military nominations they've been before the committee. they require a length of time. all in favor say aye. oppose nay. motion carries. thank you very much. senator reid. we've had a debate going on -- >> some boots on the ground. no boots on the ground. it might help us all if you can clarify precisely what our forces are doing in iraq today and you suggested if the situation changes you might come to us with a lem -- recommendation that would enhance their mission. can you clarify what they're doing? >> first of all, i think everyone should be aware when we talk about combat forces. when we bring young men and women in the military, they come in to be a combat soldier or a combat marine. we don't bring them in to be

other than combat capable. but that's different than how we use them. and in the case of our contributions in iraq right now, the airmen as the ranking member mentioned are very much in the combat role. the folks on the ground are very much in it a combat advisory role. they are not participating in direct combat. i mentioned if i found that circumstance evolving that i would change my recommendation. an example. if the iraqi security forces were at some point ready to could very well be part of that particular mission to provide close combat advising or accompanying for that mission. but for the day-to-day activities that i anticipate will evolve over time, i don't see it to be necessary right now. >> one of the presumptions, and

i'll just raise it, would be because we are using air power that there is sufficient capacity in the iraqi forces to coordinate that air power on the ground. is that the issue you're looking at? dam t me use the mosul operation as a great example of that. the counterd we had terrorist service from the iraqi security forces and in an operation center we had our own folks assisting the rover to be able to help the iraqis manage the battle on the ground. incredibly complex, three languages, english, kurdish and arab, and we worked through it. it was a real challenge. we learned some things about how to use advisors from remote locations. i'm not saying this will work every place, every time, but we pulled that mission off and i think it's a good template for

future operations. >> i presume one of the areas you're looking at is these capable iraqis who can communicate and coordinate on the ground, their special forces particularly. >> that's right. >> mr. secretary you are proposing to train about 5,000 individuals a year to go back into syria. how do you integrate these forces back into syria? will they go in as units? what's the plan after they are trained, i think that's part of the issue? >> senator, one of points that i made a couple minutes ago in answering senator inhofe's question was the point about training them as units so they can operate as units, which is as you know, with your military

experience, is critically mportant as you build an effective opposition force, not just a hit-and-run group of rebels, but an effective force command control, tactics strategy. so, yes, that is the fundamental training principle of how we begin. the length of time here depebbed penneds on a number -- depends on a number of things buzz we're probably talking about eight weeks per cycle. it might move on within a week or two, but that's the intent of how they would train up. the centcom leaders are already focused on that and are preparing and one of the things the president will get tomorrow as he spends the day with the centcom planners and commanders in tampa is taking him through

that entire structure. >> thank you. general dempsey, i think in your remarks or the secretary's remarks you suggested that the immediate operation was probably most likely be in iraq simply because we have the iraqi national security forces. we -- but that will put isil in a position of as we hopefully become more effective of making a decision to reinforce or to iraq or weaken in syria. i think your strategy is probably the most effective use of what we have at the time. would you like to comment on that? >> well, the strategy is to squeeze aisle from multiple directions so that they can't do what they've been doing which is maneuver places where they're not under pressure. so if we can get the government

of iraq to reach out to these populations that have been disadvantaged during the maliki regime so that the isil doesn't have a free flowing stream in which to float. and if we can get the -- we've done an assessment of the 50 brigades, we know which ones are capable of partnering and proving their capabilities, if we can get enough of them to go on the offensive it -- and then find a way over time in syria initially to disrupt using air power and eventually to pressure using a moderate opposition, push isil in an unatenable position. >> thank you. >> senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the witnesses. i understand that according to your testimony that we will be

training and equipping approximately 5,000 in one year, is that correct? >> yes. the estimates there's some 31,000 met after mat tassg in a very -- inadequate response to what -- >> would you please be quiet. i'm asking you now to please leave the room. please remove this lady. please remove this lady. the disruptions are not going to e acceptable to anybody.

>> i always appreciate special attention from this group, mr. chairman. > i think she voted for you. >> senator mccain. >> and obviously this group of 5,000 as you mentioned in unit size deployments will be back in syria fighting against isil. they'll also be fighting against bashar assad which they've been doing for a number of years before isil was ever a significant factor. now they will be fighting against bashar assad and bashar assad will attack them from the air, which he has done with significant -- significant success, not only against them but there's been 192,000 people

have been slaughtered in syria since the onset. syrian army is fighting against bashar assad and he is attacking them from air, would we take action to prevent them from being attack by bashar assad? >> senator, let me begin, the first part of your question, the 5,000. >> dispense with that. i would like to answer the question will we if the free syrian army units are attacked from the air by bashar assad, will we prevent those attacks from taking place and take out their helicopter and fix wing that will be attacking the syrian units. >> we are not there yet. our focus is on isil. that is the threat to our country and to our interests and to the people of the region. so what we are training these

units for, yes, is a stabilizing force in syria as an option, but the first focus is as i just said as the president laid out in his statement to the country -- >> i take it from your answer that we are now recruiting these young men to go and fight in syria against isil, but if they're attacked by bashar assad, we're not going to help them? >> they will defend themselves, senator. >> will we help gem against bashar assad's air? >> we will help them and we will support them and train them. >> will we repel bashar assad's air assets that will be attacking them? >> any attack on those that we have trained who are supporting us, we will help them. >> i guess i'm not going to get an answer, but it seems to me that you have to neutralize bashar assad's air assets if you

are going to protect these people that we are arming and training and sending in to fight, is that inaccurate general dempsey? >> the coalition reforming, senator, won't form unless -- if we were to take assad off the table, we'd have a much more difficult time forming a coalition. but i think what you're hearing us express is an isil first strategy. i don't think we'll find our selfs in that situation given what we intend to do -- -- >> you don't think the free syrian army is going to fight against bashar assad -- do you think these people you're training will only go back to fight against isil? do you really believe that, general? >> what i believe is as we train them, we can establish objectives that defer that challenge into the future. we do not have to deal with it now. >> that's a fundamental misunderstanding of the entire

concept and motivation of the free syrian army. it is bashar assad that has killed many more of thex than isil has. >> i agree. >> and for us to say that we are going to go in and help and train and equip these people and only to fight against isil, you're not going to get many recruits to do that, general. i guarantee you that. and that's a fundamental fallacy in everything you are presenting this committee today. general, secretary hagel, was the president right in 2012 when he overruled most of his national security team and refused to train and equip the moderate opposition in syria at that time? >> senator, i was not there at the time so i'm limited -- >> i'll ask general dempsey then. he was there at the time. >> i'm sorriers senator when you asked the question -- >> was the president right in

2012 when he overruled his secretary of defense, secretary of state and director of the c.i.a. and refused to train and equip the modern opposition forces in syria which, according to your testimony, we're doing today? >> senator, you know that i recommended that we train them and you know for policy reasons the decision was taken in another direction. >> thank you. are you concerned, secretary hagel, about our southern border ? we received testimony from our homeland security people that and people who are free to travel to the united states and also other radical elements might cross our southern border to attack the united states? >> i'm always concerned about -- >> i mean is that a serious concern of yours? >> i think we have to always look at these things -- >> in other words, do you think we have to improve our border

security, especially on the southern border? >> we can improve our border security. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. senator nelson. >> senator mccain, you're aware that there were published ? ports of covert training covert training -- >> i am aware of it. i'm also aware of the scale of the training that was required and i'm also aware of the situation today, and i'm also aware that 192,000 people have been slaughtered. a lot of them with these so-called barrel bombs which are and use of chlorine gas which has caused a humanitarian disaster of incredable proportions, yes, i'm aware of that. >> general dempsey, are you aware of the published reports of covert training?

