many members of congress were not aware of the program. those who were were not provided legal analysis. they were not able to discuss it with colleagues or constituents in a way that the supreme court has pointed to in past cases of ratification. the second point is an exchange that you had relating to efficiency. the government could use targeted demands in a nearly instantaneous way if it structured its arrangement with the telecommunications companies in a certain way, and congress could provide for that mechanism. the fact that congress has not yet provided for that mechanism is no bar to this court ruling. that was the case when the supreme court ruled that the government could not wiretap

individuals without a warrant and it led to the enactment of title iii, the supreme court ruled that for an intelligence surveillance, it had to be individualized. third point, smith is different from this case from a lot of reasons. it is not just the government is acquiring certain types of information. it's not that the government is acquiring information about millions of individuals and not just one, but it is also that it acquiring information definitely and not made clear a few years after smith that when the government scales up a surveillance operation, the constitutional balance is different and needs to be addressed differently. judge, you were exactly right. that the court is to assess the

expectations of privacy of this program and not just what the supreme court decided. a quick related point. the minimization procedures would be constitutionally superfluous. if smith governed this case, they could collect the records without any of those protections in place and they could store all of them indefinitely and query them for any reason or no reason at all and they can build the dossiers with no constitutional restriction. the government tries to explain why it is only asking for a narrow ruling of this court, but the legal theories are a roadmap to a world in which the government routinely elects vast quantities of information about americans who have done nothing wrong. that is not the world that the framers envisioned when they crafted the fourth amendment. if there are no questions. >> thank you. we very much appreciate the arguments of both sides which

were extremely careful and learned. we will take them under advisement. and eventually render a decision. thank you. that is the last case on the calendar. the clerk will adjourn the court. >> court stands adjourned. some news about the attorney arguing the case. eric holderday from saying he will acting associate attorney general. that is the justice department's third ranking post. that is the statement from the attorney general today. hour, thein a half working group for u.s.-russia

relations talks about strategic cooperation, particularly in nuclear strategy and forces. george washington diversity here in d.c. hosting that event. getting underway at 3:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. coming up tonight on the networks, at 8:00 eastern, this morning's nebraska supreme court argument on the keystone x l pipeline. "book tv." american history tv, the war of 1812 and the burning of washington. all ahead tonight starting at 8:00 eastern. natoer today, the assessment in wales concluded, and president obama held a news conference before departing, saying there is unanimous forement in nato for action

the threat posed by isis. the president said the goal is to grade -- to degrade the islamic group because it poses a threat to the international alliance. >> good afternoon. let me begin by thanking my great friend prime minister cameron and his entire team for hosting this summit and making it such a success. i want to thank the people of newport and cardiff and the people of wales for welcoming me and me and my my delegation so warmly. it is a great honor to be the first sitting u.s. president to visit wales. we have met at a time of transition and of testing. after more than a decade, nato's combat mission in afghanistan is coming to an end. russia's aggression against ukraine threatens our vision of

a europe that is whole, free, and at peace. in the middle east, the terror threats from isil pose a growing danger. at this summit, our alliance has summoned the will, resources, and capabilities to meet all of these challenges. first and foremost, we have reaffirmed the central mission of the alliance. article five enshrines our solemn duty to each other. an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against them all. this is a binding treaty obligation. it is not negotiable. here in wales, we have left no doubt we will defend every ally. second, we agreed to be resolute in assuring our allies in eastern europe increased patrols over the baltics will continue, rotations of additional forces throughout eastern europe for training and exercises will continue, naval patrols in the black sea will continue.

and all 28 nato nations agree to contribute to all of these measures for as long as necessary. third, to ensure nato remains prepared for any contingency, we agreed to a new readiness action plan. the alliance will update its defense planning. we will create a new highly ready rapid response force that can be deployed on very short notice. we will increase nato's presence in central and eastern europe with additional equipment, training, exercises, and troop rotations. the $1 billion initiative will be a strong and ongoing u.s. contribution to this plan. fourth, all 28 nato nations have pledged to increase their investments in defense and to move toward investing 2% of their gdp in our collective security.

these resources will help nato investing critical capabilities including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and missile defense. this commitment makes clear nato will not be complacent. our alliance will reverse the decline in defense spending and rise to meet the challenges we face in the 21st century. fifth, our alliance is fully united in support of ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and its right to defend itself. to back up this commitment, all 28 nato allies will provide security assistance to ukraine. this includes nonlethal support to the ukrainian military like body armor, fuel, medical care for ukrainian wounded troops, as well as assistance to help modernize ukrainian forces, including logistics and command and control. here in wales we also sent a strong message to russia that actions have consequences. today the u.s. and europe are

finalizing measures to broaden our sanctions across russia's finance, energy, and defense sectors. we strongly support president poroshenko's efforts to pursue a peaceful resolution. the ceasefire announced today can advance the goal but only if there's follow-through on the ground. pro-russian separatists must keep their commitments, and russia must stop its violations of ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. beyond europe, we pay tribute to all those from our isaf mission, including more than 2200 americans who have given their lives for our security in afghanistan. nato's combat mission ends in three months, and we are prepared to transition to a new mission to focus on training and assisting afghan security forces. both presidential candidates have pledged to sign the bilateral security agreement

that would be the foundation of our continued cooperation. but as we all know, the outcome of the recent election must be resolved, so we continue to urge both candidates to make the compromises necessary so afghans can move forward together and form a sovereign, united, and democratic nation. finally, we reaffirm the door to nato membership remains open to nations that can meet our high standards. we agreed to expand the partnership that makes nato the hub of global security. we are launching a new effort with our closest partners, including many that have served with us in afghanistan, to make sure our forces continue to operate together, and will create a new initiative to help countries build their defense capabilities, starting with georgia, moldova, jordan, and libya. i also leave here confident nato allies and partners are prepared to join in a broad international effort to combat the threat

posed by isil. already, allies have joined us in iraq where we have stopped isil's advances. we have equipped our partners, and helped them go on offense. nato has agreed to play a role in providing assistance to those on the frontlines. key nato allies stand ready to confront the terror threat through military come intelligence, and law enforcement, as well as diplomatic efforts. secretary kerry will now travel to the region to continue building the broad-based coalition that will enable us to degrade and ultimately destroy isil. taken together, i think the progress we have achieved in wales makes it clear our alliance will continue to do whatever is necessary to ensure our collective defense and protect our citizens. so with that, let me take a few questions. i will start with julie pace from the associated press. >> i wanted to go back to the

