point, which the army never liked. at times -- the larger point is, there is a lack of coordination between different elements of safe power. there are not any clear signs that there is a recognition and realization of this issue. >> thank you.

we won't go into some of the fine points of exactly how decisions are made, but the reality is that the proximate causes of this particular operation appeared to be the attack in karachi, which changed public opinion. and the fact that in the last two years the pakistan army in north waziristan suffered casuals. -- casualties. when you talk to commanding officers in the field, even when they lose one person it is a huge loss. the pressure was mounting from within the military. i think any smart army chief as to listen to the troops. when he meets his formation commanders and then the corps

commanders -- general musharraf who was he army chief and president concurrently never once visited fatah after having sent troops to fight there. there's no evidence of him having traveled to meet the troops in the field. the civilian leadership does not do that either. that is a mind-boggling thing for an observer like me. let me open it up to the audience. let me go to the back first or if you would, please identify yourself. also want to let everybody know, i will take down the names and keep reminding me of your interest. this single slide that you saw as part of a set which was brought to us, which is fairly useful, we will put a whole set on a website so it will be available to all of you for information. please identify yourself and ask

your question. >> good morning, everybody. i am at the embassy of pakistan. i have a short comment and then a question. the short comment, i'm giving with conviction because i have been a part of it myself. when we think about the four years lost, what went in those four years needs to be identified from the point of view of what was the army is in at those times? it was starting off from may, october. meanwhile, in between, almost all of the seven agencies were busy. there were strikes that were regularly being taken on the actions. it is important to note that what was going on in addition to

the floods and the turn show rains and the earthquake that took place. all of them, the pakistan army was involved. and the importance of the line of communication between the -- the the presidency terrorists, that was important for the army to take, that was also affecting the u.s. forces. when you talk about the four you take into account what happens within those four years, other than -- is, today we say two years, two months from might,

what next? -- off theworks table. what is next? what is going to be the effect between the relations in the region? monthsgoing to see two or a shorter time in which everything will get settled. it will take some time for the area to get settled in for the army to remain deployed and the numbers, 178, it can draw down a little. they can only take those numbers for that much more time. >> who would like to answer about the future prospects? >> i will acknowledge that he is very right. that should be considered a valid critique. there were successes because the lack of infrastructure development and lack of other

institutions' capacity. whenever there's a flood or a crisis, we now know the one of the leading politicians was marching toward islamabad. they asked the army to secure islamabad. they had responsibilities and any discussion and analysis. should have been one or two sentences. is, thereure, my view are now three things that are happening. what is happening in that region is -- there is a u.s.-pakistan relationship track, which is on the path of some resolution. the engagement between pakistani and u.s. security officers, at least on the security or, i think has really improved.

there is no doubt about it. but the dynamic between pakistan and afghanistan is as important as the dynamic between pakistan and india. these are three tracks, not directly interlinked. the future, the next challenge or next issue, next initiative, will not only be defined by pakistan-u.s. relations. it will be dependent on relations which i do not see, because the government has not been up to the mark when it comes to the afghanistan-pakistan border. there is not a clear understanding and coordination and cooperation. the relationship remains, at one level, frozen. the best thing our city did, frankly, was going to india. i do not know how that affected the view in military circles,

but i think that relationship is also important. a combination of those three tracks and relationships will define the future of the area. you made a fleeting accusation that the afghan security forces were providing artillery cover for operations from afghanistan through north waziristan. is that what you were referring to? you said that they were not stopping the heck army group. group.ani notion.a serious ago,out four months bysoud was being accompanied agents when he was hit -- kabul and the way to

taken to barber and. karzai would not release him. what more evidence can there be that the number two man is caught on the way? killed by a drone strike. other than that, he has been openly. if he ever shows up in this area if you were to-- look at the haqqani, they are facially, and structurally, probably different. you can make out a haqqani

