, he scares me. abouting you mentioned closing the government because of president obama's immigration immigration problem. isl quick, my only comment all the people, liberals and ,onservatives in the media, 20% you have to secure the border first. there is aeat, but list why. a reporter who had his head -- murdered overseas. the greatest we thought about that is as secure border. if you have a passport, the same as having a visa. you can be on a no-fly list and

not be able to go past the borders. if you are here in the visa expires, that means between 5 billion and 10 billion people. ,s long as you are working place of business and put you on an airplane. the best thing to do is have a biometric card that all the pieces are attached to. we would rather have citizens have the job. writing on the piece online at the business insider website. during the interview mitt romney said his experience running a national campaign but likely make him a stronger candidate in 2016 and same circumstances could change but reiterating that he is not running, at least at the moment that fueling

speculation on a potential 2016 bid. this headline from inside the " washington times" the president either global climate deal without congress. going to ann next. are you with us? you veryow say thank much for joining us on c-span's and theon journal" security council meeting about to get underway focusing on the situation in syria. live coverage on the c-span networks.

7002 hundred 52nd

meeting of the security council is called to order. the provisional agenda of the meeting is the situation in the middle east. the agenda is adopted. in accordance with rule 39 of the councils divisional rule and procedure, i invite the assistant secretary-general of humanitarian affairs to participate in this meeting. it is so decided. the security council will begin consideration of item two of the agenda. i wish to draw the attention of council members to document s/20 14 -- six 11. the report of the secretary-general on the dirty council resolutions 2139 and 2165. to mrs. jime floor uan king. thank you very much.

mr. president and distinguished members of the council, thank you for the opportunity to deliver the statement under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and valerie amos. it has been six months since thelution 21-39 passed with aim of pressing the parties to the conflict in serious to abide by basic international legal obligations in reduce the suffering of ordinary people caught up in the conflict. the past six, over months the plight of people in serious has not been reduced but has deepened. the violence and conflict continues unabated with more deaths of women, children and men. the social and economic fabric of the country has been ripped to shreds. according to data collected by human rights organizations by various sources, july 2014 was particularly harrowing since the

start of the conflict in syria with over 1000 civilian deaths and injuries. on the 22nd of august the high commissioner for human rights issued updated human rights figures. more than 190 1000 people were killed between the onset of the conflict and april 2014. as appalling as it is, that is a minimum number. the real test told is likely to be much higher. a marked increase in the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs by the government was registered in residential neighborhoods were civilians, including women and children, with no need to leave still struggle to survive. continue to be particularly affected. over 30 barrel bombs were reportedly dropped between 22nd

and 31st of july. killing 10 civilians, including five children. opposition and extremist groups continue to launch mortar attacks, shelling and explosive devices to residential areas, killing and injuring scores of people, including children. in damascus, 225 missiles targeted capital between the third and seventh of august killing more than 17 people and injuring at least 100, including children. almost one million people are deprived of water because of attacks on vital infrastructure. the islamic front has cut water supply to an area for displaced people several times.

medical facilities and personnel also continue to be targeted. fleeing forf people safety continues to increase. almost once. is either -- one into is internally to place -- displaced or refugee. this is taking the violence to unprotected civilians to a new level. the group continues to commit or rhythmic atrocities against those opposing the rule. for example, community sources report up to 700 members of the arab tribe who i still -- who isil accused of hypocrisy have been killed or kidnapped or crucified. reports indicate women are being sold in markets in iraq.

grave human rights violations have become the norm in syria. parties to the conflict are oblivious of their obligation to bytect civilians and divide humanitarian law as they continued to commit crimes women andung and old, men. the perpetrators must be held accountable. the impunity's must end. for the first time in six months, there have been some improvements on humanitarian access. we are reaching more people in need in hard to reach areas as a result of the adoption of resolution 2165 by this council. the monitoring mechanism is no -- not operational at the three border crossings. monitoringent of teams to iraq remains pending due to insecurity in the northwestern part of the country . the situation is constantly -- assessed.d

this has resulted in broader coverage of hard to reach areas damascus and others. they have now shipped nine areas pursuant to security council resolution 2190 five. this included seven shipments from turkey. three through the crossing and to the other crossing. the shipments included food assistance for some 69,500 people. worthod items approximately 120 5000 people, water and sanitation supplies for around 80 2500 and medical 190,000, including

surgical supplies for 700 people . all of the shipments crossed without incident and the relief supplies ongoing. these shipments were made possible due to the full cooperation of the government of turkey and jordan. the governments of. notified 48 hours in advance of the crossing of the shipments and humanitarian nature of the shipments. more shipments are planned over the next month in close cordon nation with humanitarian team in damascus in line with the u.n. hole of serious approach where crossed line and cross-border access complement each other to maximize our reach to those in need. there have also been new openings and access across conflict lines, notably in in damascus governance, including the deceased areas.

food was dispatched to approximately 97,500 people throughout aleppo covenants and 10,000 civilians trapped in brutal opposition held areas of darab . notably in areas that had not been assisted since the beginning of the crisis. includingpplies, surgical items reached the number of opposition held areas crossonth, mostly through line access. around 10 metric tons of surgical supplies and chronic disease medicines for 22,300 people were delivered to hospitals in the eastern city. authorities authorize the distribution of medical supplies including antibiotics and medicines for noncommunicable diseases. on the 20th of july, who

delivered five metric tons of medical assistance to the and were rolled damascus to support a population of 24,000 people in need. other deliveries were made to hard to reach areas. mr. president, despite these developments, much more needs to be done by the parties to ensure access is rapid, regular, safe and unhindered. 240 1000 people remain under siege. her goals continue to hamper the delivery of aid. governors are still not allowed to approve the delivery of humanitarian assistance in their earnings without first consulting damascus. the operational constraints took been-- on ngos have not removed. designated terrorist groups as well as armed opposition groups

continue to block access to the hard-to-reach eastern governance of syria. toward thevancing eastern border along the main access routes in syria. this could threaten the additional cross-border operations authorized under security resolution 2165. i must highlight the funding situation for humanitarian operations in. is dire. is syrian response plan severely underfunded with only 30% of the requirements met. the serious regional refuge or response plan is 45% funded. this adds to the challenges we face in our ability to help those in need. president, it insecurity poses a serious risks to operations and staff. last week we commemorated world

humanitarian day. it was an occasion to remember that humanitarian workers in syria who put their life on the line -- line everyday to deliver assistance to those in desperate need in syria. on the sixth of august and 18 came undery on route attack from an unknown group. to truck drivers were killed into were injured. 62 humanitarian workers have been killed since march 2011, including artie eight star volunteers, 15 staff members, 13 and two ngo staff. starkluding already 8 volunteers. humanitarian workers should not have to risk their lives to ensure -- to help others.

progressdent, the during the past month has shown that where there is political will, there is a way to improve the situation for millions of civilians in syria. effortsall redouble until we reach everyone in need with humanitarian assistance. president, each day result in more life lost and more families and communities destroyed. the rise of extremist groups would -- with complete disregard for the most basic norms of humanity threatens what remains of secularism and tolerance him in syria. now, more than ever before, the council must do all it can to end the conflict and ensure humanitarian access increases so we can reach those in desperate need in syria. and two minutes. agencies partners are doing everything we can to meet those needs.

as we have repeatedly said, the solution to the crisis does not rest with us. thank you very much. mrs. kang for her briefing. i now invite onto members to continue discussion on the subject. the meeting is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> a short meeting of the united nations hearing a report that the guardian this morning says. government forces have been dropping bombs on civilian areas including some believed to contain the chemical engine -- agent chlorine. they are going and into a private session. isis forces were waging a campaign to instill fear including public execution style killings. more about isis later on today on c-span as we take you to a discussion on that. >> going to a discussion on nsa surveillance. we take you there live here on c-span.

