drawdown in afghanistan of isaf, of course, the isaf mission finishes in just over two months' time. effectively, certainly as i left the shape of planning was really by the end of october the force level in afghanistan would be pretty much the same as the post-isaf train, advise, assist mission which we were planning at that time of round about 12,000. so i think what you would have seen anyway by now is the majority of isaf will have drawn down, and you'll see pretty much a flatline now through into the training, advise, assist mission when the isaf flag is drawn down at end of december. so i don't think it will have a major impact on train, advise, assist mission in afghanistan. that was one question. remind me of the others. ? and what do you think the impact is in terms of

withdrawal from afghanistan in terms of the earlier question about our capacity to deploy in two separate theaters of war? >> right. i think the lessons -- i slightly change the angle here and say i think there are lessons from the afghan experience which can be applied to iraq. as i said earlier the business of doing it properly, building up an army from the grass roots, building up the respect of the confidence, capability, is in a way which wasn't done frankly in the british experience in iraq is relevant to what might happen. >> on that point do you think the afghan army is likely to perform better than we have seen with the iraqi army? >> i'm optimistic. providing -- there's one major caveat, providing the international community stays committed both in continuing to train and also, and very importantly, in providing the

money. because don't forget the afghanistan did not collapse after the soviets left, it collapsed when soviet union collapsed when the money dried up. i am optimistic that providing those two cayats i'm satisfied the forces will be able to contain what will be an ongoing insurgency in afghanistan. >> on the final point do you think that the drawdown from afghanistan will ease the pressures in terms of force structures and our capacity to deploy? >> it certainly should. because you're not committed, anyway. and we've seen with the deployment with the drawdown of afghanistan u.k. forces have committed on operations overseas is probably at an all-time low since about the low figure of -- since about 196. -- 1968.

>> would you comment on turkey's refusal to get involved on a major humanitarian disaster on its own door step >> all i think i would say is yes turkey of course is a member of nato and has been a loyal member of the alliance since its formation. but of course nato is not engaged in any operations in iraq at the moment. >> nato nations are though. >> well, that is a different thing from saying nato is involved. there has been no decision taken to engage nato. nato nations may be engaged unilaterally but that is not saying the nato is engaged. therefore it's up to turkey what they should and should not do.

i think standing on the sidelines for a very long way away from what is a tough neighborhood and telling other people what they should be doing is not a good way of doing business. >> i recognize that. but are you telling us that it turkey's domestic situation which is the dominating factor in its decision not to get involved? >> i suspect that it's -- it is in probably turkish national interest more than anything else. nd it is our duties to protect. >> do you think what little we've agreed to do so far will have a negative impact on our relationship with the u.s.? >> yes, i do. i think there is a real danger given up by

default a position which we were primed to have of standing shoulder to shoulder with our number one ally. and i think that could have long-term consequences. >> well, i think there was a time when the americans could always rely on us as i say standing shoulder to shoulder. i think one of the consequences that this could well be a further distancing of america from engagement in europe. and instead of being able to say that we were alongside since we joined alonga long list of other allies who are not prepared to deliver when merica makes the call. >> so by that rationale, we ought to be joining the u.s.

and those members of the coalition and do our extending operations over the iraqi border into syria? >> well, if we want to continue to have influence with our premier ally, we need to be prepared to commit along side. and that willingness to commit significant military force into a coalition or an alliance with the americans i have i think giveen us significant influence. and if you don't commit, if you're not standing shoulder to shoulder you don't have influence. it's as simple as that. >> can you try to communicate that, translate that into something which is tangible? i understand what you're saying in the general terms but in terms of the influence that it can give us, how can you say that is in the interest of the united kingdom? >> well, i think by commiting

alongside the americans, we we a say in outcomes which would not otherwise have. and an influence on those outcomes which we would not otherwise have. >> you could say -- not taking this view. but you could say well what good did that do us in iraq reconstruction? because we really messed that up. >> you could say that but i think in return i would say that if we had done it properly we would be in a different position. >> and did we not do it properly because we weren't listened to or because we too got it wrong? >> i think we failed to do it properly for a number of reasons. and i look forward to the inquiry reporting on this. i think it's time would preclude -- we could spend a whole lot of time discussing why we didn't do it properly. >> if i may. to rurp to boots on the ground

you were very clear about the need to follow through and do things properly. but your response on turkey and er seeming to get oth countries who are much closer to the danger and the gravity in the region, i'm sure is a point well made. does that mean that the hopes of persuading other nations, our neighbors, to commit those -- to commit ground forces is in your view probably few tile? >> well, if the u.k. is trying to persuade other nations to commit more than we're prepared -- mmit ourselves, i mean for a number of -- clearly the threat is greater. and we'll help you in some way? >> it goes back to the same point. if you aren't prepared to commit and stand shoulder to shoulder with people they may

be prepared to commit but if you're going to stand in the back of the room and say go forward go forward but i'm not prepared to go with you, you don't stand on very firm ground. you talked about strategy. is the mission to destroy icele? the mission is what -- what is the mission? >> the military mission will be determined by government policy. and i don't know what the mission is. we haven't got the government policy that says it. the one hand i hear destroy isil. on the other hand i hear humanitarian relief. >> like before. >> if you don't have a clear strategy you can't have a clear mission. >> let us assume that the mission is to destroy isil. d as you say, we are picking

at the edges with air power. at the very best we're going to contain isil into hopefully the perimeter which it is currently occupying. and we are hoping -- big hope - that the kurds will -- and the iraqis will get their act together and be able to deal militarily and destroy the enemy -- which is isil -- themselves, which is a pretty tall order i think we would agree. we also are hoping, as john just implied, that the arab world would actually put up the s to back iraq and kurds, which is clearly not

evident. i ask that question of the defense secretary yesterday in defense questions what is the arab world actually going to put ut beyond something from air power? we have declared that -- again repeated yesterday, that there will be no infantry on the ground from the united kingdom and apparently the united states too. and i just can't see where we are going to have an end game. because in the end i fear that if as we started this conversation isil is such a threat to this country -- the prime minister said it, the foreign secretary said it, such a huge threat. in the end, we may have to commit ground forces into action in the middle east, and e may have to eat our words on

whether we would actually put infantry, armor, artillery, object ground and in support of those people on the ground. in a way, i'm not asking a question. i'm asking for you to comment. have i got this wrong? >> well, i was going to say, and your question is? >> i'm not sure i have got a question, chairman. my point is, i just can't see how we can do anything else if all those things happen. the arab states cop out, the iraqis and the kurds aren't good enough, and isil stays there terrorizing. are we just hoping for a america that will the people isil will rorized by rise up, destroy them, eat them? >> i think you highlight the importance of a political process or political approach that achieves that political aim. >> it's going to be very

difficult to get politics into that area anyway but it may well be that military would have to go in to get the politics in. that's perhaps my question. is military required -- is there a military requirement to go in there so that politics can operate there? >> well, i think there may well be. if the scenario you post late came to pass or comes to pass, we are left with the basic fact that if you want to destroy or neutralize isil you've got to do it militarily or you take the time to build up local capacity to do so. and that's going to take time. you either contain, in which case it might not be enough, or you have to deploy force to destroy. >> before i let you go, you talked a lot about training. if we were training sunni forces to take on isil, what

exactly would we be training them to do? are we trying to create the kind of force that we created in the 1980s against the soviet-backed afghan government? in other words, are we training our people in guerilla tactics and laying i.e.d.s? or are we training up a counter insurgency warfare force which is going to clear, hold, and build sunni territory? and if the latter, is that going to be in the form of tribal militias, a sort of nni awakening that we had in 2007-2008? or is this going to be a part of the iraqi army? >> i suppose it determines to the commander to determine the nature of the campaign in which he is involved. you need to understand the nature of the problem. you need to understand the nature of the threat posed by isil, the way isil operates,

and then design a force which can counter that. it may be any of the above. it may even be a more joined-up, capable armed force that looks more like a conventional army. >> general, thank you very uch.

