i think we are much better now than we ever were but i come from a tradition when i worked in a regional paper in the days when newspapers made so much money that you did not have to i come from a tradition in the days when newspapers made so much money he did not have to court them. i think we are much other at it. i try to answer e-mails from readers. we invite people to our page. we talk more in sessions like this about how we make decisions but i think sometimes we take for granted. i think i'll are always stunned that the federal government does not call up and say isn't it picture?use of gaza it is amazing people think like

that. i can certainly do a better job of explaining how we make decisions. >> i agree. i think so many people have so much information or distractions, the idea role of the media is not one that interest people. >> i think we are much more interested in the topic than anyone else. by and large the best thing we can do is do our job and you're asleep and well. i do think there is a humbling that occurred over the past 15 years as the industry has done much less well. so i do share the view that if we can be more transparent, that is helpful and consistent with who we want to be as an organization. like we wrap up, i would for each of you, the journalist

out there, to give a sense of how you tried to inspire the people that work with your theeagues to mind for difficult story and why it is important. left to right,om please. >> i would say i have done the last -- a lot of work at reuters to encourage more excitement about the bigger and more investigative stories. as a news agency you can be tempted to chasing every story that has occurred but there is enormous satisfaction in trying to get to the bottom of things and find out why things happened and what is really going on and what will happen next. i think is able have done more of that they have discovered it is enormously satisfying and there is enormous appetite out there for it. whether it is fine -- individuals organizations, what they're saying is we have so much information is what they

lycée as hell me make sense of the world. i think journalists get excited when they help people make sense of the world, when they are backed by the organization and they see the results. you see things happening, p -- people freed or forced labor camps and good things happening in the world. i think it is up to us to encourage it, incentivize it and share the excitement with them on doing a job and doing it really well. >> i think to encourage the bigger pieces, i deeply involved themselves in them. to send theway message of really care about is to get involved in the discussions. >> we will eat the last few minutes for the program with a discussion on relations between the u.s. and northeast asian regions.

examining security threats for u.s. and allies in the region from north korea and china and the strained relationship between japan and south korea. turn off cell phones as we prepare to begin. we welcome those who join us on the heritage home page and on c-span. our internet c-span viewers are always encouraged to participate and answers. -- in questions and answers. we will post the program within 24 hours honor heritage homepage for everyone's future reference as well. opening the program will be walter low man. serves an adjunct professor at georgetown or he leads a graduate seminar on american foreign-policy interest in southeast asia. prior to joining us that heritage, senior vice president the businessof

council and serving as senior county director. also has served on the republican staff for the senate foreign relations committee and senatorial aide on capitol hill. these join me in welcoming walter loman. ?alter [applause] >>thank you. to begood to hear her -- here amongst the many friends. we're here to talk about a pretty serious issue and that is a matter of history. of course when we say history what we're talking about really is japanese occupation of korea, world war ii and the lead up to world war ii. it it's funny you never reference the post world war two history and you're talking about history, the many decades now of toanese contribution international relations and the economy, but nevertheless, we know what we're talking about

when we say history. even listing the events can be a matter of controversy so for now we will let the word history speaks for itself and let our guests unpack the word for us a little bit. we call it american optimism if we can getut i hope through conversation about how we isolate the disputes that japan and korea have over matters of the past and talk thet ways he can manage issues going forward so we can manage the real issues in the relationship as well as the trilateral relationship with the united states. to lead off the gush and we're very pleased and honored to welcome admiral blair to the stage. former u.s. pacific command and former director of national intelligence and former director of national intelligence. chairman of the board of the peace foundation usa.

sps in tokyo was very kind to post dement in tokyo a couple of months ago. front if yous out would like to take a look at it. you can go to our website to find a copy of the speech. he also hosted us and president dement in washington. we are very pleased to be in a position to return the favor and invite admiral blair to the heritage to the foundation to share stock -- thoughts on the stage. admiral blair. >> thanks very much. it is a pleasure to be here to talk about what is a very serious subject. oncepanish philosopher famously remarked that those who

cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. ringing phrase has generally been taken out of context and use it to justify false analogies for current actions. a more intrinsic quote has been it often seems to me these three powerful countries in the region of china, republic of korea, japan all with long entangled histories are rolling down the stream of history, facing backwards. they are rowing hard, lots of energy, blades are flailing the water, foam is flying

everywhere. moving somewhat faster than the currents would carry them, however, they mostly see their own wake. they've mostly see the water and the shoreline that is really behind them. they see what is ahead of them only when they turn their head and take a quick look over their .houlders they do not seem to have a quick destination in mind. did not have a sense of how quickly the larger currents are carrying them down the river. consider china. chinese leaders are driven by what they see as 120 five years of history of humiliation and are determined never to suffer a time like that ever again. steering by the way got their powerful past humiliation they are less aware of the huge currents propelling them down the river tom and the greatest of these are the currents of greater economic relations and mobilization.

europeans true countries and the united states carved concessions out of china in the late 19th century but for the same entries that has propelled china to become the second-largest, second most powerful economy in the world. .r consider japan japan is making the new defense policy not so much by defining its interest, look into the revising a up but by single constitutional interpretation of the past. that interpretation of its ability to exercise the right of collective self-defense. river,rents in the big nature of the river bank has changed fundamentally since that time. the 1930'sof developed into rising era of passion system and worldwide depression that bread

desperation and extreme activity to political views and many countries around the world. the world of the future is not one of ideological motivated our blocs contesting for world dominance. rather a world of contesting individual nations come and sometimes acting individually, sometimes cooperating and functional multilateral groups of various kinds. a world in which failing states pose as much danger as to powerful states and which extremist violence can pose dangers to develop and it interconnected world. a world in which a major country like japan needs to deploy diplomatic, economic and military powers in sophisticated ways to cooperate with like-minded allies to preserve security and prosperity for themselves for the region and for the world. japan requires major changes for security policies, not just

legacy concepts from a past age. finally, consider korea. korean leader attitudes are driven in part historical fears that both japan and china somehow look down on korea based on historical experience. they fear economic domination by china similar to the military domination of korea in the past. they reject japanese apologies for it actions during the colonial time because they do not consider them to be sincere. korean suspect they did not respect them. they celebrate to national separate holidays on japanese colonial rule. independence day commemorating the effort of 1919 march first and national liberation day august 15. just this year joining with the chinese they completed a new on honored as a patriot but condemned as a terrorist in tokyo for a fascinating general of korea and former prime minister of japan in 1909.

