i'm a journalist and not in asia area experts lay want to preface that. in my limited knowledge that the corners of japan that do seek to minimize world war ii atrocities with the chinese were the primary the's and the military sex slavery issue where koreans are the primary victims that is where it is happening. atrocities against europeans living in asia and european troops that there is not an emphasis to walk back or done.ze actions does anybody have any insight? >> my gut reaction is because we lost.

that is in a part sort of a national psychology examination to get a good answer for it. i don't have a good answer but it's totally different circumstance because of the outcome of the war. the points scott got to about the different ways that we americans mayry, err on the side of forgetting history but on the other side we do not make a fetish of history. can -- he best answer i [no audio] ok, let's leave it there. sorry. larry from csis. for is for. your -- this is

doctor lee. acrossorean officials the board have been negative in their comments about the recent japanese investigative commission that looked back into the formulation of the statement. how it was researched and how it was formulated. commissionort of the did reveal some south korean involvement in discussions with the japanese government about the language of the chronos statement. i can understand some unhappiness on the part of south koreans about that, but on the , it seems to me any south korean official who believes south korea's involvement in those years on that issue would have been kept

secret forever. frankly, such officials were pretty naïve to believe that this would have been cap a secret forever. my question is how do you contrast the total south korean negativity of this investigative with the factort int the commissions report the statements made by the chairman of the commission upheld the statement? they said that the statement was credible, historically accurate. that the research that was done was credible and that was based on much deeper research than just the testimony of 16 former

south korean women. the the upholding of statement, which the cabinet secretary has also testified to, and the foreign ministry of is theas testified to total negativity of the south korean government regarding this really justified as we have seen so far? i did not speak for the south korean government. >> please give your opinion about it. >> sometimes i don't even speak for myself. [laughter] i'm sympathetic for the negativity about the review of the statement. why was it necessary to revisit this issue thereby raising questions? as you clearly laid out, the

official re-examination did not substantivend any part of the statement made in 1993. the chairman of the government there weremmission things that and were dubious at best that were based on the testimonials of 16 or 18 -- fewer than 20 -- women after the fact. it is prerogative to say such things in the collaborative of the women. that does not negate the of brussels.t

the review of the statement does not deny anything that the cronos statement explicitly stated, it calls into question the necessity of doing it and the timing as well. as we all know in the past, raised issues abe about the nature of coercion and credibility and south korean charges. ofh respect to the naïveté south korean officials, i fully be sealed this would under lives forever. i would also agree that to assume the japanese government in the early 90's a stone full contrition and their own fullative -- based on a contrition without consulting

south korean officials also calling into question the basic responsibility to be engaged in such mutual discussions. with the south korean media and government fog was particularly offensive was that there were thanments made more alluding to that there was give and take. the product of diplomatic concessions made by japan to south korea and not a clear objective analysis study and i think south koreans took umbrage. the south korean role did not change the basic conclusions. having said that also raises some implications.

denial maythat the be within the realm of the possible. >> thank you. mindy, if i do not give her a she could speak anyway. >> a very quick question for professor lee. why are these discussed purely in the terms of history and terms of a legalistic international law aspect in the statement the cronos was never cabinet decision? in 2007, the abe government made a binding legal governmental decision saying that the cronos statement was not an official apology and that the women were not coerced. and other words, changing the

statement. an unequivocalen apology. why is that not discussed? we always discuss how many women this happened or not to, whatever. why is this historical instead of legalistic? >> this is a historical issue. i was a bit incoherent in my presentation. really defines resolution based on legal grounds alone. the japanese government has the right and there is rationality even in their position of hiding the 19 65 wall of normalization treaty. at the same time, without moral considerations to seek to use that could essential -- issue the void of

of the facts. in my view, it is not in south korea's interest. it should be a nonissue. none grabs south korea's attention where it is largely south koreans remaining apathetic to ongoing atrocities arguably much more severe on a bigger scale. they remain fixated on the atrocities of the past. it is a symbol of national humiliation. the occupation for over a generation. view is then my more contentious issue and i believe the even after the

surviving 54 or so women pass on that in sense of humiliation will remain palpable without a repentance, of public repentance, by the japanese government. say i think how official the statement it is him a of course it's official. forever about it. if you study japan enough about ,overnment, cabinet decision the statement, and the prime minister's statement reflects japanese government officials. then you have the 1995 prime minister statement and i will just leave it at that. >> let's take one more here.

i will address this to yuki tatsumi. issue of the revised interpretation of the constitution which has been put by the abe government. even within japan, there's a lot of criticism. it's tied into the historical see it isuse they somehow turning away of this path of the commitment of japan not to return to a militaristic past. the statements we heard today about common values, democracy, so forth. the way the constitution has been reinterpreted and revised in japan has not followed procedures. it did not follow the way for revising the constitution.

abe could not even revise the way the constitution was revised and it ended up being revised by a committee appointed by babes people -- abe's people. it is totally out of context. if it does not follow democratic values, where's the whole argument that it's based on democratic process? could you comment? i think the issue is still politically divisive in japan. decision toabinet allow legal changes to reinterpret the standing article nine is announced.

changes does that law will be legislated into ? the debate about that will not even start until next april. the process even if you ask some of the people who are feeling that the changes are necessary, there are some short-circuits that have been done. prime minister abe came up with this advisory commission to mid-may and he clearly says he's not in a hurry to do it. lo and behold he just decided to do this in a cabinet decision within a month. that made it even more

politically divisive for the government to handle this. thate hand, if you see from outside of japan where you youally -- the only thing see is sporadic reporting of how for is done, if you recall the cabinet decision there was a large protest in front of the prime minister's office. over security issues, that is not something that i've seen for a while quite frankly. i do see where the concerns ,ight be coming from and why but at the same time i also do think that the changes that ends up happening is very limited and very restrained in the sense that it probably is too

restrained for some. i think there will be more discussions about that on the next panel. i wanted to just get a last question in here. yuki outlined all of the changes made during the administration, the three prime ministers. it in thoseow years? was there a real opportunity to move this ship forward that could be sustained over the long run and they missed the opportunity for political or other reasons? thoseelieve several of initiatives were missed opportunities on the part of the koreans. it probably also does reflect that the debate in korea is not ripe enough to be able to come to that point of view.

now the situation is one where under the abe government summoned korea say they cannot move forward. then you look at the dpj and you see those opportunities. i think it damages the korean position. to a certain extent not having reciprocated some of those gestures. we are going to have to leave it there and bring up the next panel. thank you all very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

thisdomi get started with third discussion before he has a chance for a bathroom break -- why don't i get started?