>> welcome to the planning session on the nsa surveillance and consequences. this fits nicely into the larger theme of the convention, entitled after the digital

revolution. the controversy surrounding the nsa ably plea implicates the uses of potential abuses of technology by government and nongovernmental act tours. five and jihadist use digital technology to build movements and states use it to trace the threats. the legal national security scholar said terrorist movements often reflect or nearer the resources, tools and aspects of the societies they attack. use digital technology to attack us, to build movements, and we use it to track them. in a sense, we see the very forces we are fighting, so digital technology is provided great benefits. it also enhance threats. many say it also applies to the nsa.

it uses technology, digital technology to protect us from terrorism, but also the potential for abuse. i am reminded of james madison statement where he said we need governments to protect us, but at the same time, we need what we call precautionary cautions to protect us from the government. if there are angels, they do not dwell on this particular earth. we are fortunate enough today to have a very distinguished panel to discuss the nsa and set the stage for what i hope will be an interesting queue in day. i am donald downs, university of wisconsin and the moderator of the discussion. is also special given the situation in the world today and iraq and syria and elsewhere, the discussion is all the more

relevant. nsa does is difficult. for one thing, the government has modified the program ep diddley in recent years due to what i call pressure and adding to the fog is a classified nature of the nsa work and the complexity of the interaction with the fisa courts, congress and executive branch. in addressing the question we have to know what is going on, but also see the forest. i hope to pay all today will get the right balance. if the nsa is watching this .lenary session, welcome if jeremy is watching, welcome to you, to. we will give you a sample of the questions we will be dealing with. how legal art nsa programs? how effective are they? what are they? how serious a are the

dangers and threats the nsa programs address and how do we define the dangers for legal policy or process? we are going to obtain data. if so, what are the same aren't? how much should the rules and norms regarding intelligence domestic differ from law enforcement's? just how different is foreign intelligence gathering from domestic law-enforcement? how much overview is provided by checks and balances in the system? review,ional congressional checking, public opinion, the press, inspector general's, executive branch checksht and have such insufficient? the nsa has often done its job

with secrecy, especially in the past. so what is the balance between secrecy and openness? and who should decide where that line is drawn? legitimacy role and of whistleblowers and leakers in our system? what is the legal status of edward snowden? the leak has provided so much information, especially about the metadata programs. what about the other leakers and or is spending a few years with putin punishment enough? how has the simple growth of new technology been responsible for the nature of nsa programs? how does the press deal with the

publication of stories involving national security? how to public opinion of the press shape policy and government response. of the classic trade-off between liberty and security? that security and liberty should reinforce one another if properly done. ifore i introduce the panel, want to say something briefly about the program to set the stage, and the panelists will say a lot more about them. the nsa was established in 1952 on that though it was based on previous intelligence operations. those point is to gather foreign intelligence through surveillance. sustained from a normal operation of domestic law enforcement. indeed, when the foreign intelligence surveillance act was passed in 1978, it was based

on the reaction to previous abuses of surveillance by the government. the main objective is to give the government a power -- the power to do what is necessary when it comes to foreign surveillance and preventing the power from reaching over to the domestic sphere. american citizens are sustained from foreign intelligence dangers. what happens when there is a third category? when american citizens are involved? that is the third area where a lot of the controversy arises. much of the controversy of the program pivot around the concern of non-foreign intelligence select into intelligence gathered regarding foreign intelligence. 9/11, for the most part, this is the reduction to a simple formula, there are four basic programs used.

of them are content-based surveillance, telephone and internet communications. 702 addresses when the nsa may look into the content. if it is purely foreign intelligence, it lies the on the purview of the fourth amendment. but the intelligence pertains to american citizens, then there are legal standards if such investigation needs to be covered by the law. the second set of programs involve metadata collection. both internet and telephone. program has been dropped as my understanding or seriously modified but the telephone program remains. bys is largely covered section 215 of the patriot act for the business records provision. bye of data -- metadata is

government providers. includes those -- such thing as numbers dialed, time and length of the call, cell phone information, websites visited and the like. this data does not itself pertain to the actual content of those communications. at one time the supreme court held such information is not upheld by the fourth information because it does not deal with content. those decisions occurred many decades ago when technology was not nearly as developed as it is now. so there is a greater concern with the new technology. in order to get into the content of this, a fisa court authorization is required. there is a big debate that her is tospeaker will address whether or not prior authorization is required to look at the made of -- metadata it tells. the communications content provisions are also approved by

the fisa court. published york times information in mid-2000. meanwhile, the extent is not really know until edwards noted until 2013. after the fisa amendment act of 2008, all four programs were given legal cover. we now know the pfizer court and nsa have been involved in a lot of back and forth in recent years over compliance. some say this shows they are doing their job. others say it shows they have not been sufficiently guarding civil liberties. disclosure,of the the government in recent months has discussed three different reform proposals. i will not get it to those now for the reasons of time but i assume the panel will be talking

about them. it will be interesting to see whether or not they can go forward given the events in the middle east. back in 2009 we have been christmas underwear bomber in detroit. the reforms were in the making back then but as soon as the act took place, reforms were stopped. there seems to be a pendulum effect into the immediacy of terror threats and the strength of proposals for reforms. it is a very distinguished group. presentr that they will accountants. georgetown university law school green -- written extensively on the nsa and related matters including too hadnsive pieces that i have the pleasure to read before the conference. she has advised leading privacy groups.

donohoo -- donohue will talk about legal implications of the bulk section program and 702. the second speaker will be matthew olson. mr. olson is now the director of the national counterterrorism center in washington. before that, he served as general counsel for the national security agency where he was position as chief legal counsel. served as an associate deputy attorney general and responsible for supervising and coordinating national security and criminal matters. honor of also have the serving the obama administration o administration. he will talk about the nature of terrorism, the threat it

presents and what the agency is doing to support counterintelligence efforts. he will also focus on the surveillance in the role of the programs in the ability to identify and disrupt terrorist threats. third speaker will be martin "ron, executive director of the washington post." he was the editor of " the boston globe" executive editor of " miami herald" and associate editor of ". new york times." willw for sure he contribute to our panel. he will talk about the press and how the press deals recording national security stories and how it interacts and negotiate with the government.

