talked with, even those based out of turkey, for them, money was an incredibly significant thing in terms of building momentum over time, that the ability to pay some element of a salary would be a thing that could perhaps build some of the greatest cohesion going >> there is the second part that if we minimize the leakage to bad guys we'll still have friends in the region that are contributing and so what to do about them? this has been a problem for years now in syria. so all i can say is, again, it must be transparent. i think this is one where the president himself is probably going to have to engage more

than once talking to, shall we say, countries not keeping to the agreed deal. but on the other hand, i think when there is american pressure, what i have seen, even with the islamic front is that sometimes our friends, when we press our friends, they will in turn squeeze. and the islamic front had been moderating its position starting in may when they issued that statement backing off of demanding an islamic state. so even that can be done, but i do think going forward, this is one where i think, unfortunately, the president, himself, is going to have to take some of his time -- he is a busy guy -- but it's going to take that, at times. there are lots of things delegated to the secretary of

state or secretary of defense, but when they're not making progress, then the president himself has to pick up the phone. >> you have to have a much more engaged president. >> it's leadership, yeah. >> great. we'll open up to questions in the front here. first, josh. >> thanks very much. daily beast. thanks for staying, panel, and ambassador ford, thank you for your service. i wanted to build on your point that there is skepticism as to whether the new plan to arm the moderate rebels will really be followed through on following the president's speech. a lot of skepticism is related to the fact that there is not a lot of faith in the administration's claims about where we're going because there are some that say the administration hasn't been honest about how we got to where we are. let me read the quote from white house press secretary josh earnest just yesterday where he talked about the opposition army and why we haven't done it yet. quote, because of the support we already provided during the opposition over the last year the capacity of the syrian

opposition is bigger, broader, and stronger. in other words, not only is he saying the syrian opposition is much better than it was last year which is refuted by everybody on the panel but is saying the obama administration deserves credit for it and that was the reason we didn't arm them before. in response to that, senator john mccain in an interview with "the daily beast" says, it's unbelievable. they've been decimated. for the white house to say they are stronger and more viable is an outright lie beyond anything i've countered with any president. i'm not kidding. so first of all, who's right, the white house or john mccain? that is the first question and sort of leads to the second question. do you think this is really going to happen? or do you think that this is going to be another example of lucy holding the football for charlie brown and then ultimately syrian rebels will find themselves out of luck? thank you. >> who wants to take that one? i'll start out.

first of all, i think it's important that everyone asks and follows up with president obama about what he means in his decisions. he is clearly uncomfortable about this. right? even the speech that he made the other night. you can see how uncomfortable he really is this with. that being said, i think that he has -- given what he's committed the united states to, i think he's made the decision. in terms of lucy and the football, i don't know how you would pull the football back at this point because if you did, it would be -- it would make the nonstrike incident last year politically unpalatable. now, i would urge the administration to stop spinning. okay? it's like digging yourself into a hole. you can't argue your way out of this one. what is accurate to say is that a lot of the american assistance has gone into syria to those in the moderate opposition. okay? now that's one thing. a lot of that is nonlethal assistance. we've been a huge provider and

the ambassador ford was involved in providing that assistance and we should have credit for that. that should be emphasized at this point. militarily, no. they are not as effective. none of our allies think they are. go talk to the jordanians or the israelis. they will tell you that qualitatively and oftentimes quantitatively they are weaker over the last year. i don't know anybody -- i don't know how anybody could spin it that way. [comment inaudible] >> i'm not going to get in the middle of the discussion between the white house and senator mccain. it's not my job. what i would just say is that, first, just from my own time in government, i think doug would agree with this, when the president of the united states gives a speech out of a -- the white house, that's not a small thing. there are a lot of interagency coordinations and meetings and that is, when he goes in front of the nation like that, that's the ty rare event, and

bureaucracy, the different departments and agencies, should now be lined up. so implementation, i think, is the question. i'm less concerned about the commitment at this point than i am about the implementation. but the implementation needs to start. congress has a busy schedule. a lot of people want to break to go back home to their districts. i'm a little nervous and some of the reporting from the "daily beast" is quite good that they're going to leave town without voting on this and then there are going to be all kinds of questions including in the region people who don't really understand our constitution because in their countries there is no such thing and they'll think, well, see, the americans are conspiring again. i really hope this congress does not journ before acting on the matter. that is the first step, to get the votes and let's go forward

on the title 10. >> if i could add, i think it's a key point. i didn't mean to -- i think it is a very good question but i see also in our debate and over the last day or so after the speech where it's something about our political culture right now where the president says something and then the opposition has to say something and i think it's good in a democracy. what i fear is quite often the blame game, coulda, shoulda, woulda as opposed to where i think the energy should be devoted, which is, okay. these tough issues we policy nerds like to wrestle with, title 10 vs. title 50, these are real issues for those slaving inside of the government within these constraints. these are the real issues as opposed to -- not that that is a real issue -- you can learn from the last year or so -- but instead of sort of this surface level, you know, i was right or -- because i don't think there is any fault. we're here in an institute that

calls for getting out of iraq and with a deadline. i still stand by that view. but these are complicated issues. i think much to the chagrin of others we put out reports now saying, just when we were out, they pulled us back in. i think for the balance of u.s. security interests it's important for us to look forward, and i, you know, i think you do have a lot of people on the hill who are doing that right now. i think that's one positive thing. >> if i can just jump in, i think a lot of our problems in syria over the years have been because we have searched for the perfect solution, which is not there. let's go for a good solution and start with that. there is no perfect solution now. >> question? right here. >> thank you. lee andrea bernstein. we talk a lot about our credibility with allies and

there's also an issue of our credibility in the international community. i would agree with the tatement that the map that was drawn, question its legitimacy right now, but the fact is, those are state borders. so when the president talks about being willing to strike in syria and prime minister cameron talks about strikes in syria, as perfectly legitimate because the government of assad is illegitimate, i mean, that -- regardless of our credibility with our arab allies, what about the credibility in the broader, international community as far as respecting international law? >> that's a key question, and i have a long list of questions. i could have talked with these guys forever. but on this, because it is, i think, a controversial issue and very difficult. ut the issue of just

illegitimacy, not just the efficacy but legitimacy of strikes inside of syria which the president and others are now openly talking about. you want to take a first stab at it? >> i think the point is you aise, the question you ask is, it's something we spend a great deal of time wrestling with. we need to work through the legal authorities question here in the united states. if we over time are going to build a regional or international coalition to get this done, we're going to have to spend a fair amount of time with the united nagss and elsewhere working to build the kind of political support that will allow us to maintain this over time. we are getting close to a moment in terms of our international position where questions will be raised about how is what you're doing now any different than what was done in other historical examples that were not -- we're not as proud of? i think it is important that we do spend the time at the u.n.

and other bodies to develop some elements of consensus moving forward on this. the question of actually getting authority from the united nations is going to be quite difficult. i don't think anyone knows how to write that resolution. but, yes. there are some people working on it. the other thing i would say is we are at a moment where we have to look quite closely at how far we want to spend in that effort in the sense that a number of our diplomats have spent a tremendous and heroic effort trying to deal with this with other members of the p-5 and we know that russia -- this isn't going to go as soon as we would like, so we need to make the effort but at the same time i don't think we can be fully constrained by that. >> i can just add, we're hoping hoping before the end of this month as well to be on the international considerations, our constitution and we have a progressive institution but we want to figure out and actually

had some invitations to try to make this like a bigger event, we want to bring people from the hill, because it is i think a hard topic. i don't have the expertise. i don't think all of us do. we're not lawyers. to deal with this issue of the u.s./congressional authorization. but we feel strongly that in general this framework and how we're talking about it is pretty shaky. and that having buy in, and i get what i think andrew said, congress doesn't want to vote on this. there are very few profiles that encourage it, it seems. we want to invite some of those voices who are and actually have the discussion. i hope we can have that event. part of it is they're back for two weeks i guess it is and getting into a think tank while they're doing everything else. i just wanted to add to the international dimension. we're deeply concerned about the framework in which, and we put in the paper, too, that there needs to be a broader discussion. i think pragmatically the american public is different compared to a year ago on this.

and for obvious and i think understandable reasons. having a national consensus on that through our institution i think would be essential as well. next question? >> i wanted to ask a question related to iran. we've talked about the force and so on, november 21 is rolling in on us pretty quickly here. i believe that's the deadline for the extension of the talks on their nuclear program. how does this play into, how might this play out if suddenly that falls apart and we're in the midst of this and then iran becomes a factor in terms of what we're going to do next? can you just sort of -- have you all taken that at all and what does it all mean? >> okay. i'll take the first shot.