>> the general has commanded at every level right the way through kosovo, iraq, but particularly relevant he was the commander of the multinational division in southeast in iraq. general, thank you very, very much indeed for coming to us. and i'm going to turn to my colleague to begin. >> general, we're going to run around some of the same sort of issues obviously. but you've said that -- or you're reported to have said, anyway, whether that's true or not, that it may be few tile to do some of these things unless you have a clear political plan to go with it. it's in one sense an obvious remark to me but it's got a lot within it. one of the objectives? what should we be seeking? what are your comments on whether the two fit together or

whether they do fit together? >> yes, i did say that. i did indeed say that military action without a political plan to pursue is few tile. what i meant by that is that it stands very limited chance of success. and that stands a pretty good chance of making things worse drks and worse in a wider context it provides us an excuse for the politicians not to get to the real issue which is sorting out the politics. reaching for the military is what they do when they can't think of what to do because it's a big mistake because it distracts the issue which are the political ones. >> so if the real political prosmmation, what is this political question that we should be dealing with first before we reach for the military then?

how do we solve it? >> you need to address the question of what do you think the problem is with isil? and this has been characterized in many ways. it is one level a simple -- another manifestation of sunni extremism. another it is significantly different than al qaeda and its orientation where al qaeda was the external influences, corrupt islam. and hence attacking the united states on 9/11. isis' focus, literally what they're saying, it's very much aimed at sort of purifying inside sunni islam. indeed you could therefore characterize it even more so as not just a battle within sunni islam but a battle within with a has beeni islam who are the true representatives on earth of with a has beeniism, because as you well know is a very pure

form of islam and it sees itself as the only atlanta form of islam. if you look at the behavior of ice sis in the taken over areas in the region, they have not just been against normal muslims, not even against the shia, but against any form of sunni islam which doesn't omply with their very strict wave has been ea interpretation. so this is a very internal theological causality behind ice sis which we need to understand which seems to me the real threat that isi sinch posed is not to us in the west is to ca that which have their official state religion as wahabi islam. and i think it is to them that we should be looking for a

resolution of what i see as being fundamentally as a fundamental religious problem and go back to the response of my earlier question. my concern with the response is we seem to be mowing the grass as far as terrorism but doing very little talking about the real problem which is this particular ideology, this mentality. and if we're talking about threats to the united kingdom i think that is the major threat rather than any military force that may be rampaging around syria and northern iraq right now. >> do you see the existing military response then to sort of containing this sort of extregs as thee guys roam around the place? my understanding is this cal fate is the whole world or muslim populations of the world including malaysia and everywhere else. no douth just starting with the middle east and the la vanity and cyprus. >> indeed. and -- >> but you've got to do

something or doing something in response. what you're saying is that's really just a containment strategy but in one sense it's not addressing the real underlying problem. but you've now got the soviets commiting materiel forces and uae woman pilot flying about the place shooting them up. i mean, is there not some progress in terms of the neighbors understanding their own problem and accommodating themselves in a different way? >> there is some. but very little. i think the containment policy is a sensible policy as far as it goes, at least it tries to buy time. buying time for the sunni region -- sunni nations in the region to work out their response. and we need to have some sympathy with them. because although you site the case of them raising materiels to fight the battle, i think they send about as many fighters as we have, which is pretty inadequate. and i suspect that that female

pilot in the uae her life is now being made hell by the religious extremists in the u.a.e. because underneath the surface of those countries, whatever their formal states say, we've got to recognize that a recent poll had a sense of people inside saub thinking that ice sis was a -- an expression of islam. and also the blog about the saudi pilot who refused to go on a bombing raid against isis because he believed in isis. so we need to recognize that there are extreme internal divisions within the sunni world and we should not assume that just because the got says some nice words about joining the coalition, actually actions do speak louder than words. and i think the minimal efforts that the sunni states have made towards isis show how difficult they're finding it to handle it. the internal power struggle is so extreme that they've termed

it the war of saudi secession. with and i think that's what we're seeing. and looking what we should do, it's right that we should see this as a threat but we should sort of -- we would be wise to take the hip cratic oath on this one and in trying to do something we do no harm. and one of the great problems is that although we in our western ways see evil and we believe we're on the side of good, that's actually not the way it's seen in the region. and if we're going to do it -- military engagement in the middle east we should remember clause's words not war being continuation of the policy but the victories found in terms of political terms not in terms of a fleeting spass of arms. so what does that look like? until you work that one out it's very hard to know what military action is actually useful. as i say, we in the west if we're leading on this, what is the effect of christian forces and what is not just an internal islam -- not even

internal sunni but internal wahabi battle for legitimacy? how does that play? how does that make our what people i would identify as our allies in saudi arabia like the king and prince, how does it make them feel? how does it make their job easier or more difficult? i would have a lot more confidence if i felt that i fully understood our planners if you willy understand the mine -- fully understood the mindset of the saudis. >> just bring about some of the practical things where we are. a couple things that come out of what you say. there's been this criticism about the iraqi armed forces. we discussed, you heard some of the discussion we heard earlier with others about this who were not going to stand and fight as a coherent army. but maybe some of these elements you're describing why that was. what is your view of the training of the iraqi army, its ability to become a coheerpt

force? what should we do? is there some way we can assist in that? >> before i answer that can i just go back to your comment about practical matters that sort of intellectual -- >> yes. >> and say that's -- those bits are absolutely fundamental to understanding the problem. if we don't get that right then we really are making a mistake. back to the issue. the army. an army is always said to be a reflection of the society that it's drawn from. the iraqi army like the afghan army will be as strong or as weak as the governments and the societal glue from which is is drawn. we can do all we want. when i was there in 2007 out there in basra trying to organize the withdrawal from basra, i had a police chief who just got sent in and he suffered about three death threats assassination attempts in as many weeks. i said what can we do to help? he said this isn't about training or equipment. it's about loyalty. and you can't touch that. i think that's a lesson we just need to learn very hard.

we can give these people the best weapons in the world we can train them but fundamentally the moral component -- if the moral component is weak it isn't any good. that's why 30,000 ran away against 3,000. because isil believed in what they're doing and these guys don't. >> when these same guys are fighting, they've got a moral component then. >> because they're fighting for their own. >> exactly. that's the point you're trying to make. isn't it? are we sort of slightly deluded that we get the sunni awakening again, whether that was meant to be and some way magically all of these different a pings will cohere into formed army? >> there's really not a yes or no to that. i still think if we're looking forward an answer what to do about isil, we have to look to it -- we need to look at the

divisions that possibly exist with isis. it's in part a positive force they have certain objectives. so why the bathist whose are fundamentally not religious particularly, happen to be sunni but they're not fundamentally relinls. how come they're allied with these ultra religious people? what is the bond? answer they both hate the existing status quo. if we can drive a wedge between them that's the way to do it. equally with tribes -- i'm not reading the intelligence but i would be surprised if the tribes are keen on isis than they were on al qaeda. so i think there's wedges there which is why the containment mission. which is -- it seems to me that containment strategy is quite -- has a certain coherence because it buys time in order for intelligence people and for these discontents and divisions to become apparent. that's again one of my concerns. that if the more we christians

get in there, the more re align people against them. where if we just incubate them and let their own internal divisions come out they may well come out. the real question is what sunni force can we muster to take back northern iraq? if our objective is politically to restore the territory and integrity of iraq as it was before? there's the difficulty. because the iraq army will be a fundamentally shia army. and seeing, taking over sunni lands, it's going to be problematic. they will be certainly not treated as liberators by the local sunni population. so the real question is where are you going to get this sunni army from? from the local tribes? from saudi arabia? i doubt it. et cetera. you can see the problems. i do see the problems. my answer would be, well, why not? because that's an argument that we'll have later.