peter fever is our last speaker. a political science at duke where he is widely known for work in international relations, national security, peace and conference study. well-known for institutional studies. director of the duke program in american grand strategy. and july 2007 he was on the leave -- on the 2-d the director for strategic planning and international reform at the national security council staff of the white house where his responsibilities include national security strategy, regional strategy reviews and other political issues. he has written widely on issues as national security, simple illusory relations and the cost of war. he will focus on the larger

political and public dynamics in and how theyrea and hinge on policymakers calculations. so the formats are the following . each panelist will present five minutes and they may lead over. we will have an exchange where they will reply to one another. after that we will open up to queuing and a from the audience. >> thank you very much. i the microphones working? >> we decided to discuss from the table. i would like to thank john for the introduction. a wonderful opportunity to come together and discuss the issues and i would like to thank my fellow panelist in advance for the discussion. there are two central programs that have really captured attention. the first is double collection

102.on 215 and section in light of the limited time i will really focus on section 215. is my will say up front primary concern constitutionally is being exercised related to the post targeting analysis and the use of foreign intelligence information and ordinary criminal prosecution without any of the protections one would otherwise see in a fourth amendment context. i would be happy to return to that during the discussion. there is a two-part series and harvard journal of law and public policy. the first one was just published. these deal with section 215 and 702. they are pretty much in the forest. feel free if you want to take a look or if you have questions, i welcome all of that as well. section 215. what i would like to say is free

things. particularly bowl collection. first is that violates the whole purpose of the foreign intelligence surveillance act and is illegal under the statutory language passed by congress. you can see, i do not have a view. that, nsa. first, it violates the purpose. there were a plethora of programs that all of us in this room know well that had to do with the collection of both information on u.s. citizens. at the nsa for instance, a project called an array, collected information on a total of 1650 p all. no more than 800 50 people at a time. operation tram rock -- shamrock lookinglected messages for ties for foreign intelligence.

is theyacteristic started limited. only monitoring americans traveling to cuba but quickly expanded to anyone involved in criminal activities, suspected drug activity, individuals with suspected international terrorism. this committee really led the charge to say they did not want to create opportunities for executive branch agencies to collect bulk information on u.s. citizens. that was the purpose behind fisa . they were concerned that developments in technology would allow agencies to exploit ambiguities in the law to intrude upon american citizens privacy. these are stated aims of the legislation. to protect u.s. persons, not just from nsa surveillance but , fisa established

for import and protections. first, any information from an electronic intercept in particular had to be specifically tied to an individual. second, that individual had to be identified as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power prior to collection of information on that person, minimization procedures had to be put into place, and the foreign intelligence surveillance court would oversee this process. initially they dealt with electronic intercept. 10 register and cap and trades and that is really what the issue in the metadata program, the number one title -- one dials and the one can be received. finally, business records is a

provision. in regards to what has happened, and many of these basic principles and the approach of congress and the purpose of introducing fisa have really been countered by nsa actions. or orders issued by verizon two arise in our book collection. no prior targeting. no probable cause the individual was involved in criminal or foreign intelligence related activity. before they had to know the target to get information. the argument is now they'd get the information to ascertain who they are. completely backwards from the approach they have traditionally had. the role is shifting.

so that is the first argument. this is really contrary to the principles. this also violates the statutory language itself. there are in this regards three ways in which it does so. the first one i want to focus on is the language that says the government must have reasonable grounds to believe the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation other than a threat assessment. so again, there has to be reasonable ground to believe the information the tangible things to an are relative authorized investigation other than a threat assessment. so what is happening in this regard is the government argues tot all metadata is relevant authorized investigation.

phraset makes the relevant to completely meaningless. if it is all many -- relevant, what is irrelevant? it also makes the reasonable ground statement. you must have reasonable grounds to believe that all records are relevant to an authorized investigation. prior clause out of existence as a statutory matter and establishes a very concerning precedent. if all metadata is relevant, then so is all e-mail, all internet metadata, all financial records are relevant. all medications and social media. all of this would be relevant to assessing potential threats to the united states. so what is irrelevant? intent.arly contradicts

>> this is part of that phrase. is being read by the nsa treats the search of the data, not the collection as the part that must be relevant to an authorizing investigation. be statue requires it must relevant to an authorized investigation. an authorized investigation requires a level of specificity prior to collecting information. whereas old collection does not in this regard. the orders issued allows for the future collection of information so the investigation might not have yet been authorized and you are now granting the authority to obtain information without the information actually being in existence. the statute is clear it has to of artie been established. bet is the first of ways to established.

this requires the type of .nformation it is pretty clear you cannot use subpoenas for fishing expeditions. i could not convene a grand jury in bethesda to see what is going on in the city. that type of use of subpoenas has been roundly rejected by the supreme court. toividually this is related individuals of a particular crime. just a search for criminals who may have a particular them -- and there is an emphasis on past wrongdoing or current wrongdoing and specific crimes that have occurred. statutory information

is 10 register and cap and trade. reading section 215 the way it does, the government has been an end run provision and that statutory language. clearly sets of guidelines for how the information can be collected. set ofhe third and final arguments is a constitutionality of this. in my view this is unconstitutional, and this is why. the government relies on the case but don referenced. this is a local case actually for us here in d.c.. at the scene of the crime, she saw a 1975 monte carlo car. she told police she had sold a car and had been robbed.

someone called her on her home phone. he basically had stolen her purse and called her and identified her as a person robbed her and told her to go out on the porch and made a number of threatening result -- remarks to her. he was trying to intimidate her and harass her. he called police and the police -- 1970 five monte carlo in her neighborhood. they took a look at the clark and from the license plate they figured out who owned the car and went to the telephone company and said may be placed up 10 register on the phone line at that time? at that time there was no ability to record the numbers dialed or received. at that time they were built in minutes. when they placed the pen register on the phone, the next morning michael smith called her

on the telephone. they used the information to get a warrant, went into the house and there was a phone book turned down, dogeared to the .hone number the supreme court says michael lee smith had no privacy interest for purpose of the fourth amendment and the numbers he down from the phone because it was out of his control. that gave rise to what is known as third-party doctrine. they said it is third-party data, just recording the information that the telephone company has, which includes not just numbers wild and received the trunk identifier information. and this information has been collected 24-74 years. with thes wrong reliance on this case? privacy interest implicated the

current technologies are significantly different than the privacy interest implicated in 1979. there are tens of millions, hundreds of millions of people impacted by these orders. location information and the ubiquitous nature and long-term nature make the quality different than what happened in 1979. the court has recently decided a under trespass doctrine. i would suggest under either approach, whether it is an original trespass -- trespass approach or higher bark, that under either approach this is unconstitutional and unacceptable to collect them on american citizens. tos is it -- what gave birth this in many ways.

