thank you. [applause] >> c-span's campaign 2014 continues between john lewis and ryan's inky -- ryan >> i could tell you all about my montana roots appeared i think it's more important to tell you where i stand. i will work to balance the budget the right way. pay and perks and keep benefits for our veterans and seniors. my opponent wants to cut education and medicare. i'm john lewis.

i proved this message to make congress work for montana. ryan is signed as platoon commander. john lewis enters fifth grade. assigned as senior ground commander. john lewis enters high school. >> i'm ryan zinke and i approved this message. i'm john lewis and this is my family. with us, what you see is what you get. i don't have my own super pac trying to buy me a seat in congress, but i do have a plan to cut wasteful spending and get rid of -- so we can keep our promises to our veterans and our seniors. i'm john lewis.

i approved this message to make congress work for montana. 2004, ryan awarded to brown stores for combat -- bronze combat. fo for work john lewis begins helping right disastrous of obama care legislation. ryan zinke and i approved this message. >> you can watch the debate live tonight at 8:00 eastern here on c-span. c-span's 2015 student cam competition is underway. this nationwide competition for middle and high school skins will award 150 prizes totaling one of the thousand dollars.

create a 5-7 minute documentary on the three branches and new. videos need to include c-span programming, show varying points of view and must be some added by january 20. go to student cam.org for more information. grab a camera and get started today. coordinatorspecial of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. she recently talked about her group's role in eliminating syria's chemical weapons from georgetown university, this is 50 minutes. >> i am here in my foreign service capacity, and the assad

regime launched a large-scale chemical weapons attack on a rebel held suburb of damascus, killing more than 1000 individuals, including hundreds of children. chemical weapons had been used previously by the regime, or, at least, there were allegations of the effect -- to the effects, this marked an escalation of the regime's brutality, and it set in motion a series of events, including the prospect of a potential american strike on syrian facilities, that culminated in the 2013 agreement brokered by the russians, where syria would let their chemical weapons under international control and dismantle them, and in exchange, the u.s. would not strike serious. in the course of about nine months, the syrian stockpiles were transferred out of the country, and most, i don't believe quite all yet, have been destroyed, but they are all out

of the country, as far as we know. with more of the u.s. or international response to those events, i think the elimination of syrian weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons stockpile is a good thing. it leaves the region safer than it was before, but the line between that august 21 day when the chemical weapons attack happened and today was not a straight line, nor do i think is the story fully understood, and that is what tonight's event is about, getting a better understanding about these important events, and i can't think of no one better in the entire world, frankly, to tell us this story than our speaker tonight, the special coordinator for the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons and u.n. joint mission to eliminate syrian chemical weapons. in other words, she is the person in charge of making this happen. prior to assuming this position,

she was a veteran diplomat with a range of experience, but most recently including as secretary-general at the undp and then prior to that as a regional director at unicef in amman, jordan. so i am pleased that you are here. welcome to georgetown. we look forward to your remarks. we should have plenty of time for question and answer. the formal part of the event will wrap up at 6:00, at which time you can join us outside therefore a reception. so without further a do. [applause] >> thank you, simon, and thank you, everyone for what i think will be an exciting conversation both ways. in my dreams, i would never have

thought i would be here speaking at georgetown on this endeavor, a huge international effort, a unique one, unprecedented for many reasons, and i hope to specify that a little bit and talk about when made it unique, what were the challenges, and also what may be the takeaways, including multi-nationalism for the international community and what may be good examples that merit replication elsewhere as we continue to address significant challenges, be it peace and security, development, be it a humanitarian crisis. it is also the day today, september 30, that it will close. the assignment has 36 hours to close. i fade away at midnight. and i will get started. as you know, the story of serious when it comes to chemical weapons, it is about disarmament with a country at war.

