we close out the segment, i want to extend an invitation to sister simone to tothe first among us complete an act. one of the opportunities that every single one of you will have here is to rededicate yourselves to the promise of community action, and as an expression of that, we do have a poster you will all be able to sign, but i what to invite sister simone to be the first to sign it. >> i will be honored. that will be great. there it is. >> thank you. [applause]

that will close out this segment. please be back here at 1:00 so you can find these because we will start as close as possible to the time at 1:15. books on sale outside but sister simone will be on the inside of this room in the back to sign them. thank you, everybody. >> just to let you know, we are covering more of this community action committee. coming up live at 2:00 p.m. eastern, the livingstone's

institution looks at the conflict between russia and ukraine. that will be live here on c-span. looking at some of our primetime programming, at 8:00, the new york ideas decibel. speakers include -- new york ideas festival. include the author of "living in the tech age." tonight,an history tv, the battle of the crater. the white house has confirmed the video showing the beheading of james foley as authentic. president obama will be making a statement at 12:45 eastern. we will have coverage of that

here on c-span. holder hasneral eric arrived in missouri. he is looking into the death of michael brown earlier this week. meanwhile, reaction on twitter from members of congress and senator mccaskill saying -- she and senator blunt will be meeting with attorney general eric holder. manual cleaver from missouri says -- you can see more, twitter. com/c-span. we will have a president at 12:45 from martha's vineyard durin.

have the usn northeast asia relations hosted by the heritage foundation. >> we have a couple of panels to further discuss the issue. i will introduce the first three. we will have them present for 10 minutes or so. they are welcomed to stay seated or come to the podium, whichever is their preference. is leest panel

sung-yoon, professor as the us university. you co-authored a piece on the the economy and you had learned me -- and you alerted me to your contribution here in washington. we are very glad to have you on the stage in washington to share your views with us. snyder has been here before and shared his great insights with us. scott is a senior fellow for korea studies and director for and foreignolitics

relations. he is respected around here on korea and korea politics. he is widely published, including an ongoing blog entitled "asia unbalance." he has been there since 2008. before that at the asia foundation, see aside pacific form, and hawaii. hardship duty. [laughter] and then we will turn to yuki tatsumi. she has been at the stimson center since 2004. this is her second time at the heritage. this is a bit bigger crowd. camerasthink we had any for southeast asia. at cisis.t, yuki was

-- csis. we appreciate you being here and sharing your perspective with us. lee.ll start with dr. and then we will move on from there. during the u.s. occupation of japan, 1940 to 1952, if the united states had all of japanese actions in colonial states mayunited have pursued the following actions. one, prohibit the speaking of the japanese language in japanese schools and force

japanese to speak english. two, start the school day with the singing of the american national anthem. subsumed japanese history and the narrative art of american history. all government sectors of industry and society , asmerican overlords absentee landlords. japan imposed in christianity as the official japanese religion. conscript a japanese men to carry out america's wars korea, 1950 to 1953. japaneserepatriate labor to work in american minds

and entries and fields and also forcibly coerce japanese women and young girls to work in american military brothels elsewhere. we know that america did none of these things. america did quite the opposite, which was to give generously to japan approximately $2 billion during the occupation years, about the summit equal approximately to the japanese national budget during those very difficult postwar years. to imposewillingness injured and its generosity, the philosophical pragmatism of the japanese leadership in the hard work of the japanese people to a great extent explains the great success of the occupation and the bilateral relationship over the past 69 years. you might say, at the end of the

day, pragmatism prevailed. modeln't we apply this toward the korea-japan relationship? yes, pragmatism prevailed. -- as my view, as must much as we may try to practice , theretional relations are some issues that if i understanding or resolution on pragmatism alone. there are some historical issues that defy resolution on legality or legally the form of nomadic treaty -- the former diplomatic treaty. the english philosopher and historian robin george hollywood -- robin george collingwood

defied this. history is the idea of thoughts -- ally, history is history is the history of thoughts and the history of thoughts therefore is the reenactment of the past thoughts in the historians' mine, calling further to explain to the scientist that nature is always and nearly a phenomena. not in the sense of being defect in reality, but in the sense of being a spectacle presented to his observations. whereas the events of history are never mere phenomena, never mere spectacles for contemplation, but things which the historians look not at but through to discern the thoughts

within them. this is an example of the japanese leadership not having it shown a sincere effort to discern the thought, the essence, the true emotional, the true human aspect of this storable. apologies.asional the japanese government even keeps a count of the number of official apologies for japan's aggression upon korea and other countries. we know that other unfortunate statements and actions by the japanese leadership have repeatedly undermined those previous apologies. the japanese public deserves better.

nation andfirst-rate advanced democracy. henry consider -- henry in the late 1970's, in his memoir "the white house years," wrote japanese actions and decisions have been by far the most intelligent and farsighted of all the major .ations in the postwar era i fully agree with that kissinger,and henry 35 years after having made that statement, would still upgrade. president obama mentioned on his

visit to south korea in late april, when asked by a korean reporter on this question said or, in the standards of this was "a terrible and egregious human rights violation quite shocking. shocking." onhink that message is right and resonates throughout much of the world. prime minister abe's visit to the shrine last year was in a way a gift, an unexpected gift to japan adversaries.

china and north korea. in my humble opinion, it brought no tangible benefits to the japanese government. japan's soleated and key ally, the united states, and increase the tensions with south korea and up over a third -- with south korea. kerry laid a wreath as a germanic gesture of peace and justice -- a dramatic gesture of peace and justice and show there show respect without clinical theater. -- without political theater.