william pitt, prime minister directed the governors of the american colonies to use general lawrence to go into homes -- general warrants to go into people's home and look for possible criminal activity. james lawrence aimlessly argued this was the worst instrument of arbitrary power. said then and their child liberty was born. this was seen as the first shot in the revolution to say we will not accept lawrence. this included prohibition on general torrents. virginia and new york and the number of states as a condition of signing the u.s. constitution said there must be a prohibition on general lawrence. that is what madison said, to protect against general lawrence. giving the ability the government -- the government to collect metadata without any evidence of wrongdoing that looks like trespass on the

private lives of american citizens. justice scalia in a recent case jones said at one cannot read the fourth amendment to write out of the existence of the founding. .ut there is an approach there was a recent case u.s. versus jones wear a gps chip was placed on a car outside of the required- the 10 days by warrants and outside of washington, d.c. on a drug dealer's wife's car, suspected drug dealer. the court decided the case on trespass. there were five justices who came out and said under tax, one has to take account of reasonable expectation of privacy and technology is changing the picture, that technology is changing what these were like. they took on board directly and said this is something

different. justice sotomayor said she would overturn third-party doctrine in light of the intrusive nature of the technologies. there are number of cases one could point to. i'm going to wrap it up because i know we are under limited time. have 2010 versus war shack am a six the circuit case. we have caught her man -- cotterman a ninth circuit case. we have justice kagan look at the reflex expectation. we have this growing body of case law where the court is starting to recognize and say wait a minute, there is a privacy interest. this is a heightened interest in something different than we have previously seen. section 702, the primary concern has to do with targeting analysis and use of the criminal -- use of the

information for criminal activity. i see it contradictory to the purpose of introducing fisa as violating statutory language and unconstitutional. thank you. going to follow laura and not be easy as the nsa general counsel to follow laura. of verydone a lot extensive and interesting work on this. let me say i am here in some ofs more as the current role -- national amount counterterrorism director. i will talk a little bit about the law at some point but i am here primarily because my daughter is a now a junior at the university of wisconsin and took the professor's class and last year i have the privilege of speaking to professor downs class with my daughter in it about national security and the first amendment. as a lookout that you all, i hope you're easier than that group was on my argument.

asked a lot of good questions. i will stay in the forest and not the trees for a moment. so i look at this now, nsa surveillance from an operational perspective. the national counterterrorism center is essentially a clearinghouse. a clearinghouse for analysis of terrorist information. is subject of today's talk nsa surveillance and its consequences. i do have a perspective now of the consequences of the surveillance. isview is the surveillance indispensable to protecting the country. it is our daily bread. every day i get a threat briefing. i have one every morning. an hour.about we go around the world and find out what is happening from a terrorist perspective. one of the primary sources about terrorism comes from the

collection of information that nsa carries out around the world. it is really through these reports, but we have the opportunity to see the medications of the people who are targeted, the targeted that are seeking to carry out attacks against the world and here at home. so i approach these questions from a particularly operational perspective. i obviously understand there is a lot more to it than just the operational side and laura's remarks make that clear. let me take a few the limoneira comments -- let me make them to the primary threat. if we have the comments about , and thenhe balance went back about a black then you have the problem. i think you need to understand the nature of the threat, that the stare we are trying to learn more about to protect the

country. i will talk about that and then i will talk about how nsa surveillance gets into that and then i will touch on the impact of the disclosure of the stolen documents and how that has affected our capability. so the short answer on the threat is it is increasingly complicated and persistent and diverse and geographically diffused. the pastanged a lot in 10 years. from what wet experienced in 9/11 and the years shortly after. al qaeda leaders who established a safe haven. we are not talking about a diverse range of actors. not just core al qaeda and pakistan by the number of groups and individuals who have varying degrees of affiliation with al qaeda. see this when you turn on cnn or open a newspaper.

you have groups obviously affiliated with al qaeda like al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, thegroup responsible for 2009 effort to take down a plane over detroit. you have the group in somalia, newsgroup in affiliate -- and al qaeda. you have groups that are aligned with or even have splintered away from al qaeda. aligned groups like boko haram in nigeria. isil, a group that has splintered off from al qaeda. that, you have a number of individuals in places like libya, egypt who have varying degrees of adherents to the ideology. you have people here in the united states to adhere to the ideology of al qaeda here yet so the way the threat picture looks

now is much more diverse and fragmented that i was 10 or even really four years ago. beyond the diversity you have geographic diffusion. as i mentioned initially, not just centered in the region, it a widespanning geographic area going from south asia in afghanistan and the middle east and across north africa, all the way from east and themolly -- mali east. this resents a real challenge for us from a terrorism perspective. the third feature of the threat is it has proven to be quite adaptive. we werewoke her -- when concerned about centrally planned and plotting from al are nownior leaders, we increasingly concerned about the change in tactics. we are there looking to carry

out smaller scale, less sophisticated attacks but those that do not require planning, and people to travel or communicate directly with central planners or leaders in these locations. so they have changed the tactics. understanding that is a vulnerability for them. so we have a threat that is increasingly diverse, geographically diffused and adapted. the question is and the thing i wanted to mention is why is the nsa so important to collect information. this flows directly from the threat. it is very difficult to infiltrate the group. they are inherently sift -- suspicious. they kill people who they suspect are spies. one of the primary ways of being able to type -- understand their intentions and identify individuals who along to the

group, is to be able to get access to the communications. it is also the case with the geographic spread of the threat that the ability to have human sources is limited because we cannot get to these different places. another reason why nsa collection is so critical. a third is the inherent reliability of this type of intelligence. it is a double standard. we are not relying on someone to report on what they hear or they may have inherent bias or limitations on what they have access to. we are able to get the communications we are seeking to learn more about. we are getting their actual e-mails or telephone calls. all of this really goes to the point, the fundamental point i started with nsa surveillance of the general proposition as indispensable to our ability to counter the threats we are

seeing and continuing to proliferate. in point.f cases syria. obviously we are seized with what is happening in syria and iraq. in serious we have the unrest that has led to of magnets of foreign fighters. we have over 12,000 foreign fighters going to syria. the numbers going up all the time. more than 1000 from europe and more than 100 and the united states. owing to syria to join the opposition. many of them joining the extremist group like al qaeda affiliates. our concern is as they go to the places, they will eventually get trained, further radicalized and then go home. one of the great challenges is identifying the individuals, understanding what the intentions are, and if they are involved in plotting, being able to disrupt that. that is why there is a very good

example of the types of intelligence we get from nsa is critical for the ability to understand the emerging threat. another point or example i wanted to share, because it goes directly to parked, the specific a sample that has been more widely individual inn colorado. 702, wasusing section targeting an individual in pakistan. they were sharing information about how to prepare an explosive device. because of that intercept,

because of that collection, nsa individual,hat i shared the information with the fbi. fromerson was days traveling to new york, was eventually arrested by the fbi while he was on his way to blow up the new york subway. the nsa and the fbi used 215 two core operate the identity of an accomplice -- to corroborate the identity of an accomplice. real, itplot that was was not aspirational, and it was stopped cause of nsa and because of these programs. is third thing i want to say -- i will talk for this a little, is the impact of the

disclosures. is the documents stolen from nsa and disclosed have had an extremely damaging impact on the ability to collect information. we have lost the ability to intercept to of key terrorist operatives and leaders. we know these groups monitor the press. they are suspicious of our ability to collect there can vacation. it is not news to them that the nsa and the united states government and intelligence agencies around the world are trying to collect to medications, but what this information did was confirm in detail the scale and scope of our capabilities. in many ways, it revealed information that had nothing to or civilhe privacy of liberties of americans. it was information about the capabilities of u.s. intelligence agencies. we have specific examples of

terrorists who have adopted greater security measures in the last year. this includes various types of encryption. they have changed internet service providers or ceased communicating in ways that they had before and dropped out of our ability for us to see what they were doing. it was an extremely damaging impact on our ability to collect these indications. we are at a point now where we are dealing with this, and the president has made significant changes in the 215 program. it knows longer looks like it was before it was described. we have a lot of work to do to address the erosion of trust that has been created. that is something that is part of why it is important to have discussions like this with influential audiences like you and why i welcome the opportunity to have the discussion. so thanks.

