this for decades in the late soviet period and now post 1991, and there are certain recurrent problems that never seemed to go away or come back to haunt us in more intensive forms. the current ukraine crisis is a good example of that. in addition to our discussions we produce working papers, and that is why we're here today. that is an unusual characteristic of the project. at our last meeting here, somebody said, i think it was -- from brookings, that we are all familiar, most of us are familiar, at least, with cross-national groups that discuss things, but sitting down and writing something together when you're countries are not allied politically is quite a challenging thing in a rather rare thing endeavor -- rare endeavor.

we have managed to do it, not without difficult at times, but it has been a challenge, but i am largely met that challenge. we have produced a series of papers that are available at the project website. if anybody is interested, i took can tell you more. we have papers in the works, and all will have presentations here in washington. one of them is on afghanistan post 2014. one is on intervention and conflict a solution best conflict resolution. -- one is on intervention and conflict resolution. that is going to be a very difficult one to write, we will see. there is also one forthcoming on the arctic. so we are happy to have this to share with you, and without further ado, i will turn it over to -- to introduce our speakers today.

thanks. >> thank you. first, i would like to welcome our colleague timofei bordachev who is here from moscow. he is the director for the center for comprehensive european and national studies at a school of economics in moscow, a national research university. at the school, he directs a program of international relations. he has authored several books in russia and several scores of articles on matters of internal elements of the e.u. and russian-e.u. relations over the last several years. he is a member of a discussion club. keith darden is an associate professor in the school of international service at american university. a book of his was published in

2009 by cambridge, and his second book should be published also by cambridge very soon. professor darden talk 11 years at yale. with all of those introductions, done, now we turn with the main show. >> thank you very much. first, i must say i am very grateful for george washington university for hosting this event. and especially, because in my view this is very important now to speak for the russian and american scholars about the issues of final important to both countries. since, as i believe, only

considering the issues of vital, not secretary importance -- not secondary importance, for both countries, we can find sustainable, long-term solution s for our problems and how to to receive with concrete diplomacy of the future. i must say i do believe that we are entering -- we entered a new stage of the international -- of the international relations. of course, we should not rely on the historic examples, but the most optimistic historical comparison would be the 19th century when the diplomacy need not mean finding solution, but diplomacy meant avoiding the conflict and keeping the peace.

so i think that with our paper, intention of which has been developed already about two years ago, we are trying to understand how both russia and the united states can, while keeping their own national interests, develop their sustainable relationship in the future. the relationship which are not going to be friendly, the relationship which are going to be mutually respectful. why do we believe it is possible? because despite the recent aggravation of the relationship, the cold war in its classic, conventional sense, as a systemic confrontation, is over. it is not going to be back. but yet, cold war thinking and

the international political system in force during the cold war remains a reference point for most contemporary writing on the u.s.-russian security relationship. even those now who proposed new -- of international security refer to the cold war because the technical parameters, nuclear weapons, and political promoters of the mutual deterrence between russia and the united states were created during this period of nuclear confrontation. but we believe that the period of the cold war and consequently the institutions, norms, and methods of -- developed during this period was an exclusion from the history of humanity, and now we are going back to the normality of the international relationship. and this normality requires to develop much more flexible techniques of interaction.

the cold war rivalry between the soviet union and the united states had certain characteristics, which made it very distinctive from the conflicts before, during the hundreds or thousands of years. four major characteristics. first, the competition between certain powers was based on energy. second, both sides shared the unquestioned ability and willingness to destroy the other. third, the ussr and the u.s. had symmetrical power and force. fourth, rival states limited the number of other security threats. neither of these conditions have been in place -- had been in place before 1948 war is going to be in the future. now both our countries face the multiple security threats. there is no enmity, -- though there is kind of an enmity between them and the ability of them to destroy each other and the willingness, if not in place, and last but not least, the power and force of russia and united states are in no way symmetrical. so proceeding from these four major presumptions, we suggest a new approach to the strategic, not symmetry, but compatibility of russian and american nuclear forces and the relationship in the strategic nuclear sphere.

and more on our justice, i will ask my colleague and friend keith darden. >> thank you, and thank you, tim, for your introduction and 4g data for hosting us today. -- and to gw for hosting us here today. to follow along for what timofei was introducing, we are suggesting the ends of arms control as a paradigm, that arms control emerged in a particular cold war context. in particular, in the 1950's, where the primary threat as perceived by both the soviet union and the united states was something called the surprise nuclear attack, and particular, a surprise cap are forced

-- a surprise counterforce strike. go back to the 1950's, there is very limited monitoring readability. we do not have a lot of information about either side. as was pointed out, there is a period of extreme enmity with the desire to and ali a late -- to annihilate the other cited under those conditions there was considerable fear that one side would initiate a launch and try to what about the nuclear forces of the other side. and the solution that arms control and lewis, particularly -- that arms control analysts, particularly those in the united states at the rand corporation, rate minds like thomas schelling, came up with was that we needed to preserve a secure second strike capability, that there had to be mutually assured instruction, destruction, and that meant that each side had to be it would withstand that initial strike and respond after that strike was experienced with a lethal blow

in return. this would provide conditions in which any moment of crisis you could be patient, because if you knew you could strike back, the dead hand could launch missiles to the other side, ever provide no incentive to launch nuclear weapons. no one would have the incentive to strike first because the answer would be taken for granted, and be lethal. in the contemporary context, the enmity is no longer there. it is not as if we do not assume the united states and russia have friendly relations. in fact, we work from the assumptions that relationship will continue to be bad and that trust will not be a defining feature of this relationship for the foreseeable teacher. but none -- future. but nonetheless, the idea that we will wake up and experience a full-scale nuclear conflict initiated by one side is extremely unlikely. the idea we would use that as a basis for planning seems ludicrous in a contemporary context. several reasons for this. not just trust -- or not just enmity, but there's better

monitoring. we are not in the 1950's. we have ways of looking into the other side to see whether preparations for launch are taking place. there is no longer a risk of surprise and even if there were still a risk of initial strike. and with the improved relations and improve transparency, we no longer have to be terribly concerned about that surprise and we attack. as a result, the force structures that were designed to produce a retaliatory strike are no longer necessary. so the triad, having submarine launched ballistic missiles, handcraft, -- landgraf, the icbm'sraft, land-based combination which would require , an enormous arsenal, diverse arsenal on both sides is an expense that neither side a two foot at this point. what we advocate is what we call a minimally effective offense of capability. the ability to strike first, not second.