it's important, i think, a number of us had mentioned. so for the way it's been sort of staked out to the american people, we're fighting isis. meanwhile in the region there is a huge, regionalized sectarian war going on in syria and iraq to put it mildly between iran and the arab countries, arab sunni countries specifically but not only if you add turkey so generally sunni/shia war. so how did these negotiations impact that? if the negotiations go well, i think that will -- that would, perhaps, make the -- encourage the iranians to be more useful. but the iranians, the moderates in the iranian regime do not have control of the portfolio to deal with iraq and syria. very important. they actually openly admit that. you'll find a couple people who try to say otherwise. it's not true. so those are two things, you know, the way the iranian

regime is structured. you have the moderate, the figure leaf and the sword. and the sword is what's going out of the region and raging r via the iraqi and and most importantly assad regime. if it goes badly, i don't think that region -- that we can say that everything will -- any kind of cooperation with the iranians, we do share some interests with them particularly in iraq. i think that will be maintained. i think also we can see that there could be that these talks are just postponed again. that is another real possibility. other than that, it's hard looking into a crystal ball on this one. >> if i could just add, i mean, somebody -- we talked about this before but at the white house has to be the air traffic controller on all of these pieces and perhaps it's the president, himself, if you hear him talk about iran or you heard him talk recently about syria, he really is deep in the details of this. somebody needs to actually figure out how these pieces fit together. i think sometimes we in think tanks have this sometimes

fantastical or academic notions of just because we're doing some talk on the nuclear program with iran, then maybe we'll be able to cooperate with them operationally, strategically on iraq and other things. and i think that, you know, on the ground it's harder, probably, to actually do that. my main point being and back to this sort of regional coalition we're building, it's hard, like andrew and others were asking me do you think this administration is going to align with assad or iran when there were whispers earlier this year. i thought, no way. it doesn't make any sense. to solve the syria problem. in part, because of the regional coalition that we need to build and they are building right now. look back to november/december last year and all of the erratic, public protests from saudi arabia officials and others about the iran deal. and the need for the administration to go out with secretary hagel and other things. bill burns gave a speech. to embrace the gulf states and

say, look. we're here. we're with you. that times ten i think in this -- if we were to sort of open up the door without consultation, working with iran. and beyond that i just see it as a very -- almost academic -- i mean, a nice idea but very hard to implement. perhaps one more question before we close. yeah. i've ignored this side of the room. sorry about that. >> to today's discussion and also absent from obama's -- >> who are you? >> my name is jared markland i work with the palestinian delegation. >> okay. >> i was just kind of oo curious. it seems to be the elephant in the room is the assad regime. i seem to see as a major attractor and also a major reason behind the spreading of the islamic state. i'm just kind of curious, what is your take on the role of the assad regime? if it is excluded it could cause problems for u.s. strategy in syria and also it's

continuing its attacks and diverting attention from the syrian opposition from attacking the islamic state. so i was just kind of curious if you could touch on the element. >> okay. all right. my position on the assad regime is pretty well known. but i guess i'd just say this. the deputy foreign minister again said they would like to work with us. the problem is that working with them just inflames the sunni arab opinion that i was talking about before. that's the big, strategic picture. tactically, i don't think they have a lot to contribute on the ground anyway. their forces are pretty stretched. they couldn't hold north central syria. they're struggling to maintain their last military base in the east. but what i do sense, and they will try to inject themselves, they will expend the bulk of

their military effort especially their remaining air power, hitting not the islamic state, most of their efforts even today, friday, september 12th, were not against islamic states. they were in suburban damascus and up around hama where they're fighting elements of the moderate, armed opposition. so that's why i say, we have to understand when we go into this, and we talk about supporting the syrian opposition, the syrian opposition is really fighting a two front war. islamic state on one side and outside regime on the other side. it's a tough, tough, hard fight. and so it's going to be messy as we try to sort of channel our assistance just to that one front but not to the other front then. assad is going to do everything he can to make that messy. >> okay. we're coming to the end of our time. two things. first for those of you in tv land, get our report. get one now. get them online. they're selling like hotcakes

supporting the syrian opposition and then defeating isis. we put a lot of work into this. as i mentioned, my colleagues really respect and value their work. it's been a team effort. second, to the audience, please join me in thanking our esteemed panel here for what has been a great discussion. [applause]

>> this weekend on the c-span net works, american history tv is live from baltimore's fort mchenry for the 200th anniversary the star spangled banner sunday morning at 8:30 on c-span 3. later at 6:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv, we'll tour fort mchenry and hear how war came to baltimore in 1814, about the british barrage on the fort, and why francis scott key was there to witness the fight. saturday night at 8:00 on c-span, the presidential leadership scholars program with former presidents george w. bush and bill clinton. and sunday afternoon at 3:30, live coverage of the harkin steak fry. sunday evening at 8:00 q & a with author rick pearlstein on the evolution of the conservative movement in american politics. and on c-span 2 saturday night at 10:00, on book tv's afterwards, author kin sell ver stein on the secret world of oil. sunday night at 6:45 eastern on book tv, democratic senator from new york kristen

gillibrand on her life in politics and her call for women to rise up and make a difference in the world. find our television schedule at c-span.org and let us know what you think about the programs you're watching. call us at 202-626-3400. e-mail us at comments@c-span.org or send a tweet at c-span #comments. join the c-span conversation. like us on facebook. follow us on twitter. in iowa's third congressional district, republican tom lathe a & m is retiring after 20 years in the house of representatives. the race to replace him is considered a tossup with the democrat stacy appel holding a slim lead over republican tom young in a recent poll. here is a look at some of the dvertising in that race. >> when republican tea party brokers went into the back room saturday they chose d.c. insider david young, 20 years on the payroll of a broken congress. young won the room by standing

up for cutting social security and ending medicare as we know it. even raising the minimum retirement age. what washington really needs is a healthy dose of iowa common sense. tacey appel, a mom of 6 worked as a financial consultant who knows small business is key to job growth. as state senator she got results helping make equal pay for equal work the law in iowa. as iowa's first woman in congress she'll fight to protect social security and medicare. staci appel. end the back room deals and put iowa families first. >> i'm david young and i approve this message. barack obama promss hope. then he ripped apart our health care system. shredded our economy and crumbled our national security. but if we band together, and fight for our conservative principles, we can put our economy and our country back

together again. >> iowa's answer is not magic. it's david young. >> iowans just want a good meal and good government. when we get the good meal, but our government over spends, over taxes, and over regulates. it under performs. i get it and you get it. why can't they? offering a dose of iowa reality to washington. then maybe we can have a good meal and good government. i'm david young, and i approve this message. >> more iowa politics on c-span this weekend. democratic senator tom harkin holds his 37th and final steak fry. speaking at the event former president bill clinton and former secretary of state hillary clinton. c-span spoke with senator harkin about inviting the clintons to the steak fry.

>> well, i put in a request to hillary. i spoke with her personally sometime ago. but she was getting ready to do her book tour. she was just finishing her book and going to go on her book tour and she said i just don't know what that's going to be like and how it's all going to transpire she said but i'd really like to do it. can you just give me some time to figure out what my schedule is going to be like? i said, sure. then i saw bill out in california. i was at a health care event in california. i saw bill clinton there. of course, then, we started commiserating about this and that. and i remember as he was kind of walking -- he was signing some of his books for some people in a little room, there were just the two of us, so i told him i had invited hillary to come out to speak at my steak fry. as he turned to walk away, i should, you should come, too. he said, you want both of us? i said, that would be great. you're both good friends of ruth and mine. we've been friends all these

years. just, you know, couple-to- coup kind of thing. that would be great. think about that. he said, i will. they did and it's such a great honor to have them both out. they've been just good friends of ours for all these years. bill and hillary have provided i think great leadership for our country in the past and in their respective ways. i served on the committee in the senate under ted kennedy with hillary clinton all the time she was in the senate so we had great working relationships in the senate. i think she just did an outstanding job as our secretary of state. in fact, as i've traveled around the world, the last few ears, it is just amazing how -- the stature that hillary clinton has globally among women and girls all over this globe. she has kind of lit a spark, lit a fire among women and girls in different countries around the world and they just

hold her in very, very high esteem. >> senator harkin's 37th and final steak fry with bill and hillary clinton is live from indian ole', iowa this sunday starting at 3:30 eastern. see it here on c-span. also sunday on c-span, house minority whip steny hoyer of maryland joins us on newsmakers to discuss the prospects for congressional approval of the president's plan to combat isis. he'll talk about the upcoming mid-term elections. newsmakers on c-span sunday at 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. eastern. >> hi. we're excited to announce it's launch week for the 11th annual student cam documentary contest. $100,000 in cash prizes will be awarded this year to middle and high school contest winners. this year's theme is the broadest ever. it's the three branches and you. we'd like you to tell a story that demonstrates how a policy, a law, or an action by either the executive, legislative, or