situation in ukraine. if the cease-fire does appears to be holding, would you and your european counterparts back away from these sanctions you say you have prepared? or do you feel it is important to levy the sanctions regardless of the cease-fire agreement? can you say specifically what u.s. contributions will be in terms of troop numbers and equipment? is it beyond the proposal you announced in warsaw? >> with respect to the cease-fire agreement, obviously we are hopeful. but based on past experience, also skeptical that the separatists will follow through and the russians will stop violating ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. it has to be tested. i know the europeans are discussing the final shape of their sanctions measures. it is my view that if you look

at president poroshenko's plan it is going to take time to implement. and as a consequence, for us to move forward based on what is currently happening on the ground with sanctions, while acknowledging that if in fact the elements of the plan are implemented, then those sanctions could be lifted is a more likely way for us to ensure there is follow-through. but that is something we will consult closely with our european partners to determine. i do want to point out the only reason we are seeing the cease-fire at this moment is because of both the sanctions already applied and the threat of further sanctions, which are having a real impact on the russian economy and have isolated russia in a way we have not seen in a very long time.

the path for russia to rejoin the community of nations that respects international law is still there, and we encourage president putin to take it. but the unity and the firmness we have seen in the transatlantic alliance in supporting ukraine and applying sanctions has been a testimony to how seriously people take the basic principle that big countries cannot just stomp on little countries or force them to change their policies and give up their sovereignty. so i am very pleased with the kind of work that has been done throughout this crisis in ukraine. and i think u.s. leadership has been critical throughout that process. with respect to the rapid

response forces and the action plan we have put forward, in warsaw i announced $1 billion in our initiative. a sizable portion of that will be devoted to implementing various aspects of this readiness action plan. we have already increased rotations of personnel in the baltic states, for example. we have the air police activities taking place in the baltic and the black sea. this allows us to supplement it. it allows us to integrat it and coordinate it further with contributions from other partners. what is signified is nato's recognition that, in light of these russian actions -- we want to make it crystal clear.

we mean what we say when we are talking about article five commitments and an increased presence serves as the most effective deterrent to any additional russian aggression we might see. angela, king, bloomberg. >> what are your specific expectations for what regional actors like saudi arabia, yemen, and jordan can legitimately provide to a coalition against the islamic state? is there a role there for iran as well? secretary kerry says he expects the allied countries to coalesce around a specific plan by the end of september. do you agree with the timeline that he set out? what concrete commitments are you leaving this summit from other nations that are here?

>> let me start with a general point. there was unanimity over the last two days that isil poses a significant threat to nato members, and there was agnitione have to take action. i did not get any resistance or pushback to the basic notion that we have a critical role to play in rolling back the savage organization that is causing so much chaos in the region and is harming so many people and poses a long-term threat to the safety and security of nato members. so there is great conviction that we have to act to degrade and ultimately destroy isil. that was extremely encouraging. beyond that, what we have already seen is significant

support from a variety of member states for actions we have been taking in iraq. we have done 100 strikes in iraq today. they have had a significant impact on degrading their capabilities and making sure that we are protecting u.s. citizens, critical infrastructure, providing space for the iraqi government to form. our hope was that the government is actually formed by next week. that then allows us to work with them on a broader strategy. and some of the assistance has been in the form of airlifts, humanitarian assistance. much has been providing

additional arms to the peshmerga and iraqi security forces. there has been logistical support, intelligence, surveillance. and so a variety of folks with different capabilities have already made a contribution. i am confident that we can build on that strong foundation and the clear commitment and have the kind of coalition that will be required for the sustained effort we need to push isil back. now, john kerry will be traveling to the region to have further consultations with the regional actors and players. and i think it is critical that we have arab states and, specifically, sunni majority states that are rejecting the kind of extremist nihilism we

are seeing out of isil that say that is not what islam is about and are prepared to join us actively in the fight. my expectation is that we will see friends and allies and partners of ours in the region, prepared to take action as well, as part of a coalition. one of our tasks will be to build capability. what we have learned in iraq is, yes, isil has significant capabilities and they combined terrorist attacks with traditional military tactics to have significant effects. part of the problem also is that we have not seen as effective of a fighting force on behalf of the iraqi security forces as we need. and we're going to have to focus on the capable units that are already there, bolster them,

bolster the work that the peshmergas have done, and support them from their. ultimately, we need a strong ground game. we will also be the sunni tribes in the area, we need them to recognize that their future is not the fanaticism that isil represents, so they start taking the fight as well. that will require the sort of regional partnerships that we are talking about. in terms of timetable, we are working deliberately. if you look at what we have done over the last several months, we have taken this in stages. first stage is to make sure we were encouraging iraqi government formation. second stage was making sure that we were building on the intelligence assessments we have done, we were in a position to conduct limited airstrikes, protect their personnel and critical infrastructure, and

engage in humanitarian activities. the third phase will allow us to take the fight to isil, broaden, the effort, and our goal is to act with urgency, but also to make sure we're doing it right, that we have the right targets, that there is support on the ground if we take an airstrike. we have a strong political coalition, a dramatic effort that is matching it, a strong strategic effort. we are discouraging people from thinking that isil represents a state, much less a caliphate. so all those things will have to be combined. and, as i said, it will not happen overnight. but we are steadily moving in the right direction. and we are going to achieve our goals. we're going to degrade and ultimately defeat isil, the same way we have gone after al qaeda, the same way we have gone after

the al qaeda affiliate in somalia, where we released today that we have in fact killed the leader of al shabbab in somalia and have worked to degrade their operations. we have been very systematic and methodical in going after these kinds of organizations that may threaten u.s. personnel and the homeland. and that deliberation allows us to do it right. but have no doubt, we will continue. i will continue to do what is necessary to protect the american people. isil poses a real threat. i am encouraged that our friends and allies recognize that same threat. julie davis. >> thank you. i want to follow up on what you were saying about isil and ask

if you think that they -- the objective is to destroying and degrading them. are those the same things in your mind? secretary kerry there is no containing them. is the goal ultimately to annihilate them? you talked about the importance of expertise on the ground and building up the capacity on the ground. since airstrikes will not do it here, if action is needed in syria, can you expect a free syrian army to do what is needed on the ground to destroy, not just push back, isil? >> you can't contain an organization that is running roughshod through that much territory, causing that much havoc, displacing that many people, killing that many innocents, enslaving that many women. the goal has to be to dismantle them.