we're going to go through the same sort of drill here as the last panel. everyone anduce have them go through one at a time and give them a few minutes for remarks and have a conversation. i have no idea why it is so darn cold in here, if you have not noticed. not noticed, you are very cold-blooded. let me start by introducing victor. he is the korea chair at csi us and director of asia studies at georgetown. -- at csis. he is the former director for asia affairs on the nsc staff during the bush administration.

many of them and they have exhausted me. i should also mention your most we had a discussion about that a few years ago when it came out a waiver glad to do that. a senior advisor for albright stonebridge group. he was also president and ceo of korea society. we have been looking for an opportunity to get him here for some time and finally he is here. we're very pleased to have him. and bruce klinger will bat cleanup which is his normal role. he is a senior research fellow for northeast asia. you know him of here. as a koreaargely reactionhe provokes

from both sides. it's how we know he's doing a decent job, by making everyone angry. heore joining heritage, spent 20 years with the cia including stints as chief of the cia korea branch and deputy division chief for korea. let me turn it over to victor to get us started. >> it's a pleasure to be here at heritage. i do want to thank heritage for the time you allow me to talk about my book when it came out a year or two ago. i don't notice the cold because fromt came over running the other side of town. it feels quite refreshing. i'm going to make my comments brief and really focus on this question of why and under what conditions these difficult historical issues have impeded cooperation between japan and

korea. get intoeally going to the position of defending one governments or another's position on the island disputes but really trying to look at this from the perspective of how and why do we have these things in feeding strategic cooperation. i have a couple of points. i do not have the benefit of the , soussion this afternoon forgive me if i am repeating something that's already been said. i'm pretty sure i am going to repeat things that have been said. the first point i would make is that the issue of history and its ability to sort of impeded, bubble up, impact political relations israeli nothing new. flow --seen the ads and

flow airing the 1960's and normalization in the early 1970's during the kidnapping or assassination attempt. we have seen this happen over .nd over again at the risk of overgeneralization. at the risk of overgeneralization, i would say this is been characterized i great deal of emotion and anger on the korean side. it is essentially indifferent on the japanese side. it is really just indifference. we know all the issues whether it is textbook statements by education ministers, we know all the sorts of issues that have created this. there was always a cycle to it. whenever we came to a textbook

revision or a shrine visit, pattern tolmost a the cycle in which you would have protests, momentary disruptions, more anger, but eventually a return to normalcy of one form or another. there is a pattern of interaction over this that we have seen over time. my second point is that today it's a little bit different. i think it's different in three ways. -- again, atthat the risk of overgeneralization, in the past we have seen these sorts of disputes arise and they followed a cycle. arguably, what is different today and from the past cycles is that the current cycles are efforts to change the

status quo of these issues. there, but what seems different this time is we are really talking about actions intentionally or unintentionally aimed at trying to change the status quo. when the previous south korean president made the decision to rocks,he two little whatever you want to call them, when he made the decision to that wasse rocks, changing the status quo. that was just not provoking them to come up with the reaction that would also change the status quo on their side but also setting a precedent for future south korean presidents were they would feel at one point or another at their term in office pressured to do the same thing. that was something that really did change the status quo and

lead to a reaction by japan that was beyond something we haven't seen before. this immediately escalates the situation. prior to the review that was undertaken when there was talk and suggestions that prime minister abe would reinterpret again aos statement is chance where there is time to reinterpret the status quo and a much deeper spiral in terms of the relationship. during the george w. bush administration after i left office but something my successor had to deal with when we had the whole sort of crisis rocks, inaming of the the end that was something that created a great deal of consternation and south korea even when president lee positioned himself in meeting with an ancient

korean map and precisely having with these islands that belong to korea. we do not know how else to resolve these issues except to try to maintain the status quo. i think that is something that's different today. we are seeing dangling more towards changing the status quo than not. secondly, quite obviously that is why we have this panel. the issues have come to the level where they have been an impediment to strategic

cooperation whether you're talking about military services and parts agreements, information sharing, the spa, a currency swap agreement or meetings between leaders, summit meetings, all of this has been held hostage to this particular cycle of very bad historical problems. the third difference i think, these days, and this is my own view. i don't know if everyone in the room shares this view but earlier i mentioned what we see is generally korean emotionalism and japanese indifference. what's different today is you still have the same korean emotional is a man and anger but what's different is the shift on the japanese side particularly even, i would say among koreans and the bureaucracy but certainly the media and the toiticians, a real shift

shake korea fatigue, this notion that they are just tired of the constant harping and complaining. they don't want to deal with it anymore. swung quite a bit in japan that we have not seen in the past. third point is the historical issues are obviously bad for -tokyo cooperations that they have ripple effects through the region. they certainly complicate u.s.-japan-korea military and strategic cooperation. there are any sorts of things.

to be able for the united states to operate seamlessly between our two alliances certainly makes it much more complicated for the united states. on a political level, it really or stains, if you will, the pivot more rebalance to asia, the notion that we are doing this but at the same time our allies completely dysfunctional and it really begs the question of how much and how successful the pivot is. of things, these sorts of difficulties only served to embolden others in the region, north korea but also china in a sense. if one of the things that china very clearly wants to do is to delegitimize and complicate the u.s. bilateral alliance structure in asia having this betweensfunctional spat

our two key allies in asia is of course something that is quite welcome and it makes it easier for china to put forward this effort to try to delegitimize. what i mean is, it's not a question of trying to compete militarily with the united states and asia but to sort of delegitimize the notion that these alliances are a core element to the architecture and asia. that is something the chinese would clearly like the region not to believe in anymore. dysfunction only serves that purpose. recommendations. history, i wrote quite a bit on this in my first book as an academic on u.s.-japan-korea in the difficult strategic

cooperations. i believe there is no solution to these sorts of history issues. you have the negotiations over comfort women. will ever see a solution to the sorts of issues. even if there is some sort of agreement that is reached on e'sfort women during ab term in office. even if there is an agreement on a fund and the chief cabinet secretary and ambassador to meet with some of the survivors. even if you get all of those things, i don't think it will resolve the issue. many still believe that prime minister abe does not believe that japan, that the japanese in theent is complicit recruitment and running of these sorts of operations. agreementere is an

that is reached, i don't think that will solve the issue. you need the negotiations to continue. somebody mentioned the term closure on the last panel. i don't think we're going to get closure on this. the issue is not whether we can find a solution but how we can manage to forge some degree of pragmatic cooperation excepting that is difficult historical issues will constitute a baseline for the relationships particularly between japan, korea, and asia. how do we forge cooperation. i would just make three very specific suggestions. koreans shouldth be willing to have a meeting