>> thank you, matt. what i will try to talk about here is how and why we decided to publish, how we went about our work, and how we think about national security issues in our coverage. i am not a lawyer. i will not pretend to be one here. i may be at some disadvantage, but i can speak in broad strokes about the role we seal for ourselves in coverage of this nature. national security is an area that is of intense focus for us at "the washington post." greatest powers of government. that is the power to make more, to spy on -- to make war, to spy on people, prosecutors, incarcerate him and killed. those are the greatest powers of all, and they are invested in our government as they are in every government around the

world. we have to cover the federal government. in covering the federal government, those are not activities that we would choose to ignore. nor are those activities that in my view we can simply defer to on whatrnment's wishes we should reports, how we should report it, what not to report whenever the government asserts a national security rationale or whenever the basis for our coverage is classified terry all. is government has shown -- classified material. the government has shown a proclivity to classifying documents of all source. an enormous amount of information is classified, including information that is relatively innocuous. they can always be -- there can always be a rationale for keeping something classified. as a result, very sweeping

policies with profound implications for individual rights. fourth amendment we talked right here. as well.ndment those of been put in place in secret. the constitution begins with the phrase "we the people," and it presupposes the people will he involved in self-governance, that this will be a government of, by, and for the people. the premise of that is people actually have information about what their government is doing, that they have knowledge of that. is to try to provide that information so that we can actually have self-governance in fact and not just in name. we have a highly experienced national security staff. the people on this panel are aware of that. they have a lot of interactions with the people on our staff.

we do rely on their expertise and their history of navigating the most sensitive subjects imaginable. we recognize that there is a --sion between national between self-governance in this country and national self-proper nation and self-protection. there is no question about that. we are not dismissive of national security concerns. we take them very seriously. we recognize it is a dangerous world. wewe have heard already, certainly know that. nor do we doubt that the government needs to engage in intelligence activities and surveillance as well. so it is not an issue of whether we should have intelligence activities or no intelligence activities or whether there should be no surveillance with a surveillance

whatsoever. reporters can make 80 regular with the pentagon, white house, intelligence agencies on the nsa documents that are issued here. we spent many hours on each story in detailed conversations with high-level officials. there was an occasion where there were 16 officials with our one or two reporters from pretty much every agency in government at the time. on many occasions at the request of the government we have withheld information that might disclose very specific sources and methods, and in withholding that information we have come into criticism from a segment of the population. we did not agree and would not agree to have every request made so by the government. so, we would have

had no stories whatsoever because the intelligence agencies would have referred we not publish a single word on this subject at all. the director of national intelligence and leading congressmen have said chillingly that the journalist who revealed this information, the contents of the classified documents, or thecobblestones -- word compasses of snowden. one congressman has suggested we should have been prosecuted under the espionage act instead of being awarded the pulitzer prize. thankfully, i am here, able to attend this panel, and be in front of all of you. what we saw in the documents that we received from snowden was something that went beyond the specific sources and methods that the press had traditionally guarded on grounds of national security. the documents reveal that the nsa was engaging in and

surveillance of risk taking scope and breathtaking -- of breathtaking scope and breathtaking intrusiveness, at a scale that many would never have approved. what we have here we believe was a national policy, not just sources and methods, and a policy that have dramatically shifted the balance toward state power and shifted the balance of -- away from individual rights, including privacy. there had been no public knowledge, there have been no public debate, and knowledge within the government itself was sharply limited. so now we have that debate. we are able to have panels like this and discuss public policy and not just have knowledge limited to a selected group in government who are shielded from the people they represent. i will turn it over.

>> it is an honor to be on a panel like this, even though i realize my presence finishes the average luster of the panel and perhaps the average salary as well. i'm hoping my being -- >> [indiscernible] >> take steps to rebalance that last piece of this. five fromak of positions of the group referenced in martin's remarks, namely we the people. broader the context? the first proposition is the public is not nearly as -- as t makeoverage mike thgh you think it is. tired of war, wanting to retrench at home, and fearful the government is a bigger threat to their freedom than terrorists are. to amend your attention

poll that served the -- survey the public on a wide range of matters that will be released very shortly. are striking. this is data collected before i household a name. only one in three thinks the restrictions on the national security agency should be increased. more people think it should remain the same, and there is a small number that thinks there should be fewer researches. it is a plurality of public that thinks that the budget for general information gathering, the nsa budget and matthew's salary, should remain the same as it is now. say it is more important for the federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats even if that intrudes on personal privacy.

so they tell the privacy balance and direction of security. gitmo more than they want to close it. more positive -- the general public does not view snowden as a hero. but another way, this is a public that the nsa could work with. this is more of an nsa kind of public.han a wrong poll there are very outspoken minority groups that hold to the ron paul view, but in general the public is more sympathetic to what the nsa is doing. the second proposition is that the public is not panicky about terrorism, but nor is it sanguine about the terrorist

threat. the public is still quite worried -- this is now 13 years after 9/11 -- still worried about terrorism, and they actually even are more worried about terrorism than they have been in a decade. the 2014 data is higher than the decade ago. 34% say terrorists have a greater ability to date than terrorists had on 9/11, and a decade ago you would've only had 24% who said that. about a third of the public angst that the president has made the country less safe in this area. data, beforeese attorney general holder said that the isil terrorist was more frightening than anything he had hagelnd before secretary described the threat in a public terms.n apocalyptic this is before the most recent

revelations. third come up because of the first two propositions, the politics do not favor of doing the threat. i think that president erred when he dismissed isil as a j.v. threat. you can be sure that if isil ever succeed in attacking the home and that the lead in thewashington post," president understands that was a mistake. the communications team does. that is why they have gone to such things to attack and the fight -- deflect the ofsident's choices, bridge going to remarkable lengths to attack people who say that

effort by him will get harder and harder to do because the more criticisms are now coming from members of his team, former members of his team. secretary of state clinton, pretty secretary of state steinberg, former ambassador ford, they have all registered very compelling and thoughtful critiques, and more democrats staffpoken with martin's about the problem. it is impossible to dismiss this criticism as partisan. president'sy, the -- or the success in terms of yazidis refugees on a mountaintop, that is going to increase the intensity of the political vice in which the

president will find himself. that is, if isil successfully attacks the u.s. homeland and the president has not authorized strikes against them in syria and elsewhere, than the question will be, why didn't he used. were successful for him in iraq to deal with the threat in isil when his advisers said you are not going to be able to contain this threat indefinitely without confronting them in syria. the fourth proposition foes to record from that. these numbers -- the poll numbers i described are likely to spike in favor of a more robust counterterrorism effort, including a robust intelligence collection, rather than the other way. i do not think we are heading into a time where the public will be clamoring for even more restrictions on nsa. i think the global instability trendlines point in the other

