you are trying to clean up a mess left behind for you by your predecessors. but i have one last question. how can gm assure its customers that new switches be installed beginning april 7 will finally meet gm's requirements? >> we are working very closely with our supplier, our executive director responsible for switches is personally look at the performance of the new switches. we will do 100% end of line testing to make sure that the performance, the safety, the functionality of these switches are safe. >> thank you. the gentleman's time has expired. ms. barra, i just want to be clear did you review the documents that gm submitted to the committee? >> no, i did not. there was over 200,000 pages my understanding. >> how about the document mr. waxman is talking about doid you review that? >> this page right here? >> yes. >> i actually saw this for the first time i think a day ago. >> thank you. i now recognize ms. blackman for five minutes.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. ms. barra you've mentioned several times in your comments today's gm. so my assumption is that you are going to run gm in a different manner than it has been run in the past? and that >> that's correct. >> and you are making some changes. i want to ask you just a little bit about time line. helping us to get our hands around this because this is the first investigation we're going to do. we're going to have others. and continue to look at this to get answers and figure out what has happened here between you all and nhtsa, and also within what happened at gm. so you mentioned in your testimony that this came to light on your watch. so i am assuming that there was no widespread knowledge in gm about this issue until you became ceo. am i correct on that? >> at the senior level of the company, we learned of this

after the recall decision was made on january 31st. i was aware in lace debtber december there was analysis going on cobalt issue. but as soon as we understood the senior leadership understood this issue and that a recall decision had been made we acted without hesitation. >> ok then how did you find out about it? was it through someone bringing the issue to you to say ms. barra we have a real problem here? or in doing your due diligence did you find out about it? >> the committee, the leadership committee responsible for making recall decisions made a desin on january 31,. they notified mark rice who immediately picked up the phone and called me. >> and can you submit to us the members of that leadership committee that make those recommendations? >> yes. >> thank you. and then was your predecessor, mr. acreson, your predecessor,

was he aware of this issue? >> not to my knowledge. >> he was? >> not to my knowledge. >> he was not. are any of the members of the leadership committee also -- were they a part of his leadership committee? >> there are members of today's team that were also members of mr. eckerson's leadership time and to my knowledge they were not aware. >> do you think there was a coverup or it was sloppy work? >> that is the question i've asked mr. velucas to uncover and i'm anxiously awaiting the results of his study. >> do you think it had anything to do with the auto bailout? >> with i'm sorry? >> ok. do you think it had anything to do with the auto bailout? >> with the auto bailout? >> again, i need to get the results of the study to make all the determinations. >> and going back to what mr. upton said you're going to be sharing that information with us? >> we will be -- >> as you get those. ok. was there -- the engineers that were responsible for this, have you brought them into the process? i know this is something that

the part was actually created by delfi. correct? >> right. >> and they have an engineering team that was working on that. so they have a shared responsibility and liability in this entire issue. have you met with them and with the engineering team that was responsible for this switch? >> i have not met with the specific engineering team that is responsible. >> ok. >> but i am speaking to leadership and those individuals are being interviewed as part of the investigation. conducted by mr. velucas. >> now, going back did you say this this was a defective part when you talked about it earlier? >> we have learned when we knew when the recall decision was made and we later went back and looked at the chronology there's points that suggest and that's why we're doing the investigation.

>> all right. now, i think that you're going to hear from more than one of us about not having a new part number assigned. who made that decision? was that strictly a delfi decision or did that come into the gm supply chain for that decision to be made as to how that part number would be coded? >> at a general level, general motors is responsible for general motors parts numbers. >> ok. >> but again that's part of the investigation to understand how that happened. >> ok. does that seem inconceiveable to you? >> yes. it is an inconceiveable. it is not our process. and it is not acceptable. >> ok. i would think that it probably is not. have you asked delfi if you can have access to their documentation and their e-mail chain dealing with this issue? >> i have not. and again mr. velucas will go as

the investigation takes him to get the information that he needs to make a complete and accurate accounting of what happened. >> my time has expired. thank you mr. chairman. i yield back. >> just clarification ms. blackburn. we have asked for that e-mail chain from delfi and we will let you know when we get that. we now recognize chairman emeritus of the committee mr. dingell for five minutes. >> mr. chairman, i thank you for your courtesy. i begin by telling the families of those who were injured or killed by the defective general motors vehicles they have our sympathy and we believe the events here are tragic indeed. i join everyone in expressing my condolences to the families who were killed or injured in those crashes. now it is incumbent upon the congress, federal regulatories and general motors to determine how these deaths could have happened and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the safety of american motorists and their

families are moving forward. i expect that this investigation will be thorough. and i counsel all the stakeholders to be unabashedly forthright. now, ms. barra, i would like to build on chairman murphy's line of questioning. and all of my questions will require yes or no answers. if you cannot answer some of my questions i expect that you will submit responses for the record and all available relevant supporting materials. now, ms. barra, is it correct that gm has now recalled approximately 2.5 million small cars in the united states due to defective ignition switches? >> yes >> yes or no?

now, ms. barra, is it correct that gm recently expanded its recall of small cars because it was possible that defective ignition switches may have been installed as replacement parts? yes or no? >> yes. >> ms barra, is it correct that the ignition switch in question was originally developed in the late 1990s and approved by general motors in february of 2002? yes or no? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that general motors' own design specificications for such ignition switch required 20 plus or minus 5 newton centimeters of torque to move the switch from the accessory position to the running position? yes or no? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that general motors approved production of such ignition switch despite test results by dell

fy during the production part approval process or p prn ap? showing that the switch did not meet gm's torque requirement? yes or no? >> that's not clear to me. >> now, ms. barra, is it correct that general motors approved a redesigned of the ignition switch used in the presently recalled vehicles in april 2006? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that gm's torque requirement was the redesigned switch remained the same as for the original ignition switch? yes or no? >> it is not clear to me and that's why we focused the investigation on that area specifically. >> when that information becomes available would you submit it to the committee? >> yes, i will.

>> now, ms. barra, to your knowledge, did the redesigned ignition switch meet gm's torque requirements? yes or no? >> i believe -- >> do you want me to say it again sf to your knowledge, did the redesigned ignition switch meet gm's torque requirements? yes or no? >> it's part of the investigation. >> ms. barra, will you please submit for the record an explanation of the factors that gm takes into conversation when approving a part for production? are there circumstances where gm may approve parts for production when such parts do not make such design specificications? yes or no? >> yes. >> if so, could you please submit materials for the record explaining when and why that might occur? >> yes. >> ms. barra, i appreciate the length to which gm under your leadership is going to recall the vehicles and ensure that

they're safe to drive. gm's cooperation with the committee is necessary in order to understand the process by which and the reasons decisions were made leading up to the 2014 recall. you may have so far done so and i expect that you will continue to do so. thank you for your courtesy, mr. chairman. thank you ms. barra. i yield back the balance of my time. >> the gentleman yields back. i now recognize the chairman emeritus of the majority mr. barton of texas for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. before i ask my questions i want to make just a general observation. this is probably the last major investigation that this subcommittee and full committee is going to conduct where we have the services of mr. dingell and mr. waxman. we have had a history on this committee and this subcommittee going back at least 40 to 50 years when we have major issues we

try to approach them on behalf of the american people in a nonpartisan very open way. and it certainly appears that we're going to continue that tradition today. so i hope that we can show the best to the american people that the congress at its best gets the facts, presents the facts, and does so in a way that in the future we protect the public health and safety for the american people. now, with that caveat, i do have a few questions. a number of congressmen so far have made the point that these ignition switches didn't appear to meet specificications. and my assumption is that you've agreed that they did not meet specifications. is that correct? >> we have learned that as we did the recall.

