the department of homeland security's review of this event uncovered a laundry list of errors that evening. including, communication systems that didn't work, and that officers were not trained to use properly. a construction project along the white house fence that obscured officers' sight lines. unlocked front doors to the white house late on a friday evening. and a k-9 officer who was on a personal cell call without his radio earpiece in his ear, or his tactical radio at the time gonzalez scaled the fence. this delayed the officers response, meaning that the k-9 was not able to identify gonzalez as the target. the report also discusses a number of training and staff issues, as well as potential missed opportunities to stop gonzalez in the months leading up to september 19th. today's hearing will take place in two parts. a public portion and a closed portion, from which we will

drill further down into the deficiencies that have been revealed in the secret service's policies and procedures, as well as any deficiencies with the physical security at the white house. in particular, i am interested in discussing how the service intends to improve security at the white house when, as was true on september 19th, the president or other protectees, are not present. a month after omar gonzalez was able to enter the white house, another fence jumper was quickly apprehended by secret service officers, including the k-9 unit. it is my hope that this incident shows that the service has already implement reforms. however, the gonzalez fence jumper is just one of many events in the past few years that call into question whether the u.s. secret service is doing all it can to fulfill its mission and prevent mistakes. others include the colombian prostitution scandal. the recent ability of a security guard with a criminal history to take a service webben into an

elevator with the president. and the incident in the netherlands dealing with intoxicated secret service agents. given the vital role the secret service plays in the security of the president and the white house, it is critical that congress investigate the service's response to recent incidents and work with the service to make sure it fulfills its critical mission. this hearing is intended to do just that. and since the ranking member has not yet arrived, we will go ahead, and swear in our only witness and again welcome him. acting director, clancy, if you would raise your right hand and repeat after me. do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? thank you very much. let the record reflect that the acting director responded in the affirmative. and we welcome him. joseph p. clancy was designated as the acting director of the

united states secret service on october 1, 2014, by secretary of homeland security jey johnson. prior to accepting the position of acting director mr. clancy served as executive director of cable security at comcast corporation. a 27-year veteran of the secret service, mr. clancy's career there began in 1984, in the philadelphia field office. mr. clancy was appointed special agent in charge of the presidential protective division on february 1, 2009. mr. clancy held this position until his retirement from the secret service on june 30, 2011. mr. clancy attended the united states military academy at west point, and is a graduate of villanova, university, with a bachelor of arts in political science, and criminal justice. prior to joining the secret service, mr. clancy worked as a high school teacher, and footba the philadelphia archdiocese. mr. clancy, we appreciate your

presence here today and we look forward to your testimony. your written statement will be entered into the record in its entirety, and we ask that you summarize your testimony in five minutes or less. to help you stay within that, there's a timing light on your table. so welcome, mr. clancy. >> thank you mr. chairman. chairman goodlatte, ranking member conyers and distinguished members of the committee. let me begin by recognizing the tremendous support this committee has given the secret service over many years, and acknowledge your staff both past and present to work with us on issues as varied as protection of former presidents, to cyber crime targeting our nation's banks and financial institutions. 44 days ago, i embarked on the greatest endeavor of my professional life. the privilege of leading the dedicated and self-sacrificing employees of the secret service through a challenging time in

the agency's storied history. while returning to public service after beginning a second career in the private sector was not an easy decision, the call to restore operational excellence to the secret service was too urgent to ignore. i did not come here today expecting this hearing to be easy but it is my hope that the next several hours will yield productive discussions about the state of the secret service. without question, the agency has been severely damaged in present years by failures ranging from disgraceful misconduct on the part of some employees, to operational breakdowns that undermine the trust and confidence that previous generations worked so hard to establish. one of those operational breakdowns was the white house incursion on september 19th of this year. i understand the committee was briefed last week on the department's review of the incident. i read the report. i found the findings devastating. what hits the hardest is the range of shortcomings that ultimately allowed omar gonzalez to enter the white house

practically unencumbered. although i firmly brief the secret service is better than this incident i openly acknowledge that a failure of this magnitude, especially in light of other recent incidents, requires immediate action and longer-term reform. the department found that the level of training for uniform division officers likely contributed to gonzalez's ability to breach the white house interior. and document -- there was confusion regarding the various roles and responsibilities during a fence jumping incident. to address this issue, i will continue to oversee the integrated training for white house uniform division officers, and tactical teams that was initiated after the september 19th incident. this training involves dynamic scenario based exercises simulating breaches of the white house grounds, my goal is to ensure that 100% of all white house branch officers receive this training by the end of the calendar year. if someone does attempt to scale the white house fence i want to ensure they are met with immediate and forceful resistance.

but i also view the fence itself as a needed deterrent for would-be jumpers. the secret service has long held that prevention is the linchpin of effective security plans which is why we are currently working with our partners in the national park service to look at potential changes that would assist in the detection and delay of any person attempting to scale the white house fence. special agent and uniform division staffing levels have direct impact on the secret service's ability to conduct regular in-service training. thanks to additional funding provided by congress, in fiscal year 2014 the secret service was able to hire a total of 238 new law enforcement positions, more than tripling the number of hired over the previous two years combined. this fiscal year we hope to surpass that number and continue our work to achieve staffing levels that are commensurate with mission requirements. however, i recognize that staffing challenges are not remedied overnight. as it stands now the recruiting

and onboard process takes approximately 12 months. with an additional 7 months of training for new agents and officers. while staffing concerns within the agency will take some time to resolve, i have taken immediate steps to improve the flow and quality of communication at all levels within the agency. an integral part of why i agreed to serve as acting director were troubling reports that some employees saw no option but to take their concerns to people outside the secret service. rather than trusting their supervisors, and the agency's leadership, to confront difficult issues head-on. that is unsustainable in any organization. while i have the utmost respect for the employees' right to report incidents of waste, fraud, and abuse in a confidential manner without fear of reprisal, i also see an urgent need to re-establish what i view as one of the most basic tenets of a well-functioning workplace. trust your boss that he will stand up and do the right thing. one of the first things i did --

one of the first actions i took since assuming this position was to foster better communication between the rank and file, their supervisors, and the agency's executive leadership. i conducted town hall-style meetings with the secret service field offices around the country by video conference. i personally joined officers and agents at the white house complex during their daily roll call. in the event that employees are apprehensive about discussing their concerns with their supervisors i instructed the secret service ombudsman to establish a mechanism of elevating employee concerns directly to the executive review board for resolution. i made clear the importance of full accountability and directed that i be present when actions are taken. the core values of the secret service, justice, duty, courage, honesty and loyalty, have guided the agency through many challenges over the course of its history. now more than ever it is critically important for us to recognize that in the midst of all the turmoil, there is

exceptional work being carried out by thousands of secret service employees around the country and around the world who embody these core values. in my view, failure can be an integral part of success. whether that refers to an agency or to an individual. and we are confident we can fulfill our mission with honor, and restore the secret service's rightful place as the most respected protection service in the world. chairman goodlatte, and ranking member conyers, this concludes my opening remarks. i look forward to a good discussion, and will be happy to answer your questions during both the open, and closed, portions of today's hearing as appropriate. thank you. >> thank you, mr. clancy. and i will, ranking member has not yet arrived. i will begin the questioning and when he does arrive, we will recognize him for both his opening statement, and questions. as you know, the officers who were present when omar gonzalez jumped the fence on september 19th believe that he was not armed and did not present a threat that would warrant the

use of lethal force. it was ultimately discovered that he was, however, carrying a knife when he entered the white house. can you explain to us the service's policy for the use of lethal force? and given that mr. gonzalez did actually have a knife when he entered the white house, do you agree with the decision to withhold the report? >> yes, sir. dhs, department 6 of homeland security and the secret service have a very clear policy on the use of deadly force. basically, what it states is that an officer, when it's necessary, is authorized to use deadly force if the individual poses an immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer, the agent, or to someone else. >> and what nonlethal options does an officer have to subdue or stop a fence jumper? >> sir, officers, in addition to their weapon, they have batons,

