racially charged case about this business -- the sort of business of divvying up people according to race. it's something that very much turns him off and turns off some of the other conservatives, even though, as someone like right -- ruth bader ginsburg, who dissented so poignantly in the shelby county case said it's not time to be able to say we don't need to take these steps. >> perhaps maybe third rail issue is the wrong term. i didn't mean to suggest the court avoids it. it's more that when the court gets into it, sparks fly. >> definitely. >> the area of the law which passions seem to run. >> 5-4 rulings, yes. >> one that that you might add on this subject, why has the court had one voter i.d. case in the last decade but a bunch of redistricting cases. it's because they have to. when you have a challenge to a statewide districting plan, state legislature or

congressional districts, that's one of the few areas the court has no control over its own docket. heard by a special three-judge panel and then an appeal goes straight to the supreme court and they have to either sashays it is so clearly right we're not going to hear it or have to hear it on the merits. campaign finance is one area, and redistricting is the other, where they have to have more cases on this subject than they might like. >> i want to make sure we have just at least a few minutes to talk about willy's and lourier's cases. willy, you were going to talk about some cases involving business docket. maybe it makes sense to make some general observations about the cases as well as to talk about the specifics of cases on the docket. >> sure. i think that the business docket is sometimes an overgeneralization because there are lots of cases that some people might call business case and other people might call, for example, a civil rights case,

and one of these cases falls in that course, under the pregnancy discrimination act. it's one of the statutes that congress passed to slap down the supreme court and tell us it had gotten the law wrong. in the late 1970's, the supreme court was asked whether discrimination against one on the pregnancy was sex discrimination. and the supreme court said no, and congress passioned a law that said, yet, it is. so this is a case in which a pregnant driver for ups wanted access to the same lying-duty -- light-duty schedule that is made available to some but not all ups employees. for example, if you injured on the job, ups under the check temperature bargaining, you can

have a light duty schedule. if you were injured playing rugby or in your hobby being a rodeo clown you can't have access to the light, duty schedule. so the statute says, basically, that women who are pregnant are to be treated without regard to pregnancy, but compared to people with the same ables and limitations. and so basically the question before the court is going to be, is this -- if you make an accommodation available to anyone, so, for example, the people who are injured on the job -- must you also make the exact same accommodation available to pregnant women who want it? or the fact that -- is the fact you don't make it available to everyone, you only make it available in certain categories, is that significant under the pregnancy discrimination act and the business community, which sees this as a business case, which is already subject to various kinds of regulations of what accommodations to offer people on the basis of temporary and permanent disables in their

ability to live their life. i think is treating this as another case that could make it harder to run a work place, especially a unionized work place where this accommodation has been carefully negotiated between the employer and the union as a way of keeping people employed by ups after long service if they're injured on the job. but title vii, a landmark civil rights statute, says what it says, pregnancy discrimination is going to override a collective bargaining agreement if this is the right way of analyzing it. so this is one of these cases where the justices' own outlook on statute -- not just statutory interpretation but the legal regulation of the work place, could have a significant difference, and i think if justice o'connor were still on the court, it would be interesting to see what she

would make off it. not only because she was a very pragmatic justice who could balance a lot of things easily. one thing we haven't said about the current makeup of the court is that while it is divided -- there are six men and three women -- the three women are all on the more liberal side of the court, and so -- >> only one of them has ever been pregnant as far as we know. [laughter] >> i'm sure that changes perspective as well. [laughter] >> i didn't mean to throw you off there. >> i'm not sure what to say in response to that. >> willy is exercising the fifth amendment on that. perhaps turn to the other cases on the business docket. >> we have more intellectual property on the court's docket as well, and i'm going to be somewhat terse in describing this case because i'll be litigating it. but the supreme court has agreed to take up a question that has

bothered the patent appeals court for a long time, which is basically how do you divide the work between a trial court and an appeals court in interpreting what patent means? patents are complicated documents and if you ever read one, my condolences. i feel for you. they are written not for normal people and not for lawyers even. they're written for scientists. or technologists or experts in whatever the field is, whether it's mechanics for fluid dynamics or biochemistry, and the patent office actually encourages you not to put too much background science into your patent, but it's all teams to be there. -- all deemed to be there. so when the judge get this case they have to figure out that the patent means to figure out whether it's a valid inexpense whether the defendant's

invention infringes the patent, and often thanks to a ruling the supreme court had 20 years ago, they have the what is called a markman hearing, which is base late minitrial before the court, not a jury, where they decide what the terms in the patent mean, often you have experts testify. usually in federal court when you have experts come in and testify and the judge decides which expert he believes and which expert he doesn't, that kind of thing is reviewed very differentially on appeal. the patent appeals court has decided it's going to review everything for itself. it's not going to extend any deference to the trial courts on the interpretation of a patent, and their overarching animating principle is we're the single patent appeals court. be have to make everything uniform. our interpretation has to be what controls. we don't want different interpretations in different district courts to survive show. u.s. supreme court, which is really the final answer, has to

decide whether it believes the federal circuit's justification for reviewing these things for itself or whether we'll see a little more deference to the trial court in patent cases, and in a whole host of cases involving the software industry or pharmaceutical industry. these could be -- could really change how patent cases are litigated. right now if you lose before the trial court, you know that the federal circuit will hear the whole thing over again, as if this slate is wiped clean on appeal, and if that option is no longer there, it may change how the cases are litigated. the third case, even more difficult for me to talk about than the case i am handling because canada is is litigating it.

>> i'm here to correct you and >> one thing that is a constant of the supreme court's "docket" is securities litigation. and different areas crop up over time, but last term the supreme court heard a significant case in which it promised to think about fundamentally changing its approach to securities class actions and then didn't. perhaps the biggest bust of the business docket last year. but securities class actions often are brought under a provision of the securities laws that require you to not lie to the market knowingly, but the case called omni care is under a different provision of the securities law which is also about false statements to the market which usually has no -- doesn't take account of your mental state. it's usually just what we call -- in the law call strict liability. if you say something false in the registration statement for

your securities, you're liable, period. however, what if it's statement of opinion? you state in your registration statement for your securities that we believe a certain thing to be true, we believe that our contracts are in accordance with the law. we believe that our accounting is in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and the legal question in this case is basically, how do you analyze one of those statements of opinion for truth or falsity? and added to that is congress in the mid-1990's made it easier for security cases to be essentially kicked out of court based just on the complaint, without the parties exchanging documents and going through the process of discovery, because that it what makes cases extremely expensive to litigate. so congress made the other type of cases under the first category of cases easier to kick out on the pleadings, especially if you didn't per swayssive -- persuasively come in with an allegation that the defends

knowingly misled the market. well, there's no mental factor in this case so will businesses be able to point the fact that the statement in their document is a statement of opinion and, say, well, you haven't alleged i believed it was false. or will the test instead be something more objective, whether no reasonable person would have believed it was false, or something else more objective that doesn't require you to allege this guy was lying, this cannon's clients are a bunch of liars. >> i'll leave the defense of compliant's veracity for another

day and turn to lori. we will talk about the very important question of the circumstances in which the destruction of fish may cause you run afoul in federal law. >> you want me to start with fish? >> it's a securities case. >> well, all right. i will start with the fish case, otherwise known at yates vs. the united states. the court will consider in this case is whether mr. yates, fisherman, was dedeprived of fair notice that the destruction of grouper would fall within a federal statute's prohibition which makes it's crime for anyone to knowingly alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal, or make a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object, obviously such as a fish, with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation. for context, this provision is part of what is known as the sarbanes-oxley act, commonly referred to as the antishredding provision. but in this case the government was creative. no offense.