>> now, i am an industrial engineer. i used to be a registered professional engineer. i'm not currently registered but i have been in the past. why in the world would a company with a stellar reputation as general motors purchase a part that did not meet its own specificications? >> i want to know that as much as you do. it is not the way we do business today. it's not the way we want to design and engineer vehicles for our customers. >> i mean, i just don't understand that. i'm -- i've never worked in an auto assembly environment. i've worked in a defense plant, an aircraft plant. i was plant manager of a printing plant. i have done limited very limited consulting in the oil and gas industry.

but i've never been a part of an organization that said we set the specs when a part or doesn't meet the specs we go ahead and buy it anyway. i just -- you know, you're currently the ceo. but at one time i think before you became ceo you were the vice president for global product development purchasing and supply chain. i mean, is it your position now that general motors will not accept parts that don't meet specificications? >> we will not accept parts that don't meet our performance safety functionality durable requirements. as i mentioned before in the steel example, there will be times where there will be a material or a part that doesn't meet the exact specificications but after analysis and looking at the

performance, the safety, the durability, the reliability, the functionality, it will be ok. that happens very often as we buy steel. to make the body of the vehicles. >> well then you don't need specificications. with all respect -- no. >> but what you just answered is gobbledygoop. it's your own specificication. it's your company's specificications. if a part doesn't meet the specificication why in the world would you not refuse it and only accept the part that meets the specificications? >> there needs to be a well-documented process if you accept a part that doesn't meet the original specificications. >> would the gentleman yield? >> briefly. >> do you have that information? >> on steel? >> no. on starters. >> on the ignition switch? >> if it didn't meet specificications do you have the information on these starters that it met all those other criteria? >> that is part of the investigation. but clearly the fact that we made a recall it did not meet

the performance. >> we have the advantage as a subcommittee that we know now what happened in the past. we know now that there is a real problem. we know now that a number of young people have lost their lives and apparently because of this defect. so we have the advantage of hindsight. and so i -- i understand that. but as ms. degette just said and a number of others, there's no reason to have specifics if you don't enforce them. this next question is not a trick question but it is an important question. right now how many parts are being used in general motors product that don't meet your own companies' specificications? >> i don't have that exact number but i can tell you the parts that we're using today meet the performance and the reliability the safety that they need to if we find we have a part that is

defective that doesn't meet the requirements, we then do a recall. >> well, again, with due -- that's not an acceptable answer i think to the american people. we're not telling you the specificications to set. now, there are some safety specificications that by law and nhtsa by regulation sets. but there shouldn't be a part in any gm product or for that matter any automobile products in the united states that doesn't meet the specificications. my last -- well, at what level was the decision made to override and to use this part even though it didn't meet specificication? was that made at the manufacturing level, at the executive level or even at some subcomponent purchasing level? do you know that?

>> that's part of our investigation to find the answer all or e-mail comments at [indiscernible] -- www.c-span.org. >> we are going to be focusing on lyndon johnson vision for a great society and its impact today. join the conversation.

>> a couple of live events to tell you about tomorrow beginning with the community action partnership annual at 11 a.m. eastern. speakers include sister simone campbell. at 2 p.m. a discussion on the conflict between russia and ukraine. family members of victims who died or were injured due to the faulty ignition switches held a news conference in april. the comments are about 10 minutes. >> i was a typical 20-year-old. i had a beautiful cobalt.

it was all mine. i had friends living in different states. luckily i had a car to get me there. i was driving when my car went from 45 miles per hour to zero in seconds. as the cars swerved to avoid crashing into me i started to cry hysterically. luckily two men jumped out of the car to push me to a gas station. i called my mother crying. it wasturned it back on fine. months later the same thing happened again. this time i was on the long haul to visit my friend in tennessee. as i was on the ramp at the other car swerved around me. in thed the key ignition, and the car was good to go. when i returned home my mother

and i brought the car to the service center for a second time. they keep it until they find the problem. they informed me my key ring was enlarged and if my knee hit the bottom it would shut down. a few months later the situation happened a third time. somehow i escaped a four car pileup. at that point i was diagnosed with a heart disease and had a pacemaker implanted. the drug -- the doctors informed me any stress or anxiety was cause for setting off this device. my mother and i decided this car was a death trap and the game of what if we were not willing to play anymore. driving the car was like a game of russian roulette. i cannot even begin to explain the fear and confusion.

my hope is that the horror stops right now. the federal government failed to take action, and drivers like me were kept in the dark. close by quoting my mother's letter. she said, this is a safety recall issue if there ever was one. i should not have to listen the safety problems. i fully believe this problem has to be revised and corrected. havext we are going to batistad staff -- terry and lauren talk together. we helped my daughter amber pick out her 2005 chevy cobalt.

we helped her pick out her chevy cobalt because of the safety features. gm was aware of the problem there were problems with the ignition switch before the car was ready for the public. i feel that gm needs to be held consequencesor the . i believe it is necessary for the department of justice to determine if there is culpability by gm. it is clear gm is only concerned with the bottom line and not the safety of loved ones. i am the birth mother of

firstmarie rose, the known fatality. at first it was one. then we were few. we are many, and there is still more. this is just the tip of the iceberg. we are the people left behind when a loved one got into what was supposed to be a safe car. a car that gm knew to be defective. our mothers, brothers, wives, and husbands are gone because they were accustomed to doing business gm style. they made a decision that fighting the problem was better than solving the problem. been of these cars have

resold. when i went to the website of national traffic safety administration, i was shocked to see the ineffective message replaced by the next message after about seven seconds. it doesn't say anything about 13 people known to be killed. convey theot importance of this message. cars offould get their the road until the ignition has been repaired to protect themselves and everyone sharing the road with them. the second part of my mission is to reform the way gm and other car manufacturers do business. now is the time to act with

, to give the tools .hey need they need more resources to get the job done. i urge congress to take immediate action to make the for theore transparent public they are charged with serving. makee pass legislation to sure it doesn't happen again. thank you. >> now we are going to have ken weimer of wisconsin. here for you today as the voice of my stepdaughter and her friend.

lost their voice while boys whilethey're riding in the 2005 chevy cobalt. steering wheel lock. power brakes no longer work and safety airbags were turned off. when all of this happened the car followed a path off the road , crushed a phone box and collided with a group of trees. all three girls survived and were rushed to the local trauma center. amy passed away within hours. alive with life support, held on for 11 days before being announced

brain-dead. megan survived but to this day still suffers physical ailment and mental anguish as being the only survivor. my wife lost everything. natasha was her only child. there will be no boyfriend troubles, wedding day jitters, no children for natasha or grandchildren for gene, no family member to care for her as she grows older. hole in her heart. the accident report shows speed was not a factor. the weather was not a factor. the ignition system was found in the position by accident. none of this had to happen. it could have been easily addressed and corrected. four years prior to producing thecobalt gm was aware of emissions which design that could cause it to turn into that position with just the weight of a road bump. they chose to keep

producing the cobalt and selling it to an unsuspected public. would fix in the problem when it was discovered save these two girls lives and the lives of many others? yes. able to not accept the responsibility and liability of these young lives? no. please help us in standing up for what is right. gm knew what was wrong. gm is liable for these young deaths. i urge congress to pass strong legislation with tough penalties so the coverups stop. an injuryhat is should not be the cost of doing business. of natashaable death and amy will not be forgotten. .top the corporate cover-up congress should act now and pass legislation.

