reformers would be undermined in that but there would be a cascade effect that would not be good for those who are more reform minded. >> i think i agree with suzanne. it would not be the end of rouhani's presidency. he would, however, risk being the end of some of the orientation towards the west that he has been pursuing. it could be in and to part of the foreign policy approach. because what it would do is it would vindicate, in my view, the wrong narrative and iran. there's a hardline narrative and i've and this is ultimately the west is not trustworthy. you cannot negotiate with the west. the west is only pursuing these negotiations in order to be able to find a new way of putting pressure on iran, depriving iran of technology. every time i ran try to negotiate, the west sees that as a sign of weakness and find a way to add pressure to iran

but there's another narrative that says that no, negotiations have to be tried because their common interest to the world is changing. the main threat in the region as defined by ran itself is not the united states but it is actually isis. add that if there is a real negotiation and if there is a given day, if i ran into a strategic utility to the united states, a to relationship can emerge. if these negotiations collapse it will be the indication of the wrong narrative and that will put back into charge the people in iran who prefer to drive a more confrontational foreign policy, vis-a-vis the est. >> i had two questions. been talking a lot about the difference in kind of the u.s. and iran, the cooperation if this deal were to go forward.

i'm just kind of wondering, other than these neutral interests, what is the part of the u.s. gains from this deal? and also there was some mention the hit the gulf states will take if the oil prices would drop. i think mr. hill said three or four years or something like that. as far as being sustainable but some wondering what kind of negative repercussions could we see from those states as result of this deal? will there be i guess negative u.s. backlash as a result? >> you want to address that a little bit? >> the real question is what will saudi arabia do? hat can stabilize the price at $75. going into the opec talks next week in vienna there is those undecided wants to do that at the current time.

they will protect their market share and focus on the price. if that policy continues in iran will have a major impact on oil prices but it will be a question what response you elsewhere in opec. at this point i'm we don't know because it's just a scenario. it's not a clear alternative. and, of course, the saudis, the emirates, israel are all opposed to a deal because they feel that will open up the door for iran to develop nuclear weapons over time. maybe not immediately but over time, changing the whole balance of power in the region. saudi arabia and the emirates have large foreign exchange reserves. saudi arabia is no public debt. they can easily cope a couple of years of low oil prices. then if you have a low oil price that might encourage -- but by 2018 the oil price might be starting a recovery. after with his big price decline that came from ending the sanctions. >> on your first question, how

would the u.s. benefit beyond what we already discussed, well, i think first and foremost the threat of another war in the middle east would fade. so that's a big plus. but beyond that, i mean, would you think about the history of the u.s.iran relationship, we have not had a normalized diplomatic relations for 35 years. and often think, i don't always agree with henry kissinger but i think of this particular court he got it right. he said something like there are no two countries on earth that have more common interests and less to fight about that iran and the united states to rethink -- and he's right. if you travel you feel that there is an affinity between americans and iranians. so i think the potential to reestablish those diplomatic relations is a big one. i would love to see us have an

ambassador in tehran and for iran to have an ambassador here in washington. i would love to see the economic relations that we heard about earlier come to ruition. and as much as anything i think the iranian american diaspora here in the united states, which i know trita can talk as eloquent as anyone, wants to see this. they are very successful part of population. they want to see the relationship between our two countries, our two governments flourish. and i think we would all benefit from that. look at the past 30 years, the lack of people to people exchanges between our societies i think has hurt us. and with a deal i think we could see that move forward and build the relationships that we

once had with iran. >> if i could just add a couple of points to that. the obvious first benefit of course is that the deal would close off any path iran would have towards nuclear weapons. that's the big take away. that's critical. if the iranians agreed to the additional protocol, i thought, and that inspections it go been anything that has existed in the past. it would make it essentially impossible for the iranians to be able to perceive them. and this is critical because we have defined a potential proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region as the primary use national securities threat in the middle east. if that is gone then that is a huge benefit. but beyond that in order to understand and imagine the benefits of a deal it would be good to set to assess what the cost of this bad relationship has been. we just go back 12 or so years