>> don's argument is going to be it isn't an offense. >> the government was create consecutive and used the statute to prosecutor a fisherman for allegedly tossing three undersized groupers back into the gulf of mexico. you cannot make this stuff up. [laughter] the court is hearing this case. yates -- the fisherman, says the term, tangible object, is ambiguous and undefine ned the statute, and like nouns accompanying the other nouns accompanying tangible objects, its possesses no recordkeeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose so goes the argument. he had no fair notice that his conduct of throwing back the undersized grouper was prohibited and so that would be a violation of the due process clause to convict him. so, this is actually -- it's a criminal case but actually a business case. so the u.s. chamber of commerce

has weighed in support of mr. yates, which is notable, and the chamber argues that consistent with the text in context and the legislative intent of this provision itself should cover only documents, records and record-keeping devices, rather than sweep in the actual inventory of goods, and the chamber's brief warns the implications of the government's interpretation would have serious effects on small businesses and other legitimate business conduct-such as routine maintenance and disposal of inventory. shoould i offer an opportunity for response? >> the government has come in for a fair amount of teasing for this case, and so don -- >> you know, that's one side of the story. [laughter] >> here's the other side of the story. that the fisherman is a commercial fisherman.

out in the gulf of mexico and he was visited by a state inspector, and the stay inpicket inspector looked at his load of fish and said, gees you got a bunch of group here below the limit that you are allowed to catch, and so i am going to instruct you to take house undersized grouper aside in the box and tape up the box and then when you come back to shore you have to turn it in and we'll have a proceeding whether you obeying the law. what the commercial fisherman did after the state inspector left was to instruct one of his employees to take that crate of fish and dump it overboard and replace it with fish that were no longer undersized. and employee did that. and then he got back to shore, and he ratted out his boss, and so the boss was essentially

prosecuted for a statute that we think is basically a statute that forbids the destruction of evidence to impede an investigation, which certainly sounds like what the fisherman did. so, anyway. -- >> i'm certain there must be a general instruction -- >> don, this not a capital case. correct? [laughter] >> that's the other side of the story. >> that's a pretty good rebuttal. moving on to the facebook case, which is my personal favorite on the criminal docket, because everyone and anyone who knows a teenager or other marginally irresponsible semi adult should tell them to focus on the case and follow it with interest. this is a case that comes out of the third circuit. it's at the intersection of constitutional and criminal law, like many criminal cases, but this involves the first amendment. the case involved a federal law that makes it a crime to threaten or injure another person when you communicate that threat through interstate commerce, and the question in this case is whether threatening is in the eye of the beholder or whether the government has to

prove that you subjectively intended your speech to be a threat of bodily injury or death to another person. so the facts of the case are pretty interesting. the alleged threats at issue are facebook posts and the defendant, anthony aloneas, his life was falling apart himself wife has left him, taking their two children. he was a frequent poster on facebook but after this traumatic event in his life, he changed his facebook persona to a rapper-like pseudonym. his posts were -- were explicit and violent, not unlike the lyrics of popular rap songs.

apparently, he would would post disclaimers at the end of the post explaining the lyrics were explaining the lyrics were fictitious for entertainment purposes only, he viewed his posts a therapeutic and a way to deal with this frustration of his life falling apart. he expresses the first amendment on his facebook page and predicted he would be arrested for the facebook posts and would be laughing all the way to the bank when he won his constitutional claims against the government you. don't see many people advertising they intend to kind of maybe sort of break the law but have their defense already and they're going to tell you about it. one of the posts -- i just want to read this so you get a flavor for this. one post is districted at his ex-wife. i guess many of them were. and just so you know, i will put also ellipses around the most

explicit language to not cause problems with c-span. hi, did you know it's illegal for me to say i want to kill my wife? it's illegal. it's indirect criminal contempt. it's one of the only sentences i'm not allowed to say. it's okay for me to say it right then. because i was just telling you that it's illegal for me to say, i want to kill my wife. i'm not actually saying it. i also found out it's extremely illegal to go on facebook and say something like, the best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would be from the cornfield behind it because of of the easy access to the gateway road and you have a clear line of sight through through sun room. insanely illegal. it goes on, from there. and another one posted right after a visit from an fbi agent to his home, his prediction coming true. he is getting the attention that he was obviously looking for.

he composed a little rap about her. which in part says the following -- little agent lady sit0s so stood so close can took all the strength i had not turn the blank ghost. pulled my knife, slit my wrist and slit her throat, leave her bleeding from their jugular in the arms of her partner. this stuff is pretty explicit and if not for the context -- i'll give our are you more context. he would at the end of the posts -- they were often based on other either rap performances, eminem songs were a favorite parody of his, and he would post the links to original work of art at the bottom of his post, again with these disclaimers saying this is my way of giving myself some therapy. so the basic question before the court is whether the government had to prove he subjectively intended to threaten or whether

it's enough that a reasonable person, and probably everyone in this room, including his wife, perceived it as a threat. he argues subjective intent is required to avoid a conflict with the first amendment. because otherwise speech that really is meant to be expression, that is not a true threat, would be chilled, and the question before the court is, what does it take to prove a true threat? so that one is pretty colorful. >> i'm not sure which of those cases is more unusual in terms of its fact pattern. >> the fact pattern is great. one of the things that makes it interesting -- the fact pattern interesting-not just to laypersons but to lawyers -- it seems to me under even the standards he is advocating, he is probably toast. so it seems like a bad vehicle because it seems like from what i have read that the facts are very government-friendly in the sense that the government could

prove subjective intent to threaten. >> under a matter of legal standard? >> correct. it's interesting they chose this one. the court waited so long to jump into the foray of inappropriate facebook behavior you. they could choose a vehicle where the legal standard would clearly make a difference. the last one on the criminal docket i'll touch on briefly is not nearly as interesting. to me. only because it has implications maybe for the average person, but maybe not. this case involves two men driving down the highway in north carolina with a -- one brakelight that was malfunctioning. and the officer pulled them over and noticed that one of anyone was laying down in the back seat with, like, blanket over his head, and even with the officer

standing there, asking for license and registration, remained laying there in the back seat with the blanket over his head. so the officer thought this was a little suspicious, asked questions of both of the men, and concluded that their stories weren't matching up and the guy the back seat was still laying down, answering the officer's questions. so he asked for permission to search the vehicle and surprisingly they agreed. the search uncovered 54-grams of cocaine. a grand jury indicted the guy in the back seat for two counts of trafficking cocaine and he moved to suppress on the ground that the stop was not objectively reasonable because as it turns out, north carolina law only requires one working brakelight. [laughter] who knew. >> obviously the officer didn't. >> well, this is the crux of the problem. the officer's position and the state's position is really, who knew? the code has more general

provision, the traffic code, that sort of suggests that all of the rear lamps, everything that came in the rear of your car that lights up, has to be in proper working order. so there's a conflict between this general provision and a specific provision that makes it pretty clear that you only need one working brakelight, and the state argues that ambiguity basically means this mistake of law was reasonable, so therefore, the stop was legitimate. and reasonable suspicion standards satisfied. the other side argues, well the court has never recognized mistakes of law as justifying a reasonable suspicion from a violation standpoint. so the court never said that doesn't violate the fourth amendment. what they have said is if there's a reasonable mistake of law, you might not get the evidence suppressed because it goes to whether that remedyes

is really equitable, so this case is interesting. cannon is the fourth amendment expert here among us, and obviously the sg, but it's interesting to me -- if the petitioner prevails here, is it a victory? under the circumstances of the case it does seem like there's both good faith and kind of objective reasonableness in the officer's interpretation of the law. so even if they win the question that it's a fourth amendment violation, what does he get out of that? >> if there's no issue involving the good faith exception before the court -- >> it's not properly -- there is some talk in the opinion that it was both kind of good faith and also objectively reasonable because there was this objective uncertainty in the law. >> i want to ask a question i suspect is on everyone's mind, why was the guy under the

blanket? >> if he had been under a cell phone i could answer that. >> the government may have a view, and i confess i have not gotten through the united states amicus brief or north carolina's brief. i read the decision below and the petitioner's brief. >> the good stuff in the case about eminem and the rap song was in the footnotes the petitioner's brief doesn't flesh out what he was doing back there. >> i think we can all agree that would ordinarily qualify as if not suspicious, certainly curious behavior. >> which is why i said, the brakelight malfunction and the experience of being pulled up and subjected to a stop for maybe something that is not illegal, that's something everyone could relate to and maybe worry about as a general -- right?