they have cs spray, the pepper spray, and obviously they're trained to use their hands, as well, to transition to that mode. >> now are you looking into other options? >> sir, we're always looking at other options that are available. close consultation with other agencies, and we share information, so we're always evaluating the equipment that we have for our officers and agents. >> concern has been raised that there's an overreliance on the dogs, on the k-9s, that may have impeded the service's ability to stop gonzalez on september 19th. could you comment on that? >> sir, the k-9 are obviously a very important asset that we have on the north and south grounds of the white house complex. it is one option of several that officers can use in the event of a fence jumper. it's a decision that the officers have to make, depending on the circumstances, whether to use the k-9. but, previous jumpers have been confronted with -- our officers

have used their hands, have used their baton, they've used other equipment to stop these fence jumpers. >> thank you. i want to give you an opportunity to discuss an incident that occurred back in 2011. it's been reported that there was a period of initial confusion about whether gunshots had been fired toward the white house on november 11th, 2011, and that officers were told to stand down. can you comment on what the service did that evening? and the days following to investigate that shooting? and did the service realize or did it not realize that anything was wrong until the bullets were found on the side of the white house several days later? >> yes, sir. thank you. as i've been briefed, when we were aware of shots being fired, initially there were -- there was a report over the radio that there was a standdown order. but that was quickly overridden.

our officers responded appropriately, they went to their defensive positions at the white house complex because they did hear some noise that sounded similar to gunshots. we continue to -- try to identify where those noises came from. we knew there was construction down on constitution avenue, but we immediately, within two minutes, notified the park police of the sounds down by constitution avenue. within five minutes we located the vehicle where mr. ortega was -- what he was driving, within five minutes. within 30 minutes i believe we started a -- or built an incident command center on constitution avenue. and then we continued to stay with the course of the investigation of the next several days. >> and how quickly was there a warrant for the arrest of the suspect in that case?

>> how many days, sir? sir we identified -- as i've been briefed we identified mr. ortega that day as the owner of the vehicle, and then through the process of the investigation through our pittsburgh field office, we were able to identify where he was located, and i believe november 15th a warrant was served on him in the state of pennsylvania. >> so within a few days. >> yes, sir. >> not one day -- >> yes, sir. >> with regard to the elevator incident in atlanta on september 16th of this year. what steps has the service taken to review and revise its policies and procedures for handling third party security contractors? >> yes, sir. needless to say, sir, that was a break in our procedures. we did not follow procedures in our advance of that visit at the cdc. we have done a investigation on that, and the -- in general, someone who only sworn law enforcement officials should be in close proximity to the

president who are armed. in this case, we did not follow the proper procedures. it's not a matter of necessarily changing policies but more of an indication that we need to do better training. and reshape some of the training that we're doing with our folks on the protection details. >> on that, what is your policy for determining when third parties may be armed while in the proximity of the president, or another protected individual? how do you go about determining that? >> sir the advance agent will ask, first, is anyone -- if there's local security at the site, is anyone armed. and then, needless to say, we also do records checks on everyone who's going to be in close proximity of the president. in this case, again, we failed our procedures in allowing this gentleman to operate the elevator armed. >> thank you very much. my time has expired and i will now recognize the ranking member of the crime subcommittee the

gentleman from virginia mr. scott for his questions. >> thank you. director clancy, thank you for being here. >> yes, sir. >> one of the problems we have around here frequently is that when we do budgets, we don't think tax cuts affect the budget, and that budget cuts don't affect your ability to provide services. can you describe a little bit about the budget ups and downs over the last three or four years? >> yes, sir. when i came back to the secret service and accepted this position, i identified three three main areas of concern. one was staffing. one was training. and obviously the morale, as well. staffing is -- it's a complicated issue. back in 2011, we were at a high point with our staffing. we had approximately 7,024 security personnel back in 2011. 2012 and 2011 -- i'm sorry, 2012 and 2013 we had a severe

drop-off. there were some uncertain times from a budget standpoint and also we realized, from what i understand, is that that 7,024 number was unsustainable. we were not able to year after year continue to pay the pay of those employees. so our numbers dropped down. now in 2014 -- >> wait, director, did you need 7,024 people? >> yes, sir. >> okay, keep going. >> so in 2014 -- in 2014, with the help of congress, we were able to hire 238 new security professionals. which was a good help to us. but we were starting from scratch after not hiring very few people in 2012 and 2013. so we're starting to work our way back up, and needless to say, in 2015, that's a priority. right now we've got schedule 6 classes of uniformed officers, and six classes of special agents prepared to go through training this year. >> now, you are understaffed.

what does that do to people's vacation time, and overtime? >> yes, sir. it affects their vacation time. it affects overtime drastically. our uniform division works extremely hard, but very often they get their days canceled or their -- they have to extend their workday. and that has a severe effect on their morale. and it obviously has an effect on freining which is something we're going to correct moving forward. >> when you're understaffed what happens -- can you explain what happens to training? >> yes, sir. when we are understaffed it's difficult to get people out to their training assignments because of the operational needs of the service. so, one of the things we've done to alleviate that in the short-term is we've brought agents in from the field. to take some of these positions that uniform division has at the white house complex so that we can get people out to training. >> what happens when people are not properly trained? >> when we're not properly

trained, sir, we fail. >> now, we have coming up next year another round of sequester, 10% across the board cut. what would that do to your staffing morale and training? >> sir, that would have an effect on our staff, and on our training, and on our morale. we will continue to do our very best to fulfill the needs, and we will meet the needs of the protection of the white house, first family. we'll do whatever we need to do to make sure we meet those requirements. >> well, if you meet those requirements then something's got to give. what priorities will not be met if you need to transfer people on to the white house security? >> sir, sometimes we do have to reach out to our field offices, who are doing a tremendous job as the chairman had mentioned in his opening remarks. their investigative functions are sometimes, we take some of those agents to support us in a protective mode.

>> did the transfer -- do you know if the transfer from treasury to the homeland security had any effect on your ability to perform your mission. >> sir, i don't think i'm one to evaluate. i was manager when we were in the treasury department. certainly i've had good exposure and experience with the department of homeland security and we've used them, as i've been briefed from the most recent united nations. we used our other components within the department of homeland security to assist us in that united nations security plan. we used their hsi investigators to help us with post standing. we used their tsa agents to assist us with meg net-o-meters. we use the coast guard to assist us with our water sea support and air support. so we were able to use the components of the department of homeland security to assist us in a very critical mission. >> just for the record, when the fence jumper incident occurred,

where was the president and the first family? >> sir, when the fence jumper on september 19th occurred, the president had just left for camp david, and the first lady was out of the residence, as well. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from north carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. clancy, good to have you with us this morning. >> thank you, sir. >> mr. clancy, if i were going to pursue an activity to direct attention to me, i believe i would find some exercise other than volunteering as a fence jumper at the white house. but that's me. maybe i'm in a minority in that role. >> yes, sir. >> but it's been reported that the service had multiple contacts with gonzalez prior to september 19th incident. will any review of that event include a review of how information regarding the suspect prior to that date was handled, including information gathered by the secret service

investigators following gonzalez's arrest on july 19th, 2014? >> yes, sir. that's correct, sir. do you want me to explain a little bit what happened? >> if you would do that. >> yes, sir. during that time, sir, when mr. gonzalez was arrested down in virginia, our roanoke office was advised of the arrest. there was consultation between the local authorities, and our agents, and at that time our agents did not interview mr. gonzalez. subsequent to that, when mr. gonzalez posted bond, our agents did interview mr. gonzalez, and we were aware of the weapons that he had in his vehicle. we were also aware of the map that he had in his possession. this is one of the most difficult, decisions an agent