yet the big currents of world koreapment have propelled to a much more secure position than it has upheld in the past. it has a security treaty with the united states, the most powerful region in the world. territorial conquest has been discredited. economic prowess counts for more based on hard work, adaptability, other forms of soft power such as cultural influences were increased we import and and by these measures korea is a very powerful country. it can deal as appear with all nations of the world including china and japan, and should take counsel of the ambition not of its fears. history is important. historical ignorance can cause a country to repeat the same mistake twice. however, remembering too much history, understanding too little is the difference between the past and present can conjure up also historical analogies,

restrict the country's ability to make rugrats and cause it to miss opportunities for positive change. restrictanother care of the effective history of the country's international policies we should note. psychologist tells us that for , individuals, the memory of pleasure is more important and lasting than is the measure of lane -- the memory of pain. poor nations it seems to be equally selective but in different directions. for countries it seems past failures, past injustices are the most powerful memories fake can have and propel action. china, for example, still thinks of itself in part as the developing and we country but china is the second largest economy in the world with nuclear and armed forces to match. the rest of the world thinks china is a very powerful country. is somewhattude

dominated by memories of just 15 when the ramp5 control of the government and ran the country into disaster. andveneers of restraint except larry behavior since that time did not seem as important in japan self image. the republic of korea in many ways inks of itself is a small, divided country, a shrimp among whales, many times invaded. rather one of the largest economies in the world with a gdp per capita exceeding more than any of its neighbors. a worldwide reputation for menu fracturing excellence and international peacekeeping operations and major contributor andf peacekeeping international appeal. politics of history that also play a role. government exploits history for partisan and power purposes and episodes of history the most useful for the purposes are often the ones most nucleating

-- most humiliating. democracy is like -- japan and korea exploit insults to bid for political power to appeal the groups with whom the issues have special resonance. it is easy to fall under this syndrome, no politician in a dictatorship or democracy ones to be vulnerable to accusations of inadequate patriotism, softness and supporting the countries on her. -- honor. they mostly believe they can control it. not so much that it causes damage to their countries. thin line in any country between healthy nationalism.d the introduction of controversial historical events in the car policies and politics often blurs the line and sometimes crosses it. even if nationalism does not become extreme, it certainly

prevents progress in other areas. whatever the root cause is and explanation, the exploit and painfulf the nations past -- exportation of the nation's painful past is a conscious political decision, whether it is a controversial wartime trying, raising the comfort women or raising emphasis on an especially brutal long and brutal for. there have been recent extensions to train japan and china on one hand when historical issues did not play such a large and crippling role. leaders in all three countries understood the benefits of cooperation in many areas, business, cultural, people two people were more important to the countries development, while not denying or covering up the historical issues and in many cases taking steps to knowledge apologize for to

them. they did not allow it to dominate the relationship that it prevented progress in the other -- in other areas as is the case now. historical animosities clearly can be a malia rated as aches the experience with germany and most of rest says -- rest of asia's experience. so much for admiring the problem as historical issues and nationalism and international relations. the much more difficult relation -- question is what to do about it. he has two panels that follow our talks that hopefully can come up with ideas about it. let me give you mine. i mentioned earlier, the solution ultimately lies with political leadership.

they must decide it outweighs the advantages. as i mentioned, this has been the case in the past when relations between japan and china were relatively cordial" operative. however, there are other actions that can be taken by others and by their friends and -- my friends in the united states. as a first step they must understand their own histories in a more sure way. all countries have painful past.es in their the united states has a least three major instances of unjust and brutal treatment of large groups of citizens. slavery against african-americans, slaughter of native americans and x per creations of their land am internment of japanese americans in world war ii. in most major historical episodes like these, some

leaders and some ordinary citizens access aerobically. some acted despicably. until a country achieves a full country, itg of its cannot handle the internal pressures to simplify and exploit that history for political advantage and cannot handle the external pressures from other countries from repeated apologies for denial or leverage. however, in my mind there is a much more fundamental and important reason for the citizens of the country to understand their history. as human beings we have to make sense of our lives and the know how we've reached the current situation, what our forbearers .id on the how that affects us it applies to individuals, families, nations. there will always be elements of myths in family and personal and national histories, but as we become more mature on the we

need to get below the myths and enter the reality, complex mixture of heroism, cowardice, loyalty, endurance and surrender that makes a real history the way it actually happened. now it may be too much to hope that china can achieve historical honesty under the current form of government. dictatorships are basically threatened by their own history, and that is why they work so hard to control it. even when they try to deal with it a come up with oversimplifications. they censor serious works of history like the recent biography. however, i do not believe it is too much to hope democracies like japan and korea can pace their own histories more honestly than they do. facing history is much more than

just a sentence or two in a school textbook. it is the encouragement and widespread discussion of serious works of history such as the recent books of japan 1941, an examination of why japan decided to go to war with the obviously more powerful united states. on examination of korean troops conduct in the vietnam war were aldiers had an -- had reputation for brutality that surpassed other countries. it is based on facts, not on whether book hurts or helps. political cause. research and books are critical. so too are movies, documentaries that reach a wider audience, often with more emotional power. the popular director clint aboutod made a movie hiroshima. it is interesting the movie from the japanese view is more

popular in the united states. received more oscar nominations than did the one from the american point of view. also, based on the american cases of coming to grips with the country's history never ends. it is not the case of putting the sentence and official school textbook, entering and accepting apologies and then moving on. a case of continued research on the facts and research of the time, book about african-americans or in 1960's outlook.different in this sense there really is no place for apology for tea. shameful at says in national history will always be painful and embarrassing and will have to be faced and learned in greater depth. isgetting the history right one important step but there are

others. opinion makers, public figures come a media commentator should emphasize the important trends of the future as much as they talk about the narrow, historical issues of the past. great games countries have made since the end of the cold war, civil war in china have all been enabled by international operations. the economic miracles in japan and china have been based on foreign investment and exports, political developments have occurred through political contact with the rest of the world. territorial aggression has been discredited among advanced nations as a way to increase power. in fact, military aggression whether by the soviet union in afghanistan, united states in considered toally be hugely expensive for dubious games. things have changed since the 1930's and 1940's and 1950's.

so while the opinion makers and influential spokesman should not disregard or cover up historical issues, they should place them in a wider context of changes that have taken place since those years. most of all, this puts a premium on national leadership. it requires careful calibration of the flick statements along with private medications. big public actions, even accompanied by very public are simply fodder for exploitation by political opportunist. public opinion eads to be shaped by smaller steps, thoughtful public statements on days of historical significance, encouragement to private initiative to the history right, public admonitions of statements whether made by a political ally or political enemy, wherever they are made.