but not too many of you probably lying in the back seat, hiding under blankets, when the police are trying to ask you questions. >> usually a good idea to sit up under those circumstances. fair to say. well, we're going to throw the floor open for questions. we were going to talk about cases come downing the pike and maybe i'll just as moderator exercise martial law and give the 60-second summary. all supreme court practitioner and journalists in the world are waiting to see whether the supreme court is going to wade into the area of same-sex marriage and has a number of cases coming up, as all you've will be aware, that present the question of whether there's a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, and we may know at the end of the month if the supreme court is going to decide that issue. there are yet more challenges to the affordable care act winding their way up to the supreme court. it's uncertain if they will get to the court this term, including cases involving questions concerning the funding of the exchanges on which health

insurance is now -- purchased as a result of the affordable care act and further issues as joan mentioned, concern thing an the applicability contraceptive mandate and the interplay between that and claimed religious liberties. there are cases involving race, cases involve eight firm action. the fisher versus university of texas case that maury worked on whet it was last before the supreme court, seems to be heading back in that direction. unclear -- >> hopefully not. we won in the -- >> may not end up in the supreme court. in the fifth circuit. cases involving disparate liability of liability for they do notat while possess a discriminatory intent

have a disproportionate affect on minority groups. it has been a contentious issue that the supreme court has tried bothsolve but on locations, it will settle before the supreme court was able to hear oral arguments. of interesting issues that are potentially in the pipeline, but difficult to predict. it is very difficult to predict which cases the supreme court might end up hearing. i think this is just a case of watching the space was him and this time next year, you will be hearing about decisions. with that, since we have about 10 or 15 minutes left we will , open the floor for questions. it will be a little harder to see those in in the balcony of your welcome to ask questions as well. i don't believe we have a microphone so i will repeat the question for the benefit of the audience and those watching on television. yes, sir in the baseball cap?

>> [inaudible] >> the question is about a gun and if any issues will end up at the supreme court? >> there are some in the court of appeal it is not for certain but possible. i would not say it is a certainty. >> there is a number of issues since the supreme court in the

-->> the core of federal hasn't come under any serious threat. it will be very interesting to see which of those next issues beyond the core question, whether they're our issues. >> any other questions? in the back? [inaudible] any courtsthe wake of the , there was certainly a lot of speculation about potential challenges to wiretap

being and other issues on aggregation of data. you think that is the next big problem? >> i think it would be one of them. i think a lot of people who have questions about privacy were the rulingsed by because the awareness showed how much we all expose ourselves. the communications that emanate from our homes that could be collect it by the government and others that are now out there. i think that is the next front, the cellthink that phone rolling at least showed a real sensitivity to digital privacy for individuals. >> information that you for your banker,with you do not have reasonable expectation of privacy, for

example things you store in the cloud. digital data you might store in the cloud. it can be reconsidered whether or not that should still be the law in the current age. we might see another iteration of this at some time. i am concerned about [inaudible]

tax i am going to try to transform that into a question. general question for the entire panel about the fourth amendment and the current issue of law enforcement generally. if any of you think that may be changing somewhat.

>> i will put it this way, when that chief justice was nominated, one of the opinions he had written what is the arrest of eating -- for a child eating a french fry on the bus platform. and i thought, this is another william rehnquist. years, weast five have not seen uniform law enforcement sympathy by any stretch. the "kids are different" area. but i think there will be different cases coming to the court in the future. but i think they will be under title vi rather than under the

fourth amendment, whether squirrels have to have a -- the childrenf being school-age influences his thinking in that area. someere have been instances regarding restriction of speech. --h the exception of the is one.rt breasts thanks you once again. they can take us off the seven second delay now. >> in the back. >> the changing makeup of the court means what kind of cases will the supreme court pick up? right impacton was

will the changing of the cc court have? what a difference it has made, because we just found out recently, last week the d c circuit and announced it was going to hear another generation of the obama health care case. made a big difference that president obama has poor appointees on. the first time he had none on. he now has four new judges on that court, and it is making a difference in the rehearing's and i'm sure it will make a difference down the road. if you think of what you had , certainly decided by two republican appointees, it does not always break that way. maybe therek that

is not going to be as many appeals coming up. no matter what it does, i think it is the most exciting circuit that we have out there. >> berrios a difference in the number or frequency of which you dissentingseparate opinions. i cannot remember the last time, other than very recent history before the last couple of years. it did not happen the year i was there, did not happen the year before that. >> in december i believe the d.c. case will be heard. >> it will be a shame if the legacy of this case is the perception that the president's appointees, that include some of the finest leathers that practice in washington and to really are a credit to the bench, if they and being hard -- as some kind of a

political hack. senator reid in particular has done a disservice to the country and the bench acting as if the outcome is preordained. that is one of the outcomes that is very upsetting about the environment.al >> will probably have a whole panel on those cases alone, but i promise we will get to the back. >> what you see about reproductive rights, particularly i am wondering about whether this concept of , particularly the antiabortion groups are trying to push, whether you see if there is any traction in the supreme court because of that. >> the question was about reproductive rights. as i mentioned earlier, abortion has not featured prominently. do you think that is likely to

change anytime soon? think they are going to stay away from that issue as long as they possibly can. directink our last abortion case -- the abortion is i think this would be in your category canada of cases they are not eager to take for sure. >> we will let that be the last word. please thank me -- please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] >> next, at a discussion on the

upcoming scottish independence referendum. justice department investigations. and at 7:00 a.m., your comments on washington journal. >> on newsmakers, talks about how congress may deal with the isis, the plan for continuing resolution, the congressional agenda, and the midterm election. newsmakers on c-span. >> now a discussion on whether scotland should break away from the u.k. and become an independent country. the brookings institution discussed the pros and cons of the referendum and perceptions from scottish voters, the u.s., and the u.k.. this is 90 minutes.

>> ladies and gentlemen, i want to welcome you to one of our first event in our revamped brookings conference space. i am thrilled that the microphone works. it seems fitting to inaugurate our new facility with the big question of certainly next week, the prevent -- potential revamping of the united kingdom. if the referendum moves to a yes vote, the renovation will be an overhaul to a system that we have known for 300 years, and many of us here on the panel are a product of. we are delighted to welcome to colleagues that have come in from edinburg to be with us. both are from the university of edinburgh who have been spearheading a major study of the implications of the referendum and of what will happen after september 18. this has been a huge study and this has been symbolic of the whole debate about the scottish referendum. it has been heavy on process. as we know, many people around the world are watching this closely because this is a rather

unique event, something that has been negotiated over a period of time, a project in the decades of interaction between edinburgh and london on issues of devolution and autonomy. we are now at the big day and the rest of the world is paying attention. of course, a lot of events that could not have been anticipated when british prime minister david cameron and scottish first minister sat down to hash out the details of what would happen on september 18, have really framed this. we have had input from unexpected places, including crimea and the leadership

weighing in on their interest in the outcome. and of course, we are also against the backdrop of events in catalonia and barcelona, spain. lots of interest in what happens outside of the united kingdom. but the big question that we will look at today and hopefully give you a sense of implications for the future for the united kingdom, scotland, and europe, and implications for the united states. implications for the united states. we're very grateful to everybody for participating in this panel. 're also joined by jeff dyer who is one of the senior journalists for "the financial times." he is from originally from scotland the one person with the genuine scottish accent.

this shows the diversity of the whole issue. juliet is originally from the united states, oklahoma, but is a resident in scotland, electorate at the university of edinburgh. charlie can tell you himself about his own origins. this has been framed in terms of civic nationalism and in terms of political choices and that's also important. finally, we'll be turning to my colleague here at brookings for the united states perspective. before coming back to brookings where he's been a fellow for sometime, jeremy served as a professional adviser to the assistant secretary for europe in the state department and also on the policy planning staff. he was not assigned to think about scotland and the united kingdom but we are hoping somebody might be thinking about this at this particular juncture and we'll ask jeremy to give his perspective on what this means to the united states.