with prime minister abe on the sidelines in new york. you should not hold not hostage to a director general level of negotiations. i just do not think it's good politics. it's not good diplomacy. there are some positive signs. tokyog with the mayor of when he visited the mayor in seoul. it higher road? do that meeting. be japan, the really has to an effort to start turning around public opinion in japan. i really feel like it has long completely innate different direction, one that is quite antagonistic towards korea right

now. friends admit this. to make thelt argument that they have to sort of figure out how to turn around this korea fatigue that we see among the politicians. this is a difficult issue for the united states. when it comes to the issues of collective self-defense and these other things. the united states in effect through its actions, non-actions, whispers, side statements are essentially saying we support japan in the

reinterpretation to the right of collective self-defense but we do not support a reinterpretation of the cronos statement or anything that has to do with, in some fashion, whitewashing the comfort women issue. it's not a statement of u.s. policy but i think that's where the united states is. it is incumbent on both the united states and korea to make abe'sse to japan that efforts to grow leadership in the world are good things. for a long time the region, the country has wanted a more dynamic and proactive prime ,inister with an agenda economic and security agenda that is much more proactive but also impress upon the point that leadership is not just about

money or power. it's about legitimacy. it's got to be seen as legitimate. like comfortsues women remain such a difficult issue for the government to with, it's to deal going to undercut all of these other efforts at building legitimate leadership on the security side as well as the side. >> let me begin by commending the heritage foundation for holding this special comments and conversations we've had today. thank you for bringing together such a fine group of friends and colleagues of mine. i have worked with every member of both panels in both of our keynote speaker today for many years. it's a special pleasure for me. inc. you for bringing me down

from the wilds of new jersey to be here today. some background about me that may not have come out in the very kind introduction. my foreignt of service career dealing with korea and japan including many years learning both languages. i devoted many years of my life seeking to strengthen u.s. relations with both those allied countries. , iing my diplomatic career had the very distinct privilege serving as country director for both japan and korea. including a time that i would now characterize as being the high tide of our trilateral korea andn on north some other issues. it's a special honor to be able to participate in this discussion today.

victor has just launched us into a very good discussion of that and i will try to add some additional thoughts. in doing so, at the outset let me provide with my own assessments of the current state of korean-japan relations for the ones that you have already heard. i don't think it will surprise thene if i echo some of comments that have been made suggesting that this plaguedship is deeply with problems, often dysfunctional, and in my view the worst shape i've seen it in many years. it is deeply and personally disappointing for me to say that having spent as much time as i have working to improve our ties with both countries. it occurs to me that if korea and japan were two countries on different continents or were separated by thousands of miles or facing very different

security threats, a problematic, political, diplomatic relationship might not be so important that they are none of those things. they are neighbors facing a range of common challenges and dangers in the fact that they find themselves at loggerheads more often than not these days and unable to establish a sort of relationship that would be in and that wenterests know that they are capable of forging is both regrettable and a cause for concern particularly to their only treaty ally, the united states of america. the u.s.the obvious, has a major stake in preserving cooperation with tokyo and seoul. ensure the rok and

japan forge the closest links to meet their common threats which u.s.lso threats to core threats in the region. it is not my purpose today to chart the origins of the .roubled ties that exist others have already done that. it is my job to talk about their impact on the united states and its strategic objectives in the region. you.e be very frank with the current difficulties between tokyo and seoul undermine long-standing efforts to create a trilateral partnership aimed at dealing with both the current and emerging security threats in the region. important arealy of trilateral cooperation to deal with north korea, that cooperation is not what it was and is not what it should be. problematic r.o.k.-japan ties have allowed suspicions to arise

about japan's current approach dealing with north korea. advantageng seeing an seems eager to leverage that gap and perhaps a deepened the divide between tokyo and seoul. japan-rokcated relationship is also being eyed very carefully by china which as others have suggested here, probably sees an advantage to be gained from current japan-korea tensions. the prc has made very clear in recent months that it regards the u.s. centered reliant system in the asia-pacific region as an anachronism and no longer relevant to the region's current security concerns. some chinese officials have even a china-centric security system based on in asia should asians approach replace the network of u.s. alliances in the region.

leaders in tokyo and seoul should reflect very carefully about whether their inability to betweenh the issues them may be creating a tactical or strategic opening for a beijing that has developed an allergy to a u.s.-led security regional architecture. i would also suggest current coreculties undermine a u.s. interest in maintaining stability in the region through these very alliances that i have they detractt as from the effectiveness of the deterrents that could and should harmonious by a more and cooperative the u.s.-japan-korea triangular relationship. i would argue this sends the wrong message to north korea. it also sends the wrong message to beijing. nevertheless, there is a bit of good news in rok-japan security relations in the both sides have

often managed over the last several years to insulate some elements of their routines security dialogue and cooperation from the most divisive aspects of japan-rok relations in they have both managed to keep much of the ongoing security cooperation under the radar. that's a good thing. rok-japanws is that security regulations is subject to the vagaries into the public mood swing, media hype, mutual recriminations that has come to criminalize this to an uncomfortable degree. dust we have witnessed how reasonable and important bilateral initiatives such as the now-defunct military information secrecy agreement were torpedoed because of the downturn in bilateral ties. we see how straightforward commonsensical cooperation, for

example, in sharing ammunition in a peacekeeping operation in sudan became impossible because of the negative dynamics in japan-rok relations. discussions are mutually important for future korean peninsula contingencies are hampered because of the curtain -- current atmospherics between the two. revived -- of the revised policy on collective self-defense is oddly and wrongly pretrade by some as somehow threatening korean security. even the normal business of diplomacy such as leadership which can serve as an important component of the sending a strong deterrent message to adversaries, even that has proved impossible because of the deterioration in bilateral ties. anrecently witnessed

unhelpful and useless debate on the issue of whether consultations might be needed before u.s. forces and facilities in japan would be any koreanp peninsula contingency. you will pardon me if i come away from that assessment of impression that kim jong-il has some reason to today.ing in pyongyang nonetheless, i am encouraged by signs of a growing realization in the seoul and tokyo that things have gone far enough and it's time for renewed efforts to reinvigorate bilateral dialogue and trilateral coordination. the meeting between foreign encouraging and so was the recent u.s.-rok-japan meeting. earlier, the director general-level dialogue was also these twosign that neighbors understand the importance of ensuring that they stay on the same page. these trilateral military

dialogues that took place on the margins of the ring pack -- rimpac were convenction were great. more dialogue including bilateral at the ministerial helpful ine resolving any lingering questions and concerns that seoul might have about japanese defense planning. it goes without saying that such dialogue is also important because we are on the cusp of a qualitative change in the nature of the threat posed by north korea. the need to refine and enhance our deterrents of pyongyang will be a major task in the coming months and years. require newll levels of bilateral and trilateral security cooperation between and among us. the north korean threat is evolving in a dangerous new

direction and the missiles with which to deliver those will all serve -- alter regional security dynamics in troubling ways. besides raising the prospect that the north might use or threaten to use these weapons, development of the capability will increase proliferation and were raise questions about the validity and effectiveness of the u.s. extended deterrent and our commitment to defend allies and it might even spur debate in korea and japan about the need for their own nuclear deterrent. such prospect, however realistic or remote argue strongly in favor of a renewed bilateral and trilateral dialogue about the nature of this new threat and the efficacy and credibility of the u.s. deterrent and defense commitments. i have every reason to believe the u.s. will want to have such a dialogue.