>> senator, we don't comment in public about any aspect of covert training. >> mr. secretary, as you know, i believe that the president has the constitutional authority to .o on and attack isis this is going to be for the long haul and eventually this issue will have to come to congress for authorization for use of military force, and you all have an appropriations request right now. my question is if congress does not approve, and i've heard some members of congress say that they're not going to vote to approve this $500 million quest, if they did that, and

refused before we adjourn to go home for the election, what kind of message do you think that sends? >> well, i think that message very, very seriously misunderstood and misinterpreted by our allies, our friends, our partners around the world, and our adversaries. this is a clear, clear threat what the president has talked about, the threat to this country from isil. and hat his request is reaching out to the congress for partnership as he has done in consultation with many, many members of the congress to be partners in this effort to

protect this country and if the congress would not agree agree -- agree to that request, it would be a devastating message it would send to the world. >> i happen to -- >> all right. all right. would you please -- will you please not take advantage of the freedom of this place and will you please remove this lady from the room. thank you. his disruption is not helping. >> as you know, mr. secretary, i'm taking this position that i think he has the -- he, the president -- has the constitutional authority to go on attack inside syria. the fact that you're making this request and as you've testified

here today that you'll train up 5,000 over the course of the next year, does that basically mean any kind of coordinated effort on the ground in syria is delayed for a year? >> if we don't have ground capability in a moderate pposition, yes, it affects a rather significant dimension of the overall strategy. >> as you know, some people are , both that attacking isis in iraq and syria, is playing into their hand by them using that to divide muslims against us. what is your opinion? this is why the coalition including out front publicly muslim arab countries is so critical to this, and i noted

that in i think one or two of my answers this morning as well as in my testimony. light asu shed anymore isis as one of you testified recedes into an urban area and takes shelter among a civilian population, how in iraq, for example, can the iraq ease security forces -- iraqis security forces be able to route them out of that civilian territory? >> this again is why we need the people, why we need the people themselves in iraq in sear and yria to support a unified unit collusive representative government in iraq to. the sunni tribes are critical to this. what's allowed so much of this to happen, senator, as you know,

as you've visited there many times is the last government in iraq for the last five years have actually exacerbated the fort and intentionally destroyed the capability of a unit government to bring in the sunni, shiite kurdish populations to a government that they would trust, that they could have confidence in, that they knew would work in everyone's interest. so your question cuts directly to the overall effort here of what the president talked about in a include inclusive unit government which we have some confidence in, but we believe so far -- will do we've seen evidence of that inclusiveness.

>> thank you very much, senator nelson. >> thank you gentleman. thank you for your testimony today. here's how i view it. ordered by iraq w. bush worked. president obama rejected the advice of many of his top military leaders to lead a residual force. our administration did not make every effort that it possibly could to gain a status forces agreement in iraq and so we completely withdrew and now sist is there controlling -- now isis is there controlling large parts of the territory and wreaking havoc that the president is responding to. i am willing to help the president and to help you gentleman take this hill again if i believe there is a plan

that will work and be successful . if training 5,000 troops by the end of one year is going to help us be successful against something that's already met met the sized at 31 -- ter the size at 31,000 if we can have some assurance that we will not throw away our gains his time as we did after the surge worked. general dempsey, in answer to the question by the chairman of this committee, do you support the president's strategy? you say that you do. now "the washington post" reports that mr. obama has rejected the recommendation of s top military commanders, that u.s. special operation

forces be doe ploid to fight the rebels. correct in "the washington post"? and where do you come down on that recommendation? >> no, that report is not correct. and where it came down on the recommendation in terms of having advisors accompany. this is the issue we're describing, whether advisors who are already there and generally resident and headquarters whether they would accompany the iraqi security forces into combat. i have not come to an occasion where i believe that's necessary. they're doing fine. we're able to provide them air power using full motion video and -- >> twhos doing fine? >> the iraqi security forces are moving back on the offensive. as i said, senator, if i get to a point where for a particular mission where they should accompany, i'll make that recommendation.

>> i did hear you say that and i at least appreciation -- appreciate that. let me submit for the record a whereinn today's "post" he talks about general lloyd austin a top commander of u.s. forces in the middle east and to austinim in 2010 general advised president obama against withdrawing all u.s. forces from iraq, recommending the president leave 24,000 troops to secure the military gains made in the surge and to prevent a terrorist resurgence. had obama listened to austin's counsel, the rise of -- where did you come down on that point? >> well, actually we don't debate anything in the military. we let our elected officials

make their decisions. it's well-known all military leaders believed e bleefed we -- believed we needed to leave some troops. there is a debate. that's a debate that will continue, i believe. i thought we should have left forces there. i traveled to iraq and i was the chief staff of the army at the time. i was disgusted with the prime minister. i don't know what -- how history will exactly describe this. let me describe mal key as a very difficult partner most of the time and particularly on that issue. >> on the issue of trying hard enough, i think anybody that's observed the situation would --nowledge that a government a united states government that could go into iraq today and persuade the prime minister to step down could certainly have

mustered the skills to get them to sign a status of forces agreement. so it's obvious to me that we didn't try very hard. let me just reiterate to you. i want us to win. i want us to defeat isis. but i want a plan that could be successful and i'm not sure 5,000 trained in in a year could be successful against 31,000. i want to make sure we don't make the same mistake again by throwing those gains away. one quick question to you, in reiding your testimony about what the coalition partners are going to do, i have no idea specifically what we're asking of them or they've n expect indicated their willingness. they want to help to do their share, begin making commitments, take measures to suppress the

flow. i have no idea based on your testimony what our coalition partners are expected to do or en what we want them to do >> senator, my point was not give you that inventory and go through that. >> are you able to? >> we can do that privately in closed sessions with a number of countries. we are in the process of doing that now. over the last two weeks we've been organizing and bidding the coalition. general allen's main job, as i noted in my testimony, is doing that with now. he's meeting with the president this morning. we have all finalized that effort. we have a list of over 40 nations. we have talked to most have come come to us who have volunteered specific areas of expertise what they would do, will make specific requests but that is

ongoing right now. >> will saudi pilots and saudi jets be involved in air strikes? >> like i said, it's part of the plan and i don't want to get into the specifics of that in an open hearing. but as i said in my testimony, as secretary kerry has said as cently as yesterday, we have middle eastern allies who have said they will be involved in military operations with us and right now let me leave it that way. let me assure you that is going on right now. it's a key part of what we need to do. >> if i could assure the senator of when we convene a chief defense conference after the president approves the cam -- campaign plan, we need to make the campaign plan the iraqi campaign plan, not centcom's campaign plan.

