everywhere. -- the planned parenthood action fund is running the largest turnout operation on the ground in alaska of any independent group. we have shipped a bunch of our staff -- they are basically living in alaska. we have hired folks from alaska who are working day and night and talking to people. one of the most difficult places to pull. none of these polls take into account the massive turnout operations that are being built they can't project how much we can or cannot change turnout. it seems reasonable to think 2% is possible in some states. when you look at the data, people say republicans are more enthusiastic -- those are all national data. they are not specific to these battlegrounds.

we feel like we have a really good shot in alaska. we did a mega-takeover of all the digital properties in the days and weeks after the republican primaries to let they stood onere these issues. now we have mail, phones, and every other way you can think of to contact people in alaska. not easy to do. they are various spread out. >> what kind of gender gap numbers do you need to see an alaska and north carolina? point to -- can you just speak about that. what you need to see. we are talked about the person who is moving the levers behind the scenes at planned parenthood in terms of our resources and investment. one of the tools that we have

developed is a gender cap dashboard. feeding information, look at turnout projections, and feed and other data, and able to estimate how big the gender gap needs to be in a particular race , and how many votes that translates to. we can see if we are a header behind. it has been interesting to watch this. it is somewhere between 11% and 17%. the hired is, the better it is and more likely that we will win. in a place like north carolina, where kay hagan is ahead, i think she is at 11% or 12%. she will definitely win. there are some other places where it is a little bit higher. most people don't have to get into the twentysomething percent gender gap as we saw with obama and romney. to bean interesting thing

able to track and monitor on a day-to-day basis. also a little bit more complicated than looking at women. there are differences between married women and younger unmarried women. can you talk about that? >> yes. you could be running digital dashboards on all kind of factors, but when we are looking at unmarried women, younger -- theyomen of color are critical in this election. you are able to say, hey, how not of these folks are generally, normally going to turn out because life is busy, because there are a lot of mixed messages as to whether we hard to vote, whether there would be massive lines, because they are african-american and for some reason we are not going to guarantee that they have an equal number of voting machines available. all of those factors are going

to contribute, but i do think when we look at where most of our targeting goes, it would be at women under 40, women of color, but surprisingly, 30% of are men.ts that is an interesting development over the last couple of years. these issues have lines being drawn between -- this is not just those lady issues or social issues, but in fact important economic issues that really influenced whether women can get the education they want, career, as well as planning a family, what $600 means to a family. i have triplets. i have a dented minivan. i had to fill that thing up and it is 60 bucks every time. is 10 trips to fill up your minivan. that matters to people. clear, and men

have said that that is my $600 two. that is my ride career and we are a family. >> are these independents? who call men themselves independents or democrats? >> primarily, when you're talking to the men, it would be more of a persuasion target, some are turnout targets. all of the turnout targets would likely be more in the democratic peace of the puzzle. planned parenthood action fund will not partisan. we are nonpartisan. we have a long history at planned parenthood of having been built by, supported by, let and republican presidents. they signed the family planning act into law. as we use the shorthand of democrats or republicans, that is not our focus. our focus is the policies of

people support. >> we have time for a few more questions. -- youconfident are you say you're not partisan -- more than one of these candidates are democrats that are supporting abortion rights that most of the targets you are targeting. how confident are you going in these last two weeks that democrats will hold the senate? that the big states you have played in, iowa, colorado, alaska will go democratic? >> i am berry confident. i think we are talking about one or two seats either way. candidates have done a remarkable job. map,, a tough year, tough tough turnout equation. they have done a really good job to make this a fight. louisiana inthe november.

we mail be in georgia in january. >> we might not know in november who controls the senate. you have a reserve fund? >> i always have a reserve fund. we don't like to tell that in advance. we are definitely preparing that key races may not be decided on that day. we may be fighting to get to 50 so that vice president biden has that tie-breaking vote, but of course we are hopeful that when you add up the act kitties that we have done, the activities that many others in the great camp pains that are being run by pro-women, we will not have to go that far to secure it. to 2016, thathead is varied different. the turnout dynamics are different. i am hopeful that whoever occupies the leadership of the senate is really thinking about