also, careers should see that -- korea should see that japan is korea's passive ally. president she, during his visit in south korea and july and vote - nation,at ravaged the saw endedhe without clear-cut victory, without indemnity, yet a war in

which the koreans were the biggest losers. the war was 400 years ago. japan today is not a feudal kingdom. south. today is -- south korea today is not the isolationist moniker he a 400 years ago -- isolationist monarchy of 400 years ago. as transparent as president xi's efforts may have been, it was also transparent that this was a false analogy. yes the efforts to bring south asea on board against china isongoing to somatic tool

ongoing. the chairwoman of the opposition presidentked the statements yet his approval ratings rose to 48%. set,ar precedent had been fanning the flames of anti-japanese sentiment really work you. politics. -- in korean politics. theirdifficult to let kind ofto shine that [indiscernible]

i expect her to calm this is to overcome this storable in addition and exercise leadership .nd reach out to japan japanese leaders must also remember that, to the south korean public, the essence, the fault within the historical incident of the past, defy resolution by apology or legal diplomatic treaty alone. that history is fraught with prime, missed fortune -- misfortune and folly that require no specification or dramatization and decidedly not forgotten. thank you. [applause]

>> i am sitting in the middle of sung-yoonriends, and yuki. that is where the u.s. is [laughter] in his last, he talked about his the.for

relationship but he did not say anything about the japanese-. relationship. remarksant to do in my is -- first, i just want to say something. and contrast to admiral blair, i inc. it is realistic and holistic and i identity andre on specific sets of challenges. one other observation i have to draw from his speech -- i think he gave a classic american view of history. the one of the things i was class of an early asian history from an asian professor is that, in the west, we look at history as the of purple record of what happened. in the east, it is about moral

views, moral judgments. i think it helps to further this further discuss why these issues are so difficult between japan and south korea. view, the realism view in international relations is that south korea and japan have common interest in the context of the chinese threat. scratch onu start to the history issues and it really is impeded by the fact that we have contending identity-based claims that have partisan narrative. one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.

a poll from the summer shows korea, the view is that japanese people have a poor view of japanese invasion of other countries. this is an identity-based issue. --is whether or not and whether or not japan is recognizing south korean dignity. on the other hand, they are having too many anti-japanese campaigns in terms of schoolbooks. impugning dignity from the japanese perspective. that is the core of it in many respects. over the course of the past year or so, what i see happening on

the u.s. side is the u.s. government has been drawn into this really to an unprecedented degree. historically, i think the u.s. try to play an evenhanded role and did not get too involved. but i notice, as i look back and think back on the past year, danny russell from july of 2013, before prime minister abe visited yasir cooney -- visited thatuni talked about problems be dealt with in a peaceful and thoughtful way. fore see the preparations president obama bringing president part and president abe together at the hague, there is an effort that creates conditions necessary for that including occur,

essentially laying the groundwork for the japanese respectnt commitment to the statements. this brings me to another point. in order to stabilize the relationship among i think the u.s. will continue to be involved. but one of the tasks on the u.s. side will be to tried to hold both japan and south korea to a non-revisionist approach. for japan, it is about history. for korea, it will end up being 1965 maintaining the normalization treaty as the basis for moving forward in the relationship. it is going to be very challenging.

the u.s. is engaged and involved to a great degree. point is i have friends who look at the japan-south korea relationship and say the best we can do is just to manage it. we can't possibly expect that it can be resolved. but i find that to be quite distressing as a conclusion because i still see a great deal for potential. and so i feel compelled to put out a vision for the japan-south korea relationship that probably would involve the kind of political will that admiral blair was talking about, statesmanship, whereby my vision would be that japan would make a grand gesture that could be

interpreted by south korea in a accept it, andd affirmed. i think a way of thinking of what is really necessary to move the relationship forward in that way is to actually move back to the 1998 joint worship agreement between south korea and japan -- joint partnership agreement between south korea and japan. neighborlyod relationship in the 21st century that squarely faces the task and develops relations based on mutual understanding and trust moving forward in a future-oriented relationship. what was the effect of the 1998 agreement on the respective publics? if you look at public opinion polls, in japan, that harder

ship -- that partnership really positiveneedle into territory on south korea for a long time and it stayed there until 2012. but unfortunately, on the south korean side, it did not move south. did not moven -- south korean public opinion into positive territory. then there is the question of timing. this is my last point and it is directly related to the issue of identity. when americans talk and -- japan-south korea relations, i think it is worth asking and reflecting on

for our japanese and south itean colleagues -- is necessarily the case that, for japan to move forward in these issues, it requires a south korean affirmation? is it really the case that, for south korea to apple with some of its ownlenges identity that it needs a movement by japan? what i am getting to is that identity may turn out to be more about self, more about the national confection, than about others. when we move in the direction of i think it will only be productive if the result of a process of self perfection in both -- self reflection in both

societies that allows them to come to a point when they are actually ready to move forward. here is where i also found the pe's remarks to be interesting. is not just peace an action of war but an action of justice. it calls for the discipline of forbearance, demanding that we not pass injustices but overcome toleration. thank you. [applause] >> i was actually going to do it from my seat but to then these two gentlemen set the precedents so i will follow suit.

this conference room has a particular memory attached to my slave labor days, if you will. ago, we or 15 years a panelhold events -- and these ministers room did not even have a window. so speaking to you alone is my own achievement. so thank you again for hosting me. [applause] censure, i would like to thank ambassador ahn because i am one of the people [indiscernible] . i did not have a chance to personally thank him.

-- because ofan's the day of japan's unconditional isrender, the reconciliation a highly regarded topic, as sensitive as it may be. i was cautiously encouraged by the speech. the housingh, as continue to call for the japanese leaders to take corrective views of history and to take proactive measures acceptable to the victims of the japanese victory while they are still alive still expressed her the for next year during

anniversary of the end of world war ii. i would also like to remind you you -- as of course many of know this -- prime minister abe did refrain from visiting the shrine a day. instead, he visited an alternative secular site that honors and pays respects for all in the last four. he also -- the last war. the memorialded family at a secular site. about speech, he talked japan's need to "face history with humility and engraved deeply into our hearts the lessons we should learn." the thing about this panel is unrelated -- unresolved issues.

