really affecting us. i think the economy and our financial be considered. i think you seeallowing me to sy comments. host: we should mention the number for the national suicide prevention hotline if any of the viewers need the number. that number -- 800-824-8255. we will see you back your summer morning. have a great, monday. ♪ [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> news from washington this morning from both ends of pennsylvania avenue. president obama will return to work at the white house today returning from a weeklong vacation to hear updates on the violence in ferguson, missouri with attorney general holder. operationg military in iraq. the washington post reporting he plans to meet with vice president biden and members of the national security team to receive updates. the gathering comes a day after the president officially notified lawmakers on capitol hill that he expanded the military operation to include airstrikes targeting islamic militants. at the u.s. capitol congressional quarterly notes that as of today one of the most powerful men on capitol hill is no longer a congressman.

the resignation of eric cantor is now official. two months after the rear -- virginia republicans so unexpectedly lost his primary race. cantor a man -- announced resignation fans earlier this month. allowing him to quickly transition to work in the private sector. in the middle east, london's guardian newspaper is reporting g strip expires at midnight in the middle east, 5:00 eastern time with no firm indications egyptian mediators have succeeded in securing a deal to end the five-week contract. a military official told the guardian monday that the israeli delegation was still pushing fo, a divisive issue as hamas and islamic jihad repeatedly ruled

out giving up weapons. palestinian sources in cairo also suggested that there is a being talkedite about in the past tense. now the united nation security council will hold a briefing this morning on the middle east. representatives from security council countries are expected to make payments -- statements. we will have that for you live on c-span.

while we wait for the united nations security council briefing on the middle east, this morning, a kurdish representative discussed the fight against isis. here is some of that. the director of the regional government in the united states based in washington and joins us now to discuss the situation in iraq and the role of the kurdish people there. i want to get your assessment of

the 10-day-old u.s. air campaign and specifically the stories we're seeing this morning on the efforts to retake the strategic inmost soul. want to start off by thanking the u.s. government for stepping up and assisting us and pushing and recalling the attacks of isis. so far airstrikes have been area effective in what they have been able to do. in ang a lot of momentum short amount of time. to airstrikes have been able stop the momentum. now we are on the reason for conjunction. talk to themwill today. that has been at least one of the accomplishments of the 24 hours. >> showing the viewer some of of the airstrikes

that have taken place. talking about the importance of this, why has it become such a focus. lexis is the largest infrastructure in the country. there are two concerns when isis took over. one is it requires constant maintenance. is the largest infrastructure in the country. some tell us they need as much a 600 pounds of on creek and filled into the holes being sucked up by the oil. it could become a catastrophic problem if it is not done to the rest of the communities. the other concern is it is affected by a large number of people.

this could take years and years to rebuild it. this would be a disaster for the whole region. it could send waves as high as 63 feet high down the country and embassies as far as south baghdad would see nine feet of flooding in their complex. will talker aspect about the humanitarian effort. specifically how it affected the critics van regional government. >> there is an unrest and conflict in syria. we started seeing about 70,000 in the beginning.

we should at least include the palestinian question. the agenda is adopted. i invite mr. robert surry, special coordinator of the middle east process. it is so decided, the security council will now begin consideration of item two on the agenda. i gave -- give the floor to mr. robert surry. >> thank you, mr. president. we meet today against the backdrop of the region with political situate -- tensions and severe political state in a iraq, as well as the recent attacks from serious against lebanese armed forces and internal security forces in the

lebanese town. given the security council has already. august of solution 2170 on countering the threats of isil and anf. i would like to focus my briefing on the situation in israel and palestine with an emphasis on gaza. meet the temporary cease-fire is holding. on the sixth and last day of the extension with israel, israeli and palestinian delegations meeting separately with egyptian authorities in a crucial effort to break the deadlock of violation. we continue to engage with party in stakeholders to end the violence and reach a durable cease-fire.

hopes of the people in israel for sustainable security rests on those talks. we call on the delegations to live up to the responsibility. i the deadline later today, midnight cairo time, we urge the parties to reach an understanding on the durable cease-fire that also addresses the underlying issues afflicting substantial progress towards it. at the very least we hope the cease-fire will be extended and the situation remains quiet. that nohared a relief blood is being set up a moment. regret it has taken too much time and too many lives to achieve the goals. in third major escalation gaza was appalling. almost 2000 palestinians have 450 nine hers whom

children and 239 are women. it includes more than two thirds civilians. some 10,000 palestinians, roughly a third of them have been injured. , two israeli civilians have reportedly been killed. a few dozen israelis have been directly injured by rockets or shrapnel. in the face of this devastation and loss of life, the united nations has mobilized every personalcluding the engagement of the secretary general and working closely with international stakeholders to end the violence. we did not relent, despite setbacks, because the loss of civilian life was so unbearable. on two occasions we were successful. the temporary cease-fire that currently prevails has provided reprieve for the past eight days and will like to commend the

government of egypt for brokering it. to allow theal recess cities -- necessities of daily lives and allow for recovery efforts, addressing the many needs of the people in gaza such as urgent water and electricity networks and find a more viable shelter for those displaced were not able to return to historic homes. mr. president, it remains my conviction that we must not in the condition before the latest escalation. willwise the restrictions continue to fuel instability under development and conflict. i am afraid the next escalation will be just a measure of time. talk to general assembly recently from cairo, the basic equation must consist of ending the blockade on gaza and addressing legitimate concert -- security concerns. this has become more urgent

given the impressive amount of disruption brought up on the strip and corresponding unprecedented level of the reconstruction needs have not yet been completed at there are indications the volume of construction will be about three times needed after the so-called consulate in 2000 nine. approximately 16,800 housing units have been destroyed or severely damaged, affecting 100 thousand palestinians. reconstruction is the main priority, while exports and transfers are crucial to help the economy get back on its feet. construction materials will not be allowed into this effect. to gaza must be facilitated in a way that the phils the security concerns. the united nations stands ready to lend its support in this regard. for years the u.n. has been importing construction materials. measuresrises robust

to monitor the exclusive civilian use of materials entering under the mechanism. this attempt -- system has worked to prevent destruction of materials, allow successful implementation of crucial projects and build trust. reconstruction of the magnitude and now needed can only be palestinianh the authority and private sector in gaza, meaning larger quantities of materials are required to enter gaza. mr. president, the engagement of the donor community will be indispensable to help gaza back on its feet. we support today's announcement to host the conference once a durable cease-fire is in place beenonditions have established. i am heartened the government of