straight away. kabul.th i do not think for them to hide would be a major -- my issue is only with the fact that it has been clearly evidence from what is happening on the ground that these people who went across the border, they are in camps that are really close to the border without any interdiction. and anytime there is a cross-border attack, the artillery comes in. they don't have the artillery. where is the artillery coming in from? haqqani, i think most of them are across the border. afghant think the national army is taking them on. as -- i am under no concert in -- can confusion that

they have been helped by iranian intelligence. whatt want to go back to mr. soleri said. there's another factor. when you have a counterinsurgency, you require a lot of helicopter support. -- i wasmigs and pumas a helicopter pilot myself. i was an infantry officer and moonlighted as a helicopter pilot for some time. they are in the last stages of their engine life. it is difficult to continue without refurbishing them. now that the m i-17's have been refurbished and we have room us from the uae and several helicopters of command, also the ammunition depletion was at a critical state about two years ago. i think a number of factors, even -- to go back to what you said about the collective decision-making, if you had heard what the corps commanders, he would've been out for years ago.

they wanted him out. it is only general canny who said no, we must let democracy succeed. i am no great support of general canny. but i give him this. he stood by it, and he was the army chief. he kept his commanders in line. he did not allow that to happen. >> the relief part is of course something that we must work on. the real part is the application. if you take a person and put them across the road in a cap. he is disrupted. he is not happy. my question concerns collateral

damage. i think you mentioned that by september or so this year, the drone operation would be coming to an end. has pakistan actually won a battle, where the outcome of the war is maybe uncertain, given the feelings about the collateral damage, plus the lack of coordination, plus the lack , along-term vision comprehensive view of what is happening? i would press you not to close that uncertainty gap. where is this diffusion? >> could i also add to the question and say, is there a war plan? the first thing i must answer this question is, there were almost 3 million refugees that had to be moved.

and north waziristan, the -- they were not brutal. they were tough to them. but in the south, they would behead them in public. was a state of absolute anarchy. -- iefugees that moved think the army is pretty confident that before the winter ofs them, at the beginning november, october -- your thing -- i said this. , i was thestan army rank of major. today, when i looked -- and i lecture regularly at the university. i have been lecturing for the last 15 years, except for two years in between.

officers.best lot of the reason is, even though five generals were retired, three of them haven't had combat experience. after that retirement in october, there will not be a single three-star general in the pakistan army who has not had combat experience of some kind. that is very important. unless a man has seen his fellow soldiers lying dead, he cannot see the consequences of leaving them into battle. he is much sharper educated. he is, the experience, he is better trained. he is committed to democracy. >> actually, for the last problem with the plan, we knew it for months before the operation was launched that the military was coming.

these things have to be addressed. we are going to win this war. >> he is talking about the military side. >> as concerns the military plan, there must be a plan. somebody is keeping it close to the chest. >> yes, but we should get some confidence, as observers. i still think that the military plan might be daring. you are right. actually, for the last one for months knew it before the operation was launched. the military is coming to north waziristan.

look for the news item. when will the first sign be heard that people have started moving out of north waziristan? almost four months before the operation began. not that it was intended, because the militants had now developed the roots in mainstream areas where they can launch movements. they knew there was some deployment or some movement happening close to the other areas. and they started moving out. many of the militants moved out. it is comparable to when someone in washington dc says the deadline we have, then it had negative complications and was very difficult to decide on that count. it is difficult. i'm pretty sure that as a result, the counterterrorism plan for the whole of pakistan should be linked or related to this operation. that is not visible. >> that would include karachi, punjab and the whole area.