thank you so much for joining us. i'll turn over first to charlie , who's going to give us a sense of the whole perspective of the referendum, paradigm, framework, how this has all evolved. i'd like to thank charlie and juliet for coming because they've used their own r explain this to this audience. we're very grateful. >> thank you very much indeed. it's a great pleasure to be here at brookings and a great pleasure to see so many people here. we are indeed representing a broad program of research on what's happening in scotland and the rest of the uk called future of the uk and scotland. if you type future uk and scotland into google you'll find us. what we're looking at is the big question. should scotland be an independent country? yes or no? that's what scotts voters will have before them next week as they enter the polling booths. that's a momentous decision by

any standard. it's a decision which could end what's generally seen as one of the most successful unions of nations in world history and if we do end it, it will be immense domestic and international implications. so quite rightly, the eyes of the world are on scotland. we will have in scotland by the end of this weekend some 400 camera crews in edinboro and i think thousands of print journalists coming the events of the next week, which is quite extraordinary. what they will see is a nation exploring its rights to self-determination with great seriousness. 4.3 million scotts have registered to vote in the referendum. that is 97% of the eligible electorate, which is utterly unprecedented. we expect on that basis to see a turnout of at least 80% and

we haven't seen turnout at that level in u.k. politics since the immediate period after the second world war. what i think is striking is how the debate has been conducted. now, we have seen and had lots of press coverage off occasional bursts of online abuse and there have been a small handful of confrontations on the streets. but that's just a very, very minor part of the debate. more generally we have seen an extraordinary flowering of civic engagement, of people in their communities, in church halls, in town halls, even more informally, committing themselves to thinking about scotland's future. i think this is by some way the biggest civic engagement process in scott ishhistory. i think from that we'll have a very well informed electorate as we go to the polls this week.

so, you might ask, what do they think? well, up on the screen here we have the poll of polls. a moving average of the last six opinion polls at various points in time. you can see that at the end of last year on the far left of that slide, the pink line at the top, which is, no, was at 60% plus and the blue line, yes, was below 40%. you can see in a rather uneven process a significant narrowing of the polls in the spring of this year, but what you can see most strikingly is a rapid narrowing in the last couple of weeks. the last six polls carried out over the last eight days showed yes, support for independence and, respectively, 47%, 51, 50, 47, 48, and 49. that's already out of date, by

the way. it's narrowed by one-third the points. 51-49. age is now expect a close outcome on thursday this week. a few words on the big themes that each side in the debate have put forward. i'll use the framing of negative and positive campaigning for this. because i think the negatives probably outweigh the positives. on the no side, largely led by the u.k. government but also by the cross party campaign better together, we have had an essentially negative message, a message which is all about risk, uncertainty, loss, you will be worse off, and the refusal to accept some of the ideas the scottish government would like to pursue if scotland became independent, including various forms of partnership with the rest of the u.k. to quote, several figures on the no side, it is not going to

happen. what we've seen now is quite a dismal vision. dismal in terms of content. it's all going to go terribly wrong. dismal in terms, also, of presentation. i think there's been a certain level of difficulty in getting the message across. i think that message of risk and loss has shown a diminishing return. it's lost its impact. i think that's one of the reasons why it on this graph you see a falling support for the no side. what we're seeing now is a big echo of those concerns from the private sector, from finance and other areas of industry. today's u.s. version of financial times is carrying lots of stories like that. that may have an effect on opinion in these last days. that may be double edged. i think scotts can be rather averse to people telling them what to do.

on the no side, we've seen little positive campaigning. very little about why it is good and certainly very little about why it would be better, why scotland would be better if it stayed in the union. we've seen a bit of a change in the last week on this. the no side has firmed up an offer and more specifically a timetable for additional powers for the scottishparliament should scotland remain in the u.k. the negatives outweigh the positives. big things on the yes side. generally, a positive message. generally aspirational. generally talking about the possibility of a better society, social justice, democratic legitimacy. a different kind of role in the international arena, which juliet will talk about in a few moments. that is a policy attuned to scotland's needs and not driven by the interests of the

heartland of the u.k. economy in london and the southeast of england. and an aspirational message about continuing friendly partnership in many areas with the rest of the u.k. after independence. all very aspirational, positive. but also i have to say very vague and often quite unconvincing especially in that emphasis on partnership, because it relies on the willingness of the partner and the partner has said, well, we're not really very willing. we've seen a much stronger negative message from the yes side in the last weeks. in fact, i think they've managed to conjure up a presentational perfect storm, which has three elements. if we stay, the national health service, that icon of post war british society, will be privatized. if we stay, social inequality will increase. if we stay, we will continue to be governed by a political party, the conservatives, which is deeply disliked in scotland.

nhs privatization, inequality conservatives, has been brought together in a very effective way which has had real traction which again is one of those reasons why the polls have closed. i think then we can boil down the big decision to pretty much this. the no side says, if you leave, you will suffer economically. the yes side says, if we stay, we will have a future of social injustice. that's the choice. if we vote yes, what next? well, we'll see a negotiation of extraordinary complexity. it will deal simultaneously with the disentanglement of scotland from the rest of the u.k. no easy task. but made much more difficult by the complications of the domestic, political timetable, including a u.k. election in may, next year, which will be held while those negotiations

would be under way. at the same time as that, the scottish government will be working with the u.k. government to work out the process and the terms of scotland's membership of the international community. no easy task. those negotiations will have a number of key issues. currency arrangements will be at the heart. that will no doubt be connected to discussion about scotland's share of assets, in particular oil and gas reserves, but, also, liabilities, in particular the scottish share of the u.k.'s accumulated public debt. my sense is on that cluster of issues the two sides after a yes vote would discover a mutual interest in messages of reassurance and stablization to markets. some of the hard rhetoric we've heard before may well ebb away into a common endeavor to calm things down.

e.u. negotiations will be challenging, not least because of other countries which have similar situations to that of scotland and the rest of the u.k. nato membership will be challenging, not least because of the scottish government's commitment to remove the u.k.'s nuclear weapons bases, part of the wider nato deterrent from scotland. we could expect package deals. perhaps extending across different areas -- currency and nuclear weapons is one package which is often evoked in that sense. i imagine we would actually see quick agreements on some of the key issues, not least because of that pressure for economic stability, but also long transition periods for implementation of the working out finer detail. final big challenge there will be how to insulate all of that very, very sensitive, lots of

different, simultaneous negotiations from what would be a febrile political atmosphere in the u.k. if we vote no, what next? well, that would be less urgency if we vote no. there will be a limited challenge to economic stability and minimal international imensions to the question. we have a timetable for the delivery of the additional talents of the scottish parliament and that starts on the 19th of september and a rapid process would follow so that draft legislation would be in place prior to the may, 2015 u.k. election involving decentralization of tax powers and powers in welfare policy. there would be plenty of issues around that not least because the pro union parties are divided between themselves but also within themselves on the content of the additional

devolution of powers. there is a big question as to whether any compromise they come up with actually satisfy demand in scotland. i say that because whatever happens, close to half of scotts if we vote no will have oted to leave. if we vote no this is not an endorsement of the u.k. as is. there will be tremendous pressure to placate that drive which has led practically half of scotts to vote no. it won't be easy. also if you placate the scotts you might stir it up in other parts of the u.k. we're already beginning to hear that a little bit in wales and articularly in england where --. to conclude, if yes, you will be observing and some of you no doubt will be participating in

a process of enormous significance and no little drama with important international ramifications. if it's a no, you'll be observing an inward looking debate, no doubt with its own dramas as the u.k. casts around for an interm arrangement that might offer some constitutional stability. i doubt actually whether we'll find them but whether we get to that situation we have to wait until next thursday. >> thank you very much. you laid that out wonderfully for everyone. so, juliet, the larger implications? >> okay. thank you. thank you to you and your colleagues here at brookings for inviting us and letting us talk about these issues today. i'm going to briefly talk about foreign policy in the referendum debate, what the yes side says about what an independent scottish foreign policy would look like and then both internal and external reactions. then i'll conclude by challenging a couple of

assumptions on both sides in this debate. i should say foreign policy is not a key issue in which voters are likely to decide and cast their vote on next week, but foreign policy is the most distinct area that would change with independence given that scotland already has deinvolved powers in many areas of public policy, health, education, others. it is foreign affairs that sovereignty would give scotland considerable new powers. and this is also a part of the discourse, at least at the elite level. so what would an independent scottish foreign policy look like? the yes side has outlined some directions although not completely specific that it would take a scottish foreign policy. i like to characterize state foreign policies as sprations in terms of four pillars -- profits, protection, principles, and pride. let me say a few things about what an independent scottish foreign policy would look like

along these pillars. the pillar of profit, clearly a liberal trade, economic foreign policy in the discussion of advantages of continued e.u. and w.t.o. membership. so we would see continuity in economic foreign policy very similar to current u.k. economic foreign policy although a much smaller economy. there could be a big difference if scotland gets in the e.u. and the u.k. votes to leave the e.u. there you would see quite a difference between a u.k. and independent scottish foreign policy. on the pillar of protection the yes side makes the case for continued membership in nato, something its party rejected until the referendum campaign began. this, and the scottish defense force would be the cornerstones of protection. the military would focus on territorial integrity and take a regional defense role in the northern europe, north sea for example. the defense budget is modeled after other small european states and focuses on maritime