has to make. make an assessment of someone they're interviewing with whether or not that individual has the potential or the motive to do harm to any of our protectees. and during that interview, mr. gonzalez did not exhibit any of those characteristics. he did not indicate in any way that he wanted to harm any of our protectees or indicate in any way that he wanted to harm any of our protectees of the president. subsequent to that, he did come to the white house for outside the white house perimeter. and as he was walking around the perimeter, one of our uniformed officers noticed he was -- he was a little suspicious the way he was walking, and there was a bulge in the back of his jacket. as i've been briefed here. and the officer approached him, and noticed that he had a hatchet in the back of his pants. as i was briefed. the hatchet, my understanding, in d.c. is not in violation of the law, if it's considered to be used for camping-type

activities. and that's what his individual indicated he had the hatchet for. the individual also allowed for -- gave a consent search of his vehicle. so he was very cooperative during the interview. when they searched his vehicle, there were no weapons found in the vehicle. there were other hatchets. there was other camping equipment to again to his story that he was involved in camping activities. so, again, he was released from our -- from the interview. then subsequently, on september 19th, he did return to the white house, and again three of the officers who were familiar with the hatchet interview recognized him. and to be candid, one of the things we've addressed since that incident, is that we've got to do a better job of communicating. those officers who saw mr. gonzalez walking on the perimeter of the white house, we did not do a good enough job of

communicating to everyone, including our joint operations center, that he was in the vicinity again. >> thank you, mr. clancy. the question before that red light illuminates. >> yes, sir. >> do you intend to review the white house's physical infrastructure or security risks? is it solely within the discretion of the service to update the physical security systems in place within the white house and surrounding grounds? and which other agencies or offices, if any, must approve any recommended improvements? >> yes, sir. that's a good question. thank you, sir. we are constantly evaluating all the security measures at the white house complex. in fact, the very first week, i walked the perimeter of the white house, as well as the interior of the white house, and looked at the security measures we have in place. now any adjustments we want to make, just as an example, the fence, we have to work with our partners, and we're happy to do that. and we've gotten very good cooperation with our partners to include the national capital planning commission, the fine

arts commission, the national park service, and we work with those agencies on the perimeter of the white house for any adjustments we want to make. >> i thank you for that, sir. >> yes, sir. thank you, sir. >> chairman, i yield back. >> thanks, the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from tennessee mr. hoen for his questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it's a great honor to follow the gentleman from north carolina who has served this committee so ably for so many years and been a friend to me. and i appreciate that. >> thank you. >> the white house protection, does the secret service protection begin on the inside of the fence, or does secret service have personnel on the outside of the fence on 16? >> sir, we have a presence on the outside perimeter as well, yes, sir. >> do the d.c. police normally also provide some type of perimeter screening? >> sir, d.c. police is also on the outside. but the actual perimeter, the

protection of the white house complex, would be the responsibility of the secret service. and we do have people that are in several different -- several different job descriptions on the perimeter of the white house. >> on the day in question of september 19, 2014, how many agents were on the 16th street side, that's opposite andy jackson? lafayette square? how many folks were on the street beyond the white house perimeter? >> yes, sir. sir, typically we would have on the street two uniform division officers, but we also have some countersurveillance units that could be in that area by lafayette park. we also have posts that are right inside the gate -- >> but on the outside you have just a couple? none of them saw this man jump the fence? >> sir, they saw him prepping to jump the fence. by that they can usually see the body language of individuals who, as you know, so many

pedestrians come up to the fence, but our officers, and other security folks, they recognize when someone is threatening to maybe prep to climb the fence and they started to move in that direction. and as they started to make a move for the fence, they shouted verbal commands, sprinted to the -- to mr. gonzalez, and they were about an arm's length or two arm's lengths short of reaching him. >> and then what did they do then? did they jump over the fence, too? or were they incapable of doing that? >> no, sir. protocol there, sir is first to get on the radio and one of the officers did get on the radio to announce a fence jumper. then, their next role is to clear the fence line of all the guests and all the tourists that are on pennsylvania avenue. once that individual, in this case, gonzalez, had climbed over the fence, now it's the responsibility, primarily, of our emergency response team, and our other officers, that are inside the fence. >> and it's easy to second-guess. i mean, i would do it every

saturday watching football. but doesn't it seem like they should have tried, been able to leap the fence and chased him from behind and not just done what you said, come radio communication and clear other folks? they -- they didn't try to apprehend the person other than yell? >> no, sir. everyone has a specific position to hold. when an event like that happens. one of the reasons is because of the k-9. one of the tools that we have, it can affect how the k-9 react to that individual. i will say that as a result of september 19th, if you go by the white house you'll see that we have a biker out there now which we know is not going to prevent someone from jumping the fence but it will allow us a little more time to react to someone who may have designs on climbing the fence. that's been helpful. >> is that the only area we've had any history of people trying to enter the white house from the outside? >> no, sir. we've had people jump fences --

the fence on other parts of our perimeter. i will see that north grounds is more prominent in people jumping, yes. >> would a moat -- >> moat? >> water, six feet around be kind of attractive and effective? >> sir, it may be. one of the things we balance is obviously the accessibility of the white house. we recognize the historic nature of the white house, and how the american people should have access to the white house. so, we are now in the process of working with our partners at the national park services to see if we can do something with the fence. that's our first step, so if we can do something that would still be appeasing to the eye and keep the historical nature of the white house, but, -- >> like a higher fence? >> maybe a higher fence, sir. or maybe some other -- >> because this guy got further

in the white house than some of my republican colleagues have ever gotten. >> yes, sir. yes, sir, but you're right, sir, a higher fence would certainly help us, and we're looking for ways and options. in fact we hope within the next few months to have some renderings, some drawings, some options for people to look at. >> the incident november 11th, there's hardly anything we can do about somebody from a great distance with a rifle is there? >> well, it's very challenging, yes, sir, you're right. but what we have done as a result of that is we've pushed out our perimeter a little further to constitutional avenue, to again to monitor that area, as well. >> i yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. >> chair thanks gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you, chairman. thank you for being here. i have a great admiration for the secret service, back from the days when i was a judge in texas. i had agents bring cases, they were well prepared, and they did

very well, and well received by juries. and i think that's still the case today. >> thank you, sir. >> the secret service does a lot of things >> yes, sir. >> is your number one priority protecting the president and the president's family? >> yes, sir, absolutely. our number -- >> so that's number one. >> yes, sir. >> and everything else is below there and you're in charge of all that? >> absolutely, yes, sir. >> i think i believe that the united states because of who we are, it's really neat that the people can go to the white house where the president lives. >> yes, sir. >> you can't do that in any other countries. whether it's western countries, or third world countries. you can't go see who's in charge. you can't go to their house. you know. and we get to do that. american citizens get to do that. i think that's a good thing. let's go back to the fence

jumpers. there have been 16 fence jumpers of recent years, is that correct? >> yes, sir. and then october 22nd i think we add one to that -- >> 17. >> yes, sir. >> all right. jumping the fence, going on to the white house grounds without permission, and i guess that would include republicans, as well, going without permission, would be a -- is a federal offense, correct? >> yes, sir. >> of those 16, leave out gonzalez, what happened to those 16 other fence jumpers? >> sir, i -- >> were they prosecuted? were they told to not do it again? were they released at the time? what happened to those 16 fence jumpers who presumably violated federal law by jumping the white house fence? >> sir, i know charges were filed. i'll have to get back to you with the exact how that played out in court, sir. i don't have those figures in front of me. >> i would appreciate it if you would take each one of those cases, date, and what -- whether

they were prosecuted and then the rule of the prosecution. >> yes, sir. >> and send that to the chairman of the committee who will share it with the rest of us. >> yes, sir. will do, sir. >> but that is the priority of the secret service is protecting the president. >> it is, sir. >> it seems to me that the secret service cannot make a mistake. this is one area where, you know, you're protecting the president. the president's family. there can't be mistakes. and if there are mistakes, but for some other intervening reason, bad things are going to happen. i believe that that makes, you know, your job, as you now -- i mean as you know the secret service knows, very serious, and very important. there could be no mistakes. ever. this is no -- you cannot do a redo if there is a mistake of security of the president and the president's family. at the white house there are not -- there's not just the secret service that is there.