these issues are often very emotionally charged when they are raised and discussed. try to step back a little bit to the extent possible of course. i have two things that i would like to raise in my humble remarks for you today. first is why we are where we are. second is what both sides will have to keep in mind as they getting the bilateral relationship on track. that all of you in did is that the responsibility is on both sides. why do the japan-karen

relationship's still continued to be constrained by history? because it is often easier for some medical leaders of both countries to hide behind unresolved history issues. as long as they continue to blame each other for the status are the cause of this status quo, they continue to convey what politically may not be popular but is necessary to change the status quo. on the part of japan, it is easy to place the blame on rok by find itts leaders easier to gain points. what i hear in tokyo when i koreans have

continued to move the [indiscernible] they refuse to define a resolution of history issues and we are not playing that game anymore. i think that is by and large the summation of what some of us start to referred to as the korea fatigue in japan. part, on thek other hand, they may be just as easy to place complete lame on japan for the status of, that japan has not repented enough for its wartime since, that the past efforts by japan have been in sufficient or insincere. however, continuing to blame each other in this way will not change and it in, as we all know. it will make things only worse, as we on the. and i submit -- as we all know. overlooking that actions by each other and

condone development by their own country that may touch sensitivities. time,pan, for a long japan emphasized and held the position that they wartime conversation issue has been legally resolved the tween the two governments when the two governments signed the rok claims in 1965. this is one of the side agreements. while that may legally be accurate and true, if may have been -- it's a leaders may have been slow to recognize that there are many humanitarian elements that need additional care. it also seems that some japanese political leaders may not appreciate as much as they could

how certain words and deeds by well-known political leaders will be perceived by rok and beyond. for instance, there is frustration in japan that those japan's or trustees -- i do have to acknowledge that a silent majority in japan is moderate. they do want to feel proud of their country. aboutey also feel remorse what japan did before 1945. thater, i am also aware not too long ago, and he japanese politician -- any japanese politician cannot stay

-- osition been discussed. it is a small they on its own. but small things like that may affect how korean perception -- how. perceives japan -- how korea perceives japan in its atonement for the past. by the same token, i don't know whether there is the howeciation within japan the examination of shaping the kona statement or launch a

formal designation of the paper reporting 30 years ago, how those developments within japan, again, how those develop its may be perceived -- developments a be perceived outside of japan. rok --like to raise that certain efforts made by japan. was ruled by the democratic government in japan, three different prime ministers made overtures to south korea. there was a new statement .eiterating the apology

what did the japanese government get in return from south korea? away from the general security agreement in the 11th hour negotiations. these actions coming out of seoul was perceived in japan as the examples of how maybe rok government is not genuinely interested in reconciliation. although i know my time is , let me just say

[indiscernible] i would be remiss if i did not mention this. i raise this issue because, among american friends, i have comments orsive feel good efforts by only a few. accept suchnot trivialization of the fund and what it is trying to do. former prime minister said in a recent interview that he does not leave the reconciliation can be achieved by just signing a treaty.

he believes that those who inflicted harm should make sincere effort to atone for what it has done in the past. in my mind, the establishment of looking forund was a solution that helps japan address the human aspect while upholding the government's official position that were time compensation was legally settled. the fund was a joint effort by government and japanese people and a great number of ordinary japanese citizens contributed to this fund,. known, when there was a cash compensation, called atonement money that was accepted by victims, there was a letter personally signed i the prime minister ring that time --

by the prime minister during that time. again, in the interview i just referred to also talked about the mutual responsibility between the aggressor and the big. , while those who inflicted harm should make sincere efforts, the victim side also, once it is convinced that the former aggressor is trying to come to terms with this past the hager, it must be -- past behavior, it must be receptive. i believe it was a part of enormous political courage on the art of those political leaders.

it is this kind of lack of political courage in both tokyo has inhibited relations where it is today. i recently read an article in " where threeirs following lessons learned were offered between the u.s. and russia. first, both sides need to recognize that this trust often distorts each other's perception of others'intentions. second, the two sides should stop blaming the other side and instead step back and consider what is it they each have done to contribute to the current tension. finally, more attention needs to be paid on influencing each other's policy choices by shaping events rather than trying to change each other's way of seeing things.

i'm not saying that the tension between japan and rok is the same but i do think that there are some elements of applicability. first, on mistrust distorting perception, one immediate example that comes to mind is the korean criticism of japan's ongoing efforts. not surprisingly, these development have been criticized regely as japan's efforts to militarize. panel, erved on another one korean journalist raised the point that koreans are still worried that japan will invade

korea again. i wanted to do for the floor to the main speaker so i did not raise it at the time, but i questione to raise the for a possible scenario where that would happen again. i challenge for those of you that have the notion that japan may invade korea again to show me -- to convince me the plausible scenario under which that is possible. on the need for the two sides to stop blaming the other side, i think i have already spent a fair amount in my earlier remarks but i would be willing to discuss it in q&a.

after all the bad blood has been shed and everything underwater, it may never be possible for prime minister abe and president pak to be best friends among world leaders. that is ok. but in the proposition that other,nd rok meet each not only because they need to respond to the immediate crisis in north korea, they need to play a larger role in the u.s. on goes in -- ongoing efforts. it would be irresponsible for both leaders to [indiscernible] and other political leaders in the country to do or say things to aggravate the current tensions. in closing, i do find it

encouraging that government officials, throughout these difficult times, officials who day to manage them day by have always wanted this relationship to work and they really persevered. there are already encouraging it ison both sides that turning more permissive for the governments to engage. and i hope these develop its will continue and i hope that they are encouraged by their political leaders. >> thank you very much. [applause] let me open the floor to questions. right here. i am a journalist and not in

asia area expert. with my limited knowledge, it seems that those corners of to minimizeo seek world war ii atrocities, specifically the invasion and occupation were the chinese were the primary victims and they military sex slavery issue where koreans were the primary victims, that is where that is happening here in but -- happening. there is not an emphasis to walk back or minimize actions. ace?completely off -- off base? if so, why? mygut -- my gut reaction is because we lost.