so all of this has got to be long term then. you made the point about sustainability and persistance. i forget what was the americans call it operation? inherent resolve is it or something? resolve and persistance. but it's got to be sustainable. what rur your comments about that? how do you see that running? if it's going to be a long terl political argument to deal with the objectives but also a longer term -- i mean? >> i have no idea. >> you have no idea. >> so -- >> you know. >> but it's important in terms of that how we configure and how we sort of try -- >> absolutely. politically we shouldn't be looking for quick wins because there aren't going to be any. and that gives -- >> so the prime minister isn't wrong to say it's generational? >> no, he's not wrong at all. and let's see this -- and if he's going to adopt that philosophy i don't think he should see this as being

something that is a recorrect event. i think he should see this as the latest occurrence since 9/11 of sunni extremism and i think the most encouraging line on that came from tony blair, not a man i normally praise too much but when he came out and said the biggest threat the world faces is sunni violent extremism and i think he's absolutely right. and if that sets the world priority then that's been the problem we've been facing for the last 12 years or since 9/11. so that is generational struggle. we've already been doing it since 9/11 and we're going to have to keep doing it. the root cause in my view is not the military corps it's education. it's actually about education. because the nature of, in my view the nature of islamic observance across the world is being altered by these mad drasses and the forms of islam taught in these schools. and that is the time bomb that

will lead to the general rational struggle that the prime minister talks about. >> those two gentlemen, they can't be wrong all the time. could they? they've got to be right some time. >> to what extent is turkey's involvement here? one thing that interests me about the discussion about syria is a lot of attention on the soviets and we had this thing about with it being armed, where arms are coming in, who is paying for them. i need to know what is happening in the north and all of a sudden we've got isil and we've got the north. so it's a big place, big spaces. but the neighbors at the top end of turkey, i mean, it's moving every day. but what do you think they can do given they are not? even seen -- to your point about religions and all the the rest of it. how should they play and how can we help them to play constructively? >> i think our start point should be to limit our expectations and to see the world again through turkish eyes not our own. if you look at it from their

point of view they like many countries assumed that assad would go very quickly and opened their door for jihaddists went through. when the nature became more extreme and what you see now if you're set in turkey is three threats from the turkish area. you see the kurds, isil, and assad. and they've got to balance those three and work out which one's the priority. it seems at the moment to get rid of the kurds, assad second and then deal with isil. because if you take the statement seriously that you want to redraw the broundrizz, it seemed to go through syria down the euphrates into iraq. so given that those are his stated objectives the question is what he turns out to do. he seems to have changed his political direction so many times agreeing to one thing, reanything on it now actually

allow it again. so i don't know. there's lot to be learned from them but i think we should start by understanding the constraints and the fear that he has and trying -- doesn't give us some compass on where he is going to be going next. >> at the moment you just want a hip cratic oath from him. do you? >> well, clearly from my point of view i would hope that he would see isil as the biggest threat because that is -- you know, as i said before i think it is. but i would understand from his point of vow it might not seem to be at the moment. >> with all your expertise and training, have you got any idea how come isil can pick up relatively sophisticated tanks, artillery, turn them around, and be pretty good at their useage without having to do a british army cause? because we would spend weeks training on these things. i am just confused that they n sort of pick up a tank and

gun it, command it, and look after it. do you have any idea or more insight on that? >> i think like most people i was -- well, i was surprised, because i understand most people were surprised, when isil burst on the scene. but reading back on it now people are saying that they've actually been at -- this force has been in gestation for some time and i can only go on what i've read in open source. your source of information is better than mine. but it seems to me that they've actually been trained on these things over some period of time. and as you say -- >> so they're prepared to take them up. >> so we've seen. but i have no particular knowledge on this. >> and the second comment and question is really, it seems so impossible for us to deal with this situation. ere's no solution that any

meth use la can come to as to how we deal with this rift through the arab world. is it true that in the end it will be history that you resolve this problem insofar as actually we're not going to have an impact. we could actually make it worse? if we do go in, we won't be thanked. and actually, in the end, the people who are most suffering will have to sort it out for themselves. and, therefore, is there an argument that we should actually just say to hell with on all your houses? and just say we're leaving? >> solution. i hate that word. the peace activist said on northern ireland. if you want a solution, go to a chemist. he said conflict is inevitable

in society. it's how you manage it. i would agree that there is no solution. this is about people. how people choose to manage their own conflict that are inherent in their society. the thing been said before, the opportunity was there after the anbar uprising from maliki had he had a different cast in mind to reward the sunni tribes for their revolt against al qaeda and bring them into the politic to make decisions on the distribution of oil profits, for instance, and also seats in government. but actually, what happened was he in fact he saw the arming of the sunni tribes as a very short-term experience. because in the shia mentality the biggest threat that united all shias and which they backed them was to make sure there was no resurgence of sunni power. so as soon as they got rid of al qaeda they were basically shut out again. and that was always the -- the political weakness of the military campaign of arming the

anbar tribes. so that was mismanaged. that opportunity was missed. should we say to hell with them? no. that's far too prescriptive. i firmly believe we should be in strong support of a fundamental sunni support of a sunni problem as i see it. >> i wasn't actually -- i was just devil's advocating. >> splendid. but that's why i'm in favor of a long-term policy of containment rather than trying to solve it from our point of view. >> that might be the alternative step. might it? we don't abandon. we just contain. >> and we wait for the sunnis to sort of it. >> that's what i'm getting at. >> and i'm sure politically somewhere we're thinking that part of the solution or part of the way to manage this may indeed be to reconsider the borders of the region and there are a lot of people i understand saying that actually the borders of iraq will not be

recovered and regained in the way that they were before. we're not going to turn the clock back. so there needs to be on that light some pretty sharp footwork politically to work out some stepping stone system to a new future. >> thank you. >> if indeed we are talking about containment until they sort themselves out, what would that take militarily to achieve? >> it seems to me that sunnis -- that isil's success has been limited to sunni land so far. as soon as they land on kurd or shia on the other, that progress has slowed dramatically. you could argue therefore that all we need to do is provide sufficient air power to make sure that it is needed if there are isis strikes that that helps maintain that sort of sectarian buffer, if you like.

how that works up in syria i guess maybe that may be a different battle than iraq. in which case it's air power and also -- which means some control perhaps on the ground. i noticed someone saying earlier that there would be no infantry on the ground but maybe forward air controllers and who knows what might provide that kind of assistance. i also think the id task is also one. it is a technique that isil used to surround posts with ieds and having a counter ied force out in iraq would be very useful and stopping them using that weapon system to take out outposts, whether they be sunni or whether they be peshmerga. and on that basis, it ought to be sustainable. certainly within iraq, to stop their own incursions further

south. >> do you think the air power so far is sufficient? >> well, i don't know enough about the land incurses. we seemed to slow their incursions. if i'm right about the shia and kurds holding their own land i'm not sure it's -- i suspect the more need is precision about how it's applied rather than the sheer quantity. at the moment we seem to go on flights and find trouble finding a target which seems we've got a bit of overkill. >> you don't think that will need significant or sizeable ground forces wherever they may ome from to also help contain? obviously special forces and the rest on the ground would -- i want to be clear what you're saying. >> i would hope that's enough. i'm taking a punt on the fighting power to protect their

own land. these local militias i do have a certain intensity of moral courage, if you like, that was notably absent in mosul. so i think if they were align with the western fire power i would be confident that they could hold where they are. >> talk about a number in the middle east. what about do they have a role to play? because they're threatened given that the vast number of refugees -- they couldn't take any more. there's great instability. >> my understanding is that jordan is playing a more forward-leading role than most countries. and certainly our country but certainly the orienttation of their king i think this is understandable and a good thing. what i would like to see is more participation from across the region. >> going back to where we started. you were saying you're not clear about what the strategy is on the basis of what you

said. >> indeed i'm not. you're quite right. >> and general shareden said that. >> yes. >> and so what i think i would like to see would be a sunni strategy with us. that's really what i want to see and us supporting it. that's the trouble with the westerners coming out with a strategy it ends up being a christian strategy. >> so you don't see a strategy? >> i can't see where it's heading. i can't see the politics. >> ok. clarify an ted to apology if i misunderstood. the intention between you say the need for containment strategy but this issue of potentially making it worse if it is christian-led as you put it. are you suggesting that that tips the balance to being unhelpful when it's ground troops and that actually the sort of level of engagement

with a bit of extra, as you described, could be a positive thing? or could this play and the u.k. being involved in this way becomes counter productive? >> i didn't see the -- i didn't see enough of the intelligence factors to be able to judge the overall effect of western air power on this. i just see what i read in the papers and the opinion seems to be divided. it is potentially very double edged for all the arguments. which is not necessarily -- i mean, every action you do has both positive and negative. you've just got to balance those. so i'm not in principle against air strikes with the aim of limiting isis advance. but the metric has to be the overall political campaign and that's what concerns me that i can't quite see that. >> because we would love our neighbors to be leading this in