at the same time, the tragedy continues unabated with. millions of people are displaced. people fall every day, and it affects security. there are tremendous threats to peace and security. the international community had to make choices. you may recall, as simon just referenced, in the run-up, in reaction to the violation of the norm, chemical weapons had been used, with the victims on our tv screens, it led to a flurry of activity, diplomatic engagement, and particularly so by the united states as well as by the russian federation. it also proved and produced the framework agreement, the famous

framework agreement that encouraged and asked serious to become a member of the conventions. obviously, that all happened in the space of a few weeks time. with syria becoming a part to the convention, the following steps were taken. it declared for the first time what it considered to be its chemical weapons program, which was always assumed by the intelligence community to be quite significant and quite large and to pose a significant threat to the region and to the civilians of the region. but these, of course, are assumptions. in syria, a declaration was made, all of the patronage of the russian-american framework agreement, but, of course, a declaration in a state party almost overnight with the threat of a military intervention still

over its head also asks for a constructive implementation plan by the international community. this is where i would not say out of nowhere but out of the hague, where the convention is based, as well as security members, a plan was made, and the u.n., as you know, has negotiations on disarmament, but we have never dealt with chemical weapons like this before. there was another normal custodian. so they were asked to merge and to provide assistance and to provide monitoring, be in syria 24/7, to assist the community to drive this process.

now, driving the process is something you have often heard of and is often spoken of. driving the process, so to speak, was working our way back. i believe everybody would say it was a very ambitious deadline, a near impossible deadline. when the syrians realize the deadline, they said it could not be done, and it is one of those moments where you realize him a my goodness, and i am sure, your students, you have made this decision, but we did not think it through, and we may be frozen on the spot, and we do not know the complexity of the task in

hand and the near possibility of achieving something that is an international requirement, that is an issue of compliance, and that is a matter for chapter seven under the security council resolution 2118, which also guided our effort. there was tremendous media speculation and ongoing clinical developments. what was asked of us as a joint mission? we went to damascus. i was actually appointed in the middle of october. as some of you know from my biography, i was certainly not selected for any prior knowledge of chemical weapons or the science. the instruction was that failure is not an option, and that we would go where we have not gone before.

and one person was working at another u.n. agency looked around, and who do i know can come with me and help me open this mission question mark who can i trust with finance? who speaks the language? who do i know that can negotiate? and how can we help the inspectors, who have not necessarily worked under these conditions of crisis and active conflict? how can we build a team together? i joined one week later, and we realized that all of us knows something, and hopefully together we know everything that is required, and what we don't know, we would just have to put our faith in either ourselves, the member states, the tremendous support from the security council, and work

constructively, continuously, and a very transparent manner with our syria counterparts, and that helped us to succeed. we were working as one. i believed in this. this is where you had to demonstrate we are the boys, the channel, the means of the international community. we don't have time and cannot afford to scribble over little issues amongst ourselves. we are here to serve. and we are here to serve the steering people, those who suffered, and also for the very important political process and to create a bigger space for the humanitarian track.

now, how did it happen? we had three phases in our work. the first one was to identify every site on the basis of the syrian declaration where chemical weapons were held. where the delivery systems were held, mobile labs, rockets, production facilities, research facility, you name it. a chemical weapons program is complicated. our inspectors went side by side and gave each a number for phone shall destruction, and what it means is i break this pen, and it is broken, but it is not totally broken. that was the first step, to render inoperable, not fully

destroyed, but to render inoperable all of the aspects of the syrian chemical weapons program. the second phase is the one you hear most of in the media. i would not say it was the trickiest one but one of the most interesting and daunting ones. a discussion took place about how we can destroy the syrian chemical weapons material. a prime time example, i will give you mustard gas. normally, they would be destroyed on soil. times of war is not necessarily the time to implement the chemical weapons. the fear is that it can be used again or that it would fall in the wrong hands. it was determined that all the materials should leave the country as soon as possible and to get a sense of comfort and confidence to the international community that it is out of reach, cannot be used again.

what had to happen therefore is that we had to pack and repack decant the material, and get it out of the country. and then others that needed to give their soil for destruction. that clearly proved not to be very popular with the people in those countries, and there were concerns from the environmental community, so the u.s. came up with the solution, let's destroy the chemical materials at sea, on ship, specially equipped for that purpose. however, between getting it away from sites to the port, the vessels that were designated,

particularly by denmark and norway for the purpose of just transport of the chemical weapons material, in italy, where they had made their port available to go back with the containers aboard a u.s. ship, you can imagine we had a phenomenal just in time, complex supply operation in hand. sometimes i felt in this role, and i am sure on one hand we were engaged with high-level diplomacy, troubleshooting, negotiations that were not necessarily easy, and at the same time, we were in the business of getting the coca-cola bottles from a to b to c, in this case for destruction, so it was a matter of reverse engineering a very complex operation, and called on a lot of parties, and also asked for the u.n. and the other group to work for the first time with a maritime hat on.