secondly, the contributions from the -- from the arab countries need to be significant. i'm looking for special forces advisors, i'm looking for trainsers, i'm looking for tankers, i'm looking for i.s.r. and strike air craft. >> thank you very much. >> just to clarify a different set of circumstances. when mal key and the government of iraq told us to get out and refuse to do a status of forces agreement, i'm pretty sure iran was with him on that, correct? iran was very close to him and iran wanteded us out of iraq as much as the iraqi government did at that point in time, is that a correct assessment secretary hagel and general dempsey? >> i'm guess i'm stuck with this. here i am, i said i didn't want to get in the debate. now i'm in the debate. who knows what was going through prime minister maliki's head at

the time. i mean i can tell you from personal contact with him, he had a almost obsessive notion of his sovereignty in wanting to establish it. was he influenced by iran? undoubtedly. he was a very reluctant partner. >> i guess the point i'm trying to make it's a much different situation now in terms of getting maliki to step down. iran was very concerned about isil taking over iraq and what that meant and clearly there was pressure being exerted for maliki to step down by iran. i think for us to take credit for getting maliki to step down is unrealistic in light of what the geo political forces were in their neck of the woods at that point in time. i can tell yound that it wasn't the united states it was ed maliki out,

his own people. iran being part of that. so it wasn't the united states dictating that maliki stay or not stay. let's not forget that iraq is a sovereign nation. it has elections. we may not like the outcomes but it is a sovereign country. that is the entire point when the -- had when president bush signed the december 200 -- 2008 agreement to leave iraq. it was a sovereign nation. so the united states didn't force or push through some new system of influence maliki out, it was the people that made that decision. >> i want to atouch on the issue of the shiite militia. we looked at the surge, one of our successes was our ability to bring over moderate sunnis and that was noted at the time and talked about a great deal about our ability to finally get the cooperation of a lot of moderate

sunnis. clearly they're thrown in with isil because of the problems political problems that they were confronted with in terms of exclusion from the iraqi government. so the clerics put out the call to repel isil to the shiite militias and they have been partially responsible for the successes that have occurred on the ground. what are we doing in this is just one of many complex problems that prents itself in this tangle that we're in. and one of the most complex is how are we going to deal with the empowerment of the shiite militia within the iraqi security forces moving forward as we try to ultimately get a political solution which is a unified government and security forces that represent all parts of that country. >> couple things, senator. i'm a little reluctant. in fact, i try never to talk bout the sunniism is a

monolithic black. it looks like isil has tribal objectives. it eats its way tribe by try wherever it goes. the fact it ends up in mosul is more happenstance of where they try to pursue. they show the slide slides have driff tried to driven away over 40 tribes. he sunnis are not monolithic and we have to remember that. the second thing, i think our support here will be conditional. for example, there were 50 iraqi brigades that we assessed, 26 of them we assessed to be reputable partners, that is to say they've remain multi confessional, they seem to have a certain co-etion

and a commitment to the central government. the other 24 concerned us a bill on the issue of infiltration and leadership and secretary -- secretary tearianism. so we can apply our support conditionally and that's the way we influence the outcome i think you're discussing. isfinally, i'm assuming this a oncontinue general -- contingency operation and wanted to point out the new provisions that have been put into law should be applicable for this efforts. i know there's been talk you've asked for cost estimates for advisors in iraq through a contracting platform. are we building training facilities in saudi, the american government, and if so, i just wanted to sound the alarm now before after, i want to sound the alarm before that all

these contracting provisions that we've worked so hard to get into place that we don't go down the road of mistakes that we have traveled so frequently about this contracting contingency. >> i can assure you, senator, any commitments we made in contract we will follow the law clearly and consult with congress. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator mccaskill. >> i wanted to follow up general dempseyers --, on a question about providing our advisors or special forces, embeding them with the iraqi forces and i believe you said you don't believe that is necessary right now. would you agree with me though air strikes are much more effective with having our special forces or having a sort

of capability with strikes on the ground with our people? >> it depends on the kind of ontact that the two forces are having. let me explain. when the two forces are separate, when isil is at some geographic accept operation from the iraqi security forces, it's not very difficult at all to discriminate between the targets. >> sure, when they're not out in -- space when we have to >> if we get into a circumstance where the forces are very intermingled then the target discrimination becomes more difficult. but i will say this isn't a light switch either you do it or you don't. there are technologies available that we didn't have five years ago that allow us to actually apply force and to see the situation on ground in ways we couldn't before. but i'm not walking away from

what i said. if we get to the point where i need we need the j pack with the iraqi security forces but i'm not there. >> you do not think we need that at this time? >> i do not. >> what was general austin's thought on this, given he's the centcom commander and his prior experience in iraq. >> on the mows um dal operation which i described was cre complicated with the two different forces speaking three different languages, he did suggest we should use j pack in an accompanying role, as we discussed it he found a way to do it as i described it to you. >> so he has not made recommendations beyond the mosul operation that we should embed embed our special forces or -- >> not at this time. he shares my view there are

circumstances when we think that will be necessary but we haven't encountered it yet. >> i think we have experienced this prior in iraq with having our forces embedded with our people being effective in targeting the air strikes, would you agree with me? >> absolutely we know how to do that. >> i -- i'm not confident how this is going to happen without the assistance of our trained special operators on the ground here. but i appreciate that you've said you have not ruled this out. >> i have not in terms of recommendations. >> thank you. has the president ruled it out? >> well, at this point his stated policy is that we will not have u.s. ground forces in direct combat, so yes. >> so including operators in j tack -- >> that is correct but he has told me to come back on a case

by case basis. >> let me ask you about the threat that we face, secretary hagel, general dempsey. general allen who i have great respect for, he has been appointed for the special envoy for the global position to described , he has in august isil as a clear and present danger to the united states. do you agree with his characterization? >> senator, i was asked the question earlier whether i agreed still with what i had said and my words were quoted back to me about an imminent threat to america's interest around the world and i said yes i do. isil is a threat to america, our allies, our interests around the world. i'm not going to answer for general allen but i think we all agree, at least within the administration, general allen,

general dempsey, the president, me and others that isil is a threat. i said that in my testimony. the president of the united states said it last week in his speech. >> well, do you believe it's a present threat to us? >> well, a present threat meaning they murdered two americans over the last couple of weeks, i'd say that's a pretty imminent threat. >> yeah, i would agree. know, our prayers continue to go out to the foley d sotloff families who jim foley was from new hampshire and steven sotloff went to school in new hampshire, i believe it's an absolute clear and present threat to us. let me ask you about the .mericans who have joined we had testimony from our top homeland security officials as well as the f.b.i. about the 100

americans that have attempted or gone to syria. what i learned this is not a firm number. how confident are we that we have tracked these individuals, that we know there's only 100 involved? i would ask the same question with with regard to those who are holding western passports where we know many of those -- we have a visa waiver program with great britain. how confident are we in those numbers as we look at this homeland threat the ability to track those individuals to come back to the united states in some bay? >> well -- in some way? >> well, i think these threats always present imperfect situations. when you ask how confident, we're as confident as we can be but you're constantly working at trying to make it better, more

secure. i announced today in my testimony it was announced couple days ago what we're doing with homeland security, what we're doing with justice, what we're doing with border patrol in coordination with all of these other nations on identifying these individuals that we do know or we're pretty sure of are in the middle east, syria where ever. there may be some we don't know, but we're constantly refining and focusing on this. i don't think we will ever be too confident that we've got them all. but we have some confidence that we do have the numbers about right. >> well, i thank you. my time is up. but what i heard in the homeland security committee last week did not give me a great degree of confidence in terms of what we don't know because the f.b.i. is basically said that 100 number could be many more. and also we know less about those where we don't always have

full intelligence sharing with all the western passport holders. >> that is right. it is an issue. >> thank you. >> senator wicker made a request that i failed to acknowledge a comment in "the washington post." it will be inserted in the record. i will also insert in the record secretary gates paragraph which reid as follows in his book. in the end, the iraqi leadership did not try to get an agreement through their parliament. would have made possible a continued u.s. military presence after december 31. maliki was just too fearful of the political consequences. ost iraqis wanted us gone. >> good morning, gentleman. it is very clear that isil presents a very serious threat to u.s. interests and allies in the middle east.