judicial branches of the federal government has affected you and your life or your community. the competition is open to students in grades 6 through 12 and students may work alone or in groups of up to three. contestants are asked to produce a five to seven-minute video documentary supporting their chosen topic and to include some c-span programming. that $100,000 in cash prizes will go to 150 students and 53 teachers and the grand prize winner with the best overall entry will win $5,000. the deadline for entries is january 20th, 2015. winners will be announced in march. visit www.student cam.org for more information on this year's contest, the three branches and you. >> scotland votes next week on whether to remain part of the united kingdom or become an independent country. polls have shown a tight race. the brookings institution today offered a preview of thursday's

scott ishindependence -- scottishindependence vote. >> ladies and gentlemen, i'd like to welcome you all here today to actually -- one of the very first event in our new, revamped brookings conference. i'm thrilled now that i put the microphone and it actually works. it seems very fitting to inaugurate our new facility, revamped facilities with the big question off certainly next week which is the potential revamping of the united kingdom and whether people would like that to be happening. simply if the referendum in scotland moves toward a yes vote, the renovation will be a complete overhaul of a system we've all known for a good 300 years and many of us on this panel here are the products of. we're absolutely delighted

today to welcome two colleagues who have flown under their own steam from edinburgh to be with us. charlie jeffrey and judith corvo both from the university of edinburgh who have been spearheading as they will tell you a major study of the implications of the referendum after o what will happen september 18th. this has been a huge study and this has actually been very much symbolic of the whole debate about the scott ishreferendum. it's been very heavy on process. as we know, many people around the world are watching this extremely closely because this is a rather unique event and something that is being negotiated pains takingly over the whole period of time. it is the project actually of decades of interaction tweened inboro and london on the issues and now we're actually at the big day and the rest of the world is paying

close attention. of course a lot of events that couldn't have been anticipated when british prime minister david cameron and scott ishfirst mince ter alex salmon sat down to thrash out the details of what was going to happen on september the 18th have now -- we've had all kinds of input from unexpected places including crimea and the leadership of crimea weighing in on their interests in the outcome, something that wouldn't have been anticipated years ago several and also the back drop of events in spain and there is a lot of interest in what happens next in places outside of the united kingdom. the big, consequential questions we're going to look at today and hopefully give you a sense of are really about the implications for the future of the united kingdom, scotland, and europe and also the implications of the united states.

we're very grateful to everybody for participating in this panel. we're also joined on my right-hand side by jeff dire who is one of the senior journalists for the financial times. he is based here in the united states and is originally from scotland. he will be the one person here with a genuine scottish accent. this shows the diversity of the issue. julius is originally from the united states, canada, oklahoma, but is an electorate of the university of edinburgh and charlie can tell you about his own origins. this is not a debate about ethnic particularism in scotland either. it's been framed in terms of specific nationalism and political choices and that is also important. and then finally, we'll be turning to my colleague here at brookings jeremy shapiro for the united states perspective. before coming back to brookings he's been a fellow for sometime, jeremy also served as special adviser to the

assistant secretary for europe in the state department and also on the policy planning staff. he was not assigned to think about scotland and the united kingdom but we're hoping obviously somebody might be thinking about this at this particular juncture and i'm going to ask jeremy to give his perspective on what this means to the united states. again, thank you very much for joining us. i'll turn over first to charlie who is going to give us a sense of the whole perspective of the referendum, the paradigm, the framework, how this has evolved. i'd like to thank charlie and juliet for coming because they've actually used their own research money to come here to explain this to this audience. we're very grateful. >> thank you very much indeed. it's a great pleasure to be here at brookings and a great pleasure to see so many people here. we are indeed representing a broad program of research on what's happening in scotland and the rest of the uk called future of the uk and scotland.

if you type future uk and scotland into google you'll find us. what we're looking at is the big question. should scotland be an independent country? yes or no? that's what scotts voters will have before them next week as they enter the polling booths. that's a momentous decision by any standard. it's a decision which could end what's generally seen as one of the most successful unions of nations in world history and if we do end it, it will be immense domestic and international implications. so quite rightly, the eyes of the world are on scotland. we will have in scotland by the end of this weekend some 400 camera crews in edinboro and i think thousands of print journalists coming the events of the next week, which is quite extraordinary. what they will see is a nation exploring its rights to

self-determination with great seriousness. 4.3 million scotts have registered to vote in the referendum. that is 97% of the eligible electorate, which is utterly unprecedented. we expect on that basis to see a turnout of at least 80% and we haven't seen turnout at that level in u.k. politics since the immediate period after the second world war. what i think is striking is how the debate has been conducted. now, we have seen and had lots of press coverage off occasional bursts of online abuse and there have been a small handful of confrontations on the streets. but that's just a very, very minor part of the debate. more generally we have seen an extraordinary flowering of civic engagement, of people in their communities, in church halls, in town halls, even more

informally, committing themselves to thinking about scotland's future. i think this is by some way the biggest civic engagement process in scott ishhistory. i think from that we'll have a very well informed electorate as we go to the polls this week. so, you might ask, what do they think? well, up on the screen here we have the poll of polls. a moving average of the last six opinion polls at various points in time. you can see that at the end of last year on the far left of that slide, the pink line at the top, which is, no, was at 60% plus and the blue line, yes, was below 40%. you can see in a rather uneven process a significant narrowing of the polls in the spring of this year, but what you can see most strikingly is a rapid

narrowing in the last couple of weeks. the last six polls carried out over the last eight days showed yes, support for independence and, respectively, 47%, 51, 50, 47, 48, and 49. that's already out of date, by the way. it's narrowed by one-third the points. 51-49. age is now expect a close outcome on thursday this week. a few words on the big themes that each side in the debate have put forward. i'll use the framing of negative and positive campaigning for this. because i think the negatives probably outweigh the positives. on the no side, largely led by the u.k. government but also by the cross party campaign better together, we have had an essentially negative message, a message which is all about

risk, uncertainty, loss, you will be worse off, and the refusal to accept some of the ideas the scottish government would like to pursue if scotland became independent, including various forms of partnership with the rest of the u.k. to quote, several figures on the no side, it is not going to happen. what we've seen now is quite a dismal vision. dismal in terms of content. it's all going to go terribly wrong. dismal in terms, also, of presentation. i think there's been a certain level of difficulty in getting the message across. i think that message of risk and loss has shown a diminishing return. it's lost its impact. i think that's one of the reasons why it on this graph you see a falling support for the no side. what we're seeing now is a big echo of those concerns from the private sector, from finance and other areas of industry.

today's u.s. version of financial times is carrying lots of stories like that. that may have an effect on opinion in these last days. that may be double edged. i think scotts can be rather averse to people telling them what to do. on the no side, we've seen little positive campaigning. very little about why it is good and certainly very little about why it would be better, why scotland would be better if it stayed in the union. we've seen a bit of a change in the last week on this. the no side has firmed up an offer and more specifically a timetable for additional powers for the scottishparliament should scotland remain in the u.k. the negatives outweigh the positives. big things on the yes side. generally, a positive message. generally aspirational.

generally talking about the possibility of a better society, social justice, democratic legitimacy. a different kind of role in the international arena, which juliet will talk about in a few moments. that is a policy attuned to scotland's needs and not driven by the interests of the heartland of the u.k. economy in london and the southeast of england. and an aspirational message about continuing friendly partnership in many areas with the rest of the u.k. after independence. all very aspirational, positive. but also i have to say very vague and often quite unconvincing especially in that emphasis on partnership, because it relies on the willingness of the partner and the partner has said, well, we're not really very willing. we've seen a much stronger negative message from the yes side in the last weeks. in fact, i think they've managed to conjure up a presentational perfect storm,

which has three elements. if we stay, the national health service, that icon of post war british society, will be privatized. if we stay, social inequality will increase. if we stay, we will continue to be governed by a political party, the conservatives, which is deeply disliked in scotland. nhs privatization, inequality conservatives, has been brought together in a very effective way which has had real traction which again is one of those reasons why the polls have closed. i think then we can boil down the big decision to pretty much this. the no side says, if you leave, you will suffer economically. the yes side says, if we stay, we will have a future of social injustice. that's the choice. if we vote yes, what next? well, we'll see a negotiation of extraordinary complexity. it will deal simultaneously

with the disentanglement of scotland from the rest of the u.k. no easy task. but made much more difficult by the complications of the domestic, political timetable, including a u.k. election in may, next year, which will be held while those negotiations would be under way. at the same time as that, the scottish government will be working with the u.k. government to work out the process and the terms of scotland's membership of the international community. no easy task. those negotiations will have a number of key issues. currency arrangements will be at the heart. that will no doubt be connected to discussion about scotland's share of assets, in particular oil and gas reserves, but, also, liabilities, in particular the scottish share of the u.k.'s accumulated public debt. my sense is on that cluster of

