, i would say, look at these three people on stage. i go to muslim conferences across america. i am absolutely inspired and energized by the people i meet. sorry if i sound patronizing, but female leaders who i meet, doing amazing things, picking fights with police commissioners, congressman, foreign governments. i go back to the u.k. and say, i am inspired. talking about the cliché example of the bad leader. you know what, we are in a good place right now. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much, everyone for an amazing,. please give them another round . kept you af we little bit late. we are trying to be culturally

>> in a few moments, examining the political implications of the current israeli-palestinian conflict. then a look at russian relations. and groverh nader norquist discuss how political parties can work together. >> with congress returning monday, here is a message to congress from one of this years c-span student cam competition winners. >> water, it makes up 75% of our bodies. take water away and humanity would perish within a week. water is the most vital substance to a human body yet it is because of us humans that nearly 50% of all lakes, bays, and estuaries are unsuitable for use due to pollution.

the u.s., we have learned to take water for granted. faucets, bottled water, and flushed toilets reinforce the same idea. water is an unlimited resource. thestep outside and diminishing condition tells a different story. marineollution kills life, destroys ecosystems, and disrupts an already fragile food chain. animals are not the only ones that suffer the negative effects of water pollution. congress, in 2014, you must provide federal funding for water treatment across the country. it must stop here. >> join us wednesday during "washington journal." a group of foreign-policy experts are just abated in a

discussion friday on the israeli-palestinian conflict. representatives from both sides of the dispute discussed the political and humanitarian implications of the latest conflict in gaza. by theent is hosted middle east institute and the foundation for middle east peace. it is one hour and 20 minutes. usthank you all for joining this afternoon. my name is matt and i am the foundation -- the president of the foundation for middle east peace. after 50 days of war, israel and hamas reached a cease-fire on august 26. the office for the con of humanitarian affairs reports 2104 were killed including 1004 hundred 62 civilians, 495 children and 253 women. the tabulation is ongoing.

the key question is what will it take to transmit the current truce into a longer endeavor. how can we avoid getting here ?gain the center for the middle east policy at brookings and a founding board member of the american egyptian rule of law association. deviously serving as an advisor and permanent status negotiations with israel from 2004 to 2009.

michael is the program director at the institute and a current participant at the atlantic council. officerforeign surface a book thatlishes you should all read. middle east and north africa division, an expert on middle rights issues. the bimonthly middle eastern magazine report -- to set up the discussion here, first i would like to go to howard and michael to discuss some of the domestic political dynamics among palestinians and among israelis that have been driving the events of the past few weeks, the reconciliation agreement between the palestinians.

go to joen and i will with comment on international humanitarian law and questions sides during the gaza war. take it away. >> inc. you, matt. thank you all for being here. i was asked to talk a little bit about the impact on palestinian domestic politics. on the surface it seems pretty , superficially, the main impact is that thomas has hamas hasonger -- become stronger.

politically, it has been strengthened. he was seen as marginalized in the process and seen as being ineffective. seen theou may have recent poll by the palestinian -- you never know the full name. the palestinian center for research. hamas went from being very weak. from being quite strong, even

within gaza, it holds true. s's reality is that hama resistance has been more effective than the approach focuseds been centrally on the diplomatic process. he has been ineffective not just in gaza but you have to look at it in context of the broader middle east peace process which is his bread and butter. he is all about his credibility and the legitimacy of negotiating a two state solution. it has not gone all that well. even the broader goal of national liberation.

certain extent, at least momentarily, they have been able to restore some sense of palestinian pride and it is important to not underestimate the importance of these intangibles for both. the symbolism is very important for a national liberation movement. , the newfound popularity might be fleeting, but i think it is what abbasre than has going for him. his credibility rests almost entirely on the negotiations process and bringing about a two state solution which is dependent upon the u.s.. surface, i think the picture is a little bit more complicated. hamas, the at within

lines between them have been blurred over the years. if you look inside, you see internal cleavages with both camps. i think those have been exacerbated by this conflict. you have this division between the leadership inside gaza and outside, which is classic palestinian history. the distinction between leadership in the territory, palestine -- you also have the military political split which i think was exacerbated during the war. in various moments, it wasn't clear who was calling the shots. to think ofher ways it in terms of radicals and pragmatists.

the internal cleavages have been intensified by the conflict and they need to be worked out. the same is true on the other side of the political equation in palestine. plo are notoriously dysfunctional politically. there is chronic dysfunction in these institutions. fatah itself, it has been true for a long time. more specifically to the gaza seen -- iwe have wouldn't call it isolation, but -- he is becoming a little bit more alone since he is personally committed with the negotiations process. that is dependent on the united states and others in the inner circle of the plo/pa leadership

are beginning to realize that that is a dead-end. so he is sort of the last remaining holdout in terms of the american-led peace process approach. so that is part of the equation. and fatahd, howamas have grown stronger or weaker vis-à-vis each other but both have been weakened in absolute terms, in terms of the broader palestinian political arena. it's problematic because we don't currently have viable alternatives. and we have not yet seen a credible or viable third wave or however we want to term it. we have to look at palestinian politics in terms of broader

politics. the trends within very much reflect the trend in the broader arab world. specifically political dysfunction. the same sorts of contradictions that led to the arab spring or alsowas the arab spring exist in palestinian society. crisis in the leadership and this is true across the region. there are dysfunctional or nonfunctioning political institutions in the case of the palestinians both the pa and the plo. you have this generational divide where a new generation of hasers or a new generation a very different set of demands and their elders have allowed

for. all of this does not necessarily bode well. you do need political forces to sustain ae able long-term uprising or mass mobilization of that sort. you do need a credible organizational structure on the ground. or one reason or another, the two main groups are not necessarily interested in much more narrow parochial ways that would be needed for mass mobilization. were still advising the palestinians, which i'm not, but if i were, i would say that the notrity now needs to be on negotiations or resistance, but on fixing the palestinian house

and putting the palestinian house back in order. first and foremost, because i think gaza depends on it. i think it's impossible to envision any sort of reconstruction much less improvement to the situation without genuine and practical hamas-pa conflict on the ground. we see that reflected in the cease-fire talks and in the terms of the cease-fire where it is clear now and before the war that there needs to be a return to gaza to allow the borders to be open. active artistic patient and support. essential for them to be grow.o survive, much less

it is also true because in the , it depends on not just institutions, but i wouldn't expect to see elections any time sooner. it might actually complicate things. is the actually needed palestinian national consensus. i think it is probably equally true. palestinian on politics. palestinians need to rethink their basic assumptions of their national aspirations.