national consensus is resolved to spearhead the construction for gaza. as part of assuming rifle responsibilities, the government and corporation with the united nations and other international partners, last week i met with the beauty prime minister in gaza. i discussed with the deputy prime minister and cabinet ministers the way forward. he assured me the government national consensus is limited to contrasting -- addressing the urgent challenge of government, reconstruction and security. as part of raising -- bringing gaza back as part of one palestinian government. appeal i madee last week and gaza. i call on all to rally behind the government of national consensus and empower it to take charge and affect transformative

change that gaza so badly needs. right now gaza urgently needs and schools,tals not rockets, tunnels in conflict. we expect hamas and all of the sections to act responsibly and refrain from actions that run counter to the agenda. as for president, we have been extremely troubled during the escalation by breaches of environment ability. on three occasions there was a direct hit on schools that were being used at the time with full knowledge of the parties hostilities as shelters for gazans live look their home to seek safety. a total of 38 people were killed in those three incidents and 317 were injured. he love and colleagues were killed in the line of duty. they come as many others have been paying the price for the heraldic efforts trying to

alleviate suffering for which we honor their memory. men estimated 100 eight installations have been damaged and on the 29th of july the gaza branch of my own office was hit by a number of projectiles which caused damage to the main building. on three occasions rockets were found in schools vacant at the time. they were an example of the disrespect for international law the safeguards u.n. installations. the secretary-general has called for a full investigation into the incident. it is not yet clear what kind of cease-fire understanding will emerge from the talks and whether it will be reached by the fast approaching deadline. that said, in any case we believe a sustainable solution must address the issue of governance, reconstruction and security in the context of the return of one legitimate palestinian authority to gaza

which will undertake institutional restructuring, including of the security sector and we should also -- should also gradually include the exclusive control of the use of force through the palestinian security forces to border crossings and throughout gaza. none of this will be easy but we see no other way to change it in gaza. as needed and incorporation with other partners, the united nations will support the consensus in the tasks, taking advantage of our presence on the ground. we are ready to take on the role and mandate it and underline the importance of international monetary agreement in support of cease-fire understanding. i trust the council will consider taking whatever action needed in support of a durable cease-fire at the appropriate time. beenlareup in gaza has accompanied by increased

tensions and violence in the west bank. since the 23rd of july demonstrations took place across the west bank, including in jerusalem almost on a daily basis, especially around checkpoints and refugee points, often resulting in clashes with security forces. the most significant took place on the 24th of july during the night of from it on when approximately four-i thousand thousand-5000- or palestinians marched on a check went. of 17 palestinians were killed, including two children and some 1400 injured. israeli security forces conducted almost 300 search and arresting 620on, three palestinians. 17 israeli security forces were injured. well settlers were injured by

palestinians. , an excavator driven by a palestinian ran over and killed an israeli pedestrian and then turned over a bus, injuring five israelis. a palestinian was shot dead i police on the scene. the same day an unknown motorcyclist shot and killed a soldier in jerusalem. mr. president, last but not least, we must not lose sight of the bigger picture. the increasingly restless situation in the west bank, together with the gaza crisis should be a bleak warning to all concerned what the future will bring if we do not reverse the negative trend. this is now on the parties doorstep. the state of permanent conflict haltedtlessness must be at once. the conflict and occupation that began in 1967 must be ended.

the two state solution is the only viable scenario in this regard and we must urge the recall on all and support both parties to return to meaningful negotiation talks. thank you. thank mr. surrey for his briefing and now invite the council to continue on the discussion. the meeting is adjourned.

>> next, more discussion on the middle east.

>> ok. welcome, everyone. i am vice president for research at the foundation for defense of democracies. i welcome you to the panel discussion today on gaza. what has been one and lost. i am honored here to be sitting next to terrific panelists. to my left is the light leak of the daily beast, a terrific reporter who has done excellent work over the past five or six weeks in gaza and more broadly foreign policy over many years.

to my far right is aaron david miller of the wilson center who has advised secretary of state, democrat and republican and author of the forthcoming book, the end of greatness, why america can't have an does not want another great president. that is all for my introductions other than to ask you to please set your cell phones to stun. i hand over the panel discussion to eli. lex i really want to dive right into it. i really want to dive right into it and take advantage of the great panel. let's start with what just happened and i would like to go panelists by panelist. if they could start with you, david miller. in thes the motivation israel,nd from hamas

palestinian authority and the reluctant diplomacy from the u.s.? conflict?ivation for the core parties in the conflict? >> yes. is basic strategic problem between israel and hamas is episodic. as much as the two may depend on the another -- on another and need each other in an odd and perverse ways, the reality is they have a strategic problem with one another. hamas copulations were born i think of desperation on one hand and determination on the other. bankrupt,y politically isolated with israel and egypt controlling the gates of gaza. they reached the conclusion that

governing gaza and a functional and productive manner was simply no longer possible. developed from their point of view in the military wing ofugh capacity in the use high trajectory weapons and annel infrastructure to risk military confrontation. whether they sought it out or not is another matter and will to unwind theme tick tock that led up to the conflict. we are in it. once high trajectory weapons were used, particularly long rage, once it became clear the military wing had been very busy since 2009 in creating a defensive and offensive tunnel capacity, i think the israelis a sickly main their own --

basically made their own calculations that this had to be an effort at a minimum to deter and degrade hamas military capacity. destroy ever enters the lexicon is another matter. factor.e is a relative want to rush things. we need to know outcomes and be certain about things but that is works in theife region. unknown andgreat victors are determined only over the course of time. i think that essentially explains the motivation of the main combatants. the question now is seems to me is strategically how do both

parties see the future? what are their objectives and what are their goals go and in essence, are we done cap go there are three primary parties. he and theua and u.s.. very the u.s. in here reluctantly. in sketching out the motivations in the palestinian authority. these are parochial to the could conflict but you argue critical to the ultimate resolution of the conflict. we can talk about that later. finally, egypt. i think you have a rather anomalous situation.

being in the situation of palestinians and hamas in particular and acquiescence in the death and destruction in gaza at large is really quite stunning. saudisadd the uae and into the mix i think there is a certain reality of the gaza conflict and conflict generally is no longer a localized shepherds war, it is part of a broader filter through which the regional parties see the region. if you ask me right now what the single greatest threat was facing the middle east certainly would not be the perpetuation of the israeli palestinian conflict. it would in essence be what is happening in iraq, particularly the rise of isis. i only make this point to broaden the lens and the filter because everyone else in the region is doing it and would be

truly a fundamental error of analysis. some outcome includes this problem. this is the fulcrum of either western civilization or the main preoccupation of the parties in the region it is not. >> there are some from the right that have tried to make the point hamas is part of an ideological movement. we havenally analyst of talked about hamas in terms of the localized grievances with israeli occupation.