to that effect, we had worked with the -- work with cyprus. this was where we can work with maritime partners, and this has been one of the unique facets. we had a unique alliance of ships, tremendous fleet. the people's republic of china, russian federation, u.s. vessel, united kingdom, and denmark and norway, and, of course, the syrian navy were all engaged in the maritime component part, and at the same time, inside syria, we were worried about trucks, negotiating with the syrian security, how they would guarantee the safety and security, when the routes were safe, when there was an imminent danger, how we would assess that, and always thinking of the clock, the clock, the clock. it is ticking. reverse engineering, when you deal with the operations peace and security, chapter seven suddenly takes on a very, very different meaning, and i think

that is also what rendered this operation tremendously different and unprecedented, but as i was just mentioning to my colleague who served with me in damascus all this time, i have been to this one area a number of occasions, and it is a wonderful seaport and a resort also in syria, as a tourist, but this time when we woke up from our hotel room, what we saw was the fleet, the people's republic of china, russian federation on the horizon, and normally as you think as a tourist, the sun is up, we are happy, and are happy moment would be when we would see these ships come, because we would know that the next shipment was about to leave the country, so it was one ship gone, one more step towards progress, and one point that has been achieved. what were the challenges? i will come back, because i do not want to make it all sound so easy, and i do not want to make

it sound like it was all one big easy ride. the biggest challenge and concern always was security. the risk and threat, the tremendously volatile security conditions in country, where no one is safe. i had to state that the syrian authorities always extended their utmost, and is the duty of the state party or host government, to provide as much protection or security for all of those who serve there, but a country at war, wrong place, wrong time obviously can be fatal, and for myself as head of mission, my biggest worry was always staff safety and security. that also meant that some message we did not undertake. we used technology. we use gps tracking. we sent cameras if we could not go to a site. when we were not sure we could go or were not sure if we could come back, which shape or form, so technology played a tremendous role, but personally,

i am delighted and very relieved, i suppose is the appropriate word, that we are managing to conclude this mission a few hours from now without any of our staff members having been seriously injured or hurt. they have all carried tremendous stress, have undertaken personally huge risks, and we were one team, and they have all done this with a single objective to render syria a little bit safer, to deal with disarmament, and you really at least deal with chemical weapons elimination, as it was so important. it is never enough. but it has been a tremendous contribution by each and every one of them. now, what was feasible, what was different from other operations that i know. if you take this out of the realm of chemical weapons or disarmament, what was a big factor of success was the

continued unity of purpose and voice of the un security council. a number of you, and i know you are in the school of foreign service, you're all interested in international affairs, or you are students of international affairs or petitioners. you know that this is not always a given. this is something we had to sustain through our own red ability, but it is also something that was clearly a choice. this was throughout the ukraine crisis and throughout many in the regions, and that is quite unique. equally so, member states put their resources and assets where they were needed. this is one of the few, i think, u.n. operations, in particular, that was not short of funding.

this was never the question, and i am looking at a colleague of mine in the audience. often, we are not in this privileged position, so it was interesting indication to me, as well, of the importance. resources. technology. the fleet. other information. whatever was required, it was provided. oath in a multilateral setting and through the joint mission but also bilaterally, and the chinese -- people's republic of china invited assets also bilaterally to the syrian, as did the russian federation, whatever was required for the success, at least to do as much as could be done and diplomacy was a key component of this in two ways. on the one hand, we did troubleshooting. we particularly also invested a lot of time talking to the regional actors. and there was the agreement reached.

we have tried to leverage as much as possible and within our mandate the knowledge, the political positions, and also the access and context that these member states would have, be it influence, or we would ask them to use their influence over any party to the conflict in syria to assure that this mission would be supported, that we could conduct our work in a safe and secure manner what that ultimately, the operation could be concluded in a safe and secure manner.

the security council, i just mentioned, proved to be a unique experience, but only for myself but the fact that the council remains united, and we asked for monthly briefings. month by month, a report was submitted. it was reviewed. council members, despite all of their other priorities and the competing pressures of other, parallel crises, council members that time, prepared, asked questions, probes, and this was a tremendously important clinical not only message, a form of support, but also a form for political accountability, or we would also have to explain how we assess progress that is ultimately the accountability of the state party, syria. so when we look at the media, it is always hard to assess that yourselves, but we made a comment from the beginning. we made a decision, rather, from the beginning to maintain a low profile in the media.