that it will not be a good idea to be going after women's health , trying to roll back women's health. >> how worried are you about the polls that are showing republicans with an enthusiastic advantage? every polish showing that right now. lookednt back and closely at those. the one thing that jumps out is that they are national polls. they are not a colorado enthusiasm poll. they are not a north carolina enthusiasm poll. it is hard when some people are in that survey who of course don't have a race, or the races goingdecided, or they're towards a republican already. i'm not sure that that accurately, fully reflects that. we know republicans would have a historical turnout advantage. they are not in any of the polls able to say hey, i know planned

parenthood has an awesome turnout plan -- they just can't do that. they have to go with the store trends. we think we can change the electorate and some of these key places. >> did you have a follow-up? obama is one of the biggest drugs for democrats. for democrats. are you worried about the drag that he would have? what would you be worried about what happen to republican controlled congress, if republicans are elected to replace democrats? >> the bigger drag on his elections is the effect of congress. that onlyurvey says

ebola and gonorrhea are less positive than congress. approval rating is holding at 14%. that is demotivating for folks, when they wonder if my life will get better, are people really in there to change things. i don't think the president is the biggest issue here. i think some of these bigger meta-issues like security, the a bowl outbreak do have people theerned, and the way that economic recovery is benefiting some people more than others, so people are not filling that fully. -- feeling that fully. when you look at alaska, where they're talking about energy, women's health, and you look at a north carolina, where they're talking about education and women's health. they are always talking about weems health. one of the things that we have noted is that also all of the environmental groups in the labor groups and many others are women'sas related to

health and access to women's abortion. a day we might not have predicted. do i worry about the senate? absolutely. you don't have to look far, look down to texas. when women move access to preventive health services, you see what happens to the quality of their health care. there are told that it not an undue burden to drive 500 miles if they want to exercise her constitutional right to an abortion. who gets elected matters. areave seen that senators varied powerful. they can shut down the government. they can hold them hostage. they can use them in their own ideological battles. i have big concerns that there will be a kind of payback of republican leadership. they might say they need to deliver that. that is why we are working so hard. i have to point out that we have endorsed 12 republicans in state

legislative races. theave five champions in republican party who stood up when they tried to defund planned parenthood in 2011 and voted against that. it doesn't always breakdown on democrat or republican lines. >> we are out of time. thank you very much. we appreciate it. >> thank you for having me. >> we are back with our reporters. jessica, let me begin with you. planned parenthood and their ground game, could it make a difference? to measure that enthusiasm that don was talking about. when you have one's in alaska north carolina, they can make the difference. i have been hearing for a while from democrats across a spectrum that we are putting faith in our ground game. they have been building this for

well over a year. since the beginning of the cycle. on election day, it is time to flip the switch. enthusiasman overpowers that, it will not be enough. if democrats turnout, she talks about how they can target people down to the issue. that is how president obama one the reelection with these data tools. it can make a big difference. >> there is a lot to overcome. what you are seeing in the polls is an electorate at an unprecedented levels of weariness with government, they are down and out about a lot of things, the economy, the unsettling news. it does not feel like in the reporting that i have done that people are excited about this election. a lot of people that you talk to don't even know there is an election going on.

polls show they don't know who controls the senate. nothing gets done. fore turnout operations democrats to overcome all of that, plus the historical trend about the midterms tending to bring out the older, whiter voters who favor the republican party. >> we heard from planned parenthood that the polls don't show necessarily that ground game operation and the difference it could make . they are mobilized by the issues that planned parenthood cares about. is that true in the past question mark have the ground games made the difference in the past? >> i think it did in 2012. we sell some polls that were wrong. they had mitt romney winning states that ended up --

make me aat does little weary when i am looking at some of these. when you have pollsters who did is what i tendat to see. colorado, republicans have an advantage. alaska, they are beginning to have an advantage. if democrats do somehow end up winning, we will have questions for that whole polling model. andhat about the gender gap how important it seems in these crucial states? >> that really is -- women are the ones keeping republicans that they. in 2010, it was the first time that republican women favored republicans. it was only by a pointer to.