and received that after 9/11 the u.s. and iran during george bush junior's presidency, starts to collaborate and coordinate against the taliban, diplomatic we, politically, intelligence wise as well as ilitary. that collaboration is so successful that when it comes to the effort to put together new constitution after the taliban has been defeated, this was a joint u.s.iran operation. in which the current foreign minister zarif was the lead negotiator for iranians and ambassador jim dobbins coordinated the entire conference and he managed to get there to make sure that not only was the military campaign, with -- six weeks later george bush put iran in the axis of evil. and all of the potential collaboration that could have continued and could lead to a very different scenario in afghanistan is gone and the

u.s. and iran started competing in afghanistan just like they had before, before the brief period of collaboration. we see what happened in afghanistan ever since. we've seen the great difficulties the u.s. has had, the major cost to u.s. soldiers, et cetera. imagine if that hadn't happened to imagine been going for for the next 10 years that you have three more cases in the middle east in which the united states decides to compete rather than to collaborate. then you get an idea of how beneficial a deal could be. last point is on the perspective of the diaspora. diaspora of course has a lot of different views, i winning i mean american committee like any other community is not one view on this issue. but there isn't a woman about a support for the negotiations which is driven partly because of course they don't want to see nuclear weapons but also driven by the belief that if there is a deal, if tensions are reduced it will ultimately be a big beneficial thing for

the pro-democracy activist and human rights defenders in ran. the ability of a brand-new been a more liberal political direction, very much depends on the extent to which iran has hostile or nonhostile relations with the west. > right here, third row. >> what's the impact of a deal or no deal on israel in all this? > suzanne? >> well obviously i think if there is a deal the u.s. government and the obama administration, would have to continue to make a special effort to provide israel with the assurances it needs to feel omfortable with iran having an enrichment capacity that is now

internationally authorized. that's going to take a lot of work. i think in recent days we've heard of various positions coming out of israel that have been, have been consistently concerned about the direction this is going. so that's going to take a very special effort. it may mean posting iran come is was defense capabilities to ake them feel reassured. but make no doubt about it, that will be a diplomatic effort that will require just as much attention as it will to probably reach this deal with the iranians. and i think it will be well worth it. my own belief is that if the comprehensive nuclear deal with iran that prevented from having a nuclear weapons capability is not only in u.s. interest but in israeli interest as well.

>> if i can add a couple of points. suzanna safley right. the israeli government since 1993 has made a point that it would be in the disaster the global threat, and existential threat. if these negotiations reaches a deal that would in any iranian path toward a nuclear weapon, that clearly is a major benefit. for the israelis. it doesn't necessarily mean that president netanyahu will do that as a benefit or at least politically that he would find that you beneficial. i think the israeli government unfortunately has increased the cost to israel of a deal by taking on a very, very for russia's public position against these negotiations and against a deal to easy take a look at, i don't know what to call it, that graphic that prime minister netanyahu added

at the u.n., not this year but the year prior to that, the essential take away was that the israeli redline articulated for the first time by an israeli prime minister, there simply of israeli redline but never articulated by the prime minister, that deadline was giving it should not have 250 kilos of 20% enriched uranium. thanks to the deal, they have zero, 20% enriched uranium. hat is without any question is a significant benefit. ased on the criteria the israeli prime minister has put forth. eyond that, if you have a u.s.

iran deal and you have a reduction of tensions between the united states and iran as i mentioned before as that will lead to less competition and rivalry between the u.s. and iran and other theaters in the middle east that will also have a positive impact on israel because it will prompt iranians to be less hostile. hostility towards israel from the iranian site has very much at times been a function of their competition with the united states. if that competition reduces the utility of iran taking on a very tough position vis-a-vis israel also reduces it. just take a look at the posture of iran since the negotiations began on rouhani and the posture of iran prior to the much more serious negotiations under ahmadinejad. that's just as a result of the negotiations. imagine what that could mean for israel if there actually is deal.