there's also the white house police, is that correct? >> sir, there's a uniformed division branch of the secret service that protects the white house. >> so they're still secret service? >> they're secret service. >> they're not white house police. >> they're not -- years ago they were called white house police many years ago, yes, sir. but now it's uniform division of the secret service. >> okay. so it's all secret service. >> it is,ier, sir. >> it is, yes, sir. >> are there -- are there protocols when people jump the fence? 16 people jump the fence to make sure that the president and the president's family, if that's the ultimate goal of fence jumper to get to them -- >> yes, sir. >> that will not happen? >> yes, sir, and obviously on september 19th we failed in the execution of that security plan, but we do have very specific assignments, responsibilities of our all of our tactical units as well as our officers at the white house complex. and they've been successful in

all cases. >> i have a couple more questions with a minute left. >> yes, sir. >> you're not trying to say this event occurred because of so-called budget problems, are you? >> no, sir. >> it has nothing to do with the budget? because that's your number one priority is protecting the president. all the other things the secret service do and do well is dekd dare? >> yes, sir, that's credit. >> clolombia, how many agents were involved in the scandal? >> i was not assigned at that time. >> i know you weren't in charge. do you know how many agents were involved? >> there were 13 and i believe 10 are no longer with us. >> you all fired ten of them or let them retire? >> yes, sir. >> something like that. all right. i thank you for your help today. good luck to you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, sir. >> chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentlewoman from washington.

>> thank you, mr. chair. thank you, director clancy for being with us today. >> thank you. i wanted to ask you regarding the september 19th incident in particular, can you explain further the radio communications challenges that were experienced? there were several officers unable to hear any quote comprehensible radio communications to notify them of the fence jumper, leading to, for example, a delay in deploying the canine unit. so is it concerning that some officers experienced unclear and muffled radio communications about the alarm break, and can you talk about what might have caused these communications challenges? whether it was people didn't know how to operate the equipment properly or whether there was actually problems with the communications infrastructure, the the underlying infrastructure? >> yes, thank you. we are very concerned with the radio communication. for us to execute our security plan, we've got to have good communication. and that night we did not have communication we should have had.

we -- i did read the report by the deputy secretary of homeland, and he highlighted that as one of our failings, the communication on that evening. we immediately went out and checked all of the radios at the white house complex as well as our joint operation center, and we did discover some areas at the joint operation center that the commander at the joint information center, when he put out word that there was a fence jumper, he was under the impression, and that his communication would override the hand held, but they did not. now we've corrected that. so when the joint operation center has to get a message out, that will override any hand held radio communication. there was also some reports of the muffling of radio communication. sometimes that's in the heat of battle. people have to slow down, use

radio discipline and explain exactly what happened. we did a review of any dead spots. were there any dead spots of radio communication? and we found there are no dead spots. but the command post was one area we had to correct. and that has been corrected. >> and given communication is critical to deploying resources in a situation like this. the the report recently issued by dhs suggests easing infrastructure may have contributed as well. so are there specific resources that may be preventing you from doing the best job you can? is there modernization to the infrastructure that is going to be important? and can can you give me any feedback on what you think will be more helpful in terms of the tools available to your officers? >> yes, ma'am. as i've been briefed, that is a main concern.

sochl our equipment is aging. that is one of the areas we are looking at to try to enhance our radio communications. it's outdated, some of it. it's still operational. we are always looking to improve the assets that we have. >> and do you know specifically what it is that you would prefer to have or what would be helpful? >> i don't have anything specific. it's more technical that i would have faxed today. but we'll provide a report for you. >> thank you, thank you. i appreciate it. i think i'll yield back my time. ch thank you, mr. chair. >> chair thanks the gentlewoman and is pleased to recognize the gentleman from utah. also to congratulate him on the new assignment in the the new congress on chairman of the house oversight committee. >> i thank the chairman and director. i thank you for being here. the president made an exceptional choice by putting you in this position in a

difficult situation. i appreciate your service to this country and your role. you have an internal conduct. my understanding is it deals with false and misleading information. do you expect every person in the secret service to live under this code? >> we do, sir. yes. >> there's no exceptions as to who or should not live under this code about providing false information and the penalties there? >> that's correct, sir. no exceptions. >> and my understanding is that if it is found that you're providing this information, that would be a five-day suspension to removal, correct? >> yes, sir. >> secret service put out a statement on september 20th, 2014, after the fence jumping incident. t where they said, quote, physically apprehended after entering the white house north portico doors. is that true or not true? >> that is not true, sir.

>> it was further said that according to mr. donovan in an associated press article, that was posted on september 20th, 2014, at 1:24 a.m. eastern dlt time, donovan said -- ed donovan. what's his role in the secret service? >> here's our public affairs office. >> donovan said the man appeared unarmed to officers who spotted him climbing the fence, and a search of the suspect turned up no weapons. is that true or not true? >> sir, it's not true. can i elaborate on that, sir? >> let me keep going. >> yes, sir. >> how quickly after he was apprehended did you find the weapon on the suspect that had entered the white house? >> sir, i -- within minutes i would have to assume, sir. >> and somehow, mr. donovan evidently claimed that the suspect turned up no weapon. this is then posted on the associated press. was there ever a correction

given to the -- posted on the secret service website or given to the media that this was inaccurate? >> sir, i don't know the answer to that. >> so they just let that linger out there. let me go on. operation moonlight. mr. donovan is quoted as saying because there was no protective assets used during the checks, there was no impact on protective oerperations. do you believe that to be true or not true? >> sir, from the inspector general's report, everyone indicated it did not affect the protection of the president. >> so you have a prowler unit outside the white house. you have the president of the united states in the white house. and you don't believe that there's trouble by taking those protective assets and moving them close to an hour away from the president himself? >> sir, i've read the inspector general's report and we respect his report, and we agree with the report that there was poor judgment in sending the prowler

unit that distance in this case. >> the inspector general came to the conclusion that the prowler unit would have been unable to respond if there was an incident at the white house. >> that particular prowler unit, yes. that's correct, sir. any agent -- >> so did the president have more or less assets around him from the secret service by uses the prowler unit away? he had less, right? >> he did not have that unit, yes, sir. >> so there was less protection for the president as opposed to more protection from the president. >> >> well, it's a prowler unit. >> we don't know if there's going to be an incident on the president. how do you come to the conclusion that the prowler unit had no affect on the president's security. we were lucky there was no incident. what if there was an incident? >> sir, we have agented assigned to watch the field office. when they are called to the white house -- >> sorry. i have the yellow light on. i need to ask the core question

here. we cited at least two, i believe three incidents, where the public was misled. there was false information. it was not correct. was there any disciplinary action, and who is involved in that chain of command to review what the secret service is saying? because as a member of congress, as a united states citizen, the secret service misled us on purpose. was there any consequence to any personnel? did you follow the code, and did you suspend or remove people from their service? was there any penalty or consequence for providing false information? >> sir, i agree with you that i have the same outrage you have regarding the communication. >> we have to do a much better job of communicating in the internal. >> did anybody face disciplinary action? you have a major morale problem.