fact doing all of that. but that isn't going to happen so we have to make a judgment as to whether we step in in some form or not. >> yes. well, they need to in our lifetime we may say it hasn't happened but there are instances where they have actually taken action if they feel sufficiently threatened. they do things in ways that we don't really conceive of. because they have a different mindset than we do. they work in different ways. >> if i have a minute -- >> you have much more time than a minute. you have ten minutes. >> thank you. general, do you believe that the u.k. ought to join the united states and its allies in carrying out air strikes in syria? >> well, if the legal

foundation is sound, which i think the foreign secretary was saying it was the other day, then militarily would make sense to -- for the same purpose on the containment strategy, to do that. >> you'll be more aware than i that the current size and structure of her majesty's armed forces. are those structures of sufficient size and capability to deal with the crisis such as the current one we have in the middle east? we would say that seem to -- the fact that we're using six now eight aged tornadoes show that we've been buying the wrong planes for the last 10, 15 years, and that we bought a brand-new sparkling plane and put a concrete block

in the nose instead of a gun as a cost-saving measure. >> that's pretty definite. condemnation. could i just take it a bit further. so we've got this one crisis. if there were to be further developments in eastern europe which required u.k. forces part f a nato mission, or perhaps further troops are required in response to the ebola crisis so that now there's three, are her majesty's armed forces sufficient to do all three issions effectively? >> that's a very motive question because it leafs undefined by what you mean by

effectively. and how you identify the mission. the ebola one i can't argue for. east european one is an interesting one in that it depends what you see the threat is. fortunately the chief of the general staff of the russians outlined a year ago the way he saw russian forces operating and it's a way -- as far as i know he's the first world country to describe how they were going to engage in what we would call hybrid war. and the big worry i would have about hybrid war is not the capacity of our armed forces to cope with it but the capacity of us to organize across government. the actual plan rather than just an approach because i think the whole nature of hybrid war is plagued with a strength of the soviets -- sorry, the russian system. froidion slip. and exposes what i would perceive as a chronic weakness

in the british government system in that we don't do -- have an executive culture to create a plan across. it's an accumulation. i've written a book on that exact topic britain in the perilous world, which i would submit as evidence to the committee. >> do we have enough forces for it? if i understand correctly, the military involvement in that campaign is small and limited. very limited and very precisely targeted because -- and the only time it's applied is when the battle is already won when the population is already sufficiently stired up when you've motivate it had population. and in georgia, as in crimea, as in ukraine, little green men suddenly appear and suddenly the gain is lost. that's really the worry i would have about the battlics. i don't see mass tanks rolling

across from germany. what i see is subversion, corruption, disinformation, massacre, all that sort of classic stuff. and in that sense it's not a question of mass that we need. it's precision and application of all believers of government in support of the host countries in the battlic. >> members that we have visitic the battlic countries and i wonder if you would agree with one of our recommendations is that there should be regular nate of exercises, not permanent nato bases but regular nato exercises in the three baltic countries. >> i was very surprised that nato hasn't forward positioned troops across nato already. which always used to be the basis of -- there was a force that was designed to represent every nation in nato that delivered the deployed exactly for that purpose. i'm surprised we haven't got

those troops there on a rotating basis already. >> i knew we lived in the troubled world. the three witnesses have indicated it's even more troubled than i thought. >> thanks very much. >> our three witnesses are reasonably unanimous in saying what's happening in iraq is too optimistic to, too little, useless, dangerous, achieving a very moderate containment. in all your discussions, including the talks around the world in recent weeks, have you come across anybody who enthusiastically support what s we're doing in iraq? >> not in the terms which you're asking the question. no. >> well in what terms? it's a very simple question. do you know anybody, can you

think of anybody at all, commentators, think tanks, oliticians, who are really well informed who say what we have reasonably in iraq, air strikes is the right thing to have done? >> i think the air strikes in iraq could well have been done but the problem is it isn't connected to political plans apart from its containment aspect. >> before public sessions. so we're going to continue a brief discussion with the general. thank you, everybody. i thank the public very much for coming. and colleagues, if they need to go. >> up next obc-span, a conversation with world bank president jim young kim. and later q&a with documentary film maker rory kendyifment and

live at 7:00 your calls and comments on "washington journal." today a heritage foundation forum on the u.s. response to ebola domestically and in west africa.

>> the 2015 c-span student cam competition is under way to create a five to seven minute documentary showing how a policy law or action has affected you or your community. there's 200 cash prizes for students and teachers totalling $100 tchourks. for the list of rules and how to get started go to student cam.org. >> on friday the world bank president said the biggest concern with the ebola outbreak is the need for more doctors and health workers. speaking at the breakfast in washington, d.c. he outlined the world bank's response to the ebola outbreak. this is just over an hour.

>> good morning. thanks for coming. this is his first visit with the group and we are honored to host a number of his predecessors starting with robert mcin a marea back in 1971. we appreciate him taking time out of his busy schedule. he was born in south korea and moved iowa with his family when he was five. he earned a bachelor's degree from brown university and a medical degree and phd in antsdz polling. before finishing his degree our guest cofounded the nonprofit partners in health which provides health care in poor communities on four continents and was a leader in tackling tuberculosis and have aids in developing countries. in 2003 drk kim joined the staff of the world health

organization becoming director of the hiv aids department. the same year he won a mcartsdzyur genius scholarship. on the way he held a variety of professorships and chaired departments including harvard medical school and its school of public health. 2009-2012 he was the 17th president of dartmouth college, a position he left when he was elected world bank president in july of 2012. now on to the ritual recitation of ground rules. as always we are on the record here. please no live blogging or tweeting. in short no filing of any kind while the breakfast is under way to give us time to actually listen to what our guest said. there's no embargo when the session ends. to help you resist the relentless selfie urge we will e-mail several pictures of the session to all reporters here as soon as the breakfast ends. as regular attendees know if you would like to ask a question please do the

traditional thing and send me a subtle nonthreatening signal and i will happily call on one and all. start off by offering our guest the opportunity to make opening comments. then we'll move to questions from around the table. thanks again sir for doing it. >> thanks so much for having me. it's a great honor to be here. i know this breakfast has a long tradition and we do know that starting with the presidents have been here. i am open to talking about anything you might want to talk about but probably something that's on the top of people ds minds is the ebola epidemic that's going on right now. first of all let me start by saying that i have been watching very carefully about what's going on in new york city and a couple of things are very striking. first, this was the city and a system that was extremely well prepared. i think we learned a lot from dallas and looking at the response from both the governor, the mayor, the public health officials, tom frieden

from the centers for disease control it was very impressive. they did everything just the way that you want a government or a system to respond. the other thing that i would like to stress, and we can talk more about it, is we all have to understand that dr. spencer is a hero. that he is doing exactly what is needed to actually bring the epidemic to an end. he is a hero in that he went and did the one thing that we need to do in order to stop more cases from coming not only here but everywhere else. we need to have health workers. we need to have experienced health workers. my understanding is that he is a fellow in international emergency medicine which is an extremely good training for something like this kind of activity. and the one thing that now we know in these three countries is that we need health workers. there's tremendous work being done especially by the u.s. and the u.k. on building facilities. but it's still not clear where

the health workers are going to come from to provide the treatment, the isolation, the infection control that we need right now. the epidemic is still growing. it's really hard to get exact numbers on where we are in the three countries but we know it's still growing. and i think any numbers that you might hear most of them are about -- are ori yield back the balance of my timed around thinking how to plan. how big could it get? it doesn't make any sense for me to tell you that it's going to get this big or that. but if we do not improve our ground game quickly, lots is being done. if i look back a month -and-a-half there's so much going on on the ground now that there wasn't before. but the biggest concern and why dr. spencer's story is so poignant for me. the biggest concern is we'll build facilities and then we won't have the workforce to put them into use. so with that, let me stop and hand it back to dave and then

we'll talk about anything else that you would like to talk about. >> i'll do one or two and then we're going to mark, guy, hannah, done, and brett to start. let me take you back to something that you said at a reuters event last week. you said in terms of the global response to ebola, we're not close yet. we're not close in terms of getting it right. has that assessment changed? >> we're closer now than even we were last week. so things are moving quickly. facilities are getting built. facilities are getting built. we're looking at every single option. i just spoke with margaret this morning. she called me whenever she needs to tell me and she called to tell me a couple things. first, they had a very successful meeting on vaccines because there are several vaccine candidates. now, let me stress. there is no proven vaccine. so we can't be lulled into thinking that a vaccine is

going to solve this problem. even if we did we would need health workers to administer them. but the one thing that was not clear is how a vaccine trial would be worked out. just yesterday, they had a meeting with the u.s.-u.k. officials from the private sector and they worked that out. so things are moving day today. she just told me that one of the big issues -- how do you pay health workers? they're working on electronic payments for health workers. all this tells you that the speed and the momentum of the response is growing. but what she told me this morning and what still remains true is that we do not have enough health workers and we are not quite sure where they're going to come from. >> my guess is you're going to get asked about the u.s. aspect by other people, celeb me ask ask you you something that may not come to mind, and that is what you see

is the role of fear and the media's behavior in dealing with all of this. you said in an op-ed in "the washington post," the crisis we're watching unfold derives less from the virus itself and more from deadly and misinformed biases that have led to a disastrously inadequate response to the outbreak. so what is your sense of how the media has behaved, what is your sense of the role of fear in dealing with this? >> the media has very tremendous -- has varied tremendously. i've seen high-quality reports that go into detail about how the virus is transmitted. then i have seen sensationalist media reports. we take this fear very seriously. from the perspective of economics, what we have learned is that 80% to 90% of the economic impact of these outbreaks has to do with fear, what we call aversion behavior. fear than it does with the virus.

