they currently have 12 seats and toa poll, anywhere from 18 20. they are anywhere from 9%-12% and labor has stated the same and if an election was held today, you would probably have 120where between 80 out of going to parties on the right. with in it, there's serious pressure on netanyahu and his position has never been great and the u.s., people think of netanyahu as far right and he is certainly right when the but not on the far right. netanyahuit seems,

has at the left. are far moreembers right-wing than netanyahu. many of the more right wing anders who are all younger sort of amendment 13 party they said the u.s., it netanyahu did not go far enough and advocated israel to read occupy for however long it takes to stamp out hamas. netanyahu is not willing to it realizes himself he isn't feasible but he faces his own party. the chair of the central committee and who was the deputy minister until netanyahu fired him the first week of the war for criticizing the government's approach is convening the party

congress later this month where no doubt there will be nothing but lots of vocal criticisms on the conduct of the war. outside of netanyahu's party as i mentioned is the jewish home party is much more popular now than it was. bennett is taking serious strides to capitalize on that. he announced he would like to make changes to the constitution that would make it a more secular party which is significant because he's looking to appeal to the right and for the first time i believe he actually has a shot at being the bearer of the right and perhaps even becoming pregnant mr. and so all these things are pushing netanyahu steadily to the right and it seems like the announcement of the 980 acres that were prepared on the state land because in the absence of the occupying, netanyahu know that he has to do something and the easiest way to do that in

the politic of the israeli right is to announce the long-term planning processes for settlement. in general, they don't want to risk a hamas takeover in the west bank and the aftermath of the type of the war and this type of fighting generally makes israelis more hawkish and security conscious than they would otherwise be. so the trend in my view is not going to the abyss. whatever the elections are and there is a wide speculation they will be within the next year, whatever the next elections are i have very little doubt of the parties are going to increase their share in the government. whether that means a larger share or if they suffer at the hands of the ied there is going to be a likely more right wing.

and of course, that is going to impact the relations of the palestinians going forward. and the peace process more generally. >> i am going to turn to joe to address the international humanitarian issues relating to not only the war but conduct of the war, bombardment and the use firing mortars by hamas and of the policy of the blockade. one of the key elements of the demand is worth rendering this and even the blockade was a condition of the cease-fire that was not implemented and this is going to be one of the most important items for the discussion in the talks that i very much hope will take place in egypt. if you can take a crack at that.

>> thank you, matt and kate for holding this event and inviting me to be a part of it. human rights watch obviously as the name would indicate looks at the human rights violations by state, by political authorities. but we also monitor compliance with the laws of war, the humanitarian law. one component is the geneva convention. human rights watch doesn't take positions on whether any party to any conflict should take up arms or launch an attack. those are political issues and political questions that we don't address. in part in order to be able to impartially look at how the fighting and the armed conflict is conducted by the parties. the two issues that we are concerned with here before i go into some of the details are one is accountability that is for

unlawful behavior and noncompliance with the law of the war and other serious violations and the other is the humanitarian consequences of the war in particular and the policies that set up the conflict to begin with among which i would include not just mentioning the blockade but intensively in effect since 2007 since hamas basically took over as the political power in gaza. and really, since 2005 with the withdrawal of the unilateral withdrawal of the military forces and settlers under the prime minister. the accountability issue i want to stress because it seems to me the elements that should be part of any kind of looking forward. and it is what has been consistently missing in terms of any of the peace talks agenda as

we have seen no matter how unsuccessful they may have been and it's certainly not because of the accountability that was among the issues raised. it's been a consistent issue for us looking at the various phases to confine ourselves to gaza. i think what we have seen a little dispiriting is we haven't seen much change looking from one conflict to another. 2009, 2012 at about 2014 and the behavior of the combatants, hamas's behavior into the conduct of hostilities. let me say one thing about with the international demand that syrian law requires. the key principle is the