and if you look at what happened with al qaeda, you initially pushed them back, you systematically degrade their capabilities, you narrow their scope of action, you slowly shrink the territory that they may control, and over time, they are not able to conduct the same kinds of terrorist attacks that they once could. as i said in my last press conference, given the nature of these organizations, are there potentially remnants of an organization that are still

running around and plotting questio? absolutely. but what we can accomplish is to dismantle this network, this force that has claimed to control this much territory so that they cannot do us harm. and that is going to be our objective. and as i said before, i am pleased to see there is unanimity among our friends and allies that think that is a worthy goal and they are prepared to work with us to come pushed that goal. with respect to the situation on the ground in syria, we will not be placing u.s. ground troops to

the areas that are part of the conflict inside of syria. i do not think that is necessary for us to come pushed our goal. we're going to have to find effective partners on the ground l, andh act against isi the moderate coalition there is one we can work with, we have experience working with many of them, they have been to some degree outgunned and out manned, and that is what it is important for us to work with our friends and allies to support them more effectively. but keep in mind when you have u.s. forces, other advanced nations going after isil and putting them on the defensive and putting them on the run, it is pretty remarkable what then ground forces can do, even if initially they were on the

defensive against isil. so that is a developing strategy that we are going to be consulting with friends, our allies, our regional partners. but the bottom line is we will do what is necessary in order to doessure that isil not threaten the united states or our friends and partners. ok? one last question. nelson. >> some senate democrats facing tough races in november have had difficulty with immigration. do you see any downside to delaying any action until after the election? >> i have to tell you this week i have been pretty busy, focused on ukraine and focused on isil and focused on making sure that nato is boosting its commitments

and in following through on what is this is certainly 21st century challenges. h johnson and eric holder have begun to provide me their proposals and recommendations. and mybe reviewing them, expectation is that fairly soon i will be considering what the next steps are. what i am unequivocal about is that we need immigration reform, that my overriding preference is to see congress act. we had bipartisan action in the senate. the house republicans have sat on it for over a year. that has damaged the economy. it has held america back. it is a mistake. and in the absence of congressional action, i intend to take action to make sure that we are putting more resources on

the border, that we are upgrading how we process these cases, and that we find a way to encourage legal immigration and so theyple some path can start paying taxes and pay a fine and learn english and be able to not look over their shoulder, but be legal since they have been living here for quite some time. know, i suspect on my flight back this would be part atmy reading, taking a look some of the specifics that we have looked at, and i will be making an announcement soon. i want to be very clear, my intention is in the absence of i am goingongress, to do what i can do within the legal constraints of my office, because it is the right thing to do for the country.

all right? thank you very much, people of wales. i had a wonderful time. >> here are highlights for this coming weekend. saturday, former fcc commissioners with campaign 2014 during a. watch the latest debates on c-span. sunday at noon, debates. and from the california governor's race, candidates. saturday, house republicans can make gains for the hispanic vote. noon, a conversation and your phone calls with the former chair of the u.s. of civil rights. the building of the hoover dam, and sunday night, the anniversary of ford's pardon of richard nixon.

find our schedule at www.c-span.org. and let us know about the programs you are watching. send us a tweet. or you can e-mail us. the c-span conversation. like us on facebook. follow us on twitter. >> live now to george washington university's elliott school of international affairs in washington for a discussion on the state of the u.s.-russia nations. the event taking place in light of the ukraine conflict, including the announced cease-fire deal signed by ukraine and pro-russian rebels that the ice this morning. you heard president obama at the closing nato news conference kraineg about the russia-u.s conflict. our live coverage get underway in just a few moments on c-span.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> good afternoon, everyone. a welcome to the elliott school of international affairs. we at the institute are delighted to be hosting this event this afternoon on the u.s.-russian nuclear relationship, in partnership with our friends at harvard university. today's panel is the rollout of a new working paper. which you should have been able to get a copy of is over on the table. we all know that over the last several months u.s.-russian

ovations have been dominated by the -- relations have been dominated by the ukraine crisis. to crisis is not entirely blame or even mainly to blame for the current challenges in the u.s.-russian nuclear relationship, but it has sharpened them. for now the countries continue to implement the new start treaty that the countries concluded four years ago. it is no surprise to hear me say we have hit a large roadblock in our efforts to find the path to further nuclear arms reductions. some even fear that advances in arms control we have obtained could be rolled back, including with regard to the imf treaty that the u.s. government declared russia in violation earlier this year. our speakers and authors of the working paper were tasked recently with finding a solution to the many problems at the core

of the strategic relationship of the united states and russia. i'm happy to say they have found a solution. it is one of many. it is worth debating. it may -- have its detractors, but i say that as a promising one and a realistic one. in the climate debate the fact he can have u.s. and russian scholars continue to work together to devise attractive solutions to problems of global interests is something we can appreciate. before i introduce our speakers, i want to first give the floor to my colleague, timothy co lton. he is the cochair of the working group on the future of u.s. -russian relationships, and he can share with you more about this endeavor. tim? >> thanks. briefly some of you have been to other presentations werof papers, although i don't see as many bases as last time. i will give a compressed version.

