pressure. watch mitch mcconnell walk that very tight rope. get -- give up the senate. ted cruz is going to make it even more dysfunctional. every time they try to make a deal, you will have three high-profile figures involved. have thoseg to likely presidential candidates saying i'm going to lose if you do this. i think it will make it paralyzed. >> the republicans will on the next congress. now, the republicans can blame each other. they will own a unpopular institution. bills,they are passing the voters are going to reject them. that is where the relationship between mitch mcconnell and john boehner is key.

know, and as senator sanders knows, it takes only one senator to hold everything off and talk for eight hours. thank you for being a part of newsmakers. i appreciate it. >> on the next washington journal, william gelston and the brookings institution lays out a two-year year plan to end washington gridlock. bonnie glaser previews the president's participation in the u.s.-china summit. we talk about jeff faust's

therts as part of commercial space companies summit. >> monday night on the communicators, professor at the university of serving a law school and director of its center for technology, innovation, and competition. >> the people who propose looktization should take a at the magic that makes the internet work. classes, pipe, service high-bandwidth services, low latency services. people think that is an old artifact. internet,designed the they not only kept that field, they included a label field.

if you look at the engineering design they suggest that this was never intended. i think a little engineering knowledge goes a long way. it is a design feature of the network from the beginning. they're using it today to deliver voice services. true, complete vips to based services called lte. a lot of video in other things. >> monday night at eight eastern on the communicators on c-span2. gave ay, president obama weeklong trip that includes stops in asia and australia. the president was scheduled to arrive in beijing tomorrow. over the next three days, he will take part in a summit.

with leaders of indonesia, australia, and china. on tuesday, he hands to burma -- as to burma to attend the east asia summit. the trip concludes in australia with the president attending a g20 meeting that is being held there. the centers for strategic and international study recently previewed the president strip. it also included a discussion on relations and trade. this is one and a half hours. >> good morning and welcome to the center for strategic international studies.

we are going to get this microphone fixed. i would like to first say congratulations to a good friend journalist of us who just got married, julie pace, who is just back from her honeymoon. [applause] mazel tov. i would like to introduce my colleague, dr. mike green. >> thank you. congratulations. we're going to give you an overview of the president's trip to the asia-pacific region, and open it up to questions. the president will be in china november 10 to 12 for the asia-pacific cooperative leadership summit and the associated ceo summit, and then there will be a state visit with president of china. he will be in myanmar. he will have a meeting with leaders.

he is in brisbane, australia, from the 15th to the 16th for the g-20, and he will give a major speech on asia policy. we will go through those and provide whatever the opposite of monday morning quarterbacking is, friday evening previews. i will start with an overview and talk about what is at stake for the president and the country on this trip, particularly after the midterm results. matt goodman will focus on the apec meeting and the economic issues. ernie bauer on the summit. and the engagement with myanmar, burma, and this trip, and steve morrison will conclude with what is happening on the ground in myanmar based on a trip he and

others took recently. i will also address some of the u.s.-china security issues up front, too. so looking at the results of the midterm for those of us who travel to the region, the polling that shows that in some cases 2/3 americans are not satisfied with president obama's leadership style, half of democrats. that squares with what most of us with who travel with what we see in governments across asia. in fact, we found in surveys we did here at csis, think tank experts in 10 asian countries that the rebalance to asia has 80% support, but there were questions in the survey of a majority of respondents who said they have questions about

implementation. the election result may reinforce those concerns from new zealand to china, whether the administration has the wherewithal to actually follow through on the pivot or rebalance as advertised. there are some substantive areas of progress. the obama administration has the best attendance record in asia of any u.s. administration. they have made every regional forum, held far more consultant meetings with japan, australia, and korea. the president now attends regularly the east asia summit. in terms of showing up, pretty consistent and a high attendance record. the defense department, although it is in a smaller and shrinking budget, shifting relative resources to the pacific,

especially the navy. tpp is clearly being prioritized over the other aspects of the trade agenda. despite questions of implications about the pivot and president obama's leadership, in our survey of strategic thinkers in asia, which we published last spring, it was striking that a significant majority of elites in asia think the u.s. will be the leading power in the region in 10 years. outside of china one or two other countries, a significant majority, particularly among our allies said they want the u.s. to be the leading power in asia in the coming years. there is a lot of opportunity for the rebalance of the pivot to succeed, but there are problems, and the president's trip will be important in addressing that. there are three that i would

highlight. these are things we have noticed for some time here at csis. the first is how the president and cabinet talking about the pivot keeps changing, and even the kind of bumper sticker keeps changing. for a little while -- [no audio] senior officials, cabinet members were talking about new great relations with china, a phrase that is not popular among our allies because in the chinese formation of a new model of relations, no other asian country is a great power. just the united states and china. the administration has appeared to drop that. we have an article coming out in "washington quarterly" next week that catalogs all the descriptions of the pivot or rebalance in every major speech on it, from the administration, and there is always a list of