i don't have any good answer but it is totally different circumstance. one, because of the outcome of the war. is the way we perceive history. err inns may have -- may forgetting history and may not know about history in the general population, but we also don't make a fetish of history. that is the best answer i can offer. >> [indiscernible] ok. let's leave it there. this is to dr. lee. been korean officials have

across the board negative in their -- >> good afternoon, everybody. today, the entire world is appalled by the brutal murder of jim foley. jim was a journalist, a son, a brother, and a friend. from difficult and dangerous places, bearing witness from a world away. he was taken hostage nearly two years ago in syria and he was courageously reporting on the conflict there. jim was taken from us. , one of fivers old siblings, the son of a mom and dad who worked tirelessly for his release. earlier today, i spoke with them and told them we are heartbroken

by his loss. jim foley's life stands in stark contrast to his killers. let's be clear about isil. they have rampaged across cities and villages killing innocent, unarmed civilians in cowardly acts of violence. their debt women and children -- they abduct women and children, said that to them to -- subjecting them to torture and rape, killing sunni and shia by the thousands. they target christians and religious minorities, arriving them from their homes, murdering them when they can for no other reason than they practice a different religion. they declare their ambition to commit genocide against an ancient people.

so i still speaks for no religion. speaks for no religion. god would stand for what they did yesterday and what they do every single day. ideology or any value for human beings. their ideology is bankrupt. expediencyaim out of that they are at war with the united states or the west. the fact is they terrorize their neighbors and offer them nothing than endless slavery to their empty vision. the collapse of any definition of civilized behavior. people like this ultimately fail. they fail because the future is won by those who build and not

destroy. the world is shaped by people like jim foley and the overwhelming majority of humanity is appalled by those who killed him. americaed states of will continue to do what we must do to protect our people. we will be vigilant and we will be relentless. when people harm americans anywhere, we do what is necessary to see justice is done and we act against isil standing alongside others. iraq who have taken the war to isil must continue to come together to expel these terrorists from their communities. the people of syria, the story that jim foley told, do not deserve to live under the shadow of a tyrant or terrorists. from governments and peoples across the middle east, there

has to be a common effort to extract this cancer so that it does not spread. there has to be a clear rejection of these kinds of i at -- kind of nihilistic ideologies. a group like isil has no place in the 21st century. friends and allies around the world, we share a common security and a common set of values that are rooted in the opposite of what we saw yesterday. and we will continue to confront this hateful terrorism and read lace it with a sense of -- and replace it with a sense of hope and stability. that is what jim foley stood for. work, wholived his courageously told the story of his fellow human beings, who was like and loved by friends and family. today, the american people will all say a prayer for all those who loved jim.

all of us mourn his loss. we keep in our prayers those other americans who are separated from their families. we will do everything we can to protect our people and the timeless values that we stand for. keep jim'sss and memory and may god bless the united states of america. at martha's obama vineyard on the beheading of photojournalist james foley. the president had called the parents of jim foley. here of the parent speaking to journalists outside their home. press says that this is the first time the islamic state has killed an american citizen since the islamic conflict that broke out in 2011. ed royce released a statement on the killing of james foley

saddened andeeply he also says we must be serious about confronting this force. that is from ed royce, chairman of the house foreign affairs committee. we will take you back to the heritage foundation, there conference on the u.s.-northeast asia relations. this again from the heritage foundation. the samel go through sort of drill as the last panel. andll introduce everyone have them go through one at a time and give them 10 to the minutes for remarks and conversation. i don't know why it is so darn cold in here. [laughter]

if you have not noticed, you are very full-blooded -- cold-blooded. [laughter] adviser andnior csis. chair at csi us -- director also a former nse stafffairs in the during the bush administration. book,ld also mention your north korea, past and future. we had a discussion here. is former deputy secretary of state.

we have been looking for an --ortunity for some time to and we are very pleased to have him. and bruce klinger will bat cleanup. he is senior research fellow for northeast asia. i am sure most of you know him here. for theown largely korea hand. i will turn it over to victor. >> thank you, walter. i want to thank heritage for the

time you allow me to talk about my book when it cannot a year or two ago. i do not actually know this is cold, i came running over, it eels quite refreshing. will make my comments brief and focused them on this question of why and under what conditions these difficult historical issues have impeded cooperation between japan and career. i'm not really going to get a discussion of defending one government or another government's position or who is right on comfort women or island isputes. eally trying to look at this

rom the aspect of of how and hy do we have these things impeding strategic cooperation. have a couple points. first, again, i do not have the benefit of the discussion this afternoon. forgive me if i am repeating some things that have already been said. i am pretty sure that i am repeating some things. the first point i would make is that the issue of history and its ability to impede or bubble up and impact political relations is nothing new. we have seen the evan flow of -- we have seen the ebb and flow of seoul-tokyo relationships during the 1970's, during the assassination attempt in the 1980's, we've seen it happen over and over again. at the risk of

overgeneralization, i would say hat -- the way this reaction has typically been characterized has been a great deal of emotion and anger on the korean side. and what essentially is indefensible japanese side. not the same level of emotion and anger, but really indifference. we know all the issues, whether it is textbooks, statements by education ministers, the security shrine -- yasukuni shrine. there was almost a pattern to the cycle in which you have protests, momentary disruption, some more anger. nd then eventually a return to normalcy in one form or another. there is a pattern of interaction over those that we

have seen over time. that is the first point. the second point is that today it is a little different. it is different in three ways. the first is that, again, the risk of overgeneralization -- in the past we have seen these disputes arise and they have holiday cycle -- they have followed a cycle. what is different today from the ast cycles, the current cycles are not efforts to change the status quo of these history issues. the history issues have always been there. what seems different this time s that we are really talking about actions, intentionally or unintentionally, that are aimed at trying to change the status quo. in the previous south korean president made the decision to

visit those two little rocks, whatever you want to call them, when he made the decision to visit those rocks, that was changing the status quo. that was not just provoking the japanese to come up with a reaction that will also change the status quo on their side. also setting a precedent for future south korean presidents, where they will feel at one point or another pressure to do the same thing. that was something that really did change the status quo. it led to a reaction by japan that was beyond something we

have seen before. this immediately escalates the situation. when there was talk about, prior to the review that was undertaken, when there was talk suggesting that prime minister abe would reinterpret the statement, that leads to spirals in terms of the relationship. during the george w. bush administration, this was after i left office but something my successor had to deal with. when we had the crisis over the naming of the rocks. that was something that created a great deal of consternation in south korea, even led presently to position himself in meeting president bush. he had him stand right at the point where dokdo, takeshima was, so he could say this belongs to korea. there is a fascinating piece that recounts all of this. the end decision was to return it to the status quo because we do not know how to resolve these issues, except to maintain the tatus quo.