issues the two sides after a yes vote would discover a mutual interest in messages of reassurance and stablization to markets. some of the hard rhetoric we've heard before may well ebb away into a common endeavor to calm things down. e.u. negotiations will be challenging, not least because of other countries which have similar situations to that of scotland and the rest of the u.k. nato membership will be challenging, not least because of the scottish government's commitment to remove the u.k.'s nuclear weapons bases, part of the wider nato deterrent from scotland. we could expect package deals. perhaps extending across different areas -- currency and nuclear weapons is one package which is often evoked in that sense. i imagine we would actually see quick agreements on some of the

key issues, not least because of that pressure for economic stability, but also long transition periods for implementation of the working out finer detail. final big challenge there will be how to insulate all of that very, very sensitive, lots of different, simultaneous negotiations from what would be a febrile political atmosphere in the u.k. if we vote no, what next? well, that would be less urgency if we vote no. there will be a limited challenge to economic stability and minimal international imensions to the question. we have a timetable for the delivery of the additional talents of the scottish parliament and that starts on the 19th of september and a rapid process would follow so that draft legislation would be in place prior to the may, 2015

u.k. election involving decentralization of tax powers and powers in welfare policy. there would be plenty of issues around that not least because the pro union parties are divided between themselves but also within themselves on the content of the additional devolution of powers. there is a big question as to whether any compromise they come up with actually satisfy demand in scotland. i say that because whatever happens, close to half of scotts if we vote no will have oted to leave. if we vote no this is not an endorsement of the u.k. as is. there will be tremendous pressure to placate that drive which has led practically half of scotts to vote no. it won't be easy. also if you placate the scotts you might stir it up in other parts of the u.k.

we're already beginning to hear that a little bit in wales and articularly in england where --. to conclude, if yes, you will be observing and some of you no doubt will be participating in a process of enormous significance and no little drama with important international ramifications. if it's a no, you'll be observing an inward looking debate, no doubt with its own dramas as the u.k. casts around for an interm arrangement that might offer some constitutional stability. i doubt actually whether we'll find them but whether we get to that situation we have to wait until next thursday. >> thank you very much. you laid that out wonderfully for everyone. so, juliet, the larger implications? >> okay. thank you. thank you to you and your colleagues here at brookings for inviting us and letting us

talk about these issues today. i'm going to briefly talk about foreign policy in the referendum debate, what the yes side says about what an independent scottish foreign policy would look like and then both internal and external reactions. then i'll conclude by challenging a couple of assumptions on both sides in this debate. i should say foreign policy is not a key issue in which voters are likely to decide and cast their vote on next week, but foreign policy is the most distinct area that would change with independence given that scotland already has deinvolved powers in many areas of public policy, health, education, others. it is foreign affairs that sovereignty would give scotland considerable new powers. and this is also a part of the discourse, at least at the elite level. so what would an independent scottish foreign policy look like? the yes side has outlined some directions although not completely specific that it

would take a scottish foreign policy. i like to characterize state foreign policies as sprations in terms of four pillars -- profits, protection, principles, and pride. let me say a few things about what an independent scottish foreign policy would look like along these pillars. the pillar of profit, clearly a liberal trade, economic foreign policy in the discussion of advantages of continued e.u. and w.t.o. membership. so we would see continuity in economic foreign policy very similar to current u.k. economic foreign policy although a much smaller economy. there could be a big difference if scotland gets in the e.u. and the u.k. votes to leave the e.u. there you would see quite a difference between a u.k. and independent scottish foreign policy. on the pillar of protection the yes side makes the case for continued membership in nato, something its party rejected until the referendum campaign began.

this, and the scottish defense force would be the cornerstones of protection. the military would focus on territorial integrity and take a regional defense role in the northern europe, north sea for example. the defense budget is modeled after other small european states and focuses on maritime forces. it rejects the trident submarine as charlie mentioned the u.k.'s current nuclear deterrent that resides in scottish waters and says it wants the weapons removed as soon as possible after independence but has not given a deadline. it is with the principles pillar that the yes side seeks to put the most daylight between itself and how it characterizes the u.k.'s foreign policy. the yes side emphasizes it would have different international priorities from westminster. most clearly in their words in matters of war and peace. the antinuclear argument is also based on value statements such as, quote, trident is an

affront to basic decency. the yes side is clearly laying out aspirations for an ethics based foreign policy, talking about scotland being a kallstrom for international justice and peace -- a champion for international justice and peace, development, human rights, and climate justice. but there are just a few clues in how these values would actually be implemented. scotland would not be an isolationist country but its partition as peacekeeping would be governed by principles of the need for international legitimacy and respect for international law. and many times along these lines we've heard asserted the hypothetical argument that an independent scotland would not have participated in iraq. pride plays a place in most states' foreign policy and it is the state's projected self-image. there is little talk of pride in the yes campaign materials. but occasionally they talk about scotland as an outward facing nation exporting goods, peoples, and ideas around the

world and referred to scotland's proud military tradition as well. so what's the no side's reaction? the no side stresses as charlie mentioned, uncertainty, risk, and constraints on scotland as a small state. the no side argues that the international memberships that scotland seeks are not automatic. e.u. membership might be vetoed, and even if granted is not likely to come with the opt out that the u.k. currently has and that scotland says it wants. the no side points out that membership in nato could come with responsibility, possibly including retaining the u.k. nuclear deterrent in scotland. the numbers for defense and intelligence in terms of spending and personnel says the no side just don't add up and could create a security risk. the no side is very familiar to those of us who study international relations reflecting the realist perspective that small states don't matter, can't have the influence big states have, are dependent on military alliances and must often compromise

values in exchange for security. thus according to this view scotland's interests are better represented and protected at home and abroad by a u.k. that has a permanent seat in the u.n. security council and has a high profile, well respected, large diplomatic service with considerable expertise. the yes side has some counterreaction to the no side's position on the foreign policy. they argue that membership and cooperation with others will come because it's in others' interests. a stable intelligence environment in scotland, for example, with shared intelligence is critical to the u.k.'s own safety given the shared geographical space and thus cooperation is likely. the yes side also argues that small states don't need the equivalent protection as big states, don't need a broad global profile, and don't attract the enemies and threats that sometimes big states do. and consistent with research on small states the yes side points out small states can often punch above their weight and have influence because they

are small states. they are often, for example, more trusted because they are seen as less a threat to others. so what has been the international reaction to this? publicly at least most states have conformed to international norms of noninterference in democratic processes and said this is a matter for the u.k. or the scottish people. where external actors have weighed in this has largely been on the no side. comments from external actors include states such as the united states, but also international organizations and businesses. these comments largely see scottish independence as an unwelcome and puzzling disturbance. the negative international reaction has many sources but chief among them are states' own concerns about their domestic problems, worries that the scottish secession would spill over into their countries. there are others that have voiced general concerns about precedents and so-called

balkanization of europe that the scottish independence move o would set off and there are concerns about the weakening of a stable ally, the u.k., probably the basis of both u.s. and french concerns about scottish independence. i don't think the international commentary has much of an impact on the internal debate and vote next week. perhaps the financial reaction this week was more important. but when states intervene, they risk some back firing among the scottish population. so i will end by questioning two assumptions i see in the debate on independence and foreign policy and, to be fair, one assumption on the no side and one on the yes side. first the no. international reactions that support the no side. in the arguments that an independent scottish foreign policy would fare poorly, there is an assumption that all else is static and only the question of scottish independence is changing. the u.k., for example, is presented as the major power

that better represents the people of scotland in the world. this is not an uncontested view and not one invulnerable to change. power balances in the world are changing, emerging powers are more important, and big powers also don't always have influence. the u.k. defense is in the midst of downsizing and likely to face further budget cuts, as well. there is an assumption u.k. foreign policy is also statically a faithful ally and nuclear power but, here, too, there are signs of change. the house of commons vote on syria last year showed a real lack of trust in international intelligence, lack of enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention, and there are real disagreements even in the current governing coalition in the u.k. over the works of trident. certainly the pro u.s. position in the u.k. is still strong but arguably not as strong as it used to be and may not in the future. my point is these are not issues that divide westminster vs. scotland. they are debated within

westminster, too, and even without scottish independence they may affect the u.k. role in the world. on the yes side there has been strong assumption of rational, interest based cooperation by others. they argue that of course britain will share the pound and intelligence and that the e.u. and nato will let scotland in because it is in their interests to do so. it probably is, and it's not a bad starting assumption, but we know that states don't always act according to their interests or they have competing interests which can complicate external relations. consider the rest of u.k. as scotland's most important negotiating partner in a post independent world. the u.k. will hold national elections next year and if the conservatives win, they have promised a referendum on the u.k.'s eu membership. the negotiations with scotland on trident on the pound, on the division of assets, on the military division, on everything will be happening in