three or four priorities. i will not read them all, but they change all the time. most recently, secretary kerry said the core of the pivot will be sustainable economic growth, a clean energy revolution, a rules-based region, dignity, security, and opportunity. very different list than that of susan rice and the president in past iterations. aboutis some confusion exactly what the u.s. autumn line is. the president will be giving a speech in brisbane at the end of the trip. the president usually speaks most consistently about asia, in the opportunity to lay down but the strategy is, what the priorities are, and what his commitment will be, which gets to the second problem right now which is most people who look at asia would argue that tpp, the transpacific partnership, is an

essential pillar of a credible u.s. focus on the asia-pacific. usgr is working hard. the administration's strategy is to get a deal on tpp, particularly with japan, and then use that to fast track promotion authority to the hill, convince them to pass the fast track authority that would allow the deal to be completed. it makes some political sense, but it is completely backwards. every other trade deal we have done we have done, the trade promotional fast track first, and then tpp. that is harder in the u.s. congress, but without it we have not been able to get deals with major trading partners. why? because they question whether they should be putting their best deal on the table if the president has not secured authority from the congress. i was in japan, came back monday. at the highest levels of the

japanese government there's a sense there are a few issues left him but they are done, they had put the best deal on the table of the they had put until they see evidence and there waiting for the midterms, that the white house will reach out and work with congress to get fast track or trade promotional authority. in my view, it does not have to pass before tpp, but there has to be some movement. the ambassador gave a very compelling strategic speech on forum we organized with the chamber of commerce, best rationale i've ever heard, he never mentioned the three letters tpp. there has to be some outreach to congress. there has to be some sense in japan that a republican congress is on board where we will possibly be stuck where we are. with tpp, the rebalance of the pivot will have a real legs in the last few years of the administration.

the president will meet prime minister abe. the dynamics are frosty right now between japan and others on this, but as a chance to reboot, i hesitate to use that phrase, to try to get it done. the third challenge of the pivot is there is a broad impression, hardly knew, that the u.s. has lost interest in asia, syria, isis, ukraine. it will be key for the president to demonstrate that we are focused on our security commitments in asia. it is a tough balancing act because china react everything that is coming out of the administration and calling it containment. very unforgiving chinese interpretations of what the u.s. is up to. let me turn briefly before i handed over to matt on the specifics of the u.s. china security problem, and that will be the economic piece. secretary kerry gave a generally

positive view of china, optimistic view, which is appropriate. he did not pull punches on some of the key security and political problems we have. he called for self-restraint and completion of a code of conduct with respect to the south china sea and territorial disputes where china is using mercantile and maritime pressure, coercion on smaller states in the region. he raised cyber, tried to frame as an issue where we could agree, because china has a commercial interest in intellectual property rights. he raised hong kong and human rights. it is a good framing of the issues in trying to avoid turning these in topics in u.s.-china relations. the problem is, although there have been some important chinese

contributions, china sent a thousand medics to help with ebola in africa, has promised to cooperate on terrorism with respect to -- and the uighers, naval exercises that we do in the pacific, but the fbi has been clear there is no change in china's policies on cyber. the fbi has been more open about the increase in hacker attacks attributed to china. the fbi has revealed major data downloads of nonmilitary u.s. health care data from china. on the south china sea and east china sea, on the maritime front, also, no real change. there was some hope that the coast guard and naval activities in the south china sea, vis a

vis vietnam last summer, when they ended that there might be a more relaxed chinese attitude, certainly in the east china sea and japan, the number of incursions by chinese ships went down but when the south china , sea, the vietnam operations ended, the incursions into japan went back up her in october there was a two-week period where some were optimistic, but when the data came out that was because of a tsunami, because of typhoons and weather. and in fact operations in the south china sea are at a routine level now with daily incursions by the coast guard, and what is troubling, the navy, which used operate 2 1/2 hours' sailing time away is now within 2 hour''

sailing time. it has gotten closer. in the south china sea, you have seen reports that china is expanding its military runway at woody island, which beijing has announced will be used for patrolling of a district, in which a lot of people of the region say is a precursor to another announcement of an error air defense identification zone, comparable to what china did in the east china sea. this is a tough nut to crack for the president. you can wrap it in rhetoric, try to build confidence, but the facts on the ground are still not a crisis, but are still trending in a way that is going to make this a challenging trip. so let me end there and turn it over to matt. are we still going to -- [indiscernible] >> ok. [indiscernible]

ok. thanks, mike. so economics is going to run throughout this trip on almost every stop, and i think there are broadly three themes that will run throughout the trip -- growth, trade, and infrastructure. the good news is that everyone in the region wants all three of those things. the challenge is that there are some pretty significant differences about how to go about achieving those things. so that is just a sort of preamble. just to take the three economic stops as it were, first, apec. the apec summit will be on november 10 and november 11, will be in a suburb of beijing. quick background, it was