i will end on this note. they are important old and new palestinian constituencies that were exasperated or intensified by the gaza conflict. thes the cradle of movement. in the west elite and the gulf and elsewhere. and also, palestinian citizens of israel. a sense of pan palestinian solidarity that i think was awakened by the gaza conflict. both of those constituencies will need to be accommodated in one form or the other. it may be in the context of israeli politics for palestinian citizens of israel.

that certainly the diaspora has in the rethinking of internal palestinian politics. bearing in mind that gaza is, in many ways, a cross-section of palestinian -- the global palestinian community in which it is made up of 60% or 70% descendents of refugees from 1948. >> michael, just to set things up a bit, the recent poll that we saw showing hamas having benefited by the war.

it was overwhelming public , one was the stated goal of diminishing and not crushing them. also shown that netanyahu now finds himself in trouble with competitors to his right like bennett and lieberman. can you address that? >> thanks for putting this panel together. i think it is useful when thinking about israeli politics in the contacts -- context of , beforermath of gaza the gaza war and where things are now. they have real challenges of the , the serious nature

netanyahu personally. in many ways, it has been the invisible man. more vocal opponents are actually in the cabinet. the view was firmly in can -- firmly in control. it did not create any political crisis for bb. first, there were low expectations across the political sector. in fact, many people did not want them. really did not present much of a challenge domestically. another factor was the sense that the situation for israel, despite many warning signs on

the horizon was not quite dire and they are forced to make a move. it was a focus on how maas -- hamas, before the war, at its weakest point. they assume this was a situation that was going to continue. much of the discussion was focused on the pa and focus on abbas, despite the fact that these talks have collapsed. then we moved during the war and there was a huge out pouring of support. any time there is fighting in

.srael it still shapes the israeli psyche in ways that have changed possibly forever. israelismajority of will not tolerate any type of rocket fire going to israel. while rockets are coming in, netanyahu really had blinding support to deal with it. the kidnapping and murder of the added toaeli teens what was already overwhelming support for a military campaign against hamas. netanyahu really use this to his advantage. he sort of had a free pass initially on the shifting goals, depending on if the goals were to eradicate hamas, restore

tunnels, theyte shifted as the war went along. as the war went on, it went from a high of about 82% down into the 30's. there was an approval rating of 3% at one point, and a drop of 50% is still not something that any israeli leader likes to see. in 2012, the israeli operation was relatively quick.

crucially, the rocket fire continues. has it rejected, broken, or lapsed, they realized pretty quickly that they had no long-term strategy. airstrikes were not going to be enough. and so, there was a sense toward the end that netanyahu had not handled things in the ideal way. is over,the war netanyahu's position is a bit less stable. politicians are pushing things much more to the right. they now have to deal with challenges, both of him his own party. if you look at the polls that have come out over the last few days, it is clear that the right in general has benefited from

the fighting in gaza. have anywherels between 29 and 31 seats accrued. at the moment they controlled 31 but 11 of those seats, they are used -- [indiscernible] they made a deal before the election. seats of their own, somewhere between 29 and 31. they currently have 12 seats and toa poll, anywhere from 18 20. they are anywhere from 9%-12% and labor has stated the same and if an election was held today, you would probably have

120where between 80 out of going to parties on the right. with in it, there's serious pressure on netanyahu and his position has never been great and the u.s., people think of netanyahu as far right and he is certainly right when the but not on the far right. netanyahuit seems, has at the left. are far moreembers right-wing than netanyahu. many of the more right wing anders who are all younger sort of amendment 13 party they said the u.s., it netanyahu did not go far enough and advocated israel to

read occupy for however long it takes to stamp out hamas. netanyahu is not willing to it realizes himself he isn't feasible but he faces his own party. the chair of the central committee and who was the deputy minister until netanyahu fired him the first week of the war for criticizing the government's approach is convening the party congress later this month where no doubt there will be nothing but lots of vocal criticisms on the conduct of the war. outside of netanyahu's party as i mentioned is the jewish home party is much more popular now than it was.

bennett is taking serious strides to capitalize on that. he announced he would like to make changes to the constitution that would make it a more secular party which is significant because he's looking to appeal to the right and for the first time i believe he actually has a shot at being the bearer of the right and perhaps even becoming pregnant mr. and so all these things are pushing netanyahu steadily to the right and it seems like the announcement of the 980 acres that were prepared on the state land because in the absence of the occupying, netanyahu know that he has to do something and the easiest way to do that in the politic of the israeli right is to announce the long-term planning processes for settlement. in general, they don't want to risk a hamas takeover in the west bank and the aftermath of the type of the war and this type of fighting generally makes israelis more hawkish and security conscious than they would otherwise be.

so the trend in my view is not going to the abyss. whatever the elections are and there is a wide speculation they will be within the next year, whatever the next elections are i have very little doubt of the parties are going to increase their share in the government. whether that means a larger share or if they suffer at the hands of the ied there is going to be a likely more right wing. and of course, that is going to impact the relations of the palestinians going forward. and the peace process more generally. >> i am going to turn to joe to address the international humanitarian issues relating to not only the war but conduct of

the war, bombardment and the use firing mortars by hamas and of the policy of the blockade. one of the key elements of the demand is worth rendering this and even the blockade was a condition of the cease-fire that was not implemented and this is going to be one of the most important items for the discussion in the talks that i very much hope will take place in egypt. if you can take a crack at that. >> thank you, matt and kate for holding this event and inviting me to be a part of it. human rights watch obviously as the name would indicate looks at the human rights violations by state, by political authorities. but we also monitor compliance with the laws of war, the humanitarian law. one component is the geneva convention. human rights watch doesn't take

positions on whether any party to any conflict should take up arms or launch an attack. those are political issues and political questions that we don't address. in part in order to be able to impartially look at how the fighting and the armed conflict is conducted by the parties. the two issues that we are concerned with here before i go into some of the details are one is accountability that is for unlawful behavior and noncompliance with the law of the war and other serious violations and the other is the humanitarian consequences of the war in particular and the policies that set up the conflict to begin with among which i would include not just mentioning the blockade but intensively in effect since 2007 since hamas basically took over

as the political power in gaza. and really, since 2005 with the withdrawal of the unilateral withdrawal of the military forces and settlers under the prime minister. the accountability issue i want to stress because it seems to me the elements that should be part of any kind of looking forward. and it is what has been consistently missing in terms of any of the peace talks agenda as we have seen no matter how unsuccessful they may have been and it's certainly not because of the accountability that was

among the issues raised. it's been a consistent issue for us looking at the various phases to confine ourselves to gaza. i think what we have seen a litt dispiting is we haven't seen much change looking from one conflict to another. 2009, 2012 at about 2014 and the behavior of the combatants, hamas's behavior into the conduct of hostilities. let me say one thing about with the international demand that syrian law requires. the key principle is the distinction. the parties have to distinguish at all times between the combatants and civilians, but -- between military objectives into civilian properties. and they may only target combatants and structures or areas that have immediate military gain. targeting civilians is obviously sort of the first order of the