is why what planned parenthood is doing -- this is a great test for that operation. >> we will leave it there. thank you both. we appreciate it. >> inc. you. ask be part of c-span's 2014 coverage. follow us on twitter and like us on facebook. schedules, video clips of key --ents, pre-goes -- previous previews. you can easily share your reactions to what the candidates are saying. the battle for control of congress. stay in kutch and engaged by phone is on twitter at c-span, and liking us on facebook. a discussion of the obama

administration's isis strategy. it includes middle east policy analyst giving assessments of events in the region and how the u.s. led coalition might move forward. this is the hudson institute. this is one hour and a half. >> good morning. i appreciate the opportunity to be a part of this panel. one of the things you saw when ice is moved into molzahn, you saw the iraq security forces move away. takeaw iraq take -- isis advantage of a permissive environment. saw an oppressive she a government. one of the reasons that isis was able to come in is that it was a concerted effort to politicize -- i security forces

got rid of kurdish commanders who knew mosul very well. that same security apparatus that was in place during the surge was able to deny al qaeda territory in mosul. as well as the tigris and euphfraties with the sons of iraq program. taking 90,000 vetted sunnis out of the apparatus, replaced commanders in the north along the environment, what isis was able to do is take advantage of temporary alliances with insurgent groups and move into territory. the one thing we started doing with the u.s. policy is we immediately started spinning up advisory groups to go to baghdad, to go to these operation centers to partner with the iraqi security forces. one of the things general petraeus cautioned was we do not want to look like the iraqi security forces when it's considered a sectarian apparatus.

so we went into these operation centers. and some of us who have worked with iraqis have noticed, are cautioned against, was when you put american advisers in these operation centers, even if they know arabic, they're not familiar with the nuances. and the shia have militia ties and there are already officers in the operation centers. so these target pacts were going to get primacy. and if we were actioning these target packets we could be complicit. so what have been successful in mosul were generated out of urbil with vetted kurdish and sunni intel from the previous now dismantled iraqi national security service which was stood up with former baathist-sunni forces that wanted to go after al qaeda and shia militias.

that was replaced with msnsa leadership took over the structure and that became something that became part of maliki's sectarian intelligence security apparatus. so that's the current set. u.s. air strikes in mosul, key strategic defeat for isis when they lost the mosul dam. so the question, are u.s. air strikes enough? they can hurt isis militarily. they were able to take out positions in the mosul dam. but paired with forces as they moved into the area, they were able to take back territory. that's the first strategic loss that isis had suffered in iraq and syria. in iraq, that was huge. they lost the mosul dam. they wanted to be able to provide services. provides water and electricity to the people living in northern iraq. they wanted to be able to show that they had a better capability to provide services than the iraqi government. they also lost two oil fields. part of the u.s. strategy now, we need to be able to exploit those operations opportunities.

when isis loses key infrastructure, we need to be able to say that. one of the thing that is happened with u.s. air strikes, before that we saw u.s. captured equipment move to syria because they would face a lesser air force capability by the assad regime. key leaders started moving back to syria as well also to the sectarian fault lines along the baghdad belts. what was left behind were foreign fighters. these fighters another opportunity to exploit isis who actually comprises isis. these foreign fighters, a lot of them came in wanting to fight assad and they were moved to iraq to do these things. so remember what mosul is. if you do back of the envelope math there's 750,000 sunni military aged males in mosul waiting to see what the central government is going to do, waiting to see what we're going to do. any time isis has a public demonstration there's always isis guards with ak-47s watching the

crowd. they're worried about what this sunni population in mosul is going to do. they don't subscribe to the ideology but they're not going to kill it without some sort of concession from the central government. so anything that we do as part of a u.s. strategy has to put pressure on abadi to fill the ranks of the two divisions that fell, mosul and talaf, the second and third iraqi army divisions, and put in 30,000 vetted sunnis that were part of the isf in the past and make them fill the ranks. that's where the effort needs to be, because we need to be the third-party guarantor. the reason the sons of iraq were successful and sunni iraqi security forces were successful in the past is they had an advisor with them and able to call in u.s. air power, post air support and be able to do these things. we can't simply say fill the ranks with sunnis because they're not going to trust the central government.