how can you parse that and can you talk about that particular issue? is hamas part of the militant -- movement or part of the end of palestinian nationalism? >> it is both the extreme end of the palestinian national movement, although there are some smaller groups even more extreme. both of those things. effort to inflate hamas with jihadist groups with are fundamentally misguided, although they do share some things in common without doubt. your finger ont the biggest differences. it has been absurd to hear people comparing hamas to isis or al qaeda.

ultimately the goals are palestinian goals. be severely them to criticized by al qaeda in the now and by isis in leaders or calling to took to burning flags online to show contempt and it didn't -- indignation over the war. they regarded as an extreme distraction from the immediate need to impose the most ruthless and brutal. this is the isis position. there is a big difference between a global transnational agenda that can't be in any way potentially satisfying, and the irrational system versus an extreme militant wing of two movements

that are not universalists in their aspirations and that are not fundamentally and so i would say the answer is definitely the second. ok >> i want to get your sense of answering this question do you think hamas started the war or did the israeli reaction to the kidnapping start the war. talk about that. >> the answer is yes. unfolded, and a number of my colleagues were in the region as the tensions began to rise. began with the kidnapping of the three teenagers from the west bank and the israelis alleged immediately hamas was responsible.

hamas denied the israeli continue to exist --. they went around the house to house in the west bank looking for culprits in the kidnapping and in the process rearrested some 50 hamas operatives who had been released. this certainly invoked the higher of hamas that began to carry out rocket attacks. nothing new for how moss. they have been firing rockets for the better part of a decade. the tensions began to rise. then you have the kidnapping from the neighborhood. it really was a claim. i actually visited on the day of the local population had burned a light rail system.

there was a sense on the part that perhaps they could fan the flames of what they want. so you begin to see the uptick thatolence and ultimately led to the firing of longer range rockets on tel aviv, jerusalem etc. and have the deterioration. we talked about is whether hamas was definitely involved. there has been a debate over this. at this point i think the debate has been put to rest. we have now heard from the brother of the operative in the west bank that has basically indicated hamas knew of the kidnapping, new of the attack, knew about it from the gaza strip and west bank and operatives abroad.

presumably that means an operative that is based in turkey who we have been senseing, so you get a that this was known from all angles within the movement. is notal note is hamas any longer in my view from our homogeneous.o monito there is the gaza strip and other brigades. each one of the power centers has some influence over the movement. i think it is still impossible to tell exactly who is -- whose was and whot drove it but it does appear at least two or three were aware of the operation in advance of it taking place. >> thank you. i want to tear into israel. you have dealt with benjamin

netanyahu. in the beginning of the rocket phase of the war, he was very clear. hamas firing rockets from civilian areas in order to get his own side killed to demonize israel. so why did he oblige the pr strategy in your view? responsibility, and i am not here representing the government of israel but it is a democratically elect the government and acts with coherence is the protection of its population. not only physical security but creating a sense of confidence and sense of security, which is extremely important. that is why disruption -- even though life in israel has not fundamentally changed by high trajectory weapons because of iron dome, it is still alter. thatere was a commitment needed to be discharged. a security commitment, a public commitment.

as any government goes about war,ting an asymmetrical including our own, there are a number of -- number of considerations to keep in mind. the uppermost consideration is projectionsilitary and ultimately destroy moral considerations. not argue to anyone, because i do not believe that israel's policy and gaza is immoral. i do not think there is a willful purposeful effort to either target civilians or a recklessness or casual disregard but i do not believe it is the central element that guide the israeli policy any more than the central element in the way we operated in afghanistan or iraq in the way we operate

use of signature strikes with predator drone's. my view is a very diverse prime minister. it is certainly not ariel sharon. he acts in some respects with the lack of confidence. he does not like risk or uncertainty, which essentially means often the rhetoric goes beyond his willingness or determination to actually act on what he is articulating. he watches and knows full well what happens to israeli prime minister an asymmetrical conflicts over extend the reach. you could identify two in particular. ariel sharon in lebanon in 1982 for whom there was a resurrection. think he had a number of goals and minds and feels relatively

satisfied, relatively satisfied that he has achieved them, but i will go back to where i started. define name will be to whoessentially solidify by comes out of this strategically .etter positioned that has yet to be decided in the tick-tock currently going on in cairo and elsewhere. >> i want to get this from the palestinian perspective. we just saw the un's human rights council name a new head of the commission going to investigate israeli actions in the war. there has been an effort from palestinians on and off to become members of the international criminal court. there have been lawsuits against

israeli officials for prior wars. politicalf the legal strategy is now part of the palestinian strategy larger than hamas? >> an interesting question. i differ somewhat from aaron on the conclusion of the conduct in the sense that i think there are moments in the current round of hostilities that we're seeing orhaps editing -- editing not. and earlier instances where reckless is the least use you could -- least word you could use for a given action. i think that certainly does happen and to me, is a minimal term. having put that on the table, i would say there are always moments where there are diminishing returns. asymmetrical conflicts for regular armies and certainly for

israel, which is plugged into the international community and whose relationship with the is very important to it so that certainly by the time you have the seventh strike on a sixth un's school housing a political had problem for the israeli government. the un'ss not just secretary-general and others in the un's "shall he but the state department and others in the u.s. government using words like alarming and horrifying and things like that, then you know you have entered into a territory where political difficulty is being encountered. pllthe point of view of the avenueis a potential more than one that is being

engaged in right now. something being explored. , and politically very popular to talk about it. certainly there have been an initial moves to get the un's nonmember observer state of the assemblyo party -- parties. let me explain for a second the jurisdiction can come in three different ways. one is if the country whose citizens are being investigated -- israeli is not so that immediately take them out of the second is if there is a sovereign power in the territory in which the old are operating it could bring a complaint so this would be the palestinian route because the third option is a un security council authorization. that is what happened in sudan.

it was investigated and the president ultimately indicted pursuant to a security council resolution authorization. what is open to potential is the second route for the nonmember observer state to exceed two the assembly parties and signs of statue to become part of that. then it is not as simple as people think. they tend to stop about this as if it were a small claims court where you go in register the complaint and then in a few months you get before the judge and is a trifecta. not how it goes. after the palestinian successfully joined and encourage the backlash, which i holds them back and probably will continue to hold significant diplomatic backlash from israel and the west. this comes at a fairly heavy cost and experience with the un's vision.

weigh the costs and benefits here. is this going to bring us anything? are we eventually going to get an investigation, let alone the prosecution and what kind of political earth -- political or diplomatic benefits will that have? you have to really do a serious about ua's and of that. however, it is popular because people think it is a pretty straightforward process. the next phase would be to have theassembly of parties find nonmember observer state of palestine is sovereign in gaza. that is a little bit trickier than people might have hoped. after that you have to convince prosecutors to open an investigation and hope for charges. prosecutors and any system do not like to bring charges they do not think they can win a

conviction on. it becomes increasingly political as the process goes on. it certainly take years. finally problem of retroactivity. thate talking about things could happen. of ways it couple can be applied retroactively but that is even trickier. at every stage we are talking about it becomes more and more difficult. as i think the other diplomatic gestures could really get the attention of different parties. statescase of the united it would be other multilateral agencies. the united states under law would be found to defund it and therefore lose its vote in what probably get american attention even more.