for two reasons. on the one hand, it may be very tempting to be interviewed or sort of to be spoken of in the media rather the work of the mission, but we felt it was only relevant for us when we had something to share, something to rectify, at times, and we did not want our work -- we did not want to be part of a debate. we wanted the work to speak for itself, progress or lack of progress, and looking back, i always feel this has been tremendously helpful. it allowed us to work closely in damascus with our counterparts, with whom he had a constructive cooperation until now. it allowed us to address and look at problems from a security perspective, operational or technical, to look at them in a calm manner and not be driven by rick opinions out there, so we built ourselves a bit of a buffer of time.

we also felt it was very important to be out there when we speak with evidence when we are fact-based, and that was a choice made both in our presentations, out reach, and engagement, and i like to think it also reinforced a sense of credibility, and it gave an element of trust in the work of the joint mission. we don't, as you can imagine, if you look back at how the joint mission was established, the ask, the timelines, the unique sets of partners that were all committed as members of the international community, and working with a country at war. it is a continuing -- continuous balancing act that we need to understand, including being aware of the mistakes that we may have made in the process, but the visibility side was not high on our agenda. we tried to manage visibility only for the purposes of direction of travel, progress, or explain why things had not

happened in the way that they were anticipated, so what are the factors for success, and then i will wrap up, and i look forward to hearing from you based on your operations or perceptions on developments in the region. member states support. it is almost a precondition. the ties and the continuous feedback between the executive council and the hague and the security council in new york. i also believe that a technical agencies such as opcw and the more political arm of the u.n., we have been able to demonstrate that this can work harmoniously, effectively, and also in a time bound and results organized manner. short of diplomacy, the multilateralism i just noted. now, what is a good practice for future missions? i do not believe you can replicate this model at all times or for all themes and issues, but what has been helpful, and i think there is

nothing that is the same when you prepare for an exam, there is nothing like having a deadline. the measurability. the partnership that was built. some countries provided money. others provided stuff. others provided access to technology, and others just gave political support, but if i go back to the example of italy or cyprus, cyprus basically gave us space in its country to work from, to deploy from, to do the thinking. a maritime component. entirely managed from cyprus. italy gave a port. we could not have done the loading from one ship to the next for the destruction without that port. critical. so each country provided an example. lebanon was immensely helpful in ongoing facilitation of goods, travel, trucks, you name it. it all sounds fairly basic, but if you have a blockage, if you have got a delay, if you have

got issues at custom, or entire deadline is just slipping for the sake of something that when you look back was just administered for bureaucratic, the all countries really did their part and more. looking back, it was a unique set of circumstances. the wars continuing. the crisis is d being -- is deepening. we can be relieved to that the components have been destroyed. we are working to address a number of issues that pertain to syria's declaration. i will speak more with you in a questionnaire and -- question and answer session. would we be able to do it again?

today, that window is not the same as last year. on the one hand, it was a unique moment. the operation averted the threat of military operation. a much needed the armor meant. would we be able to do it again today? i will leave that is a question. the region is changing and the threats are increasing. the international community needs to have better means to address crises. have the rapid response management and mitigation capacity to a dress those problems. we can solve them and build and provide building blocks for a better future. our work, and my intent and that of my staff, has been to make syria somewhat safer.

do what we can for the people of syria and the region. making the political process inclusive. and that the humanitarian and recovery tracks will be there to get people back on track. too many victims, too much suffering. thank you. [applause] >> that was great. i will take the moderators prerogative and ask that the first question is actually two questions. i ran the middle east office. in 2011, we actually had quite a robust planning exercise. it was all related to chemical weapons issues.

an extraordinarily challenging time in terms of issues. knowing where all the key facilities were. there's another phrase you hear in the military, which is no plan survives first contact with reality. you cannot underappreciate how incredible it was that they were able to do what they did and do it on time. my contractors cannot do work on my house on time. the fact that international organizations could is remarkable. two questions about the regime. you mentioned that the syrians military did a good job of keeping you safe, shuttling the

colleagues around. two questions about the regime. you saw some of the access that occurred with saddam hussein. did you have much foot dragging from the regime? what was the cooperation like? the good news story is the chemical weapons have been destroyed. but thing know how to build these things. the knowledge cannot be dismantled. how confident are you that some of the steps you took would prevent the regime from -- >> you are absolutely right. foot dragging is a term that was often used.