established by foreign minister leaders in 1989, elevated in 1993, so this is the 22nd summit. apec is a group made up of 21 asia-pacific economies, and make sure you say "economies" and not "countries." it is designed to promote regional economic integration. china last hosted, the first and last time, was in september 2001, a few weeks after 9/11. china has laid out three basic themes for its apec year. one is regional economic integration, which is a standard thing for apec. every host has that as one of its themes. secondly, economic growth, structural reform, particularly with the adjectives "innovative" and "inclusive growth and reform" attached to that theme. and then thirdly, connectivity,

meaning both hard and soft connections of infrastructure, people, institutions across the asia-pacific region. this is where infrastructure comes up. it is going to be a major topic. there has been a lot of work in apec over a number of years, and there will be a focus probably this year on public-private partnerships treating creating the enabling environments for infrastructure investment in the region and generating long-term private sector financing for infrastructure. then apec does a whole bunch of pick and shovel work, including as a commitment to a 10% improvement in supply chain performance by 2015, so i focus on global value change which is the story on trade in asia, fossil fuels subsidies, women's

empowerment -- [no audio] there are a whole array of issues. there are three non-headlines, as it were, from apec. one is tpp. tpp is in some sense born from the rib of apec. it is made up of 12 of the 21 aipac economies. it is a path towards the ultimate vision of a free trade area of the asia-pacific. as mike said, right now the negotiations are not completed. there had been a hope that tpp might be agreed by the time of this summit. it is now we can say with great certainty not going to happen. the key dynamic that needs to change is the u.s. and japan need to agree on a bilateral market access deal. that is quite close.

there is maybe a tiny hope that that could be done before next week, but i would say that is also pretty unlikely at this point. as mike said, tpa is key to this. the question is whether the noises yesterday by the president and republican party leaders was promising because it said tpa was one of the things they might be able to agree on. a second thing that is probably not going to be a headline here except in a way that i am sure some of you will write, about the free trade area of the asia-pacific, there was a chinese goal this year of setting a deadline for achieving a free trade area in the asia-pacific and doing a feasibility to start negotiations toward that end. that is probably not going to be part of this. the free trade area is something that the u.s. championed back in 2006, 2007, so is part of the

apec story, but the u.s. and other tpp partners are reluctant to agree to a firm deadline to achieve a free trade area of the asia-pacific and a feasibility study towards that end until tpp is completed. and then the third thing that will be looking around, but not central to the apec agenda, is the asian infrastructure investment tank, which china proposed recently, and an mou was signed last week amongst 20 asia-pacific countries, and this is the chinese initiative to promote greater infrastructure investment in the region. so far some of the major countries in asia have not been -- have not signed on. india has signed. indonesia may sign on soon, but korea, australia, japan, the united states have not signed on

to this bank, and i can talk more about that. that will be lurking around the apec corridors. it works now? ok. there we go. ok. just to do g-20, i'm skipping -- most of the trip chronologically. we are now skipping from the apec meeting to the g-20 meeting which will be held november 15, 16, in brisbane. quick background, this is the ninth summit of the g-20 leaders since the first summit in washington in november 2008. it is actually -- the g-20 is actually a g-49. i counted last night, it is actually 19 individual countries plus the european union, which brings another 28, minus four

e.u. states that have their own seats, six invited guests, and those invited guests are spain, singapore, myanmar, as the chair, mauritania as the chair of the a.u., senegal as the chair of the new economic partnership for african development, and for a reason that is not entirely obvious other than oceanic solidarity, new zealand will be there. australia has laid out two themes things, growth and resilience, of the global economy. growth is very traditional core of the g-20. that is what the leaders of the talking about since they met first in 2008, how to enhance global growth rate. right now global growth is weaker that everybody would like.

the u.s. is growing, but not as fast as it might following a deep recession. everybody else has great -- growth challenges, and europe is on the brink of recession, possibly deflation. china is slowing, japan is still struggling to it on to a faster growth trajectory. growth is something everybody in that room at the g-20 will be concerned about. the specific australian approach to deal with growth is to get the finance ministers in the g-20 back in february to agree to a target for raising global growth, actually, raising global gdp by 2% over five years from the level of gdp that would be implied by current policy trajectory. by 2018, the goal is to have an additional 2% of gdp and to put

in place new policies that would achieve that objective. so everybody is going to come to the brisbane summit with individual growth strategies to achieve that target or contribute to that target, and those growth strategies will center around infrastructure, trade, deregulation, competition, and structural reform. just a quick word on trade. the g-20 has done two things on trade since the first summit. one is to make a commitment to stand still on protectionist measures. that commitment has been honored in the breach in many small ways, but we have not slid into 1930's style protectionism. they will repeat that. it is encouraging the doha round of multilateral trade to get the conclusion. that has not succeeded yet

although last year they , encouraged the trade facilitation agreement at bali. that is a minor's success. india has blocked implementation of that agreement. focusear there will be a on global trade in value change. the rest of the agenda is under the resilient banner. there will be financial regulatory reform. that is a core of g20 since the beginning. you will see a victory lap about all the good measures, the financial stability board has put into place to strengthen capital standards to deal with firms and banks that are too big to fail, to deal with shadow banking, over-the-counter derivatives. tax agreements, both to deal with tax evasion and tax avoidance. i think that may be the biggest headline that the australians