that is something that is ifferent today that the things that we are seeing are really angling more towards changing the status quo then not. uite obviously, that is why we have this panel. these issues have come to the level where they have been an mpediment to pragmatic and strategic cooperation's. whether you are talking about military service and parts agreement on military information sharing or the fta and a currency swap, meetings between leaders, all of this has been held hostage to this particular cycle of historical roblems. the third difference these days,

this is my own view, i don't know if everyone shares this view. earlier i mentioned that what we see is generally korean emotionalism and anger has japanese indifference. i think what is different today, you still have the same korean motionalism and anger. what is different is the shift on the japanese side. particularly on long, i would say among even korean friends in the bureaucracy, but certainly in the media and the politicians. a shift in korea fatigue. they are tired of it, tired of the harping and complaining and they do not want to deal with it anymore. in a way that we have not seen in the past. the third point that is the historical issues are obviously bad for the soul-tokyo cooperation but they have ripple effects throughout the region.

they certainly complicate u.s.japan-korea military and strategic operations, for all the reasons we are aware of. whether you're talking about dealing with north korean boats or missiles or any of these sorts of things, the inability to be able to share information seamlessly or to be able to, for he u.s., being able to operate seamlessly between our two alliances, certainly makes it much harder and more complicated for the u.s.. at a political level, it really impedes or poses or stains the pivot or rebalance asia. the notion that we are doing this but at the same time our

allies are dysfunctional and terms of their relationship with one another. it begs the question of how successful the pivot is. and then, of course, these sorts of difficulties only served to embolden others in the region. north korea, of course, and also china. if one of the things that china wants to do is to delegitimize and complicate the u.s. bilateral alliance structure in asia, have in his very dysfunctional spat between our two key allies in asia as something that is quite welcome. that makes it easier for china to put for this effort to try to delegitimize. it is not a question of trying to compete militarily with the u.s. and asia, but to delegitimize the notion that these alliances are a core element and a legitimate leadership element of the architecture in asia. something the chinese would

clearly like the region not to believe. so japan created this function, the u.s.japan, korea dysfunction only serves that purpose. recommendations -- so, first, on history, i wrote quite a bit on this in my first book as an academic, it was on u.s.japan, korea and the historical issues. i believe there is no solution to these sorts of issues. you have negotiations over comfort women and you have these efforts for the prime minister not to go to the yasukuni shrine, but i do not think we are ever going to see a solution. even if there is an agreement on comfort women or a woman's fund or a formula for the chief

cabinet secretary and ambassador to meet with some of the survivors, a statement of regret -- even if you get all those things, i don't think it is going to resolve the issue. many still believe that prime minister abe does not believe that japan, the japanese government was complicit in the recruitment and running of these operations. even if there is an agreement, i don't think is going to solve the issue. obviously, you need negotiations to continue. no one is saying they should not continue. in terms of * * let me open the floor to questions. here are probably several that how we can get some degree of cooperation accepting these difficult issues are going to be

a baseline of the relationships rticularly between japan and korea and asia. how do we return to a degree of normal si? i would make three quick suggestions and these are very specific suggestions. the first is that i think the south koreaens should be willing to have a meeting on the side lines of unga in new york even if there is no agreement. you should not hold hostage summit level discussions, you should not hold that hostage to director level negotiation. it's not good diplomacy and there are some positive signs.

i met with the mayor of tokyo when the mayor visited. so i think there are positive signs there. take the higher road and do that meeting. for japan, i think there really has to be an effort to start turning around public opinion in japan. i feel like it's swung completely in a different direction, one that is quite antagonistic towards korea right now. my friends in the japanese government who are good friends with korea admit it's difficult to make the argument but they have to figure out how to turn around that korea fatigue and bashing in the press and among the politicians. and for the united states, i think very clearly this is a very difficult issue for the

united states. they've been dealing with it for a long time with korea in terms of trying to get korea to cooperate more with japan. when it comes to the issues of collective self-defense and other things, i know u.s. officials will say , this i think the united states in effect through it's actions, it's non-actions, it's whispers and side statements are essentially saying we support japan and the reinterpretation of the right of self-defense but we don't support a reinterpretation of anything that has to do with in some fashion whitewashing the comfort women issue. it's not stated u.s. policy but i think that's where the united states is. nd then i think it's incumbent on both the united states and korea to make the case to japan

hat the efforts to really grow japanese leadership in the world are good things. for a long time the country has proactive re dynamic prime minister with an agenda, economic and security agenda ha impress roactive and upon the point leadership is not just about money and power. it's about legitimacy. you have to be seen at legislate -- legitimate. it's going to undercut all these other efforts at building legitimate leadership on the security side as well as the economic side.

>> let me begin by commending the heritage foundation for this today this. has been extremely valuable and thank you for bringing together such a fine group of colleagues of mine. i think i've worked with every member of both panels and both of our keynote speakers today for many years. it's a special pleasure for me. thank you for bringing me down from the wilds of new jersey. just a little bit of background about me that may have not come out in the introduction and that is i spent most of my foreign service career dealing with korea and japan including many years learning both languages, devoted many years of my life seeking to strengthen u.s. relations with both those allied countries and during my diplomatic career i had the very

distinct privilege of serving as country director at the state department for both japan and korea. including a time i would now characterize as being the high tide of our trilateral cooperation on north korea and some other issues. it's an honor to participate in this discussion today. this panel has been asked to address the implications of this downturn in korea japan relations for the united states. and victor launched us into a very good discussion of that. and i'll try to add some additional thoughts n. doing so let me at the out set provide you with my own assessment of the current state of korea japan relations to the ones you've already heard. i don't think it will surprise anyone if i ecosome of the comments that have been made