and this is why. there doesn't seem to be a consequence to doing something in obvious violation of your own internal codes. >> sir, this was nonan intentional violation of the code. we just haven't communicated as well. >> they just made a mistake. an innocent mistake? was there any consequence? >> no. there was no discipline administered. >> with all due respect, my time is expired. until you actually live by your own codes and you hold people responsible and accountable, you're going to continue to have this problem. there has to be consequences when people purposely and knowingly mislead the press and the congress. >> with respect, sir, again, from what i've heard, been briefed and have seen, i would not say it's intentional. there's a difference between misconduct and operational

errors. and i think there's a very clear distinction. >> did you not know immediately he was apprehended at the the doors or deep in the white house? >> time of the gentleman has expired. he will be permitted to answer the question. you can can answer that question. >> yes, sir, again. some people -- how that information was relaid, again, not being there i don't know how that information was relaid to our public affairs office, but it wasn't relayed in the proper manner. we gave bad information. it's something we cannot do. we have to slow down with our communication. we know it's critical to give accurate information. and that's what our goal is. but we failed on that day. i agree with you, sir. >> the gentleman from new york, mr. jeffries is recognizeded. >> thank you, mr. chair, and thank you, mr. clancy for your service to this country, to the secret service, and for your presence here today. it's my understanding that the

number of threats to this particular president, barack obama in the the white house, has increased significantly since the president first took office in january of 2009. is that correct? >> no, sir. i would say there are spikes. threats rise and lower depending on world events. >> and so how would you characterize from a comparative standpoint the number of threats that this white house or this president has faced as compared to modern presidents over the last 20 or so years? >> yes, sir. our protective intelligence department does metrics regarding just what you're referring to here. and we do compare it to previous administrations, previous presidents. and the last one i looked at, it does look as if the president's threat level has gone up slightly. but that's not unnatural. it has gone up slightly. >> so the president's threat

level has gone up to some degree. and at the same time over the last six years, we've seen security breach after security breach after security breach. i think that is a reason for us to be concerned, if not outrage ed as it relates to the state of the secret service right now. as it relateses to the concern cans that you've established upon your arrival, i think you mentioned three. staffing, training and morale. is that right? >> that's correct, sir. >> and is it fair to say the staffing issues you confront relate to the fact that you don't have the budgetary resources necessary to operate at an optimal level? >> sir, i think our staffing levels from a budget perspective are appropriate at this time. one of things we need to do to build our staffing is to better our hiring process.ed in an

opening statement, it takes about 12 months for us to get people hireding on. we have to do a better job of identifying good quality people early on in the process so we can streamline that process, maybe move that 12 months to 7 months, possibly shorter. # # # as we're experiencing now, first of all, there's still an incredible interest in the secret service. the last job announcement we had 45,000 applicants. only 72 made it through the process and were hired. >> now if i can hone in on that point in terms of interest 234 the secret service. connect it to the problem that you've identified and members of this panel and other members of congress have identified, you've got the elite presidential protection unit, correct? >> yes, sir. >> and that is generally viewed as sort of an optimal assignment within the secret service, is that fair to say? >> in my view, yes it is, sir. >> you demonstrated yourself in

that time. we thank you for that. as it relates to the uniformeded division, there's a general perception among many observers to the secret service that that is viewed as a less than desirable assignment or on a cash system perhaps some may say, as it relates to secret service hierarchy. is that fair? is that fair to say? >> for the uniformed division? >> yes. >> that's a very challenging position. yes, sir. those officers at the white house and in the foreign missions, they have a very challenging mission. i have great admiration for what they do when you consider, as was mentioned earlier, the the number of people in the white house. we have over 300,000 people screened coming through that white house every day. and these officers are confronted with a variety of issues and i have great admiration for the work they do there. >> what can you do to sort of improve both the morale and the operational ability, the competence of the members of the

uniform secret service division who play a very important role, and of course, with the most recent incident we saw in terms of if fence jumping episode, clearly did not perform at a level commensurate to what the american people, the president, and the first family deserve? >> yes, sir. our people are -- they desire more training. they have a passion to get out to our facility for more training. and we've got to get them out there for that additional training. that's one thing that may help their morale. additionally, i think we've got to do a better job of communicating and hearing their sures. and that's why we put more focus on the anonymity of the concerns sent. because these officers want to be heard. and it sits on my director's staff. so twice a week, when i meet with the director staff, they will bring those issues to the table where i'm sitting. and as much as we want to allow

people to communicate up, we have to communicate down as well. and that will help the morale of the uniformed officers, too. training and better communication will be a good start for helping the uniformed officers. >> thank you. yield back. >> thank you. >> chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania mr. marino for his questions. >> thank you. director, it's a pleasure to talk with you today. it's nice to have a fellow pennsylvanian as director of the secret service. i worked for the secret service for 18 years as state and federal prosecutor. and i have nothing but praise for the secret service. you have the best of the best, and i have personal experience there, so i thank the agents for their service. the president made the right choice putting you in this position. i can tell instantly from the way you answered several of these questions. the right choice of assigning u.s. director. you have your hands full. >> yes, sir. >> there are some changes that

have to be made, but i have complete confidence in you that you will square these issues away, improve security, improve morale, et cetera. i do believe that i'm kind of old fashioned. i think secret service should be with treasury, not homeland security. i think there was a finer system of operation there. no disrespect to homeland security. they have their hands full in many other areas. and with that, i'm going to yield back, because many of my questions pertain to the second round. so thank you for being here. >> yes, sir, thank you, sir. >> thank the gentleman. if you'll bear with me, i'll recognize the the next person. mr. sicilini from rhode island. excuse me.

i'll recognize ranking member mr. conyers. >> thank you both. i apologize for my tardiness. and i too welcome mr. clancy. i wanted to raise a little discussion about the ten people that have successfully climbed over the white house fence. and is there any thought yet about how we're going to repair this problem that keeps happening? replacement or a different design, or what are your thoughts as you sit here before the judiciary committee, sir? >> yes, sir. there's several levels to this, sir. the the first is from our own

operational standpoint to address what happened on september 19th. we immediately instituted additional training and integrated training between the tactical units and our uniformed division officers, first with the four-hour block. classroom work. and then additionally six-hour block out of our training facility, where we would do the integrated training, so we could do a much better job and not allow what happened on september 19th to occur again. but additionally, there are some other things that we are looking at to include adjusting to either the height of the fence or some modification to that fence. and again, we've worked very well with our partners at national park services. we've met with them already regarding this concern. and we've also met with the -- we're meeting in the very near future with the national capital planning commission. and the fine arts commission. and with those meetings, we think we're going to do a -- we're going to find some solutions to make it more difficult for people to get over that fence. >> thank you.

now the secret service performs two huge missions. one, protecting the president, vice president, their family and dignitary. but also of investigating crimes against our financial system. and some have raised a question whether secret service should maintain both missions and question whether the investigative mission reduces the effectiveness of the protective mission. have you examined these issues yet? >> yes, sir, thank you, sir. and let me just break it up. uniformed division the officers at the white house complex are strictly there for protection. on the agency side of the house, we do have a robust investigative field office. field offices throughout the country. we think that is critical to our

mission. our protective mission and overall mission. the work our agents do in the field allows them to build skills from working the streets, doing interviews, situational awareness, those skills carry over into the protective mode so you're much more attentive, you pay attention to your details. it helps you with your advance work. there's a direct correlation between the investigative side of the house. and to include with the cyber investigations, where we've had great success, we use a lot of those people in our critical protection systems division, which we use on protective movements. we used them significantly with our national special security events. so that we see the correlation between the physical security of our sites as well as the cyber securit

security. >> thank you. let me ask you about the september 19th incident. it revealed numerous problems with radio systems, alarm systems, officer training, physical attributes o f the white house grounds and officer performance. do coyou have any way of determining in your capacity as acting director whether we have facilities in training, to host wholescale drills, to test the equipment so that we can be confident that it will not fail us in the future? >> sir, just as an example, with the training that we've instituted just recently, again, for retraining, we sent our

officers out there. we built a mockup of the white house grounds. we have the proper distance from the north fence line to the north portico. but it's a mockup at our facility. ideally in the future, we would love to have a true replica of the white house. so that our dogs can feel comfortable working in the true environment of what the north grounds are like. so that would be a long-term goal to get a mock-up of the white house at our training facility. >> glad to hear you say that. i ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be in the record. >> without objection. i thank the gentleman from michigan. the chair will now recognize the je nan from north carolina, the the former united states attorney. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director clancy, thank you for being here. i think it's very good that someone with a long history in the secret service is there to address these problems. like my friend, miss marina.