are options. register their rage and determination that, at a very significant cost. so i think it is of potential being thought about for that of programs being implemented. >> good answer. i want to talk about the idea warsthere are episodic now. they do not move the ball that much. thinknly hamas could not the objective is to destroy israel and there are peace processes. i want to get a sense of the american politics? it seems like the united states has been doing this now for going on a quarter of a century. been trying to broker a peace process and these wars do not make much sense, at least to

most that i talk to. what do you think that leads to from a political perspective going forward? viablethink it will be politically or in terms of u.s. bandwidth and energy to be to try to put back the peace process that never seems to come together? to onest want to respond thing on the icc front. i would say this with regard to the palestinian authority. , we have been hearing the palestinian authority is horribly weakened as a result of the war. that it has been effectively irrelevant. i would also argue it is in the hamas.t to see a weekend the war has now provided the plo

as the opportunity to retake the gaza strip or administer it in some way. given them an opportunity to go to the icc leon's what they had been considering already. they had been talking about this for several years. now they have something that perhaps looks closer to a war crime than settlements. this in some ways has been a .uest -- a gift i am not saying he wanted to see a war with so many casualties, etc. but he has kept to the non-violent house and has stayed out of this. he is seen by every actor on the world stage right now as the answer. i do not believe he actually is. i believe he is very autocratic. nevertheless he looks terrific relative to whom off -- to hamas.

i think this has played into the strategy on some level. the hamas suicide bombing gets the fence. who knows what happens next. we are part of a cycle where every couple of years this pops up. an bottom line is there is attractive bowl conflict. i do not think it is between that israelis or palestinians anymore or between the arab world and israel. we have seen some what of a thaw , i do not know if you can call it that the least they're working with the moderate arab states. that ase is a sense long as hamas continues to have the foot hold in gaza we will go back and go back again.

that is why i think we are beginning to see -- you are seeing a real effort in cairo to figure out a way forward. a lot of what we're figuring out right now -- i was seeing reports where they talk about a u.s. built seaport. this was recruited -- reported in hamas affiliated paper that there would be a seaport built by the united states where everything that would go there would have to move to cyprus first to be cleared and then brought in. this is the thinking we are hearing right now because there is a sense we have reached the end of the rope. because there is a sense no way gaza can continue under siege and blockade. the point is as long as hamas maintains the foothold and as long as hamas remains dedicated, as long as hamas maintains what modeld call a hezbollah inside gaza where even if there is a government structure

controlled by the palestinian authority you will still have a terrorist organization within that will be out of the range of the weak central government. that is not a solution and will be interesting to see what they come up with in cairo right now. a quick response on the u.s. policy. i would have to say this, and we're seeing some of this in the press, whether it is political or foreign policy, there is a delusion of critique of the foreignministration of policy. i have to say i agree. nuclearing the iranian crisis to go on as long as we have by ignoring the red lines in syria, setting unrealistic expectations with the peace process saying we will be done with it in nine months and then be done with it, messaging we are looking to pick it out of the middle east while you have

the massive of people going on from the emirates bring. we have messaged a horrible way that we have lost the confidence of just about every actor and ally in the middle east. the idea we can somehow get back in there and relaunch a new these process seems to me very unlikely. we will have to do some rebuilding of trust in the region and i think will take quite some time. i think most actors are writing off the u.s. and think that is a very dangerous thing. >> to underline that point there was a detail last week that the latest cease-fire being negotiated now, the state department learned about it on era,er, which in your there was the twitter but -- >> can i comment on this? i have done my fair share of critiquing over the obama administration's foreign-policy.

i think there is a broader problem we need to wake up to. i may be proven wrong at some point that over the past decade is my ownlysis analysis i have become quite attached to. it has nothing to do with politics. nothing to do with ideology. has to do with one simple proposition. we as a people, this republic is stuck in a middle of a region that we cannot leave because we for interest in allies which we cannot transform. this conundrum, and it is truly a conundrum reads one course of action. you cannot extricate yourself and cannot transform. let's be clear, i challenge anyone in the room to identify that has a definitive

in realnsive solution time and a reasonable amount of time. if you cannot extricate yourself and cannot transform you do the only other logical thing, you transact. is vital fromt discretionary. you decide what is doable from and then go about stripping down your interest to the core. vital andine what is what is vital to america. it is an interest in which we are prepared to sacrifice our old, our treasure and credibility. that is what vital means. not discretionary. not waging a decade long effort where thea new iraq

standard was never could we win but when can we leave? it has to be a cruel and unforgiving assessment of what is america's interests? problem has not .een clearly articulated the rhetoric continues to exceed the capacity to deliver, which is marrying. you should say what you mean and mean what you say. i would go a step further to talk about the past. the last time we had an effective foreign-policy, you would have to go back beyond , beyond george w. bush, bill clinton. go back to the four-year run. it was an effective policy and endshe means aligned. people do not talk about transformation. 41was the vision list, bush

in terms of presidents that set the standard for good transactional diplomacy. that is the thing we need to wrestle with. and we're not. >> that is a fair point. what it demonstrates is there is nothing new. when was the united states in a position to transform anything? >> there were three or more moments. every time during the 19 70's and even in the reagan administration. is a certain accumulation of power and time were you really could do something but generally speaking the way you describe, and that is normal. i do not disagree with either of the analyses except for this, it is not that difficult for the united states to restore

confidence with most of its. not that difficult for the united states to resume attenuated when -- attenuated leadership role. reachjust not beyond because there is still a hunger, i think, in the region for american leadership. not because anybody loves the united states or once the united states above all others but because there is not another country that can deliver in a limited way the limited things we can deliver, number one. and number two, there is not an alternative. it is not difficult i think to write the course. i think we agree there is a direct. essentially on the right page. talk about clear policy and goals, i think we need clarity enemies andfies as

adversaries. i am not even clear on that right now. alliesditional u.s. right now are pulling their hair out whether it is the israelis were jordanians or the is rockies -- i rockies or saudi's, they are going crazy right now. the enemies have essentially their ownners in disarmament and are rather pleased with the situation. they are probably tickled pink at the moment with the deals they have received. then you have the muddled middle , which is something i have been focusing on. where they the turks understand maybe being an ally it is not all it is cracked up off tond they have gone interesting directions where they are supporting actors that are hypothetical to u.s. interests and are creating a playing field where no one knows

what team they are on any longer. i think that has made itself very apparent in the most recent conflict. enterprise,man contradiction anomalies and hypocrisy all mix quite seamlessly in the behavior of great powers. this is another thing that bothers me. people demand consistency and a set of principles for american policy, we are not thinking clearly. we intervene and libya and not libya. of the worstsome insurgent groups in iraq and afghanistan because american lives are on the line but we would not even consider, and i am just reporting but not recommending any sort of engagement with hamas or hezbollah. great powers can and this power, sitting between

noncredit tory neighbors to our north and south and literally fish to our east and west has the largest margin of error unlike any other great power has and we have demonstrated that we can play fast and loose with this. we just sold the country's $2 billion, we have a strange relationship with egypt now. i think i put them in the good guy category although there are people in this town who would arguably want to hold them to standards of democratization, gender equality .nd pluralism never is a long time but you since 1950ocracies in this world that have maintained their democratic character continuously. 22.