as we look to the future, the other main challenge will emanate from china. they are channeling resources to the military over its uncertain ends. biting their time is over so more posture on territorial to go aways unlikely anytime soon. this has important implications for all of us, especially if the prc does not respond well to our collective and individual efforts to forge a more cooperative and transparent relationship with china. having said that, let me be clear the task of building better ties with china remains an important one and it is a lot more easily accomplished if washington, tokyo, and seoul are all on the same page. suggest as beijing seriouso raise

questions about the validity of the u.s.-based alliance system, japan and the rok have long shared and supported the vision of the importance of that alliance system and have playedd a central role over the decades. for the united states to continue to play that role in the face of a china that now , that will be essential. going forward, it will also be critically important to japan and korea the united states and to the region that seoul and tokyo rehabilitate their trade partnership. korea and japan cannot erase their history. they cannot and should not forget that history but they can decide that they're not destined forever to be prisoners of that history. we have several famous historians quoted here already today. let me cite a not so famous one dwell solely who

on the past are condemned to stay there. dedicate the rok can themselves to fulfilling a new type of relationship in this century that reflect their common concerns and challenges. in her liberation day speech, rok president seemed to hold out hope that just such an approach i'd be possible. us,er remarks, she reminded as we have already heard that it's the 50th anniversary of the normalization of korea-japan relations and she called on both sides to set our sights on the next 50 years to start making progress towards future-oriented friendly cooperative relationships between rok-japan. next year will be the 70th anniversary of the end of world war ii, the liberation of korea, and the dachshund beginning of the process that saw japan become a country dedicated to democracy and peace.

with these auspicious anniversaries on the horizon, could there possibly be a better way for the two countries to mark the occasion next year in august 15, 2015, by issuing a joint statement of principles to describe a new relationship? would it be possible to agree in the coming weeks to establish a bilateral forum name that a cooperative agenda that could be addressed over the next year so that leaders in tokyo and seoul could announce what they have accomplished in one years time? series ofmind is practical steps and you know what they are in public events that would form the basis for real progress between the two. in concluding, let me also ask whether it's possible that japan's prime minister and korea's president could use their speeches next year it to convey a shared agenda for future bilateral cooperation.

and the primedent minister made a good started doing just that in 1998. it is time to try this again. a turnabout in the tide may not be easy to achieve but neither does it seem totally impossible. if the two sides can launch the future-oriented relationship called for by president pak, it will mark a far-reaching contribution to peace and stability. i will stop there. thank you very much. [applause] >> bruce. i like to think of myself as walter described me as the great cleanup router. their mission was simply to get on base and i would bring them home with my analysis. instead, i'm like the little guy at the end of the parade saying, ok, thank you for your time. nothing else to see. [laughter] not the janitor. [laughter]

we have obviously focused on historic issues, but the u.s. looks at asia not so much from a historic view but from a security point of view. as such, we see our national interests and the threats to them. the most obvious threats to the u.s. and our friends are right now from north korea and china. the mostea is immediately pernicious threat including the growing threat from the nuclear missile programs as well as military attacks on south korea. they are the wolf closest to the sled than -- then china is the 800-pound dragon emerging from the shadows. has really focus been taking our eyes off the ball of these very real threats in asia. both north korea and china also share another characteristic in that oath of them also have an incorrect view of history.

theicularly their role in death of hundreds of thousands of south koreans during 1950-1953. during his visit to seoul, president xi jinping said it was a symbol of chinese in south korea sharing interest and defense against the common thread. but he conveniently glossed over china inrecent role of the 1950-1953 korean war. koreas china or north ever apologized with sincerity or otherwise for their actions anyng the war nor subsequent incident. north korea has not apologized for their repeated attempts to kill the south korean president, blowing up a civilian airliner. the list goes on and on. nor have they apologized or ceased relentless propaganda against the south including calling the president a comfort woman and many other heinous

statements. in china, currently engaged now in a charm offensive towards south korea to wean them away from the u.s. and japan has also worked against south korean national interest by impeding to theningful response acts of war in 2010 as well as the repeated violations of the un security council resolutions. china's incorrect historical viewpoint and lack of contrition, they have not refused to hold summits with beijing as they have refused with tokyo. beyond those very obvious, , there iseats unfortunately the more subtle threat we have been talking about through the day from the strained relations of our very close friends and critical partners in northeast asia, the republic of korea, and japan. let me emphasize and quickly gloss over the importance of our

relationship with both nations for our own interests and their interests. need forfact that the very close trilateral cooperation and a time of rising security threats and unfortunately right now, that cooperation is having great difficulty even though washington relations with seoul and tokyo are perhaps the best they've ever been but the strained relations between our allies is preventing further cooperation as well as splattering the u.s. with accusations of favoritism of the one ally over the other. the previous flareups between tokyo and seoul, and there have been many before the current , washington had sought to remain aloof. there seemed to be no intention of getting involved in a fight between two close friends. really, the bilateral

negotiations have become so dire that they are seen as really very little hope for reconciliation that washington really during the past year has felt the need to become more involved in behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy. the u.s. role has not always been obvious but has included some quite frank messages delivered privately, as it should be, to both our allies. indeed, washington has become frustrated with our friends. japan for the ham-fisted diplomatic approach towards resolving historic issues and was south korea's insistence as seeing every issue through the lens of history and the seeming inability to take yes for an answer. blair cited the famous adage, those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it and i would cite a corollary from another not famous historian -- me.