the groups -- group's actions have -- we've got to deny them safe havens and we have to bring strategic capabilities to the united states and a committed national alliance to bear against them. we need to work with our partners on the ground to eliminate the conditions that have aloud this cancer spread so quickly. the rise of isil should serve as a warning throughout the middle east. i would urge the new iraqi government must take immediate steps -- this is going it take our best effort. i know we do need to get it right. general dempsey in that spirit, let me direct a question to you. in order to defeat this enemy, we will need to be tough and smart. and you noted last month defeating isil will require all application of all tools of national power diplomatic, eeknomeck, information and

military. could you describe how these tools would be used as part of a well planned international effort to confront this threat? >> first, let me align myself with your assertion that an inclusive government of iraq that rec siles -- that reconciles the three major groups, sunnis shiites, kurds is absolutely a precondition to defeat isil inside of iraq. and so to your point, there has to be a integration of diplomatic economic in the sense of support for the government of iraq, as well as counter financing efforts so that the money that a senator previously described that isil is garnering every day can be tracked and disrupted. those are kind of strategic

regional issues really because isil knows no boundaries or borders. it's not a matter of convenience that we form a coalition, it's a matter of necessity. and tactically we've got to get enough of the iraqi security from and enough to go defense to offense to butt p tut bluntly. as we do, the government of iraq has to fill in behind that. to be candid, there's some risk here that the three -- the three big risks that i would mention to you are if the government of iraq fails to become inclusive and though the signs are promising they haven't yet fully delivered. second, if a coalition forms but doesn't have endurance because this is going to take several years. and the third risk is receipt rib ution when we encourage and assist the iraqi security forces

, we have to be alert that unless the government of iraq is there to embrace the people and show that they work together, there could be some retribution on the part of those who may have been seen complicit with isil. we've got some challenges ahead, we are open eyed to them and i think we've got a good plan. >> you've got significant compeer -- experience on the ground in iraq. our military will be able to provide advice and assistance, but can you explain the reasons why it's important for the iraqi security forces to take the lead in fighting back against isil on the ground? >> the author tom freedman has a famous saying that no one in the history of mankind has ever washed a rental car. and i find that to be a good way to remember that ownership is

ultimately what measures commitment. and i think it's clear that they have to own this with our help and with the help of regional partners but they have to own it. >> i talked to senator graham last week and we were discussing the fact that i think now time for the arab leaders to really truly step up. this is a threat to them. i think that's what you're saying and what we're saying as the united states. mr. secretary, do you consider isil to be an associative force of al qaeda and could you explain your reason? >> it has been an associated force of al qaeda. it has over time essentially displaced al qaeda al qaeda, but there are still affiliations to this day, but it has been associated with al qaeda.

>> general dempsey, i'd like to turn back to you. we've been been talking about syria. as you plan the mission to train and equip moderate syrian opposition forces, how does the d.o.d. define moderate and how do we take further steps to ensure the weapons and the training wewe provide won't fall into the hands of the extremist groups? >> well, senator, i suggest, though i recommended doing this a couple years ago, we learned allot in the intervening time. we've learned a lot because of the nonlethal assistance we've provided because we've had to make contacts with certain groups in order to flow that none-lethal assistance and we've learned a lot as well from our coalition partners who have been interacting with the free syrian army. we've also have learned some

lessons embeding in places like iraq and afghanistan. we are close with our intelligence agencies. i would suggest to you we've come a long way in our ability to vet. in terms of defining a moderate opposition, i don't think that will be difficult actually. the region has become so larized that those who are radical in their ideologies have made their move and those that have not have demonstrated great courage in not making a move. so i think we'll be able to find the moderate opposition. the 5,400 is capacity. at several training base -- basis in the course of the year. one last thing about developing a syrian opposition. it really need to be developed with a chain of command responsive to some syrian political structure, not responsive to us.

these can't be surrogates and proxies. they have to be tied, linked to some political structure that ultimately could assist in the governing of syria when finally the assad regime is either overthrown or through the negotiation is changed. so the important difference in what we're trying to do here is build a force that can over time actually contribute to stability in syria, not just fight. >> thank you, gentlemen. >> thank you, senator yude all - udall. >> did either-or both of you give the president any advice regarding a possible new aumf, nd if so, what was it? >> senator, obviously the

question of authority was asked early on as we developed the strategy and our advice to the president. does he have the constitutional authority which he believes he does in his legal counsel told him he did, he -- does he have the statutory authority and he believes he does. and he has said that as to his legal counsel is saying the same thing. we believe the same, that he has both statutory and constitutional authority. so that was a recommendation that i made. he also noted as you recall from last week's statement to the american public that he welcomed any additional authority that the president would give him because he feeling strongly that it's important a strong partnership between congress and

the president always be established and always be seen in the eyes of the world. >> let me restate my question. you're saying he has legal authority without a new aumf? a new aumf could nevertheless be helpful. do either-or both of you give him advice about whether to seek one? >> i'll speak for myself. the chairman can answer it. i did not advise him to seek any additional authority. i asked our general counsel and our attorneys what they thought, but i did not specifically say. >> general. >> no, i haven't had a onversation about what a new aumf method would look like. >> ok. e current estimate of isis

fighters is about 35,000 is that correct? >> i think the last number i saw not anually 31, but it's exact science. as i said, there are tribes that counted -- the latest number is 31,000. >> i assess it's a growth because of their success. the reporting probably lags facts on the ground. when wh that report was assembled they were at the height of success. >> what's your best guesstimate about what it might be a year from now? >> i haven't formed one. i would be happy to take that one for the record. >> ok. and given that number and presumably increasing numbers, i take it everyone agrees some fighting force on the ground on

the other side is necessary. what do you think that number has to be over time? >> give -- do you mean -- >> no, i mean our side of the fight, isis. >> oh, i think in iraq i think the combined forces of that part of the iraqi security forces we assess to remain viable and they are adequate to the task of defeating isil in iraq. i have concerns about the serious side of this for obvious reasons -- i have concerned about the syria side of this for obvious reasons. >> what do you think the soarian number of our side of the fight need to move to? >> the problem on the syrian side is less about how big the modern opposition should become and more about how the lack of a inclusive government in damascus effects the equation. in other words, the environment inside of syria remains ripe for

groups like isis because of the nwillingness of the syrian redge i'm to reach out to -- regime to reach out to the syrian pop ligs. >> -- population. >> do you have a guess in mind about what would be a minimal optimal ground force? >> sometime when this came up in looking at the kind of task that we might assign to a force of that size, for example restoring the syrian, iraq border, the number of military planners were considering was about 12,000. >> ok. besides training up syrians on our side, what are the plans to add to that number to come up with a significant fighting

orce on our side in syria? >> besides the training and equip mission we were just describing? >> i taking the training equip mission we're all in favor of can't aapproach that number any time soon that we know of. >> that's why i've said consistently this takes a persistent and enduring commitment. but not any time soon, that's correct. but i'll tell you, if you're asking me how does the opposition in syria finally prevail on -- against isil? i think it's going to require the assistance of jordanians and probably some of the syrian kurds and probably the turks. >> in going back to the overall isis number of 31 to 35,000, what percentage of that would you guesstimate is in syria? >> about 2/3. >> it's a great majority in syria.

ok, thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you senator vitter. senator hagan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary hagel and general dempsey, thank you for your service. i am pleased that the strategy that the administration has developed for defeating isis does include the training and equiping the moderate opposition. this is something i've pushed for over the year. air power alone, while important, does not win a conflict like this. reports of nearly 40 nations agreeing to support the fight against isis are a promising signal. and while isis presents a severe threat to our national security, it also threatens many countries around the world, especially those in the middle east. the u.s. cannot bear this fight alone. and a strong coalition, including the arab states is

obviously critical to destroying isis. secretary hagel, what is the administration's plan for going after the funding streams that are supporting isis? for example, it's been reported recently that anywhere between $1 to $2 million a day is coming to isis from oil field fields and refine rees that they have control. moving this oil doesn't have a vacuum. can you share if and how the u.s. is going off this funding stream and any other funds that are available to isis? >> senator, as you recall in my testimony this morning, i mentioned specifically what the treasury department is doing to coordinate this effort to go after the funding sources of isil. you mentioned oil, black marketing oil through borders. that's one of the obvious areas of funding.