are hoping to come out of this summit. there is agreement on automatic transfer of information on tax holders to crackdown on tax evasion. tax avoidance, there is a focus on base erosion and profit shifting. there is a two year action plan to that. also on the agenda will be international financial institutional reform. that has been up since the beginning. the united states congress has not passed the enabling legislation to implement imf reform and the u.s. is paying a big price for that in the g 20 and more broadly in terms of the global economic government story. some energy work, transparency of energy markets, fossil fuel subsidies, and then creating a more up-to-date architecture in dealing with

energy issues, since you have and the iea. one final thing about the g 20 is the australians are aiming to communique. page if they achieve that it will be historic and i very much wish them luck with that. economics has been a source of stability in the u.s. china relationship. both presidents will be trying to manage that friction. both sides have a mutual interest in balance growth.

quite a going to be focus on domestic economic reform in china to promote growth and to level the playing business, so. there will be a focus on the old chestnuts of intellectual property, industrial policies, and so forth. some nook serious concerns on cyber security and the implementation of the antimonopoly law. china is going to focus on the investment climate in the united states and high-tech exports from the united states. both sides are going to try to put an emphasis on the bilateral emphasis treaty, negotiations of which have been underway for a number of years.

china is going to come forward with a negative a list of investment restrictions early next year. it will take a couple of more years. i have corporations on economic issues, such as climate change, ebola, and there will be talk about the transpacific partnership. i'm happy to talk more about that. see standing to room on a soggy morning in washington. i'm happy to see the washington media has pivoted towards asia.

this is going to be a tough trip for the president. atn southeast asia looks are wondering who is barack obama now after the midterm elections. trying to discern whether he has the political to follow through on earlier commitments that mike talk about. i think that is important. they will measure him particularly on economics. economics is the foundational bedrock of security. are goingast asians to want to hear from the president, who has been spending political capital on elections and not on trade. it is quickly shifting gears --

shifting gears. it looks like trade is one of those. think that will be seen positively by southeast asian leaders. other signals from the white house, they have already seen a hint. southeast asia was mystified by the cancellation of secretary of thatse chuck hagel's trip was planned for vietnam and myanmar earlier this week. is being read as an indication that the white house wants to focus on the economic aspects of the pivot. the southeast asians will be looking at that for the southeast asian summit. azorwill be the ninth east summit that president obama will

be getting back on track. year's summit because of budget wrangling with the same republicans that have taken the senate. the u.s. will look at a security and political aspect of their with the economic element of their pivot. is not the way to southeast asians see it. that is something i hope the white house will work with to address as they look to pivot 2.0 or a resetting of the pivot. southeast asia cannot imagine an economic strategy for the united states that does not include china. ttp looks a little strange to them. ttp includes 12 countries and

the united states. not even all the countries are eligible. i think everybody wants to see it to get done. i think the president wants to cs spending political capital on that. will be ator of that strong statement out of the friday meeting with congressional leaders and a commitment to get tpa, which they will see as political capital by the white house on trade. next year the malaysians will host the summit. attention will be put on the structure of the east asian summit. americans in the white house want to talk about rationalizing a structure, how the regional forum and defense ministers meetings relate to the

es read we see some work on the structure of the eas ahead of the 10th anniversary. it has been institutionalized since president obama has been in office. it was a clever way to say the white house wasn't sure they were going to show up every year for a u.s. meeting. it is now a summit. i think a great credit institutionalized this important level of engagement. you will hear more about that as a preview.

u.s. investment is multiples greater than it is in china. at total u.s. investment and you include energy. we were the biggest infect -- biggest investor by a factor of two times. after the meetings in the capital it is sort of a paradise. there are 10 roads that have no cards on them. he will do a bilateral with the president. you can tell the white house is managing the trip carefully by calledt the president the leader of the opposition's

earlier this week to get ahead of that trip. the president has some important issues to manage. the most important on many people's minds is the 2015 election. she is precluded by the burmese constitution from being eligible to run for president. i think the americans would like to see constitutional changes so she would be able to run. will be a hard one between the white house trying to support continued reform and political reform in myanmar. this was a country that has cloistered itself on decades. it was a real push for senate

and house legislators, including mitchnate leader mcconnell on human rights and democracy. the president is going to have to address this and he should. there is a recognition that you have to be practical about how much change the country can handle. i think steve will talk a little bit about that. ever -- the effort to achieve regional cease-fires if .yanmar has a strong population we have cease-fire negotiations with a wide group of minorities on the periphery of that center.