>> indeed, the capital area. the fact that they called an army, which i have an issue with. so long as civilians will continue to cut on a military to discipline jobs, the military will keep on thinking that they can someday come up and clean it. whenever -- whenever they have tried, they have made a mess of pakistan. civilians have to start investing and civilian institutions. military should not of been called into islamabad. i say this with all humility, but something which i will also check, but because it is an important point, about what he mentioned about the future of the hakkani group. to the best of my knowledge, it comes from graduates of the hakkani group. they have different tribes.

one is distinct, but all the other groups look for a similar. that is one point. i will also check. not to the best of my knowledge. >> the gentleman in the blue shirt. >> i really appreciate -- i feel like we have learned a lot about the who and what has been going on. i wanted to get at the underlying why. in your opinion, to the militants have any legitimate reason -- grievances with the government? and if so what are they? what has made it in their minds that it is their will to fight instead of copper a? -- instead of cooperate? why is it that they go down this path? >> the legitimacy -- these are backward areas, very underdeveloped. nobody ever bothers to push industry services into this area.

just to give you an idea, and i want to give this as a statistic. i have 15,000 people working for me in my private security company. i have 600 people from south and north waziristan. i've never had a problem with them. some of them have been with the 15 years. if these people have an income that they can send back to their families, their ok. -- they are ok. if you do not have income, if you do not have means of livelihood, you might as well be a gun for hire for everyone. you are just a gun for hire. that's what they do. it is a peril to society. they live off the road. passes the road, they

stopped them and take a tax from them. a sense of grievance. number two is a sense of justice. they have their tribal justice. they have their own sense of justice. this was a classic case where you have local justice prevailing and they were quite happy about it and then suddenly you had a jurisdiction of the supreme court and everybody came in with the constitution. then there was a high court and for 10 years a supreme court. they had a legitimate grievance. the man died before it reached the supreme court. you have to bring it down. the most important point, which i fought for this government, -- i fault this government for also, and also started with the the basicnment, it is stakeholder has no say in the government. we have a feudal system. the feudal system persists. the less you bring democracy -- unless you bring democracy

down to the lower levels, you're going to have someone decides that they will have a school rather than have the local board decide. here's the money and how i am just going to use it. what is the justice system at the local level? that is a legitimate agreement -- a legitimate grievance, and i agree with that. >> there is another element that is worth pointingthat they willl rather than have the local boar. over time, the economic base of these groups has changed. many of them are now criminal activities. they are in the drug trade and the smuggling business. >> come for hire. >> they are basically imposing their own taxes in their areas. that is now mixed with the deprivation which fatah as an entity has suffered. let's move to the front now and then i will go around to the back again. please.

>> thank you so much. i'm a former world bank official. you said -- failed idp's and relief. my question is more on the timing of return. second, if you could comment on your recent book, the most difficult question you had to handle and if you could comment on that. >> since you are from the world bank. one of the problems which is being faced today is to deliver money to the idp's. as you know, the world bank works on the fact that in pakistan only 15% of the people have access to banking. 85% are out of the banking system. the whole of pakistan. the idp's are 100% of the banking system.

-- out of the banking system. they are working on a system, a national support program. the view of the support program is, they are trying to get mobile into them with voice-recognition or biometric data. the point is, you're bringing technology in and bringing a lot of effort into this thing. at least, i can say this, the government is trying. it is not for lack of effort. i think the effort can be more organized, as he has been saying. much more effort is required. basically, you have got to give them -- the tribal society is broken up mostly. you have to give them that amount of decision-making process. it should be for their own communities. that is very important.

taking part, i think, is very important. the local communities must decide what is good for them, not what someone sitting in islamabad decides. without knowing anything about the typography or the demography. he decides this is what is going on. >> maybe you can shed light on another conundrum that arises in this process. these figures that are being bandied about, the number of idp is. how is it that the population of 400,000 in 1998, even with the 2.9% annual increase is now over one million in registered idp's? >> i think it is a pretty important point which tells us the fact that even the 1990 eight cents this is not -- 1988 census was not accurate. it was not done in any professional manner. we kept on saying throughout the last decade, there are 3.5 million people who live in fatah. in 2008 we also mentioned 5 million. when i was to pick this right figure, i used to use the figure