the middle of these political and likely very contested campaigns. i'll stop there. >> thank you, juliet. we'll turn now to jeff dire from "the financial times." "the financial times" has been running a whole series for quite sometime now on this debate and many of the issues charlie and juliet have laid out on the table. clearly, jeff, and his colleagues are going to be very busy in the next few weeks especially as juliet has laid out that no matter what the outcome, this is going to feed into a much bigger debate in the united kingdom and the runup to what is going to be a very contested general election next year in may, 2015. i think one of the issues that juliet has mentioned here we should put out on the table, which is the continuation of the u.k. u.n. security council seat. here in the corridors of brookings i've heard from my colleagues who cover other areas of the world look agate some of the rising powers that there will be a big demand from

some of them for rethinking of the u.k. national security council seat. there is anyway as we all know. and certainly the outcome of the referendum will raise that even higher. as juliet has said, nothing will be constant in this debate. there will be more issues on the table as we look forward. jeff, we've asked you to give a big perspective on these issues and obviously you have quite a lot to say on this matter. over to you. >> thank you very much to brookings for inviting me here today. i really appreciate the invitation. charlie and juliet have really laid out very effectively the issues on the table here and some of the underlying thinking besides both sides of the campaigns. not only do we want to go over the same ground but maybe what i'll just try and -- sort of what the issue for independent scotland might look like. what happens if there is a yes vote next week though it is a tossup. just try and ask the question

what would it mean and what would it look like? i think the key point to understand is that a yes vote next week is almost a start of the issue, not the end of the issue. a yes vote will be the start of a very complicated divorce proceedings and might be quite an amicable divorce proceedings and might be a very nasty divorce proceedings but it is going to be very complicated and the start not the end of the process. as we speak today, the basic outlines of what an independent scotland might look like are still very unclear. there are core questions about its place in the world and what the state will look like, big institutional questions that haven't been resolved. there are still a lot of question marks over them. that is one of the key issues in the debate. it was mentioned that they would like to be part of the european union, a key part of the sort of sales pitch to the country. scotland likes to think it is

actually more pro european than the rest of the u.k. that wasn't necessarily always the case but that's part of the sales pitch at the moment. opinion polls show that sometimes some polls show that's true. some polls show it's not true. it is very much a core part of the kind of platform, this idea we can be a small, independent country but still part of a bigger, broader world of the eu allows us to be. it is also very important to them because it is crucial for trade relations in scotland. just this general idea that business as usual can carry on even if we take the big not necessarily immediately clear that scotland could become a member of the eu. they have reached most of the qualifications, but there are three potential questions. the first is the spanish

question, there are other countries that might object, but and is the one that is most likely to have it real problem with scotland becoming a member of the eu. it does not want to encourage its own separatist movements. although it may be unlikely to ultimately reject scottish membership, it has an incentive to drag things out and make things difficult to show that there is a price to be paid for taking this move. that would be a very tough negotiation scotland would face. there is a question of whether the u.k. would ultimately back it. again, it seems unlikely, at the end of the day, the u.k. would say now. as there is going to be a complicated negotiation had, this is one of the bargaining chips that the rest of the u.k. government would have. a talent cannot become a part of the eu until both sides have signed off on the separation agreement, the divorce agreement. that is another factor. the third is the euro factor. in theory these days new members

of the eu are supposed to become members of the euro as well. given the crisis in the euro over the past few years, one might imagine that they would have reluctance to push the rule wholeheartedly, but in theory scotland would have to become a part of the euro, and that is not something that the scottish national say that they want to do at the moment. again, i think that most of these issues would ultimately be resolved, there would be a sensible compromise that they would find, but it will be a painful and difficult negotiation. scotland says it wants to become a part of nato, as we have heard. general, a part of a business as usual, we are not going to rock the boat too much. you do not have to worry that an independent scotland will pose radical changes. that will not be a simple negotiation, either. party aresh national very anti-nuclear.

they have called it a basic affront. there is also an anti-american popular is him that is a part of &p pitches well, they talk about america's illegal wars. scotland does not want to have nuclear weapons and play that against american foreign policy in the middle east, that would not be unique and nato, there are other countries with a similar profile, that is a wrinkle, a complication. they would have to do something to soothe american concerns about that. america would also presumably have concerns about what defense spending might be like in an independent scotland, because they are committed to maintaining a certain defense spending. there are pressures on the scottish government, and independent scottish government in its first year, that would push it to try and cut defense spending. everything the u.s. wants from nato this moment is to not have another country that is going to fall below the 2% mark.

that is another tricky issue. spain is another possible stumbling brought -- black in nato as well. -- block in nato as well. i do not think that these woodblock scotland from becoming a member of nato, but it will be a drawnout negotiation where things will not be as simple as they are being projected in the campaign. if you want to mention the u.n. issue that might come up, but the final element that i want to talk about is the currency issue, which has become one of the core issues of the campaign. issuethe most difficult that is going to face an independent scotland if we vote next -- yes next week. they have said that ultimately they would be a sensible compact between scotland and the rest of the u.k. to sort things out. i am not totally clear on that, i am skeptical on that. i think that this is a key issue because there is not real -- any

real easy path for an independent scotland on the currency issue. -- thelay out the issues options that they would have, there would be the euro option. but that is not the preferred reasonfor the very basic of the problems the euro has had in recent years. the other option would be to have scotland issue its own currency. mostwould give it its autonomy, giving it the best chance in the long run to have an independent, effective policy. establishing its own currency would be very complicated, very difficult. you have to establish credibility, build institutions, you would have lots of worries about this matches in liabilities and assets, currency risk. there is a real risk of economic turbulence in the short or medium term before scotland got to the stage of having a credible currency. but the -- there is the sterling

sterlingization option, continuing to use the pound but not being a part of the arrangements in the u.k., similar to panama. that is technically possible, but there are lots of problems with that. scotland are in the central bank, said to have a backstop for the banking system, they need to build up some reserve fund, which would mean cutting spending for a number of years in order to build up this fund at an economic cost to scottish welfare spending, effectively. it has not been discussed but that would be implicit. it is entirely understandable why the snp is putting all of its money on the option that they can stay a part of the currency union with the rest of the u.k.. we will vote for independence and we will renegotiate the terms.

ideally,cotland would, have membership in the bank of england and become one of the shareholders, essentially, of the bank of england. and they would have access to all the facilities that the bank of england could offer, the lender of last resort facilities, that that would offer to the broader scottish economy. from an independent scottish point of view that makes complete sense. all clear to me that that make sense for england and the rest of the u.k.. i think that for economic reasons and for political reasons. the economic reason would be that all of the risks, essentially, would be on one side. away to think about this is that if scotland got into trouble, if an independent scotland got into trouble, england would have the resources to bail it out. if england got into trouble, scotland would not have the resources to bail it out.

it is a classic moral hazard, all the risks are on the english side. there is little reason that i could see for them to want to sign up for this kind of currency union, they are exposing themselves to risks if scotland were to run a different economic policy. it is a free ride on the back of the stability that the bank of england could offer them. do aif they did decide to currency union, the price that they would ask for would be a very, very rigid fiscal rule. rules, essentially asking for bank of england regulation of the entire scottish financial system. and possible even the pooling of fiscal resources, so even though scotland would get control of revenues of the north sea oil, it would then have to make some of that money available back to the broader u.k.. that ation of that is notionally independent scotland under a currency union would not have a great deal of real

autonomy, real independence in economic policy. again, that is something that has not really been -- in my time in scotland, that is not coming through in the argument as to what a currency union would mean for an independent scotland. the establishment would ultimately want to do a deal between england and scotland, they would not want a crisis north of the border. politically, it is not clear to me that it would be possible for them to do so. will make you think about that is the following. the striking thing about this referendum is just how little angle and seems to care what is going on in scotland -- england seems to care what is going on in scotland. to go back to the last referendum, on the weekend before that, there were several hundred thousand people marching in the streets of montréal. canadians from outside of québec were asking correct to say. there have been -- were asking québec to stay.