we had different instances, we had what we thought was a satisfactory expiration because we were there. some of it was technical order requirements based. being in the right place at the right time. the start would not have been feasible. we also had a number of issues that for security reasons, we had come up with even more ingenious solutions. we developed armored jackets. bulletproof. designed in a haphazard fashion to protect the trucks that transported the chemical weapons out of syria. that caused a part of a delay. other areas were a matter of

negotiation. the syrians indicated they were not willing to start the operation if they did not have their security assets in place. a number of them were dual use. we had to be categorical about it. the u.n. will not use the trust funds to procure it. you want it, you are accountable. and then the bilateral window the russian federation was willing to provide assets. choices had to be made. some of the delays required constant dialogue and discussion in damascus. very helpful conversation with the russian federation. we had more than once a week, three-part calls.

this was sustained at the peak of the ukraine crisis. we had a level of instinctive understanding that the authorities had declared. they wanted to see progress. you are operating in the context of war with another party's factoring and what their priorities work. when it comes to your question about the declaration, how do you assess intent, i would be a fool to speculate every country that has eliminated or almost eliminated. a number of countries are continuing their destruction, verification.

in any country, the case is once you have the intellectual capacity, you have knowledge. it is of interest, given that everything was declared and destroyed was labeled, that is a question for politicians to make a calculation. the big question of their remains the ongoing discussion on the declaration. discrepancies that need to be addressed. and the regional mix. it is important to underline that any violation of the international norm of chemical weapons prohibition, almost 200,000 people have died by conventional and other means. there are a thousand ways of dying. we see that in syria. dying. we see that in syria.

>> certainly true. it up to you.en we have about 20 minutes. there is someone with a microphone. if you are interested in asking question, raise your hand. question from the audience? sir? >please speak into the microphone. otherwise, it will not be captured on camera. >> good to know. >> tried again. -- try it again. thank you for your remarks and thank you for coming to georgetown. i'm a second your security student. -- year security student. i have questions about negotiations with the other

partners in the middle east, particularly iran. and what kind of issues were brought up. how exactly you went about solving these. i'm interested in the issue. >> it is a very good question. i wouldn't say issues brought up -- i would say there are three areas of interest. one of them is iran played an initialole on its declaration. from its ownn, experience, provided advisers that went to damascus and trained people on dealing with mitigation. medical doctors. if and when another attack were to occur. the third area is one i would say of the medic engagement,

where athe hague, number of the initial decisions where he ranhed -- -- iran was one of the negotiators. its proximity and close ties to an authorities were additional channel for us to validate, verify, and also express concerns. or say, we are not seen much happening nowadays. what is your take? constructiveer of collaboration. tousing on that one goal, focus on the illumination of the chemical weapons program. just to provide a little context for those of you who may be don't follow these things as

closely, iran is important in this context because they are not only syria's prince will ally in the region -- prince principle ally in the region, they have also been the principal actor. that puts them on the bad side of the ledger. on the other side, they were victimized by the use of chemical weapons in the iran-iraq war. traumatic experience on the iranians. it was seared into their memory. because they were used against iranian troops and cities. it put them in an awkward position. the position of the iranian government is against iranian -- chemical weapons. other questions? ma'am?

>> hi. thank you for coming. i'm a student at the college. in one of your previous conferences, you mentioned that productiontill 12 facilities. have these been destroyed or are they still going to be destroyed? >> that was a hot topic. used the terms tunnels and hangars because when i productionerm facilities, i thought of factories. it will be done by april next year. .ll things being equal >> another question? in the back?