so the virus can have a limited impact, and then fear has a huge impact. that is what happened during the sars epidemic. one of the things that is really critical is to explain and be really accurate and specific about how these things evolve. that is what they did in new york. in watching at least part of the press conference, i thought that the very clear explanations both on the part of the public health people, but then having political leaders there clearly knowing what the facts are and then reassuring the population was very important. we will see what happens today in new york, but i thought that their handling of the information piece was extremely good. >> finally for me, there is a study from the world bank on the economic impacts. and several different cases. one case, 3.8 billion, the high

case 32.6 billion -- that assumes it is contained in southwest africa. what is your sense -- has your sense of the economic impact of this changed at all in the last week or two? >> it all depends on whether we can get the response in place. if you take the perspective of the virus, the most important thing right now is to stop it where it is spreading quickly. there are still parts of the three countries where it is spreading quickly. so there is really only one way to stop this from continuing to export cases all over the country -- all over the continent, all over the world, and that is to redouble and redouble our efforts on the ground. so the agencies that are supposed to be working on this -- the world health organization, the u.n., funding

organizations like ourselves, the united states government, the u.k., france, and all the other governments -- they have stepped up their response. but unfortunately we were late, so instead of having a few dozen cases, the largest outbreak to date has been 425 cases. there are more health professionals who have been infected than the number of cases of the largest epidemic previously. so we're behind because it is moving so quickly. but while there is optimism about what has happened, there is still a long way to go. if we do not solve the health worker problem, all the efforts and worker problem, all the efforts to date will simply not have the impact that we need to have. >> mark? in >> you come to this with an an >> you come to this with an interesting expertise in your sitting in an interesting position now. what do you see as the world bank's role? and do you find organization suited for the vision you have of how it might benefit the

situation? >> the world bank is very involved in financing health. there is a good reason for that. larry summers just did a study -- now 11 months ago -- in january of 2014, larry summers published a study that shows that in low to middle income countries, fully 24% of the economic growth in low to middle income countries from 2000 to 2011 was due to improved health. the fact that life expectancy went up, maternal mortality went down, that infant mortality went down -- those interventions that led to longer life accounted for 1/4 of economic growth. we are involved in health because it is so important for growth. in this case, we have a crisis response window. and it is one of the only sources of readily available

cash we can move. because the other traditional funders weren't stepping up and because there was not a fund that immediately disperses when you have outbreaks like this, we had to become that organization. here is what we are focusing on now. we have, we've developed these very interesting instruments -- almost like insurance instruments. we call them catastrophic drawdown bonds. what we do is we go into a country like mexico and we say, the last time he had an earthquake, it was difficult getting the cash to respond. so we worked out a way that the next time something like that happens, there is a big chunk of will money, hundreds of millions of dollars, that as soon as they have a disaster, those funds will disperse. inside our organizations, people start saying, why don't we have something like that for outbreaks like this? that is what we're working on. that for the medium and long-term is exactly our role. we can use our balance sheet, set up systems of contingent

liabilities so that a large fund, billions and billions of dollars, can be set up, but we will only disperse if there is an emergency. because that was the problem. as much as organizations like msf and others and the other charitable groups that brought this to everybody's attention, as much as they would like to scale up, there was not the resources, the sort of health worker core that was ready to go. we know we have to build that. we will work on the financial pieces of it. and our hope is that together with the global community we can set something up that will work like this. so let's say something even worse than ebola, deadly pandemic flu for example, breaks out somewhere. if we can get billions of dollars moving right away, then we can bring that, the emergency health worker core into fighting

those epidemics. our hope is that it would work for an advance market signaled for vaccines. right now vaccine makers would like to go full but it is hard to find financing because they are saying it in if there was an outbreak, would there be an interest in your product? who would pay? this could take a step towards answering that question. the immediate response? yes. the link between health and economic development, no question. but even protecting from downside risk to the economy, this is one of the things we have to do. >> let me just follow-up quickly. how much money did the world bank pony up right at the beginning? >> so, really, before anyone else steps up, we pledged $200 million. and then afterward when we saw that it was much more serious epidemic we did $200 million more. usually this takes months to disperse. three months is an incredibly

rapid disbursement, but once we saw the problem from the time we took it to our board to the time it was in the three countries was nine days. normally we do not work like that, but this was so crucial that we did it. and this is going to -- the first $117 million is on the ground. and it is paying for everything from supplies, detective -- protective gear, to health worker salaries. we bought ambulances because ambulances were needed to carry the patients. so we are really doing anything that is needed right now. but a big chunk of that money also has to be for holding back those health systems. and also trying to get the economies going. so our private sector arm has now committed to increasing its activities. the economic impact in these three countries has already been devastating. and we now have to really think

about rebuilding those economies. all three of them have come out of conflicts over the last decade. and the last thing we need is for this epidemic to lead into another situation where they move back into conflict. so we are trying to do many things at once, but right now the focus has to be on putting the fire out. >> guy? >> thanks so much for being here, mr. president. my name is guy taylor from "the washington times." and i'm going to be "that guy." i want to bring the conversation inside the world bank for a minute. there have been a lot of articles, some i have written and a number of others here about unrest among the staff inside the bank. memos circulating among rank-and-file economists. there is one out now that is calling for people to hold a rally in the lobby of the bank

every thursday. there have been several such large rallies. some of these people, mostly will not give their names, but are accusing you on paper of gross mismanagement of a restructuring of the bank. i wanted to give you an opportunity to respond to that publicly, but i specifically wanted to ask, one of the things that has come out of this sense of a culture of fear inside the bank. people complain about this to reporters. i wonder what you are doing to address that, because budget cuts or reforming on restructuring are one thing, but when a culture of fear takes hold, it's a difficult thing. >> when i took the job in july, 2012, the questions that i was getting in a pretty pointed way was what is the relevance of the world bank today?

the issues that kept coming up were, are you relevant for middle-income countries anymore? one of the things that was worrisome is that we were reaching a single borrower limit. in other words, we were running out of space to support middle income countries. the other issue that came up was the sense that as a knowledge institution we had fallen backwards. that we weren't providing state-of-the-art knowledge to all of the countries who are our clients. what we did, we did a survey of the entire staff. and the survey was extremely critical of the bank as it was. and, so the issues we try to tackle were, how can we continue to be relevant for middle income countries? how can we ensure that we are moving the best global knowledge to every country?

and one of the things we foud were when we asked technical specialist, how much debt the time do you spend dividing your expertise to other regions? it came back around 1%. we knew we needed to do a couple of things. we talk to everybody and we decided that we needed to make some pretty fundamental root and branch changes. when we decided we were going to do that, i told everybody this is going to be really hard, because it had not happened for 20 years. there had been really no structural change for 20 years. this talk of moving toward a global knowledge system, talk of trying to increase our lending capacity, all of this was on the table, but nothing had happened literally since 1997. so when we started in, we tackle d the very robust agenda.