isil has'm sure, know, gotten control of small oil fields and that's where it starts. but they are multi -faceted. there is no one answer. a multi national effort that our treasury department is leading along with the state department. be assured it is a premium focus isil. off resources for important because it would degrade their capability.

i also think it is critical that the people of syria have an alternative other than isis or other radical terrorist groups or the asad regime. i had been pushing the administration to empower the opposition. while a strong moderate military forces essential i believe success can set the condition for the political solution in syria. you were just speaking about this in particular, who would be the leader of this moderate syrian opposition force. who is goingon is, ouread the force that partnering nation's train and the currentat is assessment of the capabilities and what are the plans to develop the leaders that would form the backbone of a longer-term government? senator.,

we leave one of the advantages of undertaking an overt title x training and equipment mission is it will force that issue. it will force the syrian opposition committee, the congress to find some way to establish a responsible political architecture into which this can plug. in a way the other effort has forced. the other effort go with intelligence channels and does not have the forcing function that an overt program would have. the first step is to conduct and overt program. as part of the program i can assure you that we will not only butraining riflemen training leaders so there is a military chain of command to home the syrian fighters are responsive. to thell be responsive

syrians. the effort is to allow them to take ownership and away they have not had the opportunity to do so. way that they have not had the opportunity to do so. >> thank you. news reports suggest that there could be many westerners, even americans, that might be fighting with isis. needless to say, that is a serious concern since it has the potential to create more of a direct threat to the u.s. and our western european allies. can you -- do you see the z%a westerners fighting with isis and the threat to the u.s.? if so is there a part of our strategy that seeks to disrupt their ability to recruit new members from the west, general dempsey? >> of course, i see it as a threat.

the radicalization -- the thing that sets isil apart is its radical ideology. there is another question about whether they are an affiliate of al qaeda. they were al qaeda in iraq. they became so radical that al qaeda rejected them. i consider them to be part of the al qaeda ideology but with a much more apocalyptic, if you will, world view. it's not all 31,000, clearly. but enough of them that were they to be able to achieve it and unless some of the governments in the region can find a way to address the social issues inside of their countries, then the seductive nature of that vision becomes actually the most dangerous part of it which is why their momentum has to be reversed.

>> thank you. >> thank you very much. senator fisher. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you gentlemen for the challenges that you are facing and the options you are presenting to congress on this. general dempsey, congress is being asked to fund training for about 5,000 moderate syrian rebels. if congress would provide that funding immediately, how long do you think it would take before a program is going to be up and running? i realize there is a lot of variables involved in this. you need to find the folks that we are going to be training. you need to thoroughly vet them to make sure that they are the fighters that we need and that we desire. also, how do the moderates leave the field of battle? how are they going to defend that territory in syria while

they are being trained? how are they going to defend that against assad? if you can address that, please. >> to the first part of your question, senator, we think three to five months to establish the program. some of that is consumed by contracting for equipment. it is not as much maneuvering people into the right place but during that period of time we would have to with the help of in particular some of our regional partners recruit and vet. three to five months and then deliver capability between eight and 12 months. that is kind of the timeframe that we are working towards. to your question about will they come to be trained in many cases they have already been driven out of their homes and villages by isil or by the regime in some cases. so we think we will be recruiting mostly from displaced populations and therefore it won't be as though they won't be giving up the security of their

families to come and train with us. >> sir, i believe this is the first request from the administration but it will not be the last. we are looking at 5,000 fighters now. we are looking at a growing force by isil that is, as you have estimated, is 31,000. over the period of months where we are training and finding people, vetting, training them that will only grow in my opinion. as we look at this request i believe it should be separate from the cr. i think it is very important that congress have a full debate on it. i know you probably have nothing to say on how we do our business here but i believe we need to be honest with the american people on what lies ahead and with the request as it is we are not being honest with the american people.

if we truly are going to defeat isil, to degrade them and to defeat them it's not just this one request. do you anticipate that the president will be sending more requests to congress? and if so when may we expect to see those? secretary hagel, i know you are anxious to answer. >> i always like to respond to a fellow nebraskaen. the reason i am going to answer first is because really puts the general in a more difficult position than he should be in. he may want to add something. let me answer this way. first, because i do know a little something about your institution, if it was a perfect world and we didn't have the

time constraints that we all are under and you weren't all scheduled to go out here in a couple of days and the world was more perfect i agree this deserves, should have a thorough airing with the american people. >> if i can just interrupt you, just because we are scheduled to go out on thursday we don't have to go out on thursday, do we, sir? >> that is not a decision for me to make. that falls clearly on your side. that said if we would not get the authority now we would lose a considerable amount of time. and i know it is imperfect. it was never meant to jam anyone or to put anybody in a tough spot but it is my opinion and the president has been pretty clear on this that the time is

of the essence here. when the congress comes back and obviously when you come back i assume there will have been an election and start forming a new congress, there will be a debate. there should be a debate about this. as to your questions, what further requests might be coming, right now the president has been as straightforward and honest with you as i have been. there is no hidden agenda. i can't guarantee you at all. i think general dempsey's point in some of his answers here this morning, he certainly will recommend if he thinks we need some more capabilities somewhere. that's what you want. that is the way i would answer your question. >> i would say that when i

travelled the state for three weeks in august all across the state for the first time i heard nebraskaens talk about foreign policy and ask questions about foreign policy. we didn't hear that in any campaign, any debates, any forums. people in nebraska are focused on this. they know it is a concern. they are frightened but they want this addressed in a way that we know the enemy is going to be defeated. and they expect us to do our job if that means staying here longer than we need to do that. thank you. >> mr. senator. >> i want to thank you for your continued service to the great country. i agree with my colleague senator fisher we should stay here and it should be separated, a big enough issue for it to be a policy discussion and not tied into a funding discussion. with that being said it is what it is. i have a hard time with all of

this. my problem and i think i have spoke to both of you. when i go home to west virginia people say what do you expect to be different than what you have done in that region of the world for 13 years? if money or military might hasn't changed it what makes you think you can change it now? when you look at we spent $20 billion trying to build up an army in iraq and the first time they were tested they ran, turned over the arsenal they equipped them with and is being used against us. anyone see the video of isis taking that back into syria is appalling for us to look at that. when you look at what we have done in that part of the world total of iraq 818 billion spent, 747 in afghanistan and growing. 1.6 trillion to date and growing.