prohibition. but then there are other areas in the indiscriminate attacks, so there might be an attack where there is a legitimate attack by combatants or a place or structure or building, an apartment building for instance where maybe arms have been stored making it a legitimate target in itself but where the harm to the use of the weapons that are used, the character of the fighting and so forth results in making the attack essentially indiscriminate for the civilians, many civilians are harmed. the humanitarian law understands sort of from the get-go that civilians are going to be hurt. the point is to minimize the harm so the parties in the conflict have to take into to use the language of the

conventions all feasible precautions to avoid harming civilians. on the palestinian side, hamas and recalling also that the combatants are not only hamas but they include the forces like jihad for instant into some of the secular palestinian parties. obviously the rockets launched into israel were first of all the reason that we would say does constitute to the war crime in and a sense of targeting civilians. many groups, they said they are attacking population centers essentially and so with a state they stayed in many cases is the aim as such and the type of weapons they are using are

inherently not guided and cannot be used in a way that could distinguish between military targets and civilian areas and structures. so from the get-go you have a situation where that kind of weapons the palestinians are using in fighting the attacks in israel itself are at the very least inherently indiscriminate and then in terms of the fighting and the combat that went on once the forces moved in and even during the campaign the issue of the extent to which hamas did or did not take a all of the feasible precautions in terms of carrying out military operations in the population areas. the idea of the defense forces have documented and i will go

into a little bit of detail a couple of instances where it appears the individual civilians were targeted into trying to flee the combat zone in the instruction of the idea. this is something that we also saw in the previous conflict in 2012, and especially in the 2009. the issue is whether the attacks were indiscriminate or not. so there was the idea that there were military targets in a particular building or near a particular building for instance the attacks that killed large numbers of civilians. about a number of cases that we investigated, we found there actually was no military objective. there were no combatants in the area as far as we could

determine. and the israeli government committee's response did not come up with any explanation as to why they launched those particular attacks. i wanted to say a little bit about -- first i should say that one of the problems we have had in addressing this particular conflict is a lack of access. the last time we were able to go into gaza, in other words israel if we asked for permission to go into the fall of 2009 many weeks before it started, we were refused. up to that point, the request and the delays and so forth we would eventually get in. we've not been allowed in

through since 2009. in the other instances we were able to go in after the hostilities ceased after the cease-fire was in place after the crossing and sinai between gaza and egypt. but the relations with egyptian government currently are about as good as they are in the israeli government and they have not been able to get in that way either but it makes it more difficult to do what we think is needed in terms of conducting an investigation that when you actually get to the site of a possible crime or war crime when you can't evaluate the damage and make a judgment as to whether that's what then was appropriate under the circumstances, survivors and so forth.

our ability to do that is very limited. we do have research assistance on the ground and the residents of gaza but obviously the people who bring in the kind of added expertise that that we have in assessing the armed conflict situation where issues of all feasible precautions what does that mean come issues that are disproportionate. again, those depend on not reading the newspapers and saying thousands of palestinians were killed, scores of israelis were killed, disproportionate, no. one can talk about it in a political sense disproportionate but in the legal sense as implications for accountability -- you have to look at each individual attack and make that assessment and i would invite you to look at our website and see the work that we have done.

on the figures, the number of palestinians killed. the idf claims the combatants in the terrorist operatives and they said that there are 800 other cases that are not yet determined. they are sure we will send, many of the cases were combatants. the phrase that the israelis used in the terrorist operatives is much less clear-cut at least in terms of humanitarian law.

a person belonging to hamas, for instance, is not a legitimate target under the rules, under the law. the policy into gaza conflict has been to treat these people as legitimate targets so that is one issue that we would take strong issue with the israeli understanding. a lot of attention has focused on the relatively high-profile attacks that have involved schools. both the israeli attacks and the three of which were in habitat by displaced persons, not students and that they resulted in a number of civilian deaths. we investigated those cases in which there were fatalities and the kind of responses we got as to why this particular school is targeted or why it is hit.

in one case, they said in july 24, the school -- i think where 13 people were killed including six children, they said that there was one mortar shell however the witnesses, the survivors to that attack told us that there were four shells that landed directly outside of the school's compound. the israelis said there had been a hamas operation firing anti-tank missiles near the schools but again, not indicating what constitutes mere in this case a fairly loose term.

they also asserted that when the mortar hit, it is empty which isn't something that again is a variance with what people on the scene told us. there was another strike on august 3 that didn't involve an artillery and mortar but involved a guided spike missile. it hit right outside of a school, 10 meters from the entrance and children in particular were people who were, the displaced people who were taking shelter in the school were out at the gate buying food, water, sweets, this kind of thing. the idf said there were eight

people killed, some children, and they were attacking the three islamic militants who were riding by on a motorcycle. now, they are assuming that's correct they are certainly a legitimate target but particularly with the spike, it's the sort of thing that the israelis should be using in this conflict. but why did they hit before it got there? in other words, not ready to draw the conclusions from what we know about this incident but it warrants investigations. one of the things that seems new looking at conflict seems to be more precise to attacked the residence homes and the civilian structures have been damaged, destroyed in previous conflicts as well. but it was more from the consequence of the use of artillery which has a very wide damage radius rather than the

precision weapons but what we have seen is some precision attacks. for instance, this isn't one that we investigated, but the human rights group did where there is an attack on july 29 on the four-story residential building in that killed 25 people. there was no warning as far as one could determine no explanation. they did learn that one of the residences was an operative, a political operative in the senior leadership of the palestine, one long islamist long-standing political group. two questions at least, is he by being a political operative eventually the unknown military engagements was he a legitimate target?

and then the second, even if he he was a legitimate target, it seems pretty clear that attacking this residence is such devastating consequences would constitute the indiscriminate attack. let me just say a word quickly about the humanitarian impact. i think that back in 2012 the un put out a report called the gaza 20/20 is looking at if the present trends continue and again this was 2012, these are going to be the issues in terms of housing units that are needed in health care, electricity, sanitation, these issues. and one has has to when one looks not only of human casualties but that the destruction of homes and schools and the power plant into gaza's one electric power plant if 20/20 has a telescope into 2014.

we are looking at a society that has been, you know, under siege in the sense of this blockade, this rather strenuous blockade for many years now. just to return to the accountability question. the first principle is that individual states are responsible for the conduct of the residents, certainly if they're armed forces and security forces. so in the first instance under the principle justice and global justice in this case israel or the palestinian authorities should be undertaking these kind of investigations of the conduct of their forces. up until now, both sides although israel for its part has a just system have really failed that test. given that it seems that element

on the ground that they at the very least provide some sort of leverage or improved behavior in this regard in addressing these violations of the law, frankly is a national criminal court. unlike the institution that's been set up to deal with situations with states that have a primary responsibility that are unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility. we are in a new situation politically in that since the last conflict of 2012, the palestinian authority could ratify the treaty which would make it a party to the statute and therefore eligible to

present cases, allegations for the investigation by the international criminal court. that something they didn't have that capacity until a year or so ago legally speaking, diplomatically speaking. israel, while it signed the treaty back in 1999, has ever ratified it and has indicated that it has no plans to ratify. the other way the case gets taken up by the international criminal court is if it is referred by the un security council which they've done in the case of libya. you know, politically the chances of that happening going to israel or the palestinians is absolutely nil. that is one new element to look at as we look ahead.