that is not a part of the debate here. in angling, the sentiment is the opposite, resentment. if you want to go, in words that i cannot use in the brookings institute. [laughter] it is not a polite atmosphere. an election some time, certainly if they vote yes but in the next year. a seems to be impossible for non-scottish political party to get elected on a platform saying, yeah, we should do right scotts.cott -- i think they will demand tough conditions. from the english point of view, a currency union seems to be scotland saying that we want out but we want all the benefits of staying in. that is the way that it plays in english politics. and i do not think that is a politically sustainable argument. for both of those reasons, i am a little more pessimistic as to how it will play out, i giggled

a complicated and difficult to not be the answer that scotland or the snp would like. pessimism,bit of these tight opinion polls are fantastic for generalists. this is a great story for my newspaper. it seems to me to be a terrible outcome for scotland and britain. alternative, i am not saying that it is the wrong way 59 or 49ngs, but a result, that shows a divided country and a fragile political consensus in order to take a very, very big step. that is if they vote yes, but i think that it cuts off ways as well. it is not a ringing endorsement of the union. i think we are entering a. of political fragility and vulnerability or a lot of different things that mess it up. we will get into these things in

the q&a. >> thanks geoff, i think one point that you left us with actually makes -- the united states is having this debate as well with our divisions internally between the different political parties seems quite mild, which is quite an achievement. with that, i will turn it over to jeremy to give us a perspective on how things look from here in bc where we are all where we are d.c. all sitting. >> thanks, and thanks to all the anelists, i think geoff davis good view of what the presence of scotland would be on the international scene. what i would like to cover as with the u.s. government is thinking about the scottish referendum, and also how the u.s. would react if there is a yes vote. mentioned, juliet the u.s. does not really talk about this very much.

talked about some concerns over specific issues, particularly nuclear issues, but have not really taken a position on, or at least an official position on, the referendum. this is for rather clear reasons. in the first instance, it would be rude to comment on the internal deliberations of a democratic country. it is not unprecedented, sally say, for the united states to do so. [laughter] but it is impolite. and i think that it is in general a principal for the u.s. to not do that sort of thing, particularly for allies which it recognizes have a legitimate system and are engaged in a legitimate process. again is for a clear on the u.s. side that that is what is going on, for better or for worse. of course, the united states have an opinion. i think they recognize that stating that opinion is not

always very helpful to promoting it. the u.s. weighed in semi-accidentally, i think, on the question of british membership in the european union a year or two ago and it created a firestorm in britain. one of the things that it did was that it aligned both sides -- it turned out that both sides cared very much what the u.s. out, and it became a lightning rod. i think that they have, since that time, taken the approach that they cannot actually what the u.s.ell wading into the debate will even do in terms of public opinion. so it is best to stay out of it. i think that is reinforced by the sentiment that was already mentioned that the scots are adverse to being told what to do, particularly by americans.

that despite the absence of opinion, we can make a fairly educated guess about what the u.s. government thinks. is a statustates quo power, i think that is a thing we forget when we talk about crises and u.s. action, but in fact, as the leader of the world, there is a strong bias toward stability in u.s. foreign policy and a strong bias against secession of any sort. quossion is, for a status power, nearly a complete collapse of policy. the united states is not entirely consistent in this regard. xhosa vote comes quickly to mind, and there are other examples -- kosovo comes quickly to mind. if you look at u.s. policy, they saw to avoid an idea that there was a precedent set towards secession, that there was any right of secession i provinces.

i think that that view is reinforced in this particular case because the u.s. sees this as two of its best friends divorcing. and that is never a joyful experience. i think, though, that even beyond that general principle, of the status quo power, there are real issues in the united states. some have been alluded to already but i will go over them or directly from a u.s. perspective. i think that a critical one is the idea of a weakening of a key u.s. ally, the u.k. from theis clearly, u.s. perspective, a very active, very effective ally. there are precious few of those these days. , ine is a general view that the tumble that has been , theibed after a yes vote u.k. or what remains of it would turn inward as it negotiates the exit of scotland.

it would be more likely to get out of the european union in the punitive referendum in 2017, which would further shrink british influence and british activism in the world. there is also a view that scottish exit would put greater pressure on the british defense budget and the british armed forces. and overall this might mean that the u.k. would not be able to play the kind of lead role in nato that it has traditionally. related to this, i think that there is a fear of a weakening of nato and the eu. the eu would turn inward yet again, as i had to negotiate the it had to negotiate the question of secession in general and scottish entry in specific.

because it would make a british exit more likely, that is the arc for that. sorry, i have just been at a very long conference about that. saidgets at what the u.s. when they took a position against rich exit from the european union. looking for a strong britain within a strong european union. it is clear that a scottish exit begins that strong britain and british exit from the european union weakens the european union. for nato, i think that, contrary to what has been said, this is less about the nuclear deterrent than about demonstrating weakness and disunity at a in nato's history in the face of a newly resurgent threat from russia. if you look at the nato summit last week and the president's trip to estonia, ec a strong

see ao assert -- you strong urge to assert nato strength in the face of the russian threat. of one of its members, a key member, breaking up. and then the type of government that was described taking over in scotland and all of the difficult negotiations over nato. that does not really appealed to the united states at this critical moment in dealing with russia. i think that -- while i will get to that a little bit later. i think that the third reason that the u.s. would be against this is the question of precedent. fiona mentioned, the leader of the crimea has already mentioned scottish independence as a precedent for what he would like to do.

we have also heard expressions of this justice morning on npr. of domesticsident saying, scotland can do it, why can't we. that will be an increasingly hard question to answer. this also spreads across the eu, into spain and other key u.s. allies that could well face this question. a piece aboutve this that i think we distributed out front that talks about the and thet that this sets difficulties that might cause for the european union. so what will the u.s. do in the case of a yes vote? is always a fair bet, in the face of a dramatic international developments, that the united states will urge calm. [laughter] i think that that will be the first reaction. what that really means is that

they well, broadly, accept the outcome. urging, in order to make the best of a bad situation, a fast resolution of a negotiated, agreeable divorce. specifically to create a sense of reassurance and to minimize the disruption that i talked about that they fear. think, quietly and do some extent from behind the scenes, push for eu/nato membership for scotland on reasonably fair terms. implied,l be, as geoff very, very hard negotiations on the nuclear deterrent, but i do think that they are ultimately looking for a solution. they would certainly prefer a weak member of nato to a nonmember. ,here are, as was mentioned

which of nato members have romantic anti-american notions, particularly about the nuclear deterrent. this fits into a wider debate. the united states will welcome a they wouldt i think prefer it to a nonmember, an irish solution. the key is that it has to be a negotiated solution and a transition. i think, very clearly, the united states will push back against the idea that this referendum represents a precedent for places like crimea, donnesck. the way that they will do that is by emphasizing the mutual decision nature, that this was agreed by both sides, and that was the critical feature which allows this type of referendum

and this type of separation. it must be agreed, both by the region that is holding the referendum and by the state in which the region belongs. and they will say that this is totally different from the ukraine or the breakaway provinces of georgia where this is under dispute. i think, also, and some more speculatively, if the scots vote yes, the u.s. will reevaluate its decision to play a fairly hands-off role in the british exit question for the european union. they will still have the problem that i mentioned, it is not clear how waiting in will really in will help.ing but they will have the president of not weighing in.

the united states does not make the same the state twice, they make a different mistake. [laughter] i think we will see them play a more active role, the argument that they will use is that because they have a stake in british membership in the european union, just as, for example, a country like britain would have a stake in the united membership in nato, they have every right to -- to weigh in. they will make their opinion much more known in scotland votes yes. >> thank you jeremy. obviously we have a lot of issues here, and we only have half an hour left, so i would like to bring in you, the audience. i can see already a lot of questions. people in the audience have a stake in this issue. maybe threeke questions right away, we have microphones which will come out in just a second, and then i will come back to our panel to ask them to comment on the

questions. questionsns -- two immediately. in the back, let me know at your questions, to. hugo, i speak for myself as a british expatriate englishman. oceans word at this point is potentially not that helpful -- an englishman's word at this point is potentially not that helpful. i want to take up the idea that englishman do not care about this issue, i would hate to leave the audience with this impression. if you look at twitter, you see the day of national unity from outside the borders, from outside of scotland coming next wednesday. you also see, and i recommend it very strongly, forgive me for getting slightly emotional on this matter, "the spectator"

magazine launched a campaign for people outside of scotland writing in personal words what -- about why it is that they would want the scottish people to vote to stay in the united kingdom. that is all that i would have to say, other than my question, obeying the rules, it has been suggested that perhaps it would be less an urgent situation in terms of what would happen afterwards. ,f the referendum has not shown and the campaign amongst it, eelinghere is a wide f of disenfranchisement in scotland and england in wales, and it is urgent that there is some sort of constitutional settlement, not just in scotland but more widely in the event of innovaro. -- of a no vote. thank you. >> independent. can you relate everything that you said in the situation to ireland?