fore who refuse to atone the past and those who refuse to forget the past are doomed to endlessly repeated and put their own future at risk. a look att take japanese actions during the occupation of world war ii. as i stated at an event similar to this last month here at heritage when we hosted a visiting japanese the evidence of japanese actions and atrocities during 1910 and 1945 is so unequivocal it's overwhelming. for anyone in japan to question those actions or tokyo's responsibility is historically inaccurate and morally reprehensible. it's equally indefensible to seek to minimize the scope of those actions by questioning the number of casualties or disputing details of testimony by comfort women. americans, it's incomprehensible why japan would even provide the appearance of

seeming to minimize their responsibility since after all the actions were undertaken by a japanese regime that has been irreversibly replaced by a democratic system. had tokyo atoned for its past deniedied those who those actions. if tokyo wants to move beyond the history issues in order to fulfill its own policy objectives and play a more effective regional and even global role, it must make a more concerted, systematic effort to alleviate the neighbors' conc erns over historic issues and to embrace bolder measures. recommendations, to

establish the reconciliation process to include as a minimum official, unequivocal, and repeated affirmations of the statements. and in a statement which would be worked out in private consultations to more fully embrace the responsibility for seoulctions and having articulate which steps to move forward. and a system for compensating the surviving comfort women and a condemnation of any future revisionist statements by japanese politicians and any groups advocating hate big -- hate speech. to make betterh efforts to build a bridge of reconciliation. the u.s. has its own troubled history with japan and history is important. but which history, the history of the last century or the

history of the last 70 years since the end of will board to. turning to south korea, south koreans discern future intentions based on japanese and 1945uring 1910 while americans base their perceptions of japanese future actions on those actions that tokyo has undertaken from 1945 to the present day. some perceive and ascribe to plans and intentions to resurrect 1930 past militarism and that view has no basis in fact. it is puzzling that south korea seems more worried and worked up by a hypothetical japanese military threat than the real threat from the north -- north korea. when polls show that japan is considered to be a threat second only to north korea or to be a greater military threat than north korea americans are perplexed. we have seen that most recently

in the many mischaracterizations of what the japanese collective self-defense would entail. the japanese context, changes that are being contemplated for collective self-defense seem monumental. and responding to changes but theythe u.s. point of view are small. to implement all 15 scenarios is disappointingly inadequate from what needs to be done. what i would recommend for south korea would be to criminalize -- compartmentalize its foreign-policy to exercise pragmatic leadership i not allowing emotional nationalism to impede security policies necessary for the defense of korea. and articulate a framework for by defininge issues

language that would enable seoul and tokyo to move forward rather than continuing amorphous demands for sincerity. and if culinary steps are taken in agreement to have a bilateral summit with japan and to adopt a trust policy with japan. we have things like collective self-defense and the military intelligence sharing agreement. the other is the listed defense. south korea is determined to foment a list affective defense popular.pulace than is that is the resistance to

andoying better equipment it is determined to maintain a final approach. saying i only need a goalie. that is fine enough. that last ditch final defense is enough. seoul resists integrating it system into the allied system. to use another sports analogy it is like having three outfielders in baseball who refuse to talk to each other. anyone who has played baseball know that if your outfielders because they have a different perspective on the fly ball that is coming out you know you are likely to catch the ball or in this case, to intercept the missile. it is uncertain why they

continue to resist those steps. some think it is because it does not want to offend china. that china would interpret this improved offensive system as a threat to china. obviously china is not acting in south korea's national interest. becauseontend it is south korea does not want to become involved in a system that involves japan. in conclusion i would repeat that history is important that we should focus on the proper history and that it must not hold the present or the future tokyo should more effectively address its responsibility for the past, real buster member who its friend is and where the threats are. can help our critical harness to achieve

reconciliation. thank you. >> let me open it up to questions from the floor. did you have something? thanks. really great discussion. i love your anniversary recommendations. earlier some of the discussions about the south korean investigation of how the investigation played out by lifting a lid on the consultations at the time i could bang my head. if they had not consulted it would be grotesquely irresponsible. conusole purpose of the statement was to work it out so that becomes a scandal. that becomes a criticism. that betrays the heart of the problem we're trying to resist. maybe we need to bear that in mind when we are talking, next

or we have to have these anniversaries and talk to each other. do they even want to talk to each other, is that further proof of a conspiracy? in tokyo in march or korea fatigue kept coming up and they use that phrase in english, when i went out drinking with a bunch of young journalists and they used the same damn thing. some propaganda thing. it is really there and it is a big problem but talking especially to this would have everythe contact guys, damn one of them is a lawyer, are supposed to be talking about diplomacy and relationships. there is this thing about the

lawn the treaties that always gets in the way of what we are talking about here which is public relations. nationalorate image, image, these kinds of things. that is a way to think about the approach. what are we trying to do here? we are trying to improve japan's brand with the south koreans and vice versa. the japanese are tired and they do not believe them anymore. good oldtead of washington pr -- it is a horrible thought. comments more than questions. thank you for indulging me. iswe have been large it largely talking to the same group in tokyo. i think there are many people in japan, including many in the foreign ministry who have a similar take and complaint as the one you just uttered.

and yes, there has been an acessive reliance on legalistic approach on something as delicate as the comfort women issue. some might say with good reason because it is based on the normalization agreement between the rok and japan. there was a legal framework in that dialogue and japan is a adhering to that interpretation and this issue is argument.u know that as i have been arguing with my japanese friends they made the time to lock the lawyers -- may be time to lock the lawyers up in a room and deal with this as an issue of moral responsibility , as an issue of historical closure, if you will. as an issue of japan's image in the world. when somebody countries that are

very enamored of japan and around the world have been piling on in their criticisms about japan's management of the comfort women issue. the message to tokyo should be clear, that legalisms aside, however accurate they may be, this issue has metastasized in a way that is undermining japan's moral authority, of which it has the 70 years,in 69 years since the end of world war ii. important take away from your comments just now is for senior-level japanese to internalize that and to figure out a way to set aside legalisms and deal with this from a broader historical and moral perspective. that is my two cents. i think that is

a microcosm of a lot of the historic problems and that when questionsber raised about the statement the administration should have said we are not doing a review. it is government policy, we have crates worth of evidence, enough said. we are not going to do a review. having gone down the path of doing a review they have another lost opportunity when they presented it. comment fromrtant the review was the cabinet secretary affirming the statement. that should have been a message which was repeated over and over and even beyond that saying let's take the opportunity to even more fully embrace responsibility in order to put this issue behind us. another lost opportunity. also it did reflect the south korean suspicion of anything japan does now.