natasha and amy will not be forgotten, and we must protect other families from these types f tragedies. >> those family members of the victims were present later that gm at a house meeting of recalls. the acting director testified about his agency's investigation to determine what went wrong with the ignition switches. this portion of the hearing is 25 minute. murphy and ranking members of the committee. of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

the victim's family and friends have suffered greatly, and i am sorry for their loss. top priority. our employees go to work every day trying to prevent tragedies like these. predicting dangerous behaviors behind the wheel, improving the safety of vehicles and addressing safety defect has fatalitiesce highway to historic lows not seen since 1950. recallcase of the recent of vehicles we are first ensuring that they identify all vehicles with a defective ignition switch, fix them quickly, and is doing all it can to inform consumers about how to keep safe. we are also investigating whether general motors met the responsibility to address this

effect as required under federal law. report the defect as required by law. if it failed to do so, we will -- whole general motors accountable, as we have for the last five years. internally, we have already begun a review of actions in this case to review potential defects. today, i will share what i have learned so far. and -- ntsaits investigated airbag technology. some of the information raised concerns about airbag non-deployment. convened an expert panel to review the data. neither the cobalt nor the ion stood out when compared to other

vehicles. the two special crash weretigation reports inconclusive. the airbags did not deploy and the power mode was an accessory. occupants and off-road conditions that began with relatively small conditions where, by design, airbags are less likely to deploy in order to prevent doing more harm than good. furthermore, [indiscernible] is not present when airbags are deployed and do not warrant further investigation. 2010, we found that the related consumer complaint rate for the cobalt had decreased by nearly half since the 2007 review. based on our engineering expertise and our process, the

data available to us at the time was not sufficient to warrant further investigation. what does all of this mean. it means that we were concerned and engaged on this issue. this was a difficult case where the tools and expertise we have used over the last decade have successfully resulted in many recalls. the tools and expertise have served us well and we will continue to rely on and improve them. for example, we have already in in advancedinvested computer tools to improve our efforts. also means that we need to look at how we handle difficult cases like this going forward. we are looking to better understand how many manufacturers deal with power loss in airbags.

ways to address defectpear to be remote possibilities and we are looking at ways to engage manufacturers in all aspects of the process. will continue to identify defects and ensure they are fixed. i want to close on one last important note. defectsity to find requires our providers to act on good faith and in good time. parts change and indicating potentially critical supplier conversations on airbags. had this information been available earlier, it likely would have changed our approach to this issue. but let me be clear, both we and

the auto industry as a whole must look to improve. i greatly appreciate the to testify before you today. understand you just got into this position a couple of months ago. a focus on green energy and fuel cell technology. you arestand that if uncomfortable with some of the questions, you are more than welcome to ask some of the staff behind you. i believe we have a slide available or a poster here. went to your website to see what we could learn. have that available. this is all i could find on your website about the recall notice. no information about the broader recalls, parts, investigation,

or anything like this. i cannot even read this. it simply says get rid of your car key fobs. could you fix this website so that people can use it to get information, please? >> we will take those steps. right now, consumers can go to our website and get all of the details associated with the recall if they go to the search button and select the 2005 cobalt. >> can you make it easier? make it quick? in 2005, there was a proposal to investigate airbag deployment in the chevy cobalt, correct? >> yes. this is the powerpoint presentation made to the panel.

the presentation states that there have been 29 complaints about the cobalt air baits come -- airbags. is that correct? >> that sounds correct. is a charge of war and tea claims being much higher than other vehicles. do you agree -- warranty claims being much higher than other vehicles. >> that did raise concerns on our part. likely those claims are associated with airbags. others are likely to be associated with warning lights on airbags. impertinent -- an important look at the data that we use to decide whether or not we need to look further into these issues, which is what we'd

do in this case. tsa decided not to investigate. i believe this happened twice. what specific information did you have that said don't go forward? >> when we look at the case at the time, they look at the whole body of information. they don't necessarily rely on just one piece of information. the corp. east they relied on they determined was not enough information first was an analysis of the complaint. and the exposure, the number of those provided about the number theehicles on the road and number of vehicles on the road.

when the team did that comparison, the cobalt did not stand out. it was a little bit above average, but there were several vehicles that were significantly higher. >> but twice employees raised the red flag on this. wondering if you did something different when it occurred the second time. did anybody ask questions of why and airbag does not deploy? i looked at the statements and saw a number of things about anybodysses, but did ask a question, was there anything else, any other reason ?hy a bag would not deploy at the crashlooked data was007, the

inconclusive. why? because it indicated that these happened in off-road conditions with unbelted occupants. >> i am looking at reasons why airbags would not deployed. you were talking amongst yourselves, from what we understand from the powerpoint. , did you ask gm to tell you the reasons and airbag would not deploy. raisedow concerns were at a meeting, but i do not have an answer to that specific question. important because you are saying gm did not survive you with information, but you're -- provide you with the information but you're also saying you did not ask for the information.

>> typically, those questions do get asked when we move into the investigation phase. where this was was the face were phase were concerns are raised. questionsking those of automakers. roughly half of the cases brought up are brought to , roughly half are not. we arethe things concerned about is when we engage automakers. i believe there are changes we engage automakers earlier in the process. >> so, in retrospect, what you would change in this whole process. thank you.

>> you know that when nissan was investigating their direct -- issue, theoyment literature that the airbags would function of the 62nd after the power cut off. why did they think that? >> thank you. ignition switch and airbag non-deployment. the agency mistakenly believe that the airbags were deployed 60 seconds after the power cut off. why did nhtsa think that? >> that knowledge was actually

from years of experience. there was a problem where airbags would go off long after the vehicle was turned off. they had capacitors in them. those capacitors are designed to store energy. if power is lost, the airbag can still deploy. >> that is these on the gm service literature? >> my understanding is that his beast on the each of the experience. i apologize if i was not clear in my testimony. we have since found that service information and confirmed our information. a power loss would not stand out. >> you were not there, but nhtsa was basing its determination on experience. how is it that it failed to connect the dots between the airbag problem and the ignition switch problem. >> i believe there are two situations here. the information we had at the time indicated that there were two possibilities but in front of us. one of them was the ignition being off could have been a cause. the other one was the circumstances of the crash. in those two cases, the more likely scenario was that the crash was more likely to yield to the airbags not deploying. >> you said that gm had critical information that would have helped identify the defect that

they did not have. what information could gm have given you at the agency that would have helped identify the real problem? >> i made that statement based on looking at the chronology. there were a few things in that analogy that raised serious concerns for me. the first was that there was a change relative to the ignition switch. we were never informed of that change. the second was that there was a conversation with the buyers about their control algorithm. we were never informed of that conversation. we did not have the detail on how that our rhythm works. third, general motors created a direct connection in their recall. if we had any of those problems, i truly believe it would have changed how we approach this. >> is gm is changing a part, or they were fired to inform of that change -- required to inform that change? >> i can get back to you on that. >> it seems that that is critical. in your opening statement, you said that in order for nhtsa to make a correct determination, you need all of the information. you need the company -- based on what you know now, do you think at the time that all of this was happening, gm was acting in good faith? >> we have an open investigation into that question. if we find out that they were not, we will hold them accountable. >> i hope that you will informed this committee whether they did or didn't. >> absolutely. >> when you expect to finish

that investigation? >> i cannot put a timeline on it. we're getting hundreds of thousands of documents from gm. the deadline was april 3. is not clear that they will provide all of the documents. we are making sure that they can continuously produce documents. as soon as my team can combine information in those documents, to indicate that general motors had information, we will move forward with how to hold general motors accountable. >> thank you. >> with regard to the question, there is a change that we need to notify you about. i have a different part number. i don't know what the requirements are about that. >> we need to know what information you were reviewing. will you please provide that information? >> we can provide a significant amount of documentation. we will continue to do so. >> i recognize the chairman of the committee. >> you said that in order for

them to be able to make the correct determination you need all the information and you need a company to be acting in good faith. thousands and thousands of pages. based on what you know now it looks like we will be getting some more. i wrote an act that passed unanimously. president clinton signed it into law. a major point of that was that nhtsa would get the information it needed. they would detect a trend as quickly as they could. when nhtsa considered whether to investigate back in 2007, the early warning data was one of the factors that was cited in the defect assessment. correct? like that is correct.