so how do you get abadi to do that? you've got to put pressure on iran to get abadi to allow -- abadi might want to do it now. the iranians don't want them to do it. i think this is a fight the iranians and shia militias want. but i think i've gone over my time here. >> that's terrific. thanks. i'm taking notes. thank you very much. we coauthored an article in the weekly standard about a month ago and i have to say hussein did all the heavy lifting. who is a part of this and what this large rebelion looks like. i think he is going to start today by talking about that somewhat. >> thanks for having me. on september 16, general dempsey told the armed services

committee in the senate that one of the most important factors in this strategy of defeating isis is to get some moderate sunni tribes to join the coalition against isis. on october 5, 23 new clans in iraq and syria pledged allegiance to isis, which tells us that the tribes so far do not seem to be betting on the united states or on its allies. since then as seen in so many reports and criticism against the syrian opposition, against the tribes, we call them corrupt. we think they're not up to the fight. they've been losing all the time. so the question is, how come all

the tribes wo fight on our side are the losers and all the tribes who fight on iran and hezbollah's sides are always the winners? we spent so many years training the iraqi army and they melt down in a couple of hours in mosul, and here you have the army with isis just fighting and winning. and it took us two weeks to take the mosul dam with the u.s. air power to take the mosul dam out of the hands of isis. the answer to this question is that we do not pick the tribes. they pick us. and this is very important. because this goes back to how the tribes behave. there's a tribal code and a tribal structure. a tribe is usually known by name and by genealogy and even the horses have genealogies. they're known for their territory is usually demarcated.

it's called dira in arabic. so the tribes are not as ambiguous as they seem to be. there are blue-blooded tribes. there are lesser, the opposite of blue-blooded. junior-ranking, second ranking. then there are strong tribes and there are not so strong tribes. what's happened over the past half century is that both saddam hussein in iraq and assad in syria, they knew how to deal with these tribes and the tribal areas. the tribal areas that's the northeast of syria and the northwest of iraq, and west and -- west of iraq and east of syria. they have four to six big tribal concentrations. the two most important of them, the shmad and nessa, these are very well-connected to the saudis.

to put this in perspective, the saudi royal family comes from nasad. the mother of the current saudi king, kim amduga comes from shama. so they are connected to saudi arabia. they have intermarriage. because of this they were under pressure during the assad days, the father during the days of saddam hussein. both saddam hussein and assad propped up the junior-ranking tribes. these junior-ranking tribes -- these junior tribes were doing really good at the expense of the blue-blooded tribes. by the way osama bin laden's mother comes from the area. so we have the mothers of saudi

factions coming from various tribes in syria. so they were doing really well and they hold areas like in the province. how, how it changed hands from assad to the rebels is really interesting. the revolution broke out on march 15, 2011. most of the north and the northeast, assad just lost control really fast. the only town -- and the province that's kept holding and was still loyal to assad was raka and remained loyal to assad until november of 2013. that's almost two years. even though it is -- first of all they're 300 miles away from damascus. that's almost a six-hour drive. it means that it was thinly populated with assad security

forces. it meant that assad elite forces could not go and defend because of it's a long distance. the logistics would be hard, supply lines would be thinly stretched. so all these two years, they remain loyal to assad because of the tribes who still -- they were still loyal to assad. then, on november 2, 2013, all of a sudden 14 clans from different tribes pledged allegiance to isis. since then it has become the capital of isis. and this change of area was nearly bloodless. the forces in that part just switched from being pro-assad to pro-isis. and this tells us that there's no such thing as moderate sunni tribe or radical sunni tribes. the tribes are not moderate or radical. and when the tribes pledge

allegiance to isis, that's very different from individuals joining isis. individuals join based on ideology, based on direct salary that they receive from whichever group. the tribes join for different reasons. the tribes hedge and they look for the strongest power. and when the tribes of raka saw that assad was going to fall, they changed and then the only strong power that they found was isis. of course because we were calling them carpenters, teachers and dentists and withholding all the kinds of arms. so the only strong power that they could join at the time was isis. so this is how these tribes became isis. and by the same token, the tribes mainly of other areas, the arab groups, these tribes in the northwest of iraq joined isis as well. of the six people who formed the military council of isis, five

of them come from big tribes, and three of them were high-ranking officers in sad am's army. so now we get a picture of who these people are, how these tribes are fighting on the other side. one last note before i close. the reason why these tribes, the united states got a big chance for the tribes of iraq, syria, and even lebanon in 2005-2006, and 2007. the tribes saw we were really serious in spreading democracy and giving arms and money. we saw lebanon, the jews, the sunnis join democracy. they ejected assad out of syria. that was a preview of how the tribes treated us. five years later the sawa in iraq joined the united states