there is a particular role to be played by leaders who have strong nationalist credentials. they can uniquely lead their countries to put historical animosities he heightened them without the risk of inciting domestic backlash that might in turn only create a further spiral of acrimony. as richard nixon's lead an opening to china, an opening to capitalism, so some current or future nationalist leader in japan or korea has an opportunity to leave his or her mark on history. in addition, an important place for very private communications among national leaders. trusted emissaries need to be used to test whether an overture would be reciprocated. because public dayton's and not actions are so subject to true intentions they need to be conveyed through trusted channels. national leaders and immediate staff need to resist the temptation to week everything they do to the press to get the appearance of action and the appearance of masters of the

situation. so let me conclude by providing the rest of the store by george santi ando's famous quote about history. about the dangers of forgetfulness, he goes on to explain manhunt and true orgress in which no events habits have grasp onto instincts. this is truly the challenge for the leaders and citizens for the powerful countries of southeast asia. they need to understand their own histories and understand what has changed since the time the historical events occurred. they need to avoid history impeding development of a better future, rather than rolling ships a state while facing the stern, they need to face forward on the ground a teller and steer confidently into the future. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you, admiral. hoping to look into more detail on the program. heritage has a long history of .elationships none closer with those in south korea. that is why i am honored to introduce you to the ambassador of the united states. he was appointed just this year the president. fire to this he served as ambassador to foreign minister trades. serviceeen at foreign 36 years. needless to say, far more than i can go to in their brief introduction. suffice it to say the ambassador

is an outstanding representative of the country, good friend of the heritage foundation and someone we are proud to welcome to our stage. thank you. [applause] >> good afternoon. i should begin by thanking our invitingfoundation for me to the seminar. this morning i was having breakfast with one of you, and i said it is amazing 200 people would show up on the relationship between korea and japan in august. i said it would only happen in only washington, d.c., no other place in the world. i guess we both much of it to it fact that you organized at the heritage foundation, so thank you very much. -- at the samee

time i have to say was very inspiring. thank you, admiral blair. upon issues ing history. he was depending on psychology and then depending on political science. termsruly at in disciplinary approach he has applied to japan. at the same time, i have a far simpler approach should. i will be a book to presented in mr -- far more simpler manner. in order to do it let me raise three questions and then try to answer the three questions as observed by traditional relations and japan. my first question is what is the present state of relations in korea and japan? there simpler

answer would be not the best. be very simple answer would very easily shared by all of you. but i would have to add in the sense that if you look at the part, and if i look to the , i am more optimistic when i look in the future. when i look upon the past 50 years, then korea and japan normalized the relationship in 1965. so next year we would celebrate the 50th anniversary of normalized relation -- relationships. there has been ups and downs. all in all there has been tremendous progress between the relationship of korea and japan.

is why i feel very much encouraged about the relationship. , i am look to the future will grow from strength to strength. why? because we share so many things. same values, same interest. they always say, geography is destiny. so when i think about all of this commonality between korea and japan, i am very confident for the coming 50 years and beyond we can develop the relationship from strength to strength. there has been ups and downs. could apply history and perspective and political science perspective and apply even a psychiatry at this -- psychiatrist perspective.

at the same time i think whatever perspective you take there is ups and downs. there wasrn has been recognizing the past as it was and taking responsibility for the past, it created a political space for bringing the relationship to a higher place. that has been a pattern we experienced over the past 50 years. our is the reason why in view we are deeply concerned about what is happening in the past several years. time, what ime think about the future i am very confident we will be overcoming the relationship between korea and japan. for the time being let me think about the second question, which

is given the fact that we could develop relationships and positive manner and are so confident about the coming six years and be beyond, what should be done today, that will be the second question. the simple answer to the question would be a lot. there are so many things we could be doing together between korea and japan. there are a lot of things we could be doing today and then we could be doing them on two different tracks. i would call it the track of history. the reason why i said that his korea-japan relationship is a nation to nation relationship. we know how we can develop relationship. we can strengthen the relationship insecurity. we can strengthen it in the economy.

that is what we do. that is what korea does. does.s what japan that is what we should be doing in the normal way. years ins i spent 36 koran foreign service. these days i often look back about what i personally did when it comes to the relationship between korea and japan. then i cannot be reminded again and again about what korea used to do. personally walked hand-in-hand the time when korea had to walk very hard back in 1996. when i came to geneva back in be9, then i used to

responsible for human rights issues. again, i was walking closely with my counterpart. at the time the gentleman who later on became an ambassador of course. then i used to walk very closely with him on which issues? human rights issues. i impression at the time is there are large number of member countries of the human rights commission at that time. the time isn of other countries coming from asia , no other countries and japan with which we could share so many things when it comes to the human race issue. in 2000 to an increasing number of soccer fans in the united states. in 2002 korea and japan we were supposed of football games. it does not happen too often. a very limited number when more

than one country, two countries will join forces and that happened in 2002. i personally worked on the issue. 2003, president of south korea came to japan. --the time i was directional director of international issues and was wondering if there is anything i could do to develop a normal listed relationship between korea and japan and i came up with this idea. i think many of you have been to international airport is aged. nearer. another one far i thought about tokyo. at the same time it is far nearer here to tokyo.

so i came up with an idea. go all the wayto fly? thathy can't we is the idea that i came up with. then we made a proposal in japan and the japanese like the idea. that is how it began to fly. that is the reason why each time felt much pride about and i was encouraged when i saw high school students coming to korea on a school expedition. fact, i could see a large group of high school students coming from japan who were on theto visit korea political flight. these are the examples of some

of the things i personally did. so we in fact have been doing many things to strengthen relationships. getting back to admiral layers point recognizing the past is important but at the same time we have to continue to make for as, practical efforts normal relationship between korea and japan. then i have to tell you this, again i am quoting admiral blair. issues we should be addressing. and then again admiral blair was the interdisciplinary approach

about how we should be understanding issues of history, but at this time time, let me repeat to you there is a clear and distinct pattern in the relationship. there is a reason why we keep on one in fact i already shared with you what i personally did in 1990's and 21st century to strengthen relations in japan. one reason we cannot do that very unfortunately these days is because of some of the statements coming from japan. very difficult actions being made in japan. that in fact is the reason why we keep on saying the importance of recognizing the past in a fair and honest manner. that is important in the

relationship between korea and japan. so as a matter of fact i raised this issue not only with japanese but those in washington , and the other day i was talking to one diplomat coming had a very, and interesting experience behind him in the sense that he is a european diplomat but at the he started political reform phd at tokyo university and his dissertation was on modern history of japan. this is whate of he had to say. he said when it comes to issues of comfort women, the japanese are suffering from the problem of their own creation. recognized accepted, the issue of comfort women and a fair and honest manner, the issue would have long been gone by this time.