of 7 million. i was contacted recently by a shtunon friend, -- pahst friend, who said there should surely be between 10 and 12 million. this person is producing some of the best reports on fatah by the british government. that was one thing. waziristan, idp's are coming from other areas as well. others who think that each -- if will get a check

there is no economic activity going on, even if you are in south waziristan, that is pressure as well. issue, how they come up with these assessments. i will make this assessment with not full capacity to analyze. we talk about haqqani group. they are going toward afghanistan. high can a group is also providing logistics to the pakistani taliban. they have realized that haqqani group was not only involved on the iran side. they provide the linkage with criminal groups, and north waziristan, the dismantling of suicide bombing. done aboutas to be the analytical capability of the pakistani government. >> but the absence of the capture or killing of any of these big leaders still remains a very open question. >> true.

>> let's move to dr. nassari. go ahead, please. >> thank you very it is such a unique learning experience to hear these three it distinguished experts talking about that area which has been affecting us all this time. -- if the regions, about am a pakistan american league. the comments about the army and the area of disconnect. recently, in pakistan, the entire higher echelon of the army, i found them converging with total consensus. they were really speaking with

one voice. sometimes, -- that is because of the politicians statements and other things that irritate them. other than that, they're working together in an army unit. they were working closely with this administration. a major commander said, we are going to win that war. this is about armed terrorism. this is a reward to terrorism. the enemy is faceless. even the superpowers have generally failed in this territory. given a timeline or a timeframe, our closure of this war is very difficult to get.

2014 december is really close. the real test will come after december. the army is moving forward, i understand. at the same time, the government to rehabilitate all these people , about the numbers we are disputing. >> you have a question? >> my question, since the afghani taliban would be under pressure by the afghan forces, there is a high desertion rate. afghan forces will be tested after december 14. they will be under pressure, the afghani taliban, by the afghan forces. pakistani taliban will be under pressure by the pakistan army. is there any possibility of applying the doctrine of necessity that they might start working together, taking both sides as a common enemy?

what is the possibility? >> the audience at the back, we will get to you. who could not hear, the point he is making -- in his own visit to pakistan he saw a great convergence among all the military people that he met on the aims of this exercise. the question was, is a possibility of the afghan and pakistani taliban joining hands. >> i think early this year the pakistan army intercepted messages from several sources. we said, do not engage with the pakistan army. delay this. this was a message.

do not say anything. at that point, it became a nightmarish possibility. that was after the post-2014 drawdown. they might link up together. i have no doubt in my mind that whatever the differences are, at the end of the day, they are one thus far as ideology is concerned. the second part, which is that you said that the afghan taliban will be under pressure from the afghan forces. we in a minute in the last -- i think it is the other way around. the forces will be under pressure from the taliban. having eliminated this last stronghold, we have done a tremendous favor to the afghan national forces by not allowing their logistics to take place from this place. it will have to really recapture this area from the pakistan army to do this. as far as -- obviously, i have no blueprint. i can only take my guess is from other things.

the determination the commitment , i've seen in the pakistan army which i've never seen in all my life. it is something which is amazing. it is a real pleasure to get the feedback from them. in my own unit, take it for my own unit, which was in south waziristan for two years. talk with them regularly. out of 15,000 people, 9000 rx -- are ex servicemen. all all of them have brothers, cousins, what have you, and the armed forces. you have regular feedback on what is happening. my own feeling is, the optimism is there. whether it is misplaced optimism i do not know. i think the optimism is there. hassan has a very good point. you have to activate. -- we have to get our act together.