>> what was the problem? the gm not report the information? was nhtsa unable to sort through the information? >> we have an open investigation to determine whether general motors failed in their responsibilities. we will definitely report to this committee the result. we looked at all the available information using an approach that we had used successfully to lead to over 1000 recalls influenced by nhtsa over the last 10 years. we used a process to look into the data and look into consumer

complaint data. there was a variety of other information. we dug into the data and we analyzed it. we tried to see if there was a defect trend that stood out. the data did not support that. it showed that the cobalt did not stand out. we look at the special craftsmanship. it was inconclusive. this is a case where the team worked very hard to try to understand what was happening. it was not able to see significant trends or clear enough defect.

what i am learning from this and where we have to go in the future is that we need to look carefully at the possibilities. we need to reconsider the way we are using these investigations. we need to continue to invest in tools. they are growing out of the watson ibm software. we must more efficiently use our resources. we have to move all of these tools forward the we have to

look for opportunities for changes. >> you look to embark on investigation. do you consider the number of deaths? is there some trigger that you use to warn of further exploration? is that one death, for jeff's, 20? is there some kind of standard put into place? >> there is not.

our goal and what i would love to be able to do is to do with the defects before there's a single death. it is the manufacturer's responsibility to report these effects and get them fixed. when they do not, it is our job to find them. we do not have a simple rule of thumb. each case is different. we have opened the investigations after one instance that it was needed. we have tried to rely on trend data. i cannot give you a specific. >> let's play monday morning quarterback. today is april 1, 2014. these problems arose over the last 10 years. what would you have done? what would you like to have your potter from gm that you did not have in the last eight-10 years?

>> what i can tell you based on the chronology is that i would've liked to have had information that they have changed parts on the ignition switch. i would've liked to have had information that they were talking to their suppliers. they appear to have concerns about the algorithm. i would certainly have liked to have had information directly linking the ignition switch defect to airbag non-deployment. as we go through our investigation, i should be able to go back and let you know if there is information. >> are you sure that they did not provide this information? >> it is my understanding that none of that information was available. we are continuing our efforts. we want to make sure that we understand what happened. i cannot give you a comprehensive answer. my understanding at this point is that no, we did not have that information.

i yield back. >> i will have my friend mr. kerry assist me. the chairman of the committee showed you this picture and said he could not navigate past this page. he said if new information became available, you would get that on the website. we learned in the first -- if you take your car to general motors, they will give you a loner or rental. i would call that germane and critical. i think it would be enticing to drive a 14 while they drive your car. i yield back. >> i received a call from one of my constituents who try to get a loaner car and said he could not have one. >> you could put on, take all your keys off the key ring except the ignition key. >> at is clearly on there. just to be clear, the reason we did that is because safety is

our priority. we are investigating the case. safety is our top priority, which is by the first thing i wanted people to see was how to keep themselves safe. i want to be clear, that is why we have that information. i didn't want anyone out there not to understand the steps to we invite your feedback on this program on the gm recalls. e-mail. the claimant to make sure that even though some of these claims

-- call or e-mail. the buses and interactive multimedia education center, and we bring c-span public affairs coverage do you and your community. we also visit schools and historical event throughout the country. >> to learn more go to www.c-span.org. send us a tweet. >> on the next washington journal, we look at the role local and state police have on civil disturbances. society series continues with a discussion of

the push to change immigration laws. we will be joined with marion smith. and then the national academy of housing development will focus on the housing act. washington journal is live on c-span every day at 7 a.m. eastern. >> our special look at gm recalls continues. testified on when the victims compensated. this is 50 minutes.

>> today we revisit the tragic general management issues that general motors that killed people. ge in my opening remarks that from my viewpoint, the ceo of general up and withtepped kurdish and conviction has confronted head-on the problem thathe corporate culture caused it. some see the record number of recalls at gm as a problem. i see it as a good sign. second, i want to briefly say that i think i speak on behalf of all members of congress who have asked very difficult surrounding these

tragic events, that while we are asking tough questions, we have great respect for the workers of general motors. i would like to take this moment to thank the workers at general motors. you are terrific, you build the cars, and you also were the victims of outrageously incompetent management. management was the problem here, not the workers. the valukas report i have spent some time with. i find it thorough and damning. there was indifference, incompetence, and deceit among engineers in positions of important responsibility. second, it is very clear that the culture of lawyering up and wack-a-mole to minimize liability in individual lawsuits killed innocent customers of general motors. i have many questions about the failures of the legal department today. i am also interested today in hearing from mr. feinberg, who has been asked to put together a plan to compensate those who have suffered from these management failures.

he is here independently of the witnesses from general motors. he is appearing independently of the witnesses of general motors, and he will exert independence in his role as he makes decisions about compensation to the many people who have suffered. and i certainly thank him for being here today in that regard. perhaps i am more interested today in understanding how in the aftermath of this report -- how in the world in the aftermath of this report did michael milliken keep his job? i do not understand how the

general counsel for a litigation department that had this massive failure of responsibility, how he would be allowed to continue in that important leadership role in this company. and the questions i asked today will be surrounding what he knew and why he did not know it and what kind of direction did he give a legal department that would allow them to do nothing in the face of the evidence they were confronting over years of litigation by people who were trying to get the attention of general motors about the fatal defects in the product they were selling.

>> this is one of the darkest chapters in the history of general motors. and a mission switch --

an ignition switch was approved although it failed to meet gm's own standard specifications for torque resistance. the ignition switch would slip from run to accessory with little more than the knee hitting the key or the car driving over a bump. the car's power shut off while it was being driven. even for the most experienced drivers, there is nothing more terrifying than a loss of power while moving at high speeds. i can only imagine the sheer terror of the individual driving these vehicles the minute the ignition switched out of run. what those drivers did not know as their cars swerved across lanes on the hit walls, inclines, ravines and trees, was

that the one thing they could've saved their lives, the airbag, was not going to deploy because the power to the airbag itself was shot off. if after a few crashes gm was able to understand the ignition switch problem, maybe more lives could have been saved. as the volukas report points out, gm failed to take action or acted too slowly for over a decade. two critical factors have been identified as reasons for this. gm failed to understand how its cars were built. gm failed to understand how its cars were built. incredibly, the official findings pin the blame for the delay to recall the scar on the fact that gm did not understand how its own car was built. the same engineer who approved the original ignition switch approve the part in 2006 and did not inform any person at gm and did not change the part number.

people died. millions more were put at risk because gm did not understand its own car. 54 frontal impact crashes and more than a dozen fatalities later, we find ourselves this morning for a second hearing on this issue. it is truly a dark chapter in the history of general motors. we need to make sure that the volukas report is the whole story. is the volukas report accurate, is it definitive, or are there missing pieces? the ceo of delphi is with us today and it is my hope that he will help this subcommittee understand there is additional information that provides us with more of a complete picture. i hope this testimony today will be forthcoming, and not circle the wagons. we need to know what happened here, and delphi has a responsibility to the families and survivors to provide a complete picture. if delphi knows more than the volukas report identified, now is the time to make those known. the report offers a strong timeline. i would like to explore whether delphi was fully cooperative. in the report it states the delphi had numerous documents

and other relevant material they did not supply. chairman, i am appreciative that we are holding this hearing. all americans deserve to know that for over a decade, general motors and delphi failed to demonstrate a basic level of corporate confidence. there will be a discussion of whether a changing of laws needs to be necessary. thank you, chairman. >> our first witness today is -- and our first panel consists entirely of kenneth feinberg and ms. biros, who are in charge of the fund that will compensate many of the people who have suffered tragically as a result of gm failures. we look forward to your testimony, and thank you for being here, mr. feinberg. >> i want to thank the chair for her vigorous leadership in this matter. i want to thank all the members of this subcommittee. i particularly want to thank senator blumenthal and his staff. they provided some valuable constructive suggestions as to what this protocol should look like, and indirectly i must thank the senator because the senator was critically important

and very instrumental in the design and administration of the 9/11 victim compensation fund, which proved to be a precedent for much of what is in this protocol. i want to publicly thank the senator for his work many years ago in the drafting of the 9/11 victim compensation fund. accompanied by miss camille by rose, who has worked at my side in the drafting, design, and administration of the 9/11 fund, the bp oil spill fund, one fund boston marathon, the virginia tech memorial fund, etc. she is also here to answer any questions the committee might have about the administration of this program.