first of all, could there be and ireland/northern ireland situation where a part would stay with the u.k.? and would ireland and scotland have better relations because they might end up using the euro , or could there even be a closer drawing of ireland to the u.k. because it is now a club that is relatively bigger. >> and you. -- thank you. panel for this marvelously instructive survey. i regret the absence on the panel of the elegant governor of texas, the honorable rick perry, who has some views on secession as well. everybody knows -- >> can you speak a little closer

to the might, i am not sure that the cameras are picking it up. >> ok, i regretted the absence of rick perry from the panel. everybody knows that an angle thereetropolitan england, is a disproportionate role in the leadership of cultural institutions. one wonders about the composition, the social composition, age composition, also, maybe even religious composition of the two parties, the yes and no block, and scotland. is there a class gradient of some kind? it appeared so from some of the discussions one the saw on the television, but it would be good to know something about the social composition of the opposing parties. thank you very much. >> thank you for all of these questions, we will come back

again. , i would liketion to talk about a little bit, because many of the meetings we have had in brookings, this has been one of the issues that has confused people from the outside. referendum isnd's framed in terms of civic nationalism, other people are trying to grasp who are the people on either side in terms of how they are identifying themselves. issues of identity have not been put on the table here, but they have come up on many other issues. jezaniah talked about this, and i think this panel reflects it. geoff and i talked about this, and i think this panel reflects this. they arell themselves from england originally but are living in scotland, is from scotland and living in the u.s. this is representative of a larger u.k. entry. the history of the united kingdom is one of constant migration. effortsy the previous

at national self-determination of scotland were really founded on the fact that people identify themselves ethnically or culturally as scots to carry the day. basedp platform has been on this idea, that it is the resident of scotland -- residents of scotland, however they identify themselves. this issue of identity remains important. out, as shipplay is trying to suggest, and anglicans -- in angle and, and as hugo said, people in and linda do care about this. -- in england do care about this. there is also a larger issue that i would like to put out as you think about responding to this, about the identity of britain and british identity. the united kingdom is a rather anodyne description for the

country that is great britain. great britain is not the official name, but everybody talks about it. wales, and england, as well as northern ireland. that is obligated because united kingdom is a country of emigration, and many people have come from outside of the british isles and are wondering how they will identify themselves on september 19, depending on what is happened, as well. there are all kinds of identity, bulgarians, many of the members of the british partner -- parliament come from somewhere else. we are parliament members from germany or portugal. how do they identify themselves? or the south asian community in great britain. these are issues that did not come out in the panel, but they have been part of a debate in one way or another, and i wanted

to get our catalyst to comment on this. these are great questions, thank you. >> yes, thank you very much for the questions. i will try and tackle at least some of them. one of my areas of personal research interests is what do the english think. i have done quite a bit of survey work in angle and, and i land, and i canng endorse your comments that the english do care. in april, we found 19% of people whongle and -- in england thought that scotland should be an independent country, a large majority that do not think that. however, more in-line with the geoff was saying, if scotland does so yes, what we know from the survey is that people in england would be quite strongly in support of a tough line in negotiations toward scotland.

stay, butotland to if they decide to go, a backlash. when i said no urgency, that was not really no urgency, i think there would be a great danger of the u.k. political system thinking, we have sorted that, we have done that, let's move on. no, think that if we vote and more stable set of constitutional arrangements for all parts of the u.k. would be a strong priority. who is voting yes and no? there are some clear patterns which are quite interesting. men are more likely to vote yes than women. younger people, except the very youngest, generally more likely to vote yes in older people. people from disadvantaged communities clearly more likely to vote yes than people from

more affluent communities. and then the national identity question. one of the best predictors we have of voting intention is around those people who feel primarily british in scotland. it does not work so well on the other side, those people who feel primarily scottish, this does not lead directly or so directly to supporting a yes vote. there is a territorial dimension to that. a poll was released from the scottish borders this morning we showed two thirds in favor in remaining in the u.k. there would be territorial differences between the different parts of scotland. i do not think that is going to lead to a kind of irish partition situation. i think that, given that level of voter registration, even that likely level of turnout, -- given that likely level of

turnout, the formal rules, i think we will have sufficient legitimacy. >> thank you. juliett? >> i will answer a couple of questions quickly so we can get more from the audience. of identity, parlay, being an outsider, i have been struck at how the ethnic identity has not been a part of the debate very much. it has been a functional, political debate about policy preferences on foreign policy and health care and spending issues. way that thek the electorate has been defined in terms of residency has taken away some of that, although some of us cannot vote even though we are resident there. on the question of ireland, it is interesting. ireland has look more towards

than it in this debate looks toward supporting scotland and independence. and scotland has not really reached out to think about cultivating scottish/irish inactions -- connections. they're looking more towards the nordic countries and thinking about the connections there, the arctic circle and the north sea. those countries have largely stood on the sidelines, too, and this debate, not just after the referendum, but, in the case of a yes vote, in negotiations, they will wait to take up the offer of scotland to be partners. >> thanks. geoff? >> i think that the identity question is really interesting, because i people of mention, it is not formally a part of the debate at, it is not on the table. but it is absolutely the underlying fabric of the debate, i think.

which is that scottish identity has shifted in the decades. one is that there is a strongly held view on the part of scott's that it is a different place, different school system, different legal system, the first banks. -- different banks. that the one country in the world that we share the most which is angle and -- with is england. in the last few decades the scottish bit of identity has become stronger for various reasons. the reasons that bind the u.k. together have declined. it was founded on the empire, in a sense, which was one thing that kept the scots interested in the u.k. for a long time. settlement, the memories of the world wars, fighting against fascism, the trade union movement was another powerful thing that bound them together.

then the experience of the thatcher years, when something broke in the scotland, the sense in scottish society that margaret thatcher had broken up the checks and balances in the u.k., the political grammar of how the u.k. worked. all of these have played out over the last couple of decades to give scotland a much stronger sense of identity then i had. although that is not officially on the platform, that is one of the driving forces behind what got us to this stage. globalization and individualism have created an environment in which people do retreat into tribal identities. if you go to a wedding in scotland these days, all the men of my fathers generations, in the 60's and 70's, were wearing suits. under aren 50 and wearing kilts. is not in the manifesto but it is absolutely key to understanding what is going on.

to respond if you go, all i would say is that originally, i generally hope that you are right, what he is saying about the groundswell of anguish opinion trying to make the case for scotland to say. i think that your traps and leaving it a little bit late -- you have been believing it a little bit late. >> i do not think he means you personally. [laughter] you have anything to say? >> on your point about general disenfranchisement, i think that is an important point. i make in the piece that i referred to, that was scotland phrased asng is anti-english, but it is more, if you think about it, and i london -- anti-london. and expresses the frustration is a lot of the hinterlands of northern england, wales, a lot allther areas -- actually,

the areas of the kingdom outside of the metropolitan areas in the south about feel about the english government. the disenfranchisement that they feel from the city, the cultural distance that is being created by the very different evolutions of london and the rest of the united kingdom. what the identity of scotland language, as a vocabulary, and an institutional platform to express that disenfranchisement that the rest of the united kingdom does not really have. and so that is why we see this disenfranchisement coming forward most clearly and most mostly in scotland -- loudly in scotland. and it is a problem in the united kingdom, and i think that it is a yes or no that the united kingdom should deal with urgently.

i would share some of the pessimism that they really wel -- will. >> i think that geoff, many of the british newspapers have pointed out that the divides within the united kingdom and within london itself, whether the sense of the disenfranchisement from the rest of the u.k. and london, london itself is also a divided polity. one of the features of the thatcher era was the evolution of the greater london, which was very much in into the left of government. when of the battles of that. area bank was margaret thatcher fighting with the leader of the london council. they want a certain amount of self-determination, so i think that the issue will take on some interesting dimensions as we move forward. i think that thesnp will be telling us about them.

i would like to get questions in the back, because people have been waiting seriously. please identify themselves -- yourselves. >> what is the impact on it businesses like pensions and nk if the scottish people vote yes, and what is the impact on the economy considering that many scottish people are dependent on the u.k. for social welfare, social security, and other benefits? >> thank you. hi, i am with public radio in barcelona. my question is, do you think that people should have the right to decide their own fate? as a general matter, we had 2 million people demonstrated in bart -- barcelona yesterday, but as you know the spanish government does not allow the catalan vote to go ahead.

as a general matter, do you think that any people should have the right to determine their own fate? >> there's a question from the gentleman standing right behind you. >> thank you very much, i am charles. i would not want people to think that my accent reflects bias. i have a methodological question for the panel. it seems like most of the organizations have published polls, but quite often the press has recalculated the polls to reflect an absolute confrontation between yes and no. i saw the brookings succumb to this tendency. know, the know has quite a big proportion of ae poll, surprisingly big for referendum that takes place next week, i think that 20%, approximately.