they are creating their own problem and struggling from their own problem and very painful to look upon them as somebody who spent so many years in japan studying japanese history and working as a professional in japan it is very painful to watch them. that is what i heard from the european diplomat here in d.c. so when it comes to japanese leaders i think there are two different kinds. i think all japanese leaders, are thinking about making a proud country out of japan but at the same time some of them thinking they are doing that through recognizing the past as it was that we in fact can make a proud country. think it isme that

through denial of what happened in the past that we cannot reach the same objective. i think as i already told you there are ups and downs. when we have to deal with the tendency to deny what happened in the past, it makes it very difficult to strengthen our relationship. having said that, i have come to the third point, which is when i was ambassador for one year now which i am come to base again and again in a very different corners of washington. there is where we as americans look upon the relationship between korea and japan, how could we do in the united states theave you to improve relationship between korea and japan cap code that is a

i received over and over again for the past one year. my simple answer is this, which is more of the same. in theu have been doing u.s. congress and department, the white house am a what you have been doing in the pink tanks, what do been doing in the u.s. newspapers, that in fact has been very helpful for us to try to related -- improve the relationship. why do i say that? it is because i am getting back to the point by admiral blair, which is less -- let's recognize the past failure honestly and that is what president obama has been saying again and again. andad a press conference that is exactly what he said. the first thing that might --

must happen is to recognize the past failure and honestly come is the same message is the message from the department of state was said and prime ministers. they wanted to recognize the past as they were. that as we know it has been helpful. those states have been helpful to improve -- improve the relationship within the u.s.. that is the message coming again and again from decision-makers as opinionn, as well makers in this town, including the heritage foundation. that is the reason why i say thank you for what you have been iing in the united states and

think you can keep on doing what you have been doing so far. there are my three points. thank you so much. [applause] >> i am going to turn it over to to think about the burning questions. nine of chris nelson has one as always. -- i know that chris nelson has one as always. >> thank you. terrific come a very important statements. i will try to run them both and my report tomorrow. was the ambassador invited and was he not able to come for some

reason to this? >> this is an independent effort. clarification in case someone wondered. you use a lot is of descriptive thinking in your speech. prime were to provide minister avi on what he should say in order to have president park and the korean friends , what with the prime minister have to say that you think the korean leadership come andept as ok yeah

see wondering from what you as a practitioner, do you think aboutpossible to talk korea, japan, political reconciliation under the current japanese leadership or is this something we're just going to have to wait out and hope for the best? thank you. as i said in my remarks, the visitors to the shrine have overwhelming symbolism that it is hard to shred out the elements of what is true and not true. if you read the prime minister statements he makes in conjunction with the visits to

the shrine, they are very good, balanced statements. the dim drowned out by of the fact of showing up at the thene with all of controversy that many experts in the audience are more familiar with than i the way it was established to what the museum says and the shrine says the fact that honor some and not others. all of that has gained a size any really dwarfs whatever japanese prime minister can say. i said in my remarks i think the way not to make -- the way to make progress is not to try to take short-term actions but somehow change symbolism because i think that is the work of generations. i think my advice to the prime minister would be to show

respect to the armed forces of japan, civilians who died in the way, whichfferent gets at the honorable, patriotic the debt we all owe to those who put on a uniform and fought for us and yet is not overwhelmed by the symbolic significance of the place. with respect to the second thoughts that just came from the floor, i think it is not necessarily who is in power in , it is not decided by the citizens in japan and what we could or could not do but i think at the same time what is inortant is understanding

korea and japan about what would work for the best benefit of japan. than a fifth of the international community and i think what must happen here is understanding what must be fromn -- must have been japanese leaders. i totally agree when he says what explanations are important but at the same time when politicians make an action and the symbolism of the actions. i think they are enormously important. the considerations could be made before any statement or action are taken and they impact would be extremely helpful in strengthening relationships between korea and japan. at theys have to look track of history, and i sincerely hope the strengthening relations would not be

undermined in the truck of history. the would like to ask ambassador. i often hear the question about way -- when there may be a summit meeting between the leader of japan and rok. i know that one japanese newspaper has argued it is quite unfair that the koreans, according to them, are asking for preconditions to be met by japan before such a meeting could take race and somehow they think why did they have to be reconditioned? could you address the issue? are their preconditions or is that slowing down the possibility of a meeting? >> of course.

the thing is there are meetings between korea and japan taken place. there are different levels of ministers. there are different military meetings, etc., etc.. and then why are we having for meeting? i think they are tools, instruments. i think we should apply the practical mind in the sense that it's a summit meeting will be there, then we should have thosen assurance that meetings in fact would go in the direction of further strengthening relationships in japan. there will behown certain expectations created, and that expectation would be when the leaders meet, we would move to a place that would be better than where we are today.

that level of expectation, if it is met, that would be good, but if it is not met, there would be frustration. frustration goes in the direction of undermining the relationship rather than improving it. i would call it common sense. way in the back. blue shirt. as the gentleman mentioned, emphasizing the importance of issues among other issues related to history, i feel you're compelled to make a couple of comments about soul-searching of the issue on the japanese side and ask for your comments. japan in the past,

on the issue, is the condition the japanese military systematically coursed recruitment of the innocent evidence after research and research shows in japan ignores such thing. there was one lone isolated case where officers of the imperial the forcefully coerced prosecution after two months it was suspended by the japanese command and officer in charge punished. this also was executed. again and again the japanese understanding is no systematic

cordial of policy. ago most recently, 10 days the most seriously dependent upon source of information for the critics of japan published a major retraction of the contention that paper has been pushing previously. there is no evident. so again and again. so what would you say to the most recent retraction, and then the background that i most recently explained? >> i am so glad we have someone of 36 years of diplomatic experience to handle that. even so you might need a second to cool down. well the question is coming

from a correspondent of reminds me of a commission with a commission on statement. then when this idea first came up from the japanese government that they would be in a sense of establishing the review, then our idea was, what are you going to do with respect? are you going to maintain or modify the code the answer was we're going to maintain it. if thatnd question was is the case, what will be commission or the mandate for the commission? they said the response was it is to further strengthen the basis of the statement. when that review commission came out with a report, there

was not disappointment on the part of korea. why? on the one hand we heard the chief critic of japan stating we will continue to support the statement. at the same time am a what is the kono statement? there were three elements. the first element was core shouldn't. coercion in the sense that the japanese military was responsible for the management of military process during this time. second was admission of pain, coached. been third point was, because at the japanese authorities engagement that hadse of the pain been caused to the members of the process, japanese government and japanese evil are under heavy response ability arising from that. then we in fact went through the somehow thend then

was the coercion was obliterated. i will not go into the details but what was suggested is it was overrated. there is a reason why we could not fully understand the motivation for setting up the mission -- commission and the first place. if they are selling -- saying the element of coercion in fact that there is something to be questioning the elements of caution, then in fact how could you say we was banned by the kono statement? that in fact is the reason why -- let me remind you a point that was made is somehow there was an issue in japan that somehow the issues of histories for which japan takes responsibility again and again but somehow korea does not accept the responsibility and keeps on raising the issue of

responsibility but as a matter of fact that few is wrong. i know that but at the same time if you look at the instances when the element of coercion, which in fact has been more than throughntly established various different channels is being questioned again and again, and that from time to time by japanese authorities, as that is the reason why in fact be historyet history and move ahead. that is the reason why we keep on saying denial will not be helpful. be thence would in fact starting point and must be the starting point. thank you. >> could i just add a more general point? the history of asia from the 1930's to about 1955 or so is