4,400 lives lost in iraq. 36,000 wounded, 2,200 lives in afghanistan and 21,000 wounded. only thing i'm saying is i understand syria is a conflict against the assad regime. everybody in there whoever they may be is fighting assad, the way i understand it. if they are all fighting assad even though they may not be united we are supposed to carve out 5,000 at $100,000 per person if my math is correct. $500 million for 5,000, correct? so that is $100,000 per person that we are supposed to do. the only thing i know we are short of is that training and weapons will probably be use against us at some time in the future if everything that has happened in the past.

i have a hard time understanding why we are going to convince these 5,000 to fight isis who is fighting the same religious war they are fighting against the assad regime. i am in total support of air support and using our tactical and technology as we have. but i think it should be the arab muslim ground game, if you would. that should be theirs. if we can booster them up a little bit you said we had to go back in then either we did a poor job at training in the beginning or malaki was able to undo everything we have done in the two years we have been gone. if it is that quickly undone what we have spent how can you all explain to me, how can i go home to west virginia and make sense out of this at all? anybody want to take a shot at this? it doesn't make sense to me. >> well, if you put it that way.

first, i understand, i think, a lot of the complications. we are dealing with the same issues. so i don't minimize at all what you are saying as you try to explain this to the people you represent. let me make a couple of points. first, it's not the united states alone that is going to change all of this. this is the whole point of what the president talked about in his statement to the american public last week. we are going to help empower the people of iraq. we are going to do everything we can to support their efforts with a new government, inclusive government. you mentioned the squandering of the last five years with the malaki government which has brought a great deal of this on. >> you said they are a sovereign

nation. we don't like the outcome but they have a process. that can change continuously. >> we are hopeful that this new government will put them back on a road of responsible responsive representative government. we are not going to have ground forces on the ground to do it for them. as you said it should be the people of that region, of the country. as the chairman noted the iraqi security forces have been able to get back on the offensive with our assistance. >> those forces are able -- i'm so sorry. those forces have been able to maybe hold the ground a little bit in their own territories but are not moving into syria. >> we need a ground game in syria. >> isis hasn't been able -- they have tried to take out assad, correct? is it fair to say isis has tried

to take out assad? >> isis has tried to take everybody around them. they are a threat to us. that is the main point that is important for you but for all of us. isil is a threat to the united states. >> assad is not a threat to the united states? >> well, it's not the same kind of threat. i mean, what he has allowed to happen in his own country is why we have -- >> it is barbaric. i am concerned about the united states of america. i am concerned about west virginia and all 49 other states and everybody that lives in those states. i am concerned about how we are keeping them from here to do harm to america. i am for all of that. but i'm just saying our past performance for 13 years in that region hasn't given us the results. we took out saddam hussein.

we took out gadhafi. these dictators are unbelievable. if it is not one it will be another. we are taking out and turning efforts to isis or assad. i'm not supporting assad. i think he should be gone. but as long as he is able to remain there he is fighting the same people we are asking to train to spend $500 million. it makes no sense to me. you can't sell this stuff. no one believes the outcome will be different. i think we probably need to bleed over a little bit. you know, if you look back at some of the -- i have been in the job for three years. i have been pretty clear that we have a generational problem which is to say a 20-year problem. so if it was three years ago maybe it is a 17-year problem in

the middle east as these strong men have been overthrown. and what appeared to be for a moment in time a bit of a fledgling democratic movement has been hijacked by some extraordinarially dangerous people globally. one of the things you can count on the united states military to recommend is that to belabor the metaphor of ground game and other sports analogies i will always tell you what i think we need to play an away game. i don't want to play a home game. i will promise you this, left unaddressed the issues in the middle east will effect probably our european allies far more than us initially. i believe they are awakening to that reality, by the way. there will be a period of unrest in the middle east that initially will probably just be an economic challenge but could

ultimately actually threaten us directly here in the homeland. and so we have to -- this is -- we don't have a choice. if i could wall up continental united states and somehow assure you that the people of west virginia would remain safe i would do it, but we can't. so we have three tools in the military arsenal. one is we can do things ourselves. we call that direct action. second, we can build partners and we can enable others like we are doing with the french. what we have tried to do over the past few years is do less ourselves, more with partners and enable others. that's the right path. we should do less ourselves, enable partners and build partners. if we fail to address all three we are back to doing it all ourselves. so what we are suggesting is a strategy where we can get others not only to do some of the

lifting but maybe pay for it, as well. i think that is the message to the people of west virginia. we have to be engaged because people, we are antithetical. most of isil's ideology is antithetical to our values. you can't just let them fester. do we do it ourselves or try to do it with others? i think it is the right path. >> thank you very much. senator graham. >> that is a good way to begin. i couldn't agree with you more. the goal is to destroy isil and all they represent, is that correct? >> it is. >> very briefly, describe what destroying isil would look like, general dempsey. >> i will probably be a little more articulate about that in iraq because we have a partner and a credible ground force to enable. defeating or destroying isil in iraq will require the combined

forces of isf and pesh to go offensive to regain lost territory while concurrently and this is the important part, the government of iraq fills in behind with inclusive inclusive policies -- you're well familiar with the complaints of the kurds and -- >> can we maybe speed up -- >> then we restore the border, then they're defeated. >> i'm with you. you take all the territory they hold. take mosul and fallujah away from them. put an iraqi military on the ground, loyal to the iraqi, not just shias. you have an exclusive government in baghdad where sunni tribes where they're better off playing politics in baghdad than siding with isil. that's destroying their ability to regenerate in iraq. syria we'll talk about in a minute. i want to continue the theme why this all matters. is there any doubt in your mind, any of you, if isil had the

capability to kill millions of americans, they would do so? >> there's no doubt in my mind. they'll kill anybody that doesn't go to their ideological bend. >> i agree. >> if you're a christian in the region, they will i can you very quickly, is that correct? >> unless you convert. >> okay. i'm trying to persuade my colleagues, are these limited to the middle east? are there radical islamists we should worry about in africa? >> absolutely. >> does the thoers to use military force allow this administration to go in to attack aquip in yemen without a new authorization? >> it does. anything affiliated with aq. >> i'm going to write you a letter and show you the organization we ko not attack without a new aq.

i'm a very robust article 2 guy but i think this is a robust reading of the current au. i'm not going to stand in your way. areas of agreement. training the free syrian army, you recommend we do that with all of the complications that go with it. >> and with the coalition, i do. >> okay. >> so, now let's get to syria. to destroy isil, if two-thirds of isil's in syria, do you agree somebody's got to go in on the ground and dig them out eventually? >> somebody, yes, sir. >> and it's better for us to be part of that somebody than just >> absolutely. >> can you think of an arab army you could form in the next year that you would have confidence that could go in and destroy isil in syria, hold the territory without substantial american support? >> there are partners inr the region who are very capable of

special operating forces. and i think the campaign would envision that they would participate. that would certainly be our ask of them to participate in a ground campaign. >> my question is, request you envision a coalition of arab states that have the capabilities to go into syria, defeat isil, hold the territory without substantial u.s. military support? >> as long as, senator, you'll elaborate on what you mean by substantial u.s. military support. >> getting them to the battlefield. how do they get there? what does it take to maintain a large army in the field? do they have the intelligence capability if we don't help them? do we have sufficient air power to win the day without our support? do they have the special forces capability to kill the leaders of isil without us being on the ground? >> well, i was with you until, without us being on the ground. as i mentioned in previous testimony -- >> it's easy. if you think they can do it

without us being on the ground, just say yes. >> yes. >> okay. >> what if they lose. >> any campaign is made on supgss. i just made one. if it's proved invalid -- >> what's the consequences of an arab army going into syria virtually on their own and getting beat by isil to us? >> i wouldn't suggest virtual on your own. i think there will be enabling support -- >> yes? >> yes. >> we're having a semantic problem here. the bottom line is, what does it mean to the world if we take on isil and they defeat the people we send in to take them on? that's a bad day for us. do you agree? >> it's a bad day for the region, yes. >> bad day for the world, isn't it? >> yes. >> do you agree with me this is probably our last best chance to get these guys in a box and keep them there? >> i think it's our last best

chance to convince regional governments that if they don't solve their internal problems, we can't do it for them and they better get serious about it. >> what if the following happens -- the regional players say that i don't trust united states because you've been so unreliable. you have drawn red lines and done nothing. you withdrew from iraq and left the place in shambles. that i really don't want to follow your leadership because i don't think you're capable of winning the war because you don't have the resolve. what if they tell us, we're not going to do anything other than maybe drop a few bombs? would you consider the recommendation to the president that maintaining safe haven in syria and growing capability over time is a major threat to the united states? could you envision yourself recommending to the president, if nobody else will help us, that we go in on the ground and clean these guys out in syria? >> yeah, i haven't confronted

that question yet, senator, but i'll react to it. i don't think that even if we were to go in on the ground, armors vision -- >> the full weight of the military? >> i don't think we would do anything more than push this problem further to the right. this has got to be -- to your point. if we don't get the kind of coalition i'm describe, then we're into a very narrow ct framework in my view. >> if i may just follow this point. so our national defense in terms of stopping isil from killing thousands or millions of americans if they get the capability, really comes down to whether or not we can convince the arab world to go in there and defeat these guys? >> it really comes down to little a coalition so that what the arab muslim world sees is them rejects isis --