our project has been around for several years. the reset.ted in -- the reset period. i do not think we were primarily stimulated by that, but it did not hurt. really objective was pretty simple. it was to bring together a of roughlyzed group a dozen on both sides of specialists from the two countries, equal in measure, funded by sources on either side of the border, so to say. in our case, the support at twost in the last year or has come almost entirely from the carnegie corporation of new york, for we are rate full. this.ganizational in for on the russian side, our main partner now is a school of

economics, which is one of russia's leading research universities. in terms of putting this together, i guess what we asked our two was moving beyond morning half and analysis or headline-driven analysis, moving beyond also a beat recrimination about -- also maybe about recrimination and the pass, to quit thinking about the future. we did not know what the near-term future held, of course. has not exactly fulfilled our hopes. we have not given up hope. the group is from equal proportions, and we wanted to have younger scholars, experts, both in russia and in this country. ihe russian cochairman is serge

kargonov, but most participation is from younger cohorts. we wanted to do something to is a certain gap, sometimes i think, and perspectives between university -based academics like me, for example, and ink tank types, especially on the american side. there is also some relevance on the russian side. in terms of problems we have chosen to address, we do this a couple of times a year. we have an extended meeting in moscow or in washington or in cambridge, massachusetts, and we address the single large thing which we select through consensus. put in a very interesting way. what we should be trying to do early on was to untie some of the not in this relationship at. ising the u.s.-relationship not a new challenge. but we have been trying to do this for decades in the late 1991, period and now post

and there are certain recurrent problems that never seemed to go away or come back to haunt us in more intensive forms. the current ukraine crisis is a good example of that. discussionsto our we produce working papers, and that is why we're here today. that is an unusual characteristic of the project. at our last meeting here, somebody said, i think it was -- from brookings, that we are all familiar, most of us are familiar, at least, with -national groups that discuss things, but sitting down and writing something together when you're countries are not allied politically is quite a challenging thing in a --her rare thing endeavor rare endeavor. we have managed to do it, not without difficult at times, but it has been a challenge, but i

am largely met that challenge. we have produced a series of papers that are available at the project website. if anybody is interested, i took ell you more. we have papers in the works, and all will have presentations here in washington. one of them is on afghanistan post 2014. one is on intervention and conflict a solution best conflict resolution. veryis going to be a difficult one to write, we will see. there is also one forthcoming on the arctic. so we are happy to have this to share with you, and without further ado, i will turn it over to -- to introduce our speakers

today. thanks. >> thank you. first, i would like to welcome our colleague timofei bordachev who is here from moscow. for thee director center for comprehensive european and national studies at a school of economics in moscow, a national research university. a the school, he directs program of international relations. he has authored several books in russia and several scores of articles on matters of internal elements of the e.u. and relations over the last several years. he is a member of a discussion club. en is an associate professor in the school of international service at american university.

was published in 2009 by cambridge, and his should be published also by cambridge very soon. talk 11 yearsen at yale. with all of those introductions, with thew we turn main show. >> thank you very much. first, i must say i am very grateful for george washington university for hosting this event. and especially, because in my view this is very important now to speak for the russian and american scholars about the issues of final important to both countries. believe, only considering the issues of vital,

not secretary importance -- not secondary importance, for both countries, we can find sustainable, long-term solution s for our problems and how to to receive with concrete diplomacy of the future. that weay i do believe are entering -- we entered a new stage of the international -- of the international relations. of course, we should not rely on the historic examples, but the most optimistic historical comparison would be the 19th needry when the diplomacy not mean finding solution, but diplomacy meant avoiding the conflict and keeping the peace. paper,ink that with our

intention of which has been developed already about two years ago, we are trying to understand how both russia and the united states can, while keeping their own national interests, develop their sustainable relationship in the future. the relationship which are not going to be friendly, the relationship which are going to be mutually respectful. why do we believe it is possible? because despite the recent aggravation of the relationship, the cold war in its classic, conventional sense, as a systemic confrontation, is over. it is not going to be back. andyet, cold war thinking

the international political system in force during the cold pointmains a reference for most contemporary writing on the u.s.-russian security relationship. now who proposed new -- of international security refer to the cold war because the technical parameters, nuclear weapons, and political promoters of the mutual deterrence between russia and the united states were created during this period of nuclear confrontation. periodbelieve that the of the cold war and consequently the institutions, norms, and methods of -- developed period was an exclusion from the history of humanity, and now we are going back to the normality of the

international relationship. and this normality requires to develop much more flexible techniques of interaction. rivalry between the soviet union and the united states had certain characteristics, which made it very distinctive from the thelicts before, during hundreds or thousands of years. major characteristics. first, the competition between certain powers was based on energy. second, both sides shared the unquestioned ability and willingness to destroy the other. and the u.s.sr had symmetrical power and force. fourth, rival states limited the number of other security threats. either of these conditions

had been in place -- in place before 1948 war is going to be in the future. face theour countries multiple security threats. -- thougho enmity, there is kind of an enmity between them and the ability of them to destroy each other and the willingness, if not in place, and last but not least, the power and force of russia and united states are in no way symmetrical. fourproceeding from these major presumptions, we suggest a to the strategic, not symmetry, but compatibility

of russian and american nuclear inces and the relationship the strategic nuclear sphere. and more on our justice, i will ask my colleague and friend keith darden. you,ank you, and thank and for your introduction 4g data for hosting us today. to follow along for what timofei was introducing, we are suggesting the ends of arms control as a paradigm, that arms control emerged in a particular cold war context. 1950's,cular, in the where the primary threat as perceived by both the soviet union and the united states was something called the surprise particular,ck, and a surprise cap are forced strike. go back to the 1950's, there is very limited monitoring

readability. we do not have a lot of information about either side. as was pointed out, there is a period of extreme enmity with the desire to and ali a late -- to annihilate the other cited under those conditions there was considerable fear that one side would initiate a launch and try to what about the nuclear forces of the other side. and the solution that arms control and lewis, particularly those in the united states at the rand corporation, rate minds like thomas schelling, came up with was that we needed to preserve a secure second strike capability, that there had to be mutually assured instruction, and that meant that each side had to be it would withstand that initial strike and respond after that strike was experienced with a lethal blow in return. this would provide conditions in which any moment of crisis you could be patient, because if you knew you could strike back, the

dead hand could launch missiles to the other side, ever provide no incentive to launch nuclear weapons. no one would have the incentive to strike first because the answer would be taken for granted, and be lethal. in the contemporary context, the enmity is no longer there. it is not as if we do not assume the united states and russia have friendly relations. theact, we work from assumptions that relationship will continue to be bad and that trust will not be a defining feature of this relationship for the foreseeable teacher. future. -- but nonetheless, the idea that a will wake up and experience full-scale nuclear conflict initiated by one side is extremely unlikely. the idea we would use that as a basis for planning seems ludicrous in a contemporary context. several reasons for this. not just trust -- or not just enmity, but there's better

monitoring. we are not in the 1950's. we have ways of looking into the other side to see whether preparations for launch are taking place. there is no longer a risk of surprise and even if there were still a risk of initial strike. and with the improved relations and improve transparency, we no longer have to be terribly concerned about that surprise and we attack. as a result, the force structures that were designed to produce a retaliatory strike are no longer necessary. so the triad, having submarine launched ballistic missiles, handcraft, -- landgraf, the combination which would require an enormous arsenal, diverse arsenal on both sides is an expense that neither side a two foot at this point. what we advocate is what we call a minimally effective offense of capability. the ability to strike first, not second.