that suggest this relationship is deeply problem plagued, often dysfunctional and in my view the worse shape i've seen it in in many years. it is deeply disappointing for me to say that having spent as much time as i've spent working as hard as i have to improve with both cup triss. if they were on different continents or separated by thousands of miles a problematic political and diplomatic relationship. the two might not be so important. but they are none of those things. they are neighbors facing a range of common challenges and dangers and the fact they find themselves at logger head more often than not these days and find themselves unable to establish the relationship in both their interests and we know they are capable of forging is

both regrettable and a cause for concern. a cause for concern particularly to their only ally the united states of america. he u.s. has a major stake in preserving stability in . rtheast asia it is my job to talk about their impact on the united states and its strategy objects in the region. let me be very frank with you. the current difficulties between

tokyo and seoul under mine u.s. efforts to create a trilateral partnership aimed at dealing with the current and emerging security threats in the region. in one critically important area, trilateral cooperation to deal with north korea. that cooperation is not what it as and is not what it should be. problematic our ties have allowed suspicions to arise bout seoul and kim jong seeing an advantage seems eager to leverage that gap and perhaps deepen the divide between tokyo and seoul. the complicated japan relationship is being eyed very carefully by china which others have suggested here probably sees an advantage to be gained

from current teppingses. the p.r.c. has made very clear in recent months that it regards it as an arackism and is no longer relevant to the current security concerns. some have even suggested that a security system based on an asia for the a'sans approach should replace the u.s. alignses in the region. leaders in tokyo and seoul should reflect on whether their inability to deal with the issues between them may be creating a tactical or strategic opening for a beijing that has developed an aler ji to a u.s. led security architecture. i would also suggest that current difficulties in relations under mine a core u.n. interest in maintaining stability in the region through these alignses that i mentioned

just as they detract from the effectiveness of the deterrents that should and could be provided by a more coormentive s. japan korea triang guelar relationship. his sends the wrong message to korea and to beijing. nevertheless there is a bit of good news in that both sides have often managed over the last several years to insulate some elements of their routine security dialogue and cooperation for the most devicive aspects. and the two sides have kept much of their ongoing security cooperation under the radar. the bad news is the security cooperation remains subject to the vagaries to the two countries diplomatic and

political relations and the mood swings that has come to characterize bilateral atmospherics to an uncomfortable degree. we have witnessed how reasonable initiatives such as the military information sec resi agreement were torpedos and we've seen how straightforward common sense information, for example sharing am in addition at a peace keeping operation became impossible because of the negative dynamics in relations. discussions of critically important mutual support and cooperation are hampered or even barred because of the current atmospherics between the two. the valuable support that japan could provide the united states in a contingency on self-defense

is today oddly and i would say wrongly portrayed by some as somehow threatening korean security. ven the normal business of leadership which can send a strong deterrent message to adversaries has proved impossible because of the deterioration in bilateral ties. and we recently witnessed an unhelpful and useless debate over the issue of whether consultations might be needed before u.s. forces and facilities in japan would be able to help in a korean peninsula contingency. you pardon me if i come away from that incident with the impression kim june ill has some reason to be smiling at kim jong today. things have gone far enough and

it's time for renewed efforts to reinvigorate trilateral coordination. he recent r.o.k. was encouraging and dialogue on north korea was a welcome sign that these two neighbors understand the importance of ensuring they stay on the same page. the trilateral military dialogue that took place on the margins of the exercise in the pacific was also valuable as were the japanese assurances that were provided to korea in that dialogue about the scope and limitations of japan's new collective self-defense doctrine. more such dialogue including bilaterally at the ministerial level would be valuable particularly in enhancing transparency and solving any

lingering questions and concern korea may have about japanese defense planning. it goes without saying such dialogue is important because we are on the cups of change of the threat posed by north korea. the need to refine is going to be a major task in the coming years and that task is going to require new levels of bilateral and trilateral security cooperation between and among us. the north koreaen threat is evolving in a new direction and the north's per text fedex of nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver those went seasons going to alter regional security dynamics in trouble ling ways. the capability is going to increase proliferation and raise questions about the validity and effectiveness of the u.s.

expended deterrent and commitment to defend our allies and might spur debate in korea and japan for their own nuclear deterrent. such prospects argue strongly in favor of new dialogue about the nature of this threat and the efficacy and credibility of the u.s. deterrent and defense commitments. i have ever reason to believe the united states will have just such a dialogue. as we look to the future the other main challenge we face will emanate from china. and thier stronger china beijing is making clear the days to hide one strengthen buys one ime is over. away s unlikely to go

nytime soon. having said that, let me be clear the task of building better ties with china remains an important one and that is a lot more easily accomplished if washington, tokyo and seoul are all on the same page. let me also suggest that as beijing begins to raise serious questions about the validity of the u.s. based aligns system, japan and the rok have long shared and supported the u.s. vision of that system and have welcomed the central role the u.s. has played over the decades. and for the united states to don't play that role in the face of china that questions the closest possible cooperation and coordination with our korean and japanese allies is going to be essential. going forward it'sing to to be

critically important that seoul and tokyo refurbish and rehabilitate their frayed partnership. they cannot change history and can't and should not forget that history but they are not forever destined to be prissners of that history. let me cite a not so famous historian, me, by saying those who dwell solely on the past are condemned to stay there. the and the rok have ility to dedicate themselves to the future. rok president held out hope such an approach might be possible. in her remarks she reminded us that next year is the 50th an

verse si of the norm si of relations between japan and korea. and she said to set on the next 50 years to friendly cooperations between the rok and japan. next year will be the 70th anniversary of the end of the world war ii and the beginning of a dramatic process that saw japan eventually become a country dedicated to democracy and peace. with these auspicious anniversaries on the horizon could there be a better way for the two countries to mark next year than by issuing a joint statement of principles that would describe a new type of japan rok relationship? would it be possible for seoul and tokyo to agree in the coming weeks to establish a bilateral forum that could be addressed over the next year so leaders

could announce what they had accomplished in a year's time? have a series of steps and practical progress and public events that would form the basis for real progress between the two. in concluding let me ask whether it possible that japan's prime minute sfer and korea's president could use their speeches next year to convey a shared agenda for future bilateral cooperation.