not pretty in any way that you can think about it. there were a series of brutal acts a can on a large scale by many countries, against many countries. there were a a lot of innocent victims. there were some victims who were not innocent. it was a nasty place for an long time. cann't think any country have a monopoly on righteousness in the eventshame of those 50 years. what i was trying to say is the attempt to hold a "we were "ight" and "you were wrong sweepstakes is not going to help our children and grandchildren understand what happened there, to be able to incorporate it into their memories, and the histories of their families,

their fathers, the grandparents, their ants, their mothers, and hopefully move on to a better approach that will not kill and brutalize so many people, or allow other people to do it. it seems to me, this issue is so much bigger than whether on one particular day a particular thing happened. we are playing around with shoelaces when we have a huge set of major issues we have to deal with. what i'm talking about is trying to get a large, overall understanding of this timeframe in which there were some heroes who attempted to keep bad things from happening, or who refused to carry out orders that were barbaric and right against their creed. there were some who went ahead and did it. there were many who did nothing and did not know about it, or wish they did. and perhaps could have made a difference. it is that sort of sad

understanding of what went on that i think is the key to moving on, and which will not be solved by simply, o, yes, government was responsible -- was responsible for act be, or government see was responsible -- government "c" was responsible for actd. we need to take the full extent of understanding of what went on and move forward to a better future. >> just briefly, i wanted to say that i think this frustration that some of us face, or are stuck in the middle of, we spent a great deal of time that -- telling our korean friends that the japanese have already dealt with this, have already apologized 60 times, or what ever the count is.

and to some extent, that is true. but then questions like that raise the prospect that actually you haven't. we get stuck in the middle. true,arge extent, it's the government has officially dealt with the issue. but as long as you take every opportunity to reopen it, then that is what we have problems, and the ups and downs of the last 50 years. >> they should be reopened and a sense of understanding, but to use it as a clinical instrument time and again, i think, is what is keeping us for making progress. -- from making progress. >> yes, right here. mike billington from executive intelligence review. ambassador, and perhaps also admiral blair, at think it is clear that many people here in the u.s. are anxious for japan-korea collaboration because they want them to be joining forces against china.

and as is reflected with the effort to get the sad missiles the ploy, which the koreans believed were deployed against china, not north korea, and the recent effort to prevent korea from joining with china's asian .nfrastructure bank proposals i would like for you to address this. i know that the relationship with china and russia is crucial for getting peace within the peninsula and for longtime economic development. if you could address that side of the issue, please. economictrue that relations between japan and china are getting more important. was an article in the "washington post" with a very high ranking government official in japan. ,nd there was in a sense

, in the sense that it was a very simplistic theme. which was, as when there is an increasing economic relationship between europe and russia, and reasons why the country -- the countries are not reacting strongly against russia with you right -- with regard to ukraine. that thea risk relationship can create and that the united states could be undermined. that high government official thatan expression surprised me.

i was thinking about it, which must be the strategic relationship between korea and japan? in my presentation i was emphasizing again and again about common interests that we share between korea and japan. and those kind of statements someone in a responsible position in the japanese government, it could very likely have an effect on the relationship upon the countries in the region. i truly believe it is not going to happen at all, to undermine and theon between korea united states, because of the increasing economic relationship between korea and china. that is very simplistic. and i have to remind you, and myself, that the security alliance, the security partnership, the only country allies is korea has a with the united states.

and we think about security, there is only one. i could come up with hundreds of reasons why, but it is really one powerful reason why we don't think it is going to happen at all. it is the statements being made by the department of state and the white house. is not going to undermine korea's for the ship with the united states, not even by one iota. >> let me ask one question here, because admiral blair, i don't want to miss the opportunity to ask you about this, particularly if you could comment on the new guidelines on self-defense from in thend where it fits

need for u.s. activity in the region. >> i will be glad to talk about that. let me just add a quick item. i don't want to let this item stand that the united states somehow wants to get japan and korea together to form an anti-chinese coalition. that simply is not what the american interest is in this situation. china is attempting an approach in east asia, which involves trying to gain bilateral advantage in the series of individual of relationships with countries, and it prefers to operate in a sort of spoke and in itselationship interest with individual countries, and try to increase them as the management increases. the united states, korea, and japan, i think, are all

countries which believe in principles, common which applies to countries large or small in economic and security and territorial dispute and the whole rest of it. i think what the ambassador was saying about common values has to do with these values and the way we approach problems and the way we believe security and prosperity should be achieved in , byregion, by compromise that we alliples apply to. in that sense, that is what we countries ofcratic have betterpan to relations with each other, so they can work to support these principles, which we think apply to making progress in that part of the world. on collective self-defense, as i

mentioned in my remarks, i think japan has very fine military equipment, very well-trained officers and men, and an absolutely abysmal system for bringing that to bear in support of japanese and common interests around the world. set ofuilt on this principles and an interpretation of the constitution that was set entirelyrs ago under different circumstances. and i think every step that to give its armed forces more flexibility to be used by the government, to solve japan's security problems and common security problems, it anticipating problems, participating in disaster relief, helping to deter north korea and so on, is a step to the good. i think the steps taken recently are in the right direction and i hope that they continue.

shouldn't be confused a return to 1930's style militarism in japan. japan today is so far from putting the percent the month back on the bows of the ships. it.nnot even imagine i would like to separate these histories and get the history right. japan will operate in armed forces, which will operate, i'm sure, as has japanese policy been in the past 70 years, in and are -- in a responsible manner. >> thank you, we will have to leave it there. in thankingjoin me

the ambassador and admiral for being with us today. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

continue the will conversation with our experts. we have a couple of panels to further discuss the issue. i will go through and introduced the first three. we will have them percent for 10 minutes -- present for 10 minutes or so. they're welcome to stay seated or walked to the podium, depending on their preference. and then we'll have some two and a before our next panel. dr. lee is a professor of korean studies and assistant professor at the fletcher school. listi, on your bio, you

quite a few publications, like anyone does in our sort of business. the one you did mention was a piece you co-authored about a year and a half ago in the washington post regarding north korea's economy. you co-authored that piece, in fact. that is the first thing that really caught my attention and alerted me to your extraordinary contribution you have to make two debates here in washington. you also delivered a star with the hunts and foundation. we are very glad to have you back to the stage here in washington to share your views with us. we will turn to scott snyder. scott has been here before to share his great insights with us. he is a senior fellow for korea studies and director of the u.s.

council on policy for foreign relations. -- the u.s. policy on council for foreign relations. he is well published, including an ongoing blog entitled "asia unbound." since 2008,there and before that, the asia foundation. and he was in hawaii. you cannot telecommute to hawaii. you have to be there to do it. hardship duty. [laughs] and then we will turn to yuki t etsumi. this is her first time -- second time to heritage this year. this is a bit bigger crowd than we managed that day. i don't think we had as many cameras.