that is actually going very well. integrity is important and though cease-fires having a political basis, not just a military bases, is vital. it is a very important story that this is a new president of indonesia coming out. the aipac eas and g 20 meanings. president obama will meet him for the first time. that should be a very important meeting. indonesia is half the population. think what we are going to see -- it may bee

nuanced and have japanese characteristics and is in direct, but i think the indonesians are going to play a really big role in areas like foreign policy and national security concerns. term --e five-year coming to that i think one thing you will see out of the east asian summit is a growing to stand up to china on the maritime security threat. mentioned that he is correct, the chinese have not let their foot off the gas. rhetoric from china on the code of conduct -- the best way you can look at this is the charlie

brown cartoon where china would be lucy holding the football. the chinese were serious this time. i think they really want the united states to continue its role in putting this on the agenda. cohesivenesssed and there is a quiet determination in this southeast asian countries, despite joining the infrastructure and bank. i think the united states has been put into that sort of reactive mode on the asian infrastructure bank.

the way to get around this is play offense. not received a company has of economic strategy for asia. they have all the pillars of it right. even if they can get their act together and articulate a strategy i think southeast asia and the rest of asia will be game for that. they are very much interested in having a sino centric order economic integration. thank you very much. wrap up withng to remarks from steve morrison. he is the director of our global health program. we will open it up to your questions.

please use your microphone area and we will be passing around the microphone. if you could identify yourselves that would be very helpful. >> a few words about ebola. president announced a $6.1 ebola. supplemental for the majority of that money is for overseas purposes in west africa and support of the broader global health security agenda. that is a lot of money. it is twinned with the isis request. clearly it is something that is going to have to be negotiated carefully. tag incarry a price terms of copper mice on travel

bans. been the lead power in the response with a billion-dollar commitment on both the military and civilian side. this steps up the game significantly. alone.ot do this others have come to the table. the u.k., the world bank, the ec. the response from other parts of the world and major powers has been very paltry. this is despite a really aggressive diplomacy led by nancy powell john kerry, and others.

china is an exception in the region in terms of its response. it is deploying several hundred health workers. it is making the case it has special capacities and experiences dating back to pandemic flu response. most efforts are concentrated in sierra leone. this is a very welcome positive development, making a commitment of this kind for multiple reasons. the region is alive to the threat of ebola. the region is quite alive to the threat and that has changed significantly. i will try to minimize any .edundancy the delegation we took out in

august follows onto an earlier mission. this is one we did jointly with the southeast asian studies. we went out there prompted by what we saw in washington. a harder and negative conclusion. we framed this around to which direction the things are going. we put a focus on issues and constitutional reform. a special focus on health. of congress is moving to be more aggressive. the opinion climate has hardened and that is something the

president has to deal with as he moves forward here. the electoral season is fully on folks in myanmar. there is a lot of excitement and interest. we don't know what is going to happen in terms of these constitutional provisions. this is a fluid set of negotiations. on the cease-fire negotiations there was a commitment towards federalism as a whole and towards long-term negotiations. there has been further bad news around that. is back and forth and still drawing conclusions.

what remarkable is you have major interests, the global u.k.,the world bank, the on a long-term basis to facilitate a reform of that sector. they are beginning to show substantial gains. they are making those calculations on a time frame. there is a government to work with, partners to work with, the environment is favorable. related to that on health we put it takes focus on malaria. that may sound like a purely technical issue but in fact it is a threat. there is an enormous amount of

activity underway right now begin to combat that. we put quite a bit of detail and emphasis on this. fund has done a remarkable job at putting resources in and the like. it was a fairly brutal assault back in march. federal union of authorities pray much abdicated responsibilities and stood back wall that happened. there is a process of trying to repair the damage. the president has put special emphasis on this. this is terribly complicated and difficult to reconcile and move forward. can't turnhing we

away from nor have we. it has been a sterling job at putting the stake in the ground, andding up to this abuse insisting upon holding the government to account. into detail about the buddhist and muslim violence land grabs and journalism. it is on the report. on the big issues around , it isutional matters just stay tuned here. is the u.s. has struck a middle path of being engaged and continuing to call out those areas that are most problematic. u.s. engagement draws wide were -- wide support. we have been able to navigate a very difficult and politicized

environment. on the electoral peas, which is going to be the central prism isis is onjudgments, the ground, operational, and doing a terrific job. we called for a stepping up of that effort for specific ways. happened andat has call for a doubling of the bilateral engagement. in closing we need to be realistic. we need to be realistic around these complex transitions. we should not make conclusions about where things are and where they are going to be in another year. is aot sure that particularly prudent way to jets subbing as complicated as this.