you have to activate an actor. we do not have a national security status. we do not have a national security strategy. we have got to clearly -- the civil government has to spell out a strategy. once you have set up national security, there's a common minimum program which all the political parties agree on, then you can go ahead and do all the things within that framework. in a framework we disagree, you can sit down and debate. >> would you like to add briefly? i understand your hope. you need very well when you say this, because you want to see pakistani democracy flourished. i only say, hope is that a method. it is not about only convergence. it is about civilian supremacy. civilians have to decide and make policy decisions. an army's implementation takes orders -- takings orders from

civilian population is important. military officers are paid government officials. they have to always be subservient to and respectful towards military leadership. that is happening in a democratic transition. one point about convergence of the afghan taliban and the pakistani taliban. i see that convergence happening. there is pushed from the side. on the afghan taliban also. we will see some action. lately, this military unit goes on the side of the taliban. the seniormost general since the vietnam war died in action if i am correct. that was recently in national defense in kabul. these are the signs that the taliban is not going anywhere.

on the pakistani side, i was more hopeful. the way they have expanded their network in the province in karachi, there's no signs of any effective cord needed action, -- coordinated action. the rise of the pakistani taliban may be under a different name. i think that is not possible, it is highly likely. at some stage, the convergence of interests and coming together some of the militant sides, i hope to be proved wrong about the title of my book. that is -- the future of the political crisis will be a major factor in deciding what is going to happen on the side of the afghan taliban. >> we have a question in the second row. if you could stand up and identify yourself and ask your question. >> i'm a recent graduate of the university of texas. it seems like the operation was very strategically handled by the pakistan army.

also the government is trying to target. my question is that keeping in mind the border between afghanistan and pakistan, do think operations open and totalitarian -- do you think operations in northern wires down will put an end to the taliban factories? it justwould you say sends the problem toward the afghan government? >> it is safe to say the sanctuaries are not impossible. the freedom that they had. it was possible that they have some hideouts in the mountains. the freedom of movement that they could actually roam around with freedom, that century they had is not possible.

strategically, the pakistan army and air force wanted to go there in the end of february. the time the operation to lace, one hour after the last folding finished in the afghan presidential election. they timed it so that once elections are over, the hit was by the air force mostly. i want to go back to something interesting. you mentioned karachi. i have lived in karachi. it is a far better place than what it was a year back. thanks to a quasimilitary force called the rangers. the pakistan rangers. as of that, the targeted killings have come down. large portions of karachi are dominated by the taliban, that is totally untrue. false. some political parties to dominate that area. the np dominate some areas, the people dominate some areas. the taliban may certainly be

there. very few areas of karachi are dominated by the taliban. the rangers have done a good job over the last eight months, nine months, to restore law and order. there have been people caught three days ago one street away from one of the leaders house. he's a confessed killer. the rangers have done a good job over the last eight months, nine months. there have been people caught three days ago. . person was caught he is a confessed killer. he only killed about 72 people. he only killed about 72 people. he killed 72 people. he confessed it. how can you take or is someone who is killed 72 people and say he is politically motivated? >> it also depends on the interrogation methods, i think. >> there is a question that is in the back.

after that i would like to come to the front over here. these will be the last two questions. i'm so sorry. we are running out of time. go ahead. >> good morning. [indiscernible] my question is really concerned about -- it seems to me the pakistani army is stretched too thin. some in a different provinces within pakistan that are having to come back. the army is stretched. what is that mean for development? i am concerned about the human impact. >> the question is about the economic impact on pakistan's economy as a whole.

let me take another question and then we will have both of you answer them. go ahead. >> thank you for your very informative presentation. how does the panel view the appointment of special representative by china for afghanistan recently? >> a special representative of china for afghanistan and pakistan. this is very late in the game. let me go back to the young man over there who i was going to ignore because of the time, but i think if you can get a question and we can get an answer. can you comment on the security situation in light of articles 2, 4 and five, especially with the upcoming -- maybe that might undermine gains in north waziristan.