and the indians and the turks are not on the list because they basically suspended the democratic process yuri various periods in the and herbal. it is a very small club. we just need a much more sensible -- >> before we get to the q&a, i want to go back to the bottle versus discretionary interests of the united states. in brokering a two state solution, a vital or discretionary interest for the united states at this point. /[laughter] i can answer that question very clearly. i would put it into the discretionary category, not , butse it is unimportant because our capacity to actually conflict-ending agreement -- and i choose my words very carefully, a conflict-ending agreement in we may descend reconciliation

be a ways off but an israeli prime minister and a palestinian president stand before their respective parliaments, legislative counsel and say the over, no to my it's more claims to be adjudicated, the conflict is over. possibility.no i am 65. i see almost no possibility in the near-term that i can hear such a statement. certainly from these two. so it belongs in the discretionary box because we can't achieve it. >> it's a nonstandard. if you judge by that, you would never assert that an interest is vital if it cannot be achieved in the immediate term. popularthink that is a -- a proper population

especially for a great power. i think there are many instances where that has been the case. i would argue this is still a vital interest because the middle east is still vital to the united states. true, this issue has become bound up with all the others in the middle east and it is not driving the agenda like the way iraq is in the riser isis is in but, in the end, there is still nothing more and -- more important than this is. event away from the medalist toward israel or anywhere else has proven to be a chimeric. it only existed rhetorically. i

think resolving this issue is a vital interest for the united .tates an have/.states, need to from the u.s. perspective, i am not sure how to answer that question, to be honest. ultimately what has happened over the last couple of years is that it has basically become clear that the problems we are seeing in the middle east is not connected to the israeli-palestinian conflict .er the we are seeing across

middle east from isis to syria to the a runny -- these are not necessarily tied to us of them are not tied to the israeli-arab conflict. from israel's perspective, it is going to survive and need to have some kind of agreement with its neighbors, whether that includes gaza, west bank, part of gaza, no gaza, no part of west bank bug gaza, it is clear israeli-arabthe conflict will not ring the and to our involvement in the middle east. i never heard anyone serious make it. this is a panacea. [laughter] idea from its advocates was that this was never a panacea but rather that there is nothing we could accomplish from the point of view of a few years

ago that could have been more beneficial. i still think that is true over the long haul. we have a distinguished audience today. so let's get right to it. we will start out front. >> [indiscernible] i have two questions. i do recall possibly whether an opportunity was locked. after the gulf war, aftershock n.o.i. and people peering into windows, the u.s. got a technological edge over any other country i believe it was george bush who made a speech

about a new world order but it was never followed up. you had a wonderful opportunity --the beginning accept that realist,at: powell, a discussed you need a foreign force which turned out not to be true. on the icc, you mentioned three possibilities of going to the icc. the first two involved a formidable -- involved affirmative action from the plo. the other is the human rights council referring the issue with a recommendation to the security council, just like they did after the goldstone report. that was not assessed for. why? toause they were not able get nine affirmative votes in

the security council. togonk it was nigeria and who were not going to vote affirmatively and it was taken off the table. repeated,enario was do you think that scenario would play out again? would that be the backstop of the u.s. veto? >> you are right on bosnia and the balkans. form's -- a brilliant foreign policy strategy. it is a legitimate criticism. council rulerights all, i think it was

not just the united states but russia and china for their own reasons, not in the security council but in the human rights to see that did not want it. you don't want to report on your own troops. [laughter] if you are the chinese government and you look at the president and you say is a something i want to sign on beyond the human rights council and you say no. i don't think it is a winning strategy. in the end, as we have seen, it is easy to leverage an automatic majority in a one-state, one-vote multilateral body of.

in the same way, i think it is hard for them to get a majority in the security council, as we saw. they couldn't get to the requisite number of folks. it would probably be the case in future efforts to go to the icc. manage to overcome it but there is the u.s. veto. so that is a dead-end in my view. >> there is a tendency to look at the icc at the goal. i don't think it is the goal. right now, it is a useful tool to talk about how palestinian policies can be elevated at the u.n. goo

they were denied by the security council and then there was a famous vote at the general assembly that did not afford them statehood status but they continued to pursue that under the apostle leadership. -- the abbas leadership. as they keep this process alive, it is a means to a different and end. there are two tracks going on simultaneously. it is one. captures the, that population imagination even more , is the idea that this is a nonviolent means to my lawful what to pressure them in means are available to you to

put pressure on israel that don't backfire, that don't cause more harm than they incur. there are people out there who argue that the icc and similar measures could prove that. there are others who say that the cost-benefit does not pay off. maybe it is not as reckless as violence, but it does add up in the end. >> jonathan, about deconstruction. there will be big money coming into gaza and there is a push now to get the pas in charge of reconstruction which i think is a good thing in however, how you do that? and you mentioned that the and, given qatar's vote in the , egypt, etc. ct

to theld you recommend u.s.? how should we navigate this map be there with a cease-fire and a proposed cease-fire. >> thanks. >> what we have to look at when we talk about reconstruction in gaza is this will be asked waited. it has the potential of being exploited on two levels. ousteds no question that in authority has a track record that is awful in terms of skimming off the top and tapping individuals who run the system, either on the border where unofficial taxes are levied or what has taken inside. with things cannot happen

the needs of that it has. broadly, he is looking for the answer. is hot and dry because of that. but you have a make sure the funds actually get through. there needs to be a significant amount of order site. they are talking about having live stream cameras and added oversight. be manythere needs to layers to ensure that corruption does not take. we needll be some that to make sure and make it clear that we should not trust the palestinian authority as it is constructed right now. .one are the days if i had we have to make sure that we superimpose it.

