are actions against isil are focused and shaping the dynamic which remains the priority. the challenges the ace as isil exploits long-running simmering conflict. because we do not have a partner government to work with in syria or regular military partners to work with as we do in iraq, in the near term our military aims in syria are limited to isolating and destroying isil's safe havens. coalition air strikes in syria are accomplishing this by continuing to target significant isil assets, which has impaired isil's ability to move fighters and equipment into iraq, disrupted their command and control, damaged their training bases, and significantly limited their financial revenue by hitting captured oil fields and disrupting their crude oil distribution and collection

sites. the longer-term effort is to train and equip credible moderate syrian opposition forces, especially in areas most threatened by isil. this will require eight to 12 months to make a difference on the ground. we know the opposition will continue to face intense pressure in a multifront battle space, and we are considering options for how u.s. and coalition forces can further support these forces once they are trained and equipped. these forces are being trained in units, not as individuals. our strategy in syria will demand time, patience, and perseverance to deliver results. we cannot accomplish our objectives in syria all at once. the position of the united states remains that assad has lost the legitimacy to govern. but there is no purely military

solution to the conflict in syria. alongside our efforts to isolate and sanction the assad regime, our strategy is to strengthen the moderate opposition to the point where they can first defend and control their local areas. next, go on the offense and take back areas that have been lost to isil, and, ultimately, as their capability and leverage develop, to create conditions for a political settlement in syria. thanks to the broad bipartisan support in congress, mr. chairman, including majorities in both parties, preparations for our syria train and equip mission are now complete. we've established a combined joint interagency task force to equip the coalition program for syria.

saudi arabia, turkey, and other partner nations have agreed to host training sites. development of those sites, recruiting, and vetting will begin when congress has authorized the actual funding. we are still moving forward doing what we must do to prepare for that vetting process and that training. we're still at the front end of our campaign against isil. as president obama told leaders of both houses of congress last week during a session, which i attended with general austin, congressional support -- your support is vital for the campaign to succeed. you all know the administration is requesting $5.6 billion in additional overseas contingency operations funding for fiscal year 2015 to help execute our comprehensive strategy in iraq and syria. $5 billion for the department of defense.

$3.4 billion would support ongoing u.s. military actions against isil under operation inherent resolve. $1.6 billion would go toward a new iraqi train and equip fund devoted to helping reconstitute iraq's security forces. this fund will be critical for enabling iraqi security forces, including kurdish and tribal forces, to go on the offense in 2015. and it will require the iraqi government and coalition members to make significant contributions as well. over 60% or $1 billion of the $1.6 billion fund would be available initially. the remaining $600 million would not be released until the government of iraq and coalition partners have provided at least $600 million of their own contributions. because the iraqi government must invest in its own security and its own future. as the president said last week, the administration will be engaging the congress to support

the effort against isil by enacting a new and specific authorization for the use of military force, one that reflects the scope and the challenges of our campaign against isil. dod will work closely with congress on each component of this effort. as this mission continues to progress, we will continue to evaluate and re-evaluate each element of our strategy. having just marked veteran's day earlier this week, let me again thank this committee for what you do every day to support all our men and women in uniform and their families serving this country across the world. mr. chairman, thank you. >> general dempsey? >> thank you. i want to thank you for all

you've done for the defense of our nation. your devotion to men and women of the joint force and importantly to their families will continue to resonate throughout our ranks. i too appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee this morning to discuss our strategy against isil. secretary hagel has detailed the elements and progress of our comprehensive approach against isil. broadly, our strategy is to reinforce a credible partner in the iraqi government and assist regional stakeholders to address the 20 million disenfranchised sunnis that live between damascus and baghdad. they have to reject the isil ideology from within. we have the first strategy enabled by the coalition, but as i've said before, it's not an iraq-only strategy. it will evolve with the coalition and multiple lines of effort overtime. we need to squeeze isil from multiple directions, deny safe

haven, and disrupt activities in syria. we need to build up a syrian opposition to confront them. we need to take a long view. this requires the multiple lines of effort all have to move apace of each other. these lines of effort include counter financing, counter foreign tighter flow, counter messaging, humanitarian aid, economic progress, the air campaign, restoring an offensive capability to the iraqi security forces, and a ground campaign managed by the iraqi security forces with the isf from baghdad and the peshmerga from the north with contribution from the tribes and in particular in the anbar and nineveh provinces. an ongoing dialogue with my coalition counterparts, there's a consensus across the coalition about our common vision and the objectives across those lines of effort. and there's a strong commitment to work together closely in this complex and long-term

undertaking. progress will be uneven at times, but with strategic patience, the trend lines favor the coalition over the long term. we are alert that the assumptions that underpin our campaign will be challenged. most notably, we don't know to what agreement the government of iraq will convince the kurds and sunnis that it intends to have a government of national unity, one that gives confidence they have a future. we'll continue to revisit and review our assumptions as the campaign evolves and will adapt. which brings me to resources. our commitments across the globe, as you well know, are up. resources are down. to add to that, sequesterization is months away.

every day we don't have budget certainty, flexibility, and time means that we will continue to erode our readiness, and over time, i will have fewer military options to offer. the joint chiefs and i appreciate your support to help us work through not only our national security challenges, but also the resources and flexibility necessary to meet them. thank you. >> thank you, general dempsey. in september, you testified to our colleagues in the senate, "if we reach the point, i believe our advisors should accompany iraqi troops on attacks against targets i'll recommend that to the president." however, during a recent interview on "front line," deputy national security advisor ben rhodes announced the president will not reconsider his boots-on-the-ground limitation regardless of any recommendation you might provide. furthermore,eems

to equate boots on the ground to a 150,000-person u.s. invasion force. i haven't heard anyone talk about sending in divisions. so please help us understand the circumstances where you would envision the need to introduce u.s. military troops into combat situations and the size and types of forces

s. wind of the assumptions is that the security forces will be willing to take back the province.

if the assumptions are rendered invalid, i want to adjust my recommendations. >> how can the administration continued to press ahead with transfers from guantánamo at this time? is this not in conflict with stemming thef flow of foreign fighters? congress know, the delegated the responsibility and decision to make that on whether we would release any

and which detainees from guantánamo. , i have takend that responsibility seriously. every time i certify and send documentation to this committee, i am saying with my name and reckon -- reputation that i --ieve that the absurd assurances substantially of releasingrisk detainees. they released a percentage of their intelligence on those who have returned to violent

extremism since the release from guantánamo in this administration. i am dealing with what i have right now. thisthe course of administration's detainee theyse i think over 80, assess that over 90% of those toainees had not intended and had not in fact given any return to the battlefield. every certification that i make, bottom line, with all of the s i have to make by

has to my best judgment be unanimous before i will seriously entertainment. i believe that if i can get the assurances required by the host governments and the mechanisms, and i go into detail that it substantially mitigates the risk , then i will sign it. and i have. >> thank you. >> thank you. to ask a little about tot has changed with respect working and training these iraqi troops to be effective .