distinction. the parties have to distinguish at all times between the combatants and civilians, but -- between military objectives into civilian properties. and they may only target combatants and structures or areas that have immediate military gain. targeting civilians is obviously sort of the first order of the prohibition. but then there are other areas in the indiscriminate attacks, so there might be an attack where there is a legitimate attack by combatants or a place or structure or building, an apartment building for instance where maybe arms have been stored making it a legitimate target in itself but where the harm to the use of the weapons that are used, the character of the fighting and so forth results in making the attack

essentially indiscriminate for the civilians, many civilians are harmed. the humanitarian law understands sort of from the get-go that civilians are going to be hurt. the point is to minimize the harm so the parties in the conflict have to take into to use the language of the conventions all feasible precautions to avoid harming civilians. on the palestinian side, hamas and recalling also that the combatants are not only hamas but they include the forces like jihad for instant into some of the secular palestinian parties. obviously the rockets launched into israel were first of all the reason that we would say does constitute to the war crime

in and a sense of targeting civilians. many groups, they said they are attacking population centers essentially and so with a state they stayed in many cases is the aim as such and the type of weapons they are using are inherently not guided and cannot be used in a way that could distinguish between military targets and civilian areas and structures. so from the get-go you have a situation where that kind of weapons the palestinians are using in fighting the attacks in israel itself are at the very least inherently indiscriminate and then in terms of the fighting and the combat that went on once the forces moved in

and even during the campaign the issue of the extent to which hamas did or did not take a all of the feasible precautions in terms of carrying out military operations in the population areas. the idea of the defense forces have documented and i will go into a little bit of detail a couple of instances where it appears the individual civilians were targeted into trying to flee the combat zone in the instruction of the idea. this is something that we also saw in the previous conflict in 2012, and especially in the 2009. the issue is whether the attacks were indiscriminate or not.

so there was the idea that there were military targets in a particular building or near a particular building for instance the attacks that killed large numbers of civilians. about a number of cases that we investigated, we found there actually was no military objective. there were no combatants in the area as far as we could determine. and the israeli government committee's response did not come up with any explanation as to why they launched those particular attacks. i wanted to say a little bit about -- first i should say that one of the problems we have had in addressing this particular conflict is a lack of access. the last time we were able to go into gaza, in other words israel

if we asked for permission to go into the fall of 2009 many weeks before it started, we were refused. up to that point, the request and the delays and so forth we would eventually get in. we've not been allowed in through since 2009. in the other instances we were able to go in after the hostilities ceased after the cease-fire was in place after the crossing and sinai between gaza and egypt. but the relations with egyptian government currently are about as good as they are in the israeli government and they have not been able to get in that way either but it makes it more difficult to do what we think is needed in terms of conducting an investigation that when you actually get to the

site of a possible crime or war crime when you can't evaluate the damage and make a judgment as to whether that's what then was appropriate under the circumstances, survivors and so forth. our ability to do that is very limited. we do have research assistance on the ground and the residents of gaza but obviously the people who bring in the kind of added expertise that that we have in assessing the armed conflict situation where issues of all feasible precautions what does that mean come issues that are disproportionate. again, those depend on not reading the newspapers and saying thousands of palestinians were killed, scores of israelis were killed, disproportionate, no. one can talk about it in a political sense disproportionate but in the legal sense as

implications for accountability -- you have to look at each individual attack and make that assessment and i would invite you to look at our website and see the work that we have done. on the figures, the number of palestinians killed. the idf claims the combatants in the terrorist operatives and they said that there are 800 other cases that are not yet determined.