and we did it in a time of low interest rates. so historically low interest rates affect us. our income is lower. the only way we would have been able to do that, to grow our capacity, to lend to middle income countries and to have global knowledge was at the same time to do a review of expenditures. it turns out that an expenditure review had not been done for a long time. i suspect that all of your organizations have gone through reviews. we had not for more than a decade. so, what the board told us was, we will work with you and let you increase your lending capacity and we support the move to go to global knowledge groups, but you really have to do something about efficiency and your expenditures. so, the complexity of this is we did it all at once. the reason we did it all at once is because each was contingent on the other. you can expand your lending to

middle income countries, but you have to go to the expenditure review. if you can expand your lending, the only reason they would want more lending is if your knowledge was significantly better. so we're in the middle of this, and people are absolutely understandably worried about their jobs. they are worried about what the system will look like. and big bureaucracies like ours, when people get used to a way of doing things, no matter how much they may be critical of it in a survey and tell you that there are steps -- etc., when you change it, it's unsettling. we knew there would be many course corrections we would have to go through. and we are in the middle of a course correction right now. you know, the rallies have happened. and after one of the rallies, i had a town hall meeting and we spoke about specific issues. there were some issues that i had, i was aware of. then there were others that were

brought to my attention in a very clear way at that town hall. the next week he had another and made policy changes. i would put it this way -- i have great empathy and sympathy for the people who have to go through this and are still uncertain about their jobs. but the only thing we can do is to keep going, and make sure that changes happen. then everyone will know soon enough whether or not they have a job or how the process of making decisions around jobs will go forward. you know, i have learned a lot from this process. one of the things that is most important is that when you have 188 governors, a live-in board. our board lives and works within the institution. 25 executive directors. people from 100 different countries. with this much cultural complexity, with an organization that is so complex that has not gone through a change in the

long time, it is tough. so i know there is no doubt it is tough. but there are things that are happening already that i think are because we made these changes. for example, the response to ebola has not been a regional response at all. it has been a response that has evolved all kinds of different expertise in the bank. now we are structured so we can do that. we recently were able to put together a price on carbon, a statement on a price on carbon for the u.n. general assembly. again, that was a cross -- an institution wide effort that really would not have happened before. so i, i am extremely optimistic and confident that this is going to get better. >> real quickly because we have got a lot of other people in. >> i appreciate your answer. you did hold these town halls.

at one of them, the issue of the cfo's bonuses came up. i'm curious to know. this is bertrand -- he was given a signing bonus. you announced to the staff that he would renounce his bonus. however, the world bank press office then came out and said he he had already received 70% of his bonus, and he was going to be keeping that, but foregoing the last part. could you clarify that? because this is going to be broadcast. i'm sure there are people inside the bank that know you are the person has the answer. is he giving his bonuses back, or he's keeping him and not getting them going forward? >> he's not giving what he artie -- has already received back. that would be very difficult process to go through -- he is not giving what he already received back. the premium is because we are --

organization, and salaries for staff in different countries are based on local salaries. and it's very difficult for us to attract the kind of talent we need in many places in the world if we do not have a premium. in the case of bertand, he was the cfo of one of the most important and largest banks in france. we were trying to help meet the salary cut that he was taking. i think bertrand did a great thing in refusing to take anymore, but we are not asking him to give back what he or he had. >> thanks for coming and talking about this again. i am going to go back to the >> -- two ebola. >> a little louder. >> i wanted to ask you about the chance of, how the disease is spreading or not in west africa.

if you talk to experts looking at the number of cases in the fact that even in nigeria, as we talked about the response, was huge for just a small number of cases. and given we don't have enough workers, the expectation is that this is going to spread with neighboring countries. what does that mean for the strategy for how to deal with this? what does it mean for the u.s. response? because the u.s. has come in, and so far they've said their troops will not be coming near the disease, but do you think that is a realistic strategy and what is the exit point for that? >> so, what happened in nigeria was really a model. but it was a model that was workable because there was one cross-border case that led to 20 cases. so, just to give everyone the numbers. it was over 200 physicians. over 600 other health workers.

upwards of, more than $10 million of cost. they did almost 19,000 home visits where they took people's temperatures. this was during the contact. it was a textbook public health response. but if you can imagine if there were 100 cases or 1000 cases that came over the border, it would challenge even nigeria to be able to respond effectively. so right now the strategy is to focus on what are the critical things to do to make sure you can somehow knock down the speed of the growth. so the two things that people have identified are safe burials and then identifying the people who are sick. then, at the same time, trying to provide them both treatment in preventing further infection. so, i think the goal now is 70%

safe burials and 70% detection of cases. that is not the classic public health response because whether they are saying is that it's going to be difficult to find every case right now and difficult to do all the contact tracing. so i think they are being practical and try to take that first major step -- knock down the growth by going at the places where, going after those problems that are spreading the virus the most. then after that, you may be able to then bring in the classic public health response. but right now that is the reality. we are now using not the ideal techniques but it is because the epidemic in those three countries is too big. now if we had thousands of health workers going in, we could get all of that done and then get to the classic public health responses, doing the contact traces. that is what you would like to do.

in a situation where you do not have enough workers, you have to focus on what are the highest impact things you can do right now. >> do you think it is going to spread to neighboring countries, and what does that mean for the strategy of how to fight it? >> so, we are also -- the world health organization, the whole global response is working with each of the neighboring countries to put their response in place. so i think there is no doubt that the neighboring countries are much better prepared than liberia, sierra leone, and guinea were, but it is going to be a challenge. if it is one case at a time, there are systems that will respond. if we do not get it under control and hundreds or thousands of people start coming across the border, then i think we are going to have a very serious problem. >> we are going next to "the l.a. times." "the dallas morning news." "the journal."

mr. lee? >> with the g-20 coming up, what are you expecting physically, or maybe what are you looking for in terms of their response to ebola? and secondly, on a non-ebola question, there have been reports about the u.s. actively opposing china's efforts to build a development bank. and that could rival the world bank, and i wonder what you think of that effort. >> i suspect there will be talk about ebola at the g-20. i think president obama and prime minister david cameron have been very loud about asking other countries to make donations and to do their part. i'll certainly give the same message, that we still need resources and we still need

health workers. so i will surely give that message at the g-20. at the g-20, the topic of discussion will be global growth. this is what, the two items that the australians have focused on for their hosting of the g-20 has been target for global growth, and that is the 2% local target. the interesting thing is when the oecd and imf did a survey of all the different economic strategies that are, that are currently being carried out, that if everyone did what they said they were going to do, there is a possibility to get to 1.8% global growth. so, in that sense, it is a relatively positive picture, but then the question is -- will everybody implement all the structural reforms that they need to reach that target? that is going to be one of the discussion items. yeah, yeah.

and so, so the other issue of infrastructure gets right to your second question. one of the things that the australians have identified is that there is a massive market failure right now. there are a lot of great infrastructure projects that could both boost the growth of economies, especially in developing countries, and there's lots of capital sitting on the sidelines earning low returns. and the win-win situation could be that we find some way of mobilizing that capital that is sitting on the sidelines and get it invested in these vital infrastructure projects. and so, the australians have really focused on building something called the infrastructure center, global infrastructure center, that will be a clearinghouse of information and opportunities to bring capital on the sidelines and infrastructure projects

together. now, that's exactly what the asian infrastructure investment bank is going to do. it was launched yesterday in china. you would have to ask the united states government what their take on this is. i will tell you our view. the chinese government began talking with us very early on, really immediately after they had this idea. and the idea was that especially in asia, there is nowhere near enough money for infrastructure. the estimate is that there is $1 trillion in additional investments that were needed in infrastructure in developing countries alone. so if you put all the multilateral banks together, we are $45 billion. if you look at the private sector, some from 2012 to 2013, private sector investment in infrastructure in developing countries went down. and so, the figure in 2013 was around $160 billion. all of the infrastructure investment does not begin to

meet the need in developing countries for infrastructure. our perspective is that any institution that comes to the table to try to make these investments in infrastructure, we welcome. we have been working very closely with them. and they want to utilize our technical expertise. we have been doing everything from project preparation to implementation support, to bringing multiple different groups together to finance projects. so the asian infrastructure investment bank should be a very welcome addition to the current situation, which is a woeful lack of financing for infrastructure. now, the politics of it we are not a political organization. it is actually in our articles of agreement that we do not get involved in domestic politics. so we'll have to ask the u.s. the position on it. my sense is that we could work with them very well.