directions, and it is easier for me to imagine scenarios where the public concern about this will increase tremendously than it is for me to imagine scenarios where the public will become more sanguine. intensifies further the political pressure on the administration. particularly, the pressure to be more expensive on intelligence questions. one of the reasons the bush administration in the fall of 2001 moved as quickly as they throwingcelerating and out existing war plans and creating a new war plan in order inattack al qaeda afghanistan on an accelerated basis, the administration was very concerned that out kind of would go up too low on the u.s., that they would get a strike in before the u.s. have been able to avenge the first strike. and they were concerned in such

a climate, if i al qaeda had gone up 2-0 on the u.s., that the pressure from the public for an unrestrained, for overwhelming response, using all elements of national power, including perhaps even weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear option, the pressure on the administration would have been even greater. so part of the reason for moving so quickly was to bring the political environment back into a line with a more covert-- align with a more reasonable counterterrorism strategy. ironically, president obama has put even greater pressure on the intelligence community. ben rhodes, the president's chief spokesperson in the national security area, recently said about a week ago that at that time there was no need to attack isil in syria. and the reason was that they did

not have clear indications of isil was going to pose a direct imminent threat to the homeland. but ben rhodes insisted if we did get that clear indications and warning, the president would authorize a strike. what that does is put a tremendous amount of pressure on your indications and warning capacity. that was a shot across the bow of the intelligence community. because in political terms, that was saying we do not need to act now, because the intelligence community has told us we do not need to act now. if we are wrong, if there is a strike, intelligence community has not warned us adequately, it is betting the political predicate for a blame shift, it wills an effect that

make sure that not a siegel possible threat that goes unnoticed. so the reason for my fifth and final proposition, there is an interesting policy maker and area, ingap in this the study of this issue. let's stipulate for the sake of this panel, let's stipulate that some level of homeland risk is irreducible, that even if the team does all the work, there some irreducible threat that remains retired heard many academics accept that premise. they wonder why are we doing us to reduce it? what are we going to such great lengths, including accepting trade-offs on security and privacy from an essay, why are we doing so much to reduce it? the policy makers i have interacted with see it in a mirror image.

they say the threat is that this your adjustable level precisely because we are going to such extraordinary lengths to reduce it, and that is why we have to maintain the extraordinary lengths so that the threat remains at whatever is the irreducible level. so i close by saying i think the pressure on the president will increase in this area. and i call to your attention with the president said a day or two ago in a speech to veterans. killed that if isil americans, he would avenge their deaths. and no one should out his willingness to do so. i accept that at face value. i do do not doubt his determination. he has proven he will use all elements of national power to americans.death of and americans do want the president to avenge those deaths. but they want even more for the president to take all reasonable

measures to prevent those deaths. they are not just interested in averaging. they want prevention. vice back to my political problem for the president. if the president does not take action against isil because he is waiting for clear indications and warning of a homeland attack, and if he does not get those clear indications and warnings, because of restrictions that have been placed on the nsa, then in that hypothetical, the blowback will be severe, and the debate as whether the approval prices is overly general, i do not think will have much resonance with voters. >> thank you, panel. very interesting, and we want to speak to any questions. we have until 12:00, and we have ample time for questions and answers. let me speak about what peter

just said. given his assessment of the political vice, can we expect to see any kind of reform of nsa, and, if so, what will it look like? i will jump in. made aink the president very important speech earlier this year in which he outlined the challenges that we face in this area, much along the lines we have all discussed. we he identified -- he identified, for example, his speech about the revolution, the civil war, world war ii, talked about intelligence gathering, and the inherent difficulty that we have been trying to alex national security and private and civil liberties. one of the points i wanted to make today that is crucial from my perspective, having worked on these issues for several years,

including under the past administration, is this discussion did not just begin with the post story or the guardian story last year. this has been an ongoing debate with lawyers, policymakers. congress, the courts, and with the public. and we can talk about how much can be public and how much should be public. this date has been going on. and the president pointed out that have been take changes -- big changes. the fact after 9/11 we are talking about threat inside the states, that the biggest threats are asymmetric actors, and that led the president to announce a series earlierms in his speech this year. the quick answer then is, yes, there will be changes, yes, congress has undertaken legislation right now. there were changes that we made

on the executive side that did not car, including going to the fisa court for every time we look at the data that is collected under 215. but notwithstanding lawyers' points about the ways in which fisa, out of whack with under the statute, and constitution, the reality is it is legal and it is constitutional, because every judge who has looked at it with the exception of one judge, but every fisa court judge who is a that it has said so. as long as i am in the seat at the national counterterrorism center, we are going to try to take advantage of those laws that allow us to do these things. this is going to be maybe where laura wanted to go, but now where does not. the president said they arrived and collection. we are going to work with

congress to end balk election. we will still maintain a capability that is roughly equivalent with what we have now. >> can you work with these changes? >> we are working through that. with we canworking -- yes. >> i would like to highlight a reason why we have to have those reforms. it is a problem when the law says you have to have reasonable grounds to believe information is worthy of investigation, and it turns out all phone calls are relevant. you may not knowingly collect entire domestic conversations come in the nsa says we collect tens of thousands and charlie domestic conversations, but anyone in since we might not know at that time, but we're still going to collected.

it is a problem when the law says you have to be able to obtained this, and no court will allow you to collect metadata. it is a problem when the loss is one thing and inside a super secret classified world that only a handful of people have access to, something very different is being done in the peoples name. the second point, disclosure has damaged intelligence, but so does the use of the law in a manner that looks so different from what it actually says on its face. that also create rate damage, and the damage is too democratic governments. on the constitutional point, something we have not touched on is 702, and what is being done there is is not just information deals with -- 702 non-us persons located outside the united states, the collection of information on it. 703 deals with persons outside

the united states. 4 is u.s. persons outside the united states. different standards apply to each category. 702 you are collecting information on non-us persons, and one of the concerns is this would be reversed targeting. they would say that the concern is intelligence agencies will say we are targeting foreigners, and we're going to collect all international indications, but we are not hurting americans in the united states. the discounted target over seas. that is why they introduced these other provisions, other mechanisms to prevent this from happening. what is happening is this is being interpreted, not just to or from targets overseas, but related to about those targets, which is a broader understanding. you can collect more information. if i communicate with somebody

and there is reference in the content of my communications to a selector, that information can be collected and mined for communication. this is to, from or about. fa is allowed to collect more information that it otherwise would be allowed to collect. it is not allowed to clear the database using u.s. information, names, affiliations, titles, and you query the data. you can query this database, which the fbi has co-mingled with traditional fisa, and there are no records being kept of this. under the fourth of ma amendment, the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable search and seizures shall not be violated. we have this right, and yet use personal identifiers are

being used to clear this database. the fisa court said there are reasons why the war and its were not required. they were good reasons. the purpose of the surveillance is not garden variety where there is, a high degree of probability if you were to require a warrant it would impede the government's ability collect information and would hurt u.s. national security. you can collect information. none of those conditions hold when the fbi goes back to the database to see if there is any evidence of criminal activity. the southern district of new york, said it is hard to get warrants. it is hard to predict the impact of seeking a warrant. there's a danger of notifying enemies by morning foreign officials -- by warning foreign