they are sure we will send, many of the cases were combatants. the phrase that the israelis used in the terrorist operatives is much less clear-cut at least in terms of humanitarian law. a person belonging to hamas, for instance, is not a legitimate target under the rules, under the law. the policy into gaza conflict has been to treat these people as legitimate targets so that is one issue that we would take strong issue with the israeli understanding. a lot of attention has focused on the relatively high-profile attacks that have involved

schools. both the israeli attacks and the three of which were in habitat by displaced persons, not students and that they resulted in a number of civilian deaths. we investigated those cases in which there were fatalities and the kind of responses we got as to why this particular school is targeted or why it is hit. in one case, they said in july 24, the school -- i think where 13 people were killed including six children, they said that there was one mortar shell however the witnesses, the survivors to that attack told us that there were four shells that

landed directly outside of the school's compound. the israelis said there had been a hamas operation firing anti-tank missiles near the schools but again, not indicating what constitutes mere in this case a fairly loose term. they also asserted that when the mortar hit, it is empty which isn't something that again is a variance with what people on the scene told us. there was another strike on august 3 that didn't involve an artillery and mortar but involved a guided spike missile. it hit right outside of a school, 10 meters from the entrance and children in particular were people who were, the displaced people who were taking shelter in the school were out at the gate buying

food, water, sweets, this kind of thing. the idf said there were eight people killed, some children, and they were attacking the three islamic militants who were riding by on a motorcycle. now, they are assuming that's correct they are certainly a legitimate target but particularly with the spike, it's the sort of thing that the israelis should be using in this conflict. but why did they hit before it got there? in other words, not ready to draw the conclusions from what we know about this incident but

it warrants investigations. one of the things that seems new looking at conflict seems to be more precise to attacked the residence homes and the civilian structures have been damaged, destroyed in previous conflicts as well. but it was more from the consequence of the use of artillery which has a very wide damage radius rather than the precision weapons but what we have seen is some precision attacks. for instance, this isn't one that we investigated, but the human rights group did where there is an attack on july 29 on the four-story residential building in that killed 25 people. there was no warning as far as one could determine no explanation.

they did learn that one of the residences was an operative, a political operative in the senior leadership of the palestine, one long islamist long-standing political group. two questions at least, is he by being a political operative eventually the unknown military engagements was he a legitimate target? and then the second, even if he he was a legitimate target, it seems pretty clear that attacking this residence is such devastating consequences would constitute the indiscriminate attack. let me just say a word quickly about the humanitarian impact. i think that back in 2012 the un put out a report called the gaza 20/20 is looking at if the present trends continue and

again this was 2012, these are going to be the issues in terms of housing units that are needed in health care, electricity, sanitation, these issues. and one has has to when one looks not only of human casualties but that the destruction of homes and schools and the power plant into gaza's one electric power plant if 20/20 has a telescope into 2014. we are looking at a society that has been, you know, under siege in the sense of this blockade, this rather strenuous blockade for many years now. just to return to the accountability question. the first principle is that individual states are responsible for the conduct of the residents, certainly if they're armed forces and security forces.

so in the first instance under the principle justice and global justice in this case israel or the palestinian authorities should be undertaking these kind of investigations of the conduct of their forces. up until now, both sides although israel for its part has a just system have really failed that test. given that it seems that element on the ground that they at the very least provide some sort of leverage or improved behavior in this regard in addressing these violations of the law, frankly is a national criminal court. unlike the institution that's

been set up to deal with situations with states that have a primary responsibility that are unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility. we are in a new situation politically in that since the last conflict of 2012, the palestinian authority could ratify the treaty which would make it a party to the statute and therefore eligible to present cases, allegations for the investigation by the international criminal court. that something they didn't have that capacity until a year or so ago legally speaking, diplomatically speaking. israel, while it signed the treaty back in 1999, has ever ratified it and has indicated that it has no plans to ratify. the other way the case gets taken up by the international

criminal court is if it is referred by the un security council which they've done in the case of libya. you know, politically the chances of that happening going to israel or the palestinians is absolutely nil. that is one new element to look at as we look ahead. >> i am just going to do a round of questions with the panelists here. and then after after that we will come to the audience for more questions. first to khaled, you had talked about the crisis of legitimacy in the palestinian movement and the need to establish a consensus but you also said that elections could complicate things more. so my question is how then to create that and how to generate that consensus and what