you gentlemen were not involved in this, but i have been involved in this for 18 years, so i have been clearly on the side asking these gents. in afghanistan we saw we had ghost people in the afghan army, meaning they did not exist. people, anderate that it's been one of the reasons we have been so ineffective with the training and ringing up of the afghan forces. iraqinterested in the situation, going back to the bush administration where there were throwing out thousands of numbers of who was being trained and who wasn't, and they were often wrong. what we saw was the iraqi army either run away from the fight , or respect to isil

following with respect to isil. leadership.was the , what hasstion is changed, or what needs to change in order for us to continue having iraqis actually fight the battle so that our people do not come in as it's on the ground -- boots on the ground? what has changed, what have you live from the fact we did not get it right in afghanistan? what do we change that these men can actually take the fight to isil, and that our men and women do not have boots on the

ground. you an answer, but i will also ask chairman dempsey to give an answer. it dempsey spent a lot of time in iraq. there are few military leaders who know as much based on personal experience the general dempsey. you my brief response, and that i think this committee will want to hear from general dempsey on this. what has changed? and number of things. il andstart with is what it represents. we have never seen a threat like this before. a comprehensive threat that it represents the sophistication, the organization, the funding to funding,ty, the --

capacity, ideology, it is new. the threat is significantly arse than we have seen four. before. i understand the threat. i'm asking what is the difference in the iraqi man that andave and the forces there making a difference, not running away from the battle, being led correctly? >> i will get to that. you asked the difference. there are a lot. starting with isil. a national unity government led by prime minister, who for the arst time has designated minister of defense. we have not had a minister of defense in iraq for more than 40 years.

the prime minister maliki took unto himself as he did the rest. this is reconstituting leadership of the security force. as i noted in my testimony, 36 new commanders were switched, starting across the top. men and women will not fight if they do not have confidence in their leaders. not have confidence in their country, in their government, that the government will support them. those are fundamental changes. second point, maybe you can clarify if those 36 new split?ers are a 60-20-20 >> we do not know yet.

been retired,at soho been relieved, some would've been moved. we are familiar with who is taking their place. i hope it is not some artificial ratio because you want to get someone into the isf's can lead, fight, and inspire. we will see very shortly who takes the place of those who have been changed. this is a brief answer to a complicated question. we left iraq with some things undone. established a logistics and intelligent architecture. they did not have the support and capability to integrate. we left there with a ministry of defense that was largely dysfunctional in the way it was assigned leadership. they knew that, they knew we knew that.

but it was not a completed work. it remains a work in progress. then to couple that back to the secretary's comments about what creates courage on the battlefield. in his confidence that you have somebody in the central government who will actually care for you and her family. -- your family. we would not be swinging and fighting out there unless we knew our families were being taken care of. we cannot hold the iraqis to a higher standard that did not exist. the iraqi government needs to create a government of national unity. that is not happen, they will not hold together. >> thank you.

>> thank you both for being here. that the president said he would be engaging congress to support a new and a updated horforce. is this administration going to propose language and send it to us, and when? they'renot know what going to propose, i do not know specifically if they are going to send it up as a legislative proposal. i do know the conversations are being held right now and have then with various members and their staffs about the right approach. as you know, said,

last week that he intends to engage congress on this. i know he has had specific .onversations let me follow up with some of your comments that we made to ms. sanchez. never before seen a threat like isis or isil. one of the key questions as to what extent we can ultimately be successful of instant -- against isis without dealing with assad. what is your view of that? some of our closest allies in this effort believe that we can

only be successful if we become involved in the effort against assad. it is a fundamental question you ask, and i will answer it this way. let me give you my assessment about isil. when you look at the brutality of what assad has been doing, killing women and children, killing minorities of any kind, it completely indiscriminate, ,nd the sophistication of that it represents a pretty clear in different kind of threat.

i think it is also a clear thing, that assad, as of how he has governed has brought this astounding instability upon himself, his people, on this country. like isil,wed groups al qaeda, other terrorist organizations, to be strengthened. putthat is not going to isil back in the box, or begin defeating or degrade them. the site is part of the equation -- a song as part of the ssad is part of the

equation. but if you look at the swaths of that they control, you could today, and that will not change all the dynamics in syria. but who will you replace assad with, and what army would take on isil? a longer-term part of it. so that is part of it, but isil is right now, and they are threatening the country and government ovef iraq. that is why a we are dealing with our components first, they are a threat or allies, they are a threat to us. >> thank you.

you have my first two minutes, you get my next two. what do you know about the current 2014 requests through the end of the cr? what is and that, and why do you need an additional $5.6 million in 2015 given that there is authority for you through the cr out of 2014 money? questionswer to your about why we need additional as i have noted in my testimony that part of that new additional money, the five dollars or defense -- $5 billion for defense is for the train and equip program in iraq.

when we made these omissions months ago, it was not the case. -- submissions a month ago, it was not the case. for ther dollars or continuation which we did not have six months ago either, of our efforts of syria and iraq, airstrikes, and the continued assistance we are giving a rock. iraq. ofticularly the state o sustainability to carry that out. without it was the most honest way to do it. set up a fond, let everybody know the counting and how we're up a it, and why -- set

fund, let everybody know the accounting, and how we are doing it, and why. >> general dempsey, the defense has requested a broad waiver of existing laws in this request for the iraq train and equip. i understand there's a request for a similar waiver. why does the department need such a waiver, and what would the impact be if you didn't get waivers and you, for example, had to follow existing acquisition laws in order to implement? >> the issue is pace, i think, is probably the short answer to your question, congressman. we think that a national security waiver in the hands of the secretary of defense allows us to move with the pace we believe we need to move, in an environment where -- you know, it's interesting. one of the realities of this campaign is kind of the conflict between progress and patience.

you know what i mean? and so i've mentioned that strategic patience is actually a virtue in this kind of conflict. i think progress purchases patience. in that context, the waiver would allow us to move at a pace that would allow us to produce that kind of progress that would, as a result, result in patience. >> all right. that's fine. thank you both for giving me food for thought. i appreciate you coming in. i'll yield back. >> thank you. mr. jones. >> mr. secretary, it's kind of ironic. the last time i heard before today a secretary of defense talk about military involvement in iraq was secretary donald runsfeld. i know isis is evil. no question about it. they need to be taken out. but i looked at some of your statements from 2002, when you were a senator and how you felt about the obligation of a member of congress to make a decision to send a young man or a woman to die.

i also looked at your statements in 2007 when, like myself, you came out against the surge in iraq. now we are possibly going to be asked by the president of the united states, like we were by george bush, to authorize an aufm. this is nothing but an abdication of our obligation. adam shift tried to sunset out the aumf that we gave to president bush, which has been used by president obama. and i do not understand how we in congress can continue to abdicate what the constitution says is our responsibility. james madison once said, the power to declare war, including the power to judging the causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature.

and i do not believe sincerely, because when this -- this happens to be president obama. he wants to have another aumf, an extension of what we have.

it's not going to be but so long that you have sent more and more troops to iraq to train, many of these former saddam hussein loyals. now they're fighting with isil. some are fighting on the other side. it's very complex. i understand that and i agree with that. but for goodness sakes, why in the world should we make such a commitment, and we don't have an end point to it. i would like for you or general dempsey -- i have great respect for both of you -- to submit for the record two things, very quickly. how does this new war end in your opinion?