the logic behind this is that we would have time in a crisis and an awareness of what the other side is doing so we would only have to strike the other side with one nuclear strike. we would not have to withstand a strike in order to be able to respond, and that that is a sufficient deterrent. that most of the cold war did not have a secure second strike and ability. even the darkest days in the early cold war, either the soviet union or the united states had a second strike capability. but a nuclear deterrent capability was enough to lead caution to every crisis. we think in a contemporary time when relations are marginally better that that deterrent effect can continue to hold it with placed ourselves to treat it naturally a short discussion with a second strike capability and calls for a

nuclear zero, the elimination of nuclear weapons from the countries'arsenals. we do not think that is a particularly good idea. the nuclear deterrent plays and apart role, particularly for russia, and part because the conventional capabilities of russia and united states are no longer operable. -- no longer comparable. the united states has a greater superior art the in conventional weaponry. and moving nuclear weapons would leave a very insecure russia so they are not likely to do it, so it is silly to propose it is policy. second, any of the things we thought were destabilizing during the cold war are not destabilizing in the post-cold war period.

missile defenses. if you want to ensure that a second strike is effective, a missile defense system is a bad thing because the few weapons that remain after a counterforce strike might be able to be called by missile defenses. if you're not concerned about maintaining a second strike capability, if you're only concerned with having an offensive capability, a first-rate capability, and both sides have the capability of penetrating each other's missile defenses, which is certainly going to be the case for the imaginable future of the united states and russia, then missile defenses are not the stabilizing. they can be quite stabilizing for dealing with dangerous third parties that have weaker missile capabilities, and do not have the same speed or accuracy or more point reentry vehicles that the u.s. and russia have in their arsenals. and so even if united states were to develop missile defenses unilaterally, so long as russia preserves its offense of capabilities in the nuclear realm this is not a threat. it is not destabilizing. the two countries can still determine another.

-- deter one another. third, and in keeping with this, the arsenals do not need to be the same. parity was very important in the cold war context, where the balance needed to be preserved, that if one arsenal got too large, it raised the prospect that that initial counterforce strike would be so effective that a second strike could not be launched. if we are not concerned about that, if all we need to do is maintain an effective first strike capability, then the size of the arsenals that one has depends on your other capabilities. united states to maintain a much smaller nuclear arsenal because of our extensive conventional capabilities. all we need is to be able to deal with a first strike against multiple threats, so not just russia, china and other nuclear countries. russia, to correct u.s. defenses, if they should ever developed to a point where they are significant, might need to maintain a larger nuclear arsenal, both to compensate for their weaknesses in conventional weaponry and because they would have to counteract u.s. missile defenses which might cull some of those warheads.

we could have different force structures. russia could have more weapons. it would not be alarming to the united states. in fact, each country should reduce to the level at which they feel secure and we do not meet international agreements to achieve this end. we do not need to have the arms control paradigm of negotiating to achieve new lower levels of parity. each country can achieve the equilibrium that suits them best. and those equilibria are almost certain to be different from one another. the threats two countries face are different. i say that -- or we say that this does not require treaties, and that is true. it can be done unilaterally, both missile defenses and forced the structuring can be done unilaterally. it may party application of existing treaties. -- the abrogation of some

existing treaties. just as the united states abrogated the amb treaty, russia may need to qualify its treaties to deal with intermediate range threats like china, and we should acknowledge that. that whatever they need to do to provide for their own security, and a secure russia does not hurt our interests as long as we have a strong deterrent against them, we should accept that. and so the long and unlikely to be successful negotiation process that bilateral arms control treaty negotiations and tail is not likely to be innocent -- and tail is not likely to be necessary. in many ways it leads to disappointment and freshman -- fresh in between the two countries. fourth, there were something good about the cold war treaties, that we may not need to do things elaborate anymore. we may not need to establish treaty obligations that are unnecessary. but those treaties provide a means for verification and observation, particularly the later treaties and the cold war, that we think are very important.

the transparency is particularly important in a world that we are advocating, where countries develop their own security strategies and are quite flexible. we need to be aware of each other's capabilities. the abilities and ideally, interests as well. so to maintain a system without treaties and without agreements, it will require considerably more contact, a lot more information passing between the two sides. ideally, we could have something like pose certain cameras -- closed circuit cameras have on sites so we could observe amy lee reparations for launch es. you could see quite clearly whether the other side was preparing an attack or not. but ultimately, we are entering a world where cooperation is not likely, but coordination and compatibility between our forces

in the russian forces is -- and the russian forces is something that is attainable, something we are aware of each other's vital interest, or are forced structure is -- for structure is providing for our security can and we provide a stable deterrent for one another so that war between the countries is unlikely, but it allows us to do with third-party threats like china or nonstate actors. in fact, it is even conceivable we could cooperate in the not-too-distant future on dealing with some of those threats if the relationship were to improve. thank you, and we will leave it at that. >> thank you very much. i would be happy to open it up for discussion. i have a few questions of my own but i will hold them back for now. yes?

>> i was a student in the soviet union during the cold war. one difference now that disturbs me -- the soviet students i met did not believe in the ideology. you could tell from talking to them create when the cold war began to melt you could see it was like pushing on an open door. the cold war is basically a struggle of a leads. -- of the elite. i didn't have the sense that it was in the emotions of the people, neither here nor there. the west would accept them. something has changed in the emotions of the people. this is directed more to mr. gorbachev.

either one of you can adjust this. -- can address this. that would be harder to correct. >> i must agree. it will sound very undemocratic but i am advocating the view that ordinary people should be much less engaged in the end -- in the discussion. and in the advocating of international affairs. i am very conservative, if you want. i'm afraid that the quantity of public engagement into the district -- into the discussion of international affairs is

overreaching the acceptable limits and needs to be reduced. coming back to our paper, my big concern is -- which could help to build the relationship while touching the hearts of the people and keep the important issues of national survival on the level of dialogue. my english is not enough to say.