the logic behind this is that we would have time in a crisis and an awareness of what the other side is doing so we would only have to strike the other side with one nuclear strike. we would not have to withstand a strike in order to be able to respond, and that that is a sufficient deterrent. did most of the cold war not have a secure second strike and ability. even the darkest days in the early cold war, either the soviet union or the united states had a second strike capability. but a nuclear deterrent capability was enough to lead caution to every crisis. we think in a contemporary time when relations are marginally better that that deterrent can continue to hold it with placed ourselves to treat it naturally a short discussion with a second strike capability cnuclear zero, the ef nuclear weapons from the countries'arsenals. we do not think that is a

particularly good idea. the nuclear deterrent plays and apart role, particularly for russia, and part because the conventional capabilities of russia and united states are no longer operable. a greater states has superior art the in conventional weaponry. and moving nuclear weapons would leave a very insecure russia so they are not likely to do it, so it is silly to propose it is possibllicy. second, any of the things we thought were destabilizing during the cold war are not destabilizing in the post-cold war period. missile defenses. if you want to ensure that a second strike is effective, a missile defense system is a bad thing because the few weapons that remain after a counterforce strike might be able to be called by missile defenses.

if you're not concerned about maintaining a second strike capability, if you're only concerned with having an offensive capability, a first-rate capability, and both sides have the capability of penetrating each other's missile defenses, which is certainly going to be the case for the imaginable future of the united states and russia, then missile defenses are not the stabilizing. they can be quite stabilizing for dealing with dangerous third parties that have weaker missile capabilities, and do not have the same speed or accuracy or more point reentry vehicles that the u.s. and russia have in their arsenals. and so even if united states were to develop missile defenses unilaterally, so long as russia preserves its offense of capabilities in the nuclear realm this is not a threat. it is not destabilizing. the two countries can still determine another. third, and in keeping with this, the arsenals do not need to be the same.

in thewas very important cold war context, where the balance needed to be preserved, that if one arsenal got too large, it raised the prospect that that initial counterforce strike would be so effective that a second strike could not be launched. if we are not concerned about that, if all we need to do is maintain an effective first strike capability, then the size of the arsenals that one has depends on your other capabilities. united states to maintain a much smaller nuclear arsenal because of our extensive conventional capabilities. all we need is to be able to deal with a first strike against multiple threats, so not just russia, china and other nuclear countries. , to correct u.s. defenses, if they should ever developed to a point where they are significant, might need to maintain a larger nuclear arsenal, both to compensate for their weaknesses in conventional weaponry and because they would have to counteract u.s. missile defenses which might cull some

of those warheads. we could have different force structures. russia could have more weapons. it would not be alarming to the united states. in fact, each country should reduce to the level at which they feel secure and we do not meet international agreements to achieve this end. we do not need to have the arms control paradigm of negotiating to achieve new lower levels of parity. each country can achieve the equilibrium that suits them best. and those equilibria are almost certain to be different from one another. the threats o two countries face are different. i say that -- or we say that this does not require treaties, and that is true. it can be done unilaterally, both missile defenses and forced the structuring can be done unilaterally. it may party application of existing treaties. just as the united states amb treaty,e

russia may need to qualify its treaties to deal with intermediate range threats like china, and we should acknowledge that. that whatever they need to do o provide for their own security, and a secure russia does not hurt our interests as long as we have a strong deterrent against them, we should accept that. and so the long and unlikely to be successful negotiation process that bilateral arms control treaty negotiations and tail is not likely to be innocent -- and tail is not likely to be necessary. in many ways it leads to disappointment and freshman -- fresh in between the two countries. fourth, there were something good about the cold war treaties, that we may not need to do things elaborate anymore. we may not need to establish treaty obligations that are unnecessary. but those treaties provide a means for verification and observation, particularly the later treaties and the cold war,

that we think are very important. the transparency is particularly important in a world that we are advocating, where countries develop their own security strategies and are quite flexible. we need to be aware of each other's capabilities. the abilities and ideally, interests as well. so to maintain a system without treaties and without agreements, it will require considerably more contact, a lot more information passing between the two sides. ideally, we could have something --e pose certain cameras closed circuit cameras have on sites so we could observe amy lee reparations for launch es. you could see quite clearly whether the other side was preparing an attack or not. but ultimately, we are entering a world where cooperation is not likely, but coordination and compatibility between our forces

in the russian forces is something that is attainable, something we are aware of each other's vital interest, or are forced structure is -- for structure is providing for our security can and we provide a stable deterrent for one another so that war between the countries is unlikely, but it allows us to do with third-party threats like china or nonstate actors. is conceivable to we can do with some of those threats if the relationship or to improve. thank you and we will leave it at that. >> thank you very much. i would be happy to open it up for discussion. i have a few questions of my own but i will hold them back for now. yes?

>> i was a student in the soviet union during the cold war. one difference now that disturbs met- the soviet students i did not believe in the ideology. you could tell from talking to when the cold war began to melt you could see it was like pushing on an open door. the cold war is basically a struggle of a leads. i didn't have the sense that it was in the emotions of the people, neither here nor there. the west would accept them. something has changed in the emotions of the people. directed more to mr.

gorbachev. either one of you can adjust this. -- can address this. that would be harder to correct. >> i must agree. it will sound very undemocratic but i am advocating the view that ordinary people should be much less engaged in the end -- in the discussion. the advocating of international affairs. i am very conservative, if you want. i'm afraid that the quantity of public engagement into the district -- into the discussion isinternational affairs

overreaching the acceptable and needs to be reduced. paper, my big our is -- which could help relationship while touching the hearts of the people and keep the important issues of national survival on of dialogue. to say.sh is not enough semi-your english is excellent.