i realize it's just your opinion. but it's very important, because of who you are. what is the end state of what we're trying to accomplish? the american people, over 50% of the american people, do not want our personnel in syria or in iraq. and i will be honest with you.

i don't know how we can convince the american people that a nation that's financially broke -- you sat right here, general dempsey, and you're exactly right. sequestration and all the budget problems coming your way. yet you're asking for five or six billion dollars to drop more armaments in iraq and syria? where is it coming from? please explain to the american people and to this congress how this war is going to end some day, whether we are advisors or we're fighting. and i hope to god we're not fighting. and i hope we do not give the president a new aumf. if you get those into the committee in written form, then you won't have to answer the questions. but this, again, looks like we're going down the same road that secretary donald rumsfeld told us we had to do. yet we had no end to that as well. >> congressman jones, if i might just respond briefly. you very accurately described my

position when i was in the united states senate. but it's basic to the responsibilities of congress. an aumf comes out of congress. the authority of military force for a president. that authority comes from the congress of the united states. and i too hope the congress will engage in this. i have great confidence the congress will. they need to. they must. it is the responsibility of the congress. so i'm right with you on that, on that point. and i'll give you my best thoughts on your other question as well. thank you. ms. bordallo? >> thank you, mr. chairman, for

holding this important hearing. secretary hagel and general dempsey, thank you for your time today. as i stated before, i believe that isil could become a direct threat to the united states or our allies in europe. and we must make efforts to avoid that threat. while i believe that we must keep all our options open, it must be a joint effort with our coalition and allies to stop isil. secretary hagel, what additional u.s. or allied military support do you believe it will take for the iraqis, the kurds or the syrian rebels to hold their current position and eventually advance to retake areas now controlled by isil? >> congresswoman, as i noted in my statement, that's a very important part of what we are doing to assist the iraqi security forces as they strengthen their capacity, capabilities. that's obviously a big part of the train and equip effort, as our coalition partners are with us on this, as well as a reinstitution of the iraqi security forces at the top with

confidence, with trust, of the men and women in uniform. and the unity government. they in fact believe it's worth fighting for, as general dempsey said, that they have some confidence in, not just for themselves but their families. and so as i have noted, it is a comprehensive strategy. i believe it can be done. but this is an iraqi fight. it is their future. and we can help. we are helping. we're doing everything we can. and we'll continue to support them, as we will with our coalition partners. but that's the way i would just very briefly respond to the question. >> thank you. general dempsey, in testimony before the senate back in october, you mentioned that oco is not the solution to funding. i have stated that i agree that the oco credit card is going to come to an end sometime very soon. however, as the ranking member on readiness, i'm deeply concerned about the loss on oco on readiness. when will you have a better sense of what this is going to cost, both monetarily and in manpower, to continue operations against isil? what is the department doing to plan and budget for this and other activities into the base budget? >> thank you, congresswoman. i did say that.

in fact, i think i went on to say that oco, or the overseas contingency operations fund, was gas money and that the service chiefs actually also need the base to support the recruiting, training, organizing and equipping of the force over time. you can't sustain the force with oco. you can use it. and that's why i described it as gas money. to your question, we actually have a pretty good idea of what it's costing now. and given that we think our level of commitment is about what it will be for the foreseeable future, it's approximately $8 million a day. and the funding requests that the secretary mentioned accounts for that. we're well aware of the desire to rely less on oco and more on base. that's a debate -- you know, from a military perspective, i can just tell you what i need and you all have to decide how to provide what i need. but the base budget is an important component of readiness, because it's the foundation on which we build. >> thank you very much. and i yield back, mr. chairman. >> yields back the balance of the time. mr. secretary, we understand that you recently had to postpone your trip to vietnam and burma to prepare for this hearing and others on capitol hill. i know our allies and partners

in the region are concerned with senior administration officials postponing important travel to the region. i share their concern. but i hope they understand that our government does have the ability to walk and chew gum at the same time. while we are focused in this hearing on the isil challenge, we remain as committed as ever to america's enduring interests in the indopacific area. i appreciate the accommodations you made to the hearing. i also hope you'll reschedule your trip and continue your strong record of engagement in asia. and thank you for being here. the last time you were here, we asked a question about a strategy to cut off the finances for isil. and i think you were kind enough to acknowledge then that we needed to develop that, and i was just wondering if you could outline for us a little bit about the strategy that we have now in trying to cut off the finances of isil. >> congressman, thank you for your thoughts on the asia-pacific emphasis. as you've accurately noted, i unfortunately had to make a decision, and i didn't want to have to do that for the reasons you mentioned. as you probably know, since i've

been secretary of defense, i have had six major trips to the asia pacific. this would have been my seventh. i will reschedule. we are planning on that rescheduling. i talked to all of our asian partners, pacific partners, explained to them why i was having to reschedule. and i get the emphasis. i agree with you completely. but at the same time, to your point about the administration being able to walk and chew gum at the same time, as you know, the president is there now. and he will be in that area for a few more days in different countries. we'll have other follow-up visits as well. but i am rescheduling. it is important. there's no less emphasis on the importance of the rebalance. on your question about financing on isil, i alluded to a couple of things in my statement when i talked about cutting off their more obvious oil sales, as they

have, as you know, taken control of some of the oil fields in eastern syria. and they did have some in western iraq. we've been able to take back some of that, the iraqis have, the oil refinery and so on. that is one thing we're doing and been pretty effective. been able to not only disrupt that but stop that oil flow out of there that gets into the borders. and they were getting a few million dollars a day from that. now, other things. our treasury department is taking the lead on this, with partners all over the world, the united nations, european partners, middle eastern partners. we're trying to shut those money markets off any way of funding

and resourcing isil has, continues to have. we have made a global effort that we lead. as you know, they also get funds from contributions inside. we try to stop that through our intelligence communities. so this is as much of a focus as it was when i was here two months ago, has to be for the reasons that i mentioned. and as i also said in our comprehensive strategy, cutting off those funds is a very big part of what we're doing and what we're attempting to do and will continue to do. >> the gentleman from connecticut, mr. courtney, is recognized for four minutes. >> thank you, mr. forbes. earlier, secretary hagel, some of your predecessors were excited as sort of some grounds or authority for the notion of boots on the ground, larger

presence of boots on the ground in iraq and i suppose in syria. i want to just, for the record, again remind people that secretary gates, in his farewell address to west point, stated, i think correctly, that any secretary of defense who advises a president to engage in a ground invasion in the middle east ought to have their head examined. and i think the approach you've described here today, which is to strengthen local forces, to provide assistance, as we've seen unfold in kobani, is really the right approach to adhere to secretary gates's good advice, i think, which is that we're not going down that path again. as someone who voted for the title 10 authorization, i just want to share with you, a mother from new london, connecticut, of a marine came up to me and said, you know, i'm with you to this extent, but, you know, i'm counting on you not to, again, open the door to just a redux visit of what this country went

through over the last eight years or so. i just want to share that input with you. your request for additional resources obviously is in the middle of a lame duck where it's not clear where we're going yet, in terms of whether it's going to be an omnibus. i just wonder if you could share your thoughts about what a cr would mean in terms of being able to implement the things that congress authorized. >> well, recognizing the purview of the congress on appropriations, i will answer your question this way, because you've asked me for my thinking on it. i begin with what chairman dempsey said. any enterprise must have the flexibility and essentially the authority to plan, as best we can.