>> the question is about the imposition of article 245, which is bringing the military in aid. just to update everyone as of , today, section 144 has been imposed on islamabad, which means you can have a gathering -- cannot have a gathering of more than four people in public. that led to the next. if you wouldn't mind trying to respond to these, that will wrap us up. >> i'm not qualified to answer more about idp's. i will focus on this. i think the civilian law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to support 144. it will be a good test to see.

this -- they will be looking for this opportunity to conduct this opportunity to conduct terrorist attacks in islamabad. again, i think pakistani -- neither pakistani intelligence nor the police have the capacity to stop suicide bombers. this will be a test to know whether their infrastructure it dismantled. this will be an important thing. that is why i think politically the government is really, really nervous about this. we will see this kind of absence of capacity there. it will be coincidence, lock to toluck, depending on luck save pakistan, as regards the security threat. china is very insightful. it is coming. the iranian influence, chinese influence is increasing. this is as the u.s. drawdown is happening. there's no doubt about it. china, for the first time, had

police training. which it never happened before. previously, their focus was only on economic factors. we have seen this change. i think they have choreographed it very statistically from their point of view. in some ways it can be good. if there is more regional and national interest in afghanistan, so far, is only the night is dates some of its -- it is only the united states and some of its allies which took the main responsibility in afghanistan. if china is taking more responsibility and initiative from other countries, in principle that should be a good sign. >> my own personal information from the chinese, they have expressed an interest in participating in peacekeeping on a much larger scale than before. even now, there are 600 peacekeepers for the u.n.. >> i think one more reason which people are aware of, but it don't think it comes out, is that the chinese have strategically decided to have a chinese/pakistani economic

corridor. they're investing money inroads and railways. right from -- right down to the border. that is attached to the people's liberation army in 1970i was a helicopter pilot. there is nothing in the province. now they have $20 billion invested every year into the province. they're absolutely determined to get this road through. makes sense for them to have somebody for this area, especially -- there are some who would interact with the government so if there's any problems, because this will go right through the center, through this area where the trouble is taking part. the chinese-pakistan economic corridor. there are railway lines and pipelines.

you will have problems. they are investing a lot in the power stations. all these power stations are strung north and south along this area. to answer your question about the idp's, they -- my own feeling is that the pakistan government will not be able to do it without help from outside agencies. they must take help from specialized agencies like unesco and all these different agencies. the world food program is already there helping out. i may be wrong, but i believe there is coordination at the government level going on. in all these agencies. the only disturbing factor or handicap is the fear for the safety and security.

that is the only thing. the government is insisting that even if his agencies have to operate in this area, they must have a pakistani element rather than from outside persons coming in. >> one figure which has been cited that the government of pakistan related to the costs of the security operations and the cost to the economy over the last decade, plus, has been upwards of $60 billion to the pakistan economy. one can parse those numbers, but that is a very fitting and to this very rich conversation, which included military tactics and strategy and discussion of the civilian aspects and the economy.

i think the critical part that is still missing, and it is still too early to say when -- ends, tell me how this ends. i think nobody yet knows how this is going to end. it certainly has raised enough questions and i am very grateful to my guests for helping us understand which way this is going and what the government -- with the pertinent questions are. unless pakistani society, pakistan civil government and institutions in the military can get together and carve out a national strategy and create a nexus between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, this is not going to end well. and so on that less than optimistic note, i want to thank you all for coming, and and join me in thanking our speakers. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> the white house, earlier today, released this photo of president obama meeting with his national security advisor, susan rice. they spoke in martha's vineyard, or the president is vacationing with his family. after the photo was released, the president made a statement about iraq. he congratulated the new prime minister designate and urged him to form a government. we will bring those remarks from the president as soon as we have them. president spoke, house speaker john boehner issued a statement, saying in part --