>> i would like to think of self as the great clean up batter and i would bring all of them home from my analysis. at the ty i'm the guy end saying all that was great. i have nothing else to say. >> i would say as we've focused on historic issues but the u.s. looks at asia not from a historic view. as such we see our national interest and threats to them. the most obvious threats to us and our friends are from north korea and chinenafment north korea is the most prenishes threat including the threat from

nuclear missile programs as well attacks on south korea. if north korea is the wolf closest to the sled then china is the 800 pound dragon emerging from the shadows. some of the implications on focusing on historic issues is ball. our eye off the they both share another characteristic in both of them have an incorrect view of history and particularly their role in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of south koreaens during 1950 to 1953. the his visit to seoul, president cited the war as a symbol of chinese and south korea sharing interest and defenses against a common threat. but he conveniently glossed over the recent role of china in the

korean war. nor have they ever apologized with sincerity or otherwise to south korea for their actions during the war. north korea has not apologized for its repeated attempts to kill the south korea president or blowing up an airliner and the list goes on and on. >> yet despite china's incorrect historical viewpoint and lack of

contrition, seoul hasn't refused to hold summits with beijing as it has tokyo. beyond those direct threats to the u.s. and its friends, there is the more subtle threat we've been talking about throughout the day, that from the strained relations of our two very close friends in critical partners in korea and japan. let me emphasize the importance of our relationship with both nations for our own interest and for also their interest. and also the fact of the need for very close trilateral cooperation at a time of rising security threats and unfortunately right now that cooperation is having great difficulty even though washington's relations with seoul and tokyo are perhaps the best they've ever been but the strained relations between our

allies is prevepting further cooperation as well as splattering the u.s. with accusations of favetism of one ally over the other. now during all of the previous flare ups between tokyo and seoul and there have been many before the current administrations. washington had sought to remain aloof. there seemed to be no percentage in getting involved in a fight between two close friends. really the bilateral relations now have become so dire and for such a long time and there seems really very little hope for reconciliation that washington during the past year has felt a need to become more involved in behind the scenes shuttle diplomacy. and that u.s. role has perhaps not always been obvious but it's included quite frank messages delivered privately to both our allies. washington has become frustrated with both our friends.

with japan for it's diplomatic approach toward resolving historic issues and south korea's insistence on seeing every issue through the lens of history and seeming inability at times to take yes for an answer. and admiral blair cited before those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. i would cite a corollary from another not famous his torn, me. those who refuse to atone for the past and those who refuse to forget the past are doomed to repeat it and put their own future at risk. let's first take a look at japanese actions during the occupation in world war ii two. event similar an to this. atrosstiss it's

unequivocal and overwhelming. for anyone to question those actions or tokyos responsibility is historically inaccurate. it's equally indefenseable to minimize the scope of those actions by questioning the disputing azzties or details of testimony by comfort women. for americans it's incomprehensible why japan would even provide the appearance of minimizing its responsibility since after all those actions were under taken by a japanese regime that has been replaced by a democratic system. it would not still be issues had tokeyoy atoned for its past and denied those who deny those actions. i think successive japanese administrations have undermined their own attempts at

reconciliation by adopting a minimalistic approach. if tokyo wants to move beyond the history issues and play a more effective regional and global role, it must make a more concerted effort to alleviate the neighbor's concerns over historic issues and to do so by embracing bolder measures. i would offer five recommendations. one is to establish a process to include as a minimum official and repeated affirmations of the statements. two, would be even better than that a new statement worked out in private consultations with seoul to fully embrace responsibility for the past actions and have seoul art late what steps it will take to move forward. three, a agreed upon mechanism or the the comfort women.

four, a pledge by the prime minister. and five, a condemnation of future revision of statements by japanese politicians as well as groups advocating hate speech. for historic issues to become water under the bridge, it requires both japan and south korea to make efforts to build a brimming of reconciliation. the united states has its own troubled history with japan and history is important. but which history? the history of the last century or the last 70 years. turning to south korea, it's a future japanese intentions based on japanese actions during 1910 while americans base their perceptions of japanese future actions on those actions that 45 o has undertaken from 19

o the present day. it's puzzling to americans that south korea seems more worried and more easily worked up by hypothetical japanese military threat than the very real threat from north korea. when south korean polls show japan is a security threat second only the north korea or in some polls to be a greater military threat than north korea americans are just perplexed. we've seen that most recently in the many mischaracterizations of at the japanese collective self-defense would entail. the changes that are being contemplated for self-defense seem monumental given the legislate arji of the last several decades in responding to changes in the security environments. but from the u.s. point of view, it is still small.

even if they were to implement all 15 scenarios it's inadequate of what would need to be done. for what i would recommend tr south korea would be one to come part meant lies it's foreign policy. to exercise pragmatic leadership by not allowing emotionalism to impede for the defense of korea. two, would be to art late a framework for resolving the issues by designing specific steps and or language that enable seoul and tokyo to move forward rather than continue demand for sincerity. three would be to offer tokyo assurance that it will publicly accept japanese steps toward reconciliation. four, preliminary steps are take on the have a summit with japan. and five to adopt a trust policy

with japan. when we think of some of the implications of these strained relations, we have things like collective self-defense, the military intelligence sharing agreement. another one is ballistic missile defense. right now south korea is determined to implement a less effective defense of its own pop lose than is otherwise available. and that is both a resistance to ploying better equipment and really they are determined to maintain a final approach defense only. it's like in soccer saying i only need a goally. i don't need defense players. a goally is fine. that last ditch final defense is enough. and also seoul resist implementing or integrating its ballistic defense system into