and they fought alongside u.s. troops. they ejected al qaeda from there. what happened after that was very interesting. we got disengaged and the national security advideser to vice president joe biden was handling this. he at the time he reasoned that what's more important is for prime minister maliki to keep pumping oil, to edge iran out of the oil market. of course this confirms all kinds of conspiracy theories. that was: we are there for the oil. the tribes thought we are not serious, they came, they left. we need a power that's here to stay, and that would be either iran or isis. and i don't think the tribes will be joining us any time soon. or the ones that will join will not be the stronger ones. thank you. >> thanks. that's a very depressing assessment. [laughter]

thanks very much. that was really informative and terrific. the next speaker is andrew taylor. a very old friend and colleague, and also one of the premier, if not the premier, syria expert here in washington and in the united states. and that's one of the thing that is andrew will be touching on syria as well as some other things including the administration's larger vision of isis and the lavant. we might not get to all of that in the introductory statements but we'll come back to that later. >> thanks for that introduction. it's an honor for me to be up here with you all today. and thanks for attending. i see a number of friends in the audience as well. so in terms of the administration's strategy itself, to deal with isis, as well as how the supplies with iraq and syria, the strategy generally is an iraq-centric approach. the ink blot, so to speak, starts there. and the reason why i use the ink blot analogy isn't just because

of the different parallels with the satwa and the surge in iraq during the war. but also just the dealing with what is the -- what isis calls the islamic state, this sort of massive territory between that encompasses a lot of the euphrates valley. in iraq, you have a military campaign which involves air strike support, as well as arming of certain factions inside of iraq. and u.s. support to try and rescue certain minorities in particular throughout the country. and these gentlemen to my left can explain this a lot better than i can. that combined with an overall political strategy in that you want to try to get -- they're aiming to get a more inclusive iraqi government that's more permissible and that can entice some of the tribes and others particularly from the sunni population which makes up the basis of isis, back into the

iraqi government so that it functions again. and in this particular case, in the case of iraq -- i'm not surprised that the administration is starting there. the u.s. has a lot of experience there. and while there have been a lot of problems over the last two years the iraqi system at least you have the hope of some change. it might not be real change. it might not be change as fast as we would like. but yet the hope of some change. prime ministers there can comb and go. their parties might not come and go but certain figures can. certain fixed positions can change. and it's easier for americans to relate to. and it's because of that that i think you've seen the administration's emphasis on iraq. both from experience and possibilities there. in syria, it is a completely different situation. u.s. action against isis, as far

as i can tell, does not -- is not part of any kind of sthriege other than to degrade isis overall. there are some caveats to this. for example, trying to hit isis political and military facilities. so to degrade its power primarily in iraq. also, to hit some of the rudimentary oil refineries which have bine set up in the river valley and also in the euphrates river valley. and that's logical. isis sells refined products, crude oil to sustain part of its operation. that's quite smart. but in terms of the overall strikes, the administration is in a bit of a bind particularly when isis is advancing like around cobabi.

you saw an uptick in strikes. that's largely a reactive policy. but the overall problem in syria is you don't have a political process. there isn't one. and the reason why there isn't one is because the war in syria has hardened up positions among the different parties on the regime side as well as on the opposition side and made a political outcome there really a remote possibility at best. i think that's part of the problem that the obama administration in intervening in syria is trying to intervene so it doesn't tip the balance one way or the other. of course the united states has a stated policy that president assad should step aside since august of 2011. a whole slew of legal sanctions go along with it that have been supported by not only the members of the bureaucracy and former very prominent former members of the administration, but also on capitol hill. but over the course of this -- the syria crisis, actually achieving that objective has

meant increased u.s. involvement that the president himself is unwilling to put forward. basically, the president has been on the horns of a dilemma for about a year. and this dilemma is largely as follows. either the united states increases its effort with its allies to get rid of the assad regime, ok, and there are a lot of ways you can get rid of the assad regime. but generally that's what we're looking at here. that would allow for some kind of process, transition that would -- they could fold the opposition into and bring the country back together again. and the other part of this dilemma is just letting things go as they are and acquiescing to what are called cease-fires. and they're cease-fires with a small c. it surrounds the assad area, they starve the people off, cut off water, drop barrel bombs and