[indiscernible] t>> he u.s. efforts -- >> i have not heard. from chinese officials. not at all. we, without question know that there are many more infrastructure projects that are worthy of investment that we can invest in. we know that for sure. so, i think the critical thing for us would be to make sure our efforts are well coordinated. i can even see coinvensting in one of the outcomes of the australian g-20 was that we establish the global infrastructure facility for just

again, that is not nearly enough. so what we did is we built, we just launched a facility that we will put some of her own money in, but we will do all of the preparation, we will use our safeguards. then we're going to try to attract money from other sources. for example, sovereign wealth funds that would not take -- from europe or the u.s. that would not think of investing in infrastructure in developing countries. if we are involved and make it clear that the risk-reward ratio makes sense, then we can bring some of that capital into building roads and highways and sources of energy in africa. >> apart from mr. duncan, the first case of ebola diagnosed, the record of treating patients has been good so far in the u.s. with the two nurses who were infected -- they clear the virus before an average person show symptoms. are there specific early interventions that we are learning about here that might be able to be applied in africa tickets to that stage of catching it early enough?

or is it just general hospital care? >> so, the ebola virus is a very interesting virus in the sense that it's really not well-adapted to exist in the world in the sense that, in a developed country, if you prevent any further infections and it gave intensive care to the people who are sick, you can stop it spread very quickly. it is, the reason it has spread in those three countries is because it's opportunistically taking advantage of the fact that their health systems were not developed to detect, treat, or prevent further infections. so it only can spread if you're falling down on the job in terms of providing services. so i think we all recognize that the next thing we have to really do is to commit to putting in

place adequate health services in every country in the world. because it is going to be the country that does not have the services that is going to be the accelerator of future epidemics. we now understand that we have got to get better at it. but the treatment is really supportive care. so there are some candidate drugs, vaccines. but supportive care, meaning that what happens is when the virus gets into cells and they leak, you lose fluid. and your electrolytes -- potassium -- alexa let's get out of balance. what you need to be able to do is replenish those fluids. there's a great story. a doctor from liberia who survive. he forced himself to drink 12 liters of fluid a day. he forced himself to eat by holding his nose. any modern hospital, you would not have to do that.

you would provide intravenous fluid. if needed, you would provide either gastric feeding or intravenous feeding. in other words, all the tools that we need to get survival rates up very high, we have. one of the efforts we are trying to make in these three countries, and this is especially the focus of my former colleagues at partners in health, is to try to increase the capacity to do things like monitoring and managing electrolytes and providing intravenous hydration, because for the doctor who survived, i think just about all of his colleagues died. because it is really hard to drink 12 liters of fluid a day, and hold your nose to eat. any modern medical center would have given those nurses a much better chance of survival.

so what we are trying to do is to argue that we have put in place in these countries a high level of care, intravenous fluids, electrolyte management, so that the incentive is for people in those three countries to stay where they are. they want to stay in their home country. they want to go back to work in their field. they want to go back to their jobs. but if you're in a situation where those things are not available and you know that survival is much higher elsewhere, the incentive is to leave. so this is something i just cannot stress enough. we've got to get beyond nihilistic notions that nothing can be done. the only way to put it out is to put in as high a quality of services as we possibly can. do the things quickly that we know will slow things down. identifying who they are. but if you tell patients, we are going to isolate you. we are not going to give you any fluids, tube feeds, but we are going to make sure you do not infect anyone else. if you think that going into isolation is a death sentence,

then unfortunately, the incentive is to go somewhere where it is not a death sentence. so that's the challenge. that is why we need health workers so badly. >> michael? >> dallas morning news. what were the mistakes and what were the learnings that you didn't see, that you saw taken advantage of new york -- in new york? >> first of all, we now have a much, much higher level of suspicion. and we're paying much closer attention to travel history. so dr. spencer is a trained professional, so he was taking his temperature twice a day from the time he came. the fact that he made the call and got the care literally the morning when his temperature spikes suggest to me that the chance, just as everyone said, the chance of infecting others before that was as the

department of health said, almost nil. in dallas, there just was not the level of heightened awareness that this might come. so, it's on the one hand unfortunate that that happened to dallas, but fortunate that we learned from it. my understanding is that because of that experience, health systems all over the u.s. are now at a level of preparedness that they simply had not been before. and so, it's the repair this, thinking ahead. there is no miracle drugs. no magical or surgical procedure that stops it. it is high-level suspicion so that when you know someone might have ebola you isolate them right away. then when they get sick, you provide the care they need to survive. i don't know exactly what the number will be, but i suspect

that for a case cup early -- for a case caught early. mr. duncan died, but it was probably because we were late in getting the treatment. if we treated him early, the chances of him surviving would have been much higher. if that's the story. i hope that will become the story. that went cases are caught early and in a prepared health care system like the united states, that not only do we prevent infections but survival is very high. >> any other questions mentioning the importance of getting health care workers. given the cases that have made the most attention in america, have center dot health-care workers. how are you going to convince thousands of folks to put themselves at risk? >> it's a great question. that's why i started by saying that dr. spencer is a hero.

dr. spencer understood this epidemic. he understood that the only way to protect americans in the medium and long-term was to treat, in his case, guineans. he understood that. that is the case. so, even after dr. spencer came back with ebola, i would still say that what we need now is for physicians -- we take various forms of oath. the oath is we 'll do everything we can to protect ourselves, but our job is to treat those who are sick. if you have a global epidemic raging in three countries, i think it is extremely noble that also very much in the spirit of what we, of the oaths we take in becoming physicians. and so, i wish him the best. i hope he gets better quickly. i would not be surprised if he goes back and continues to treat people in those countries.

and i would urge others to seriously consider going and helping. >> "the journal." >> my colleague in monrovia has said that there are numerous anecdotal cases of workers who aren't getting paid the cash that, including yourself, the bank has provided. what sort of accountability structure do you have an assurances do you have that the cash is being spent as intended and isn't being siphoned off into some accounts? secondly, nobody has mentioned this. i'm just curious whether there has been any mention of sick on the. your secondment to oversee global efforts on this.

you constantly seem to be saying that there is a shortage of supply, a shortage of action. you seem to be pushing, knowledgeable of what is going on. there's been criticism of other efforts. and finally, if you could, can you elaborate just what your understanding is on the shortage of health-care workers? what are we talking about? how many thousands are we short? >> so, ian, as you know, we have been aggressively trying to lead the fight against corruption in developing countries since 1996 when jim wolfensohn -- it was unknown for people like the president of the world bank to use what they call the c-word.

corruption. his aids begged him not to say corruption. he then went out and did the speech called a cancer of corruption. ever since that time, people like paul volker and others have been working with us and all the other institutions to follow the money as carefully as we can. every single project is audited. we have people on the ground who are following the money. and you know, our understanding is that a lot of this is just related to the inefficiency in the system. on the other hand, if there are people siphoning off these funds, we have about as robust system as one can imagine in settings like this to follow it afterwards. so i think it is really, as i said, margaret chen this morning called me at 6:15, by the way,

to tell me that one of the things they are trying to do is to put electronic payment systems in place. we know there are great examples of electronic payment systems that are working in africa. in kenya. so it is one of the things we're going to work on over the next literally days to weeks to get that system on the ground. if we can do something that is more automated, that people get paid on a a card with a cell phone, we will put it into place. i have a day job, ian. and the response is being led by all the appropriate people. so the secretary general is very personally involved in the response. and you know, as i said, margaret is 24 hours a day, margaret chen, the head of the world health organization is working on this issu they are the ones who can convene a meeting on vaccines

and come up with the protocol. they are the ones who can convene all the right people to have the kinds of conversations that need to be had about where to go. it is interesting. they prod in the person -- the person who is running the response is probably the person has the most experience in doing things on the ground. bruce is an old friend. he has been running the polio eradication response. that is a huge effort. now that he is involved, there is something you have not heard of -- the global outbreak alert and response network. g-o-a-r-n. they have 300 people that were brought together around previous epidemics, and they were critical in managing the sars epidemic. now just about everybody from that network is in those countries. so i think there are a lot of -- there's a lot of activity and organization. i do not feel like i need to, i would need to, and i haven't been asked to step in.