-- >> your english is excellent. you speak of a deed disappointment and a resentment that is born of disappointment. reset we are talking about is not a reset towards the fantasy of warmth in the relationship and the united states. realism ofet for the the coldness of that relationship. normalize a relationship based on strategic interests so that it doesn't lead that kind of resentment hostility. in many ways that is a product of the gorbachev thinking end of the cold war expectation that the united states is going to come in and we are going to live together in one happy family.

that is not the way international politics works historically. that is not the way it has turned out. a much more realistic set of expectations about the relationship my familiar rate that. >> thank you for the presentation. ask about the military doctrine that is in the process of being reformulated. we are told that the new doctrine will actually be made public. they also give signals about the intentions of countries. judging by other newspapers close to the militant industrial complex, it seems that this new doctrine will before related in aggressive terms. nuclear tactical strikes are not

resort butod of last they will actually be used in a very aggressive and forward moving fashion as well as a certain level of threat is perceived. this approach you are proposing here will actually make its entry into this new doctrine? ideas, onsed on your your theoretical developments that you yourselves have worked a moreoes this reflect technical approach among russian that is kind of above or below the current hysteria that surrounds the question? >> one of the interesting things

about this project and doing the into thewas going back different strategies that existed on the soviet side in the cold war. they don't follow in a nice clear statement. this doctrine is not a significant change from the historic position on nuclear weapons. they were always just weapons. in the event they have retained an enormous arsenal of nuclear arc -- of nuclear artillery. this was always part of their war fighting doctrine. -- it ist is chet telling they have not been used. i think it is likely they will not continue to be used. awareness that nuclear weapons are weapons, that they are not there for some abstract notion of reserving mutually asserted instruction, they're

there for use and have a deterrent function because they're usable, that is completely reasonable. this is not so different from american thinking and the contemporary context as well. the level of engagement -- russia's nuclear power. i don't believe this is a huge to partner -- huge departure. don't believe it has to be destabilizing. >> i do not belong to the russian security community.

neither is he. though i don't belong to the security community i think that there is selection is going on and it will be just one of the products of this reflection. the security community adapts much more flexible. consideration they emerged from the borders suddenly. middle east russian chinese relations are strategically -- though it does not prevent both sides from taking a certain security measures. i would agree that this approach

is not much different from what after theeveloped second world war. we write that nuclear weapons are always considered as just another. just another instrument. >> thank you. you.atulations to both of paper developed it is an impressive document. i have a couple of questions.

thinking about how either american or russian officials would react to the change you thatroposing it strikes me current russian officials would be far harder to sell on this and that they have somehow become more better students of shelling than their american and more interested in concepts such as a secure second strike and focused on the .tility exclusively what happened? how do we understand how we went from war fighting to nuclear weapons to what we have today.

that is the first question. about arms control , it is worthncy thinking about how we achieve transparency. they have been the only means historically of providing forward. the data exchange and and even the commitment not to mess with the other side' home means, only if they are legally binding in the context of arms control. compliance -- it is the only way we have figured out how to do the transparency we described. we have never had that before and it would be a different thing.

the question about whether you are talking about on nuclear weapons or just to teach it nuclear weapons comes up. principle ofe .onstrategic weapons >> this paper changes how we think about it. this is the legal framework -- where the legal from her can be found to ensure transparency. -- we do care about

political issues. the debate was predominated the classic american approach. we have more intensive debate. it is also just a weapon.

we have five future generals. we think the debate is not developing. the adoption of second strike capabilities, strategic and shelling, i think it justifies larger military budgets.

it is a way of articulating strategic concepts that justifies much more military sent -- the terri spending. they had requests about this insane proposal. this argument continues to hold. what would be the harm in unilaterally reducing your atlear arsenal to the level which you could simply destroy the other country? is a pretty powerful deterrent in and of itself. i think that is a very subversive concept for defense complexes in both countries.

it was an accident, a high -- a byproduct. onshould be focusing agreements that simply provide transparency. it was quite unlikely to achieve in the current context. we would be much more likely to achieve just the transparency and just the observation verification. both sides have an interest in that. russia would be interested in making sure we are not mobilizing to attack in -- to attack. we are facing a lot of crises these days. whether we are talking about on nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear weapons, in many ways we

are advocating class to turns. straight out to terrance. to the extent of your capabilities that involve nuclear artillery, those may enhance the turns as well. if we are concerned about the baltics or ukraine, then limiting the nuclear weapons and removing them from a strategic doctrine would advocating their use. it may be a way of limiting conflicts in the future. the conflict has remained relatively limited.

collect the question i want to -- >> the question i want to ask -- it is about the between the two sections of the paper. keith was right in saying a possession of nukes has moderated what might have been an excess of american or unrealistic reaction of some kind, let's say that is true.

lord knows we have had enough difficulties in recent months. of we know there is one issue in which russia would be even more incensed of american policy changes shift. that will be on the question of nato enlargement. what if ukrainian leadership takes the lesson from these events that it either has to -- it had a ukraine physical custody over weapons it could not fire. nonetheless it had them. now is in them up and this very difficult situation with its neighbor. alternatively if you cannot build your own and ukrainians auld do this only against very stiff resistance of the

united states who wanted to do that, the alternative would be to join nato. o this would be an unintended side consequence of what you are proposing and is ?here nonproliferation >> i think that is a false choice, nuclear rise or nato, to provide your own security. ukraine is in the situation it is in now. that ation to the fact social movement overthrew the government and the government lakhs legitimacy in parts of the country that created the conditions in which separatism can grow. him or is no question separatism was supported by russia. the real problem is ukraine

cks state capacity. nuclear weapons were not solve this particular problem. him with ukraine -- would ukraine fire nuclear weapons of moscow? i don't think so . secession? have been we had secession in chechnya print this is a different type of problem -- in chechnya. this is a different type of problem. play very important role in dealing with internal challenges like the ones the ukrainian government is facing. i think that ukraine cost choices --ukraine's it is billed the state or die and effectively achieve

legitimacy. state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. it is a political problem. it is not a military problem. evening -- it is removing oligarchs from power, removing private companies, removing the private he -- the privately supported information. if ukraine could have been a , who couldte the nuclearssure weapons will not get into the wrong hands? those that can employ them regardless of the intentions of the ukrainian or american government.