>> your english is excellent. you speak of a deed -- deep disappointment and a resentment that is born of disappointment. the reset we are talking about is not a reset towards the fantasy of warmth in the relationship and the united states. -- in the relationship between the united states and russia. it is a reset for the realism of the coldness of that relationship. and which will reduce the expectations in many ways, but normalize a relationship based on strategic interests so that it doesn't lead that kind of resentment hostility. in many ways that is a product of the gorbachev thinking end of the cold war expectation that the united states is going to come in and we are going to live together in one happy family.

that is not the way international politics works historically. that is not the way it has turned out. a much more realistic set of expectations about the relationship my familiar rate that. -- might ameliorate that. >> thank you for the presentation. i want to ask about the military doctrine that is in the process of being reformulated. we are told that the new doctrine will actually be made public. they also give signals about the intentions of countries. judging by other newspapers close to the militant industrial -- military-industrial complex, it seems that this new doctrine will before related in aggressive terms.

nuclear tactical strikes are not just a method of last resort but they will actually be used in a very aggressive and forward moving fashion as well as a certain level of threat is perceived. do you see this approach you are proposing here will actually make its entry into this new doctrine? is this based on your ideas, on your theoretical developments that you yourselves have worked on or does this reflect a more technical approach among russian military circles that is kind of above or below the current hysteria that surrounds the question? >> one of the interesting things

about this project and doing the research was going back into the different strategies that existed on the soviet side in the cold war. they don't follow in a nice clear statement. like what you can get in the u.s. national security archives. this doctrine is not a significant change from the historic position on nuclear weapons. they were always just weapons. usable in the event they have retained an enormous arsenal of nuclear arc -- of nuclear artillery. you know, the sort of short range weapons. this was always part of their war fighting doctrine. i think it is chet -- it is telling they have not been used. i think it is likely they will not continue to be used. -- that they would continue not to be used. in the awareness that nuclear weapons are weapons, that they

are not there for some abstract notion of reserving mutually asserted instruction, they're destruction,ssured they are there for use and have a deterrent function because they're usable, that is completely reasonable. this is not so different from american thinking and the contemporary context as well. the level of engagement -- russia's nuclear power. i don't believe this is a huge to partner -- huge departure. i'm don't believe it has to be destabilizing. i don't think it is terribly different from our own thinking on nuclear weapons.

>> i do not belong to the russian security community. neither is he. though i don't belong to the security community i think that there is selection is going on and it will be just one of the products of this reflection. the security community adapts much more flexible. taken into consideration they emerged from the borders suddenly. middle east russian chinese relations are strategically -- generally strategically friendly , though it does not prevent both sides from taking a certain security measures. i would agree that this approach is not much different from what

has been developed after the second world war. we write that nuclear weapons are always considered as just another. just another instrument. but a very strong weapon full stop -- but a very strong weapon. >> thank you. congratulations to both of you. having seen the paper developed it is an impressive document. i have a couple of questions.

thinking about how either american or russian officials would react to the change you are proposing it strikes me that current russian officials would be far harder to sell on this and that they have somehow become more better students of shelling than their american counterparts and more interested in concepts such as a secure second strike and focused on the utility exclusively. what happened? how do we understand how we went from war fighting to nuclear weapons to what we have today.

that is the first question. this question about arms control and transparency, it is worth thinking about how we achieve transparency. they have been the only means historically of providing for it. the data exchange and inspections and even the commitment not to mess with the other side' home means, only if -- the other side national if theyl means, only are legally binding in the context of arms control. verifying compliance -- it is the only way we have figured out how to do the transparency we described. it is interesting to think about how we would do it outside of that context. we have never had that before and it would be a different thing.

the question about whether you are talking about on nuclear weapons or just to teach it nuclear weapons comes up. it is the same principle of nonstrategic weapons. >> this paper changes how we think about it. this is the legal framework -- where the legal from her can be found to ensure transparency. i do believe -- we do care about

political issues. the debate was predominated the classic american approach. we have more intensive debate. it is also just a weapon. we have five future generals. we think the debate is not developing. the adoption of second strike capabilities, strategic and shelling, i think it justifies larger military budgets. it is a way of articulating strategic concepts that justifies much more military sent -- the terri spending. -- military spending.

they had requests about this insane proposal. this argument continues to hold. what would be the harm in unilaterally reducing your nuclear arsenal to the level at which you could simply destroy the other country? is a pretty powerful deterrent in and of itself. i think that is a very subversive concept for defense complexes in both countries. it was an accident, a high product -- a byproduct. we should be focusing on agreements that simply provide transparency. it was quite unlikely to achieve in the current context. we would be much more likely to achieve just the transparency and just the observation verification. both sides have an interest in that. russia would be interested in making sure we are not mobilizing to attack in -- to attack. we are facing a lot of crises these days. whether we are talking about on nuclear weapons or strategic

nuclear weapons, in many ways we are advocating class to turns. straight out to terrance. to the extent of your capabilities that involve nuclear artillery, those may enhance the turns as well. if we are concerned about the baltics or ukraine, then limiting the nuclear weapons and removing them from a strategic doctrine would advocating their use. it may be a way of limiting conflicts in the future. the conflict has remained relatively limited. collect the question i want to ask -- >> the question i want to ask -- it is about the implications between the two sections of the paper.

if keith was right in saying a possession of nukes has moderated what might have been an excess of american or unrealistic reaction of some kind, let's say that is true. lord knows we have had enough difficulties in recent months. of we know there is one issue in which russia would be even more incensed of american policy changes shift. that will be on the question of nato enlargement. what if ukrainian leadership takes the lesson from these events that it either has to nuclear rise ukraine -- it had a physical custody over weapons it could not fire.

nonetheless it had them. of it gave them up and now is in this very difficult situation with its neighbor. the alternatively if you cannot build your own and ukrainians could do this only against a very stiff resistance of the united states who wanted to do that, the alternative would be to join nato. is it possible this would be an unintended side consequence of what you are proposing and is there nonproliferation? >> i think that is a false choice, nuclear rise or nato, to provide your own security.

ukraine is in the situation it is in now. it completely keen -- completely neglected its capabilities for 25 years. that is why they in this situation it is in now. in addition to the fact that a social movement overthrew the government and the government lakhs legitimacy in parts of the country that created the conditions in which separatism can grow. there is no question separatism

was supported by russia. the real problem is ukraine lacks state capacity. nuclear weapons were not solve this particular problem. him with ukraine -- would ukraine fire nuclear weapons of moscow? i don't think so. would there have been secession? we had secession in chechnya i think this is a different type of problem -- in chechnya. this is a different type of problem. they don't play very important role in dealing with internal challenges like the ones the ukrainian government is facing. that ukraine's

choices are not nuclear rise or be russian among but it is -- to build a state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. -- build the state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. it is a political problem. it is not a military problem. >> it is room evening -- it is removing oligarchs from power, removing private companies, removing the private he -- the privately supported information. -- privately sponsored military formations. if ukraine could have been a nuclear state, who could absolutely assure the nuclear weapons will not get into the wrong hands?

those that can employ them regardless of the intentions of the ukrainian or american government. them i want to talk about the role of conflicting strategies in syria between -- how the conflicting strategies of both countries will affect the strategies of the two countries. how will the situation in syria affect the compatibility of the two nations? >> i think strategic compatibility gives us a sustainable framework. i think strategic compatibility will leave us selfish of our

-- self-assurance in our diplomatic action. it makes the diplomatic action more solid, primarily on the russian side. when it deals with problems like the syrian problem, it is more about bilateral relations. >> the danger is not cases like syria. if there were circumstances in which both countries perceived a vital interest was at stake, those are the ones at real risk. if there is a lack of common interest in areas of vital interest, where there is equal resolve on both sides, that could escalate into a broader

conflict that would undermine the stability of the relationship. the u.s. and russia can have very different views and pursue different policies on a variety of conflicts throughout the world but not fundamentally destabilizing their relationship with one another. that is the historical norm in international politics. we would like to avoid armed confrontation. the capability of the relative powers is not going to play an important role. we have limited ambitions. but i also agree and i think >> i also agree and i think that we enjoy the situation when the survival interests are not contradicting and overlapping. this is one of the arguments in the basis of power.