>> we are going to open it up to questions. >> two questions. you talked about specific things on u.s. china relations. how would you characterize the overall state of the relationship? what role does the selection play? how much has the regional leaders paid attention to the u.s. election? to they ?ee them as a week lame-duck does he have to prove them that e is still a leader? >> i think the china community in washington has been a bit surprised that xi jinping has been less accommodating and tougher than expected.

the saying in beijing is he talks like dung acts like now. -- acts like mao. the expectation was simultaneous pressure against india and japan and the countries, cyberattacks, this would lead to a natural push back. there has been an unprecedented amount of pushback. doesn't seem to appear to have led to any calibration in chinese foreign-policy. i would characterize the china u.s. relationship as one that is but one downward spiral where a heightened level of tension is the new normal. and the challenge of the new president is can nearing to frame the relationship in a win-win way because as others

on broad economic issues management of north korea and regional integration were generally -- were generally on site. aipac is a transpacific grouping. this is not a summit in beijing designed to push the u.s. out. china wants to accelerate movement on the free trade area, which would include the aipac members. the reason they are saying no is because it is too fast. one is to set the rules before we get into deep negotiations with china.

we are slowing china down but the theme is more integration. it is not one of downward spiraling hostility. chicago council last year released its by annual survey. 49 percent of americans say chinese u.s. relationships are adversarial. only 3% of americans did not have an opinion. >> is he a rock star, is he a lame-duck, the jury is out. i think the narrative among of lot of the elites, including leaders is that president obama has the asia engagement dna in his blood. domesticen hijacked by

politics and elections in the united states. to turn tobe able legacies. he said it himself, i will be the person -- the first pacific president of the united states. he was born in hawaii, grew up in indonesia. of the guide iis can help talk to americans and understandingonal not just among politicians but among americans that asia is final to the future of ourselves, our kids, and not only our jobs but our security. of there is still that hope that because he lost the election that that is what he will have to accommodate, work with the republicans, do trade, and then start talking to americans about asia.

>> 49% said cooperative. gideon. 48% said adversarial. i think i said it the other way around. >> aiming friends in asia, you mentioned that they were welcoming american engagement and push back. countries in that group are leaning more towards china? i would guess cambodia was one. >> i think it is a fair question. balance overmember everything. balance in everything. if it was the americans that were playing complete offense and we had all of the ideas and china was on its act for, there would be demand for more chinese

engagement. we have to be careful about understanding that. right now, we have an historic window in the united states. abbott in added -- australia pulling for more u.s. engagement, abe in japan and asean. everyone is lined up and they want to see the americans .laying offense there is a disconnect between china's rhetoric, what it says it wants to do and what it is actually doing. that worries asean and they want china to feel safe, secure, and be economically successful so they can share in the success. they want the americans to be economically engaged, successful, and deeply engaged on a security basis so china

does not use its newfound economic might to impose its own definitions of sovereignty on smaller neighbors. personally think this is overplayed. atalked to the cambodians year and a half ago. me that we misunderstand where we are on china. they want americans to be engaged. he sounded like every other leader. he wants balance. in practice, his foreign been -- that is very kind the cousin cameras are rolling. i do not think it is particularly useful to do a spectrum of the asean countries on this issue.

>> what should president obama's message be on hong kong? a lot of americans watched the pro-democracy protesters. how fine of a line does he need to walk? in terms of the constitution in realistic tot think that it can change before the elections and what would have to happen? what does that process look like? thank you. kong, there is concern in the administration within chinese media and government circles, there are accusations that the united states is the evil hand behind the protests. my recommendation would be don't worry about that. the president should speak out clearly in support of what these people in hong kong are asking

for. language that suggests this is good for china's development, china's relations with other parts of asia. this is no time to be wobbly. as margaret thatcher said. harder to do this when you do not control the media environment. i remember traveling with president bush and talking about how to deal with these issues in beijing, but he did it. he found ways to talk about religious freedom and other issues. to frame it in terms of what is in china's interest, ultimately -- >> if i could maybe stage the twotogether -- stitch the

together. i think mike is right. the americans have to talk about this. the president has to talk about this. in asia, there is a lot of analysis going around that democracy is being stepped back. i think that is absolutely wrong. if you look at the two, the democracy protests in hong kong rising out of nowhere, , where down in china you think asia is going? i think we just have a bubble going on in thailand. the middle class is moving forward and they want to hear president obama supporting this kind of event.

i will ask steve to comment because he is on the ground. that is a good question. there is time to change the constitution politically. very hard to see how that would happen. and ild be extraordinary think part of what the right house -- the white house is is it to manage right now is almost impossible to get that done before the elections and partially because the elections are coming. if it does not happen, i think what we should be worried about is throwing the baby out with the bathwater and saying ok, myanmar's economic and political reform has failed because they did not get it across the line. i personally have spent a fair amount of time in myanmar and -- sheality time with did not say this, but there is

understanding that she wants this change before the election, is if it cannot be, there this iron determination to continue to fight and if her party wins, i thought she thought that there was room to get enough votes potentially to make changes after winning and controlling parliament. there are two provisions in play. one is within the constitution that bars her because of citizenship issues. second is the provision to set aside 25% of parliamentary seats for the military. most of the debate within the constitutional committee is centered around this. i agree entirely with ernie. . think the signals are clear the odds of seeing resolution on the first of those two to open