margaret and i are old friends. i hired her as part of a transition team in 2003 when i was leading the transition for the new director general. i have known her for a decade. and i know these players so well that it has been really helpful for me to be in this position being able to put resources in various places in collaboration with the others. i think that is not the issue right now. the issue is continuing the momentum and at the risk repeating myself too often, getting the people in place who can actually make it happen. >> we have got five minutes left. we go to mark and then the general lady from "figaro." the npr. >> you have talked about the importance of russian resources to the west african region. but -- rushing resources to the west african region. we have our hands full trying to do that and get health systems at home in the u.s. ready in

cases like new york, but is there also a need to get going on the wider public health system? could this crop up in other developing countries that are not ready and are resources being mobilized for that and how so? >> great question. let me answer the health question -- the health workers question. it is thousands. more than that, it is thousands who rotate. it's really hard to do this kind in of work for a year. so the nsf has rotations. we need literally thousands and thousands of trained health workers who will need more training around ebola to step up and volunteer. we would love to see hospital systems in the u.s. in volunteer numbers. we would love to see countries all over europe. cuba has stepped up

impressively. we'd like to see more countries do just that. the answer is yes, could another epidemic, top of this? yes, absolutely. could another epidemic crop up? all those answers are yes. i think this is a wake-up call. i hope it is. this is why i'm so focused on getting this global facility put together. because if we go out and say you need to put billions of dollars into a fund, i think that is going to be a negative response. if we say that we need to set up an instrument that you'd only have to pay back if it disperses, and it would only disperse in the face of a terrible emergency, that i think we have the beginnings of a discussion. i actually began the discussion at the g-20. there has been a lot of interest. so we are going forward.

we are going to put something together. now, but you also need basic public health. infrastructures in place in every country in the world and it's really not that expensive. it's affordable and you'll. -- and doable. this is a conversation i'm having with tom friedman at the centers for disease control all the time. we are having that conversation as we go, but for now, the focus is -- has been on the immediate response. >> is that important for ebola or just for the future? >> ebola. ebola is not an airborne infectious disease. if it was, it would be an issue for ebola. but ebola, because it moves relatively slowly, outside direct contact, we are focusing on the countries in the region. if they get on planes and go to europe and the united states, i think awareness is so high that the systems are more prepared now than before.

in the medium and long term, we have got to get on this task. >> [inaudible] >> little louder, please. >> i was wondering about how is -- [inaudible] about the importance of having health workers on the ground. what's the u.s. military are doing now? is it balancing the lack of health workers? and how are you thinking the response in terms of the rotation, when these health workers go back to the u.s. like this doctor from new york. is it imaginable that they would wait in the country to make sure they do not have ebola before going back? or is it not imaginable in the way that you're going to organize their rotations?

>> i think the rules now, and the new rules coming up, are if you've been to this countries, depending on your level of risk, the cdc is going to ask you to take your temperature on your own four times a day and call in to report what your temperature is. the reason that is so important is -- and it's reflected in what happened in new york city -- is that the u minute your temperature goes up, you have to report yourself and go into quarantine. if that's possible, if that system is in place, that i think it is still possible for health workers to go and come back. the fact that you're not infectious until you have symptoms is an advantage for us in this epidemic, which means that people should be able to come back and forth as long as we have a system in place that detects symptoms the minute they happen. that's what the cdc and usaid has put into place now. >> last question, scott? >> [inaudible]

i know this is something you have wrestled with in other context, and i wonder if you can talk more broadly about the challenge of trying to convince people that the first rule of medicine can make a difference outside the first world. or has experienced rate is any better at that? >> i think, my own experience in this is that we encountered an epidemic, an outbreak really of multi-drug-resistant work.... -- multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis. we found a really large number of cases in one community in a squatter settlement in lima, peru. i have treated patients with deadly diseases, and they could actually cough it on you. what we knew is that the only way -- and it is the same story

-- the only way to stop this outbreak of t.b. in this community was to treat the people who were wick. one should treat them, they stopped becoming infectious. they knock out the infection in their lungs, today's top transmitting it. you have to treat them over 18 months. it is the only way to stop an outbreak. so, when we said, we have got to treat it, everybody in the public health community said it is impossible to treat. too collocated. then we kept saying, what do you expect us to do? turn your head. we knew this was going to become an even bigger problem in other areas, especially in africa. there was an outbreak in the russian prison system. we fought for years to convince the world for feminization -- world health organization and other public health bodies to say ok we have to treat this in developing countries.

what happens here was the sense that gee, these countries do not have any of these capacities. so, gosh, can we do this? instead of saying, this is happening. what is the adequate response to this epidemic? safe burials. identify people right away. provide treatment, so that you are not putting them into quarantine to die. i think it took time to get over the sense that you could not do it in these countries. there is no sense we cannot do it. there is only -- how on earth are we going to do it? what are the things we can do right now? we are now on a war footing. it took us a long time to get there. my sense is that a part of it was a sense of hopelessness you cannot do anything. i hope that is over.

is why we want to put these financial mechanisms in place. when the finance ministers begin to understand that the downside risks to the global economies and my economy are huge, then we can make progress. it has always been the wish of global health people that they could have conversations with ministers of finance. .ow, that is part of my job i think we can put together mechanisms that don't require huge amounts of on front -- upfront investments, but could protect us in the future. >> thank you. we look forward to having you back. >> thank you. >> one of the things the nigerian finance minister said was critical in their outbreak

was the use of the mobile phone network to communicate not only the fear and the risk, the fear of contagion, is there not something that could be done in terms of an open phone drop? literature issues? for dealing with the dead, etc.? etc. actice of burial, >> the u.s. and the u.k. are putting into place the cell phone networks. there was not a huge amount of penetration of smartphones in the three countries. understanding that a bunch of philanthropists have also been trying to work to help extend cell phone coverage in the system. that is the understanding now. they are trying. q&a with rory

kennedy. a.m., "washington journal." [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] today, dan glickman talks about food safety related to global and cultural development. our coverage begins at 10:30 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> tonight, meredith atwell baker of the wireless association. >> i was at the commerce and this is repurpose thing spectrum from the department of defense and this process is going wonderfully. it is paired, internationally harmonized, we are so excited

about aws 3. we will have the broadcast incentive option. that discussion is going well. , thoseenhill report numbers have really turned the discussion from a policy discussion to a business decision. carriers, weur will come to them and it is going to be a big situation, a win-win situation for everyone. tonight at 8:00 eastern on "the communicators." the 2015 student cam video competition is underway. open to all middle school and high school students to create a 5-7 minute video titled "the three branches and you." there are 200 cash prizes for students and teachers.

for the list of rules and how to get started, go to studentcam .org. ♪ , we have rory kennedy. her news about documentary "last days in vietnam." >> we are racing down the runway. hundreds of thousands of people. grabbingrunning along, , we are pulling them on as fast as we can. the sea of humanity jamming on. , we areulling away

leaving behind, we are pulling up, people are pulling, the plane is taking off. >> as the minority vietnamese army closed in, saigon and south vietnamese resistant crumbled, they began to consider the certain impressments and possible death of their south vietnamese allies and co-workers. but with an official vietnamese, they took matters into their own hands to execute the evacuation and save as many south vietnamese as possible. ms. kennedy talks about her career as a film maker and her family's history. she's the daughter of robert f. kennedy and ethel kennedy. >> can you remember when there was a vietnam war?

>> i was 7 when it took place which was 1975. there's not a moment where i remember vietnam. but i feel like it was kind of in the ether of my childhood. it was in my consciousness. i have always felt that there was a seminal event in our nation's history. i was happy to have the opportunity to revisit vietnam and through this particular story of -- of the final days of the war. >> did you go there at all? >> i never went to vietnam. my intention was to go there. but we -- you know, the story that i wanted to tell from the vietnamese perspective is about the vietnamese who were left behind and what happened to them. but we were told that and i did extensive research that nobody many vietnam would talk to us about this time in history,

particularly who had done imprison or torture or they kind of struggled in the aftermath of the war. there was fear of government retaliation and repercussions. so that -- because their story is 100% in 1975, you know, really in those final days, there's not really a big story to be told about what's going on in vietnam today other than what happened to the people left behind which is obviously a significant part of our story but we ended up finding a number amount of people who helped provide that perspective. >> how do you and your husband divide up the responsibilities on something like this? >> well, technically i'm the producer and director. and he's the writer. but mark is really my partner in all of my feature documentaries.