>> questions? over here. >> thanks. so i was wondering, there have been some groups here questioning whether iran has complied with the joint plan of action particularly with regard to testing testing on advanced centrifuges. i wonder if you could unpack better make it clear. furthermore what would be, are there any viable alternatives to a negotiated solution? thanks. >> does anybody want to talk about the allegations are violations of the interim deal? i think you know, there was a think tank that said that iran may have violated by ceding iranian into the ir five centrifuge. do you want to address that at all? so there was this allegation i think the administration was

pretty clear actually at the outset of the negotiations that testing of these centrifuges, this r&d work was written into the deal is being permissible and so the activity that was highlighted was actually considered as this r&d work. that being said the administration after this allegation was made they did announce that they contacted the iranians and that even though this was not a violation they asked that the iranians not continue to do this work and report is that they did. so this actually demonstrates how important the challenge for diplomacy that we actually have far in addressing these issues. >> if i could add one thing to that. at the end of the day the iaea has come out and clearly verified everything the iranians said they were going to do and everything the u.s. and the p5+1 said they would do under the deal have been done. the iaea has been passed with

overseeing the implementation of this so their statement is he final word on this. at the same time on the west side as well as the e.u. side they have also confirmed their belief that the iranians have held up their end of the bargain. there is an area outside of these negotiations between a iaea and iran which there has been some delay and there has been some tension. there have been some problems but that is outside the joint plan of action. that's an ongoing problem that the iranians have for the iaea and those two should not be confused. >> sorry, the second question? >> is there any viable alternative to a negotiated solution? >> so i think this is -- is there any universe in which there is no deal and there are some solution short of that. i know there were murmurs that the iranians were saying that if there isn't a deal that they

would still comply voluntarily with the inspections that are happening. is there any credence to those reports? is there any signaling that decides that withstand the continuation of the status quo meaning the interim agreement on a voluntary basis? >> i mean short of a deal, could we imagine muddling through for a little while? probably especially if the iranians continue to adhere to the current parts of the interim agreement and as jamal said i am hearing that the iranians have said even if there is not a collapse but some sort of extension of course the iaea would be able to stay in and maybe if there was a collapse they would keep the iaea. that is i don't think a solution. it's not a sustainable long-term solution to getting

this deal done. and if we play this out, and if we have a muddling through a approach we can imagine those voices that have been advocating military strikes against iran's nuclear program coming to the forefront again. and i think that would be, it could be very hard to manage at this time especially if the iranians pull out of the joint plan of action. you could see a potential link back to where we were or perhaps even worse where the military option was being considered and i think, certainly from the u.s. point of view with our attention focused on defeating isis, and dealing with crises throughout the world not only in the middle east but ukraine and elsewhere, i just can't imagine that this administration would want the situation to deteriorate from that point.

once he gets to that point, there is no guarantee that a spiraling like that can be managed. >> i would like to add something to that. i think when the -- u.s. negotiator put it very well that there is no deal the name on the of the game on both sides will be escalation and that's the worst-case scenario which would be a relatively good scenario. that escalation in the u.s. side would mean more sanctions and potentially gravitation towards military confrontation on the iranian side. all of the limitations that have existed so far on the joint plan of action would be taken away and they would probably go back to 20% expanding their centrifuge count etc. etc. so the idea that at no deal scenario leads to the continuation of the current status quo i think is something that we have to be very cautious of. it's probably the opposite and

a no deal scenario will lead to the deterioration of the current status quo of militarily, diplomatically and economically. >> israel threatens months ago to launch a new reactor that was going to create plutonium. israel said that was clearly a military plan, purely something they could attack. he was going to be above the round in the desert. so the pentagon said to me this building is so visible it had the word attack written on the roof. so anyway because of the agreement we had last year with a ram construction of this reactor has slowed down. it may not produce plutonium, it may produce something else but basically this threat if negotiations collapse and iran everse what it was doing a year and half ago building this reactor could clearly set the stage for military action in israel which again would make things worse. >> may i ask you a question?

>> and what the price of gas would be if there is a deal. what would it be if there isn't a deal and you have an escalation? >> i think we had an military attack on iran the price of a $10 a barrel with the fear of military in the area. how far would they go in retaliating? i think it would be easily upwards of $10 barrel. how far we go would depend on how well played out. china has a major interest in us because they get over half the oil from the persian gulf. they are active investors and iran and have had a close relationship. they would probably tell the iranians please don't -- because we need not to be open. but again we don't know what iran would do. the radicals would take over in which case you might get extreme action. we just don't know. it's a wild card. > i think the official close to negotiations put it

succinctly and that is failure is not an option so we will be watching with baited breath what happens over the weekend leading up to the 24th and hopefully we will be mindful of the many benefits of a potential deal. i want to go ahead and thank our participants, david hale, suzanne dimaggio and trita parsi. i want to thank the archive foundation for sponsoring this event as well as congressman moran. i want to thank all of you for being here today. take care. the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] national able satellite corp. 2014]