the fact that we found rockets inside schools, that there was one booby-trapped tunnel underneath every one of the facilities, it has had a very politicized role. it also need some reform, some fromsite and from senators capitol hill. no matter what role rumor has, you seemed so full of energy right now. it needs to be done in a way that does not allow us to go back to where we were. in terms of the tunnels come in terms of the rockets and the way structure works inside the gaza strip. i think the politicization by the two parties and their have been the use of

some of our facilities by hamas, some abandoned once. when israel targeted facilities. andink the demonization where it really gets politicized is at political football. in their way, they answer my's -- the instrumental eyes and agency, one that needs be supported even if you call for greater oversight. that is ok but you are indispensable. >> there is no question, in terms of a services that it palestinians on the gaza strip, it is undeniable that that is absolutely needed.

but to say that it has been politicized by others is not giving them enough credit. it has politicized itself thoroughly through this process. the spokesperson has become a central player. >> for humanitarian grounds. you can't possibly say that he is expressing -- that is totally unfair and let's be honest. he was not. >> bottom line is that unrest has always had a very controversial role. the israelis have struggled with it. the united states have struggled with it. on the one hand, they provide substantial services and on the other hand it serves as a tool to perpetuate the refugee situation rather than solving it. it is able to teach things or pay themselves through the process. the product -- the point is there needs to be reformed and a

lot of the structures good question you will have to explain to me because i am lost. refugeeou resolve the in gaza when almost everyone is a refugee? >> they are not all original refugees. this is part of the problem in general. every other refugee problem in history has been solved by the something about refugees. in gaza, you had the 8000 or so refugees. over time, many of them have died over the years. roughly 30,000 or 35,000 of them left according to the best figures we have. but now you have the children, the branch -- the great-grandchildren. beenefugee status has bestowed upon the descendents of refugees were you now have a million jews. you have 5le -- million refugees. it is impossible to solve this. father -- fromo

father to son and it is impossible to solve here i. >> there is still a great dependence a. if you call them refugees are not refugees, you still end up with the same exact problem. >> no doubt been but i was responding to your point that this has been politicized by others. my point is that it has done a great job at politicizing itself. >> in the second row here.

>> this is off of what aaron said about a negotiated agreement not being availed in the new future. what about the idea that a government official, when he talked about -- do you think this is something that could work? >> i don't even know how to respond. they tried reaching a framework agreement. they are ill-prepared. after all this time, i am persuaded that the politics and the substance and the absence of leaders that are masters of their political houses and their own ideology.

it is no coincidence that every time there has been a breakthrough in this conflict, without exception, it has been preceded by trauma or alternatively an act of heroic statesmanship. and leaders that were prepared to risk -- they were not risk-averse. the left in israel has never and will never dominate the so-called peace process. the only prime minister ever to

concede, however tiny it was. it has transformed. benjamin netanyahu arguably falls into the basket, potentially, of such a transformed talk. i think he lacks the confidence and authority of the others to make these moves. on the palestinian side, i think abbas is a good man. i think he is a prisoner of many things. and palestine, despite the unity agreement still, to this day, resembles noah's ark. there are two of everything. constitutions, security services, sets of donors, and different visions of where

palestine is. the answer you're to your question, my judgment is no. coordinated unilateralism is going to be no more successful from an interim agreement that a permanent solution from anything else that has been tried. >> i don't know about coordinated. there are lots of things both sides could do or should do or shouldn't do and would better not do. they can help the situation at least get past diplomatic way. the danger is when it becomes an effort to unilaterally impose the new reality. it doesn't work out very well. contrast that with agreement. those work. the reality has to be neutral. if it is about behaving better

or not behaving as badly as both sides that done, why not? >> i am puzzled by the centrality of these talks, this idea of hamas disarmament. that it will become a decommissioned military zone. it seems totally unrealistic and maybe a comment about if ihh is going to send another flotilla and that could see some really bad fireworks between israel and turkey. >> as far as israel is concerned, calling for a demilitarized gaza was an overreach on the part of the netanyahu government.

we continue to hear about it from those making a big move in the israeli political spectrum as well. i think this is essentially asking thomas to willingly destroy itself. i can't imagine it would be in a position where they're willing to do so. i think it is important we talk about this as an ultimate goal but it would only happen after the inclusion of hamas in the plo and that means renouncing its charter. we are a long ways away from that. it's good to set that as a horizon goal but i think that is about where we have to leave it for now. the last flotilla went so well that they decided to reconsider it. the role of turkey, i have been tracking it for a while now. turkey was and is one of the

strongest proponents of thomas. there have been reports of proponents of hamas. ofre have been reports financial assistance, material assistance. there is this individual who is the founder of the brigades in the west bank who is based -- yet the flotilla activity in the past. not to mention the rhetoric we have heard which has just been absolutely toxic and harmful. turkey's role has been a malignant one throughout this process. it continues to surprise me that the u.s. has not taken this up in a more serious manner. it is one thing to be a proponent of the palestinians and another thing to take the side of hamas. >> there are three ways of reading disarmament. one is with the two of you have said, that this is a rhetorical gesture that is essentially

political. something the israeli public would like to hear and that's about it. there are two other ways of reading it. it is a demand that is known up front to be unacceptable unless they are broken as an organization. unless hamas is broken as an organization. that is when they will disarm, when they are broken. you may create a demand that the world would see is absolutely reasonable and rational that you know the other side is not going to accept to say that they want except reasonable demand and we don't have an agreement. another which is even more nuanced is disarmament in this context, in the context of some adjustment to the closure from the egyptian side and the israeli side, and in the context of a reconstruction program which is virtually inevitable, it can be code for a greatly intensified regime of inspections and monitoring, dual

use goods which is almost everything like cement, steal, and anything except food and medicine. it might be a way for israeli leaders preparing everyone for demands that probably the egyptians would share for much more intensified inspections and monitoring including inside of gaza. >> i think this is 100% right that this is a purposeful effort and quite clever on the part of the israelis to introduce and normative standard that the international community and americans are thinking seriously about. there's decommissioning, taking away one third of the high trajectory weapons. dismantling the 15,000 to 25,000 units of the palestinian army that hamas has actually created.

which i think is beyond possibility. one is staunch and the flow of high trajectory weapons and the other is tunneling. the over under problem. the over problem is the trajectory targets. that can be dealt with. if you can contain slavery within the states where it already existed, and would fundamentally died. -- it would fundamentally die. staunch the delivery of weapons components and on the other, you try to create some monitoring regime to deal with the issue of tunnels. israelis will develop their own underground technology. it may take quite a while. the same sorts of techniques people use to explore for oil and gas to basically address the under problem. i think they have actually succeeded in some respects of changing the frame of reference with demilitarization but i do not believe it is designed to take guns away.