-- of our paper. that gives us luxury to develop the entire concept. >> with regard to missile defense, the assumption is if the country has missile defense capabilities it will make the use of nuclear weapons -- if nuclear weapons more likely ofause of the capability counterstrike. also, you mentioned that countries could unilaterally altered their defenses. if missile defense did become the

norm between the two countries, what with that have on quantities necessary. -- what effect would that have on quantities necessary? >> missile defense is not likely to be effective against a sophisticated country able to penetrate those defenses. both united states and russia have a level of technological sophistication in their weaponry that they should be able to defeat any missile defense. missile-defense is largely a filter for other countries. if not for the type of weapons that the united states and russia are likely to have -- in that sense it is not destabilizing. you're absolutely right that it could prevent we call limited offensive, or effective offensive capability, then it could be destabilizing because russia and united states would

no longer have a deterrent. it would simply be in the realm of conventional weaponry. that would be a world of insecurity as it was in the past. it is not likely to happen. but it will filter out the things the north korean, that are real threats to the united states and potentially similar threats to russia. in terms of unilateral reductions, we are faced now -- because all machines have a lifespan the rockets we built during the cold war are coming to the end of there's. theirs. it is not a question of do we reduce but do we rebuild. we are now faced with a choice of if we could start it all over again would we build the arsenal? the answer is clearly no.

it is a question of letting certain missiles go through the end of their lifespan, building new certain missiles that are sophisticated, and that is a different model than the cold war and a much more reduced force. that is what we mean when we say reductions. it is not building enough to return to those cold war levels. >> we will be able to develop the nuclear forces which will be able to penetrate any american defenses. then antimissile defense cannot be a destabilizing factor. it can be if russia will feel unsecure -- unprepared.

survivalls it -- it's is threatened by this system. >> this is an area where transparency will be important. russia has to have some familiarity with the technical specifications of our missile systems to know that it doesn't negate their nuclear capability. we should be able to provide that information because it enhances our security. >> i have three questions. do you guys see a world where there are no nuclear weapons echo -- weapons? does your paper just getting rid -- address getting rid of the icbm component? and did you guys have any good or funny stories from the research that you put into this paper? [laughter]

>> do we envision a world without nuclear weapons? >> no. the answer to the first question is there is no answer -- is no. the stories are so politically incorrect that i cannot tell them in this room. i have been speaking to the russian generals. >> i could envision a world without nuclear weapons in the same way i could envision a world without spears as the primary methods of warfare. but in the contemporary context i think taking away some of the most powerful weapons you have without new weapons emerged is -- without new weapons that are more powerful emerging is extremely unlikely. china has not been a party to any of these bilateral cold war agreements.

-- that is the dark shadow on this paper. we talk about the u.s. russia and in relationship. china is out there. china is a threat to both parties. in different ways. that is going to have a nuclear deterrent. there is no question about it in the nuclear context. >> this is political talk already. is thatmistic point neither russia nor america's feeling from danger -- feeling of danger from china is objective in nature. the cases are very subjective and not by the objective threat of china but by how we perceive china. that makes the situation looks better. i actually say that it is you

are really scared of china. -- you actually say that because you are really scared of china. [laughter] in terms of funny stories, when we started writing this paper we were hammered for being too pessimistic. increasingly we are hammered for being too optimistic about the nature of the relationship. because trust is so low that we cannot ratchet down our arsenals at this time. is, even if trust is nonexistent, a small arsenal and powerful. thei would like to jump in -- >> i would like to jump in. what i still don't quite understand is if it was possible to achieve another arms-control agreement between russia and the

united states, if we were able to obtain that we have, wouldn't -- that level of trust that we had, wouldn't that still be preferential to the proposal you put forth? or are you trying to say in fact -- i squirmed when i heard you say that the era of armed controls -- arms-control is dead. are you saying that doing your own thing is preferable to negotiating bilateral treating -- a bilateral treaty between russia and the united states? i would suspect there would be plenty of russian generals that would like to hear what you had to say. i thought part of what you had to say was a musty and -- unless the u.s. is interested in reducing its nuclear are so -- nuclear arsenal can do so without concerns. and the russians can continue to grow it as they would like within whatever treaty boundaries that exist.

they should be comfortable of that. my concern is how you would sell that here. those in the nuclear zero community would be worried about taking unilateral reductions that do not get us closer to a world of nuclear zero. there are plenty of people in this town who you will never be able to convince the united states needs to unilaterally reduce its weapons, not only given a certain level of russian capabilities but in the new context we are in. i am still uncertain how we are going to sell this. >> there is a chinese saying words make bad deeds. him i did not believe in the continuation of the arms control negotiations would be good as i do not believe continuation of any cold war preferences would be good -- any cold war practices would be good for continuing national security eerie -- security. >> i think the problem with arms control is they read assigned to

-- they were designed to achieve parity. parity, largely in nuclear capability. in the current context with american superiority and everything but nuclear weapons, i think it is not likely to -- symmetrical reductions in nuclear arms will not achieve symmetry insecurity -- and security on the two sides. it is a dangerous path for you to go down if you argue that if both sides feel secure it will have a stable elation ship. -- relationship. i do think that unilateral reductions could occur. we have certain financial constraints. we may want to invest those resources somewhere else.

would you allocate resources to something that is a fantasy that is not likely to obtain? why, if you have a finite defense budget would you budget for a counterstrike source? i wouldn't if i faced a budget constraint. this country faces a budget constraint. i don't think we would do things that are unnecessary. we do many things that are unnecessary, but it is plausible to me that the case could be made that those resources should be allocated for american security more effectively than they are.