>> i am a first year student. regimetion is, did the give you any guarantee of the destruction of the chemical weapons that could have been in anor eventually placed opposition controlled area? >> if i understand your question correctly, what we know is there was one site in a contested area. completely in accessible from the outset. ,hat has always been considered by the international community. considered abandoned. that site has not been visited.

it will become a in due course, if that situation changes and conditions change. there are no concerns at present over that site. decisions had to be made to extract the material, even though we could not get it to aleppo. the site was about to be overrun. from't know if you recall the media, in may ended june, there was tremendous pressure and a waiting game. deceive the deadline could be made -- to see if the deadline could be made. it was holding up the start of the chemical weapons distraction process. at one stage, there were so much fighting in one area the authorities had difficulty to have access, to extracted the

material. it was no longer clear what to do. this was confirmed by key member states. in the end, they had to take the risk, extract the material, and it is a good thing they did. you had a fairly toxic mix of different chemicals used. if you have that, you can start something nasty. had -- not had that. in other areas, we used technology and video cameras. there is a very detailed process. a checklist of what you have to do and when it is valid. how you do it. a very elaborate process of verification and monitoring. >> this is an important benefit of dismantling the weapons. the battlefield in syria is fluid. agreementence of an

to get the weapons out, there is the possibility the facilities could be overrun. that is the reason that pentagon engaged in detailed planning in 2011. not so much a fear they would eapons on a large scale as they would fall into the hands of jihadists. ,t was a nightmare situation you didn't want to see the weapons falling into the hands the wrong hands. the plans required thousands and thousands of troops. it was a big deal. a hand from a gentleman in the back? that since syria is now a signatory, they will require inspection in the future. what are the plans going forward?

how the inspections will take place in future situations where weapons may be uncovered? >> i'm not 100% sure if there is a detailed plan. going forward. they are in the midst of wrapping up the discussion. making sure the tunnels and hangars get destroyed. looking forward, not knowing how the situation will evolve, it is not hard to see you will -- how you will have a detailed verification. unless you can see that through, other state parties -- you need to keep a question mark. even though syria has become a member, it is not like any other state party.

for now, it is under review of the security council. and the executive council remains -- and that sense, if maybe 30 days. it is an issue of concern. >> other questions? right over here. >> good evening. i'm a recent graduate. my question involves two events. the decision making calculus. this came as quite a surprise. i'm wondering if this an example of successful negotiations behind the line? >> why did he do what he did? >> i will give you the appropriate answer. mixed bag of a

deterrence, pressure, and time sensitive diplomacy. decisions have to be made. this is geopolitics. the terrorist factor, with the opportunity through diplomacy that you can have something that can be achieved, with an expectation and a time mandate, there's something in it for most of the politicians to say there is a way out. i think future historians will have to sort out what the motivations were and what role iran played behind the scenes. how seriously they took the u.s. military threat and what alter your motives. i don't think we have the answers to this question. but we know the answer to one

important question. whatever one thought about the wisdom of of using military force at that time, in late august work early september, it would not have destroyed the chemical weapons to the degree that the diplomatic outcome did. whether we should or should not have taken action, that is an important question. if you are focused on the chemical weapons issue per se, it is indisputable that what they did had a exponentially effect than had they launched 50 tomahawk missiles. other questions? rehear? >> -- rate here? -- right here? >> i wonder if you can address the ongoing use of chlorine test and why that was not addressed before. >> i will give you a process

question that is kind of important. and then where we are now. there have been a series of allegations of the use of chlorine gas as a weapon of war. it was decided in the hague that a fact-finding mission would be sent. i represent the joint mission, the elimination of syria up a stick cleared -- syria's declared program. chlorine is not covered. mission wasnding sent. it faced difficulties. there was a time issue. it takes time to do this. you have to make sure your methodology is appropriate. you have the right steps in the right team. they could not access parts of the country to interview victims and gather further data. they tried. there was a serious incident. the fact finding mission was

fortunate that nobody was injured let alone killed. they continued their work. there was a report where they stated chlorine gas has been used. they have not stated by whom. report interviewed victims in turkey. the conclusions are strong. it has not drawn a final conclusion. it is expected to continue its work. it is a tragedy that we keep hearing about the use of chlorine gas which has continued. that is a dilemma for the international community. the report is one thing. but for the victims, it is nothing at the end of the day. >> we have time for one final remaining question. i want everybody to offer another round of applause

to our guest. for all the hold work the organization -- that only for joining us but for all the hard work your organization has done. thank you. [applause] the real reason you came is for the free food and beverages. >> it's ok. it is a good reason. >> syria's foreign ministry is speaking out against a recent decision by turkey to allow foreign fighters to launch operations against isis from turkish territory. reuters reports the syrian foreign ministry called the approach a flagrant violation of moveharter and warned the was a danger to peace and security in the region. turkey has recently been trying to stop advances by isis