>> i just want to thank jonathan, eli, and the other panelists. i have a question basically about the linking or delinking of hamas with the isis phenomenon which is global. if you look at the report of digging technology from hezbollah to hamas to isis, that is one instance. it might be brussels or if you look at the flags in the demonstration in the hague recently, or look at mumbai where the outside aligned guys, terrorist attack that house. or you look at the leader talking about israel, gaza, and

india and kashmir. in the same vein. this leaves the need to believe and i just want to ask your views on that. whether the gaza situation fuels the global al qaeda phenomenon or the al qaeda situation giving the timing and synchronization of timing, does the global isis phenomenon also influence hamas's actions. >> you're asking a question that i think we have seen answered over and over again that absolutely what happens in the palestinian israeli conflict often fuels the sort of hatred and ideology that feeds right into al qaeda or isis. this question of militant islam, becoming a term that we don't

use a lot right now. david ross, the ceo of foreign policy talking about how we lack in global policy dealing with militant or radical islam. i think what we're seeing right now has refocused. there is a sense maybe over the last six years and this is been one of the critiques i have had, we weren't calling this phenomenon what it was. we were talking about violent extremism and trying to define the definition down of what it was we were fighting. i think it is become a little difficult to deny that we are fighting an islamist threat when the main group we are fighting is called the islamic state. it makes it difficult to deny this. but certainly it is part of a broader phenomenon, the idea that al qaeda and hamas or isis are one and the same, no. they are very different. each has their own local

grievances that are married to the broader ideology. i should note that there have been links over time. and also the same goes for hamas links to iran and some of it acts as well. we are still dealing with his broader phenomenon and it has been written us an surged in the 1990's. we tried to deal with it in the gulf and iraq war era. when that war failed, we tried to pretend it wasn't there but the phenomenon still exist. we are getting a sense that with the amount of critique i am seeing, we need to refocus now on the islamist threat. >> his question did a fantastic job of virtually every scrap, globally, that could possibly be used to weave these together. i think there are two registers.

that they are linked in a reinforcing way. you asked in what direction does it reinforce. but there is also a non-reinforcing way. these are all islam and there are armed islamists there is a core at the base and you can even expand it and say there is ultimately a connection of nonviolent islamists. what that means is ultimately, the idea that brotherhood parties are the proper corrective is the wrong idea. on the other hand, there is an extent to which the thomas relationship is very

is very relationship problematic. if they are vulnerable on the ground, it's probably to a threat from their religious rights. it would be people flying the banner that might bring them down more easily than anyone else. and they have confronted small groups like that and have reacted in a very violent manner. the just wipe them out because they know very well that this is a potential threat. and certainly when you see any group that used to represent the religious right moving to the center or becoming the center by virtue of ruling, it opens up space even further. that is what has happened here and in other places. >> i would add that in the case of isis, they are being fought right now by an iraqi army supported by iran and in syria they are fought by the iranians and on and off.

they have recently been thanked for being provided with the advanced rocket technology they use. it's an important distinction and iran itself is an islamist state in many ways on the shia side. >> and the muslim brotherhood parties, other lesser jihad arrests that are not on good terms with isis. >> and those in iraq that fought against the al qaeda lunatics. >> i would add one more thing. there was a sense about a year ago after the fall of mohamed morsi that hamas is extremely vulnerable and could potentially even be defeated you are financially or militarily, politically, that this was a devastating blow. and if you talk to the israeli leadership, there is a debate about what would happen and the way it shook out was there was a real fear of doing anything.

they would rather keep they hobbled hamas then destroy it and send the lessons of the rest of the islamist groups in the region that they can destroy israel. it was an accurate that they thought it was somewhat predictable and they wanted it weekend -- weakened. and they did not want a vacuum that could create some of these jihadi groups that are running around in the gaza strip. >> good afternoon. it's a pleasure to be here. in terms of the u.s. leadership, we have never heard an american president speak almost daily about the u.s. can't do.

i thought i would share that with you. focused on the palestinian and unity government, something that was skirted around. something that the finance minister made today who basically said that we fear -- what has happened here? the israeli cabinet voted unanimously to break off talks because of the reconciliation agreement. they voted with the cabinet in that regard. what is your view on the palestinian unity government now?

>> i don't think there is a consensus view at the wilson center. he made a compelling point that the israeli government is not at all certain that when the thehat they want palestinian authority back in gaza for one primary reason. that is because there is a fear that thomas -- hamas's objective, knowing that they need some measure of palestinian authority and support that the game is to deliver benefits. it however retains control of gaza and its repository of weapons. it is in some respects the hezbollah model. it preserves its ideology, coherence, and the veto power.

whether or not that is realistic, the reality is the peace and focus of this has been driven by a bunch of guys living 20 or 25 meters below ground in bunkers. you may be right. about the four components of hamas's world. it seems to me that those that have the military initiative are essentially controlling the fight here. how do you we can and undermine hamas as an organization? and yet to degrade and the deter itsrad and capacity?

>> there is a good bit of disagreement if this was at technocratic government. it was clear that the government was formed based on an agreement with the maas -- with hamas. to say it was merely technocratic, they did not want to be friars or suckers. they didn't want to act like they didn't know what was gion oing on. it is well known on the subject. excuse me. i think the other problem was this hezbollah model that we discussed, that it would be able to be this state within a state and it was not going to address that problem. there is also the question of ehat if an election did tak

place. the implication was that hamas would be able to take part again and you have 2006 revisited. it leads to another political crisis and we never actually answer the question whether hamas should or can be involved in the next round of elections. we have kicked that can down the road. the more important thing i would think about now, there has been a shift in israeli thinking. you will hear some people say that we haven't come around to this. but there is a shift in thinking with most of the israeli figures i have talked to saying we are now ready for this, ready for abbas to take over. we want hi. -- him. as long as he is in the drivers seat, that's fine. let's do this. this is something i have talked about with many colleagues and we have had discussions here as well. this idea that it is either abbas or hamas, making these choices are horrible for the palestinians. there needs to be a political reform process that lends itself to having different choices and having different leaders.

abbas is now 80 years old, nine years into a four-year term. this is not the guy that will be delivering the gaza strip let alone the palestinian people. i think the israeli perspective right now is shortsighted much in the same way the international community is. if you're not looking at the long-term horizon for political participation and trying to figure out how to make a government really function, we are going to go right back to where you are. >> it is essential and a medium-term project. you're asking about the immediate aftermath, really. the answer is we don't konw. you kept coming back to the same question of is hamas weakened or not? it depends not on the relationship with israel but its relationship with the tla and the plo -- pla and the plo. that is where the wins and

losses get tallied. in domestical political politics. as far as that is concerned, what happens and what doesn't happen. how does the aftermath, the cease-fire process, and the winding down of this wave of hostilities play out politically among palestinians? does hamas have a case to make? why did you keep fighting for 28 days after the egyptians offered you -- you basically took that more or less. later on, what did you accomplish? right now, they don't have a very good answer but they might at the end of the day. even if they are politically

damaged, if the palestinian authority is not in position either because they have not been put in that position internationally or they have not been able to take advantage for opportunities that were created for them, you can have a wash in which hamas comes out better because they seem more dynamic. both parties emerge with equal credibility. we have no idea. that's why the terms and conditions under which this ends, either through agreement or de facto, becomes absolutely decisive. in determining how this plays out. that is when you will know the answer. is hamas weaker or stronger? stay tuned. >> first of all, thank you all. i would like to follow up a bit on previous points. the issue of public opinion.