south korea should have declared victory and they should have said affirmed the statement as abe did in march and the statement before that. the reports show that even before the japanese government interviewed the comfort women from their own available holdings of evidence, they were going to as they told a south korean diplomat, they were going to issue the statement. victory number two and victory number three would be that japan responded to south korean for specificemands words, specific actions. that is what diplomats should do and that is a model for what should be done now is quietly se oul saying what it would like and tokyo saying what it might do. the -- they did lose

opportunities on both sides to put the issue behind them. the statement review, i had the same feeling when i was and there was a lot of handwringing about what would come out about the consultations and it reaffirmed how bad things are. historian, not so famous historian juan cedeno things are bad when the solution -- not soproblem famous historian said you know when things are bad when the solution becomes a problem. there is this dialogue going on

and we have to see how that turns out. there is a tone on the korean side where they are trying to say we can carp at -- compartmentalize the issue with japan. where does that come from? i do not think that comes from some sort of realization that they are being unreasonable. shot a inc. shot -- bank from the summit. that they areried falling into china's lap. it is a reaction to that. when you do policy you do your best you can to make lemonade out of lemons so there is a lemon, korea falling into china's orbit. it creates some antibodies and we have to show that we are in morese that to promote

japan-courier corporation. the challenge from an everyday policy perspective is not on the korean side, persuading them. there is some. it is on the japan side because things have shifted so much as you said from your trip to japan. that is the harder rock to roll up the hill right now. >> i am a long term resident of years with the30 world bank. toea and japan should be, country, likeian siamese twins create -- twins. f both countries as

china. we use chinese script in writing and sort of korean. unofficial documents, chinese is evidence -- evident. it should not have been just a history of the end of the 19th century but rather a long history of more than 1500 years when the group of families and andrship from korea came dominated japan. to this day the oldest city in with as the -- named korean word. of you today, especially american participants said what can we do?

you are essentially enjoying a fight between two countries who should have been friends and taking them on to continue fighting by putting all kinds of conditions and saying layoff. it is not that important whether comfort women did this or that ofwhether in the government the administration, the japanese military or the government of date between 1910 and 1945 despicable things -- did despicable things. all of you use the word the occupation of korea. there was a colonization but the japanese side did not regarded as occupation. they went in the wrong track of annexation. this was approved by the league

of nations to the point and however uncomfortable it might be in the 1936 olympics, it was a korean person who [indiscernible] raise the flag. is,last concluding point our future together, it is the western powers that divided korea into two parts. doneu think you have enough to reunify the north and south instead of saying how dangerous north korea is? thank you. what part of that to pick up. there is a lot of debate that we could have their -- there. to debate 1500 years of history

would be beyond the scope. thank you. >> kevin with the state department, most of my career was with japan. note -- it is important to -- a lot of the noise that you hear is not from people who represent the vast majority of people in japan. an official made these statements, it was wartime and comfort woman was -- comfort women were necessary, he was about hisiticized

potential as a national politician. to theea referring revisionism or the fudging of history issues by the japanese toernment, it is difficult find any statement from anyone in the current japanese government that has walked away from the statement -- both statements. the people outside of the government have said a lot of suga have abe and stuck with the statements. my question is, what do you think could he said by him -- that wouldter abe satisfy the government or are we in a situation where the current leadership in korea in this complicated situation,

[indiscernible] and didn't get a good deal in the 1965 agreement. is there anything that bobby -- andcould say in your view what might that be that really could move this forward from the korean perspective? >> my view on this is i don't think these are resolvable issues. even if an agreement is reached on comfort women, even if the prime minister meets with survivors and apologizes, i do not think it will resolve the issue. there are biases on the korean side. the attribute any statement that is made by a japanese politician is conciliatory and something that is motivated by the

situation. something that is off-color, that is the real japan. bias, attribution bias that is systematic in the korean side that makes it on.icult for them to move add, if you go back through the record you could find a number of statements made by some members of the cabinet, certainly numbers of the diet that have set korean teeth on edge and teeth in washington on edge as well. i will not name any names or point any fingers but the record shows that i would agree with you, the vast majority of people in the government and outside the government do not subscribe to some of these more extreme views and interpretations. i think that is true. and public opinion polling in

japan confirms that. in terms of what the prime minister might say, one of the watchwords in dealing with these thees is that in light of tragic and troubled history between korea and japan over the centuries, i saw my japanese -- tell my japanese friends this all the time. you cannot ever stop saying you're sorry. i know it is difficult but it is true. you have to keep it up. america has its own issues with minorities and our troubled history as well and you cannot end the apology and say that is it, we are done, we are finished. there has to be this ongoing subtext of apology that will go on forever. i would agree with what victor said. past is so problematic for many koreans that you will never

actually ended all -- and it all. the best you can do is manage the problem, shelve it, as i said in my remarks, you cannot erase it, you cannot ignore it. you have to live with it and figure out a way to build a more constructive, positive as the president said, following a more future oriented relationship. keeping in mind the history. half of my ancestry is irish and we're still fighting certain problematic issues that arose in our relations with the brits. my grandfather was in the ira. there is one for you in terms of the strength of feeling in certain parts of my family about the stuff but somehow the brits and ireland have managed to get beyond a lot of these issues that go back just as far and in some cases further than korea and japan problems.

there is a way forward. >> i do not think we are going to solve it but if there can't be enough progress where you can move the history issues out of the spotlight where they are now , if you can move them to the side and compartmentalize and do not ignore them but not have them front and center so they are the all-consuming viewpoint and all-consuming issue. there are a couple of things. there has to be an acknowledgment by south korea that the problem did not start with abe. anyone who has worked with these issues, it is cyclical. correct a lotd to of the misperceptions and mischaracterizations. when south korea took two hours spentummit with noda and

a lot of time talking about comfort women, that is a mis-prioritization of issues. seoul need to correct when people make a mischaracterization. that is not correct. that is a falsehood. seoul a, i think in need for realization that will -- they will never have 100% compliance. there were always be someone in japan who says something inflammatory. when the president said as long as there are some politicians in japan who say heinous things are incorrect things, we will have problems. you are never going to be able to control 100% of the population from saying some.

as i mentioned before if you can get behind the scenes discussions between the two identifieshere seoul what it wants, what are the words, what are the examples that they want so that japan can see if they've provide those -- if they provide those and agree to move forward if tokyo were to utter those words. difficult, difficult to come up with the exact formula would be. conceptually i think i know what it is and conceptually the issue is that both in the korean domestic political context and contextnese political to my it is not legitimate to reconcile relations over history. feelese politicians do not lucky it wins them a great deal of legitimacy and domestic legitimacy to be for a cleaning

and on the korean side there is no incentive to be conciliatory. the point at which this thing gets better is when east's -- each side perceives the other as taking steps, making a japanese position something that is considered to mystically legitimate. that is what happened in postwar germany. of contrition was deemed politically legitimate. something that every politician should aspire to and that is clearly not the case in japan or korea right now. >> we will have to leave the discussion there. i want to thank my panelists for this discussion. it was an excellent discussion. i hope i'm not wrong to be a little hopeful after this discussion. i thought of all the ways it could go very badly.