every business, every nonprofit, and to take away that critical management tool for the pentagon, where we cannot plan, based on a continuing resolution, every few months, maybe will will happen, maybe this will happen, or maybe it won't happen, is really disasterous. and it does damage to our institution. it does damage to the confidence of our men and women that we ask to go out and serve. it does huge damage to our future investments. people don't recognize sometimes that our defense enterprise has to be thinking years and years down the road. the platforms that we have today, the sophistication of our technology and platforms, far superior to anything since world war ii.

this just didn't happen, a year ago, two years ago, three years ago. these planning stages and investments and having some certainty that you've got aing budget and you know what -- that you've got a budget and you know what you're going to have this that budget is critical to planning. continuing resolutions are not good for the department of defense. >> and in terms of the specific operations that we're discussing today, i mean, again, is that just sort of, again -- does it make it difficult for you to figure out what extent of operations you can conduct? >> well, you factor that in. that's exactly right. and when you take away, those are hugely important management tools. but we're talking about our national security here. we're not talking about putting out a new product or a new-colored shoe or overcoat or automobile.

we're talking about the national security of our country. so as much ability, flexibility that we have to have some certainty as to what's ahead, also to retain a force that these young men and women, smart. they've got other options. and these young enlisted officers think about what's ahead. are we going to continue to draw down? what's the future? i understand it's an uncertain world, unpredictable world. we all do. but you can't run an institution, especially the department of defense, responsibly on continuing resolutions. >> the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from south carolina, mr. wilson, is recognized for four minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. secretary, thank you very much for being here today. the american people are counting on you to provide information, counsel to our president. and you've indicated, secretary, national defense is your priority.

and i'm just so concerned that the president has an odd world view. it's inconceivable to me, the release of trained mass murderers, as detainees from guantanamo, that it builds good will anywhere. but it puts the american people at risk. it puts our military at risk. and i have a personal interest. two of my sons served in iraq. they developed a great appreciation for the people of iraq, who do want to live in a democratic society, not a totalitarian one. additionally, i've got four sons serving in the military. i'm counting on you, and so are my constituents, the american people. in this regard, mr. secretary, the islamic state, does it still pose an imminent threat to the people of the united states, and is it an imminent threat to our allies? >> well, thank you, congressman. and i thank your sons. again, i'm well aware of their service and what your family has

done for our country and continues to do. as i said in my statement, and i think in some of the comments i made here this morning, it is a threat. it continues to be a threat, a significant threat, to the united states, to our interests, to our allies. and we've seen every dimension of that play out. so yes. >> and such a threat, with the capabilities, say, the seizure of an extraordinary city, mosul, that enhances the threat, doesn't it? >> it does. and we're very honest about that. as i said in my statements, i think that there is good progress being made by the iraqi security forces, peshmerga, as we -- just to give you one example, over the weekend -- you

may be aware of this -- there was a ceremony in anbar province. about 2,000 sunni tribesmen were there and are preparing to be sworn in to the iraqi security forces. this is in the province, the general area of mosul and the areas that will have to be taken back. the isf forces have taken much of that back. not mosul yet. they will. but the mosul dam, i mentioned in my comments zumar, the oil field. a lot of good news there. but, yes, of course. any time they hold significant identifiable cities or pieces of geography, it makes it more

difficult. >> and we should remember that indeed osama bin laden operated from a cave in the middle of afghanistan and was able to conduct mass murder in this country and around the world. and in regard to achieving a stable self-reliant iraq, can this be done with the personnel that you've sent, or what do you anticipate? >> well, first, we, the united states, cannot assure a stable iraq. the iraqi people will have to do that. as i have said, we are supporting them. we are doing the things that we think are most important, the things they've asked us for. they have requested from us. and that's a significant difference from recent years. they've invited us in. they've invited us with our coalition partners in to help them. but i believe prime minister abadi and others understand the seriousness of this. it's imperfect. they have to do it. we'll help them do it, but they have to do it. >> chairman recognizes the

speaker from massachusetts. >> i, like my colleagues, remain greatly concerned with recent developments in both iraq and syria. but given the long-term consequences of u.s. operations in the region, i think we have to be sure that the administrations overarching strategy and objectives are fully discussed and robustly debated here in congress. this is especially important given the lessons of the last decade, when despite seven years of conflict in iraq, 4500 american lives lost and more than $1.5 trillion spent. our military effort did not resolve is conflict we are now confronted with. given these harsh lessons and because a full debate has not occurred, i voted against a short-term authorization to train and equip the moderate syrian forces. before we move forward, we need to be clear on what we are asking and will ask of our brave

service men and women, what the costs might be, how we are going to pay for any operations against isil, what the exit strategy is, what we are asking of our regional partners, their willingness and capability to meaningfully engage in this effort and what our ultimate goal might be. but it seems to me the horse is ever more out of the barn. while i have appreciated the president's current commitment to not send u.s. ground troops into combat, i am troubled by the recent tasking of an additional 1500 troops to iraq. and president obama's statement that he has not ruled out deploying more troops. general dempsey, i appreciate your candor. i think you are very forthcoming when you describe a complex, multifaceted long-term effort that requires strategy patience.

in a situation that will continue to evolve. and you have said in the past and are clear about today saying that there are situations in which you could consider recommending ground troops. you also just described the very important role of the iraqi security forces and the deep investment that we're making in bringing their capability back to par, so that they can take on this task. but what if they are not up to the task? could you talk about some scenarios you might envision? as you've said, you only make recommendations. i'd like you to talk, if you could, about some of the recommendations you might make if it becomes clear that the iraqi security forces cannot take this on. >> yes. what i'd like to do, congresswoman, is give you kind of an unclassified answer but

promise you that in a classified session next week, we can talk about contingency planning. as i mentioned earlier, if some of the assumptions we've made are rendered invalid, of course we'll have to have a branch, as we call it, in military terms, to our campaign plan. look, we absolutely need a credible partner to provide ground forces in that region so that we don't have to provide the ground combat power to accomplish the task. if the government of iraq fails to reach the kind of national unity agenda that we think they need, which would empower and encourage the iraqi security forces, then we'll have to look for other partners in the region to assist us or build other partners in the region. but, again, i would defer to a classified setting. i will say that since we -- i think we agree that this is a long-term commitment. you mentioned end state. the end state is defined as ultimately the defeat of isil. i've actually said, including in my opening statement, that will occur when the 20 million disenfranchised sunnies reject that ideology and we see some

indication, just, again, a glimmer of indication, that that's beginning. isil has to continue to advance to succeed. it has to maintain momentum. and we've begun to break that momentum. then i think we'll have a clearer picture and answer to your question. one last point. this campaign will be marked or characterized -- i've described it this way. three steps forward, two steps back. and at every step forward or back, we'll debate about the size of the step. >> i look forward to your classified briefing. >> general, the time has expired. the chair recognizes the chair of the tackle subcommittee, mr. turner from ohio. >> secretary hagel, i want to personally thank you for your support for a provision that's in the national defense authorization act that protects the custody rights of our

service men and women. as you know, the house on a bipartisan basis has in the past six years taken action to provide a national standard to protect men and women in uniforms, their custody rights. i appreciate your letter of october 30 where you both affirm the d.o.d. support for that provision but also go further to say that this legislation did >> this legislation does not affect other laws. thank you for the time you spend with me. general dempsey, you said you had never been limited in your conditions to your president. he has not been limited in his ability to reject them. forthcoming in your recommendations, but the gap between your recommendations and the presence proposals.