the broader allied system. to use another sports analogy. it's like having three outfielders in baseball who refuse to talk to each other. f your oufereds are talking to each other, you know you are more likely to catch the ball or in this case to intercept a missile. it's uncertain why seoul continues to resist both those steps. some think it's because it doesn't want to offend china. that china would interpret this improved defense system as a threat to china. well, obviously china is not acting in south korea's national interest. others contend it is because south korea simply does not want to become involved in a system that also involves japan. i'd say in conclusion i'd repeat that history is important but we

should focus on the proper history and it must not hold the present or the future hostage. and tokyo should address its responsibility for the past. seoul should remember who its real friend is and who the real threats are. and the u.s. should take whatever steps are necessary to help our two critical partners to achieve reconciliation. thank you very much. to et me open it up questions. thanks guys for a great iscussion. >> altering some of the earlier discussion about how the

investigation played out in terms of lifting the lid on the consultations. at the time, i kept banging my head what in the hell. if they hadn't consulted, it would have been irresponsibility. it was to work a reconciliation. the idea that becomes a scandal betrays in many ways the heart of the problem we are trying to resist. maybe we need to bear that in mind. next year we got to have anniversaries and talk to each other. do they even want to talk to each other? that further proof of conspiracy? when i was in tokyo in late arch or april. i went out drinking one night with a bunch of journalist and

they use the same thing. it's really there. and it's a big problem n. talking especially to i guess this would have been the contact guys. wait a minute, you're tokyo, right? >> law faculty, right? >> every one of them is a lawyer. you say wait a minute, you are foreign ministry, you are supposed to be talking about diplomacy and relationships but there is this thing about the law and the treaties that always gets in the way of what we're really talking about here which is public relations. japanese are tired and they on't believe them anymore.

maybe we need to bring good old washington p.r. to this. that's a horrible thought. omments more than questions. >> there was a legal framework established in that dialogue that led to the normalization process and that japan is adhering to that interpretation

and this issue was closed. you know the argument. >> it may be time to lock the lawyers up in a room and deal with this as an issue of historical closure if you will, in n issue of japan's image the world when so many countries that are very ennamered of japan around the world have been piling on in their criticisms about japan's management of the comfort woman issue. the message to tokyo should be clear that legal lisms aside, however accurate they may be, this issue has me tass sized in a way that is undermining japan's moral authority of which it has prided itself in the 70

years since the end of world war ii. and so i think one important takeaway from your comments just now is perhaps for senior level japanese to internalize that and to figure out a way to set aside if you will legal lisms and deal th this from a broader historical and moral perspective. >> i just add i think in a way that is microcosm of a lot of historic problems in that when a member raised questions about the statement, the administration should have simply said we're not doing a review. having rnment policy, gone down the path of doing the

review, they had a lost opportunity. maybe the most important comment cabinet review was secretary amitt romneying. that should have been the essage repeated over and over. and even beyond that saying let's take the opportunity to even more fully embrace responsibility in order to put this issue behind us. another lost opportunity. also it did reflect the south korean suspicion of anything japan does now. south korea should have declared victory and they should have said affirmed the statement as abe did in march and the statement before that. the reports show that even before the japanese government interviewed the comfort women from their own available holdings of evidence, they were going to as they told a south korean diplomat, they were going to issue the statement. victory number two and victory

number three would be that japan responded to south korean requests or demands for specific words, specific actions. that is what diplomats should do and that is a model for what hould be done now is quietly seoul saying what it would like and tokyo saying what it might o. i think the -- they did lose opportunities on both sides to put the issue behind them. >> on the statement review, i had the same feeling when i was in seoul and there was a lot of handwringing about what would come out about the consultations and it reaffirmed how bad things are.

another famous historian, not so famous historian juan cedeno things are bad when the solution becomes a problem -- not so famous historian said you know when things are bad when the solution becomes a problem. here is this dialogue going on and we have to see how that turns out. there is a tone on the korean side where they are trying to say we can carp at -- compartmentalize the issue with japan. where does that come from? i do not think that comes from some sort of realization that they are being unreasonable. it is a inc. shot -- bank shot from the summit. people are worried that they are alling into china's lap.

t is a reaction to that. when you do policy you do your best you can to make lemonade out of lemons so there is a lemon, korea falling into china's orbit. it creates some antibodies and we have to show that we are in and use that to promote more japan-courier corporation. the challenge from an everyday policy perspective is not on the korean side, persuading them. there is some. it is on the japan side because things have shifted so much as you said from your trip to japan. that is the harder rock to roll up the hill right now. > i am a long term resident of washington and 30 years with the orld bank.

korea and japan should be, to use another asian country, like siamese twins create -- twins. the parent of both countries as china. we use chinese script in writing and sort of korean. unofficial documents, chinese is evidence -- evident. it should not have been just a history of the end of the 19th entury but rather a long istory of more than 1500 years

when the group of families and wnership from korea came and dominated japan. to this day the oldest city in japan is the -- named with a korean word. all of you today, especially merican participants said what can we do? you are essentially enjoying a fight between two countries who should have been friends and taking them on to continue fighting by putting all kinds of conditions and saying layoff. it is not that important whether comfort women did this or that or whether in the government of

the administration, the japanese military or the government of japan between 1910 and 1945 date despicable things -- did despicable things. ll of you use the word the occupation of korea. there was a colonization but the japanese side did not regarded as occupation. they went in the wrong track of annexation. this was approved by the league of nations to the point and however uncomfortable it might be in the 1936 olympics, it was korean person who aise the flag. the last concluding point is, our future together, it is the western powers that divided

korea into two parts. do you think you have done enough to reunify the north and south instead of saying how dangerous north korea is? thank you. >> not sure what part of that to pick up. there is a lot of debate that we could have their -- there. to debate 1500 years of history would be beyond the scope. thank you. > kevin with the state department, most of my career as with japan. is it -- it is important to note that the -- a lot of the noise that you hear is not from people

who represent the vast majority of people in japan. hen an official made these statements, it was wartime and comfort woman was -- comfort women were necessary, he was roundly criticized about his he was criticized by about 80% of the japanese public. korean ambassador referring to the revision as the fudging of history issues by the japanese government, it is difficult to find anyone -- a statement from anyone in the government who has walked away from the statement. the people outside of th