it's a bit premature to be talking about this program because we do not begin receiving claims until august 1, a few weeks from now. we are right on track. this protocol will form the basis for the submission of claims. i think lawyers around the country for their input as to what this form might look like. i think various nonprofit foundations interested in automotive safety for their input, and i also must say, i think general motors from the top down. they have been very helpful and constructive interacting this protocol. this compensation protocol is entirely our corrective

responsibility. i don't think there is anybody who provided this input that is entirely satisfied with all aspects of the protocol. i am optimistic that as the chair pointed out in her introductory comments, we will compensate. the innocent victims of this tragedy, that is the purpose of this protocol and i am confident it will succeed. claims can be submitted for the next five months through august 31, december 31. we will stay in active work into 2015, processing claims that may come in late in the year. you're not going to disappear on december 31. -- we are not going to disappear

on december 31. there are some interesting features of this program that i can highlight in one minute. it is uncapped. we are authorized to pay as much money is required. the bankruptcy of gm is no barrier to compensation. if there were accidents that occurred before the bankruptcy, they are as eligible as accidents that occurred after the bankruptcy. there are some people who already settled their claims years ago was general motors, and signed a release that they

will not sue. they can come into this program. if under our compensation rules of they are entitled to additional compensation, they will be paid. the contributory negligence of the driver speeding, cell phone texting while driving, intoxication -- irrelevant. we are not looking at the driver or the circumstances of the driver's negligence. we are looking only at the automobile to determine whether or not the defective ignition switch was the proximate cause of the accident. you never know on these programs. we have our fingers crossed and we are cautiously optimistic.

we build on the success of past similar programs. i believe that beginning august 1, we will be ready as the chair and others have insisted to begin receiving claims. we are finalizing the documentation, which we will deliver to the subcommittee. but we will be ready to receive claims. we will pay those claims within 90 to 180 days after the claims are deemed substantially complete, and finally, we have a very pervasive notice program to reach out to all eligible claimants, all those who think they might be eligible. we are determined to reach every driver or engine victim to make sure they know of this row graham. we are confident that the program will work as intended.

thank you. >> a couple of questions. when they hired you to administer this compensation program, did general motors lay out any limitations on the program cost scope? if so, what were the limitations? >> the only limitation they really laid out was the limitation that only certain eligible vehicles are subject to this program. as the chair knows, in bp there were limitations in my jurisdiction. in 9/11, as congressman blunt and others drafted that legislation, there were limitations. the only limitation in this program that gm insisted on were that only the eligible vehicles listed in page three of the compensation protocol are eligible for consideration. >> did you suggest any classes or coverage that should be included the general motors rejected? >> no. i am not an automotive engineer.

i asked general motors, what are the vehicles? what is the definition of an eligible vehicle that could give rise to a valid claim? this was their response, which is reflected expressly in the protocol. >> if the airbags did not deploy but should have, if there is any evidence that the seat else pretension ours worked as designed, under your protocol, the victim is not eligible? >> that is right here at the victim is not eligible if the power was on and the airbag did deploy. if the airbag deployed and the seatbelts were working, then a fortiori, the likelihood that the ignition switch could have been in the off position causing the accident is not possible. we concluded and i concluded that if that deployment renders the claim in eligible. airbag non-deployment or a claim in which the victim or his or her family say, we don't know whether the airbag deployed or not, eligible. filed a claim, and we will work with the claimant in that

regard. >> if the airbag did not deploy, you are eligible if you are in one of the cars on the list? >> exactly. >> regardless of the seatbelt? >> exactly. >> the total decision here is what car it is, and whether or not the airbag deployed? >> and/or whether the seatbelts deployed. if the seatbelts deployed, the power is on, it could not have been the ignition switch. >> are you talking about whether or not a seatbelt is on? >> it is not the seatbelts per se, it is the pretension ours, which are electronically controlled. if they were operational, it is unlikely that the cause of the accident was the ignition switch. >> you are saying if the pretensioners were working, there was not a shutdown of the electrical system that would

have prevented the airbags from deploying. >> correct. >> what if there is a frontal crash and the airbag does not deploy, and seconds later there is a rear crash and the airbag is deployed? >> file the claim. if there is a frontal crash and the airbag did not deploy, we want to look into that claim. >> you are open to looking at each situation. that would be a situation where the airbag did deploy, but not until the second crash. i want to make sure everyone is clear that even if your airbag did not -- even if your airbag did deploy, it would depend on the facts of the case. >> i would like to take a look at that claim. >> this is the issue. the switch goes off and on easily. it slides off easily, it slides back because there is not appropriate torque in it. things that bump it, move it -- just as easily as writing off the road could bump it, a frontal crash could move it from off to on, correct? >> theoretically you are

correct. i have two answers to your hypothetical. first, it is highly unlikely that that circumstance occurs. i guess it could buried it is highly unlikely. what i want to avoid with this program is being inundated rice thousands of -- by thousands of claims where the airbag deployed, making it extremely unlikely that it was the ignition switch causing a delay in getting money out the door to the vast number of claimants which clearly can demonstrate airbag non-deployment through police reports, photographs, etc. the whole key to this program is getting money out the door as fast as possible to eligible claimants. that is why the airbag deployment provision in the protocol is designed, frankly, to discourage thousands of people from filing a claim when

in the overwhelming number of cases, airbag non-deployment is a certain step in the direction of finding eligibility. >> i have questions about the amount of money that you have to spend, and also about punitive damages. i have a feeling my colleague will answer these questions. i will leave those questions to my colleague and turn it over to the senator. >> thanks for being here. i don't know that it is premature to have this

discussion. i think this is the perfect time to have this discussion. i want to go back to what the chairman was asking you. you are saying there is no scenario where the key could have gone from run to accessory, have an accident occur and still have the airbag deployed? >> that's right. senator mccaskill raises a hypothetical situation, but it's not the type a situation that is likely that would justify drafting a compensation program that would invite anybody with the airbag deployed to file a claim. >> it took 10 years to figure out what the problem is and you are telling me that scenario cannot happen? >> it is so rare.