mechanisms other than election is here? >> it is a dilemma that is a dilemma that i think a lot of countries have confronted over the last several years. do you hold an election first to determine how do you decide who gets to write the rules of the game in the constitution? for for example, should you hold an election first or play to the group that is perceived as rep resentative and it is kind of a chicken and egg a sort of question. i think that with experience as i interpret it as borne out that holding elections to decide we saw that happen in egypt where unless there is a broad consensus of the main societal and political actors upfront on the rules of the game, then the outcome of any election or

political process is likely to be contrasted. we saw that both in the cases of the election and after his overthrow. in the case of the palestinians, they are based on winners and losers and then you are deciding the way forward and it means hamas and fatah have a different approach. one is committed to a two state solution and the other is not. it has a very different vision of how to resolve the conflict as well as how to govern palestinians. so, you can't make those subject to an election because they are affected by everything including the weather, literally.

if you try to hold an election in this environment, you are going to get a very distorted, skewed outcome that will not be to the advantage of those currently in power i think. on the one hand, you need the right conditions but you also need the broad agreement. the way that it has operated in the past, plo is operated on the basis of consensus. and that is the consensus of the main political factions. and that is true for the first half of the plo existence until 1988 and it hasn't been true since because you have these major political organizations like hamas and a few secular groups outside of the umbrella of the plo. palestinians are now paying the price for allowing these groups

to operate outside of the agreed-upon consensual national umbrella. on the one hand, the plo claims to be the legitimate representative but on the other hand, it does not include these major factions that have attacked. some of them have won elections so they clearly belong in the big tent of the palestinian politics, but they are not represented. elections are not a substiitute for a national agreement. it is messy and may seem undemocratic, but i think in

this environment it is essential to forge a national concensus based almost on an intuitive sense of being representative. i think it can be done. andas happened in the past even in the palestinian context. >> thanks. michael, stepping outside domestic politics, i wonder if you could address the relationship between israel and egypt and the way it has been managed over the cease-fires.

there was an interesting piece in "the wall street journal" that talked about the closeness that has developed such as the united states is almost being cut out of the discussions. what is your perspective of egypt's role and will it impact politics in israel at all? >> i think you have to say it is constructive if for no other reason than egypt was the one party that brought the sides together to brokered the cease-fire. so in that sense it was certainly constructive. the first couple weeks, the fact egypt had no creditability with hamas and that egypt didn't want to do much to do with hamas at all was a factor in extending the fighting. in contrast to 2012, where hamas trusted egypt as a broker and this time they did not. i don't know how constructive

they were able to play in the beginning. as the fighting went on, egypt was able to broker a deal, and that is certainly constructive. in term of how it factors into the israeli politics, netanyahu has been a phrase being used talking about new diplomatic horizons, and a lot of people assumed that meant with the palestinians. i don't think it does. i think he is talking about a wider regional initiative where israeli is aligned with states like egypt, jordan, saudi arabia in an effort to limit the influence of hamas and other muslim brotherhood groups. he is looking to use the fight and the region where you have a split among arab states and if

you widen it you can include turkey. i think he is looking to take advantage of that situation and get israel firmly into the camp of what we might call status quo arab state versus revision arab states. so to the extent that a closer bond with egypt helps israel get into the that group than i think israel is going to try to play that angle as hard as it can. i am not sure how feasible it is. i think netanyahu thinks he has a stronger than he actually does. but between that and the fact that israel has lots of natural gas to sell and signed an mou this week with jordan that was worth $15 billion, i believe. and they are looking to do something similar with egypt. between energy and regional

dynamic and betwene a joint desire between egypt and israel to limit hamas' influence, i think netanyahu and his government will try to get as close to egypt as they can. >> thank you. i think we have about 20, 25 minutes left. going to the audience for questions now. please identify yourself, your affiliation, and keep the question short and ask the question in the form of a question, please. >> i am jim. i don't know if any of you read the op-ed piece by former ambassador kirkser. he was the former u.s. ambassador to israel during the first bush ii administration. his proposal was twofold. one was to bring in an international force with boots on the ground in gaza that would