we have been talking very high. i want to go down to public opinion. you brought up the issue of public opinion among the palestinians. whether hamas will answer well is up for grabs. on the israeli side, as you said, this was about security and the perception of security. what we are seeing now is israelis are talking about feeling less secure, both in the north and south. and the change in the israeli position on security. the iron dome was a changer. you are talking about something that will sense tunnels. it a defensive measure where israeli doctrine has been to go in and fight it on their territory.

the best defense is an offense. you see that changing in any way? israel'sposition on side? also, a sense that they brought nothing to the israelis and left people feeling less secure? >> that is a tough one, to risk generalizing for a society that has different currents and his -- and different political streams. my sense was the israelis were looking for something more than a tie. this could not be 2012 or 2006 in lebanon. they wanted a determined event. the reality is -- sharon broke the back of the second intifada.

perhaps netenyaju's objective was to create the authority that sharon developed. that took him beyond his perceived transactions -- transgressions in lebanon. but netanyahu is too risk averse. to have courted the something more definitive. you have two choices. you have transformation where a fundamental crisis literally leads to a shifting of the tectonic plates in some regards. influences leaders' calculations. and aolitics are reshaped new dynamic is created. sorry, i don't see any single factor emerging out of this equation that would lead to such an outcome.

i fall back to the default positions. this will come out the way it usually comes out. some transactional agreement. which is probably better than 2012. it will have to be better than 2012. will it then create as much time as 2008-2009 created? that is my take because i cannot divine the transformative implications of this. it is localized with some interesting tales, if they can be connected. >> i would add this on the israeli public opinion front. i watched a ton of the israeli tv during the conflict. there was a clear sense the

israelis rallied around this conflict. there was a strong sense of national interest, national pride. there was specifically pride in the idf. this is a redemption of the idf after the hezbollah conflict. there were many problems on the ground. the ground troops proved able, relatively speaking. there is pride in the defensive technology. the idea that the startup nation is now blending in with the defense needs of the country. there's a frustration. part of it had to do with the way that israeli leadership frame the conflict. hamas was going to get defeated. a kept getting a hard hit,

hard strike. that was the term that was used over and over again by military leaders. it it is unclear whether that was in fact the case. no question that, on a military level, it was overwhelming force. what the end result was remains a question. driving this debate now in israel is going to be the southern community without question. they are far further to the right than they were before. they are unhappy that hamas was not destroyed. i think there's a sense -- you can't meet hamas halfway in terms of israel's existence. there is no way to negotiate with hamas. there may not be a way to fully defeat it if you are going to operate as a moral or ethical army. if you got the casualties were bad from this last month,

imagine if israel went all the way in and did what it did that the south wanted them to do. it is impossible. there is a sense now, it is hard to make addictions but you see a sense that guys have a little predictions to make but you see a sense that guys little bit more prominence right now. the center can use this as perhaps an opportunity to talk about working with the pa. that me be where the discussion is heading. >> i want to thank our panelists and audience. i think this was a useful discussion. the meeting is now adjourned. [applause] >> thank you very much, gentlemen. >> we were right on time. all right.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> you can watch this discussion any time on www.c-span.org. the associated press reports palestinian and negotiations hardened their positions today. both sides appeared reluctant and to return to the deadly all-out fighting that destroyed large arts of the coastal strip. that is from the associated press. from earlier today, the united nations security council meant to receive enough a from the secretary-general's released on board. as much of hisu comments that we can as we start a discussion on capitol hill that is scheduled to start in five minutes. we will show you as much as we

can from today at the united nations. >> the seven thousand 240 or needing of the sick or to counsel is called to order dated the provisional agenda of this meeting is a situation in the middle east, including the palace and in question. the agenda is adopted. in accordance with rule 29 of the councils provisional rules of procedure i invite special coordinator of the middle east peace process and representative of the secretary-general to participate in this meeting. it is so decided. >> we meet today against the

that drop of a vested region with heightened political tensions. as well as the recent attacks by a violent extremist groups from syria against lebanese armed forces and internal security forces in a town -- a lebanese town. on 15 augusttion of resolution 2170, encountering isil, iat of iso--- if would like to focus my briefing on a situation on israel and palestine with an emphasis on gaza. as we meet, the temporary cease-fire between israel and gaza is holding. now on the fifth and last day of ascension, meeting

separately with egyptian authorities in a crucial effort to break the deadlock of violence and retaliation. i traveled to cairo and the secretary-general has continued to engage with the stakeholders to end the violence and reach a durable cease-fire. in gazas of the people for a better future in the hopes of the people in israel for sustainability rests on those talks. today,deadline later midnight cairo time, or 5:00 the am here in new york, we seek to find an understanding on the cease-fire and address the underlying issues afflicting gaza or make system to progress toward it. at the very least, we hope the cease-fire will be extended and the situation remains quiet.

believewe all shared that no blood is being said at the moment. but we also regret that it has taken too much time and too many lives to achieve this pause. the total of almost 2000 palestinians have been killed, of home 459 our children and 700 dirty nine are women -- 739 are women. surveillanccivilians. a few dozen israelis have been directly injured rockets or shrapnel. station andof this loss of life, the united nations has mobilized its every effort, including personal engagement to the secretary-general, and working closely with international stakeholders to end the violence, we did not

relent despite said that's because the loss of civilian life was too unbearable. onto occasions, we were successful. humanitarian forces allowed civilians a much-needed respite. like to commend the government of egypt for brokering at. it is essential that the guns remained silent to allow for increased humanitarian, early recovery efforts, addressing the needs of people of gaza, and during -- including needs of water and more viable shelter for those displaced who are not able to return to their destroyed homes. mr. president, it remains my conviction that we must not leave gaza in the condition it was before this latest as question. otherwise, on exit and entry's

of old will continue to feel instability and conflict. i am afraid the next escalation will be just a matter of time. as i told the general assembly recently from cairo, the basic wage and must consist on addressing consider -- addressing security concerns. the assessment of gaza's needs have not yet been completed, but there will be at least three steps needed after the so-called got let in 2000 nine. approximately 1600 housing units have been destroyed or severely damaged, affecting some 100,000 palestinians. reconstruction