leave a sliver of territory for the fighters to run out while the regime then moves in, activists are arrested and tortured sometimes to death. and this cease-fire model was held out as the way the regime was going to come back a little bit earlier this year. they had two tracks, one peace talks in geneva which went nowhere, and then the cease-fire model. a lot of people were betting on the cease-fire model privately. they thought the regime had wind at its sails. and it also was a little bit easier and more coherent they thought to deal with. and that's because we have to be honest about this, the members of the syrian opposition also have tremendous fault and tremendous divisions that makes working with them very, very complicated. and the overall problem has been

that the nature of the syrian battlefield and that everyone is battling against president assad. but they generally are not -- the groups have not consolidated. their leads have not consolidated. therefore you have al qaeda affiliates fighting alongside nationalist batallions. and they do this on a regular basis. they're doing it right now in southern syria. and when they work with a common purpose they're very effective. and they're pushing the assad regime back right now towards damascus. the problem of course in that is how do you support such a chaotic and unorganized space? it's not impossible. but it's difficult in that any arms or anything that's introduced into that environment could fall into the hands of al qaeda affiliates. and that would be bad.

not only bad in a general sense but really bad in the legal sense. and no politician wants to touch it including the president. so he was betting on assad coming back and kind of carving out as much territory as possible, eventually the rebels would give up, and there would be some kind of lame political process at the end of this to call it a reconstituted country. that formula changed with the isis outbreak in june. fundamentally changed. and so now the problem that we have is that the assad regime is incredibly weakened. there are a lot of problems internally. and they're losing ground particularly in the south but other areas of the country. they've been trying to retake the larger city alepo. they might try to circle it. but the problem with regime is it can go out and retake areas but it can't hold them. this goes way back to the beginning of the uprising. and this means that not only are they unable to consolidate power in the west where they're strongest. they're not going to be able to

go out and clean up isis. so the question is what can fill up that vacuum and take into account sunni aspirations in the euphrates valley where sunnis are in the majority? and it's there that right now we're starting from basically zero. u.s. has had a covert campaign to support the syrian opposition in the country, about a year-and-a-half. we deal with about nine groups there if not more. and they're supplied with weapons including tow and detain weapons on a regular basis. but in an overall political sense they're not organized towards one end and that title 50 program, covert program, will be folded into the train and equip program, the title 10 program that has been abnounsed. but in the meantime, we are striking these stargets. and isis is not giving way. and we don't really have an opposition force to fill up that vacuum. so it's in that chaotic situation that we will probably see the assad regime try and lash out to

retake some areas, likely see them fail, as well as tribes in the euphrates valley itself try and assert themselves. but in order to retake -- i don't think we're going to have one force taking and holding those areas in any kind of coherent way. at this point, if we keep on going in the direction that we're going in terms of our syria -- our approach to syria, i'm afraid that boots on the ground are probably a much more likely possibility going forward both in the next two years as well as for the next administration. because i don't see one side or the other being able to really clean up this problem once isis is degraded from the air. i think that's going to be the main problem that this administration faces on the way out, and the next administration faces on the way in. thank you. >> thanks. that's terrific. well, that's a terrific introduction. i want to be able to come back

later to some specific issues like the fight between isis and the kurds in kobani but first what i would like to do is fill out -- i want to fill out the more general picture which i think is going to be very helpful here. one of the things that i believe is the three panelists are saying or this how i would like to put it together, i believe that isis is part of a larger sunni rebelion which is the function of the policies of the maliki government, the function of the policies of bashar al assad's war. and also standing behind that is the islamic republic of iran. so the iranians have forces on the ground. the united states, after the 2001 withdrawal, is much more limited. is much more limited leverage. what i would like to fill out now is i would like to get a

sense of what are the chances that the united states, that the administration can now address that issue, which i think we all agree on that one of the fundamental problems that's going on, how do we get the sunnis to buy in, whether it's the sunni tribes, whether it's the sunnis that mike was speaking about in mosul. >> we lost a lot of leverage with the sunni population when we assured them that the sons of iraq program would turn into drops in the iraqi security forces and other jobs in the ministries. that didn't happen. a good friend of mine who actually recruited a lot of these individuals was often met with hugs and kisses when he saw these guys in jordan. the last time he met them, he had one of the individuals grab all of the unit coins out of his pocket from other u.s. army battalions that they had worked with over the ar