we all have concerns about how the strikes have been effective. issue to how -- the population f participating in iraq, how the forces and all the might be armed and your assurances that will be able to with the iraqi regimen. what is missing your recommendations? actually is the act tion, you described the campaign as erratic. >> i would never say erratic. >> thanks for the opportunity,

i want to add precise. to not very careful create circumstances of two in n casualties or impact in the groups. we have to be very precise in our air campaign. been successful and careful. i can say to you there is no gap. we have both made this had ations and been accepted. all recommendations are made options are and high risk options. high-risk option would be

groups that would meet fight. we do not think that is the thing to do right now. we will continue obviously looking at that, we are very concerned of the success or to t the president goal is defeat isil. >> thank you to both of you for being here. i was writing down a lot of what you are talking, because i think that will reflect my constituents concerns about what we are doing there . but what i've been hearing in month in my district, and i have t repeat things.

you expect some detail the isis threat, regionally. what is the threat? >> the threat -- you started with originally -- regionally the extent and inhumanity of or they have been they continue to do, have expanded their base until most recently we got into this. they are a threat to the iraqi as was noted here in an earlier question.

this till control the second-largest city in iraq, mosul. if they will be allowed to they would not only as have, inflame sectarian war and continue to gather momentum with the ideology. which brings in their successes momentum with foreign fighters, which hold passports states and ited european nations. that started to expand the threat not only to the middle east but europe and the united states. i could continue, but i think you get the picture. the word e not heard insurgency in this

debate, that was obviously our approach to iraq and afghanistan earlier on. transformed have whatever military operations we did in those regions. where would this fall? encountered terrorist with insurgency? isis is actually creating a are e, if they consolidating their control would counter insurgency be the way to go as far as responding to them? is a think our strategy -- good question, it is clear this point. our strategy is counter isil.

if you hear from a testimony, i many of those points, general dempsey had further refined those points how we are countering isil. one of the points i noted, is a comprehensive strategy. questions got into that, cutting off the funding is one. all the partners in the region involved. doing everything we can to new iraqi unit government that has all the minorities. giving everybody some in the new ry power government, which would empower the trust in them. we can frame it up however but to counter

isil it is a strategy that is focused on this particular threat. the world is dynamic and changes. to go back to ng or 10 years ago, we learn from our mistakes. this is a unique threat. clearly we are led to any from t that could emanate iraq and syria with planning and operational activities that could threaten the homeland. clearly -- aligned with counter strategy. will say in iraq is having a counter insurgency. they do have an insurgency in hands, it allows them to think not only of the military component.

they have to follow it up with government economic development and government assistance. >> gentlemen from minnesota. >> i believe it is important for all of us in america to what the focus on policy is. the policy is to defeat isis, our enemy. whatever we do with iraq is a in achieving that policy. our ultimate goal is not to is neither , which tool to have our policy in defeating isis. sometimes we forget, we speak many wars were in.

all useful discussion, but the policy is to defeat isis. general dempsey, america is not flying helicopters over iraq? >> yes. >> i would like to get more that force on what looks like. while we have forces doing logistics and so forth, we actually have americans out and about. -- that i me think had good said we american medical forces, we don't want americans being on iraqi medical support. my question general dempsey is,

earlier answer talking ion, as you are about turning over to iraqi to ces some responsibility do some fighting, but if they would hold them accountable. i can understand what that means how would we do such a thing? >> i think congressman that two things have been put together to create their confusion. was that a monk the tenants of our strategy is that assist the iraqi forces, the government of iraq accountable for the progress. >> but what does that mean?

do not s that if they unity, i national would be those that would recommend to not support them to the degree that we are. they need to be some conditions. >> i agree with you. i just don't believe that we know what that means. important at it is the two all, certainly of you, think about what that means, holding accountable. keeping in mind what our policy is, and that your job is to defeat isis. recognises the gentleman from wisconsin. you for your service.

my question general dempsey, away in war in iraq and syria? against isil, ar yes sir. case, ce that is the you secretary please provide what the recent legal authority to conduct such a war. when a previously there was the fourth powers act, and that is not the case. we are still at war. there is the iraq and to hanistan authorisation use military force, but i would most legal e the justification if you would please for the record. in his a heavy chairman

opening remarks that any to use military force is on arrival. perhaps his staff could tell him that this member of the to see his ould love proposed authorisation to use the military forces. bottom line, this is more for us than for you gentlemen to declare war. there might be some legal that fication in the past, could be stretched, but for this case i don't think so. have an obligation here and we should be on to it. said that the to conduct aid that

the war successfully we only to be supporting it. my question have to go with two have not been discussed, you mentioned the coalition but you do not mention turkey or iran, would you please do so. what are they doing and what is their role? >> iran is not a member of the coalition. know historically iran and iraq had a cultural and economic ties. that has not stopped. not coordinating with the government of iran. >> is the government of iran involved in any other military actions? >> they are not involved in anything of the coalition. >> are they involved in any military actions?

>> as far as i know the ring army is not engaged in iraq. there may be other components like the shia militia. to have been rue there, and have been over the years. as far as an official uranium i vernment military presence am not aware. turkey, as i noted in my comments. of the eed to be one training sites for the training and equipped of the syrian opposition. they, as you know, have worked with us opening theto getting supplies to kobany. they have continued to work us in other areas of

common interest, that are important to our efforts and their own border. they are hosting one and 1 million refugees coming out of syria. coalition, rt of the an active part and we continue to work with them. >> doctor hack is recognised. >> thank you for being here gentlemen. i appreciate your general earlier in the hearing. has undertaken an investigation of the transposition of the five taliban detainees. addition to previous

request, the committee sent two letters to get additional material. the committee will continue to the your commitment with department of corporation. >> yes, of course . will continue to cooperate. you have urious if been up to date of the terms of the memorandum for the prisoner exchange. who in the department is responsible for keeping up-to-date and are you satisfied with the terms? >> yes. are receive a s report. a special envoy. i took the general counsel two weeks about this.

i am continually assured that the qatari government is fulfilling its commitments, and is exercising the operations they said they would, in order to maintain the security of this five individuals. and sometimes s more often. would ask you now, they hhave been some reports in the media about some of the dating is -- detainees have received. any concerns about the visitors and those activities? >> with at the limit of an open hearing i am aware of those reports. have seen so far we cerns me more that what are doing now, and what is the in the boundaries of

assurances we received, and the agreement we have from the qatari government. >> i appreciate the departments continue support. >> the lady from california is recommended. hegel nk you secretary and general dempsey for your leadership. you spoke earlier arm about guantánamo detainees joining the fight with isil. is there any evidence that detainees from one time i'll the fight with isil? i am aware of. >> general dempsey? the 89 comments refer to

also released, that 90% of them we have clear evidence that they have no activity. are largely % unaccountable for. the last nine months, i will take on that for the record. sometimes i feel like we are in a time warp. have been sitting here talking about isil, the cnn is about change of strategy trying to get its to overthrow al-assad. can either of you respond to that? >> i believe the administration has addressed that.