i spent a long time working with the secret service and have nothing but respect. the secret service is always willing to jump into a task force and bring whatever resources they have to the table and how to multitask is always good. they bring a lot to the table and always pride themselves in having prepared cases and so forth. picking up where mr. mari in, a left off, it saddens me to hear the secret service is having such morale problems. considering the elevated rate of statue in secret service and in

talking to agents over the years, some think that the problems with mora wile started when secret service was taken out of treasury and lumped together with a lot of other law enforcement agencies, all great agencies, i'm not saying them. but you were in the the secret service when it was in the treasury department. take a moment and just reflect on that. do you think some of these problems started then, and if so, you know, what have you thought about ways to address morale problems that may have started when secret service left treasury? >> yes, sir, when i was a younger agent, a younger manager in the secret service, we were under treasury. but i didn't have a lot of exposure to those decisions at that time. so my true management experience has been with the department of

homeland security. and to be candid, sir. the issues that we've had as of late are really a reflection on some of the things that we've done. and i'm really focused on we've got to fix our own operational procedures, our conduct, and our morale. obviously concerned when i came back from the private sector and saw the reports on the morale issues, that was very concerning. so that's one of the areas, one of the top three areas, i think, we need to fix. and i'm committed to working oen ways to fix that morale. and as i said earlier, i think training is one thing we're going to have to build up the training. if we can get our folks trained, they're going to feel more confident in their actions every day. and the other is communication. our folks want to be heard. they can see how we can be better. they've got good ideas out there. we want to hear their ideas.

if it's an idea we cannot implement, we need to get word back to them and explain why we can't implement the idea that we have. the key is communication. people want to be heard. my first day on the job, i met with our senior staff and said that's one o f the priorities we've got to have. we've got to communicate with all of our people. all of our agents, our officers and protective staff. and make sure they're being heard and respected. >> good. one other follow-up question, and then i'll yield back. regarding the security guard who was armed and hadn't been cleared, were there any other security guards armed? >> sir, as i've been briefed, there were other armed security at the the cdc. they were not on the perimeter. they were on the outside of the inner perimeter. which is not uncommon on the the outside perimeter to have arms -- >> so there were armed security who had not been cleared on the outside of the perimeter. were there any on the inside of

the perimeter, like the individual that we've noted? >> as i've been briefed, sir, not on the inside of the perimeter, other than the elevator operator who was armed. >> thank you, i yield back. >> thank the gentleman from north carolina. the chair will now recognize mr. cicilini. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you mr. clancy for be with us today. as you understand, the protection of the president is a critical national responsibility, and i know that we all recognize dm many ways the work of the secret service really, our able to defend our democracy is directly tied to our ability to protect the occupant of the white house, whoever he or she is at any time. so these issues are serious. and i think we all appreciate the seriousness with which you are approaching these new responsibilities and i thank you for being here to provide some testimony today. you made some reference to staffing levels having declined over the last several years while the workload of the agency has not. and so i would like to hear from

you whether or not, recognizing there are training and personnel and scheduling and communications issues for -- that relate to each of the incidents we're reviewing in particular, are there more general concerns that you have about resources, both at the staffing level and in terms of infrastructure, equipment, and the capacity that you have to integrate new equipment as it becomes available. >> yes, sir, first with the staffing levels, we think we are appropriately funded for the staffing levels at this point. our concern is getting people into our pipeline and getting them hired quicker. so we can build up our staff. from the infrastructure standpoint, there are some things that we will be looking for additional funding. we've talked about the the fence here today. once we get good renderings and get the approval, if we get the approval from our partners in the national region, that will be -- that will be required. some additional funding for that. but also our communications we would like to update our

communication systems. we saw that we had some failures on september 19th. so our communications need to be upgraded. and then, you know, the vice president's residence, we have a lot of facilities we protect. all of those are under constant review. we want to update our alarms and cameras, and that's the main focus. >> now, i was pleased to hearto additional training, to be sure that you have some expectations to make requests for additional facilities at your training facility. but in addition to that, it seems as if staffing policies also played a role in the incident, particularly in the incident on september 19th. and the agents being required to work overtime and many shifts in a row, and that obviously contributes to a general

weariness, and the way seniority plays a role. so can you speak to what you will be doing or have already done to address the staffing issues so that they are contributing to the kinds of experiences that we are -- >> yes, sir, you bring up an excellent point, sir. particularly at the white house. we are taking it and making a review of our staffing in terms of experience at the white house. we want to make sure we have a good mix of experience as well as newer agents at the white house complex. and that review is ongoing now. we've already completed that review at our other branches of the uniformed division. >> because it appears that sometimes the the least experienced officers are being assigned the most important responsibilities. isn't that what happens? >> we may have an overabundance of junior officers. to make sure we have good experience and mentors for the junior agents who may be on duty at the same time.

>> and that's an issue that you're examining? >> we are, sir. >> i should have started with this, and i'll end with this to say i have enormous respect for the men and women of the secret service. they have always really representeded the gold standard in many ways, and i'm very pleased you've undertaken the responsibility to address these deficiencies and help raise the morale of this agency. it's essential because of the important work that they do, and obviously i think this committee and this congress will look to be a partner and support you in any way you think is necessary to achieve that mission successfully. and with that i yield back. >> thank you, sir. >> thank the gentleman from rhode island. mr. director, i want to start by also thanking you for your service. i hold law enforcement in very high esteem. i would be bias towards law enforcement. i think they have been given unique powers in our culture. with those come correspondingly unique responsibilities. it's a difficult job. and it takes a different kind of

person to be able to do that job. when i hear reports about alcohol abuse while you're either on the job or about to go on the job, and when i hear reports of sexual harassment of female agents or solicitation of prostitution, with all due respect, that doesn't strike me as a training issue. that's a morale issue, that's a character issue. that's a recruitment issue. if you need to go to a seminar to learn at that stage of your career not to send sexually explicit texts to female agents, you have no business being in the secret service. there's a quote from the spokesperson. periodically we have isolated incidents of misconduct, just like every organization does. but the secret service is not like every organization. that is not a defense to me. you guys are different. >> yes, sir. >> and so in from a recruitment

standpoint, and we're going to get to jurisdiction in a second. but from a recruitment standpoint, are you getting the recruits you want or state and local law enforcement folks, men and women applying? are you getting folks with no experience? talk to me about recruitment. >> we're getting a wide rang of candidates in our recruitment. one of the things we feel in my short time here is through the usa jobs, we're getting a lot of applicants who may get moved on because they use the right words and the computer system. what we need to do is if any of our people know good quality people. people who served in the military. people who have law enforcement experience, good quality people, get them to our field offices. get them an interview and get them in the hiring process. we have to get back to that. >> i'm going to refer to your

experti expertise. i'll probably have a different perspective on whether or not yo jurisdiction should be as expansive as it is. way back when the earth cooled when i used to work with secret service, i never got the the connection between investigating counterfeit $100 bills that were created on an ink printer and protecting the life of the president or vice president or judge. i would rather have a state local law enforcement officer who used to do homicide cases or child sex assault cases. so, you know, i watched atf in the early 1990s kind of delve more towards title l 21 cases. they just found themselves matriculating towards drug cases. i just wonder if it would not be in the service's best interest to let the marshals or bureau or somebody else handle some of these and focus on what really is incredibly important, which is protecting the life of our