forces. it rejects the trident submarine as charlie mentioned the u.k.'s current nuclear deterrent that resides in scottish waters and says it wants the weapons removed as soon as possible after independence but has not given a deadline. it is with the principles pillar that the yes side seeks to put the most daylight between itself and how it characterizes the u.k.'s foreign policy. the yes side emphasizes it would have different international priorities from westminster. most clearly in their words in matters of war and peace. the antinuclear argument is also based on value statements such as, quote, trident is an affront to basic decency. the yes side is clearly laying out aspirations for an ethics based foreign policy, talking about scotland being a kallstrom for international justice and peace -- a champion for international justice and peace, development, human rights, and climate justice. but there are just a few clues in how these values would

actually be implemented. scotland would not be an isolationist country but its partition as peacekeeping would be governed by principles of the need for international legitimacy and respect for international law. and many times along these lines we've heard asserted the hypothetical argument that an independent scotland would not have participated in iraq. pride plays a place in most states' foreign policy and it is the state's projected self-image. there is little talk of pride in the yes campaign materials. but occasionally they talk about scotland as an outward facing nation exporting goods, peoples, and ideas around the world and referred to scotland's proud military tradition as well. so what's the no side's reaction? the no side stresses as charlie mentioned, uncertainty, risk, and constraints on scotland as a small state. the no side argues that the international memberships that scotland seeks are not automatic.

e.u. membership might be vetoed, and even if granted is not likely to come with the opt out that the u.k. currently has and that scotland says it wants. the no side points out that membership in nato could come with responsibility, possibly including retaining the u.k. nuclear deterrent in scotland. the numbers for defense and intelligence in terms of spending and personnel says the no side just don't add up and could create a security risk. the no side is very familiar to those of us who study international relations reflecting the realist perspective that small states don't matter, can't have the influence big states have, are dependent on military alliances and must often compromise values in exchange for security. thus according to this view scotland's interests are better represented and protected at home and abroad by a u.k. that has a permanent seat in the u.n. security council and has a high profile, well respected, large diplomatic service with considerable expertise.

the yes side has some counterreaction to the no side's position on the foreign policy. they argue that membership and cooperation with others will come because it's in others' interests. a stable intelligence environment in scotland, for example, with shared intelligence is critical to the u.k.'s own safety given the shared geographical space and thus cooperation is likely. the yes side also argues that small states don't need the equivalent protection as big states, don't need a broad global profile, and don't attract the enemies and threats that sometimes big states do. and consistent with research on small states the yes side points out small states can often punch above their weight and have influence because they are small states. they are often, for example, more trusted because they are seen as less a threat to others. so what has been the international reaction to this? publicly at least most states have conformed to international norms of noninterference in

democratic processes and said this is a matter for the u.k. or the scottish people. where external actors have weighed in this has largely been on the no side. comments from external actors include states such as the united states, but also international organizations and businesses. these comments largely see scottish independence as an unwelcome and puzzling disturbance. the negative international reaction has many sources but chief among them are states' own concerns about their domestic problems, worries that the scottish secession would spill over into their countries. there are others that have voiced general concerns about precedents and so-called balkanization of europe that the scottish independence move o would set off and there are concerns about the weakening of a stable ally, the u.k., probably the basis of both u.s. and french concerns about scottish independence. i don't think the international commentary has much of an impact on the internal debate

and vote next week. perhaps the financial reaction this week was more important. but when states intervene, they risk some back firing among the scottish population. so i will end by questioning two assumptions i see in the debate on independence and foreign policy and, to be fair, one assumption on the no side and one on the yes side. first the no. international reactions that support the no side. in the arguments that an independent scottish foreign policy would fare poorly, there is an assumption that all else is static and only the question of scottish independence is changing. the u.k., for example, is presented as the major power that better represents the people of scotland in the world. this is not an uncontested view and not one invulnerable to change. power balances in the world are changing, emerging powers are more important, and big powers also don't always have influence. the u.k. defense is in the midst of downsizing and likely to face further budget cuts, as

well. there is an assumption u.k. foreign policy is also statically a faithful ally and nuclear power but, here, too, there are signs of change. the house of commons vote on syria last year showed a real lack of trust in international intelligence, lack of enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention, and there are real disagreements even in the current governing coalition in the u.k. over the works of trident. certainly the pro u.s. position in the u.k. is still strong but arguably not as strong as it used to be and may not in the future. my point is these are not issues that divide westminster vs. scotland. they are debated within westminster, too, and even without scottish independence they may affect the u.k. role in the world. on the yes side there has been strong assumption of rational, interest based cooperation by others. they argue that of course britain will share the pound and intelligence and that the e.u. and nato will let scotland in because it is in their

interests to do so. it probably is, and it's not a bad starting assumption, but we know that states don't always act according to their interests or they have competing interests which can complicate external relations. consider the rest of u.k. as scotland's most important negotiating partner in a post independent world. the u.k. will hold national elections next year and if the conservatives win, they have promised a referendum on the u.k.'s eu membership. the negotiations with scotland on trident on the pound, on the division of assets, on the military division, on everything will be happening in the middle of these political and likely very contested campaigns. i'll stop there. >> thank you, juliet. we'll turn now to jeff dire from "the financial times." "the financial times" has been running a whole series for quite sometime now on this debate and many of the issues

charlie and juliet have laid out on the table. clearly, jeff, and his colleagues are going to be very busy in the next few weeks especially as juliet has laid out that no matter what the outcome, this is going to feed into a much bigger debate in the united kingdom and the runup to what is going to be a very contested general election next year in may, 2015. i think one of the issues that juliet has mentioned here we should put out on the table, which is the continuation of the u.k. u.n. security council seat. here in the corridors of brookings i've heard from my colleagues who cover other areas of the world look agate some of the rising powers that there will be a big demand from some of them for rethinking of the u.k. national security council seat. there is anyway as we all know. and certainly the outcome of the referendum will raise that even higher. as juliet has said, nothing will be constant in this debate. there will be more issues on the table as we look forward. jeff, we've asked you to give a

big perspective on these issues and obviously you have quite a lot to say on this matter. over to you. >> thank you very much to brookings for inviting me here today. i really appreciate the invitation. charlie and juliet have really laid out very effectively the issues on the table here and some of the underlying thinking besides both sides of the campaigns. not only do we want to go over the same ground but maybe what i'll just try and -- sort of what the issue for independent scotland might look like. what happens if there is a yes vote next week though it is a tossup. just try and ask the question what would it mean and what would it look like? i think the key point to understand is that a yes vote next week is almost a start of the issue, not the end of the issue. a yes vote will be the start of a very complicated divorce proceedings and might be quite an amicable divorce proceedings

and might be a very nasty divorce proceedings but it is going to be very complicated and the start not the end of the process. as we speak today, the basic outlines of what an independent scotland might look like are still very unclear. there are core questions about its place in the world and what the state will look like, big institutional questions that haven't been resolved. there are still a lot of question marks over them. that is one of the key issues in the debate. it was mentioned that they would like to be part of the european union, a key part of the sort of sales pitch to the country. scotland likes to think it is actually more pro european than the rest of the u.k. that wasn't necessarily always the case but that's part of the sales pitch at the moment. opinion polls show that sometimes some polls show that's true. some polls show it's not true. it is very much a core part of the kind of platform, this idea we can be a small, independent

country but still part of a bigger, broader world of the eu allows us to be. it is also very important to them because it is crucial for trade relations in scotland. just this general idea that business as usual can carry on even if we take the big not necessarily immediately clear that scotland could become a member of the eu. they have reached most of the qualifications, but there are three potential questions. the first is the spanish question, there are other countries that might object, but and is the one that is most likely to have it real problem with scotland becoming a member of the eu. it does not want to encourage its own separatist movements. although it may be unlikely to ultimately reject scottish membership, it has an incentive to drag things out and make things difficult to show that