there is know no change. there is no change. and a different direction. that we erception is would train free syrian army and that they would fight isil. been many reports that they are not willing to they want to t overthrow the syrian regine. what assurance that we have that will fight eisel and not assad? >> that is the purpose of the training. this is also part of the betting process.

more basic to a point -- one of the points i statement as to why moderate syrian opposition will be part of this training effort. i noteed that their homes and families are in jeopardy from isil, from the paternity and and murder of isil. to see assad go, yes. but the most absolute immediate threat to these people is isis. what they are doing to the villages and these people's homes. this is all part of the betting process. only have 90 seconds, i

continue to be concerned about how we shut off isis revenue stream. i want to know what we are shut down their revenues by closing down the oil refineries we have taken control of. >> the chair recognises the gentleman from virginia. >> thank you for joining us think a for your service. today those units that have been trained or those that have significant ined, a challenge for them does not affect the present mission by future missions. each of our service chiefs have

spoke about the redness and means for the force of upon risky places its force. how the address that current situation? into that integrate the challenges we face? to continue been it seems to me we are deep in. point where t to a we are turning to full spectrum we ining and making sure have a continued readiness? >> free profound question, meaning intricate. we are correct that

consuming readiness as soon as we feel. we will not be talking about the necessity of assuring. have pressured or readiness. while the other questions, when will this all end? for the next it generation. norm if you not the look act in history, and it is the not the norm in the present. in my opening ed remarks, budget certainty and flexibility. i think we will need additional account for new

requirements. just tioned three of them over the last six months. i also need your support for some of the reforms that we requested. that will allow us to be more predictable and sustainable over time. i think we absolutely have to of this horrible shadow of sequestration. places is psychological shadow over the defence budget that has very bad long-term effects. >> let me ask this question, today as we speak. come back in 2015 and the reduction in co-funding expected expected to go from 60,000,000,000 to 30,000,000,000.

give me assessment or would you think the military will be? >> we will be less ready than my 40 year of career. >> secretary hagel? >> i were completely agree. would put the military in a very deep hole. -- we king is now recognise now the chairman from california. >> thank you mr chairman. wanted to ask about the level will give us that

confidence in the troops that are training right now in order to pull out of our activity. i know we're not talking about boots on the ground. americans believe that in order need s to do the job we highly trained professionals. like to know whether we that n any position to see and l of expertise preparedness those required of those who go to special operations. believe that to the possibility that something occurring that would require the kind of professionalism, is something that we must be planning for. do we respond two people that level of

expertise? clearly boots on the ground. will not be underground is have airstrikes. you can absolutely assure i would never come to the secretary defends and suggest anybody to any d unless they are in best training and best equipped force. of skills o sorted and expertise weather is in the conventional forces or in the specialised. >> i am talking about the iraqi partners. >> well, of course there is always a gap between our level of expertise and theirs.

it is conventional, is earthy and ground. we tend to focus on what we are we ng on the ground, but have been flying for five weeks now and extraordinary are comparing. those men and women have been exceeding expectations in my view. i'm not sure how to address your question about the expertise issue. if you could elaborate a bit more. certain need to have a level of expertise and a those who are trained on their part? we know our team will not be required. -- iraqi security

forces, have a team that is absolutely capable. they have been overused because the iraqi he best in security forces. trying to reconstitute them, they are also very well lead. so they have capability and leadership. we need three divisions, it is roughly 9 which is to say 80,000 compton iraqi security forces, to recapture deterrent sorry that is lost. to conduct a h training. did not necessarily see a response on their part, and we are looking at the iraqi forces?

when we did assessment. >> two divisions and if you're more brigades collapsed in northern iraq. they collapsed because of corrupt leadership. there was a time when a man over purchase his command an iraqi brigade. that was a terrible outcome. they collapsed because a terrible leadership and no-confidence. a can of mythology that built up around isis. isis has now been stopped, some forces that abandon the post had been reintegrated in the forces. that is all part of this campaign. >> thank you.

>> the turnout organises the gentleman from california. >> i might lead with a quote from you secretary hagel. with president obama to go into afghanistan as i did with bush. nobody can stand a field with is what question happens next? where is this going what is the endgame? so what is this going? the iranians are training or -- iraqis then we are. an h of you work for

administration that had iraq finish and completely. about the long view, general, the long view is that we were not be here that we had stayed in iraq in the first place. not e's a mistress and did give it up. i do not get it. i would question the crew ability -- credibility on this. you do not see this coming. we literally would not be where is the right now administration would take in the right position in the first place. to have a status of support with iraq?

we do not even have a status of forces with iraq right now. we satisfy ve requirements to protect our troops. i will respond to some of your points. last of your quotes, is the most dangerous foreign policy since vietnam, if it is carried out i will resisted". you are consistently against the iraq war as a senator. highest are the second ranking military officer in a civilian capacity in the of leading charge our forces to iraq.

i am really compounded and how look merican people would at your team. of what now in charge we lost, because of decisions made by the administration. -- let me wagon pull see if i can pull some of this apart. i can go back and replay 2011. the united states leave or not leave. we never left. we have the largest diplomatic compound in the world. our embassy there is the largest in the world. regardless, we are where we are. not esponsibility today is

back in 2007 or 2002. i have a new responsibility with new dynamics. 50,000 troops in iraq. yes we are the most powerful military in the world. but we are trying to build and built, not us, them. we hope to build a sustainable they can protect themselves, they can do all the sovereign t governments can do. to face the threat that isis poses a guest asked and our allies. those my responsibility today.

>> the chair now recognises jessica. >> as both of you walk through testimony i can help but think it sounds very familiar to other testimonies about training an army of iraqi forces. training a national guard. overall i am wondering how we can be walking down the same last we walked over the ticket or more, and hope for a different outcome. you have outlined your train the iraqi forces. have a few questions, how many kurdish forces were you your arm them directly?

i'm not putting those weapons through the central government. it has been very assistant on those weapons of or ammunition that we have provide to the central government. >> the specific questions you asked. we oted that of brigades will be training, three of those 12 are kurdish. tthe request that have made for materials. through is all going the iraqi government. >> how can you be assured that they are getting any of that? publicly their ministers have said that they are not receiving those arms. they are being given.

the request our ongoing. statement, aid in my or the request from the iraqi forces are not there yet. a good deal of this is still coming. we do not produce large inventory of arms in weeks or months. all of that is going through the iraqi government. way, in my d by the specific amount of arms have been given directly to the kurdish from coalition partners over the last few months. up until this day, none of arms will be provided to the kurds from the us government?