them i want to talk about the role of conflicting strategies -- how thetween conflicting strategies of both countries will affect the strategies of the two countries. syriall the situation in affect the compatibility of the two nations? strategic compatibility gives us a sustainable framework. i think strategic compatibility selfish of our

diplomatic action. it makes the diplomatic action more solid, primarily on the russian side. when it deals with problems like the syrian problem, it is more about bilateral relations. >> the danger is not cases like syria. him if there were circumstances in which both countries perceived a vital interest was at ske, those are the ones at real risk. is a lack of common interest in areas of vital interest, where there is equal resolve on both sides, that could escalate into a broader

conflict that would undermine the stability of the relationship. the u.s. and russia can have very different views and pursue different policies on a variety of conflicts throughout the world but not fundamentally destabilizing their relationship with one another. . that is the historical norm in international politics. to avoid armed confrontation. the relativey of powers is not going to play an important role. we have limited ambitions. >> we enjoy the situation when the survival interests are not contradicting and overlapping. this is one of the arguments in the basis of power.

that gives us luxury to develop the entire concept. >> with regard to missile ifense, the assumption is the country has missile defense capabilities it will make the -- if nuclear weapons missile defense did become the norm between the two countries, what with that have on quantities necessary.

what are missile -- >> both united states and russia have a level of technological sophistication in their weaponry that they should be able to defeat any missile defense. missile-defense is largely a filter for other countries. if not for the type of weapons that the united states and russia are likely to have -- in that sense it is not destabilizing. russia and united states would no longer have a deterrent. it would simply be in the realm of conventional weaponry.

king's that are real threats to the united states and potentially similar threats to russia. in terms of unilateral reductions, we are faced now -- because all machines have a rockets we built during the cold war are coming to the end of there's. it is not a question of do we reduce but do we rebuild. with a choiceed of if we could start it all over again would we build the arsenal? the answer is clearly no.

it is a question of letting certain missiles go through the end of their lifespan, building new certain missiles that are , and that is a different model than the cold war and a much more reduced force. him that is what we mean when we say reductions. when- that is what we mean we say reductions in not returning to those cold war levels. >> we will be able to develop the nuclear forces which will be able to penetrate any america defenses. if russia will feel unsecure -- unprepared.

>> this is an area where transparency will be important. russia has to have some familiarity with the technical specifications of our missile systems to know that it doesn't negate their nuclear capability. we should be able to provide that information because it enhances our security. >> i have three questions. do you guys see a world where there are no nuclear weapons echo -- weapons? does your paper just getting rid of the icbm component? and did you guys have any good or funny stories from the research that you put into this paper?

>> do we envision a world without nuclear weapons? >> the answer to the first answern is there is no -- is no. the stories are so politically incorrect that i cannot tell them in this room. >> i could envision a world without nuclear weapons in the same way i could envision a as theithout spears primary methods of warfare. and the contemporary context i think taking away some of the most powerful weapons you have without new weapons emerged is extremely unlikely. china has not been a party to any of these bilateral cold war agreements.

that is the dark shadow on this paper. we talk about the u.s. russia relationship. china is out there. china is a threat to both parties. that is going to have a nuclear deterrent. there is no question about it in the nuclear context. >> this is political talk already. -- theurn the opportunistic point is that neither russia nor america's feeling from danger -- feeling of danger from china is objective in nature. the cases are very subjective and not by the objective threat of china but by how we perceive china. that makes the situation looks better. >> in terms of funny stories,

when we started writing this paper we were hammered for being too pessimistic. foreasingly we are hammered being too optimistic about the nature of the relationship. even if trust is nonexistent. .he myra memories conversations what i still don't quite understand is if it was possible to achieve another arms-control

agreement between russia and the united states, if we were able to obtain that we have, wouldn't tot still be preferential the proposal you put forth? or are you trying to say in fact -- i squirmed when i heard you -- are you saying that doing your own thing is preferable to negotiating bilateral treating -- a bilateral treaty between russia and the united states? beould suspect there would plenty of russian generals that would like to hear what you had to say. him i thought part of what you had to say was a musty and -- unless the u.s. is interested in reducing its nuclear are so -- nuclear arsenal can do so without concerns. they should be comfortable of that. my concern is how you would sell that here.

those in the nuclear zero community would be worried about taking unilateral reductions that do not get us closer to a world of nuclear zero. there are plenty of people in this town who you will never be able to convince the united states needs to unilaterally reduce its weapons, not only given a certain level of russian capabilities but in the new context we are in. i am still uncertain how we are going to sell this. >> there is a chinese saying that that words make bad deeds. him i did not believe in the continuation of the arms control negotiations would be good as i do not believe continuation of any cold war preferences would be good -- any cold war practices would be good for continuing national security eerie -- security. problem with arms control is they read assigned to achieve parity.

parity, largely in nuclear capability. in the current context with american superiority and everything about nuclear weapons, i think it is not likely to -- symmetrical reductions in nuclear arms will not achieve symmetry insecurity on the two sides. i do think that unilateral occur.ons could we have certain financial .onstraints we may want to invest those

resources somewhere else. would you allocate resources to something that is a fantasy that is not likely to obtain? wouldn't if i faced a budget constraint. this country faces a budget constraint. i don't think we would do things that are unnecessary. it is plausible.

>> you just mentioned the u.s. should allocate resources toward more strategic defense things. do you think we are entering a new era in u.s. russian relations that would be more the thing to the u.s. -- towiser to allocate the u.s. to allocate resources -- america's ability to project its power more effectively echo -- more effectively? want ask you to comment on improving american security. comment onask you to the ruling american security.

i think better nuclear weapons may be a good goal for funding. that would be a reduction in number. i do think priorities in other areas should be pursued. manned fighter jets would not be first on my list. i think that is going the way of catapults and things that are no longer going to be important. not convince the navy paid -- navy plays ace -- i'm not convinced the navy plays a centrally important role in what you are suggesting we spend money on. i am not opposed.