you don't want to discourage claims from being filed by the overwhelming cases where airbag non-deployment is a major step in the direction of finding eligibility. >> you said you will compensate all innocent victims. let me give you a scenario. suppose i'm driving a cobalt, and the airbag does not deploy and the key goes from run to accessory. i walk away unscathed. but i destroy the car. am i compensated? >> that is a litigation matter. you are not compensated under a protocol limited to death and physical injury. you may very well be compensated. there are thousands of lawsuits pending on economic damage to the car, diminished value of the car, but that is not the scope

of this death and physical injury program. >> why would you stop there? isn't a loss a loss? >> in the very beginning, in my conversations with lawyers representing injured and deceased victims, it was always understood that this program, like 9/11 and like one fund boston common is limited to death and physical injury. i'm not saying those folks don't have a valid claim. they just don't. >> come to this program --come to this program. >> is there a way to appeal this decision, that a loss is a loss in this case? >> in the courts. >> can they appeal to gm? >> i guess they can appeal to gm as well. >> i don't know if you have performance indicators moving forward on what you and your staff will be -- based on your pay, it is important there is transparency of your compensation, and knowing here that you are being compensated by gm, a think transparency is important. will you or your staff be paid based on a number of claims made or the number of that nature? >> absolutely not. >> the me talk you about bp. previous administrations of the

bp oil spill victim compensation fund did receive some criticism. from some of the stakeholders that you are working for the oil company's interests, instead of being independent. >> i will say. >> how do we know that you will be accountable to the victims? >> bp, when the criticism came my way, i asked former attorney general michael mukasey of the bush administration to review my whole compensation, the whole way we went about being paid, my independence, and he wrote an opinion letter which i made available, making it very clear that i was independent and doing the type of work i was asked to do. the only real way that you blunt criticism that is sure to come about my compensation -- the only way -- is how fast you get money out the door to eligible claimants in a generous way so

that they can see that the conduct of this program and the professed independence is back up by the way these claims are being processed. until these claims begin to come in and people see how they are being processed and how they are being found eligible, i will always confront that criticism and that's the way you have to address it. >> thank you. >> thank you very much, chairman mccaskill. thanks to both of you for being here. the investigation into the general motors ignition switch defect issue paints a picture of

a company that for years showed indifference in the fact of mounting evidence, of risk and of danger. i believe there are still questions to be answered, and a key point for victims, mr. feinberg, and one of the reasons we are having hearings today are questions about how the fund and claims will work. i greatly appreciate the fact that the new gm ceo has stepped up and taken this head-on, not only with the recalls but also with setting up this fund and working with the victims. something very bad happened here, and we all know that. as you know, mr. feinberg, only the results and history will judge whether there is true justice for these victims. i'm glad the chairman held the steering so quickly after our last one so we can continue to be informed and ask questions. in my case, i have a victim, a very young woman named natasha. she is out of minnesota.

she was only 19 years old. she died when her car went barreling at 71 miles per hour into a grove of trees. she was a hockey goalie. she had a lovely little note she wrote to her dad right before she died about how she always knew he had her back and he was there. all they want now is to make sure that gm has their back. my first question is about these young victims, since many of these cars involve younger drivers. i am a saturn driver. i still have a 15-year-old saturn, and the chevy cobalt, that was the kind of car that she was killed in. can you ensure that there will be fair compensation for these younger victims when it is often harder to assess what their earnings potential will be?

>> absolutely. like 9/11, where many young people died on the planes at the world trade center and pentagon -- here even younger people -- we will make sure that compensation is generous and it is adequate and appropriate. in the protocol lays out in some detail how we will go out compensating nonwage earners who have not yet begun a professional career. we also lay out rules that allow any younger victim or anybody who has died in the crash or who was terribly physically injured to come in and see us, and we will develop a tailored compensation program, what i call track b, that reflects the unique circumstances of those younger people. we will be glad to do that under the rules of the protocol. >> you estimate a lower participation rate for young

people because you have not seen this in the past? >> no. >> concerns have been raised about some safety groups about the documentation required, that it may be too burdensome. some say it may be difficult to prove that years ago and ignition switch failure caused the crash. how do you respond to that? >> is a lot less burdensome than going to court to prove their claim. there is a provision in this protocol that makes absolutely clear that if anybody files a deficient claim, they cannot find the documentation, we will work with that claimant to try and cure that deficiency. there are various ways, a menu of options as to documentation, contemporary police report, the car, the black rocks in the car, insurance reports, warranty and maintenance reports,

photographs. perhaps one of the best examples of collaboration, senator mccaskill's example of showing a photograph, a front end collision and no airbag deployment. that case is well along the way to eligibility. we will work with the claimant and no airbag deployment. now, that case is well along the way to eligibility. so we'll work with the claimant to make sure that even though some of these claims are very old, the accidents occurred over a decade ago. we'll try and reconstruct that documentation. >> along that point one last question. under the terms of the 2009 bankruptcy, g.m. is technically free from liability for injuries and deaths that occurred prebankruptcy. can you assure the plaintiffs that they will have equal opportunity to compensation regardless of whether and when g.m. went through bankruptcy? sglverages yes. that is absolutely assured and g.m. has acquiesced to that recommendation. > thank you very much.

>> senator blount. >> thank you, chairman. the chairman and i are obviously -- she mentioned in her first comments we have a number of g.m. employees in our state. we are grateful for those employees. and the work that they do. and concerned about anything that reflects on their products, their future opportunities, their ability to make the good living that they make with the hard work that they do. and so looking at this, is important to us. it's important to the country. mr. feinberg, i appreciate your comments. certainly when we set up the model after 9-11, the idea is the one you continue to pursue that victims are not subject to which judge they're assigned to. that you don't have cases handled one somewhere and one way somewhere else. they still have the legal option if they want to take it. but if they want the assurance that these cases are going to be handled in a way that has a

structure, they have that from you. now, in that structure, as i understand it, when it comes time to a settlement, you have the ultimate authority on what that settlement would be, am i right in that? >> that is correct. the program is as you just pointed out entirely voluntary. no one has to come into this program. and if they do come into the program, we will determine their eligibility and if they're eligible, the amount of compensation. and only as with 9-11 as you know, only after they know what it is they'll receive, how generous it is. only do they then agree and there is no appeal from my determination and g.m. cannot -- cannot react -- reject our final determination. they have agreed in advance to abide by any final decision that is made. >> and am i right in believing that g.m. then has no input on what your final determination

on an individual case would be? >> they can just like the claimant, they can provide whatever information they want in advance of my determination to complete the record. but once i have that record, i've heard from the claimant, i've heard if g.m. has anything they want to add, once we make that determination, they have no say, they have no right to appeal. they have no right to second-guess. they are bound by that determination that we make. >> and at what point do you think you'll begin to deal with some of these individual cases? >> august 1, the claims start to come in. and under the protocol, once the claim is deemed substantially complete, once we have the documentation, then within 90 days, we will begin to process the claims, authorize payments, and invite the claimant to accept that compensation. >> and you said earlier you were grateful to g.m. in helping draft the protocol in addition to determining

eligible vehicles, was there anything that they added to that protocol or help with in that protocol? >> yes. i asked g.m., and plaintiff lawyers, and nonprofit foundations, the entire protocol, what do you think about the dollar levels? what do you think about the process, the procedures? nd i must say that general motors, from the c.e.o. to mr. milken and down the line, extremely cooperative, constructive. they say wanting to do the right thing. i have only appreciation for eneral motors in assisting ms. byros and myself in drafting of the protocol. i doubt anyone likes all of it except ms. byros and myself. but they provided valuable input and i'm very grateful for them. >> thank you for your leadership on this and so many other funds like this. and i wish you well and

certainly everybody involved as you move forward with trying to deal with these claims in the best possible way. in terms of the company, better late than never. but for those people who were dramatically impacted and have a loss that they'll never recover from, as senator kolb chur was talking about, that note from a daughter to her father is a sad last and only thing to have of those last moments of that young girl's life. we're going to be very interested as you work your way through this. and i think the company made a good choice and look forward to watching as this progresses. >> thank you, sir. >> senator blumenthal. >> thank you, madam chairman. i want to thank you for having this hearing which i think is very important. i thank mr. feinberg for your work, very challenging work in this area.