>> they already reject isil. >> do they embrace -- they fund them because the free syrian army couldn't fight assad. they were trying to beat assad. i think they realized the folly of their ways. let's don't taint the mid east unfairly. is it fair to say syrians have two things in common, they don't like isil and they don't like assad? >> i agree. >> is it fair to say most muslims reject what isil does in the name of their religion? >> yes. >> is it fair to say that if you don't contain this threat and eventually destroy it, that it gets worse over time, and a year from now, if they're still flourishing in syria and this coalition hadn't come about, america's endanger -- more in daj of an attack than we are today? >> yes. >> thank you. >> senator shaheen.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, secretary hagel and general dempsey, both for being here this morning and for your service. i would like to direct my question first in a different direction. i think the barberism and threat that isil poses really became real for people in this country, certainly for people in new hampshire, with the brutal murders of james foley and steven sotloff. as senator ayotte has said, sotloff is from new hampshire and james foley went to school there. we saw that very personally in terms of what happened. i know it has been reported there was an effort to rescue the hostages who were being held by isil that was not successful. i certainly commend the courageous service members who were part of that effort.

there have been reports in recent news stories from the foley family that really raise, i think, very troubling and serious questions about the support that our government provided to the families and to the efforts to free jim foley and steven sotloff and the other hostages who are currently held who are american citizens. is there more our government can and should be doing to support the families and to looking at how we can help free hostages when they're being held in this situation? >> first, like all americans, our thoughts and prayers go out to the families. as to your question, senator, department of defense does not have the direct contact/responsibility on this.

however, that said, thank you for your comments about the rescue mission. it's an open hearing. we don't want to say too much about it, but it's been in the press. to your point about, can we do better and can we do more and is there an effort to address some of the more human dimensions of this, i'm not going to prejudge our departments and agencies and how they handle it, but i think we all must be mindful of the humanity here involved, if it was our children or any of us personally in this situation. and i know our law enforcement people, people that have the responsibility of dealing with this, it's a tough responsibility. they follow the law.

but i think we could and should maybe revisit some of these practices now. our national security policy directive, as you know, is very clear on ransom. that's been in place for many, many years through different administrations. i'm not suggesting we change that. >> i appreciate that. >> but i think there are some areas that we could do a little better with as far as dealing with families and the human part of this. again, that's not meant assist criticism for any of our i don't know all the facts on how it was handled. >> i certainly -- >> could i, just because you mentioned the mission itself. i've been at this a long time. that was the most complexed, highest risk mission we've ever undertaken. and that should give the family

some solace and you some confident that you as military, we are focused on this. we when we had the opportunity to do so, we tried to get them. >> and i appreciate that. i do hope though, given what we've heard from the foleys and from the other families, that there will be a reassessment of how our government supports families facing this kind of a crisis. i want to go next to the estimate of isil's troop strength, because it's been, as you reported, 31,000 is the most recent estimate. how could it have grown to that size without our intelligence recognizing the threat. and what is part of our plan to address the recruitment? there have been a lot of reports

about how effective the messaging is, that isil has been using to recruit young people, particularly westerners. how is that part of our plan and why is our intelligence not picking up the extent to which this effort has been growing? >> i can't speak for the intelligence committee or intelligence agencies. i'll tell you they're focused on it. the way they grow, though, i mentioned that isil strategy is actually to consume tribes. and so they may be in a conflict with a tribe one day and then overcome it the next, which might increase their numbers by 3,000, 4,000. once the tribal leader pledges allegiance, the entire thing shifts over. so, that's part of it, i think. they've also sprung a few thousand prisoners from different prisons inside of iraq that were very hardened

terrorists. so, they are -- they are growing. again, the numbers that are reported are -- were estimated based on the free reign that at the time isil was having in iraq. i think we're going to see a shift on that. that's part of our strategy. the public diplomacy part of this, which is not a military line of effort, but it has to be -- it has to be part of our strategy. we have to point out to arab and muslim youth, and western youth, for that matter, the risk posed by that ideology. >> >> i want to close by saying, i intend to support the request for funding to train and equip vetted opposition groups in syria. but i do believe that it would be a mistake for us not in congress to have a debate about

a long-term, broader strategy to go after isil. i think it's very important for us to have a bipartisan, bicameraal support that the american people can be part of. i know the chairman of the foreign relations committee is working on a specific authorization for use of military force, which i intend to work with him on. and i certainly hope there will be an effort to the part of the administration to work with congress on that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator lee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks to both of you for being here today and for all you do for our country and for all you do to keep us safe. this is an exceptionally important issue as it relates to our national security. i think the president last week quite accurately portrayed the threats that we're facing from

isis, that it's a threat to the middle east with aspirations to attack global targets in the united states. the president should, in my opinion, do everything he possibly can to protect americans and to protect u.s. facilities in iraq and syria from isis and from other terrorist activity. óx3 however, like many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, that the president authorization for his expanded campaign to degrade and destroy isis. i also do not believe that we should authorize parts of this conflict through a continuing resolution. this is a serious and important

discussion about our national security. and it should be debated and discussed, ultimately voted on within congress based on its own merits and it shouldn't be lumped in with a much broader discussion with a lot of other things. i think we owe it to those who valiantly put their own lives on the line to make sure this is debated and discussed and parameters are properly set in its own context. senator hagel, i have a question as it relates to some of this discussion, as it relates to some things president obama has said in recent weeks about isis. in an interview he gave to -- i believe it was thomas friedman at "the new york times," just barely a month ago, he stated that the notion of arming syrian

rebels has, and the next few sentences are all in a quote, has, quote, always been a fantasy. this idea that we could provide some light arms or even sophisticated arms to what was essentially an opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists, and so forth, and that they were going to be able to battle not only a well-armed state but also a well-armed state backed by russia, backed by iran, a harden-battled hezbollah. that was never in the cards, close quote. now, the president, hardly a month later, is seeking authorization to do basically th that, so, mr. secretary, what has changed and why does the president who apparently didn't think that would work and described that as some sort of fantasy, what has changed to

make him think it will work now? >> well, first, thank you, senator. at the risk of interpreting what the president meant when he said that, i recognize that is always risky, as i said. let me address your question this way. what's changed now is the urgency of what has occurred in the middle east, specifically in iraq and syria. two americans, now a third, brutal murder of a british citizen, the different dimensions we've seen the last five weeks, especially unfold, what isil has been able to achieve in a relatively short amount of time. the changing of a government, the leaving of one iraqi government with a new government

coming in. over about a six-we're periek p governor, there were a number of occurrences that came together, that i do think presented a whole new picture much have of realities, of urgency, of danger of threat. let me stop there and see if that helps you a little bit. i saw the interview and i read the interview. but, again, at the risk of trying to interpret what he meant, i offer that. >> and i appreciate that. and i do understand that things -- some developments have occurred since then that have brought this appropriately to our attention, to the attention of the world. i would be curious to know, though, strategically, how that changes. how that changes.