>> the kurds request will be worked through the iraqi government. >> how they stated publicly that will provide those arms to the kurds? >> that is an iraqi government issue. >> they have stated publicly they will not. >> it is clear that iraqi a strong and viable and trained kurdish force it is in the interest of the country. -- kurds have been given every item on that list. >> there are also the troops on the ground have been the most effective with limited resources.

my last question is to what confidence -- how can we have confidence that the iraq government will not end up with the said it come of -- deserting units. >> there is risking everything. we are eve that what doing now to help rebuild the is qi security forces changing the leadership. we believe it will be a new of trust and confidence, and support in the sunni forces. sunni tribes, 2000 tribes in a ceremony this weekend the iraqi to go into

security forces. are of those things we we believe can , go to make a strong security iraqi force to take back their country. with an inclusive unity and a strong participatory government. thank you mr chairman. are cruelly u --accurately described isis. george bush said, "if we leave iraq before the say we are ready, will be risking the future of iraq.

on a ll see mass killings horrific scale, and we will be increasing the chances of american troops happy to return even more dangerous enemy". this president, mr apology for an standing by as isis went into iraq. this bush prediction came precisely true. i have is that i am afraid it is the same approach is being warned out in other fronts. is, the rous isis greater danger is if some of element of that ideology gets their finger on the nuclear button.

this president seems he is oblivious to that as he was to isis entering iraq. latest funding request is will be a group that fighting alone shia militia. that is a way of elevating iran's credibility. is increasing the chances a day when they will gain taxes to nuclear weapons. to administration seems not see it. to believe were doing enough with iran?

with the first comments. did he president certainly not do anything. force could have stopped them gaining the power. remind all of our defence all, intelligence had noted the threat of isis. we were all aware of it. we spoke to the iraqi government with the previous prime minister. is a sovereign nation. into iraq be invited to help.

we told the premise that he had a problem and he had to deal with it. working not just invaded iraq without the sovereign country, government cted inviting us in. even though we were talking to the government, it is important to use state this. a new government did not take september of this year. thenwe were invited in in summer. to be invited in. that is first. on iran, this demonstration is aware of the danger of iran.

the president said again his policy is the same as president bush policy. iran will not and cannot have a nuclear weapon. that we ush policy was would dismantle and make sure they were not have the ability. this demonstration has written an agreement that the protocol will be protected policy. been talking ve talks have at the been about after the united nations. it is to dismantle, to do all we want to do to the iran away from capacity or capability of building a nuclear weapon.

the department has responsibility to continue to provide the president with all the options on the table. the he chairman recognises gentleman from georgia. set the record straight to what factors led the us to withdraw its troops from iraq. because of the inability to attain that of forces agreement. can you remind us all of the major factors into an agreement with iraqis? into a long oing history, i was not in this job at the time. the united states could not get assurances that it

that it always requires wwhen we have troops in a country. to protect our troops. through a rmally done status of forces agreement. the fact is we were not invited to stay. like you to explain, and iran rest the us have jointly with respect to this isis issue. that are some other things we can -- that we have joint interest about? demonstrated t has

through his brutality, all groups and sectors of people, sunni, shia and kurds. to the whole eat region. because threat to iraq it now controls large parts of the country. at the same time, with the not working s are with iran. >> other any areas with the us and iran can cooperate in to the isis threat? >> each sovereign country in the middle east must protect its own interest.

iran certainly is doing, as it iraq is doing and turkey is doing. that is an independent effort. where we can areas have joint concerns? were have joint concerns not joint corporation? do you see joint operation impossible? >> the fact that iran is a country that sponsors terror,

trying to get nuclear weapons. me ask you this, is the leader endured -- injured or alive? >> they should probably talked about in a classifier hearing. >> doctor fleming. thank you mr chairman. what is the current strength of isis? worked had reports of 40,000 or 50,000. what is the current strength? a band around it

of 30,000. that includes groups that they -- scooped skipped up along the way. outside the core group is properly two thirds are in syria and a third are in iraq, i will say there are 15 to 18,000, >> there may be another 20,000 will fight alongside them. is that what you're saying? >> i think that is where the number comes from. is to r strategy in iraq go back and undo the things went wrong in iraq.

you have better leadership, we stand up their military eventually restoring the border. i think we can assume the most of this isis members will end up in syria if we move them out of iraq. so what about the syrian peace, the free syrian army. long will it take for them to become an effective force? >> i think we have testified we can sly berthing to put enough pressure on the isis forces in syria. but would probably need 15,000. >> will there be an offensive force? the actually going to syria and attack and destroy?

>> it would be a force large enough to defend initially so can actually hold territory. it should have the capability of the town to become offensive. do we get 15,000, talking timeline? are actually ils part of of a planner contention. they are talking about isis in iraq and syria. were along the way will be enough of a critical mass to employ. i do know what tomorrow, but will get more details.

>> mr scott. >> thank you for being here. we know you have a lot on your plate. our national security and things are going on in the world. about try to be brief this, secretary kerry was to move or the ability into syria. which were the -- fronts to go into war. he was going to get back to me that he has not responded. we wanted to ask for this principle is to go into war. we in powell doctrine, do

have a clear containable objective? again what ook at powell expended in that. nation is in en a danger, all resources should be used. why should we approve an give risation that doesn't you, general dempsey, the to lity to do what it takes win the war? >> congressman that is a great question. use of the military are

state conflicts does go better with colin powell instructions than when we face something like isis. when we look at mass, it has a quality of its own. when it is applied against the force of another. have a particular kinetic effect against it but you can also generate antibodies in a population counterproductive to what you're trying to achieve. i'd like to unpack this in a longer conversation with you or a paper but you will tell you this, in terms of what we're doing in iraq and what we're doing in syria, i refer to command sergeant major i had as a young lieutenant colonel, and i was trying to figure out of these five or six or seven things that we really had to get done, how would i possibly prioritize? a young lieutenant colonel, and i was trying to figure out of these five or six or seven things that we really had to get

done, how would i possibly prioritize? he said to me simply, his name was don stockton, he passed away since. he said look, colonel, just make sure that you keep the main thing the main thing. and so isil is the main thing, and our priority is in iraq, and then we will figure out while disrupting in syria what to do about it in syria. >> general, i'm certainly not a student of war, but i have a tremendous amount of respect for both of you. i guess my problem with this administration, as respectfully as i know how to say it, i believe the indecisiveness at the white house has led to a lot of the problems and the challenges that we're facing today, and when we first saw isil, we knew that no good was going to come from that, and the indecisiveness is what bothers me. i don't feel like you have that

indecisiveness. i feel like it is the president of the united states' indecisiveness that quite honestly puts our men and women in uniform and our american citizens at risk because he's not willing to make the decision to turn it over to somebody who will go do what it takes to protect this country so i respect you, and i'd love to have one that just gave you the authority to do what our military leaders think it takes to protect americans. >> thank you, mr. palazzo? >> thank you, mr. chairman, general dempsey, secretary hagel for being here. happy veterans day, happy veterans to the vet rans behind you. happy birthday and there's cake downstairs if you haven't had enough. very important topic, thank you all for being here. previous hearings we discussed how isis is self-financing and how that's kind of unique compared toment some other islamic extremist organizations

in syria and other place, they're self-financing through smugg smuggling, extortion, murder, rape, these are bad people. general dempsey you mentioned some of the things that we're doing. have we been able to truly disrupt their financing source that will lead us to help in i guess break up their logistics? >> we have certainly disrupted it. there are some things that i'd be more willing to share with you in a classified setting where we have reflections of the impact of some of the things we've done against their oil revenue, for example. but again, some of that's probably best described in a classified setting. but i will tell you, the answer to your, the answer is yes. we have significantly disrupted their financial support. >> because after all, if we can the ability to buy bullets and band-aids, hopefully another way to break their will to fight. >> congressman, i just add to that a couple points we've made