i have only five minutes here but you spent more than five minutes, actually more than five hours in talking to me and my staff and we hope we can continue to work on many of these very profoundly important details. but the devil here is in the details. and in the discretion that you will have. i want to ask you about one area of what i hope is within your discretion. on june 30, of this year, when you announced the details of your compensation protocol, g.m. announced the recall of more than eight million cars hat had ignition defect -- defects, defective ignition switches. the company acknowledged those defective ignition switches. beyond the models involved in your compensation fund so far caused at least three deaths and numerous injuries. added to the list of the

chevrolet cobalt and saturn ion, we have multiple other models of chevrolet, oldsmobile, pontiac cars, g.m. has now recalled more than 14 million cars in 2014. many of the reasons for these ecalls are defects in the same part, the ignition switch. that killed people and injured many in the matter that you are providing your compensation fund. i happen to believe that the compensation fund has to be expanded. i believe strongly that your fund must be extended to include those victims of death, injuries, and damage, in those other recalls. would you agree with me? >> i can't agree or disagree. i have no jurisdiction, senator, and i can be very

clear on this. just as with these other compensation programs, where policymakers tell me in drafting your protocol, this is what is eligible. i have no authority to go beyond the list of automobiles listed in this compensation program. >> would you recommend to g.m. that it expand or extend the fund? >> that is entirely up to g.m. that is entirely up to g.m. i'm not an automotive engineer. and all i can say, senator, is that when g.m. asks me to byros a fund, from ms. and myself to administer that fund, they made it very clear that the only models where this problem and the context of the problem gave rise to this special compensation are these models. as with 9-11 and with b.p., i must abide by that delegation of authority.

>> let me move then to another topic. i can tell you about instances and the airbags deployed the crashes resulted from this tee effective ignition switch. the hypothetical scenario that we've been discussing here is a real fact. i've talked to people who drove those cars. they stalled. and they were able to turn them on. and i can present to you specific instances of crashes. will you consider them and make refunds? >> i want to see those claims. i've talked in the last e nths to automotive engineers to lawyers to g.m. officials. i think it is such an unlikely possibility despite -- but if it is, i would like to see that claim, i would. >> let me just close with this thought. and inspired to raise it by the

observation made by chairman mccaskill. bout the laurg here. lawyers typically are supposed to be the corporate conscience. they're supposed to be the ones who make sure that corporations comply with the law in spirit and letter. here, the lawyers for g.m. tually enabled cover-up, concealment, deceit. and even fraud. and i believe, although we ution the word "alleged" as lawyers all the time, that the criminal investigation now under way by the department of justice will find culpability on the part of those lawyers. would you agree with me as someone who has been a member of this profession, and done it with great distinction for a long time, that the lawyers here failed the public and failed g.m.?

>> i agree that the lawyers work in the public interest or should. i don't know enough about the underlying circumstances that give rise to this to make an official on-the-record decision about the lawyers in this case. i just don't know the answer to that question. >> thank you, madam chairman. thank you, mr. feinberg. >> senator baldwin, welcome. senator baldwin is here as a special guest of this committee today. and we welcome you. and welcome your questions. >> thank you, chairman mccaskill and ranking member heller for allowing me to join you today. i'm not a member of the commerce committee. but i have had discussions with family members and let me just share by way of an opening statement that on the night of october 24, 2006, three girlfriends, natasha wigle who you heard about earlier from senator klobuchar, amy

rademacher and megan kearns were returning from a trip to a wal-mart in st. croix county, wisconsin. one of the border counties between wisconsin and minnesota. 205-n re heading east on in a chevrolet cobalt that lost power and into a telephone pole and the airbags never demrade. the accident killed natasha and amy and left megan seriously injured. as you heard from senator klobuchar, natasha was a goalie on her hockey team. her parents could count on one hand the number of times they had seen her in a dress. the tomboy also had an artistic side that impressed her art poetry. with her the first thing that comes to macher's amy rade

friends and teachers remember her is her last, inif he can shugs. when she got going her whole class couldn't help but join moo in. she dreamed of one day opening a day care to work with kids professionally. officer keith young, a member of wisconsin's state patrol technical reconstruction unit was one of the first officers to arrive on the scene that night. a 20-year accident construction veteran, officer young was able to correctly identify the cause of the crash. that the ignition had been turned from the run to the accessory position. shutting off the car's engine and disabling the airbags. officer young sent his report to the national highway traffic safety administration, and subsequently to g.m. despite the careful analysis, neither ntsa or g.m. took action. for the parents of these

wisconsin girls this hearing of course is of little solace. nothing we do here can repair the damage that's been done. the best we can do is work to ensure no other family has to endure what they have. so i again thank the chairman and ranking member for allowing me to join this. mr. feinberg, i have for you only one very simple question i hope. one of the victims in the october 2006 accident was sitting in the back seat of the cobalt. her family expressed concerns to my staff in preparation for this hearing that g.m. did not consider this victim one of the official 13 victims because there is no back seat airbag that could have then failed to deploy. mr. feinberg, can you shed some light on if the back seat passengers will be included in

this compensation program? >> the answer is absolutely yes. not only the back seat passenger, pedestrians are included. occupants of a second vehicle that collide with the defective vehicle, all included. all can file a claim. based on your summary, it sounds like a very eligible claim. whether you're the driver, a passenger, a pedestrian, or the occupant of another vehicle, all eligible to file under this program. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator baldwin. i just have one question. and then we need to move on to the other panel because we have a series of votes coming up at midday. mr. feinberg, there's no punitive damages in this. and this is very difficult and gut wrenching decision for laurgs. so i want to make sure i understand this procedurally. if, for example, a victim from missouri is 81 years old, obviously her damages in terms of compensatory are going to be

smaller because she was near the end of her life. her case is such that i think factually there would be a strong case for punitive damages. if she files a claim, and gets an award from you, is she then obligated to take that award or can she leave it on the table and allow her attorneys the opportunity to litigate the issue as to whether or not her claim could still be heard because of misrepresentations that were made in bankruptcy around the g.m. bankruptcy filing? >> if i understand your question, the claim will -- the compensation will remain on the table for 90 days. during which time the claimant can decide whether to accept that compensation, release her right to litigate for punitive damages, or decide nope, i think i'm going to go the litigation route and try and

get not only compensatory damages but punitive damages as well. that is entirely up -- the option of the claimant. >> it's really difficult gut wrenching choice for a lawyer, which i know you appreciate. based on your background. because typically the bar to overcome, a bankruptcy decision, as to what claims are discharged, is difficult to overcome. because you have to show that there was fraud. and that's a high bar in the law. on the other hand, it seems hollow, i think, to many of these victims' families that just because their loved one was at a certain age or at a certain income level, general motors will really never feel the brunt of what punitive damages are designed to do. and that is to penalize a corporation for exactly the kind of conduct that was present at general motors. i'm sure you acknowledge this

is a very difficult decision for these families. >> i do acknowledge that. now, of course, you and i can agree that if a claimant decides that 100% compensation leaves open the question of a punitive damage verdict against g.m., there will certainly be some lawyers and some claimants who will opt to seek punitive damages. so it's not as if a claimant who comes into this fund and decides to accept full compensation, it's not as if there is no option for somebody else to go and seek those punitive damages. i think one way or the other, your hypothetical is true, senator. somebody is certainly going to go after g.m. for punitive damages. if just under the hypothetical wouldn't be this claimant. >> i understand. >> who decides i want 100% of this money right now. >> i understand. and i just wish that we could leave this open longer so there would be time for that issue to be litigated. so that lawyers were making

their advice based on what decisions the court had made in regard to this fact pattern. >> you know how long -- how long that would be. if there is going to be litigation over punitive damages, you're talking about years and years of uncertainty this entireatch hearing on our website, c-span.org. here are some of the highlights for this weekend. saturday night, highlights from

