under to mold and siege. turkemans are quite different from peshmergas because they have armed forces. the floor to the speakers come i would like to express my gratitude to the organizers of the very important meeting at the wilson center. . .

>> there's so much going on that life is never boring in iraq. and obviously excitement of different kind. and there are many hot topics on many peoples' minds, especially the international community. this may include the war against terror. the formation of government. the military air strikes.

also possible u.s. administration's change of policy in the region which may include going into syria. but to ask iraqis, obviously they're busy dealing with a never-ending crisis, only one of which is the war against isis. and the least of which is actually the formation of government. and they face crisis in the presence of a failed political process in baghdad. a nonfunctioning state that is now divided and on the brink of disintigration. maybe i should start by giving you the latest on the formation

of government as you suggested. and then branch out from there. >> mr. abadi was actually nominated by the president to form the next cabinet, and he has until the 10th of september to sign also agreements with sunnis, fellow shiites and kurds. nothing is easy in iraq and this will be protracted. there's no guarantee that he will be able to meet the deadline. there is obviously pressure from the united states and iran for

obvious reasons. to say the least, this will remove probably the biggest obstacle for progress and that is namely, mr. maliki himself. in fact, the u.s. administration has been very explicit that any future military support to baghdad is conditional on the removal of mr. maliki. and the kurds and many sunnis have made it conditional in their collaboration with baghdad and fight isis on the removal of mr. maliki. and mr. abadi himself is actually in a hurry to form the government. he has not been resting for the

last week or ten days. he's been working 24/seven round the clock trying to negotiate with everybody. so it's really a difficult task for him. and he promised to form the government as soon as possible. he gave 72 hours to various political leaders to nominate their ministers. so his deadline is actually tomorrow which you can guess is very optimistic. for him and for iraq as well as the international community, failure is not an option. it will be disasterous on all stakeholders. but failure is a real possibility. there are those who are working on making it fail. there are those who are actually making it difficult for him to progress given the type of conditions and preconditions

that they have put forward. so far the negotiations have been going relatively well. and only yesterday, the kurdish delegation finished their first meeting with mr. abadi and went back to meet with kurdish leaders, and they held a press conference saying that there's room for optimism, but we're not over optimistic about the chances for mr. abadi meeting all our conditions. so basically, mr. abadi has not had the chance to go down to the nitty gritty and has been very busy trying to bring the conditions of the ceiling down on everyone. and the government is meant to be one of national unity. mr. abadi will need to bring

every interest together basically and satisfy everybody which is an impossible task. and mr. abadi's brothers and sisters within the state of law as well as within the house of shiite would be asking for the lion's share of positions as well as authority or say, um, the government. and they are by no means united. they're by no means easy or make it easy for mr. abadi. and, of course, the -- mr. abadi's biggest challenge is to bring the sunnis on board as well. so you would think that given that the sunnis are in the poorest state in their power base and their constituency has

been taken by isis and they are in desperate need of they, they would be in the weakest place. but that's not correct. their hand is now stronger than ever. everybody now strongly believes that defeating isis in iraq and liberating the major towns and cities of the sunni triangle will require their active engagement. you need to be engagement of sunnis on the ground. everybody insists that the sunni political and tribal leaders. this is where they may turn a corner. so the sunnis on the other hand themselves would probably no longer accept sectarian rule by a shiite majority. the kurds, on the other hand, have lost faith in iraq. and they wish that they did not

have to go back to baghdad. but they are doing so out of necessity and lack of choice. the kurds could not comprehend how essential government in baghdad could starve people from funds at at the time of war against terror. how they can deny -- arriving in kurdistan via the air when people are being slaughtered and religious minorities facing genocide and increasing number of displaced people need basic needs. that's the refugees internally displaced from all parts of iraq. in fact, yesterday, mr. maliki decided to give salaries to people from mosul and tikrit to only those in baghdad now and

none of those in kurdistan reach. so had it not been for the u.s. air strikes and the international help, it would have been extremely difficult to stop isis and make progress. as well as helping the internally displaced people who are now well over 600,000, in fact, if you include those elsewhere, it exceeds 650,000 people. so imagine kurdistan just under 5 million and it suddenly increased by 5 million without the resources to pay their salaries and baghdad withholding their budget. in any case, kurdish leaders have come around and have invested seriously in baghdad's political process.