>> i am just going to do a round of questions with the panelists here. and then after after that we will come to the audience for more questions. first to khaled, you had talked about the crisis of legitimacy in the palestinian movement and the need to establish a consensus but you also said that elections could complicate things more. so my question is how then to create that and how to generate that consensus and what mechanisms other than election is here? >> it is a dilemma that is a dilemma that i think a lot of countries have confronted over the last several years. do you hold an election first to determine how do you decide who gets to write the rules of the game in the constitution? for for example, should you hold an

election first or play to the group that is perceived as rep resentative and it is kind of a chicken and egg a sort of question. i think that with experience as i interpret it as borne out that holding elections to decide we saw that happen in egypt where unless there is a broad consensus of the main societal and political actors upfront on the rules of the game, then the outcome of any election or political process is likely to be contrasted. we saw that both in the cases of the election and after his overthrow. in the case of the palestinians, they are based on winners and losers and then you are deciding

the way forward and it means hamas and fatah have a different approach. one is committed to a two state solution and the other is not. it has a very different vision of how to resolve the conflict as well as how to govern palestinians. so, you can't make those subject to an election because they are affected by everything including the weather, literally. if you try to hold an election in this environment, you are going to get a very distorted, skewed outcome that will not be to the advantage of those currently in power i think. on the one hand, you need the right conditions but you also need the broad agreement. the way that it has operated in the past, plo is operated on the basis of consensus. and that is the consensus of the main political factions. and that is true for the first half of the plo existence until

1988 and it hasn't been true since because you have these major political organizations like hamas and a few secular groups outside of the umbrella of the plo. palestinians are now paying the price for allowing these groups to operate outside of the agreed-upon consensual national umbrella. on the one hand, the plo claims to be the legitimate representative but on the other hand, it does not include these major factions that have attacked. some of them have won elections so they clearly belong in the big tent of the palestinian politics, but they are not

represented. elections are not a substiitute for a national agreement. it is messy and may seem undemocratic, but i think in this environment it is essential to forge a national concensus

based almost on an intuitive sense of being representative. i think it can be done. andas happened in the past even in the palestinian context. >> thanks. michael, stepping outside domestic politics, i wonder if you could address the relationship between israel and egypt and the way it has been managed over the cease-fires. there was an interesting piece in "the wall street journal" that talked about the closeness that has developed such as the united states is almost being cut out of the discussions. what is your perspective of egypt's role and will it impact politics in israel at all? >> i think you have to say it is constructive if for no other reason than egypt was the one

party that brought the sides together to brokered the cease-fire. so in that sense it was certainly constructive. the first couple weeks, the fact egypt had no creditability with hamas and that egypt didn't want to do much to do with hamas at all was a factor in extending the fighting. in contrast to 2012, where hamas trusted egypt as a broker and this time they did not. i don't know how constructive they were able to play in the beginning. as the fighting went on, egypt was able to broker a deal, and that is certainly constructive. in term of how it factors into the israeli politics, netanyahu has been a phrase being used talking about new diplomatic horizons, and a lot of people assumed that meant with the

palestinians. i don't think it does. i think he is talking about a wider regional initiative where israeli is aligned with states like egypt, jordan, saudi arabia in an effort to limit the influence of hamas and other muslim brotherhood groups. he is looking to use the fight and the region where you have a split among arab states and if you widen it you can include turkey. i think he is looking to take advantage of that situation and get israel firmly into the camp of what we might call status quo arab state versus revision arab states.

so to the extent that a closer bond with egypt helps israel get into the that group than i think israel is going to try to play that angle as hard as it can. i am not sure how feasible it is. i think netanyahu thinks he has a stronger than he actually does. but between that and the fact that israel has lots of natural gas to sell and signed an mou this week with jordan that was worth $15 billion, i believe. and they are looking to do something similar with egypt. between energy and regional dynamic and betwene a joint desire between egypt and israel to limit hamas' influence, i think netanyahu and his government will try to get as close to egypt as they can. >> thank you. i think we have about 20, 25 minutes left. going to the audience for

questions now. please identify yourself, your affiliation, and keep the question short and ask the question in the form of a question, please. >> i am jim. i don't know if any of you read the op-ed piece by former ambassador kirkser. he was the former u.s. ambassador to israel during the first bush ii administration. his proposal was twofold. one was to bring in an international force with boots on the ground in gaza that would provide security and maybe even governance of gaza with the palestinian authority playing a role, but a light role given their dysfunction. and basically they serve as a referee between the plo and

hamas. and both boots on the ground was saying he expected them to be arab boots on the ground and maybe turkish but certainly not american. secondly, most interestingly he linked that to an international peace conference where the same countries would then be negotiating with israel and palestinian authority on a more sure palestinian authority on a more long-term permanent solution. he thought israel would be much more prone to do that today given what happened in gaza and the need for international force in gaza, which he thinks israel would accept. again, this is all him saying that. my question to both of you, from a palestinian and an israeli point of view, how do you think this will fly in those respective societies? >> i will start.