-- process efficiently sufficiently, those odds are low. we face the predicament which is she and the opposition have to make an internal calculation at some point in time about how much do they lean in and play and how much do they lean back and not play. those determinations have not been made yet but the u.s. government faces a broader predicament -- how do we reach judgment on what is free and fair? i think what ernie is getting at is that beyond those 2015 elections, there is a question of what is the u.s. approach and what is good enough and sufficient to be able to continue? election outcome is going to determine what the bilateral

relationship looks like. >> on this one, i would fall the administration. secretary clinton took a risk on this issue. they achieved an important historic shift. the white house chalked it up as one of the signature achievements. alumnifor our friend and derek mitchell in rangoon, senior officials dropped this. i am not talking about civil society engagement, i am talking about senior u.s. officials. they just put this on the scoreboard. been probably should have a high level of sustained engagement, not just to turn the corner with myanmar, but to make

-- i amwere engaging achievedwe could have a full free election in 2015, but you look at the range of i thinkhat we have,--- we would have benefited from more high-level engagement. >> thank you. first, you mentioned that the imf board of reform is jeopardizing u.s. legitimacy or leadership in the region. can you give examples of how and what that is costing the u.s.? also, you said the u.s. needs a comprehensive strategy on ozzie asean.n can you explain what that would mean and what it would look like?

>> the reform was something that the u.s. champion in 2010 at the korea summit. because itt recognized that for the imf to continue to be an effective , global economic governance, the ability to do surveillance and monitoring of economic policies and to make loans where necessary, it needed andddress so-called shares chairs, imbalances of the institution itself. it pushed this agreement. everybody agreed and everybody has implemented it. the u.s. has failed to implement it because of congress' unwillingness to approve a relatively minor transfer of money that was already committed to another pie. i think that has had a

tremendously damage -- damaging implication for the united to sway others on imf-related issues or broader issues than the g 20. it fed they, frustration of the large emerging economies that want more voice in global economic governance. i think you can draw a line from this failure directly to the establishment of the infrastructure bank and the bricks bank before that, which may end up being useful pieces of architecture. -- if the u.s. has an interest in supporting the best elements of the bretton , it needs to follow

through and do this reform. i am certainly hopeful that, in a new congress, this will be taken up again and passed quickly. it is getting in the way of a lot of things in the region. >> is this going into those negotiations as well? >> in a broad sense, yes. it is affecting our ability to be champions of the whole state. i do not think it specifically .omes up in a broad sense, it does affect u.s. ability and effectiveness. >> we have important pillars in place. is not a strategy for u.s. engagement in asia

economically. it is an important pillar. if we did that, it would have set a high level model that others could dock into. we need to do that. what we are failing to do is articulate -- to connect the dots, basically. bilateral investment treaties that we are negotiating and have free-trade areas that we have with australia and korea and singapore. what we need to do is articulate why ite tpp a vision for is important for americans and what our strategy is to make sure that we are not only deeply part of -- which we are -- but that we are driving the order of .ow asia will be structured this is not hard. we have all the pieces in place. thinke to talk to what we

and once we do that, we're going to be in much better shape. tpp strategy the was designed to incentivize a growing group of asia-pacific economies to join this updated, rules-based system. in it has actually worked the sense that it started with five countries and is now 12. when japan joined, china took a renewed interest in tpp and it has been looking at tpp as a form of containment. joined, china understood that this was a strategy of trying to draw china and others into this global, rules-based order. while i agree with ernie that it needs a broader framing, the reason that tpp is so important

is that it is designed to pull people into this higher standard system. it is critical for trade and broader economic strategy in asia. >> julienne than howard. -- julie and then howard. her wanted to talk about being less accommodating. indication onn why that is? they had a lot of emphasis on obama and biden build a particular relationship with him. fundamentale conceptual flaws of the pivot to assess thelure nature of china's behavior in asia. i think there have been different views within the

administration. until recently, much of china's assertive behavior in the east and south china sea were driven by domestic pressures, nationalism by the philippines, japan, vietnam provoking china. there has been another view which is that this is, in fact, part of a chinese strategy, if you will, to steadily assert more and more control over the so-called first-island chain that stretches down from japan. to do so first by denying or complicating u.s. access and asserting control, i think the sense is that the center of gravity in the administration in it is shifting towards the latter view. part of the reason is what i said earlier.

peng is not adjusting or calibrating as other countries push back. why is that? part of it is thatxi -- part of history andi has a tradition from his father, from his time. thinking strategically about china's interest and how to secure them. xi isk part of it is that a marxist in the sense that he is interested in the marxist dialectic and sees the forces of of economics favoring china overtime. --re are views across asia southeast asia, i have heard this, japan, and elsewhere. chinese side the is not calibrating because they see weakness in washington and

they see a window of opportunity . before they get a republican who is going to be harder line. that is hard to prove, but i have heard that hypothesis in a number of asian capitals. so take your pick. the bottom line is, the consensus is growing and there will be more tension with china over the next few years. as i say, it is a downward spiral, but it will be coming at a time when the administration has a lot going on in other parts of the world. >> thank you. specifically on the u.s.-japan trade access agreement, i thought i heard maybe a little discrepancy in views. michael talked about frosty talks and matthews talked about