i wonder the panel could comment on this and give some indication of if they think the hesitant voters will vote yes or no. juliett r and in surveyk -- are work, so they will respond. that is standard practice when you're predicting elections, to get rid of the don't knows and report figures without them. but it does raise the question of what way they are leaning. different pollsters are reporting different levels of don't know, it depends on the calling method. in face-to-face polling, people get more don't knows, i think people are reluctant, face to face, to give their opinion. the picture we have had from some academic survey research, which is using the same panel of ,otes at different time points which is perhaps the most reliable evidence that we have,

is that between the two type points, which were earlier this year and then in the early summer, don't knows were breaking towards yes. of 25 to 18, 4 to three. that is one of the things we have been seeing in the tightening of the polls, it is difficult to say. i wanted to take the opportunity to come back to geoff and clarify. i am skeptical that there would be a formal currency union. and i am sorry if you thought that i was sent -- that that was what i was saying. i do think that the sites on the today have become quite polarized, and the no side has partso definitive, and so -- some parts have gone beyond that and saying that the next u.k. manifesto was saying that

we will not have a currency union, that it will be hard to move away from that position. when i was suggesting was that there would be an interest in a stabilization process, most likely around and informal use ing by an independent scotland. perhaps we have seen the first stages of that stabilization process in the announced an's of of all theuncements major banks in scotland saying that in the event of a yes vote they would move their headquarters, and not necessarily their activities, to london, so that there would be a lender of last resort. that is one way of managing some of those transitional issues. that both point was sides, including the u.k., which would be bearing uncertainty around currency, uncertainty

around continuity of business for many firms headquartered in the rest of the u.k., would have an interest in stabilizing, in reassuring, in saying it is all going to be ok. i'm not sure if i coined the phrase or somebody else wrote it and i just absorbed it for myself. plusdea of sterlingozation some stabilization arrangements seems a more likely outcome than currency union. >> thank you. juliet? >> that may take the catalonian question at the back and use it as a platform to come back to something jeremy was talking about on precedent and secession. there is a strong international norm for people to have the right to decide who governs them. the principle of national self-determination is not always

obeyed, not always supported by outside groups, but it is a strong and ever-growing normative power in the international system, it is what you see outside actors, even if they are against scottish independence or have worries or concerns about the implications, are not interfering, are staying on the sidelines, are not making public comments on this. i think that this concern about the spillover of scottish independence to other secessionist movements is sometimes exaggerated. i was at a very good conference about this one at glascow university last year. experts onin secession movements and how they relate to each other, the research shows that they do not domino effect. in a be that other secessionist movements use an instance as a president to push their case,

but that is not very successful. the results of secessionist movements are determined more by local factors rather than what is happening next door or across the world. that secessionist movements around the world will probably use the scottish independence referendum in their movements for secession, regardless of the outcome of a referendum. and i think that there is a clear difference. this is the case of a mutual decision by westminster government and the edinburgh government to allow this to happen. and this is a fully democratic process, without any real conflict. ,hich is quite an amazing thing and quite a unique thing in international history. >> geoff? >> i will take the economic question, if i may.

it is divided between short-term impacts and long-term impacts. the short-term impact is of uncertainty, because it will create a huge number of questions about the future arrangements with the country. that can have economic impacts. you may see pension fund moving south of the border. we can imagine people withdrawing money from scottish banks as they start to get worried about future arrangements. charlie,ely agree with there will be a very strong self-preservation institutional movement on both sides of the ,order to try and overcome that to try and stop the uncertainty from causing big disruptions in the economy. the medium-term outlook really depends on what sort of currency arrangements the independent scotland ends up having. in my reading, most of them would involve a new scottish government having to enforce a. of austerity to build -- a area

period ofsterity -- a austerity. the wildcard would be the oil, an independent scottish government would have revenue from oil, a high oil price would counteract that. the oil price would really defined whether scotland could keep spending that money in the medium-term. in the short-term it is about uncertainty, and that is a big issue at the moment. >> thanks. charlie? >> i will unwisely weigh in on the self-determination question. the norm of self-determination is one in which the rhetoric of states is always exceeded -- has always exceeded the practice. is very common for states to get the rights of self-determination, but actually if you look at the history of the thing, it has always been

clearly and consistently limited in the sense that people have a right to self-determination, but they do not have a right to determine the size and the scope of the political community over which that self-determination runs. forso it is not legitimate the brookings institution to suddenly decide that it wants to be an independent country, bow to do so, and secede from the united states, though occasionally we have considered it. [laughter] this is the issue on which the u.s. civil war was fought. a quite clearly determined that even if there is a right to self-determination, there is not necessarily a right to secession, especially a secession that is not agreed by the larger political community. that has been a fairly strong , although practice there are exceptions, even since

the rise of the self-determination movement after world war i. >> thanks, i want to bring in a last set of questions. there is a gentleman standing at the back, a gentleman by the cameras, and a lady at the front. i'm sorry to everybody else, it is that these people have had their -- please. the gentleman is in the handy cameras as well. >> my name is kevin, and i am an intern at brookings. if i understood correctly, i heard that if scotland gains its independence, england will not have enough power and influence to play a prominent role in nato. what does this mean for the united nations? future, and if ireland gained its independence, dould angle and -- would englan be kicked out of the position it enjoys in the united nations and be replaced by an emerging power like terminate or brazil --

germany or brazil? >> the gentleman behind the camera, please, and then the lady in the front. >> i am with the european news. i covered the referendum campaign two decades ago in voted by ftquébec %, something like that, to stay in canada. since then, this issue has disappeared in canada. the question is, is colin votes no buyer similar outcome, are we going to see the next referendum next year, in two years, or will the issue fade away? thank you. >> this lady here. >> thank you. i am taking, i am a congressional reporter for "hispanic outlook." i have read a lot about immigration. in the immigration debate, when

people talk about nationalism, there is a connotation of xenophobic and anti-immigrant, but i am not hearing that in this conversation. i went to a political conference two weeks ago, international, and european scholars told me that the whole concept of multiculturalism is dead now in europe. people do not talk about it. i'm wondering if the debate is more about a government versus small government -- big government versus small government. that the huge multicultural governments like london just cannot identify to the many, they do not feel that they can control it. again, multiculturalism, xenophobia, the government versus small government. those are good last questions, unfortunately we do not have a lot of time, there are a crowd of people outside of the door. i hope that they are not demonstrating, i think that

there is another event. i will get last words from our panelists for my charlie. -- panelists, charlie. recently aid have government led by the pro-independence party which was hoping to secure sufficient support to move towards a further round of constitutional discussion, so i do not think things are over in québec. if is a novo, i do not think that they would be over in scotland. alex has said that this is a once in a generation issue. i suspect that the definition of generation could be reasonably flexible depending on how other events go. votesample, if scotland no, and the u.k. as a referendum on eu membership, which has a u.k. wide majority to leave, but a scottish majority within the u.k. to stay, adding that his terrain which is -- i think that is a shortrain which

political generation away which could revive the debate. i believe the other questions for others. -- let me talk about the immigration, it has not been a part of the scottish national at all, they promise a more liberal immigration policy than the u.k. had. you have seen the tensions within the united kingdom and more broadly that jeremy spoke of, london versus the rest were divisions within london, scotland can maybe be seen in the independence referendum and the rest of the u.k., the rise of more and i immigrant populist parties. -- anti-immigrant populist parties. i think that a smaller u.k. after a yes vote would raise more questions about whether the u.k. has the right to be represented on the un security council. those questions are already raised, and the door is already

open with no simple solutions in sight. -- itot see that it would would add to the call, but i do not think it would provide more answers. the day after a yes vote, india would be out to say it is time to reform the u.n. the logic for reforming the security council has been powerful for a long time, and it has not happened. consensuso organize between the members, and that is never impossible. i think it would be more possible after a referendum vote. even if the national side loses, they have absolutely made a powerful case that there is a strong groundswell of support for independence in scotland. if they lose, they will not get 30%, they will get 45, 49%.

the issue will be back on the agenda, sooner than you might imagine. >> thanks, geoff, jeremy, any last words? we will refrain from trying to tip the scales. i hope that nothing we have said here will tip the outcome one way or another. we all know how inadvertently one kid way into a debate and make a mess of it -- can weigh intuitive a and make a mess of it. we hope that your magic touch that we have educated on the key issues. we are a week ahead of these momentous events. i hope that everybody will be watching this very closely. , you you for participating and the audience, and this part is a bit ash in this discussion today. -- in this discussion today. thank you very much. [applause]

>> next, a for him on u.s. -- a will faceow the us isis. after that, a discussion on the scottish referendum. now, the center for american progress in washington dc discusses isis. the formerncludes u.s. ambassador to syria, robert forward -- ford.