there is a price to be paid for taking this move. that would be a very tough negotiation scotland would face. there is a question of whether the u.k. would ultimately back it. again, it seems unlikely, at the end of the day, the u.k. would say now. as there is going to be a complicated negotiation had, this is one of the bargaining chips that the rest of the u.k. government would have. a talent cannot become a part of the eu until both sides have signed off on the separation agreement, the divorce agreement. that is another factor. the third is the euro factor. in theory these days new members of the eu are supposed to become members of the euro as well. given the crisis in the euro over the past few years, one might imagine that they would have reluctance to push the rule wholeheartedly, but in theory scotland would have to become a part of the euro, and that is

not something that the scottish national say that they want to do at the moment. again, i think that most of these issues would ultimately be resolved, there would be a sensible compromise that they would find, but it will be a painful and difficult negotiation. scotland says it wants to become a part of nato, as we have heard. general, a part of a business as usual, we are not going to rock the boat too much. you do not have to worry that an independent scotland will pose radical changes. that will not be a simple negotiation, either. party aresh national very anti-nuclear. they have called it a basic affront. there is also an anti-american popular is him that is a part of &p pitches well, they talk about america's illegal wars. scotland does not want to have

nuclear weapons and play that against american foreign policy in the middle east, that would not be unique and nato, there are other countries with a similar profile, that is a wrinkle, a complication. they would have to do something to soothe american concerns about that. america would also presumably have concerns about what defense spending might be like in an independent scotland, because they are committed to maintaining a certain defense spending. there are pressures on the scottish government, and independent scottish government in its first year, that would push it to try and cut defense spending. everything the u.s. wants from nato this moment is to not have another country that is going to fall below the 2% mark. that is another tricky issue. spain is another possible stumbling brought -- black in nato as well. -- block in nato as well. i do not think that these woodblock scotland from becoming a member of nato, but it will be

a drawnout negotiation where things will not be as simple as they are being projected in the campaign. if you want to mention the u.n. issue that might come up, but the final element that i want to talk about is the currency issue, which has become one of the core issues of the campaign. issuethe most difficult that is going to face an independent scotland if we vote next -- yes next week. they have said that ultimately they would be a sensible compact between scotland and the rest of the u.k. to sort things out. i am not totally clear on that, i am skeptical on that. i think that this is a key issue because there is not real -- any real easy path for an independent scotland on the currency issue. -- thelay out the issues options that they would have, there would be the euro option. but that is not the preferred reasonfor the very basic

of the problems the euro has had in recent years. the other option would be to have scotland issue its own currency. mostwould give it its autonomy, giving it the best chance in the long run to have an independent, effective policy. establishing its own currency would be very complicated, very difficult. you have to establish credibility, build institutions, you would have lots of worries about this matches in liabilities and assets, currency risk. there is a real risk of economic turbulence in the short or medium term before scotland got to the stage of having a credible currency. but the -- there is the sterling sterlingization option, continuing to use the pound but not being a part of the arrangements in the u.k., similar to panama. that is technically possible, but there are lots of problems with that. scotland are in

the central bank, said to have a backstop for the banking system, they need to build up some reserve fund, which would mean cutting spending for a number of years in order to build up this fund at an economic cost to scottish welfare spending, effectively. it has not been discussed but that would be implicit. it is entirely understandable why the snp is putting all of its money on the option that they can stay a part of the currency union with the rest of the u.k.. we will vote for independence and we will renegotiate the terms. ideally,cotland would, have membership in the bank of england and become one of the shareholders, essentially, of the bank of england. and they would have access to all the facilities that the bank of england could offer, the lender of last resort

facilities, that that would offer to the broader scottish economy. from an independent scottish point of view that makes complete sense. all clear to me that that make sense for england and the rest of the u.k.. i think that for economic reasons and for political reasons. the economic reason would be that all of the risks, essentially, would be on one side. away to think about this is that if scotland got into trouble, if an independent scotland got into trouble, england would have the resources to bail it out. if england got into trouble, scotland would not have the resources to bail it out. it is a classic moral hazard, all the risks are on the english side. there is little reason that i could see for them to want to sign up for this kind of currency union, they are exposing themselves to risks if scotland were to run a different economic policy. it is a free ride on the back of the stability that the bank of

england could offer them. do aif they did decide to currency union, the price that they would ask for would be a very, very rigid fiscal rule. rules, essentially asking for bank of england regulation of the entire scottish financial system. and possible even the pooling of fiscal resources, so even though scotland would get control of revenues of the north sea oil, it would then have to make some of that money available back to the broader u.k.. that ation of that is notionally independent scotland under a currency union would not have a great deal of real autonomy, real independence in economic policy. again, that is something that has not really been -- in my time in scotland, that is not coming through in the argument as to what a currency union would mean for an independent scotland.

the establishment would ultimately want to do a deal between england and scotland, they would not want a crisis north of the border. politically, it is not clear to me that it would be possible for them to do so. will make you think about that is the following. the striking thing about this referendum is just how little angle and seems to care what is going on in scotland -- england seems to care what is going on in scotland. to go back to the last referendum, on the weekend before that, there were several hundred thousand people marching in the streets of montréal. canadians from outside of québec were asking correct to say. there have been -- were asking québec to stay. that is not a part of the debate here. in angling, the sentiment is the opposite, resentment. if you want to go, in words that i cannot use in the brookings institute. [laughter] it is not a polite atmosphere. an election some

time, certainly if they vote yes but in the next year. a seems to be impossible for non-scottish political party to get elected on a platform saying, yeah, we should do right scotts.cott -- i think they will demand tough conditions. from the english point of view, a currency union seems to be scotland saying that we want out but we want all the benefits of staying in. that is the way that it plays in english politics. and i do not think that is a politically sustainable argument. for both of those reasons, i am a little more pessimistic as to how it will play out, i giggled a complicated and difficult to not be the answer that scotland or the snp would like. pessimism,bit of these tight opinion polls are fantastic for generalists. this is a great story for my newspaper.

it seems to me to be a terrible outcome for scotland and britain. alternative, i am not saying that it is the wrong way 59 or 49ngs, but a result, that shows a divided country and a fragile political consensus in order to take a very, very big step. that is if they vote yes, but i think that it cuts off ways as well. it is not a ringing endorsement of the union. i think we are entering a. of political fragility and vulnerability or a lot of different things that mess it up. we will get into these things in the q&a. >> thanks geoff, i think one point that you left us with actually makes -- the united states is having this debate as well with our divisions internally between the different political parties seems quite mild, which is quite an achievement.

with that, i will turn it over to jeremy to give us a perspective on how things look from here in bc where we are all where we are d.c. all sitting. >> thanks, and thanks to all the anelists, i think geoff davis good view of what the presence of scotland would be on the international scene. what i would like to cover as with the u.s. government is thinking about the scottish referendum, and also how the u.s. would react if there is a yes vote. mentioned, juliet the u.s. does not really talk about this very much. talked about some concerns over specific issues, particularly nuclear issues, but have not really taken a position on, or at least an official position on, the referendum. this is for rather clear reasons. in the first instance, it would be rude to comment on the

internal deliberations of a democratic country. it is not unprecedented, sally say, for the united states to do so. [laughter] but it is impolite. and i think that it is in general a principal for the u.s. to not do that sort of thing, particularly for allies which it recognizes have a legitimate system and are engaged in a legitimate process. again is for a clear on the u.s. side that that is what is going on, for better or for worse. of course, the united states have an opinion. i think they recognize that stating that opinion is not always very helpful to promoting it. the u.s. weighed in semi-accidentally, i think, on the question of british membership in the european union a year or two ago and it created a firestorm in britain. one of the things that it did

was that it aligned both sides -- it turned out that both sides cared very much what the u.s. out, and it became a lightning rod. i think that they have, since that time, taken the approach that they cannot actually what the u.s.ell wading into the debate will even do in terms of public opinion. so it is best to stay out of it. i think that is reinforced by the sentiment that was already mentioned that the scots are adverse to being told what to do, particularly by americans. that despite the absence of opinion, we can make a fairly educated guess about what the u.s. government thinks. is a statustates quo power, i think that is a thing we forget when we talk about crises and u.s. action, but in fact, as the leader of

the world, there is a strong bias toward stability in u.s. foreign policy and a strong bias against secession of any sort. quossion is, for a status power, nearly a complete collapse of policy. the united states is not entirely consistent in this regard. xhosa vote comes quickly to mind, and there are other examples -- kosovo comes quickly to mind. if you look at u.s. policy, they saw to avoid an idea that there was a precedent set towards secession, that there was any right of secession i provinces. i think that that view is reinforced in this particular case because the u.s. sees this as two of its best friends divorcing. and that is never a joyful experience. i think, though, that even beyond that general principle,