commander and chief and our judges and other important people. i mean, why is that not enough? >> sir, i appreciate your view. i would say additionally from my earlier statement that our field office, in addition to the investigations they do regarding counterfeiting, cyber crime and whatnot, they also do protective intelligence investigations. so if you're sitting in kansas city or texas, and there's a threat made to the president, those same field offices, agents go out and do the investigation. so they've got the skills, and they've got to make judgments on is this someone who could potentially threaten or harm any of our protectees. so they learn those skills as well. additionally, when our protectees travel to any city within the country, those same field offices, those agents who already built up rapport with the locals in the the county officers, that has already been built through their investigations. and now we're going to rely on us to support them in a

protective mission. in the middle perimeter, the outer perimeter. and so those relationships are very strong. and we use that from a protective standpoint. they start the advance work. when a president goes to kansas city, the beginning is done by a field agent. well, you're the expert, and clearly i'm not. but it's really tough for me to draw a connection between the investigation of financial crime and the investigation of counterfeiting and protecting the life of "x." there may be categories of crime where there's a more natural, seamless transition. i don't know. you're the boss. there may be books that do prepare your agents. i don't see that. i'll share with a colleague outside. for whatever reason we tend to have the person who is not

responsible before us. the person who you could argue was responsible is no longer in that position. i'm not going to spend my energy speaking. i do not understand not searching the white house when there is any evidence of a shooting. i cannot understand not doing that. but it's not fair to you for me to ask you about that. so, let the record reflect that i will on at least one occasion. i will recognize the gentle lady from texas, miss jackson lee. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. this is a very serious hearing. and i'm grateful to the judiciary committee for its concern, and i particularly want to thank you mr. gowdy for his words. i associate myself, as i imagine every single member of congress does, and that is to recognize first of all, the storied history of the secret service.

your name has certainly traveled through many presidents' careers and we thank you so much for your sacrifice. as well, i associate myself with that the most important responsibility, i believe, is the securing of the commander in chief. although, you haved a added additional duties. i think you've been engaged in the treasury before coming to homeland security and our founding fathers and mothers thought that was an appropriate role for you to be engaged. so the changes would require assessment and overhaul from many parties, including members of the yeets congress. but i did want to put on the record that i thought that no one doubted the respect that we have for the secret service. and particularly for the important and crucial role that you have.

as i recall, a former director pearson was brought onto address the scandal about the culture of the service, and an independent review panel will ensure a report in the near future. just for the record, is that report coming soon? >> yes, ma'am. that report has been completed. >> >> and i'm not talking about the one we received on homeland security. is there another report coming? >> the investigation on september 19th conducted by the deputy of homeland security. that's completed. >> right. >> now there's a blue ribbon panel. >> that's correct. >> by the secretary that was set up. my understanding is december 15th it will be completed. >> okay. >> that's what i'm asking. december 15th we can expect that. >> yes. >> that ties into the reason director pearson was appointed or besides the kpen tensy, but the idea was issues need to be addressed before. is that correct? >> that's correct.

>> and so, we also know that every director has to address emerging threats and resolve staffing moral problems, et cetera. and so i'm hoping this report will address that question. just as a side, and i'm going to into the aspects of december 19th. but we know there are issues dealing with morale. i think you acknowledged that. >> yes, ma'am. and are you focused on trying to address those questions? >> absolutely. >> and i know that a recent order or notice came out for a female agent to wear their hair in a bun. as opposed to any other kind of hair style. can you tell me how that is relevant to caring for the principles that they have concern for. >> i'm not familiar with that directive. but i will certainly go back after this hearing. >> would you please check that? i would appreciate a response back. and i would argue vigorously

that is inappropriate and certainly contributed to low morale. who is responsible for overseeing the disciplinary processes? is a discipline consistent and appropriate across the workforce for similar violations? and has that -- so the base of my question is who is responsible, and is there an attempt to make sure there's even handed assessment of the sis plin? >> yes, yes ma'am. as a result of the events, the office of integrity was set up by director pearson, and so, the purpose of office integrity is to have one central location where all discipline willerred into. and there a decision is made whether or not it's a criminal violation or whether it's a misconduct violation. et cetera. but what we wanted to make sure is that there's a consistency and a discipline that is affected. we have a table of penalties now

that will ensure there's a kinsy as we are confronted with these operational errors or misconduct. >> let me go to two incidents and and say i have the greatest respect for the first amendment and the greatest respect for the media. but i do know sometimes we have to get to the facts. let me get two facts on the table. without any personal acknowledgment as to what is going to happen. on one instance in the breach, a gentleman was on the phone, on a personal phone. ear plug not in their ear, and they're walkie-talkie was in the locker room. second instance is the gentleman on the elevator who has the story is told was certified and authorized to be there with a gun.

and he was doing his job. he was a commander in chief after he got in the car. how does that trickle up to if you were at that time director. how does that trickle up? those are incidents that with the best mind you couldn't imagine that happening. and they were legitimately doing his job, certified and got star happy and took pictures? why don't i yield to you and find out, because i want to get to the point that we're not knocking off directors every five minutes because of incidents happened that should have been taken care of by the immediate manager? mr. clancy? >> yes, sir. yes, ma'am. as far as the officer at the white house complex on the cell

phone, that's been reported through the investigation deputy secretary of homeland security, we waited for that report to be concluded. and we forwarded the facts of that report onto our office of integrity. so that's under review now. for any discipline that may be affected. and in regards to -- >> that would be the responsibility of the special agent over that area, the white house? >> it's actually the responsibility of this specific central office of integrity. so that it's removed from the direct supervisor. >> but the actions were under the direct supervisor. >> in regards to the cdc events, that is -- that was fully investigated. it was actually self f reported. they saw the individual in the elevator was armed. he self f reported that. immediately we had an interaction. we had a full inquiry.

and those details were also sent to that office of integrity to determine what discipline, if any, should be administered. >> time of the gentlewoman has expired. >> thank you. >> i yield back, thank you. i'm going to be brief. two predecessors ago we had a scandal. it turned out that this committee, two other committees were never given the full facts. and we then had subsequent revelations time and time again. during each of these, committees of jurisdiction including my other committee oversight endeavored to work with your people and homeland security to get the full facts, and in each case, we did not get the full

truth. will you pledge today in all cases during your tenure to give us more, not less, and if there's something that may be relevant in even the most spurious way, at least make the staffs of the committees of jurisdiction aware that there is something else we may or may not want to pursue, and at least in an in camera format. because without that we're playing a game i don't want to play ever. certainly not publicly. i ask. you answer. i ask another to see if there's anything else. i don't want to ask publicly. i don't think the chairman wants to ask publicly or any of the rest of us what it is you're not telling us. >> yes, sir, you have that commitment. >> thank you. and i'll end this as quickly as i can. the term law enforcement sensitive is one recently used, if you will, in the two versions

of this report. and now our other committee got to look in camera at the sensitive material. do you know how fox got what we were only allowed to look at in camera to get it on the air, and in other words, it was on camera but we were looking at it in camera? >> no, sir, i'm not aware. >> will you pledge to see if you can find out, and if it came from the offices of the president or anyone else in the administration, would you at least report back to us so that we know that there's two standards, the standards for the press, when convenient, and the standards for congress, because i just have to share one thing with you. i have always felt that an in-camera review followed up with a discussion about what should be made available fully to the committee and under what conditions is a reasonable middle ground. but if anything is withheld from

congress and asked to look at in camera, by definition i think it is fair to say you have, in fact, asserted a form of privile privilege, so at least the potential for privilege or sensitivity or near classification, and that bars from the administration from willy nilly releasing it from the the press, in order to get, if you will, either a positive spin or get ahead of the story. i hope you appreciate the sensitivity. >> yes, sir. thank you, sir. >> so will you come back with any findings of how that got to fox before it got to chairman? >> i will, sir. this is the first i'm hearing about that, yes, sir. >> okay. our staff at oversight will be glad to share the detailed time line with your people. >> thank you. >> thank you. and i do yield back the balance of my time, mr. chairman. >> chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from florida, mr. desantes for his questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. good morning, director.