the new york ideas forum. on sunday, q&a at 8:00. c-span 2 --0 on friday night at 8:00 on c-span 2, it in-depth with reza aslan. american history tv on c-span 3 on friday at 8:00, a look at hollywood spur trail of slavery. slavery.yal of sunday night at 8:00, former white house chiefs of staff discussed the president make decisions. find our television schedule one week in advance at c-span.org. join a c-span conversation, like

us on facebook, follow us on twitter. a couple of live events to tell you about tomorrow. beginning with the community action partnership annual convention at 11:00. speakers include sister some on imone campbell.e our special look at the jam recall issues continue now with michael milliken, jim executive vice president and general counsel. he testified last month where he apologized the victims families and explained what action g m was taking to prevent future ignition switch problems. he was joined by the company ceo mary barra. this is 40 minutes. >> members of the committee,

before i begin i want to say those who lost loved ones and those who are injured i'm deeply sorry. i know we as a company and i personally have a responsibility to make sure this never happens again. i'm the general counsel of at general motors company. i have worked for g.m. for 37 years. prior to that, i was an assistant u.s. attorney and before that, i clerked for the honorable vincent j. brennan of the michigan court of appeals. as you are aware, the investigation conducted by anton valukas revealed the failures behind the ignition switch recall including failures on the legal staff. when ms. barra testified before this committee on april 2, a number of you, including you, chairman mccaskill, raised serious and important questions about the performance of the legal staff. and our responsibility in this tragedy as general counsel, i'm ultimately responsible for the legal affairs of the company. and i'm here today to answer

your questions. i first learned about the cobalt ignition switch defect during the first week of february of this year. i immediately took action. i wish i had known about it earlier. because i know i would have taken action earlier if i did. we had lawyers at general motors who did not do their jobs. didn't do what was expected of them. and those lawyers are no longer with the company. i have taken and will continue to take steps to make sure something like this never happens again. the valukas report contains detailed recommendations for how the legal staff can improve. and serve an even greater role in meeting g.m.'s commitment to safety. i'm assuring the implementation of each and every recommendation. and i have made and will continue to make other changes to help improve. i have directed that before any settlement or trial of a case involving a fatality or serious bodily injury that the case be brought to me for my personal review with a focus on open

engineering issues. i've reorganized the legal staff to foster sharing of information and the identification of emerging trends. including vathe a senior attorney to be the chief legal advisor to jeff hoyer, vice president of global safety, with a direct reporting line to me and a dotted reporting line to mark royce, executive vice president of global product development. i've supplemented existing legal sources within -- with attorneys from two outside law firms to make sure that we have the proper level of engagement. i've also appointed a well respected outside law firm to conduct a zero-based review of our litigation practices. i've met with the entire u.s. legal staff to discuss the valukas report's findings and to set high expectations for the staff going forward. these changes and others will result in greater transparency and information flow on issues of safety within the legal taff, as well as the company

generally. and i'm committed to make sure that i and g.m. senior management team have a full line of sight into all safety-related matters. g.m.'s legal staff is comprised of hard-working and dedicated professionals of the highest integrity. they strive daily to help global g.m. achieve its business objectives in a lawful and ethical manner. they have expressed sincere and deep disappointment and regret because of the actions and inactions of some individuals within the company including some on the legal staff who failed the company and our customers. the g.m. legal staff is dedicated to helping g.m. become the leader in automotive safety. we now have to correct our mistakes. and we are. but this is only the beginning. all of us at g.m. are committing to seth a new industry standard for safety, quality, and excellence.

we must do better. we will do better. i am personally committed to this. thank you. >> thank you, ms. barra. >> chairman mccaskill, ranking member heller, and members of the committee, when i first appeared before you, we were in the early stages of the ignition switch recall. i promised you we would get answers. and be fully transparent in what we've learned. i also said i would not wait to make changes. today i worked to fix the mistakes that led to the ignition switch recall are well under way. as a result, we are building a stronger company that places customers and their safety at the center of every aspect of our business. in a town hall meeting before thousands of general motors employees and several thousand more around the world jay satellite we accepted responsibility for what went wrong. i told the men and women of g.m. that our actions would be

guided by two clear principles -- first, we would do everything in our power to make sure this never happens again. and we will do right for those who were hurt. and it is on this point i want to begin. i want to recognize the families who lost loved ones and those who suffered physical injury because of these mistakes. to each of them i extend my and our g.m. employees sympathy. we will not forget them. nor the special responsibility we have to them. we are committed to treating each of them with compassion, decency, and fairness. that is why ken feinberg will independently administer a compensation program. mr. feinberg has talked about his compensation program. it is, however, worth noting that he has complete and sole discretion over all compensation awards to eligible victims. and this is very important. there is no cap on this program.

as i stated earlier, we want to do all that we can to make sure this does not happen again. we created this compensation program as an exceptional response to a unique set of mistakes that were made over an extended period of time. the valukas report was only a start and many changes were in motion even before we received the findings of of the report. i will use the reportaries findings and recommendations to attack and remove the information silos wherever we find them and to create an organization that is accountable and focused on customers. i'm committed to acting on all of the recommendations contained in the report. actions we have already taken include elevating safety decision making to the highest levels of the company. i've created a new position, vice president of global safety. he has full access to me. we removed 15 employees from the company. some for misconduct, and incompetence. others because they didn't take

responsibility or act with a sense of urgency. we've instituted a speak up for safety program to encourage and recognize employees that bring issues, potential safety issues forward quickly. and we've added over 35 investigators to identify and addressed issues much more quickly when they relate to safety. we've aligned the legal staff to help assure greater transparency and information sharing among the staff and across all business units around the globe. and most importantly, we created the product integrity organization. which brings a complete systems engineering approach to the safety of our vehicles. overall, we are dramatically enhancing our approach to saflte. you can see it in the aggressive stance we are taking on recalls with the redoubling of our efforts. we are bringing greater rigor, discipline, and urgency to our analysis and decision making. we are mining every source of data available to us from the factory floor, warranty

information, customer calls, legal claims, and social media. we are not waiting to see if a trend develops or updating spreadsheets. we want our customers to know when we identify an issue that could possibly affect their safety, we will act quickly. yes, we have recalled a large volume of past models and a result of our exhaustive review coming out you have also conducted 12 recalls of less than 1000 vehicles in four of less than 100 this year. this demonstrates how quickly we are reacting when we see a potential issue. i also know that the recent efforts and the current frequency of recalls have garnered considerable attention. lacing the highest value on or customer safety is what our employees want to be known for. we want to stand as a company that is setting the new industry standard for safety. our employees will not forget what led to the ignition switch

recall but they also don't want to be defined by it. after my town hall, i could hear it in your voices, i could read it in their messages. they're all in to make this a better company. i believe in them and together we have been working hard over the last few months to address the underlying issues that caused this problem in the first place. been at town hall, i have inundated with calls and e-mails him employees telling me they are more motivated than ever to make gm the best possible company for our customers. this is our mission and it won't happen overnight, but i can tell you we are holding each other accountable to do exactly that. .e are 100% committed i appreciate the opportunity to be here today and i welcome your questions. >> mr. o'neill, thank you for being here. >> thank you. chairman mccaskill, the ranking member and members of the

subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify. i am the chief executive officer and president of delphi automotive. first and foremost, on behalf of myphi, i want to express profound sympathies to the victims and their families. people were hurt and lives were lost. we must work together to avoid tragedies of this nature going forward. the subcommittee's work is an important part of that effort. members of the subcommittee, i appreciate the opportunity to address the important issues that you're considering. we fully support your efforts. i would like to discuss three main points. first, delphi's efforts to provide replacement parts and support general motors in connection with the recall. withd, our cooperation