was that theyuki sis. she is also widely published and -- and a go ton person for the japanese perspective. that is testified by the fact that she is here. she is feeling a little bit lonely in a whole group of korea experts and korea interested people. we very much appreciate you being here, yuki, and you can share your perspective with us. with that, we will start with dr. li and then move on from there. exit during the u.s. occupation of japan, 1940 5-1952, if the united states had followed japanese actions in colonial korea, 1910-1945, the united states may have pursued the following actions. one, prohibit the speaking of the japanese language in

japanese schools, and force japanese to speak english. two, start the school day with the singing of the japanese -- pardon me, the american national anthem. three, subsume japanese history under the narrative arc of american history. our, dominate all sectors of industry and society as american overlords and absentee landlords. fifth, impose in japan protestant christianity as the official japanese religion. to, conscript japanese men carry out america's wars elsewhere, for instance, in korea, 1950-53. repatriate japanese

laborers to come to work in american minds and in factories and fields, and also forcibly coerce japanese women and young girls to work in american military brothels elsewhere. we know that america did none of these things. america did quite the opposite, which was to give generously to japan approximately $2 billion during the occupation years, about the sum equal approximately to the japanese thoseal budget during very difficult postwar years. america's unwillingness to impose on japan a punitive peace , its generosity, its philosophical pragmatism of the japanese leadership and hard work of the japanese people to a great extent explains the success of the u.s. occupation and the overall health of the bilateral relationship over the past 69 years.

you might say that at the end of the day, pragmatism prevailed. why can't we apply this model toward the korea-japan relationship? yes, pragmatism prevailed, but in my view, as hard as we may try to approach the study of international relations through a pragmatic, or even a moral perspective, and a moral view of history, the -- there are some issues that defy understanding or resolution on pragmatism alone. there are some historical issues that defy resolution on legality , or the believe, a formal legalesec treaty -- or , a formal bid for my treaty, and institutionalized sexual slavery is one of those issues. the english philosopher and rg collingwood defined

history that's -- this way. thoughtss the idea of all history is the history of thought, and the therefore thoughts, is the reenactment of the past thought in the historians mind. collingwood goes further to explain that to the scientist, nature is always and merely a sense ofn, not in the being defective in reality, but in the sense of being a spectacle presented to his observation. historythe events of are never mere phenomena, never mere spectacle for contemplation, but things for

which the historian looks not at, but through to discern the thought within them. contentious,ery andicult issue of women japan's recent fudging on this is deeply disturbing and is an issue an example of the japanese leadership not yet having shown the truet to discern human aspect of this historical issue. we have occasional apologies. the japanese government keeps count of a number -- of the number of official apologies for you fans past aggression both on korea and other -- for japan's past aggression on both korea and other countries. but the statements made by top japanese leadership have repeatedly undermined those previous apologies.

the japanese public deserves better. japan is a first-rate nation, and advanced to mock receive. henry kissinger more than 35 years ago -- and advanced democracy. henry kissinger more than 35 of hisgo in his memoir white house years said "japanese actions and decisions have been by far the most intelligent and farsighted of all the major ." ions in the postwar era white house years, boston, little brown, page 274, i believe. [laughter] i completely agree with that assessment. -- 35think 35 actors years after making that statement, i think kissinger would agree. but japan has made some official on you as a clingy and women's issues are not shared around the world.

kuni and women's issues are not shared around the world. in late april, when asked by a korean reporter on this issue, evendent obama said that in the midst of war, by the "andards of four, this was terrible and egregious human rights violation, quite shocking." i think that resonate, not to suggest that president obama or any single individual is the supreme arbiter of moral justice. message is that right on and it resonates throughout much of the world. there -- therefore, for japan to fudge on this is turning issue is a problem. december 26th, 2013, that

was in a way and expect a gift adversaries, china and north korea. in my opinion, it brought no benefit to the japanese government. exasperated japan's sole and key , and ofe united states course, increased tensions with south korea. kerry and secretary hagel visited the different and laid a tokyo wreath in honor of fallen japanese soldiers during world war ii. it was a dramatic gesture of peace and respect, and the two men in so doing show that there is a proper way to honor japan's war dead without resorting to political theater, which is a visit to the oscar niche trying -- the shrine by top japanese leaders.

we should see that when it comes to national security, japan is south korea's passive ally. --much as china may tempt attempt to convince south korea to align with itself in a joint opposition coalition against japan based on the common history of victimization, south korea should resist that overture. the president during his visit to south korea in early july spoke at the university and he invoked a war in which china and korea fought shoulder to shoulder against the common foe, japan, a war that ravaged the nation, a war in which the major combatants had operational -- exercise operational command. a war that saw china across the river confining his adversary to the southern half of the peninsula. a war that ended without clear-cut victory, without

indemnity, get a war in which the koreans were clearly the biggest losers. a war that took place 400 years ago. japan today is not the feudal kingdom during those years. south korea today is not the oflationist korean monarchy 400 years ago. the more appropriate analogy for xi to have invoked would have been the korean war in the 1950's. calls itt president xi just an great. theransparent as president's efforts may have been, it was also transparent this is a false analogy, yet the effort to bring south korea on board against china is an ongoing diplomatic tool exercise quite ably by the chinese

leadership. there is a precedent for this. in 2005, when the prefecture , the leaders came out and said we are on the verge of a diplomatic war against japan. the chair of the opposition party rebuked the statement of the president. and yet, his approval readings withinngs spiked up days. a precedent had been set. fanning the flames of anti-japanese sentiment really works in korean politics. as myopic and arguably strategically self-defeating as that posture may be, it really works and it's very difficult for the south koreans elected leaders to shun that kind of , a dynamicnamic

including domestic politics. she has yet to rise to a great statesman, states woman, but i think she will. i think she will help to overcome this historical tension with japan, perhaps as early as the fall, and reach out to japan. but in japan, japanese leaders must also remember that to the south korean public, the essence, the thought within the historical incidents of the past defy resolution by apology or legal diplomatic treaty alone. because that history is fought with crimes, misfortunes, and follies that require no falsification or dramatization, and that remain decidedly not forgotten. thank you. [applause]