of the status quo power, there are real issues in the united states. some have been alluded to already but i will go over them or directly from a u.s. perspective. i think that a critical one is the idea of a weakening of a key u.s. ally, the u.k. from theis clearly, u.s. perspective, a very active, very effective ally. there are precious few of those these days. , ine is a general view that the tumble that has been , theibed after a yes vote u.k. or what remains of it would turn inward as it negotiates the exit of scotland. it would be more likely to get out of the european union in the punitive referendum in 2017, which would further shrink british influence and british activism in the world. there is also a view that scottish exit would put greater

pressure on the british defense budget and the british armed forces. and overall this might mean that the u.k. would not be able to play the kind of lead role in nato that it has traditionally. related to this, i think that there is a fear of a weakening of nato and the eu. the eu would turn inward yet again, as i had to negotiate the it had to negotiate the question of secession in general and scottish entry in specific. because it would make a british exit more likely, that is the arc for that. sorry, i have just been at a very long conference about that. saidgets at what the u.s. when they took a position against rich exit from the european union. looking for a strong

britain within a strong european union. it is clear that a scottish exit begins that strong britain and british exit from the european union weakens the european union. for nato, i think that, contrary to what has been said, this is less about the nuclear deterrent than about demonstrating weakness and disunity at a in nato's history in the face of a newly resurgent threat from russia. if you look at the nato summit last week and the president's trip to estonia, ec a strong see ao assert -- you strong urge to assert nato strength in the face of the russian threat. of one of its members, a key member, breaking up. and then the type of government that was described taking over

in scotland and all of the difficult negotiations over nato. that does not really appealed to the united states at this critical moment in dealing with russia. i think that -- while i will get to that a little bit later. i think that the third reason that the u.s. would be against this is the question of precedent. fiona mentioned, the leader of the crimea has already mentioned scottish independence as a precedent for what he would like to do. we have also heard expressions of this justice morning on npr. of domesticsident saying, scotland can do it, why can't we. that will be an increasingly hard question to answer. this also spreads across the eu,

into spain and other key u.s. allies that could well face this question. a piece aboutve this that i think we distributed out front that talks about the and thet that this sets difficulties that might cause for the european union. so what will the u.s. do in the case of a yes vote? is always a fair bet, in the face of a dramatic international developments, that the united states will urge calm. [laughter] i think that that will be the first reaction. what that really means is that they well, broadly, accept the outcome. urging, in order to make the best of a bad situation, a fast resolution of a negotiated, agreeable divorce.

specifically to create a sense of reassurance and to minimize the disruption that i talked about that they fear. think, quietly and do some extent from behind the scenes, push for eu/nato membership for scotland on reasonably fair terms. implied,l be, as geoff very, very hard negotiations on the nuclear deterrent, but i do think that they are ultimately looking for a solution. they would certainly prefer a weak member of nato to a nonmember. ,here are, as was mentioned which of nato members have romantic anti-american notions, particularly about the nuclear deterrent. this fits into a wider debate. the united states will welcome a they wouldt i think

prefer it to a nonmember, an irish solution. the key is that it has to be a negotiated solution and a transition. i think, very clearly, the united states will push back against the idea that this referendum represents a precedent for places like crimea, donnesck. the way that they will do that is by emphasizing the mutual decision nature, that this was agreed by both sides, and that was the critical feature which allows this type of referendum and this type of separation. it must be agreed, both by the region that is holding the referendum and by the state in which the region belongs. and they will say that this is totally different from the ukraine or the breakaway

provinces of georgia where this is under dispute. i think, also, and some more speculatively, if the scots vote yes, the u.s. will reevaluate its decision to play a fairly hands-off role in the british exit question for the european union. they will still have the problem that i mentioned, it is not clear how waiting in will really in will help.ing but they will have the president of not weighing in. the united states does not make the same the state twice, they make a different mistake. [laughter] i think we will see them play a more active role, the argument that they will use is that because they have a stake in british membership in the european union, just as, for example, a country like britain would have a stake in the united

membership in nato, they have every right to -- to weigh in. they will make their opinion much more known in scotland votes yes. >> thank you jeremy. obviously we have a lot of issues here, and we only have half an hour left, so i would like to bring in you, the audience. i can see already a lot of questions. people in the audience have a stake in this issue. maybe threeke questions right away, we have microphones which will come out in just a second, and then i will come back to our panel to ask them to comment on the questions. questionsns -- two immediately. in the back, let me know at your questions, to. hugo, i speak for myself as a british expatriate

englishman. oceans word at this point is potentially not that helpful -- an englishman's word at this point is potentially not that helpful. i want to take up the idea that englishman do not care about this issue, i would hate to leave the audience with this impression. if you look at twitter, you see the day of national unity from outside the borders, from outside of scotland coming next wednesday. you also see, and i recommend it very strongly, forgive me for getting slightly emotional on this matter, "the spectator" magazine launched a campaign for people outside of scotland writing in personal words what -- about why it is that they would want the scottish people to vote to stay in the united kingdom. that is all that i would have to say, other than my question,

obeying the rules, it has been suggested that perhaps it would be less an urgent situation in terms of what would happen afterwards. ,f the referendum has not shown and the campaign amongst it, eelinghere is a wide f of disenfranchisement in scotland and england in wales, and it is urgent that there is some sort of constitutional settlement, not just in scotland but more widely in the event of innovaro. -- of a no vote. thank you. >> independent. can you relate everything that you said in the situation to ireland? first of all, could there be and ireland/northern ireland situation where a part would stay with the u.k.? and would ireland and scotland have better relations because they might end up using the euro , or could there even be a

closer drawing of ireland to the u.k. because it is now a club that is relatively bigger. >> and you. -- thank you. panel for this marvelously instructive survey. i regret the absence on the panel of the elegant governor of texas, the honorable rick perry, who has some views on secession as well. everybody knows -- >> can you speak a little closer to the might, i am not sure that the cameras are picking it up. >> ok, i regretted the absence of rick perry from the panel. everybody knows that an angle thereetropolitan england,

is a disproportionate role in the leadership of cultural institutions. one wonders about the composition, the social composition, age composition, also, maybe even religious composition of the two parties, the yes and no block, and scotland. is there a class gradient of some kind? it appeared so from some of the discussions one the saw on the television, but it would be good to know something about the social composition of the opposing parties. thank you very much. >> thank you for all of these questions, we will come back again. , i would liketion to talk about a little bit, because many of the meetings we have had in brookings, this has been one of the issues that has confused people from the outside. referendum isnd's framed in terms of civic nationalism, other people are trying to grasp who are the

people on either side in terms of how they are identifying themselves. issues of identity have not been put on the table here, but they have come up on many other issues. jezaniah talked about this, and i think this panel reflects it. geoff and i talked about this, and i think this panel reflects this. they arell themselves from england originally but are living in scotland, is from scotland and living in the u.s. this is representative of a larger u.k. entry. the history of the united kingdom is one of constant migration. effortsy the previous at national self-determination of scotland were really founded on the fact that people identify themselves ethnically or culturally as scots to carry the day. basedp platform has been on this idea, that it is the resident of scotland --

residents of scotland, however they identify themselves. this issue of identity remains important. out, as shipplay is trying to suggest, and anglicans -- in angle and, and as hugo said, people in and linda do care about this. -- in england do care about this. there is also a larger issue that i would like to put out as you think about responding to this, about the identity of britain and british identity. the united kingdom is a rather anodyne description for the country that is great britain. great britain is not the official name, but everybody talks about it. wales, and england, as well as northern ireland. that is obligated because united

kingdom is a country of emigration, and many people have come from outside of the british isles and are wondering how they will identify themselves on september 19, depending on what is happened, as well. there are all kinds of identity, bulgarians, many of the members of the british partner -- parliament come from somewhere else. we are parliament members from germany or portugal. how do they identify themselves? or the south asian community in great britain. these are issues that did not come out in the panel, but they have been part of a debate in one way or another, and i wanted to get our catalyst to comment on this. these are great questions, thank you. >> yes, thank you very much for the questions. i will try and tackle at least some of them. one of my areas of personal research interests is what do the english think.