i don't know how well the idea of international force would fly within israeli society. certainly not a force that includes turkey at this time. i think in general the thrust of public opinion within israel now is that the best solution would be for the palestinian authority forces to takeover security and border crossings in gaza. and whatever beast the israeli government has over the palestinian authority, they have very few with p.a. security in the west bank. so i think there is some sort of level of implicit trust that exists among the israeli government and large portions of israeli society for the p.a. security forces that would not necessarily translate into a wider force comprised of soldiers from other arab countries and from turkey. in general, i think the israelis are wary of internationizing the conflict too much. certainly, israel's experience with the international community

least. and the level of trust is very low. i don't imagine there would be a huge amount of positive for the international force as opposed to a p.a. force. >> i think you can make the argument on the palestinian as well. there is not a lot of incentive to have an international force. i think there would be a lot of disagreement among the regional stake stakeholders and the united states and others. hamas has said they will not accept an international presence. the p.a. has no intent to accept

the international role of governing. that was the purpose of the palestinian authority. and in a way it is kind of a setback for the idea of a palestinian state. i think the problem with palestinian governance is not they don't know how to govern. it is there is this lack of basic national concensus, that that is what is missing and the conversation isn't being had in the same way the egyptian and syrian conversation isn't being had. there are different degrees of consequences. that basic consent needs to be achieved by various palestinian groups. that is the impediment. i don't think it is a technical

know how. both p.a. and hamas can govern. and both have shown they are able to maintain security. the question about israel's security relates to political goals and objectives. there is an outstanding conflict between palestinians and between palestinians and israel. there is a blockade, an occupation, and there are issues. that is the source of insecurity and violence, not primarily because of a lack of capacity i would argue. there is a lack of will to maintain israel's security because one side has an incentive to harm israel's security because of these ongoing issues. so unless the political issues can be resolved, i cannot imagine -- it isn't a situation of technical capacity. >> joe, you want to address? >> i didn't see the editorial but the way you present it it

doesn't sound realistic it me. there is one where area where more shoes on the ground, boots on the ground, that in terms of the crossings between israel, egypt, and gaza -- there is a security role in terms of -- and this would address or could address the blockaid issue -- if you had an inter international team of experts who could be monitoring for the transit of arms or equipment of military use and planning for follow-up monitoring of dual use items and would basically allow everything else in. and obviously that force, whatever its particular complexion, would need the confidence of israeli and whoever you are dealing with on the palestinian side. that was attempted in the past where the european union was supposed to provide those

elements, and it ended up being a lack of israeli cooperation in allowing them to move to the border area and carry out their assigned roles. that would be worth exploring. >> and the u.k., france, and germany all indicated -- they extended the mandate of the mission and they indicated they would be willing to support the p.a. coming back in. so i think that is a possibility. can we go to the gentlemen in the front here. >> i am from washington, d.c., and i thank the institute and

the panels for this afternoon. i have two questions. the question is you mentioned importantly participation of the international of the palestinians to be consulted. how do you see that being carried out in practice? and my second question is, is there any way to bring netanyahu and his bunch and hamas accountable for what they have done? >> on the first question, there have been a lot of proposals put out there emanating from inside the palestinian territory on how to reintegrate them into conversation at least, if not institutionally. bear in mind, the plo began as a diaspora movement and there is

where it was forged. most of the current leadership in the plo are themselves refugees and not from the west bank. some people have proposed elections. election can be held in lebanon and syria for refugees. the mechanisms are there. it is a question of political will. the same way plo was convened, created without a territory or a base, it can be reinvented in a sense where the mechanisms are out there and what isn't there is the political will by the current leadership, whether it is hamas or fatah other factions to reintegrate the diaspora

institutionally, not on an individual bases. that would take rethinking the plo as an institution, and that conversation is happening among a lot of palestinian intellectuals, but hasn't yet produced an outcome. >> on the accountability question, it is a good question and i tried to suggest in my talk that, you know, perhaps the dimension of these national criminal court has a greater viability today. i would not say it is great, but it is more than it had been. i think there are steps along these lines that individual states can take, particularly states that are close allies of one party or the other.

certainly in the case of israel's close allies, starting with the united states, for instance there is a u.s. law on the books referred to as the leahy law, that says units of a security force cannot receive u.s. assistance or arms or funding if they have been credibly shown to have been involved in war crimes and human rights violations in war. as i understand it and i have been told -- and those

assessments are supposed to be made in the u.s. embassy and there is no body in israel in the u.s. consolate that has been followed up with. that would be interesting to , to pursue this. if it is true, you know, to remedy that. so there would be that kind of, you know, mandated reporting that might have consequences and i am not looking here in terms of, you know, so much cutting off arms supplies as much as giving incentives, in this case, to the israelis, to carry out more serious investigations and hold their own officers accountable. >> i do apologize in advance if i cannot get to you. i just want to hit around the room a bit. i will come back to you. let me go to the lady on the aisle.

>> i am a physician and a member of j street. my question is for mr. coplow. you have not talk about the united states -- when you discussed domestic politics, you didn't mention the united states. but the right wing and ultra right wing in israel -- do they not care what the united states this happening -- thinks or assume the united states will back them no matter what? >> i am not sure it is an issue of not caring what the united states thinks. sure, there are some that view antagonistic agains4t israel, as absurd as that is. i don't think this is an sure of not caring what the u.s. thinks. i think it is more of an issue

of trying to figure out at what level the u.s. cares. to the extent the u.s. cares about very deeply, you will see the israelis hold off. i will give you an example. before the 2013 election, the israeli government announced tender plans to build an e-1 which is the area in the east bank with a lot of contention and the buidling would cut the northern and southern west bank in half. that was a plan that was never going to be implemented because that is one of the u.s.' clear red lines, and it has been for a while. it wasn't implemented and i don't expect it to be. so on things like that the israeli government certainly cares what the united states thinks. on other issues, if they think they can get away with it

without consequences, they'll do it. that does not make them unique. the relationship between israeli and the united states is a lot more complex and complicated than the united states' relationship with other countries. so there is a lot more back and forth, and this red line gets tested far more often. but i would not say in general netanyahu and more mainstream politicians don't care but it is more a matter of testing the boundaries. >> this gentlemen here in the blue shirt. wait for the mic, please. >> i am herbert grossman and i am a retired judge. my main question is when you talk about two factions among the palestinians and one

faction of the plo or fatah or the palestinian authority is in favor of two states and hamas is opposed to that you are only talking about the surface. the fact of the matter is, whether you agree with me or not, most of the palestinians believe abbas is in favor of a temporary two-state and that eventually they will take over the other state. so it is a matter of stages. whether he actually believes that or not we could argue all day. but the fact is if the palestinians saw he really was in favor of a final situation of two states they would not vote for it. he would get the same percentage of votes that were low in the previous election. 3%. he is 79 years old now. polls indicate a

two-state solution isn't what the bulk of the arabs in the arabs in israel want, in palestine. so what benefit is there for israel to go into negotiation for a two-state solution if they will end up with the same thing they have from hamas and this goes from your position who doesn't tell us why the right ring has ascended, especially since the last war, the fact that most people realize if they give over strategic positions in the west bank they will end up with the same thing they have in the southern border with hamas and on the northern border with hezbollah -- rockets, tunnels and artillery aimed at the coastal heartland of palestinian.

and the third thing is that everybody in this room recognizes that israel did everything it could to spare civilian casualties -- [laughter] >> please, all right. ladies and gentlemen, please. did, noterything they bombs on the roofs of houses, the calling off of airstrikes -- everybody knows that. this stuff here doesn't belong in this kind of discussion here. but you are picking on little things which -- to talk about the international court which is loaded against israel is no solution at all. those are my comments on that. i do not want to prolong you.