>> this month, c-span presents debates on what makes america great, evolution, and genetically modified foods. issue spotlight, with in-depth looks at irs oversight, student loan debt, and campus sexual assault. new perspectives on issues including global warming, voting rights, fighting infectious disease, and food safety. and our history tour, showing sights and sounds from america's historic places. find our television schedule one week in advance, and let us know what you think about the programs you are watching. us. us or e-mail join the conversation. like us on facebook. follow us on twitter. >> a panel of three euro judges in cincinnati heard oral argument last week on whether

ohio has to recognize same-sex couples legally married in other states. last monthrt ruled that ohio's 2004 law banning gay marriage is unconstitutional. >> eric murphy, interim director of ohio department of health. these cases involve state recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriage. in that respect, up from the michigan case that was just argued, which involved in state licensing for performance of same-sex marriages. in rejecting the ohio voters' d

public policys issue, the district court ignored its place in the judicial hierarchy and our constitutional democracy. point, it is as case as theon this michigan licensing case. in the prior discussion, the first circuit case -- in that case, i think that analysis had it exactly right. the judge talks about how any right or they recognize has to be consistent with acre, -- with baker, which is a result that does not lead to same-sex marriage. the plaintiffs in this case have not proffered any ground in which to distinguish the right to recognition from the right to licensing. essentially, mimic the same approach with respect to baker. doctrinal say developments have superseded

baker. >> with respect to the nonrecognition part of the ohio case, didn't judge black line out there is this wrinkle that not seem to equally enforce this prohibition on out-of-state marriages that are not consistent with ohio requirements for marriage licenses? >> in the equal protection context, he did suggest this refusal to recognize marriageste same-sex was unprecedented, which i do not think is correct. the courts have gone about it to distinguish between what they call void and voidable marriages. marriages violate what would be deemed a common-law marriage. it would not be recognized, whether they were recognized by another state. >> a common-law marriage out-of-state would be considered void in ohio? >> it depends.

way the courts undertake the choice of law analysis is to say out-of-state marriage is only voidable, we will recognize it here even if it is unlawful here. that is the first cousins marry kate -- marriage case. for other types of marriages, if the marriage would be deemed void, which ohio courts would take to mean -- common-law is not recognized and would not be recognized. case, that was an in-state ohio marriage, a common-law marriage. the court established the rule that it was absolutely void and the court would not recognize it. voidable is thes distinction, not same-sex marriage versus opposite sex marriage. that is one example for why i think baker is controlling. another distinction may try to is ais to say that there

substantive due process right not to marry, but marriage recognition. i do not even think you need to analysis, because under the supreme court cases and this court's cases, when you have a specific provision directly on point, a specific textural source of protection, elsewhere within the constitution, you do not even get to substantive due process analysis. i think that is applicable here. the full faith and credit clause is the clause dealing with, one state has to recognize another state possible is. the plaintiffs have made no argument, at least with respect to the marriage license itself, that that would violate the full faith and credit clause. is some suspect due process right to marriage recognition. the analogy we make in the breeze is, the brandenburg case, it refused to engage in

substantive due process analysis with respect to a free-speech case. we are essentially making the same point here. substantive due process is not a super full faith and credit clause. all this goes back to the notion that all the rationales to try to distinguish baker fall flat. >> what is your assessment of this doctrinal development? >> i think based on this court's own precedents, my interpretation of that phrase is, if you have a case that is all but overruled, a summary dismissal, but they did not go with a summary dismissal -- they do not expressly cited. the supreme court may be did not know, because it was a one night order. that is the type of doctrinal development that is necessary in order to implicate that provision. i think that is consistent with

what this court has already held in the case cited in our brief. regular opinions and summary judgment should have the same president value. ,hat means summary dismissals every bit as regular opinions, trigger the agostini and rodriguez rule. i do not think they can be established in a manner consistent with this court's cases, to suggest this rule is only for regular decisions. >> aren't there some opinions that suggest, if they don't hold, that one of those summary might have some kind of binding affect on the court from which it came, but not against the world? >> i do not think that is true. i think at least the right and distinction in the supreme court cases, the binding affect it has