something they previously described as a fantasy into something that could be realistic, but i understand that's difficult for you to answer in this context. i'd love to be able to talk about that on another occasion if we can. can you describe what the end objective in syria is for the united states? in other words, do we still contend assad must go? that he cannot stay in power? also that the -- what the objective is as it relates to moderate groups, that the president would like to see this. what does the post-assad syria look like that we're after, or is that our objective at all? the issue on our position with assad remains very clear.

the president stated, i said it in my testimony here this morning, the president has said, still strongly believes, assad has lost legitimacy to govern his own people. we've got a country in complete chaos because of assad. that's the individual responsible for creating what is occurring and has been occurring. your question about the end state in syria, i think what we, the administration, i think the american people would want to see, and i hope the -- and believe the syrian people is a free syria where men and women and their families have rights to choose and have rights to determine their own leaders and their own futures. and i think that is really the essence of the ultimate

objective we would like to see in syria. >> okay. i see my time has expired. thank you, mr. secretary. >> senator, thank you. >> thank you, senator lee. senator blumenthal. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to both secretary hague. and senator dempsey for, again, being with us and for your explanation and very forthright testimony here today and in the past both privately and publicly to members of this senate. i want to say to you first, secretary hagel, how much i appreciate the decision you made recently to change the department of defense policy on reviewing other than honorable discharges for veterans suffering at the time of their discharge from post-traumatic stress and most especially my

thanks to you on behalf of the 80,000 vietnam era veterans who will benefit by that policy change to give them liberal consideration as they apply to the discharge review boards. these veterans who suffered at the time of their discharge from post-traumatic stress often received less than honorable discharges because of the injuries that they suffered in combat, at war. and they've lived with the stigma and the black mark on their records for decades. many of them became homeless and jobless as a result. and i want to thank you for committing to me when we first met that we would do the right thing and then, in fact, doing the right thing. so, i really appreciate your policy change in that regard. i want to, perhaps, unfairly quote to you something you said

on the floor of the senate in 2002, in october, at the time that the senate voted in favor

treasurer. witness the beheading, shockingly, repulses ively of these two brave individuals. and yet the war weariness that many americans feel at this point, general dempsey mentioned earlier the quote from thomas friedman, that nobody ever washed a used car, but a lot of people have rented unwashed cars.

and it seems to me we are, in effect, renting an unwashed car insofar as we want to make sure that it's serviceable and it works. but do not want to go into a situation where there's no clearly defined exit strategy. can you tell us what the threat is to the united states that we will eliminate by degrading and defeating isil? >> well, that's always the problem of giving a speech on the floor of the senate. it is on the record. let me just comment on that because it's going to reflect on my answer to your question. i put a lot of time and effort

into that speech, senator, and writing it. part of it that you read back, i do not disassociate myself from at all. for those words you read back, i'm even more mindful as secretary of defense of my responsibilities. doesn't mean i'm right, but i'm even more mindful than i might otherwise be of what i saw occur starting in 2001-2002, and i was part of. that's first. second, to the real question, what is the threat and how will it change? i think we're in a different situation today and what the president has laid out to the american people as to what his objectives are versus where we were in 2002. main reason is that isil is a

very clear threat to the united states of america, to our people. you mentioned the two brutal murders of two americans. that's not just a threat. that's an action that was taken. there are a number of other examples to our allies. i thought general dempsey's commentary to answer a question -- a difficult question of senator manchin posed was full of a lot of thoughtful and wise thinking on where this is all going to go f we don't do what we should do and need to do now. i think that's different from where we were in 2002. because i do think isil is a threat and a very clear threat to the united states, to our interest, to our people, to our allies, and we could spend a lot

more time this morning going through that case and making that case, i think what the president's laid out, what i strongly support is the right thing to do because it is in the interest, clearly, of our country. one last point on this. what general dempsey said about if we don't do something now, and i think the way the president has framed that something, how we're going to do it -- we can't do it alone. i think it's been clear and a lot of the testimony this morning, and the questions that this country, the united states of america, as much as we have engaged, as much as we have bled, the lives we have left behind, we still haven't fixed the problem. we can't fix the problem.

access to potentially billions of dollars in oil revenue. over time what is the specific danger to america if they are able to use that nation's state to project jihad here?

>> senator, as you have expressed it and asked the question, over time, if isil is not stopped, and you mentioned the economic power that it has now, then what i would foresee happening, not only immediate threat to united states citizens and our people, our interests, but i think you could very well find jordan go down as the country as we know it today. i think saudi arabia could well be beyond just threatened, their oil fields. i think the expansion of where this could go in the middle east dominate i dominating oil production. lebanon is also in a very tentative state.

libya is in chaos. everywhere you look in the middle east, there is trouble. and if a force like isil, in my opinion, is allowed to continue with its ideology, with its resources, with its capability, then as general dempsey said, there's no doubt, it will impact this country and the world economy. now, this is down the road, if this is not stopped. but i think that's what we're looking at here, senator. it's an immediate threat to our interest as well. >> general dempsey, worse case scenario if isis were allowed to consolidate power, in your judgment, what would be the worst case specific risk to homeland and to the lives of american citizens? >> the combination of radical

ideology, plus the youth bulge. inequitab inequitable division of resources. it would almost surely trigger a confrontation with iran into which the rest of the world would be drawn for obvious reasons. but also provides them with this combination of resources plus radical ideology we actually haven't seen. most of the radical ideologies are resource starved, resource limited. resource rich radical ideology must become a threat. it's inconceivable it wouldn't be. >> do you believe if they were able to consolidate that power there would be a risk of their attempting and even succeeding with a terrorist attack of the magnitude of that that occurred on september 11, 2001 or

potentially even a greater terrorist attack? >> i would phrase it this way. given what they've demonstrated in brutality and utter disregard for human life, other than than that which adheres to their ideology, whatever weapon system they would have in their possession, there's no doubt they would use it to include weapons of mass destruction. >> well, let me ask about -- it's been reported that up to 100 ner1 100 americans are fighting along side with isis. how would you assess americans with u.s. passports coming back to the united states to carry out acts of terror here? we've been in close contact with intelligence communities and law enforcement. and the risk will increase, unless their momentum is

reversed and unless their dominance of the media space -- they are actually quite capable in social media and other forms of messaging. so, unless their momentum is blunted, which will begin to strip away this myth they surrounded themselves well, and unless we counter them in the media space, then the risk of radicalization flew the internet will continue to rise. >> you would characterize the risks of americans coming back from isis with u.s. passports as significant, is that fair? >> i do. that view is shared by our european allies as well. >> if the objective were to destroy isis, not to degrade é]n 90 days, what would be required militarily to carry that out? >> it's not possible, senator.

militarily we could -- we could confronted them, we could destroy a lot of equipment, we could drive them underground, if you will. but as i said, they will onlyçe defeated or destroyed once they're rejected by the populations in which they hide. there is no -- truly there is no military solution to isil. >> what would be required to kill those who are taking up arms right now? >> well, actually, i think that's the path we're on. which is to say using our unique capabilities, our counterterror capability, our isr capabilities, our air capabilities, while working on the rest of the equation, which is this coalition of willing allied partners -- or willing arab partners, there is no -- i moon, that may be a tough pill to swallow, but there is no military solution. it has to be part of a broader

whole of government/regional campaign. >> one final question, secretary hagel. >> the with the, as i understand it, has laid out what could be an extended military operation that could extend many months or even years. in my view, carrying out such an operation, not responding to immediate exagaincy, requires congressional authorization and i think congress would be prepared to grant that authorization if a case were made with specific objectives. what is your position as to the legal authority of the administration to carry out an extended military campaign for years, potentially, absent congressional authorization? >> well, i believe the president has the statutory and constitutional authority to take the action that he is doing to protect this kn coun