>> you just mentioned the u.s. should allocate resources toward more strategic defense things. do you think we are entering a new era in u.s. russian relations that would be more beneficial to the u.s. the thing to be wiser to allocate -- to the u.s. to allocate resources for more weapons granting? that is, that we would have limited strike capabilities. or would it be better toward more conventional weapons such ?s surface ships >> i want ask you to comment on improving american security. -- i won't ask you to comment on the ruling american security.

i think better nuclear weapons may be a good goal for funding. that would be a reduction in number. i do think priorities in other areas should be pursued. manned fighter jets would not be first on my list. i think that is going the way of catapults and things that are no longer going to be important. of not convince the navy paid -- navy plays ace -- i'm not convinced the navy plays a centrally important role in what you are suggesting we spend money on. i am not opposed.

>> i am a lieutenant colonel air force pilot. i wanted to talk very quickly. i understand the argument in terms of it's not a nuclear -- not a numbers parity game. what you feel about an asymmetric jump -- let's say the lungs -- the long-range strike bomber gives a true largely penetrating capability against a country like russia.

how does that factor into the arms control debate and this idea of stability between the two countries? how does russia feel given the fairly extensive use under the bush doctrine of preintervention by the united states, how does that factor into this? we talked about the turns and stability being a capability and the will to use it. we display the will to use conventional force and now we have an overwhelming conventional force that will only go stronger. how does that play in your argument? >> for me compatibility is to answer and resolve our own fears related to each other. the compatibility meaning to have enough power and assured ability to feel safe in relation with russia or america on the other side. as the situation in europe grows there is a certain feeling of compatibility.

this paper is intended to give it a feeling of more structure in a systematic way. him >> -- >> i do believe there are weapons that would reduce the stability. art of -- part of compatibility is the deterrent capability and hypersonic weapons that were quite accurate. it could lead to bringing us back to the 1950's with a very

effective first strike that was a surprise. him that would be destabilizing in this context region of that would be a good case for this new arms control regime. him awareness of the launch would be extremely important. him we are just aware of what is going on with each other's forces. i do think some of these arguments are sensitive to current weapons technology. him the general principle behind it of compatibility would give us some guidance on how to move

forward in the event the technology changes. it would require more handholding than others. on the issue of the united states, russia is very uncomfortable with preemption. in large part concerns about what is going on in ukraine from the russian perspective are that this was a prelude to the entry of nato forces into ukraine, creating instability, over -- overthrowing the government, and then asking for our help and us providing it was a way to bring our forces closer. that is a powerful merited.

it is not a correct narrative. we are not eating ukraine cost military. i think there are ways that we can take down the temperature. through wise action and policy and communication with the russian side. i think a country with a pre-doctrine of strikes and scary to a lot of people. =them -- >> thank you for your presentations. you look at military issues, the assumptions that you couldn't the analysis of security and what achieves security for a country -- these comments seem to lead to believe that the amount of weapons in the country would leave it to resolving the issue with russia's sense of insecurity in today's world. i want to bring in the issue of values and economics into your story to say that russia has been compatible whether through arms control or without arms

control and the strategic incompatibility is more value-based incompatibility. let me bring in merkel. there may be some truth to statements looking at russia as trying to live in a realist world view and western countries and the united states at least been more divided in terms of realism, constructivism, liberalism. it doesn't have that much money to spend on weapons. it amounts of money to spend on weapons has been increasing get the sense of security has been

rising as well. it is also about the values and the world vision team eaters have. it is about the globalization and who it benefits most. the global economy has been beneficial to russia as well. him if we look at how it was integrated into the economy, that is where the sense of insecurity may be coming in as well. whether allowing either country to spend as much on weapons as they can would actually bring a sense of security or if that is the way -- it is a little confined studying psychological issues. >> that is a good question. i think the feeling of security is always of a subjective nature.

this beautiful lady would have a huge snake in her hands and say it never bites. we would still feel a little bit unsecure because security is very subjective. him it is security as we perceive it. him -- it is security as we perceive it. i take the liberty and responsibility to formulate and to suggest what might be the resolution of the national security concerns. of course these suggestions come in line with my theoretical congregation, which you can see and understand. taking about the global economy

-- speaking about the global economy, we are living in interesting times where the global economy, global market is more and more in contradiction with national regulation. we see it in europe, in asia, many other cases. i think this story only starts with how the countries will see themselves. him >> i think there is a difference between allowing

countries to spend as much as they want, not having strictly enforced arms control agreement, and advocating they spend the law. in many ways we are saying moving away from arms control but advocating they build less, that they take the notion of sufficiency and we are putting forward a different notion that would require less spending. as to the west being the real world -- we have a large military and if we trusted in international law and believed that the norms of territorial integrity were sufficient to

limit states and the public outcry were sufficient we would not have the defense spending that we do. him we clearly think we live in a world that has threats and we take efforts to counter those threats. russia does the same with far fewer resources. we are advocating a way this could be done better that was less threatening to each side. >> i'm with usdi my views and questions to not represent the department of defense. i was caught by a footnote. in a way this follows from the previous question. take a look at the question of the angle of political culture. it talks about the soviet view of instability and that the soviets believed that stability

was best achieved through their own supremacy. contrast the american view -- your views may be a very enlightened way to look at the problem. your approach with taken the -- how would your approach take the way that you would like an russian political culture, particularly strategic culture, that the expectation would be that the russians feel secure because they have a decisive defensive capability. others might worry that with the background of the political culture they may feel emboldened in a way that may not be rational in some sense but might have some historical precedent. >> that is quite a theoretical question. i always tell my students. it is impossible to draw a clear distinctive line between the willing believe and willing to do. dealing with this nation we never know what is enough. it is why we are so concerned about china and their potential. i believe that the clear absence of strong ideological content in russian policy now keeps optimistic notes to this -- to

how this foreign policy looks. in soviet times the foreign policy was ideological. foreign policy was not based on ideology. him here to the western perspective it is optimistic. -- if you look from here to the western perspective it is optimistic. one of the purposes and one of the poppel -- one of the possible future areas on this strategic compatibility issue might be how we deal with the other rising powers like china, india, potentially brazil, potentially south africa. how do we incorporate their strategic culture, which is absolutely, fundamentally different from ours since the russia and the u.s. belong to the same tradition, to the same

religious tradition. , it is a good question and a hard question. does ratcheting down the two emboldening -- ratcheting down lead two emboldening? i would distinguish between weapons and results. you can have very high resolve with the weapons you have. that is a deterrent. if we can persist -- if we can persuasively drawdowns when affective set of weapons -- draw down to an effective set of weapons we would not embolden our enemies. >> you spoke of a bilateral agreement in unilateral action. as you just briefly mention the role of china is certainly a large factor in a clear nonproliferation or the reduction of arms. what reduction does china have in your position? >> though we had some discussion