they now have a president in baghdad who was instrumental in stopping maliki from extending his premiereship -- some of which might be beyond his powers. they want guarantees that -- they want guarantees not just from him but from the house of shiites as well as others putting pressure on them. they want guarantees that the next prime minister will not be like mr. maliki. they will not use salaries as a tool to punish political rivals.

>> kurdish politicians are under

increasing pressure and demand from their own people to go independent, and there are an increasing number of political leaders becoming convinced that their future is not in iraq. finally, a few words about isis. i don't need to tell you why isis has done and what it's capable of. however, i would like to emphasize that isis is a real threat to us all. a real threat to all of humanity. isis managed to grow and undermine two sovreign countries. defeating isis will not be easy or quick. it requires a long-term strategy. and international

collaborations. it needs radical rethinks of alliances. i suggest that u.s. air strikes is a model that should be adopted in iraq and syria. by that, i meant striking from above and having in the ground their own people pushing isis out. so most importantly, as a final point, it's not just the united states and iraqis, it's the regional powers that need to change strategies, rethink their approach to iraq and the middle east. iran, turkey, saudi arabia, the gulf countries, anybody who has a stake in the region, a stay in

the region, who has so far influenced the events in iraq. they need to rethink before we even talk about wing against isis. thank you very much. >> thank you. thank you very much. >> so our next speaker is -- a professor of political science. he will tackle the question of -- sir, the floor is yours. >> thank you, mr. president. i would like to discuss the

turkish reactions to what's going on in iraq. turkish. i remember last year events from turkey and the middle east. relationship with iraq. we are living in a new reality. and i see major changes which is a background to turkey's relationship with iraq and others including the united states. for some time before this crisis in iraq that started innup, turkey has been -- and that

kurdistan was widely a part of the broader -- in the sense that turkey has moved from being a problem solver in the region to becoming partly part of the problem. and then there's a lot of criticism towards -- with baghdad and especially prime minister maliki. most of the critics -- turkey -- defend the rights of the sunni groups. integrate the sunnis into the iraqi political system. also, their relationship with the kig is a criticism.

starting from 2007, 2008. that relationship became to be very essential in the overall middle eastern policies of turkey. and it took another dimension which is the relationship between turkey and the kig. turkey moved into the direction of -- production through tu turkish -- and also in the -- turkey was in a sense undermining the territorial integrity of iraq. in general, also contributing to broader instability in the region. the counterarguments that we heard from turkish officials

that it valued the territorial integrity of iraq for its own. but turkey also needed to see the nation's building process in --ty creditty credit -- tikrit. >> so we have seen turkey on several occasions and from time to time we even -- and maliki on

tv. maliki trying to respond -- who follow --

>> advantages to turkey from the recent crisis. but especially the hostage situation in mosul. it's put turkish policies on a different page. behind the scenes. without publicizing some of -- it is -- the other actors in terms of the relationship. also, the in iraq led to new realignment on the ground, new

actors are popping up in the fight against isis and the isis advance into areas in august. also, a growing interesting of the western actors including the united states into iraq now the air force and so on and so forth. >> if you could speak into the microphone a little bit. >> okay. the air force and the military operations in iraq and the position of certain european governments to provide military assistance to krg. this is also changing the policies of krg and the territory integrity of iraq. and they've also created new security challenges for turkey.