provide security and maybe even governance of gaza with the palestinian authority playing a role, but a light role given their dysfunction. and basically they serve as a referee between the plo and hamas. and both boots on the ground was saying he expected them to be arab boots on the ground and maybe turkish but certainly not american. secondly, most interestingly he linked that to an international peace conference where the same countries would then be negotiating with israel and palestinian authority on a more sure palestinian authority on a more long-term permanent solution. he thought israel would be much more prone to do that today given what happened in gaza and the need for international force

in gaza, which he thinks israel would accept. again, this is all him saying that. my question to both of you, from a palestinian and an israeli point of view, how do you think this will fly in those respective societies? >> i will start. i don't know how well the idea of international force would fly within israeli society. certainly not a force that includes turkey at this time. i think in general the thrust of public opinion within israel now is that the best solution would be for the palestinian authority forces to takeover security and border crossings in gaza. and whatever beast the israeli government has over the palestinian authority, they have very few with p.a. security in the west bank. so i think there is some sort of level of implicit trust that exists among the israeli

government and large portions of israeli society for the p.a. security forces that would not necessarily translate into a wider force comprised of soldiers from other arab countries and from turkey. in general, i think the israelis are wary of internationizing the conflict too much. certainly, israel's experience with the international community least. and the level of trust is very low. i don't imagine there would be a huge amount of positive for the international force as opposed to a p.a. force. >> i think you can make the argument on the palestinian as well.

there is not a lot of incentive to have an international force. i think there would be a lot of disagreement among the regional stake stakeholders and the united states and others. hamas has said they will not accept an international presence. the p.a. has no intent to accept the international role of governing. that was the purpose of the palestinian authority. and in a way it is kind of a setback for the idea of a palestinian state. i think the problem with palestinian governance is not they don't know how to govern. it is there is this lack of basic national concensus, that that is what is missing and the conversation isn't being had in

the same way the egyptian and syrian conversation isn't being had. there are different degrees of consequences. that basic consent needs to be achieved by various palestinian groups. that is the impediment. i don't think it is a technical know how. both p.a. and hamas can govern. and both have shown they are able to maintain security. the question about israel's security relates to political goals and objectives. there is an outstanding conflict between palestinians and between palestinians and israel. there is a blockade, an occupation, and there are issues. that is the source of insecurity and violence, not primarily because of a lack of capacity i would argue. there is a lack of will to maintain israel's security

because one side has an incentive to harm israel's security because of these ongoing issues. so unless the political issues can be resolved, i cannot imagine -- it isn't a situation of technical capacity. >> joe, you want to address? >> i didn't see the editorial but the way you present it it doesn't sound realistic it me. there is one where area where more shoes on the ground, boots on the ground, that in terms of the crossings between israel, egypt, and gaza -- there is a security role in terms of -- and this would address or could address the blockaid issue -- if you had an inter international team of experts who could be monitoring for the transit of

arms or equipment of military use and planning for follow-up monitoring of dual use items and would basically allow everything else in. and obviously that force, whatever its particular complexion, would need the confidence of israeli and whoever you are dealing with on the palestinian side. that was attempted in the past where the european union was supposed to provide those elements, and it ended up being a lack of israeli cooperation in allowing them to move to the border area and carry out their assigned roles. that would be worth exploring. >> and the u.k., france, and germany all indicated -- they extended the mandate of the mission and they indicated they would be willing to support the

p.a. coming back in. so i think that is a possibility. can we go to the gentlemen in the front here. >> i am from washington, d.c., and i thank the institute and the panels for this afternoon. i have two questions. the question is you mentioned importantly participation of the international of the palestinians to be consulted. how do you see that being carried out in practice? and my second question is, is there any way to bring netanyahu and his bunch and hamas accountable for what they have done? >> on the first question, there have been a lot of proposals put

out there emanating from inside the palestinian territory on how to reintegrate them into conversation at least, if not institutionally. bear in mind, the plo began as a diaspora movement and there is where it was forged. most of the current leadership in the plo are themselves refugees and not from the west bank. some people have proposed elections. election can be held in lebanon and syria for refugees. the mechanisms are there. it is a question of political will.