we almost got to the bad outcome. we handled it pretty well. i am glad we heard those views and we can have a conversation. thank you for coming and hope to see you next time. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

[indistinct conversations] >> tonight, a look at the congressional investigation into general motors ignition switch recall. the ceo took responsibility and apologized to the families of the victims who died as a result of the faulty switches. here's a look.

ago, gmthan a decade embarked on a small car program. sitting here today i cannot tell you why it took so long for a safety defect to be announced for this program. i can tell you we will find out. this is an extraordinary situation. it involves vehicles we no longer make, but it came to light on my watch so i am .esponsible for resolving it when we have answers we will be fully transparent with you, with our regulators, and with our customers. while i cannot turn back the clock to my as soon as i learned about the problem, we acted without hesitation. we told the world we had a problem that needed to be fixed. we did so because whatever mistakes were made in the past, we will not shirk from our responsibilities now, or in the future. today's gm will do the right thing. that begins with my sincere apologies to everyone who has been affected by this recall. especially the families and

orends who lost their lives were injured. i am deeply sorry. >> that was a portion of a hearing that took place earlier this year. you can see the entire event at 8 p.m. eastern here on c-span. all this month while congress is in recess we are showing you "book tv" in primetime. tonight, books on money issues and a look at the book "war and boys."and "flash "money, how the destruction of the dollar threatens the global economy and what we can do about it." that is at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span2. battle of fort stevens. that took place in july of 1854

the confederate army probe defenses before deciding to turn back. that is on c-span3. >> this month, c-span privet -- presents debate so what makes america great, evolution, and schmidt -- genetically modified loans, and, student fighting infectious disease and food safety and our history to her showing sights and sounds from america's historic laces. find our tv schedule one week in advance at c-span.org and let us know what you think about the programs you're watching. us. us or e-mail join the conversation, like us

on facebook, follow us on twitter. >> tomorrow, eugene o'donnell of the john jay college of criminal justice looks at the role police play in civil disturbances like the current one in ferguson. and marion smith of the u.s. citizenship and immigration services on president johnson's push for changing u.s. immigration laws. after that can't watkins -- kent watkins discusses the on the bus housingact -- omnibus act. live at 7n journal" a.m. on c-span. jonah perettiyear buzzfeed and its mix

news.ht content and this is half an hour. have read a buzz feed article today? in the past week? here's a question. buzzfeed has been evolving. today? buzzfeed >> one of the reasons i started thinking about the history of media a little bit was when i -- what are other companies like, it was hard to find any. if you look at facebook or startups, wech

have hired journalist and we have people doing stuff that none of the tech companies are doing and when you look at time warner or disney or viacom they are these giant companies with multibillion-dollar, billions in profit that are using cable and broadcast and they are very buzzfeed isom what doing. the companies that are most similar are media companies in their first 10 or 20 years. when you look at get newspapers and magazines and the hollywood studios and they are similar to and --d and like voice and others that are emerging. >> a lot of people see buzzfeed at funny lists or photos

of kittens and puppies. when did you start hiring journalists, what inspired that? >> we started as a site that was like a lab. we were experimenting with things and when people care about them when we first started it was social things, entertainment content and in the social web to the point where people were sharing longform journalism and news and entertainment. about we hired ben smith three years ago and he started building out a new steam and today we have an investigative and they have been hiring a lot of impressive reporters who are getting into their groove doing longform, longer-term investigations. we have two reporters in ukraine.

>> what percentage are engaged with journalism as opposed to the kind of cute lists and frivolous content? depends on the time. when the boston bombings happened the most popular was all hard news content and we had reporters covering the bombings and we had people in new york who were using their knowledge of twitter and instagram to figure out what was going on in the web. we were the first to to'snticate suspect umber twitter account. news.atar predated the they all went to the same high school. we were able to use our

knowledge to figure out what was happening. and during this moments the most popular content is news content but during slow news the most popular content is things like 23 animals who are extremely disappointed in you. what city should you actually live in or things like that. >> how are people discovering the journalism content? wax people discover it in the flow. when you look at facebook you see hard news, longform next to cute kittens next to entertainment content. buzzfeed, youat see that mix. >> what percentage is journalism as opposed to animals that are disappointed in you and our

lungs people born in the 80's would understand? -- back to looking at the history of the media, their early history of newspapers, there was limited space so you had to make these decisions because of limited space about much knew she would put and how much advertising and how much serious and how much frivolous stuff. there was a battle to be the number one tape or in the country. a newspapers rationing, paper rationing. space.as limited less pages two print stuff on. the herald tribune shrunk the size of the new so -- to keep advertisers happy. times" cut ads so

they could cover news. they lost money during the war but when the war was over their circulation was higher. all the advertisers came back and there was more paper and they were able to win this war. decision of how much do you user limited resources for ads , what isch for news different about the internet is we do not have to make that choice. we can do all the news we can possibly do because the internet never runs out of space. we will do all the cute animals and quizzes and lists because we are not going to run out of space for those and we will do all the branded content and and all thatising can exist on their own track without scarce resources of either time like a television station or bandwidth like radio

or print like a newspaper. that has created an interesting opportunity to build a media company that is -- does not have the normal kinds of constraints that companies have had. >> are there times when those focuses common to conflict question mark >> we have a food and food section and diy section, we have a test kitchen where we are making incredible recipes and it is awesome stuff. a lot of people do not know we have it. it comes on the front page and -- if you'reot active on pinterest you are likely finding our food and diy conflict -- content. it is becoming more about having each piece of content reach its

full potential. there is not these conflicts. there is some lingering legacy of some print where people think that if you do one thing it means that you cannot do something else. it is not true. people who are used to the newspaper dropped on your news and howthe many ads are there. you take that calculus, it is a weird site. if you think that there is no constraint on what you can do and the adjacency does not matter, then you start understanding more about what we are doing. >> are there instances where someone who is familiar with across a serious

article and doubts the credibility because it is the buzzfeed brand? brandple are used to one doing different things. there is were you had edward r morrow doing the news but you had comedy and variety and you had offered hitchcock on the same network that had the evening news. people are used to having that mix. i think the bundle is something that has always been so important to media. a lot of the journalism wars were between papers fighting over the content. [indiscernible] if you lose the comics, you will

lose half the readers. there was a protracted bidding war. fewer people would read the journalism if the comics were not there. it is something that our news content, our longform content reaches a much larger audience than it would if we did not also -- 200 million video views a month and massive amounts of pure chiffon quizzes and lists and other content. media startups are more of the thing than they have been. there is a lot of tech startups and what you generally see

looking at the history of media is new technology emerge that often is a distribution technology. distribution technology gets built out and people create content companies that take advantage of the distribution that did not exist before. a lot of people do not know the early story of cnn which was wtbs was a local station in atlanta that was owned by ted turner and cable was this new thing where satellites could be missing a to a region. could, ted-- you turner realized i could be my local station by satellite and a could be carried on cable to all these places around the country. it seemed like it was an exciting new thing. people thought why would anybody want to watch the local television station.