and you've been frank about some of the incidents in response to the organization of the secret service. you said, look, these are just mistakes we made. that didn't necessarily attribute to that. and i appreciate it. and i think it's important that we in congress will conduct oversight on how the agencies operate. we have to conduct oversight on legislative processes that we've done. you look at the history and congress created a lot of problems as well in various different areas. and i think moving the secret service to dhs is something i've been thinking a lot about since these have become more public. and i think we need further inquiry. and you did mention when the united nations protective operation was undertaken there was utilization at the coast guard and the u.n.

i appreciate that. but you would still be able to liaison with other agencies, correct? >> yes, sir. that's correct. >> and so being a part of the bigger bureaucracy, does that make the secret service's mission -- is it conducted more efficiently as a result of that? or are there bureaucratic hurdles that the secret service has to deal with that they did not when they were a part of treasury? >> again, sir, it's difficulty me to compare the two because i was not in management role under treasury. i will say the department of homeland security is very inclusive. the secretary has had me up there several times to work with the other components and meet with the other components, and so there's a good sharing of information. >> what about in terms of, you mentioned the competition, or you wanted to hire and you're not doing that on the scale you want. are you competing for more resources because you're in dhs? there are alled in that, and it

seems like you have less competition. is that accurate? >> it would be hard for me to evaluate compared to the treasury. i know all the agencies have important missions. so we are all vying for those dollars. >> yes. >> and i know you said you were in a management position. but i have retired secret service agents in my district, and they've served in both capacities. pre-2003 and then after, and i think by and large, you know, i get negative feedback. but when you're talking with people, other agents who have lived through this, is it something you would say a substantial number have misgivings about? >> when we have failures, they're really our failures. >> and i understand that. you've been frank. but we have to look at how are we, you know, we're legislating

this stuff. we're funding these different agencies. and if we haven't done that in a way that best meets the needs of the american people, we have to go back and evaluate. so i'm just curious. i know there's morale issues with the secret service. you know, if you're just, you know, at over the water cooler with people, who have been in the secret service, is it something people will look back and say, man, that was a great thing the congress did. or are you likely to hear people say, man, i liked it better in treasury? >> certainly some people have said they liked our time in treasury, and they had good memories of that time frame. but again, i have too be focused on, you know, our agency and where our failures are, and working with our people, and that's really my focus. and others can determine whether or not we're situated properly in the department of homeland security. but i'm focused on the operational needs. >> now i understand, and as you should be.

but we need to always look at this stuff. and it just seemed to me, and again, i would like to do some more investigation into this. but with treasury, there's less bureaucracy. and actually for congress it's good because i think we conduct better oversight that way. dhs has been problematic for us in terms of oversight of other functions, other than the secret service. but anyways, i appreciate you stepping up to take this position. i know it's a tough job, and we wish you all the best, and i yield back the balance of my time. >> i thank the gentleman for yielding back the remainder of his time. we now go to the gentleman from east texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, director, for being here. you know, we've had different hearings, secretary of homeland security has been here a number of times. and you know, there seemed to be in the the past a feeling of invulnerability of the white house. that the fences, you know,

somehow there was bound to be more security there than you see. so it rattles folks when somebody can jump over the fence and get there. and somebody else was saying, oh, i think there's two rows of fences. isn't there just one row of fence around the white house? >> sir, as a result of september 19th on pennsylvania avenue on the sidewalk there, we've now put a bike rack in addition to the permanent fence. realizing that people can still get over the bike rack, but it gives us a little more time to react. so there is bike rack in front of the original fence. >> well, how tall is the fence there, and i'mclassify ied. >> 7'6". >> is there any talk about making it higher? has that been discussed? >> yes, sir, it's been discussed. and we've been working closely with the narter i er ipartners .

>> your time as acting director. but you remember late 2009 there was a christmas, christmas party crashers, the salahis that got in there, and they were not on the the list, and there was a hearing that it wasn't so much involved that there was a social secretary of the white house who is supposed to be there. and if somebody is not on the list, gives the ultimate yes or no. and she told someone she didn't care about having to be the one to say no, and it left the secret service in a terrible

bind. but what was obvious to those of us who would go over to the white house regularly is that it was all about appearances over the christmas party crashers, that even though it really wasn't so much the secret service's fault as a breakdown in the white house leadership, the secret service who wore plained clothes suits were made to start wearing uniforms so that it looked like there was a lot more security there. . and in fact, we went from just having one check point you had to go through there at the southeast corner to adding another there near the monument. and then adding another down on 15th street. and so, it pretty clearly was all about appearance to make it look like, gee, it was a secret service's fault and we've sure -- we've tripled those up, added a bunch of people there when really it wasn't necessary that anymore need to be done,

other than just make sure white house gave proper direction. so my concern is that there's been too much about appearances and not as much about actual protection. has there been any thought to just eliminating the fence around the white white house t napolitano, maybe having a virtual fence or electronic fence? has that been discussed at all? >> sir, i'm not aware of any discussions in that regard. >> would you be in favor of removing the fence around the white house and having a virtual or electronic fence around it? >> sir, by knee-jerk reaction, that would be, no, sir. partly because of the number of tourists that come on pennsylvania avenue and come right up to that area. and they take pictures and whatnot. >> secretary that pal ton notice said the fence was worthless.

you put a ten-foot fence up, somebody is going to build a 12-foot ladder. so, i would think if the administration is going to be consistent, it's now time to remove the fence from around the white house because if it isn't good enough for our border, it isn't good enough for the white house. i would ask you to consider the consistency and also consider the fact that maybe there is real virtue in having a fence that slows people down. with that, i yield people back. >> i thank the gentleman. as originally scheduled, we'll take a short recess, maybe you have a short bite of lunch. is 1:30 okay to reconvene? >> yes, that will be okay. >> we'll have the room made right and be back in at 12:30. we stand in recess.

>> for the thanksgiving holiday, congress stands in recess until the beginning of december. and lawmakers return, they are expected to vote on government funding when current spending runs out. in the house, members will also consider how to proceed on immigration after the

president's announcement on executive action. in the senate, vote scheduled on nominees for the ambassador to argentina and hungary. c-span, house live on the senate live on c-span 2, and both [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> this weekend on c-span. today on the communicators, founder and ceo on their congressional legislation predictor which uses data mining and artificial intelligence. :30, chrisning at 6 christie talks with newly elted gop governors. 10:00 on book tv, former cbs investigative reporter on the obstacle she faced while reporting on the obama administration. sunday night at 10:00, the 2014 national book awards.

on american history tv on c-span3, tonight at 9:00, brooklyn college professor tells how leading up to the american revolution, taverns and new york city were used as central meeting places to talk about british policies and patriotic spirit. sunday at six :00 on american artifacts, u.s. house historian and its curator, news articles from their collection to tell the story. televisionmplete schedule at c-span.org and let us know what you think about the programs you're watching. call us at the following number. e-mail us at the following address. send us a tweet. conversation,n like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. this week, president obama awarded the national medals of science and technology during a ceremony at the white house.

one of this year's recipients was eli harari, recognized for his invention of the flash drive. he spoke to reporters about the honor. i feel important. >> i wanted you to talk about what it was like to be at the white house. >> this is on now. privilege to be here today. it is a great honor for my family, myself, the company that i cofounded, sandisk corporation . on a beautiful day like today, it is really very good. the president has been gracious. a great sense of humor and very inspiring to all of us. it is us.so it

innovation,ieve in creativity, pushing the envelope , and changing the world. changing the world is easy to say, but it is difficult to do. sandisk, three immigrants, ,hree students, one from india one from china, and one from israel, myself, started this company 26 years ago. we woulded that provide a surge for the portable world that did not exist at that time. or no smartphones, no real digital cameras, no internet. no mp3 players, but we were going to develop storage that you could carry with you so that you could have all of your memories in your pocket.