turkey has been struggling with the refugees flowing from syria and now the refugees from iraq. but also inside iraq in kig controlled areas, turkey ask providing an immense amount of assistance. and also turkey is also trying to play a roll, behind the scenes, in the formation for assisting baghdad. i personally have been trying to argue that turkey plays a very crucial role in the government formation process. those who follow -- it's a

stalemate in the process. in the convention of the new parolemeliament -- moving forwa. turkey came up with the idea of moving step by step. and i have seen a tushirkish --e process -- the selection of the new speaker off to parliament to elect the new president and also -- this is an essential

contribution coming from turkey in terms of untying -- today, turkey still standing for a yuan unified iraq but also realized that the solution has to come from the political processes. there's a very urgent security challenge because of the rise of isis, the advance of isis. at the end of the day, it is based on social realities and -- security challenge along -- >> and the political processes in baghdad to corporate and also we need to think about -- in the next stage. and in that sense, again, the

new government has to be based on power sharing, revenue sharing, and also the issue of -- designate -- he abadi has a good chance to build coalitions, but turkey also sees a lot of challenges before mr. al abadi -- this is essential because he --

>> these are challenges that have to be addressed while they are also fighting isis. >> long term, rethink about the --

>> and i have a few words about the kig. as i mentioned at the very beginning of my presentation, the turkish -- >> from the region. the pipeline --

>> areas we have seen the krg especially -- >> has been more or less the main of turkey's -- the way i see it. and i would like to stop and make we can discuss everything.

>> thank you. thank you very much. >> may i just -- we have a lot of electronics in the room. if i could ask you to turn off your blackberries and cellphones, that would help with severe feerns with the microphone. -- interference with the microphone. thank you for that. >> local people and as you know -- >> should i provide my own perspective? >> i'll try to provide you a snapshot of what is going on in

iraq. >> i'm a little bit older than i seem. >> it was kind of limited to the northern part of iraq. it was not going to -- you know,

forget about the -- >> i'm not quite sure about the first one. but he changed the whole landscape. and that changed immediately the policy. there was this new -- >> while they -- and, you know -- so they need to change the iraqi policy. they need to go beyond the norm in northern iraq. so that means, you know -- lost

its significance. >> also looking at the -- in 1990s, they were told there were five to seven million to -- now we're told there are 700,000 to 3 million -- and the significant -- in turkish foreign policy. in the wider middle eastern

perspective -- it is an ongoing process. this process --

>> three kinds of territories in iraq. the one is the krg territory area. the other is called the disputed territories. and the other is the rest of iraq, of course. to the area of -- was under control of the iraqi central government up until the islamic state expansion. northern iraq. so at the time, the kurds were -- but now there's -- and now the --

>> i can't talk freely. i'm no longer associated with the foreign ministry. to some extent, everybody speaks. but the -- are middle class urban people. they don't have the tribal organizations. it's not like the kurdish presence in northern iraq. there are idea logical differences. -- so the picture is not -- not very much promising. so they're either going to live,

you know -- of, you know, guaranteed peaceful existence or another option is to live in geography facing -- military power to defend themselves. and if you are lucky, we're going to have an iraqi government and then a central government, the krg disputed territory as well. this is the optist scenario. so the -- is also, you know --

>> it may have an impact. please at th positive. does not feel -- it did not l let -- we are going to be in a better situation. they rather prefer to blame turkey to sell to krg for oil.

is a must. the second is, you know, rather than working on, you know -- what really matters to them is cultural rights. since the areas they live the social fabric and demography. they have to now deal with a new social fabric from what they were which was middle class. in these areas.

so what is -- as an -- military

powers. to some other entities have been empowered -- you know, for position. and having, you know, decisional suffering -- it's, you know, we don't require an expert to say that -- working towards a better

arrangement of -- existence. and external >> before asking your question, please indicate your name and your affiliation and please

>> what could baghdad possibly give in return and do you anticipate that there will be -- how can you have any kind of rev referendum under the current circumstances given the instability? thank you. >> i think that i can see two or three fragments of questions within questions from the last one. you can have a rev referendum --

that was kind of regaining volume of our territory -- that has come back to the kurds by the failure of the iraqi army to protect the people. so let's forget about how it was regained. i do not think the kurdish people are contemplating the scenario where they would give over control to the iraqi army. were it not for what they considered to be their right to -- handing it over back to a government that has not yet demonstrated its ability to protect the people and provide

security. it will be -- baghdad has always seen -- as the leverage. over one city. it's all about making iraq work. if iraq works again, the kurds will sign up to it. but the idea is that there has to be a new mechanism and new arrangement with baghdad, the status quo can be maintained amicably. therefore, this article is dead. in other words, don't even talk about having kirkut.