between -- we'd originally argued that china is much more challenged to russian security than i do believe. since i still -- we can observe the russian military superiority over china is immense. both in nuclear and conventional forces. that is why chinese do not go for military training exercises with conventional forces in the framework of our duration. i think that china finds itself in a very complicated environment. china is forced externally to act more assertive. this imposed assertiveness of chinese foreign policy of a country that is not used to be assertive can potentially create challenges because of the misperceptions and misunderstandings from the others, including russians. >> you spoke of a bilateral agreement in unilateral action. as you just briefly mention the role of china is certainly a large factor in a clear nonproliferation or the

reduction of arms. what reduction does china have in your position? >> though we had some discussion between -- we'd originally argued that china is much more challenged to russian security than i do believe. since i still -- we can observe the russian military superiority over china is immense. both in nuclear and conventional forces. that is why chinese do not go for military training exercises with conventional forces in the framework of our duration. i think that china finds itself in a very complicated environment. china is forced externally to act more assertive. this imposed assertiveness of chinese foreign policy of a

country that is not used to be assertive can potentially create challenges because of the misperceptions and misunderstandings from the others, including russians. >> my politically incorrect answer is it does not recognize the limits to the territory indispensably governs -- it extensively governs. russia make sure that the northern border of china is sincere. china will not expand to the north so long as russia has a nuclear deterrent. we don't need to worry about that. we need to worry about other

borders. that is something for u.s. policy to take care of. i do think china needs to be watched carefully. and to make sure it is deterred so it does not expand. >> we have reached the end of our session. this has been a stimulating discussion. i remain more optimistic than i was when i came into this. a huge thank you for coming all this way to be with us. thank you to the davis center and tim colton and to the carnegie corporation of new york for sponsoring this wonderful endeavor. please join me for thanking our -- please join me in thanking our wonderful panel. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

a >> today's white house briefing is expected to get underway in just a couple of moments. the spokesman will take questions here in the james brady reading room. live coverage on c-span it's underway. a quick reminder that the house and senate are back in session today after five weeks of recess. the senate will have a judicial thirdly -- 5:30 p.m. and you can catch that on our companion network, c-span2. the house will will be working on a number of small bills, including federal penalties for id theft and a new monument for african americans served in the revolutionary war. gaveling back in at 2 p.m. eastern with live coverage of the house here on c-span.

a quick note, this story is in the news from the hill, congressman john dingell of michigan, the longest-serving member of congress in history, admitted to a detroit hospital for abdominal pain. 88 years old, he is expected to be released from the hospital in the next couple of days. he will return to washington this week as congress reconvenes from their august recess and plans to be back in town next week for votes. according to his office he is doing well and remains in good spirits. again, waiting for today's white house briefing with press secretary josh earnest. in the meantime, a look at u.s. strategy to confront isis, the potential role of congress, and efforts to amend the 2001 authorization of the use of military force. this discussion to waste this morning on "washington journal."

john bradshaw is with us. solutions to out national security problems. this is one we have dealt with a lot in recent weeks. bet: the president will addressing the nation on wednesday to talk about his plans for dealing with isis. the headline this morning, destroying isis may take years, according to u.s. officials. they seem to be outlining some of the things the president may say. they say that the administration is planning to carry out a campaign against the islamic state in iraq that may take three years and could last until president obama has left office.

the first phase, an air campaign with nearly 145 airstrikes over the past month is already underway. the next phase, which would begin sometime after iraq forms a more inclusive government, expected to involve an intensified effort to equip the iraqi military and kurdish fighters. the final, toughest, a politically controversial phase of the operation. destroying the terrorist army inside syria might not be completed. --nners envision a minute military campaign lasting 36 months. when you hear that framework, how does that sit with you? >> the president and the administration have been thoughtful and cautious in coming up with that strategy. i think there are a lot of risks their of getting drawn into a much longer campaign. as we have seen in the past when we start these operations that

mission creep is always a danger. from thee want to hear president on wednesday, more than these operational plans we want to hear the strategic goal in undertaking these operations. him discussd destroying isis, making it a more manageable problem. the goal should be to dismantle isis to the point where they are not capable of launching a strategic attack against regional interests. when you have that kind of pull, you know when you achieve it. terms of destroying isis it gets you into these long-term campaigns. with these terrorist organizations you don't know if they are morphing into different things. articulated inre

preventing them from having the capacity. host: does that strategy involve u.s. combat troops on the ground? >> i don't think that it does. the american people are very war weary for that. also, members of u.s. forces will be involved with combat troops. they need to be more forthright on what the threat is. it doesn't mean that they couldn't do it in the future, the could be regional attacks,

but we want to make sure that we understand the threat and assess it carefully. don't get carried away. there is a threat -- there is something there for how big the threat, once they beheaded this journalist -- these were horrible, gruesome things. you felt more interest from the capital. there are ways to pursue those people who give those beheadings and i believe they will be brought to justice at some point, it may take some time. you have to factor that in in a reasonable way. inviting c-span viewers to join in on the conversation on how the u.s. will deal with isis -- host: the reaction on capitol hill, the house and senate come back today. we are seeing headlines like

this -- house gop authorizing use of military force. they are talking about a resolution being drafted by fred will. what would you like to see congress do in terms of the reauthorization of the original use of force from 2001? does that need to be updated or readdressed? yes. --guest: they put out a report a couple of weeks ago where we called for the 2001 authorization to be modified incrementally and repealed. so that that 2001 mass, as it is called, would be eliminated. is directly 2001 connected to the nexus of the 9/11 attacks and groups that perpetrated those attacks. that war needs to be wound down. we should really not have these open-ended kinds of authorizations.

let's specifically look at isis and what needs to be done and give the president the authority he needs for that particular case. there should be a time limit on it. in one year from now that is something that congress can do, but it is open-ended. you mentioned congressman wolf's open-ended proposition. it is so broad that it would put us at war with practically every muslim in the world. anyone who supports any kind of jihadist ideology would become a target. it is too broad for what needs to be done. from thewill hear president on wednesday and a nationwide speech. outlines of what he is telling congress yesterday on meet the press. press." the [video clip] >> given the fact that the punditry overwhelmingly felt -- >> you are pointing at me.