in phoenix or new york or somewhere else but he started licensing television shows and movies and lots of other kinds of entertainment. and started to be a distributor of this kind of entertainment. when he saw the adhesive event -- possibility there is going to , be someone to dominate news on cable and he started cnn. it was interesting he started with entertainment and moved into news. at the time, the networks were spending $200 million year to do half an hour of news on the evening news and the plane was -- cnn's plan was to spend 20 to $30 million to do news 24 hours a day. everyone thought it was impossible. you could cover things in ways that you could not if you only had a half hour. and you had to wait. he had this built-in advantage i contract -- by content that fit

with this type of distribution. it has grown into a giant company. newspapers were exploding and there were so many people could not read them all. time said let's aggregate the newspapers. it was possible to print photos. people would listen on the radio and they would hear someone's voice. they did not know what newsmakers looked like. life magazine let people see for the first time what people looked like. when you look across or even radio. people thought he would go back to cigars because cigars are much better business than radio. no one would stand for ads that interrupted the flow of audio and radio.

and radio would never be up business and that was the start of cbs. the key is the reason there are so many media startups is because there is an explosion of distribution technology. whether it is radio or new printing presses or cable closesion, there follows behind an explosion of new kinds of media companies. with smartphones and social -- you areying seeking ability to distribute media internationally more quickly than ever before in history. lots of companies have started to form to take advantage of that map of distribution that did not exist five years ago. when buzzfeed started the iphone did not exist. now we have 60% of our traffic or more on mobile devices.

that has enabled distribution that people did not think was possible a few years ago. >> is there a point of saturation where there is only so much that media startups can grow and only room for so many in terms of distribution accessibility? >> there used to be what people called natural monopolies. if you are the biggest newspaper in philadelphia you would have a natural monopoly. you had the big printing press and had the trucks to drive the papers around and who else can start something to compete with you and the argument was on the web we would never see that happen. any blogger can start a site. it does not cost a lot to publish and there is tons more content. there is no limitation of space. likewise with radio. there is limitation. if you get a slot on the dial you have an advantage.

what you are saying is the competitive advantage is having to come from technology. it is the ability for editors to make content more quickly. pages loading faster and better data to optimize your site. it is possible to will the great media business but the way that you build competitive advantage is in technology. that is why we have a focus on building technology. for news and entertainment. that is why a lot of companies are focused on that as well. >> what is the future or roll of role of technology and media?

>> you cannot tell a good media company unless you have great technology. >> is that limited to the platform or is it beyond the lab form moving forward in terms of hiring data scientists? >> we build a lot of the tools we use everything that allows us to make a better product because all the pieces fit together. some sites -- everything is -- make the mistake of having a frankenstein approach where everything is powered by some other start up and they are stapling them all together. that is a better approach. i think there will be some startups that into modifying the layers. google analytics will be used by people because no one wants to build their own platform from scratch or something like that. it is still up for grabs which players will end up eating -- eating outsourced to other tech companies in which one

should -- publishers will build themselves. when you look at cable or newspapers and you see that there is this virtuous cycle of media businesses where people who build the better platform and up attracting better talent and that talent into the back ends up improving the platform and it is a virtuous cycle. there will be several companies in this current crop of new companies building media businesses that get that cycle going. and becoming big players and building companies that will last for a long time. if you work that buzzfeed they should be able to reach a larger audience and have better understanding one of how people -- understanding of how people work. so we're focused on building

that cycle and other people are also -- also have a similar focus and that will lead to interesting new companies that will keep growing. for the long-term. >> given that there is this rise of the new media startups and given that you do not think that there is a saturation point, what advice would you have for someone who is launching a media star today? -- start up today? >> it is good to look for new emerging platforms that people laugh at and think are not that important. people laughed at radio and cable when ted turner went to cable. looking for areas where people think this is silly and this will never amount to much is often a good base to go because

other people are not there and you can figure out how to build something that is unique for a new distribution platform before it matures. we thought we would be focused on social and we thought social -- we saw social becoming the dominant way of how people consume news and entertainment. mobile became better than pc's and that was not something we predicted or expected that we were interested in social almost for intellectual reasons more than anything else. being interested in something when it is small have a deeper -- helps you have a deeper understanding and a unique approach. >> what are some of the lessons that people should look into, such as lessons learned from old media?

>> every big media company was once a start up. if you look at cbs there is not that much you can land because -- you can learn because they are a giant and you are small and starting out. if you look at them when they were losing money, that looks like a lot of startups. when you look at time magazine that looks like a lot of new media startups that are starting today. hollywood studios are interesting. i was surprised reading about the early days of hollywood that you would go to a movie theater and you would see a bunch of short films and then you would see a newsreel updating you about the war or something and then you would see a 60 minute western. that is what you paid to see. people look at startups in the media space and they are doing

these small, silly things. they're not like these big movie studios but if you look at what paramount was doing, they were making short films that are more similar to what we are doing on youtube than they are to the feature films they are doing today. it is a case where there is something to learn from history. there is lots of differences. is oldsest comparison media companies are the model and there is lots of interesting lessons to learn. >> do you have a list or what would it look like if you were to give advice or wrap up the history of old media in a list? >> i am not as good at lists

like the pros at buzzfeed. i think that for me, the things that happened most interesting is newspapers, early magazines, early hollywood studios, and early cable television and those are huge industries that became multimillion dollar industries. when you look at their early days it is shockingly similar to the way small media startups are operating now. they would be on my list but it would need a better name created i an editor and not by me. >> it looks like we're just about out of time. we have some time for questions. does anyone have questions? we have a question over here.

>> you published the 96 page report of the new media people as to what they need to do did you see some lessons in their for new media companies? staff research of where media is added -- headed? mobile is huge and cannot be ignored. if there are new companies that are not thinking deeply about mobile than they should be. --had athat report was law and it. how do you focus? there are a lot of good ideas.