this morning on this, it is your point, question, observation is part of the comprehensive effort that we're using to stop him, and it isn't just force. yes, that's a big part of it, but all the other pieces, and just as you said, you don't cut off that funding source, they'll keep coming. so it's a priority piece of the overall strategy, and we are making progress. >> earlier the status of forces agreement was brought up, and it was said that we have more of a diplomatic note and y'all said you feel like that's enough to protect our men and women in uniform from any form of prosecution in iraq, which led me to believe usually when there's military force, there's a civilian contractor force. is there currently a civilian contractor force providing services to our men and women in

uniform and what kind of protections do they have? and how many do you think may be over there? >> yes, we did not, we intentionally have approached this mission in an expeditionary way so we're not dragging in a big log cap to provide life support for our forces. we're dealing with it as a military. now that said, there is, as you know there's an office of security cooperation in iraq that deals with the fms case. it's the part that the secretary referred to as the pa are the that never left iraq, where these 200 military men and women who were helping procure weapons systems and then provide them to the iraqis over time. that is supported by a contract, whether it's with a particular weapons systems dealer or in some cases trainers, and they have as part of the contract, they have protections and uhm

mun i immuneities under the contract. >> secretary hagel i think this week you were quoted, actually at a veterans day speech at the vietnam war memorial and you publicly stated "we must openly acknowledge past mistakes and learn from them because that is how with' void repeating them." i'd have to agree with you. congress i think has been honest saying the sequestration and placing those devastating defense cuts on top of our men and women in uniform was a mistake. there's a huge appetite to remove those defense caps but also i think a lot of people look at this administration and see they made some mistakes in how we've handled isil, how we've handled iraq, the 2011 withdrawal, and i hope that through your comments alone that this administration and others will be honest and not glossing over the past but looking at that time honestly so we can avoid making mistakes because our men and women in uniform

their lives depend upon it so thank you. >> thank you, mr. nugent. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and i really want to thank both of you for your service to the country, belated happy veterans to you, you both deserve our congratulations and our respect. you are responsible for the lives of our servicemen and women, and i appreciate both your positions and secretary hagel, i appreciate your past comments in regards to putting our sons and daughters at risk. i have three sons that are currently serving and so that hits a point for myself and my wife. but as we move forward and two of my sons were in the drawdown in iraq in 2011. i just wonder, and i know you weren't responsible, because you pr weren't in that position as it relates to status of forces agreement but also an enduring

presence in iraq. do you think as we move forward as this starts to, and you mentioned it's going to take years but shouldn't we have a status of forces agreement? would that be preferable as we move forward that we have an enduring presence in iraq, instead of walking away like we did, and then because it is so unstable there, who knows what it looks like again after we stabilize it, would it be a good idea that we have a status of forces agreement that allows us to have an enduring presence there? >> congressman, first, thank you for your sons' contributions and service and for your family's sacrifice and service. as to your question, i think a good question, and it is something worth thinking through, but these are the kinds of things you continually think through but they evolve. what that place looks like, what

the world looks like in six months i can't predict. i can do what i can do now knowing what i know now, anticipating, general dempsey -- >> i think we've talked about strategically looking forward. that should be part of our strategic plan. >> it always is, but again, we're not intending to stay there in an indefinite way in the same capacity that we're now at the invitation of the iraqi government to come back in to help them, training and equipping and so on. that's not an indefinite mission. in our air strikes, that he's not indefinite. so we think through what we need now and what the coalition requires, and then what we're going to need as we go along and as we get wiser as we go, too. so you adjust. you have to adjust. >> and i understand, you know, not trying to -- i guess i am trying to pin you down. would you recommend to the

president at some point in time, and i know things change, would it be in our best interests to have a status of forces agreement with iraq and have an enduring presence of some type within iraq? >> well, what i recommend to the president, what general dempsey has recommended and our leades s first protection of our forces. that's it. whether you call it a status of forces agreement or whatever it is, whatever the piece of paper or document. it has to mean something. the privileges and immunity document that we have, the diplomatic note, our commanders, i feel that it's adequate to protect our forces and what we need now. now, into the future, we adjust. we have to adjust. we may want something different. we are looking at things. we will continue to look at them, but right now, what we

have now is essential and it's adequate for what we require to protect our troops. >> i was the chief staff of the army at that time. the reason that we believe the status of forces agreement was the right instrument to achieve, to seek to achieve was the scale, the size of the residual force which was going to be approximately 10,000. secondly, the nation of iraq was at a, was a stable platform. there was no ongoing conflict within this report. so we thought that requiring a status of forces agreement from a responsible government as an expression of a shared commitment was the appropriate instrument. we couldn't get it. the difference? we entered, we re-entered iraq in an extremist situation with a brand new government that actually hadn't even named all of its ministers, and so we accepted the diplomatic note as adequate to the task, because of

the scale, and also because we don't have these men and women traveling all over iraq. at some point in the future, as the secretary says, when this platform is more stable, i think -- >> i would think that, because it was important to have an enduring force back in 2011, when talks broke down, i would think that would remain the same todatoday and maybe even be the reason to have that is what we're facing today in iraq with isil. just an observation. >> yes, maybe. >> thank you, sir, and i thank both of you. >> that concludes our questions from the members of the committee. i want to thank you, again, both for your service, for being here, and, boy, oh, boy, you just, just made it, mr.

brydenstein. >> only if if it's an easy one, congressman. >> well i appreciate that, mr. chairman. i'm down to four minutes now? okay. three minutes. well, first of all thank you guys both for being here, mr. secretary and mr. chairman. we, our country is facing a major challenge in the middle east and i am sometimes deeply troubled by the way things are going, and today we're here to talk about a $5.6 billion ask and it seems as though we're in the middle of replanning or changing our strategy, changing our tactics. there's 30 nations that are meeting to talk about the next ste steps. it seems to know we're actually in a position where we're getting ready to allocate $5.6 billion and not fully understanding ultimately what our approach is going to be.

could you guys each take a few seconds and respond to that so that i can go back to my constituents and say we're not just giving $5.6 billion but we're actually taking a serious approach at this? >> congressman, thank you. it's a pretty important and basic question, so i get it. i tried to lay at least the general parameters of that out, that question in my statement as to the general breakdown of where would it be used, why, and why we think it's important. also, you mentioned and others have this morning, what are others doing? what are the other coalition partners doing? and as you just noted, one of the reasons that general austin has over 30 of our coalition partners in florida this week is working through where their contributions are specific, money, planes, people,

logistics, so on, are going to come from, and you know we have condition in our request actually the congress does this, that we can only draw down so much of that training and equipment part, the 1.6 million, until others have put their money in. but the specifics of how all that's broken down, the time frame, we have all that. and we would, and briefings that we will start and e we generally started will continue to have with staff in explaining why we have asked for this much money, we are prepared to do that. >> i'd like to take about 30 seconds and swing at this myself. you asked what are we doing. well, we have a counter isil strategy. it's not an iraq strategy. it's not a syria strategy. it's a counter isil strategy. secondly, the strategy is built around a remarkable coalition.