[laughter] >> that this is going to be a good year for senate republicans because the seats that were up were in states that were tilting or significantly were republican. we will get the president's comments on in just a second. 3880 -- a reminder of our numbers -- we are -- are talking about u.s. reaction to isis. john is on the independent line. caller: hey, c-span. i love you. i love c-span 1, 2, and three. you, john.

ruth is in aurora, colorado. is that ohio? to go ahead with your comment. -- go ahead with your comment. caller: i keep expecting there theresome relationship and i have not heard one word. is there a connection between these people? well, there are many, many different terrorist roots in the region. it is hard to keep track of all of them. methodology ofis taking hostages for ransom money, a big source of funding crisis. or killing them. and it is a tactic that terrorists have used, but it is not leer that these are the same

people that killed daniel earl. was killed inearl afghanistan? not iraq. guest: correct. host: headline this morning from "the journal." counterterrorism police are poised to arrest a dozen associates of jihad john as they close in on bloodthirsty hostage killers, insisting that they know the identity of the execution or embed that they will unmask came within days. suspected of killing british aid of the fourne beatles holding hostages in serious. authorities have thought to identified three of them and are in a desperate race to track davidhe group before haynes is killed. florida, republican line, crystal, good morning, you are on the air. we elect these public

officials to do their jobs. not to act like children. party needs to work with the president and get the job done. this is ridiculous. we are not dealing with a bunch of kindergartners. we need them to work with the president to get these things done and stop acting like children. it is ridiculous. you, crystal. in terms of the issue of dealing with isis, is there any common ground between the president and republican leaders? guest: i think that this is an issue where we will see a lot of bipartisan cooperation. my staff and i have met with staff members from republican and democratic senators. there is a consensus emerging that the president should come to the congress and ask for reauthorization. there is no inclination to give it. it is difficult to agree on the details area do some of these

people have said that we should get in the room for authorization, but as soon as you mentioned as he tells the whole thing breaks down. it will be difficult to come up with a well thought out, limited authorization. i think one of the reasons we have not seen the president and his team on the hill yet is that they want to get at something that is not kind of knee-jerk and just for right now. we want to get them what they need over a longer. of time. host: yesterday the president broadly outlined where he may go in terms of what to ask congress while speaking to "-- while speaking to chuck todd on "meet the press." [video clip] >> what we are doing, and also what we are not doing. we are not looking at sending in 100,000 american troops. we will be part of an international coalition carrying out air strikes in support of

work on the ground by the iraqi troops. we have a plan for them. to understandple that over the course of months we will be able to not just want , we will be of isil shrinking the territories that they control. ultimately we will defeat them. isil able to or counter the airstrikes at all? military experts are concerned that they have a steep learning curve and they will not know how to avoid these strikes. they have been bold about amassing these troops in open convoy, which they are learning

is going to open them up to these airstrikes. we are focused on the military strategy, but this problem is not going to be solved only militarily. the political component of an inclusive government in baghdad is essential to this. behink the president will talking about that in his speech on wednesday. but we cannot just tackle them with economic tools, cutting off their funding supply, economic business. you can prevent them from being able to govern the territories that they have, which is part of the process. what if there are indications that the new leader is not any better to work with than the previous? guest: the new prime minister said all the right things. his rhetoric is very good. he seems to be committed to

bringing tribal leaders back into the fold. there is a lot of optimism there. it is a huge challenge and i would not be certain that he can pull it off in the short term, but there are two sides as he starts to consolidate power. host: is this typically something the administration has before announcing it to the u.s.? and before hand there was a lot of behind-the-scenes work for those who thought it was time for a change. host: kansas city is next. connie? you were talking about a political solution in the region. theink we need to work with arab league and the meetings so i thinkust had,

we need to turn this around and and i am hoping obama is working closely with them and whatever he comes out of on wednesday, bringing them strongly and the fold. related to that, this is from "the washington times." "turkey to join fight against islamic date here go >> there are other countries in the area and haveyou raise it been traditionally reluctant to step up and anyway turkey seems to ready and they have their own

internal political issues to deal with. more as a european ally, but they do have a lot of differences between the hard-line and secular muslims. where they would come out and the coalition is still challenging. of "thee front page miami herald," this morning. good morning, don, on the independent mind. caller: good morning. good morning, sir. i think that isis is questing for nuclear weapons. that they can make the grand jihad approach to the world. not focused on the middle east. it is the world in its entirety.

the ideology is an abstract from the koran. mohammed did not appear on the scene until 60035a.d. trailk that the money should be followed and cut completely. anyone funding this terrorist group should be sanctioned. that way they won't have the money to support these kinds of actions in the world. , as they havesil supposedly acquired in the campaign the ideology that should be sent to that region and quarantines by the rest of the world in that region. issue of the

financial support for isil, where is it coming from and how much is it? guest: we know that they are getting money from black-market oil. there is a lot of smuggling, also just taxing the populations where they are in control. some of those things can be divided more easily than others. they may well be getting money from other sources. they are kicking in about $1 million a day. they are well-funded. take $450able to million from the bank in mozilla , which seems to be a false report. as indicated, they have this global islamic state and have declared their caliphate in a smaller area. the clarinet and making it happen are two different things. they have great ambitions. and have evil ambitions

apocalyptic ambitions. right now their hands are full dealing with where they are. both of these imploded after a couple of years because the people that they were trying to control did not like this kind of extremely strict law. there are internal problems the islamic state will face. we have to be wary of their long-term levels of ambitions, but right now they are not able to pursue those ambitions. in terms of the best american allied tools to degrade isis, what are those? we need to rely on local fighters on the ground, which used to be our adversaries. seem to haveorces lost a little bit of her edge --

their edge. of course on the syrian side the president needs to give billions to so-called moderate syrian rebels. that has not yet happened and i am sure they will talk about that on wednesday night. we can provide intelligence and air support is a well as whatever else is needed. at least the military part of this equation will have to rely on regional forces. omaha, nebraska. this is the democratic line. thank you for c-span. mr. bradshaw is wrecked on a lot of things. having repeated a lot of the president's speech from the , as far as isis goes,

they need to follow the money trail. if america doesn't stay over there -- >> i apologize for the lengthy delay. for the lengthy delay. let's go straight to questions. >> the strategy going on right , do you explain what that means a bit more? taken the speech from wednesday, so i don't want to get out ahead of that speech. of whative you a sense the president is thinking when he says things like that. as he confronts the situation

, hethe threat posed by isil puts the safety and security of the american people at the top of his list of concerns. the actions he has ordered so strike isil is principally motivated to protect american personnel, including the embassy and consulate in iraq. there are other objectives that we are pursuing in terms of religious and ethnic minorities being targeted. also specific counterterrorism organizations being targeted. when the president is making these decisions, particularly as related to an organization like the, he is thinking about security of the american people. and the threats that this extremist organization principally poses to the

homeland. individuals with passports rep traveled to the region and taken up arms along isil. there are concerns about the ideas for those who tried to travel back to the west. as it relates to the principal concern to the threats posed, the president is concerned about the threat of terrorism. the othery counterterrorism operations being carried out are relevant references. one of the other things the president mentioned in his interview is that we have seen the united states effectively thanks to the courage and ,ervice of the men in uniform we work effectively to defeat terrorists who pose a threat to the united states.

where you see the administration and the president order in other places. what the president is trying to do is illustrate that there is a track record here that people can about you wait. we will have to consider each of them differently. consider theto chief concern. what the solution looks like. in terms of what is successfully and the by the military support of the american intelligence agency.