now with the way things happened and the events of june, 2014, the reality changed. alive and the kurdish state is dead. neither would be correct constitutionally. they would have to come up with an amicable arrangement where they would have to implement articles. otherwise, this is a recipe for disaster. >> what are those three elements? >> one is reconciliation. i'll give it a try. you can look it up. there has to be a state of reconciliation, rev referendum, an element that the president has to define the areas that

maybe people who know more about these three elements. but i think it depends with the word referendum that has to be done. and this compensation element as well. all of these can happen under the curdish control. it does not have to be baghdad that does that. now it's the other way around. thank you. yes, please. >> i wanted to ask the turkey a am -- analyst. >> sorry. >> i have two questions. i know you said that turkey still prefers a unified iraq, but there's been a lot of confusion recently because we heard from a spokesperson that a

kurdish state is no longer stable. so my question is: if push comes to shove, will turkey accept an independence kurdistan? >> and the second question is about -- you mentioned something about rethinking iraqi federalism. what do you mean exactly by that? i know the kurds are calling for -- more power to the local authorities. we just saw joe biden writing an article in the "washington post" and also not having national guards for every region. is that something turkey also wants to see, some kind of more powerful local governments? thank you. >> thank you.

>> first question, i guess you're referring to --

>> within turkey and k.r.g. -- it was critical of some of the k.r.g. programs. but from 2007 to 2008, turkey changed its policy. now turkey -- accomodation engagements with the k.r.g. now iraq is not seen as a threat to turkey. but if push comes to shove, if the k.r.g. were to come independent, turkey would not see it as a threat. and then in that sense, this could also be more a general thinking on the part of -- but it doesn't necessarily mean that turkey was supporting the

independence of k.r.g. because i remember when he gave that interview to you, it was -- giving its sort of concern and approval to k.r.g. independence because -- calling for getting ready for the -- so somehow -- >> official --

>> so far. there's a perception that the federalism is what is lacking in certain respects. this is what i see. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> could you please -- >> yes. >> for the panel, i wanted to ask whether you see the turkey's policy towards isis as sustainable considering that you could say that turkey perhaps looks at isis and syria as a necessary nuisance to removing assad but looks at isis and iraq as an essential threat to the stability of iraq.

so is there going to be more of a unified policy or is this a -- >> and then before >> whereas, you know, they're certainly not a friend of assad. i think there's some confusion embedded within the question. i think this turkey has not initiated any air strikes in iraq. okay. this is not something

that officials would actually accept. they also have not officially -- >> i don't think any official would accept that. because i'm actually aware of these arguments. people like me ask that question all the time. this is probably going to be answer the question, the official line will not accept that they have any policy tow d

towards supporting in syria or not supporting in iraq. isis is a terrorist organization. >> to compliment what -- there's no -- >> isis was the agenda -- and then, for instance, the nation of isis in regards to the foreign fighters. from syria inside -- it is on

the >> that dallas -- in the initial phase of isis between -- in fact, the syrian intelligence and isis if turkey was so keen on getting that up, isis was not necessarily the first support. but turkey did support other elements of the -- especially -- and, you know, fight isis given in the --

>> turkey didn't whereas we considered turkey as a strategic ally in this sense and a lot of people expected turkish intervention and nothing happened. some people wondered why. this is actually a policy. the only reason i responded is because i thought we may spend some more time -- i've given thought to it.

>> bbc host the second debate. meant -- 90 minute discussion happen and glasgow. before, a local reporter, severin carrell. >> scottish voters go to the polls to decide to whether to remain part of the u.k. he is a scotland correspondent with "the guardian" and give us