i have done quite a bit of survey work in angle and, and i land, and i canng endorse your comments that the english do care. in april, we found 19% of people whongle and -- in england thought that scotland should be an independent country, a large majority that do not think that. however, more in-line with the geoff was saying, if scotland does so yes, what we know from the survey is that people in england would be quite strongly in support of a tough line in negotiations toward scotland. stay, butotland to if they decide to go, a backlash. when i said no urgency, that was not really no urgency, i think there would be a great danger of the u.k. political system

thinking, we have sorted that, we have done that, let's move on. no, think that if we vote and more stable set of constitutional arrangements for all parts of the u.k. would be a strong priority. who is voting yes and no? there are some clear patterns which are quite interesting. men are more likely to vote yes than women. younger people, except the very youngest, generally more likely to vote yes in older people. people from disadvantaged communities clearly more likely to vote yes than people from more affluent communities. and then the national identity question. one of the best predictors we have of voting intention is around those people who feel primarily british in scotland. it does not work so well on the other side, those people who

feel primarily scottish, this does not lead directly or so directly to supporting a yes vote. there is a territorial dimension to that. a poll was released from the scottish borders this morning we showed two thirds in favor in remaining in the u.k. there would be territorial differences between the different parts of scotland. i do not think that is going to lead to a kind of irish partition situation. i think that, given that level of voter registration, even that likely level of turnout, -- given that likely level of turnout, the formal rules, i think we will have sufficient legitimacy. >> thank you. juliett? >> i will answer a couple of questions quickly so we can get more from the audience. of identity,

parlay, being an outsider, i have been struck at how the ethnic identity has not been a part of the debate very much. it has been a functional, political debate about policy preferences on foreign policy and health care and spending issues. way that thek the electorate has been defined in terms of residency has taken away some of that, although some of us cannot vote even though we are resident there. on the question of ireland, it is interesting. ireland has look more towards than it in this debate looks toward supporting scotland and independence. and scotland has not really reached out to think about cultivating scottish/irish inactions -- connections. they're looking more towards the nordic countries and thinking

about the connections there, the arctic circle and the north sea. those countries have largely stood on the sidelines, too, and this debate, not just after the referendum, but, in the case of a yes vote, in negotiations, they will wait to take up the offer of scotland to be partners. >> thanks. geoff? >> i think that the identity question is really interesting, because i people of mention, it is not formally a part of the debate at, it is not on the table. but it is absolutely the underlying fabric of the debate, i think. which is that scottish identity has shifted in the decades. one is that there is a strongly held view on the part of scott's that it is a different place, different school system, different legal system, the first banks. -- different banks.

that the one country in the world that we share the most which is angle and -- with is england. in the last few decades the scottish bit of identity has become stronger for various reasons. the reasons that bind the u.k. together have declined. it was founded on the empire, in a sense, which was one thing that kept the scots interested in the u.k. for a long time. settlement, the memories of the world wars, fighting against fascism, the trade union movement was another powerful thing that bound them together. then the experience of the thatcher years, when something broke in the scotland, the sense in scottish society that margaret thatcher had broken up the checks and balances in the u.k., the political grammar of how the u.k. worked. all of these have played out over the last couple of decades to give scotland a much stronger sense of identity then i had.

although that is not officially on the platform, that is one of the driving forces behind what got us to this stage. globalization and individualism have created an environment in which people do retreat into tribal identities. if you go to a wedding in scotland these days, all the men of my fathers generations, in the 60's and 70's, were wearing suits. under aren 50 and wearing kilts. is not in the manifesto but it is absolutely key to understanding what is going on. to respond if you go, all i would say is that originally, i generally hope that you are right, what he is saying about the groundswell of anguish opinion trying to make the case for scotland to say. i think that your traps and leaving it a little bit late --

you have been believing it a little bit late. >> i do not think he means you personally. [laughter] you have anything to say? >> on your point about general disenfranchisement, i think that is an important point. i make in the piece that i referred to, that was scotland phrased asng is anti-english, but it is more, if you think about it, and i london -- anti-london. and expresses the frustration is a lot of the hinterlands of northern england, wales, a lot allther areas -- actually, the areas of the kingdom outside of the metropolitan areas in the south about feel about the english government. the disenfranchisement that they feel from the city, the cultural distance that is being created by the very different evolutions

of london and the rest of the united kingdom. what the identity of scotland language, as a vocabulary, and an institutional platform to express that disenfranchisement that the rest of the united kingdom does not really have. and so that is why we see this disenfranchisement coming forward most clearly and most mostly in scotland -- loudly in scotland. and it is a problem in the united kingdom, and i think that it is a yes or no that the united kingdom should deal with urgently. i would share some of the pessimism that they really wel -- will. >> i think that geoff, many of the british newspapers have pointed out that the divides within the united kingdom and within london itself, whether

the sense of the disenfranchisement from the rest of the u.k. and london, london itself is also a divided polity. one of the features of the thatcher era was the evolution of the greater london, which was very much in into the left of government. when of the battles of that. area bank was margaret thatcher fighting with the leader of the london council. they want a certain amount of self-determination, so i think that the issue will take on some interesting dimensions as we move forward. i think that thesnp will be telling us about them. i would like to get questions in the back, because people have been waiting seriously. please identify themselves -- yourselves. >> what is the impact on it businesses like pensions and nk if the scottish people

vote yes, and what is the impact on the economy considering that many scottish people are dependent on the u.k. for social welfare, social security, and other benefits? >> thank you. hi, i am with public radio in barcelona. my question is, do you think that people should have the right to decide their own fate? as a general matter, we had 2 million people demonstrated in bart -- barcelona yesterday, but as you know the spanish government does not allow the catalan vote to go ahead. as a general matter, do you think that any people should have the right to determine their own fate? >> there's a question from the gentleman standing right behind you. >> thank you very much, i am charles. i would not want people to think

that my accent reflects bias. i have a methodological question for the panel. it seems like most of the organizations have published polls, but quite often the press has recalculated the polls to reflect an absolute confrontation between yes and no. i saw the brookings succumb to this tendency. know, the know has quite a big proportion of ae poll, surprisingly big for referendum that takes place next week, i think that 20%, approximately. i wonder the panel could comment on this and give some indication of if they think the hesitant voters will vote yes or no. juliett r and in surveyk -- are work, so they will respond. that is standard practice

when you're predicting elections, to get rid of the don't knows and report figures without them. but it does raise the question of what way they are leaning. different pollsters are reporting different levels of don't know, it depends on the calling method. in face-to-face polling, people get more don't knows, i think people are reluctant, face to face, to give their opinion. the picture we have had from some academic survey research, which is using the same panel of ,otes at different time points which is perhaps the most reliable evidence that we have, is that between the two type points, which were earlier this year and then in the early summer, don't knows were breaking towards yes. of 25 to 18, 4 to

three. that is one of the things we have been seeing in the tightening of the polls, it is difficult to say. i wanted to take the opportunity to come back to geoff and clarify. i am skeptical that there would be a formal currency union. and i am sorry if you thought that i was sent -- that that was what i was saying. i do think that the sites on the today have become quite polarized, and the no side has partso definitive, and so -- some parts have gone beyond that and saying that the next u.k. manifesto was saying that we will not have a currency union, that it will be hard to move away from that position. when i was suggesting was that there would be an interest in a stabilization process, most likely around and informal use ing by an independent

scotland. perhaps we have seen the first stages of that stabilization process in the announced an's of of all theuncements major banks in scotland saying that in the event of a yes vote they would move their headquarters, and not necessarily their activities, to london, so that there would be a lender of last resort. that is one way of managing some of those transitional issues. that both point was sides, including the u.k., which would be bearing uncertainty around currency, uncertainty around continuity of business for many firms headquartered in the rest of the u.k., would have an interest in stabilizing, in reassuring, in saying it is all going to be ok. i'm not sure if i coined the

phrase or somebody else wrote it and i just absorbed it for myself. plusdea of sterlingozation some stabilization arrangements seems a more likely outcome than currency union. >> thank you. juliet? >> that may take the catalonian question at the back and use it as a platform to come back to something jeremy was talking about on precedent and secession. there is a strong international norm for people to have the right to decide who governs them. the principle of national self-determination is not always obeyed, not always supported by outside groups, but it is a strong and ever-growing normative power in the international system, it is what you see outside actors, even if they are against scottish