>> people thinking about this in terms of yemen, somalia, places shrouded in secrecy, that is not what the president is talking about here. right? >> the president has been engaged in an effort earlier this year. his desire and our collective effort is to try to bring new efforts. >> that is one type of counterterrorism initiative. >> each of these situations is a little bit different. each of them has their own unique threat. what i would say is that the president has been clear president has been clear about what he is not contemplating. he is not contemplating deployment of boots on the ground in iraq and syria. he is talking about going up a broader international coalition,

looking for the support in the effective governance of the iraqi central government to combat this threat. is it possible that there might be some clandestine efforts underway here? i'm sure that that is underway here. but what the president is talking about is having -- is something he has laid out a couple of times. a decision made about whether airstrike should extend into this area? saidat the president has -- and he said this in the interviews that he conducted over the weekend, is his willingness to go wherever is necessary to strike at those who are threatening americans. a range ofen true in other circumstances. there are parallels here. over -- they went

after osama bin laden in pakistan. he made that speech in the summer of 2007, where he talked about his commitment as commander-in-chief. he did whatever was necessary to protect the american people. as he tried to assess the president's thinking. [indiscernible] -- wherever they are. >> i am sure that that decision would rise the level of the president making that announcement. but it is about providing insight on this issue. i don't know if i was successful on that effort, but it was valiant. >> the president's office said in these interviews that they did not have authorization for this plan.

but they have been clear that this is a long-term thing. is this going to go on for more than a couple of months? >> the administration has demonstrated, i think, in a closelyent way, consulting with members of convene these meetings with leaders in congress. this was before they went away on their august recess. we have come to discuss these issues and follow-up on the successful summit from last week.

considering some of these difficult and high-stakes questions. in addition the president has long believed, something different that he has confronted from different national security questions, the president believes that when the american people through their elected representatives can demonstrate a united front across party is beneficial to our foreign policy. that the american people are united in pursuing and accomplishing a specific foreign policy priority. it was clear that he does believe that he has the authority to do whatever is necessary to protect the american people, but he went on , so we have been

consulting with congress to route. an open-minded dialogue will be maintained between the administration and leaders in congress as we move on this important foreign-policy priority. >> no need to ask for authorization? the way the president described it is you. it was important for congress to understand and debate it and engage in the kinds of -- concentrations that they are leaving right now. the president is not in a position where he sets the legislative calendar. he is in the position of consulting and trying to be as candid as possible with leaders from congress about what he is

contemplating and what the policy implications are. it is important in the mind of the president for congress to be a partner in these decisions. the responsibility as elected representatives of the american people to be engaged in this process. but ultimately it is the responsibility of the commander-in-chief to make the kinds of decisions related to our military that rest on the shoulders of the president. >> he also said there might be a need for more resources. can you address the kinds of money requests or funding requests that he might wind up submitting to congress as well? >> i don't think there are any funding request to preview at this point. i would remind you that when the president traveled to west point he talked about his interest in the creation of this counterterrorism partnership.

this is a core component for the president's strategy in dealing with this and other issues like it around the globe. additional resources that can be used by the united states to build up a effective partners. we have well-trained, well-equipped, a effective partners that we can work with to confront these partners. need to get into a position where the united states is fully responsible for dealing with these kinds of emerging threats. we all want to be able to work closely with partners around the globe. partners who have better knowledge of local politics, better knowledge of local terrain. who in some cases can prevent some of these situations from becoming so urgent and so severe. requestone example of a the president has made to members of congress. but i think that members have

not voted on it. they would like to see those resources provided in terms of strengthening the hands of the president. >> [inaudible] given the administration compromised american citizens fighting alongside isis, it could potentially come back as one of the ones that sought out legal justification in that case. considering whether drone strikes or direct airstrikes were used. tensely against american citizens. >> i don't have any kind of policy announcement to make on these lines. i would point out that the administration has sought, at the president's direction, to provide additional insight to

working journalists on the legal justification and decisions that strike out threats at somalia and in yemen. as it relates to isil more generally, we are concerned about the threat posed by these foreign fighters. analystsieved by some that those who have traveled to the region to take up arms alongside isil, there are theres that indicate that is a risk that those individuals could return to travel unimpeded , either completely or relatively unimpeded. president will not hesitate to take the actions he thinks are

necessary. >> can you comment on the potential legislation on capitol hill? on the americans who are fighting alongside isil and the support? >> i don't think we have taken a position on them at this point. the mentioned to jeff, administration is certainly interested in working in a partnership with members of congress. >> [inaudible] boots on the ground? >> combat boots on the ground? >> combat wounds on the ground. right that's as far as i got. >> who is going in to syria?

to occupy that space? especially in terms of pushing isil back from the stronghold? the administration has been there all along. launching shoulder sized ground to air missiles, some of the equipment transferred to them has shown up in the hands of isis. why is the free syrian army now a more viable and trustworthy fighting force that it was a few months ago? >> there's one thing i want to quibble with a bit. for more than a year now we have been providing military and nonmilitary support. we have been providing military support -- >> legal military support. in terms of fighting in the proxy world the coalition? that.ill get to it is important for people to understand that support from the obama administration has been

flowing in for more than one year now, including military support. the president has thought, in the context of the west coast speech i mentioned earlier, the administration has sought additional resources to ramp up that assistance to the syrian opposition. we would certainly hope and expect that that would improve inir capacity and success taking the fight to the regime and to isil. to essentially and effectively wage that battle on behalf of the citizens of their country. an effort has been underway for some time. as you pointed out, we have sought to increase or ramp up that assistance. you pointed out a somewhat more complicated -- >> we will leave the white house briefing here for live coverage

of the u.s. house. about two gavel into session after their five-week recess.