the same way plo was convened, created without a territory or a base, it can be reinvented in a sense where the mechanisms are out there and what isn't there is the political will by the current leadership, whether it is hamas or fatah other factions to reintegrate the diaspora institutionally, not on an individual bases. that would take rethinking the plo as an institution, and that conversation is happening among a lot of palestinian intellectuals, but hasn't yet produced an outcome. >> on the accountability question, it is a good question and i tried to suggest in my

talk that, you know, perhaps the dimension of these national criminal court has a greater viability today. i would not say it is great, but it is more than it had been. i think there are steps along these lines that individual states can take, particularly states that are close allies of one party or the other. certainly in the case of israel's close allies, starting with the united states, for instance there is a u.s. law on the books referred to as the leahy law, that says units of a security force cannot receive u.s. assistance or arms or funding if they have been

credibly shown to have been involved in war crimes and human rights violations in war. as i understand it and i have been told -- and those assessments are supposed to be made in the u.s. embassy and there is no body in israel in the u.s. consolate that has been followed up with. that would be interesting to , to pursue this. if it is true, you know, to remedy that. so there would be that kind of, you know, mandated reporting that might have consequences and i am not looking here in terms of, you know, so much cutting

off arms supplies as much as giving incentives, in this case, to the israelis, to carry out more serious investigations and hold their own officers accountable. >> i do apologize in advance if i cannot get to you. i just want to hit around the room a bit. i will come back to you. let me go to the lady on the aisle. >> i am a physician and a member of j street. my question is for mr. coplow. you have not talk about the united states -- when you discussed domestic politics, you didn't mention the united states. but the right wing and ultra right wing in israel -- do they not care what the united states this happening -- thinks or

assume the united states will back them no matter what? >> i am not sure it is an issue of not caring what the united states thinks. sure, there are some that view antagonistic agains4t israel, as absurd as that is. i don't think this is an sure of not caring what the u.s. thinks. i think it is more of an issue of trying to figure out at what level the u.s. cares. to the extent the u.s. cares about very deeply, you will see the israelis hold off. i will give you an example. before the 2013 election, the israeli government announced tender plans to build an e-1 which is the area in the east bank with a lot of contention

and the buidling would cut the northern and southern west bank in half. that was a plan that was never going to be implemented because that is one of the u.s.' clear red lines, and it has been for a while. it wasn't implemented and i don't expect it to be. so on things like that the israeli government certainly cares what the united states thinks. on other issues, if they think they can get away with it without consequences, they'll do it. that does not make them unique. the relationship between israeli and the united states is a lot more complex and complicated than the united states' relationship with other countries. so there is a lot more back and forth, and this red line gets tested far more often. but i would not say in general netanyahu and more mainstream politicians don't care but it is

more a matter of testing the boundaries. >> this gentlemen here in the blue shirt. wait for the mic, please. >> i am herbert grossman and i am a retired judge. my main question is when you talk about two factions among the palestinians and one faction of the plo or fatah or the palestinian authority is in favor of two states and hamas is opposed to that you are only talking about the surface. the fact of the matter is, whether you agree with me or not, most of the palestinians believe abbas is in favor of a temporary two-state and that eventually they will take over the other state. so it is a matter of stages. whether he actually believes that or not we could argue all

day. but the fact is if the palestinians saw he really was in favor of a final situation of two states they would not vote for it. he would get the same percentage of votes that were low in the previous election. 3%. he is 79 years old now. polls indicate a two-state solution isn't what the bulk of the arabs in the arabs in israel want, in palestine. so what benefit is there for israel to go into negotiation for a two-state solution if they will end up with the same thing they have from hamas and this goes from your position who doesn't tell us why the right