>> let's address that, as you will. >> i will take the first piece. i don't know if i agree with the characterization that most palestinians believe in two states in order to in two states in order to take over israel eventually. the reality is more nuanced on that. on the israeli and palestinian sides, the two-state solution has been a precarious concept always. on the mindset of both sides they would go for one state in their ideal way. for palestinians it is one historical state of palestine and there are palestinians who are citizens of israel, who were refugees or from the west bank -- they are all palestinians. i think the dream is to have a single democratic state from the river to the sea. but there was a moment in which

there was a broad political and even popular consensus to move away from that and say if we as palestinian are going to exercise self determination it will be in the context of a two-state solution. the two state solution for palestinians has been the least worse option always. it is not the best option. and that is why you see the slim plurality that supports it. if you measure support for a two-state solution and poll 1990 and 1988 and poll it today, you will find different results i think, especially from the younger generation. the younger generation said you tried to get two states. it didn't work. we had the experiment and it never went anywhere because israel isn't prepared to let go of control. the question you ask is what

incentive does israel have. the bottom line is palestinians are after self determination and they can only get it two ways and that is in the context of two states or in the context of one state. it is essentially a choice that israel has. there is not another way for palestinians have to rights, to have citizenship rights equal with other people in the world outside of those two. we have a one-state reality, but it isn't one based on equality or rights, not based on self-determination. so if the two-state solution, which is a compromise, from the standpoint of the palestinians, if that is rejected, which sounds like you reject, then there will ultimately be no choice for palestinians to pursue, if they want to have rights, and of course they do,

other than to seek them through a one-state, one-man, one-vote state, and it can be called israel, it can be called palestinian, it can be called anything they want. but they will seek their rights one way or another. it is up for israel to decide which one it is prepared to accommodate. i think from how i understand israeli interests, a two-state solution would be more favorable to them than a one state which i think would be aninevitability if the two-state solution isn't possible. >> we just have a few minutes lef. michael and joe, want to address any of that? >> on the strength of the israeli right, i believe it was clear because it was due to a security concern. it has been that way since the

the second intifada, and i think that is the way it is going to remain. israelis have security concerns and i think they are rightly held and it is certainly making sense they are going to be attracted to parties that address those concerns to the extent that israeli voters want them addressed. and that is not to say that there is not a big chunk of israelis who are still in favor of a two-state solution. let's not forget the 2009 elections, the party that won the elections won 39 to 49, but the reason livni didn't become the prime minister was because she could not put a coalition together. but the vote leader in 2009 was a party that was running on a

platform of tuesday solutions. certainly, security is paramount for many israeli voters and does explain the right of the israeli right ring. >> joe, final thoughts? >> hard to know what to say. obviously, we disagree about israel doing everything possible to spare civilians, and i am not sure about picayune situations you said i raised to the contrary. one of the purposes it can serve is leverage for the state of israel or any other state where we are talking about wrongdoing that needs to be investigated to pressure them what they should be doing in the first place. >> i want to thank our panelists and thank you for being with us

today. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> coming up next, a look at the current state of u.s.-russia relations. cover --ph nader and grover norquist discuss how parties can work together. 6:00, aing up that question and answer with david farenthold.

secretary sylvia burwell at 10:30 a.m. >> here are a few of the comments we have recently received. and am thankful for c-span that like lasts night am a you had a book called , " we will stop your heart. " work, keep up the good i'm not crazy about the group discussion. i am also grateful that you have a phone line that we can call. not all of us senior citizens can work a computer. a show on c-span, i

don't remember if it was c-span , but what in two thought was nice about how they conducted the meeting was that when somebody got to the microphone to ask a question, whomever the moderator or host they called the audience member andumber -- then they leave, would say whatever they were going to say about the question or statement and then the person that asked the question got to have an actual conversation to clarify the intent of what the question or issue was about. with the way it is that most people call in and then you hang up on them, and then the panel speaker speaks often left field and doesn't get to the hard details and meet that the

question of the caller was talking about. >> i'm calling to tell you about cspan3. i sure enjoy your programs on the weekend. thanks for running this thing on nixon and all the different things you did with the different histories and everything. i sure do appreciate it. >> continue to let us know what you think of the programs you 'se watching area at: cous mments@cspan.org. a discussion about the current state of relations between russia and the united states. in light of the ongoing russia-ukraine conflict,

scholars talk about security policy as it applies to the u.s. and russia. it is one hour 25 minutes. >> good afternoon, everyone. a welcome to the elliott school of international affairs. we at the institute are delighted to be hosting this event this afternoon on the u.s.-russian nuclear relationship, in partnership with our friends at harvard university. today's panel is the rollout of a new working paper. the paper which you should have been able to get a copy of is over on the table.

we all know that over the last several months u.s.-russian relations have been dominated by the ukraine crisis. the crisis is not entirely to blame or even mainly to blame for the current challenges in the u.s.-russian nuclear relationship, but it has sharpened them. for now the countries continue to implement the new start treaty that the countries concluded four years ago. it is no surprise to hear me say we have hit a large roadblock in our efforts to find the path to further nuclear arms reductions. some even fear that advances in arms control we have obtained could be rolled back, including with regard to the imf treaty that the u.s. government declared russia in violation earlier this year. our speakers and authors of the working paper were tasked recently with finding a solution to the many problems at the core

of the strategic relationship of the united states and russia. i'm happy to say they have found a solution. it is one of many. it is worth debating. it may -- have its detractors, but i say that as a promising one and a realistic one. in today's climate, the fact he can have u.s. and russian scholars continue to work together to devise attractive solutions to problems of global interests is something we can appreciate. before i introduce our speakers, i want to first give the floor to my colleague, timothy co colton. he is the cochair of the working group on the future of u.s. -russian relationships, and he can share with you more about this endeavor. tim? >> thanks. briefly some of you have been to other presentations wereof papers, although i don't

see as many bases as last time. i will give a compressed version. our project has been around for several years. we got started in the reset period. i do not think we were primarily stimulated by that, but it did not hurt. and our objective was really pretty simple. it was to bring together a modestly sized group of roughly a dozen on both sides of specialists from the two countries, equal in measure, funded by sources on either side of the border, so to say. in our case, the support at least in the last year or two has come almost entirely from the carnegie corporation of new york, for we are rate full. -- grateful. the organizational

in for this. on the russian side, our main partner now is a school of economics, which is one of russia's leading research universities. in terms of putting this together, i guess what we asked --aspired to was moving beyond morning half and analysis or headline-driven analysis, moving beyond also maybe about recrimination and the pass, to quit thinking about the future. we did not know what the near-term future held, of course. it is has not exactly fulfilled our hopes. we have not given up hope. the group is from equal proportions, and we wanted to have younger scholars, experts, both in russia and in this country. the russian cochairman is sergei kargonov, but most participation