officials. when we have the information in our hands, it is hard to argue why you should not be required to get a warrant to search the database for evidence of criminal behavior. the privacy and civil liberties warned came out with a report where the said the fbi frequently does this. they do not keep a record of this. there is no probable cause required. this amounts to an end around of the fourth amendment. i want to change course a bit and maybe address some of the things that peter said, because i felt there was a bit of a characterization of what we post,"t "the washington how we are, and all that sort of stuff. let me offer some clarifying remarks. we never said that snowden is a hero i'm a by the way. what we suggested is in these documents that he provided us and "the guardian" that there

was information that the public at a and had important public policy implications. and that probably should lead to a debate, such as the one we are involved in here today. we have never suggested that the public is not concerned about terrorism. we are concerned about terrorism. we cover it every single day. by the way, we feel is very acutely, the individual who was recently the headed -- journalist, a and there are other journalists who are being held by terrorists throughout the world. we are not pollyannas about that subject. we did not say that a majority of americans favored greater restrictions on the nsa. we conducted our own polls, which is pretty much what was reflected in the polls that peter cited. nonetheless, to say that we one in three say recessions should

one in three say more research and should be in place is not to -- we have said that and do feel of surveillance does raise important constitutional issues, as laura has been talking about, and is potentially subject to abuse. aree is no question that we in a period of terrorism threat, and there is no question in a period like that individuals are willing to give up their rights in favor of security. but that is a decision that the american public can make through debate such as this one. the american public can arrive at a policy that they think is appropriate, and i suppose if they choose in some manner to give up their rights, they can

do so, although we have a constitution and those things have to be contested and discussed in courts and in and in-- political forms forums such as this one. i agree with lars that while perhaps disclosure of these impact andas had an perhaps a very serious impact on the government's ability to to conduct surveillance, it is important in the field of the fight of terrorism, non-disclosure of all this, the fact that all of this was largely secret from the american do damage to our civil liberties and our ability to govern ourselves. >> peter, any response? --i think you misunderstood i was not attributing those to the views of the editorial board of "the washington post," but

you're right that there has been a marked change in the tone of coverage of these issues, even since the tragic beheading. the reporters i talked to there approach on this issue is different than it was two or three months ago, and at the height of the snowden revelations when the outrage was mostly directed at the nsa, and i think there has been a return to a more balanced perspective that you just articulated, i think there has been since then. the public has voted on these issues, voted to reelect president bush. it voted to elect the people who passed the patriot act. it voted to reelect president obama, and both president bush and president obama defended

these kinds of actions. there is now obviously lots of reasons why the public votes for a president. that just ofc -- my distillation of the argument is the public outrage at the nsa probably hit a high water mark, is what i would say, at the height of the and that worlde, events are likely to push the public away from that, further and further away from that, more likely to do in that direction than to push them more in the direction of laura's camp. that does not speak to reflection of policy reforms. they have been made and there will be more tweaking on the margins, and certainly if there or any new action, it

will be much more tailored and restricted and the original 2001 -- it is not to say that the public the be -- will force politicians to be unrestrained, but it is to say we are moving more in the direction of taking more risks to confront terrorism than it is accepting more risks from not confronting terrorism. >> at the political science convention, the relationship between law and politics. judges will often decide cases somewhat differently, based on circumstances. perhaps press, at least in terms of what it publishes. there is a relationship between politics and the law. the panel, laura would seem to be the most uncomfortable with that proposition. >> that the courts solve

politics? >> it has always been a separate domain for law. >> obviously, we need to teach constitutional law. you are aware of the political context in which decisions are ofe and of the orientation the justices. also the effort to reconcile decisions with substitution provisions. >> before we go to the audience? >> i would like to throw out -- both an observation and i may have a question for marty. the observation is -- this is an important discussion, and the discussion of where the law is heading, an important part of this debate. i think it would be wrong and is a myth that has been widely is flawlesslya

making these arguments and going forward on its own, implementing these programs. the fact is on 215 the fisa court, independent article 3 judges, have upheld 215, including sets the revelation -- since the revelation of the snowden document invisibly the debate in the public. the federal judges, three out of four have upheld 215. congress passed 702 fully understanding how it would be implemented, and the one judge that has looked at it has upheld it as constitutional, within the statute. it may be the case that sunday articles laura is writing will change the law, but that is not today. from my perspective, we have an obligation to execute the law in a way that then protects the country and takes full advantage

of the laws and tools on the books. sionink it is a misimpres that the weight nsa is implementing these laws, because there are a lot of people within the justice department, they say the branch, within fisa courts, validating them, reauthorizing them come and determining they are within the constitution. >> i think it is an important you made a very reasonable opening comment about how -- and i agree with you how "the washington post" approaches these issues. the challenge i think is the initial story that "the washington post" roque said that nsa had directly tapped into the ,ervers of internet companies

90 internet companies. this turned out not to be true. this was the lead story. a lot of people might think then and even today that that was the case. in fact, what that program was talking about was section 702 of fisa, which had been validated by the courts. i understand the pressure on the press to publish when you have something like that based on what you know, and there may be timeliness pressure as well. inging that is unr bell. not true. lead paragraph of that initial story. it is very hard to change that impression once it is out there. i think there is pressure. there is a back and forth, and maybe we have gotten better at it in working with the press,

but the other problem is not every press outlet is "the washington post" and engage in that type of discussion with the government and is responsible. >> let me address that. first of all, we had discussions with the nsa before publishing that story. the second point is that was an actual nsa document that said they could tap directly into it, so it was an actual account of what nsa was doing its own people in its own documents. in addition, the story did not stop there. it said that the nsa and the government denied it was doing that, and it quoted stints of me from technology companies -- quoted extensively of technology companies saying they were not aware of this, it did not bypen, so it did not stop just saying that government can just willy-nilly cap into these networks.

quoted from the government saying this is not the case. it quoted from the technology company saying it was not the case. it also quoted from the actual nsa document incident which said it was the case. as far as every media outlet not being "the washington post," i appreciate your difference is there to the paper. the reality is snowden could have done what was done in the case of wikileaks. he could have actually turned this over to wikileaks. all of this information, without thermediary involved, intermediary being us and "the uardian," he could've posted it out there, anyone to look at, any terrorist organization, any other country, to take a look at and pore through and look at it to their

heart's desire. for reasons he articulated, he gave it to us to exercise our judgment and in exercising our judgment we spent an anonymous amount of time with the government going over this information. and actually withholding information that the government felt was far too sensitive. we spend months on some of these stories. we have spent enormous amount of time and an onerous amount of money. we have taken enormous percussions with the security of the documents we have. i do not think that is an act of irresponsibility in any way. certainly the government would argue that nothing should be out there, that the government should essentially know everything and the public should know almost nothing. that is not a position -- >> [indiscernible] >> that is the position of son,

and that is not a position that i think i feel is consistent with the very principle of self-governance. make onewould like to quick final point. please line up buying the microphone. if you just ask your question back there, i can then take it up on the media. >> a comment. this reliance on the fisa concerns me, because if we look across the board from the past 10 years from a of 20 judges on the court, only three were democratic appointees. all of the judges on the court to review that had issued these important decisions wringing down the law between -- two of panel, haven the actually said fisa was unconstitutional in the first place. the applications that come for decade,t, in the past