>> i am a lieutenant colonel air force pilot. quickly.to talk very i understand the argument in 's not a nuclear -- not a numbers parity game. what you feel about an asymmetric jump -- let's say the lungs -- the long-range strike largelyives a true penetrating capability against a country like russia. how does that factor into the arms control debate and this idea of stability between the two countries? feel given the

fairly extensive use under the bush doctrine of preintervention by the united states, how does that factor into this? we talked about the turns and stability being a capability and the will to use it. we display the will to use conventional force and now we have an overwhelming conventional force that will only go stronger. how does that play in your argument? compatibility is to fears and resolve our own related to each other. the compatibility meaning to and assuredpower ability to feel safe in relation with russia or america on the

other side. as the situation in europe feelingere is a certain of compatibility. this paper is intended to give it a feeling of more structure in a systematic way. >> -- >> i do believe there are weapons that would reduce the stability. -- part of compatibility is the deterrent capability and hypersonic weapons that were quite accurate. it could lead to bringing us back to the 1950's with a very effective first strike that was a surprise. him that would be destabilizing in this context region of that

would be a good case for this new arms control regime. him awareness of the launch would be extremely important. we are just aware of what is going on with each other's forces. i do think some of these arguments are sensitive to current weapons technology. the general principle behind it of compatibility would give us some guidance on how to move forward in the event the technology changes. it would require more handholding than others. on the issue of the united states, russia is very .ncomfortable with preemption in large part concerns about what is going on in ukraine from the russian perspective are that

this was a prelude to the entry of nato forces into ukraine, creating instability, over -- overthrowing the government, and then asking for our help and us providing it was a way to bring our forces closer. that is a powerful merited. it is not a correct narrative. we are not eating ukraine cost military. hii think there are ways that we can take down the temperature. and policye action and communication with the russian side. with a a country pre-doctrine of strikes and scary to a lot of people.

-- >> thank you for your presentations. you look at military issues, the assumptions that you couldn't the analysis of security and what achieves security for a seemry -- these comments to lead to believe that the amount of weapons in the country would leave it to resolving the issue with russia's sense of insecurity in today's world. i want to bring in the issue of values and economics into your story to say that russia has compatible whether through arms control or without arms control and the strategic incompatibility is more

value-based incompatibility. merkel.ring in there may be some truth to statements looking at russia as trying to live in a realist world view and western countries and the united states at least been more divided in terms of realism, constructivism, liberalism. it doesn't have that much money to spend on weapons. it amounts of money to spend on weapons has been increasing get the sense of security has been rising as well. it is also about the values and the world vision team eaters have.

it is about the globalization and who it benefits most. beenlobal economy has beneficial to russia as well. him if we look at how it was integrated into the economy, that is where the sense of insecurity may be coming in as well. whether allowing either country to spend as much on weapons as they can would actually bring a sense of security or if that is -- it is a little confined studying psychological issues. >> that is a good question. i think the feeling of security is always of a subjective nature.

this beautiful lady would have a huge snake in her hands and say it never bites. we would still feel a little bit unsecure because security is very subjective. him it is security as we perceive it. it is security as we perceive it. i take the liberty and responsibility to formulate and to suggest what might be the resolution of the national security concerns. of course these suggestions come in line with my theoretical congregation, which you can see and understand. economybout the global -- speaking about the global economy, we are living in interesting times where the global economy, global market is more and more in contradiction

with national regulation. asia,ee it in europe, in many other cases. i think this story only starts with how the countries will see themselves. think there is a difference between allowing countries to spend as much as strictly, not having enforced arms control agreement, and advocating they spend the law. in many ways we are saying moving away from arms control but advocating they build less, that they take the notion of sufficiency and we are putting forward a different notion that would require less spending.

as to the west being the real world -- we have a large military and if we trusted in international law and believed that the norms of territorial integrity were sufficient to limit states and the public we wouldre sufficient not have the defense spending that we do. him we clearly think we live in a world that has threats and we take efforts to counter those threats. russia does the same with far fewer resources. we are advocating a way this could be done better that was less threatening to each side. >> i'm with usdi views and questions to not

represent the department of defense. footnote.ht by a in a way this follows from the previous question. question ofat the the angle of political culture. it talks about the soviet view of instability and that the soviets believed that stability was best achieved through their own supremacy. view -- the american your views may be a very enlightened way to look at the problem. your approach with taken the -- how would your approach take the way that you would like an russian political culture, particularly strategic culture,

that the expectation would be that the russians feel secure because they have a decisive defensive capability. others might worry that with the background of the political culture they may feel emboldened in a way that may not be rational in some sense but might have some historical precedent. >> that is quite a theoretical question. i always tell my students. a clearpossible to draw distinctive line between the willing believe and willing to do. dealing with this nation we never know what is enough.

it is why we are so concerned about china and their potential. that the clear absence content indeological russian policy now keeps this -- tonotes to how this foreign policy looks. in soviet times the foreign policy was ideological. foreign policy was not based on ideology. him here to the western perspective it is optimistic. here to theok from western perspective it is optimistic. purposes and one of the poppel -- one of the possible future areas on this strategic compatibility issue

might be how we deal with the other rising powers like china, brazil,otentially potentially south africa. how do we incorporate their strategic culture, which is absolutely, fundamentally since thefrom ours russia and the u.s. belong to the same tradition, to the same religious tradition. , it is a good question and a hard question. does ratcheting down the two emboldening -- ratcheting down ?ead two emboldening i would distinguish between weapons and results. you can have very high resolve with the weapons you have.

that is a deterrent. persist -- if we can persuasively drawdowns when ffective set of weapons -- draw down to an effective set of weapons we would not embolden our enemies. >> you spoke of a bilateral agreement in unilateral action. as you just briefly mention the role of china is certainly a large factor in a clear nonproliferation or the reduction of arms. what reduction does china have in your position? >> though we had some discussion between -- we'd originally argued that china is much more challenged to russian security than i do believe.

since i still -- we can observe the russian military superiority over china is immense. both in nuclear and conventional forces. do not goy chinese for military training exercises with conventional forces in the framework of our duration. i think that china finds itself in a very complicated environment. china is forced externally to .ct more assertive this imposed assertiveness of chinese foreign policy of a country that is not used to be

assertive can potentially create challenges because of the misperceptions and misunderstandings from the others, including russians. >> my politically incorrect is it does not recognize the limits to the territory indispensably governs -- it extensively governs. russia make sure that the northern border of china is sincere. china will not expand to the north so long as russia has a nuclear deterrent. we don't need to worry about that. we need to worry about other borders. that is something for u.s. policy to take care of.

i do think china needs to be watched carefully. and to make sure it is deterred so it does not expand. >> we have reached the end of our session. this has been a stimulating discussion. i remain more optimistic than i was when i came into this. a huge thank you for coming all this way to be with us. thank you to the davis center and tim colton and to the carnegie corporation of new york for sponsoring this wonderful endeavor. please join me for thanking our -- please join me in thanking our wonderful panel. [applause]

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