is from younger cohorts. we wanted to do something to bridge what is a certain gap, sometimes i think, in perspectives between university -based academics like me, for example, and think tank types, especially on the american side. there is also some relevance on the russian side. in terms of problems we have chosen to address, we do this a couple of times a year. we have an extended meeting in moscow or in washington or in cambridge, massachusetts, and we address the single large thing which we select through consensus. and it was put in a very interesting way. what we should be trying to do early on was to untie some of

the knot in this relationship at. fixing the u.s.-relationship is not a new challenge. but we have been trying to do this for decades in the late soviet period and now post 1991, and there are certain recurrent problems that never seemed to go away or come back to haunt us in more intensive forms. the current ukraine crisis is a good example of that. in addition to our discussions we produce working papers, and that is why we're here today. that is an unusual characteristic of the project. at our last meeting here, somebody said, i think it was -- from brookings, that we are all familiar, most of us are familiar, at least, with cross-national groups that discuss things, but sitting down and writing something together when you're countries are not allied politically is quite a challenging thing in a rather rare thing endeavor -- rare endeavor. we have managed to do it, not without difficult at times, but

it has been a challenge, but i am largely met that challenge. we have produced a series of papers that are available at the project website. if anybody is interested, i took can tell you more. we have papers in the works, and all will have presentations here in washington. one of them is on afghanistan post 2014. one is on intervention and conflict a solution best conflict resolution. that is going to be a very difficult one to write, we will see. there is also one forthcoming on the arctic. so we are happy to have this to share with you, and without further ado, i will turn it over to introduce our speakers today.

thanks. >> thank you. first, i would like to welcome our colleague timofei bordachev who is here from moscow. he is the director for the center for comprehensive european and national studies at a school of economics in moscow, a national research university. at the school, he directs a program of international relations. he has authored several books in russia and several scores of articles on matters of internal elements of the e.u. and russian-e.u. relations over the last several years. he is a member of a discussion club. keith darden is an associate professor in the school of international service at american university.

a book of his was published in 2009 by cambridge, and his second book should be published also by cambridge very soon. professor darden taught 11 years at yale. with all of those introductions, done, now we turn with the main show. >> thank you very much. first, i must say i am very grateful for george washington university for hosting this event. and especially, because in my view this is very important now to speak for the russian and american scholars about the issues of final important to both countries. since, as i believe, only considering the issues of vital,

not secondary importance, for both countries, we can find sustainable, long-term solutions for our problems and how to to proceed with concrete diplomacy of the future. i must say i do believe that we are entering -- we entered a new stage of the international -- of the international relations. of course, we should not rely on the historic examples, but the most optimistic historical comparison would be the 19th century when the diplomacy need not mean finding solution, but diplomacy meant avoiding the conflict and keeping the peace.

so i think that with our paper, intention of which has been developed already about two years ago, we are trying to understand how both russia and the united states can, while keeping their own national interests, develop their sustainable relationship in the future. the relationship which are not going to be friendly, the relationship which are going to be mutually respectful. why do we believe it is possible? because despite the recent aggravation of the relationship, the cold war in its classic, conventional sense, as a systemic confrontation, is over. it is not going to be back. but yet, cold war thinking and

the international political system in force during the cold war remains a reference point for most contemporary writing on the u.s.-russian security relationship. even those now who proposed new models of international security refer to the cold war because the technical parameters, nuclear weapons, and political promoters of the mutual deterrence between russia and the united states were created during this period of nuclear confrontation. but we believe that the period of the cold war and consequently the institutions, norms, and methods of -- developed during this period was an exclusion from the history of humanity, and now we are going back to the

normality of the international relationship. and this normality requires to develop much more flexible techniques of interaction. the cold war rivalry between the soviet union and the united states had certain characteristics, which made it very distinctive from the conflicts before, during the hundreds or thousands of years. four major characteristics. first, the competition between certain powers was based on energy. second, both sides shared the unquestioned ability and willingness to destroy the other. third, the ussr and the u.s. had symmetrical power and force. fourth, rival states limited the

number of other security threats. neither of these conditions had been in place before 1948 war is going to be in the future. now both our countries face the multiple security threats. there is no enmity, -- though there is kind of an enmity between them and the ability of them to destroy each other and the willingness, if not in place, and last but not least, the power and force of russia and united states are in no way symmetrical. so proceeding from these four

major presumptions, we suggest a new approach to the strategic, not symmetry, but compatibility of russian and american nuclear forces and the relationship in the strategic nuclear sphere. and more on our justice, i will ask my colleague and friend keith darden. >> thank you, and thank you, tim, for your introduction and gw for hosting us today. to follow along for what timofei was introducing, we are suggesting the ends of arms control as a paradigm, that arms control emerged in a particular cold war context. in particular, in the 1950's, where the primary threat as perceived by both the soviet union and the united states was something called the surprise nuclear attack, and particular, a surprise cap are forced strike. go back to the 1950's, there is very limited monitoring readability.

we do not have a lot of information about either side. as was pointed out, there is a period of extreme enmity with the desire to annihilate the other cited under those conditions there was considerable fear that one side would initiate a launch and try to what about the nuclear forces of the other side. and the solution that arms control and lewis, particularly those in the united states at the rand corporation, rate minds like thomas schelling, came up with was that we needed to preserve a secure second strike capability, that there had to be mutually assured instruction, and that meant that each side had to be it would withstand that initial strike and respond after that strike was experienced with a lethal blow in return. this would provide conditions in which any moment of crisis you could be patient, because if you knew you could strike back, the

dead hand could launch missiles to the other side, ever provide no incentive to launch nuclear weapons. no one would have the incentive to strike first because the answer would be taken for granted, and be lethal. in the contemporary context, the enmity is no longer there. it is not as if we do not assume the united states and russia have friendly relations. in fact, we work from the assumptions that relationship will continue to be bad and that trust will not be a defining feature of this relationship for the foreseeable teacher. but none -- future. but nonetheless, the idea that we will wake up and experience a full-scale nuclear conflict initiated by one side is extremely unlikely. the idea we

would use that as a basis for planning seems ludicrous in a contemporary context. several reasons for this. not just trust -- or not just enmity, but there's better monitoring. we are not in the 1950's. we have ways of looking into the other side to see whether preparations for launch are taking place. there is no longer a risk of surprise and even if there were still a risk of initial strike. and with the improved relations and improve transparency, we no longer have to be terribly concerned about that surprise and we attack. as a result, the force structures that were designed to produce a retaliatory strike are no longer necessary. so the triad, having submarine launched ballistic missiles, handcraft, -- landgraf, the combination which would require an enormous arsenal, diverse arsenal on both sides is an expense that neither side a two foot at this point. what we advocate is what we call a minimally effective offense of