on the lower courts, versus the binding affect on the supreme court -- the supreme court has quite clearly, as you can see, said it has less binding affect in the supreme court. with respect to the lower courts -- >> that was from michigan. i am sorry, the minnesota case. came out of the minnesota supreme court, did it not? >> that is true, your honor. -- isther he has standing that -- i may be a little confused here. you have to address standing, because it is jurisdictional, if without that party, you would not have a case. you have other parties that clearly do have standing, one does not have to address it. to we have to address it? >> i do think you do. the rule you are talking about only applies when they are seeking the same relief. -- the reliefmore

the plaintiffs sought was just, as applied -- he wanted broader injunctive relief variant you can put it on the death certificates of any future clients. the general rule, when they are -- seeking identical claims >> as applied to one death certificate, but without it, you cannot attack more broadly -- >> the injunction. it would have to essentially be more forward-looking. with respect to -- i am happy to talk about the third-party standing point. with respect to that, i think it is pretty straightforward. , theasiest route third-party standing doctrine --

there has to be a close relationship. the decision and kowalski made clear that a lawyer's future prospective relationships with clients was insufficient to establish the necessary closeness. that is on all fours, i think, with this case. a relationship with a client is -- >> that those were people that are ephemeral at this point. am i correct? >> future clients. that is correct. does he have current clients, and he is a member of the class, and his business actually is with the classng that is at issue, as to funerals and burials. >> i would think you could make the same distinction. i think he is talking about

future clients. he has not identified any other specific clients. the response to kowalski is to cite craig versus warren, which was the case dealing with your vendors. vendords.er craig asestablished being to be where the transaction between the two parties is itself illegal. in that case, the vendors cannot sell beer to minors. >> if there was no impediment to reaching these issues -- essentially the same issue in the tennessee and kentucky cases. it starts to look insignificant. do here hear what i am saying? either by opposing or invalidating, but do we care about in ohio? you would have a decision that would be binding.

>> and barring a meaningful -- distinction would not make a difference, would it? >> there is a difference between president and relief. i would completely concede that the state -- it would depend on what the opinion would stay. -- would say. -- thet know that that standings with respect to these cases. i think that is the easiest way out, with respect to third-party standing. the other factor, not only closeness, but hindrance. it is not too much of a hindrance. they have been asserting their own rights. sense, forou get the me, with these other district -- they say they

are measuring a trajectory. it does seem fair to say the supreme court trajectory favors the plaintiffs. it is equally fair to say these cases do not compel an answer, you not necessarily answer the question. the trajectory does favor them. it just does. they are not saying it about baker. hollingsworth -- but what is a lower court to do about that? >> i think with windsor, it is a garden-variety application of the animus case. concurrence in the bishop case was a pretty good , this doctrine can apply.

in windsor, it was an unusual federal intrusion into what had always been a state matter. and in romer, it was an unusual experience of illumination of one class of people's rights. explain thennot traditional definition of marriage, which has existed since the founding of the states , and you cannot really explain either, i don't think, the two thousand four amendments. i do not think the 2004 amendments were explained primarily by democracy. the citizens or the general assembly worrying that this fundamental question of public policy would be taken from them, either by a massachusetts court or by the ohio supreme court. it is a rational response to aat concern to pass

constitutional amendment retaining the traditional definition of marriage. i think judge holmes had it exactly right in bishop why suggesting that in both of those cases, what they are really faciallyt is unprecedented laws. judicial eyebrow, so to speak, to apply this type of animus doctrine. i do not think that concern is present with respect to the laws that have existed. there is something unusual about following the usual course. i think those cases are distinguishable on that ground. rational basis, we talked about democracy. recognition cases, there is uniformity, and having just one position on this fundamental

issue, so that the laws cannot be easily evaded. the uniformity rationale also. >> but implementation problems arise if the plaintiffs win? aequire legislative response. birth certificates have fathers and mothers. maybe it should be changed. >> it is a pragmatic question. >> i would imagine these things would happen throughout the revised code. there are references to husbands and wives. i certainly think that the general assembly would have to do a thorough read of the revised code to determine what needs to be updated.