being quite close. i am wondering where that is actually and maybe how you see the midterm election results influencing whether or not the president gets tpa. close, i think is the way to put it. look, these negotiations are very hard and very complex. you have 20 countries at different levels of development and different views on these issues and different capacities. with the u.s. and japan, you have a lot of -- a long history, a lot of baggage on trade to get this done. to af that is leading strained set of talks. including the bilateral ones between the u.s. and japan. with that say, both the u.s. and japan and the other 10 countries

in tpp have a very strong interest in getting tpp done. ultimatelyt is cutting through the other tensions or feelings that people are having in these negotiations. in terms of interest, everybody wants to get this done. i think they are close. i think the gaps are well-understood on both sides. there is some final political impetus behind them to get it done. the second part of your question -- i think the real obstacle -- i agree that, in practice, the lack of tpa authority has made it more difficult for the u.s. and japan to reach this agreement. it is time for tpa to move. i am encouraged by the early indications of both the republican leadership and the president himself, that they are ready to work on moving forward.

i think that must happen in order to get -- i think it is a technical matter. i think tpa is going to have to be passed, if only five minutes before tpp is put before congress. you cannot have tpa being nickeled and dined -- dimed. >> last week, in tokyo, i heard that this is the worst dynamic since the 1980's. that the tension in the room is palpable. and i said, just like every other trade agreement right before we finish it. in that sense, it is more of the same. but tpa is really blocking this. nevertheless, questions about whether the president can deliver.

>> in history, when we have done these deals, we have always had tpa done first. on fridayays of hope may turn that around. if it does not, i think we will be stuck five yards from the end zone. a if i could shamelessly buy soundbite here, it is always noisiest before the dawn of trade agreements. i am encouraged when i hear -- it shows that the two sides are getting close to the political compromises that will have to be made. >> i have a question. mentioned, there are some 20 countries signed up already. , theding to recent reports

koreans are considering to join in the future. how likely would the united ?tates change its position under what kind of circumstances or conditions might the u.s. consider to join it in the future? >> i think that is possible as a ,atter of administration policy whether with this administration or some future administration. i might even say that is ultimately likely if this institution gets up and running. as a practical matter, let me just be clear. the united states cannot join this bank in the near-term as long as congress is not willing to do the things it needs to do to enable it if they cannot pass with ata reforms relatively minor budget hit, you think that they are going to approve multibillion-dollar appropriations for a chinese-led

bank? i do not think so. that said, to answer your like the i think that, united states, korea and australia have their own -- and japan -- have their own concerns about the way this institution and there are a number of questions about the governance structure, how the shares are going to be divided , how then particular operational lending standards are going to be set. are there going to be environmental standards, death sustainability standards, open procurement so that anybody could get one of these loans? favoritism fore certain squires? there are a bunch of questions like that that are legitimate thinking, countries about joining this institution need to work through with china and china needs to explain those things.

that havee concerns been raised have moved the needle and china has realized that some of these issues -- they need to address them themselves to make sure that this institution can work effectively. they also have to convince people they need to clarify how those governance and operations questions are going to be followed through. korea andure whether australia are going to join. there is an argument that both countries, joining would enable them to work within the bank to shape those issues. there is also an argument that once you are in, it is very hard to change the dynamics. the bank is going to be based in beijing with 37% chinese capital. so it is going to be hard for any other participants to change things once they are in. >> we have got time for one more. we are going to go right here. thanks.

a quick one from me. i wanted to ask what your expectations might be from the obama summit on wednesday. probably going to expect something good from there? will it be anything like previous summits? >> not much came out of thailand. was ast important part bilateral investment trade. he will say something positive about it. i do not think there has been that much movement to announce a significant landmark. the administration negotiators are focused on tpp. i think they are probably right. kerry previewed an agreement on co2 emissions and the environment that will be of some significance and will be announced. there is a possibility of an

announcement on military transparency. for example. and then some agreements on exchanges and things like that. i do not expect some large framing agreement on u.s.-china relations. the administration has tried that. 2009, they issued a statement in beijing where each side would respect each other's core interests. it unraveled because it was not credible. the 2012-2013 never to do that again sort of fell apart. i suspect the president is going to be wary of some effort to reproduce the famous communiqués or something like that. he will have to speak out and i'm sure he will at some point in hong kong, on the east china sea, the south china sea.

xi will probably talk about a new model of relations. so you will have two parallel narratives and that is probably the key for now. >> with that, i want to thank everybody for coming today. this will be posted online later this afternoon at csis.org. please follow us on twitter as well. you will get advanced notice there. thank you very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] a with tavisq&

smiley followed by prime minister's questions. talks former congressman about the midterm election results. >> this week on "q&a," our guest is tavis smiley, out with his new was the book "death of a king: the real story of dr. martin luther king jr.'s final year." it explores the tumultuous and difficult finally dear dr. king's life as he clashed with the press, the president, and leaders of the civil rights movement. book,is smiley, your saysh of the king," it there is