only eight have been denied in whole and only three in part. out of 18,000 cases come before the court. there's no advocate opposed to the government at the courts. -camera proceedings. there's no advocate constitutional advocate or advocate that may challenge this at the time it was being put forward. you see the impact of this. the judges that have released opinions, one of the opinions,, it spends a page and a half dismissive of any question of treatmenty had a note of advanced technologies come of these cases that have been handed down. we have other cases we can look to come and none of it has been cited, and there is no contrary opinion being at rest of the court at the time. i would ask that they were not designed to be in court to create president and not a

fourth amendment warrant exception, which is what had happened in regard to 702. it is now found that there is a warrant exception which has never been recognized at a domestic level, and since 1978 fisa has controlled those collections. these are secret, they look at that the president for a court that was not designed to have president with no contrary counsel to rely on this as a state of the constitutional provisions i find concerning. >> you would support and advocate? >> absolutely. is steve, from the cornell law school. i have a question about -- i want to push back a little on the third-party doctrine argument. i think the statutory arguments

you've made were absolutely compelling. youhird-party doctrine, argue it is qualitatively , and the argument is is a greater invasion of privacy. and it strikes me -- i am opposed to third-party doctrine from the beginning. and third-party doctrine knew there was a violation of privacy, but said it is irrelevant. trash, gete people's their bank records, you can get their e-mail, you can get the bank records, including credit cards, and so forth, you can get their telephone records. we know that invades privacy, but it is not within the scope, is not a search, there's no reasonable expectation of privacy. so if it is all attentively different under third-party doctrine, it does not make a difference. the second point is it is not clear to me that it is

qualitatively different. if you give me a choice between having the government get my bank records, my phone records, search in my trash, and so forth, versus their knowing who i called, there is a much eager invasion of privacy. it is qualitatively different in the sense of more people are involved, but in terms of the particular invasions of privacy, the third-party doctrine already was doing greater invasions of privacy than the metadata of the nsa. the final point i want to raise with respect to this is a question. subpoenarements for a are not constitutional, and i am says you, if verizon cannot get this without a

subpoena, what is the relationship between the requirement for a subpoena and probable cause? i ask that because i do not know. >> ok, so feel free to jump in. >> please be brief. >> all right. cause is not required for subpoena. i had a discussion in the paper of the subpoena cases relevant to this. is twogest period years. that is the longest time, and probable cause is not required in that instance. on this broader point, whether there is a distinction, we have information available to us that was not available then. social network analysis. if heou put one -- to see called somebody who is suspected

harassment, that is different from saying let's look at the social network and who is related to whom in this network, which would levy the most power. that is the kind of information one can get. you can also get trunk identifier information. before when you had land lines, you cannot tell where michael went everyday. now we have the technologies that allow us to track cell phone towers, allow to find out where one can is different kinds of information to the same third-party records. even if the records are different from before in terms of the privacy interests, and beyond this limit the type of information we now have with third parties is qualitatively effort. on the icloud, the amount of information you put up about our personal correspondence from her private dealings with others, the concept of inside the home,

the filing cabinet is sacrosanct and you need a warrant to get into the filing cabinet pick because we keep the contents of cket,cabinet in our po this is what the right case was about. whether you have privacy when the police arrest you this is a new world we live in. and in the intelligence committee, the idea just because this information is given to apple or google or any where on i think that does not understand the privacy interests now indicated by how technology has changed the context in which we live our daily lives. >> it is really important to emphasize one point after laura, which is when the government seeks under fisa to obtain the contents of communications of u.s. persons, they have to get a warrant. the thing we are talking about undermines that basic

proposition. the government is going to get the contents of this information, they must get a warrant. >> university of utah. this is a question about the contemporary structure of data and analytic techniques. with surveillance of the area of health, you do not know what you are looking for until you see a pattern. you do not know whether there is something of significance or who might be the relevant entity. i am actually very interested in is toy, and the question ask you, are there any ways given that feature of analytics thaty to craft or form so when you cannot identify the target in advance so that we can figure out ways to think about

relevance and the use of subpoena powers and so on, given that fact about the power data and and...? >> my thought, this presents a national security as a haystack argument. senator whitehouse is big on that haystack. you cannot build a haystack to find a needle. don't we need on this information so we can find the are lookingwe for in a haystack. the general warned allows you to collect a lot of information to find evidence of wrongdoing, and i would say that is part of the criminal matter under u.s. law in the fourth amendment. there is no automation exception. if the government were to put cameras in all of our bathrooms and to record us, they would say we do not access, we are only going to access it it when we suspect there's activity, and we're going to look at general patterns of behavior. i would be a privacy violation.

the thank you build this haystack using computers and assume there is no human intervention, that is not established as an exception to the fourth amendment. while i understand your concern with privacy -- with regard to health law, looking for patterns, when it comes to criminal matters where you can this is something very different from that is where constitutional protections come into play. this gets us to an aspect we have not talked about yet, but i think will prove increasingly politically relevant, and that is while it is a fact that nsa is not targeting each of us individually in this room or on this panel, i'm pretty sure, we are in fact targeted by google, facebook, by private companies who are actually doing precisely the things that you just ascribed. they have assembled a haystack and are looking for things, and

if you have any doubt of this, check out the ads that you see when you're checking out pandora. the internet companies do this. i recognize there is an important constitutional distinction between the government doing this and private companies doing o it, and we accept that companies will do this, and that makes it legal. from the political view, i think the public will get increasingly uncomfortable with that level of targeted surveillance come and reform see pressures for coming in through that door, and maybe eventually migrating over to the national security area. >> hi. i am at ohio state university. it has been a great panel. thank you very much. relations.ernational that underlies the thrust of my russian. terroristt the

information data environment tie is the primary repository for c.t. information, and we know the nsa is one of the primary collectors of that information, . thatassume, feeds in c.t information. we know the u.s. as information agreements with other countries. there is a foreign partner extract of the terrorist watch list. it seems there is an international dimension here. -- i knowmment a bit you will be limited on what you can say -- on how foreign partners are benefiting from an essay surveillance activity -- from nsa surveillance activity, databasee c.t. becoming a global clearinghouse? >> pre-well-informed question. r business ou

pretty well. we have the statute to make sure governmentis a consolidated database. we share that subset of that class by database with the terrorist screening center, which is then responsible for using it for various screening purposes, airports, and the like. some of that information is shared under agreements with other countries. idea -- i think the important point is when it comes to u.s. information, that the nsa collects, that they have a series of rules and laws and policies that limit what can be shared about u.s. persons. minimization for seizures based on what they could, so every step in the process, from the initial step of that collection of the information which use in its useed databases, for screening purposes, and sharing them with other countries, there are a number of steps all designed to protect

privacy and civil liberties of u.s. persons that are taken along the way. that is about the best way to answer. it is probably a longer answer to get to the debate, so your question, is there a number of safeguards placed into the system to perfect privacy of the u.s. persons? >> thank you. i am from george mason university, i was wondering what reforms you think you can do to optimize both the need for the people to provide oversight to the nsa and also the nsa's needs to protect ways and means? >> one i did not mention before that i touched on his possible changes to the way the fisa court operates. there, ais just seems judge who wrote a letter recently