capability. the ability to strike first, not second. the logic behind this is that we would have time in a crisis and an awareness of what the other side is doing so we would only have to strike the other side with one nuclear strike. we would not have to withstand a strike in order to be able to respond, and that that is a sufficient deterrent. that most of the cold war did not have a secure second strike and ability. even the darkest days in the early cold war, either the soviet union or the united states had a second strike capability. but a nuclear deterrent capability was enough to lead caution to every crisis. we think in a contemporary time when relations are marginally better that that deterrent effect and can continue to hold it with placed ourselves to treat it naturally a short discussion with a second strike capability and calls for a nuclear zero, the elimination of nuclear weapons from the countries'arsenals. we do not

think that is a particularly good idea. the nuclear deterrent plays and apart role, particularly for russia, and part because the conventional capabilities of russia and united states are no longer operable. the united states has a greater superior art the in conventional weaponry. and moving nuclear weapons would leave a very insecure russia so they are not likely to do it, so it is silly to propose it is possiblelicy. second, any of the things we thought were destabilizing during the cold war are not destabilizing in the post-cold war period. missile defenses. if you want to ensure that a second strike is effective, a missile defense system is a bad thing because the few weapons that remain after a counterforce strike might be able to be called by missile defenses. if you're not

concerned about maintaining a second strike capability, if you're only concerned with having an offensive capability, a first-rate capability, and both sides have the capability of penetrating each other's missile defenses, which is certainly going to be the case for the imaginable future of the united states and russia, then missile defenses are not the stabilizing. they can be quite stabilizing for dealing with dangerous third parties that have weaker missile capabilities, and do not have the same speed or accuracy or multiple reentry vehicles that the u.s. and russia have in their arsenals. and so even if united states were to develop missile defenses unilaterally, so long as russia preserves its offense of capabilities in the nuclear realm this is not a threat. it is not destabilizing. the two countries can still determine another. third, and in keeping with this, the arsenals

do not need to be the same. parity was very important in the cold war context, where the balance needed to be preserved, that if one arsenal got too large, it raised the prospect that that initial counterforce strike would be so effective that a second strike could not be launched. if we are not concerned about that, if all we need to do is maintain an effective first strike capability, then the size of the arsenals that one has depends on your other capabilities. united states to maintain a much smaller nuclear arsenal because of our extensive conventional capabilities. all we need is to be able to deal with a first strike against multiple threats, so not just russia, china and other nuclear countries. russia, to correct u.s. defenses, if they should ever developed to a point where they are significant, might need to maintain a larger nuclear arsenal, both to compensate for their weaknesses in conventional weaponry and because they would

have to counteract u.s. missile defenses which might cull some of those warheads. we could have different force structures. russia could have more weapons. it would not be alarming to the united states. in fact, each country should reduce to the level at which they feel secure and we do not meet international agreements to achieve this end. we do not need to have the arms control paradigm of negotiating to achieve new lower levels of parity. each country can achieve the equilibrium that suits them best. and those equilibria are almost certain to be different from one another. the threats of two countries face are different. i say that -- or we say that this does not require treaties, and that is true. it can be done unilaterally, both missile defenses and forced the structuring can be done unilaterally. it may party application of existing

treaties. just as the united states abrogated the amb treaty, russia may need to qualify its treaties to deal with intermediate range threats like china, and we should acknowledge that. that whatever they need to do to provide for their own security, and a secure russia does not hurt our interests as long as we have a strong deterrent against them, we should accept that. and so the long and unlikely to be successful negotiation process that bilateral arms control treaty negotiations and tail is not likely to be innocent -- and tail is not likely to be necessary. in many ways it leads to disappointment and freshman -- fresh in between the two countries. fourth, there were something good about the cold war treaties, that we may not need to do things elaborate anymore. we may not need to

establish treaty obligations that are unnecessary. but those treaties provide a means for verification and observation, particularly the later treaties and the cold war, that we think are very important. the transparency is particularly important in a world that we are advocating, where countries develop their own security strategies and are quite flexible. we need to be aware of each other's capabilities. the abilities and ideally, interests as well. so to maintain a system without treaties and without agreements, it will require considerably more contact, a lot more information passing between the two sides. ideally, we could have something like pose certain cameras -- closed circuit cameras have on sites so we

could observe immediately reparations for launch es. you could see quite clearly whether the other side was preparing an attack or not. but ultimately, we are entering a world where cooperation is not likely, but coordination and compatibility between our forces in the russian forces is something that is attainable, something we are aware of each other's vital interest, or are forced structure is -- for structure is providing for our security can and we provide a stable deterrent for one another so that war between the countries is unlikely, but it allows us to do with third-party threats like china or nonstate actors. in fact, itit is conceivable to we can do with some of those threats if the relationship or to improve. thank you and we will leave it at that. >> thank you very much. i would be happy to open it up for discussion. i have a few questions of my own but i will hold them back for now.

>> i was a student in the soviet union during the cold war. one difference now that disturbs me, the soviet students i met did not believe in the ideology, you could see, you could tell from talking to them,. meltthe cold war began to him a you could see it was like pushing on an open door. itidn't have the sense that was in the emotions of the people themselves, neither here nor there. now i am concerned that is changing. that there is a sense of betrayal felt by the people in russia who want the people and united dates to accept them and in the united states to

accept them. either one of you can address this area i don't see this discussed much. but it does concern me about this change. because that would be hard to correct. >> i must agree. undemocratic,very but i am of the view in my country that ordinary people should be much less engaged in discussion. and advocating of their international affairs. , if youy conservative want. that the quantity of the public engagement into the

discussion of international overreaching the acceptable limit. recused.to be paper, i must our say that this might be considered as one of the rakes -- breaks which can help to build the relationships which are not touching the hearts of keep the potent issue of national survival on the level of intergovernmental and lymphatic dialogue. dialogue.tic i'm sorry my english is not

enough maybe -- >> your english is excellent. ,art of what we are advocating you speak of a disappointment and resentment, and the reset that we are talking about is not a reset to the fantasy of warmth in the relationship the twin united states and russia. to the realism about the coldness of that relationship which will reduce those expectations in many ways, but normalize relationship based on strategic interests so that it does not lead to that kind of resentment and hostility that in many ways is a product of the thinking, and of the cold war expectation that the united states will come in and live happy and one european family.

the waynot international politics works, historically. that is not the way it has turned out in the post-cold war. -- post-cold >> thank you for the presentation. i want to ask about the military doctrine that is in the process of being reformulated. we are told that the new doctrine will actually be made public. they also give signals about the intentions of countries.