>> i'm very pleased to have the opportunity to join this panel at heritage foundation today. although i do have to say that i uncomfortable. first, i drew the short end of the stick and got on the history panel instead of the future panel that is coming up next. and of course, i'm sitting in .he middle of two good friends we have worked together on various things at various times. i could not help but think that is a little bit analogous to the position that the u.s. is in, with regard to history issues between japan and south korea. [laughter] and then as far as preparing for the talk, of course, as a good korea watcher, i was reading about pope francis in korea and all the things that he has been saying. in his last mass, he talked

about the relationship, but did not say anything about south korea-japan relations. it got me thinking this is a really godforsaken topic -- [laughter] -- very challenging to address. what i want to do in my remarks is, first, i want to say something. my presentation in contrast to admiral blair's, which was think his was very realistic and holistic. i would say that i'm going to ands more on identity specific set of challenges. one other observation that i just have to draw from his i think he gave a classic american view of history. but one of the things that i was taught in an early class in asian history from an asian perspective -- an asian professor is that in the west, we look at history as the

imperial record of what happened. in the east, it is about moral views. it's about moral judgment. that helps to further explain why this set of issues is actually so difficult between japan and south korea. doing some've been work on japan-south korea relations. and of course, the realism view is that japan and south korea in themmon interests context of a chinese threat. i think that was implicit in admiral blair's presentation. but then you start to scratch on the history issues, and it really is impeded by the fact that you have contending identity-based claims that are part of a narrative, the historical narrative in terms of how south koreans and japanese view each other. and admiral blair mentioned one that is a good example, one man's freedom fighter is another

man's terrorist. recent poll from the summer shows that in south korea, the view of japan is that people have aese poor understanding of japan's invasion of asian countries. a history textbook issue. which is really an identity-based issue. it is really about whether japan is recognizing south korean dignity. and on the japanese side it is, well, the south koreans are showing excessive anti-japanese and they are having too many anti-japanese campaigns in terms of education in school books. is really about impugning dignity from a japanese perspective. that is really the core of it. veryny respects, and it's

deep. over the course of the past year or so, what i see happening on u.s..s. side is that the government has been drawn into this, really i think, to an unprecedented degree. historically, the u.s. try to play and evenhanded role and did not get too involved. as i look back and think back on the past year, this -- assistant secretary 2013 russell from july of before the premise are visited talked about how it is hugely important that the relations between japan and its neighbors improve and it be dealt with in a peaceful and thoughtful way. i think we see the preparations bringingdent obama president park and prime together --abe e together.ter ab

there is a necessary series of events that need to happen for that to occur, essentially laying the groundwork for the japanese government commitment to respect the kono statement. in my view, in order to stabilize the relationship, i think the u.s. will continue to .e involved but one of the tasks, i think, to u.s. side is going to be try to hold both japan and south korea to a non-revisionist approach. and for japan, it's about history. i think for korea, it's going to maintaining about the 65 normalization treaty as for moving forward in the relationship.

to be very challenging, i think. because the u.s. is engaged and involved to a great degree. point, i have friends who look at this japan-southsouth -- korea relationship and they say, the best thing to do is to just manage it for some we cannot spec it to be resolved. -- is to just manage it. we cannot expect it to be resolved. i find that quite depressing. because i see the opportunity thetransformation between japan-korea relationship as well as the trilateral relationship with the united states. i have to hold out hope for the revision of the japan-south korea relationship that probably would involve the kind of political will that admiral blair was talking about. i would call it statesmanship. whereby my vision would be that gestureuld make a grand

that could be interpreted by ,outh korea in a positive way and accepted and affirmed. -- i think that the way was thinking about what would really be necessary to move the relationship forward in a way. it would be to go back to the 1980 eight joint partnership agreement between south korea and japan. 1988 joint partnership agreement between south korea and japan. at that time, the two sides agreed to "build a solid and neighborly relationship in the squarely facesat the task and develop a relations -- develop relations based on mutual trust." what was the effect of the 1998 japan-south korea agreement on the respective public -- respective republics?

if you look at public opinion japan, the joint partnership really moved the needle. it moved japanese public opinion into positive territory about south korea for the first time, and it stayed in positive territory until 2012. but unfortunately on the south korean side, it did not move south korean public opinion into positive territory. i would suggest that the challenge is really to find a formulation whereby both sides can move into positive territory. ofn there is the question timing, and this is my last point. it is directly related to the issue of identity. that is, especially when americans talk about japan-south korea relations, we tend to move in the direction of thinking about mutuality, you know, steps that both sides can take with

each other. but i think it is worth asking and reflecting on for japanese and south korean colleagues. case thatssarily the for japan to move forward on these issues it requires a south korean affirmation? and for our colleagues, is it really the case that for south korea to grapple with some of in terms of its own identity that it needs a movement by japan? essentially, what i'm getting to is that identity may turn out to be more about the national conception than about others. eventually, maybe we will move in the direction of mutuality. i certainly hope so. but i also think that it will only be productive if it is a result of the process of self societies in both

that enables those societies to come to a place when they are actually ready to move forward. and here i actually found the poster marks in seoul, korea interesting. pope's remarkse in seoul interesting post up he talked not just about peace, but justice. justice calls for a discipline of forbearance, and it demands that we not forget past injustices, but we overcome them through tolerance and cooperation. thank you. [applause] >> i was actually going to do it from my seat, but then these two gentlemen set good president -- precedents for me. thank walter and

the heritage foundation for hosting me here. this conference room has a myticular memory attached to slave labor days, if you will. about 10 or 15 years ago, we used to hope -- host a group of japanese defense members in this particular auditorium. i was in that room that does not even have a window doing the interpretation. me standing here today speaking exactlyf you alone is my own self achievement. i feel pretty good about this today. [applause] then also, in absentia, i would like to thank the ambassador because i'm one of of theeficiaries airlines. i did not have a chance to personally thank him, but it japanese scholars and my korean colleagues, it

made the exchange a lot faster, easier, and cheaper. very thankful for that, too. because the day of japan's conditional surrender, august 15, was just this past friday, i think of reconciliation between japan and korea are very time -- is a very timely topic, as sensitive as it may be. as i speak today, i'm mindful of a speech delivered by the korean president last friday. i was cautiously encouraged by the speech as well. ,n that speech, president park of course, she continued to call for the japanese leader to call -- to take proactive measures victimsle to the women while they are still alive. she deals -- she still did

express her hope that next year, the anniversary of the ending of the world war ii, that there will be hope for the future relationship for the two countries. butoesn't need reminding, prime minister abe refrained from visiting the shrine that day. instead, he visited a secular site, a woman tomorrow that pays honor to all of the war dead in the last war. and he also attended the atorial ceremony that was the secular site. in his speech, he talked about japan's need to "face history with humility and ingrained deeply into our hearts that lessons we should learn." the theme of this panel is unresolved history issues.