ring has ascended, especially since the last war, the fact that most people realize if they give over strategic positions in the west bank they will end up with the same thing they have in the southern border with hamas and on the northern border with hezbollah -- rockets, tunnels and artillery aimed at the coastal heartland of palestinian. and the third thing is that everybody in this room recognizes that israel did everything it could to spare civilian casualties -- [laughter] >> please, all right. ladies and gentlemen, please. did, noterything they bombs on the roofs of houses, the calling off of airstrikes -- everybody knows that. this stuff here doesn't belong

in this kind of discussion here. but you are picking on little things which -- to talk about the international court which is loaded against israel is no solution at all. those are my comments on that. i do not want to prolong you. >> let's address that, as you will. >> i will take the first piece. i don't know if i agree with the characterization that most palestinians believe in two states in order to in two states in order to take over israel eventually. the reality is more nuanced on that. on the israeli and palestinian sides, the two-state solution has been a precarious concept always.

on the mindset of both sides they would go for one state in their ideal way. for palestinians it is one historical state of palestine and there are palestinians who are citizens of israel, who were refugees or from the west bank -- they are all palestinians. i think the dream is to have a single democratic state from the river to the sea. but there was a moment in which there was a broad political and even popular consensus to move away from that and say if we as palestinian are going to exercise self determination it will be in the context of a two-state solution. the two state solution for palestinians has been the least worse option always. it is not the best option. and that is why you see the slim plurality that supports it. if you measure support for a two-state solution and poll 1990

and 1988 and poll it today, you will find different results i think, especially from the younger generation. the younger generation said you tried to get two states. it didn't work. we had the experiment and it never went anywhere because israel isn't prepared to let go of control. the question you ask is what incentive does israel have. the bottom line is palestinians are after self determination and they can only get it two ways and that is in the context of two states or in the context of one state. it is essentially a choice that israel has. there is not another way for palestinians have to rights, to have citizenship rights equal with other people in the world outside of those two. we have a one-state reality, but it isn't one based on equality

or rights, not based on self-determination. so if the two-state solution, which is a compromise, from the standpoint of the palestinians, if that is rejected, which sounds like you reject, then there will ultimately be no choice for palestinians to pursue, if they want to have rights, and of course they do, other than to seek them through a one-state, one-man, one-vote state, and it can be called israel, it can be called palestinian, it can be called anything they want. but they will seek their rights one way or another. it is up for israel to decide which one it is prepared to accommodate. i think from how i understand israeli interests, a two-state solution would be more favorable to them than a one state which i

think would be aninevitability if the two-state solution isn't possible. >> we just have a few minutes lef. michael and joe, want to address any of that? >> on the strength of the israeli right, i believe it was clear because it was due to a security concern. it has been that way since the the second intifada, and i think that is the way it is going to remain. israelis have security concerns and i think they are rightly held and it is certainly making sense they are going to be attracted to parties that address those concerns to the extent that israeli voters want them addressed. and that is not to say that there is not a big chunk of israelis who are still in favor of a two-state solution. let's not forget the 2009 elections, the party that won

the elections won 39 to 49, but the reason livni didn't become the prime minister was because she could not put a coalition together. but the vote leader in 2009 was a party that was running on a platform of tuesday solutions. certainly, security is paramount for many israeli voters and does explain the right of the israeli right ring. >> joe, final thoughts? >> hard to know what to say. obviously, we disagree about israel doing everything possible to spare civilians, and i am not sure about picayune situations you said i raised to the contrary.

one of the purposes it can serve is leverage for the state of israel or any other state where we are talking about wrongdoing that needs to be investigated to pressure them what they should be doing in the first place. >> i want to thank our panelists and thank you for being with us today. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> the nebraska supreme court hears oral argument. then, president obama's news conference. after that, the american history to work. the westward expansion in the united states. court heard supreme oral argument in the dispute root of the keystone pipeline. approved revised route. landowners challenge the decision. a lower court ruled the governor did not have the authority to apprth