and because of these issues, we have already seen a little bit of it, up to the preceding up to now. these issues are often very emotionally charged when they are discussed. i would like to the extent possible in my opening remarks him at least, try to step back a little bit. to the extent possible, of course. i have two things i would like to raise in my humble remarks for you today. issues i are the two will mainly go through. the first is, why we are where we are. the second is, what both sides will have to keep in mind as the two countries work toward getting the bilateral relationship on track, if you will. one take away that i would like -- i would hope that all of you in this room would leave this event today with is the responsibility to bring this current relationship back on track is on both sides, although

from a different angle. do japan-korea relations continue to be constrained by history echo i'm risking over supplication, but let me offer the following. -- constrained by history? i'm risking oversimplification, but let me offer the following facilities year for leaders of the country to hide behind unresolved issues. as long as they continue to blame each other for the status , and they are the cause of this current status quo, they can continue to do what politically may not be popular, but is necessary. on the part of japan, it may be easier to lay the blame by continuing to say that it's nydia leaders prefer to deny japan to score political points within the country -- its media leaders are for two demonize japan to score focal point within the country. the most common thing i hear

whenever i go visit is that koreans have continued to move the goalposts. they refuse to define the resolution of history issues. and we are not playing a game anymore. i think this is by and large a some of usf what nowadays start referred to as korea fatigue in japan. hand, it mayher also be just as easy to the complete blame on japan for the status quo. japan has not repented enough for its wartime sins. by japanefforts made were either insufficient or insincere. however, continuing to blame each other in this way will not change anything, as we all know. it will make things only worse, as we all know. and i submit that both sides have chosen to dismiss, or to overlook certain actions by the

other, and continue -- and also condone the elements within their own countries that may catch sensitivity within the other. let me talk a little bit about what i mean by that. , for a long time, japan emphasized and held the position that wartime compensation issues have been legally resolved between the two governments. when the two governments a pet -- signed the agreement for economic cooperation in 1965, this is one of the agreements that were signed when two countries normalize diplomatic relations in 1965. while that is legally may be accurate and true, it may have been slow to -- its leaders may have been slow to recognize that they might -- there might be humanitarian elements to some of these issues that need additional care. and also, it seems that some

japanese political leaders may not appreciate as much as they could how certain words and deeds by well-known lyrical figures, and pot -- well-known political figures, and qualified public political figures are received. for instance, there is frustration in japan that those japan's wareny deeds are a minority and on the fringe. knowledgeave good that a silent majority in japan is moderate. they do feel proud of their country. but they also feel worse about what japan has done before 1945. however i'm also aware that not , any japanese

politician could not stay in senior positions in the government if they make any insensitive remarks about the history. because as soon as they say something, either they were forced to resign or they submitted a resignation letter before they were forced to do so. little has been discussed how something like that has kind of stopped somehow. it's a small thing on its own, things like that may affect how korean perception -- how korea perceives japan in terms of its effort with its atonement for the past. on the same token, i don't know whether there is the appreciation within japan how this fudging, as dr. lee calls of thethe examination

process of shaping the 1992 -- the 1998 kono statement, or with the formal investigation about newspaper reporting 30 years ago , how those developed within -- those developments within japan may be perceived outside japan. do likeame time, i also has chosen torok dismiss certain government -- some efforts made by the government in japan. for example, in 2012, when the japanese government was ruled by the democratic party of japan, three different japanese prime minister's made different types of overtures for south korea. kan issued aer

statement reiterating japan's apology. , inheritinger nota from prime minister kan, what the japanese government had taken since colonial history. and what did they get a return? away fromment walked the general security agreement in the 11th hour of negotiations. again, these actions coming out seoul was an indication that maybe the rok government was not interested in

reconciliation. i know my time is limited. it would be remiss not to mention this. let me say a little bit about the woman's fund. raised this issue because even among american friends, i have heard some dismissive comments about this fund, saying that it was an effort that had no significance, or merely a feel-good effort by only a few. there may be ways in which japanese government could have implanted this fund a bit differently, i think they do not accept such trivialization of the fund and what it tried to do during its operation. riyama whoe minister should be credited for his statement, said in his interview that a cannot be a credit for just signing the treaty. this runs through the theme of what admiral blair talked about

and that the ambassador talked about and that dr. lee talked about. he believes that those that inflicted harm should make sincere effort to atone for what they have done in the past. ofmy mind, the establishment the asia woman's fund was a product of the government's maximum effort to seek a solution to help japan address that human aspect of that issue, while upholding the governments official issue that wartime compensation was legally settled. the fund was a joint effort by ,overnment and japanese people and in fact, a great number of ordinary japanese citizens contributed to this fund. that whenle known there was a cash compensation that was called atonement money accepted by victims, there was a

letter personally signed by the prime minister during that time. and i want to point out that this personally signed letter was signed by four consecutive prime minister's, starting with hashimoto through koizumi. in an interview that i just referred to, prime ministermoria the relationship between victim and aggressor. he's -- he talked about while those who inflicted harm should seek to reconcile, the victim also needs to come to terms with its past behavior and be open and respective -- receptive to its efforts. the 19 any seven joint declaration -- the 1997 joint declaration that was mentioned was the product of enormous

political courage on the part of those clinical leaders. and i do think it is the lack of this political courage both in tokyo and seoul that continues to allow history to operate with hampered relations the weight is today. what can we do about? i was just reading an article on by a professor of soviet form policy. he offered the three lessons from the cold war. first, both sides need to recognize that mistrust often distorts each other's perception of others'intentions. second, the two sides should stop leaning the other side, and instead set back and consider what it is they have each done to contribute to the current tension? -- more more tension attention needs to be paid on each other's policy decisions by

shaping events rather than trying to change each other's way of thinking. i do not mean to suggest that the tensions between japan and the rok are at the level of cold between the u.s. and soviet union, but i do think there are similarities in these lessons learned that i just mentioned. first, a mistrust on each other's part. one particular example that admittedly comes to mind is the korean criticism of japan's to the right of self-defense. not surprisingly, these elements ane been criticized as effort for japan to renewal tries. -- to re-militarized. not long ago i was participating in anotherst

discussion, and it was brought up that koreans are still worried that japan will invade korea again. wanted to do for the floor to the main speaker, so i did not raise that at the time, but i really do like to challenge anyone to come up with a plausible scenario under which something like that would occur. and by the way, for something like that to occur, the u.s. has to condone it. i really challenge -- for those of you that have the notion that japan would somehow invade korea convinced me of the plausible scenario under which that is possible. the side -- on the two sides stopping blaming the other side, i think i've are to discuss that. onally, the need for focus shaping each of the policy options by shaping events rather than trying to change the ideas.

after all of this bad blood has , it may never be possible for prime minister abe and prime minister puck to be best friends. that is ok. if you agree, though, not only with me, but apra blair, the admiralor -- but blair, the ambassador, and michael pallas, that's -- and my co-panelists, that they natalie meet each other for their individual countries, but also democracy in east asia, then it would be responsible for both leaders to let the current fight go for long, and for other

leaders to do or say anything to aggravate attention. i do find it encouraging that the government officials throughout all of these difficult times. governments have always wanted this relationship to work. and they have really persevered. -- there aready in already encouraging signs on both sides that the political environment in those countries may be turning a bit more permissive for the governments -- to engage. and i do hope these elements will continue and i hope that they are encouraged. >> thank you. [applause] let me open the floor to questions. there are probably several that are still relevant from before. i'm a journalist and

not in asia area experts lay want to preface that. in my limited knowledge that the corners of japan that do seek to minimize world war ii atrocities with the chinese were the primary the's and the military sex slavery issue where koreans are the primary victims that is where it is happening. atrocities against europeans living in asia and european troops that there is not an emphasis to walk back or done.ze actions does anybody have any insight? >> my gut reaction is because we lost.