>> i was born and raised in new orleans. i'm the second youngest u.s. attorney right now in our country and i also happened to have lost a brother to street violence in new orleans. so this issue of tryinging to intervene in the lives of young people is near and dear to my heart. right now what we are using on one hand student pledge against gun violence where we are going out into all 450 schools throughout southeast louisiana on one day, october 15th of

this year, and the pledge is quite simple. we're simply asking our young people to pledge not to bring a gun to school. they promise not to use a weapon to resolve a fight or dispute. and lastly they promise to use their influence with their family and friends to ensure that those individuals don't use a weapon to resolve a fight or dispute. it's a very simple pledge. it's been around since 1996. over 10 million young people have used this and taken this pledge. this is the first time we'll be doing it in new orleans. on that day we'll be sending a very powerful message that our young people individually and collectively are taking a stand against vileance in their community and in our schools. >> a discussion on efforts to reduce the prison population while continuing to reduce violent crime. tonight at :30 eastern on -span 2. >> this thanksgiving week c-span is featuring interviews

from retiring members of congress. watch this interview tonight through thursday at 8:00 p.m. eastern. >> people think it's become so partisan. well, tell that to some of the people involved in congress back in the 1830s to 1860 period, with henry clay or certainly steven a. douglas. these people were struggling desperately to try to work out compromises to keep the union afloat and avoid it spreading up. >> i think we have a lot of talented younger members. and it's not just by the way mrs. pelosi. i think she's been a great leader and she is really good at raising money. that's not one of my forte's. i was never good at that. but they have to start training younger people and bring

younger people into the caucus to become hopefully the future leaders. one of the things that i certainly believe with all my heart and soul, you have to know when to leave. >> and also on thursday thanksgiving day we'll take an american history tour of various american native tribes at 10:00 al eastern follow "washington journal." then at 1:30 attend the groundbreaking ceremony at the new diplomacy center. and supreme court justices at 8:30 p.m. eastern. this thanksgiving week on -span. >> rand senior adviser brian ichael jenkins says since 9/11 americans and europeans have

joined the conflict. this is an hour. >> good afternoon, everyone. our center focuses on the middle east from across the rand corporation. we try to focus on the challenges facing the region. today the region is at a critical juncture. the panel you're about to hear from are going to be discussing the really complex challenges that we're facing in the region. but i wanted to note that our center here at rand we also try to focus on longer term solutions to some of the underlying issues that are generateding so much of the violence today. that's why we focus on issues like education for syrian

refugee children which is one of the greatest displacement crisis in the globe today. we also focus on the critical question of youth unemployment in regions like the middle east. our view if we don't dackle these kind of long-term challenges we are going to just continue to see the cycle of violence that generates threats rather than opportunities from this region. so it's my pleasure to introduce these distinguished panelists behind me. they're going to be expanding on some of these challenges but also finding opportunities i hope we'll see. i ask attest to their expertise and knowledge and their contributions to rand on a regular basis. moderating first is karen. she is the former publisher of the "wall street journal," former senior vice president at dow jones and company, a recipient of the 1984 pulitzer prize in international reporting for her coverage on the middle east.

and she is also the author of a very well noted book on saudi arabia. i believe it is outside the doors here. she currently serves as the chair of the rand board of trustees. next to karen is brian michael jenkins, very advise tore the president of rand and who is kshed to be the father of terrorism studies. all of these panelists have a long record of publicication soss they will promote their books outside as well. ambassador james dobbins is the senior fellow and distinguished chair of diplomacy and security at the rand corporation. he most recently served as director of the rand international security and defense policy center. next, last but not least we have seth jones who now direct it is national security defense prolsy center at the rand coppings. he served as the representative to the commander to the assistant secretary of defense

for special operations. so please let's all welcome them. [applause] >> thank you. and excuse me. i feel like i'm turning my back on all of you there. we are in a time in my 30 years, 30 plus years at least of going to the middle east where i think there are more divisions, chaos, and depression than i can ever remember. we'll try as dolly has said to focus on some opportunities. i hope my colleagues will have some. it is really an honor for me to get to moderate this panel trustee 'm, yes, a here but i would say this even if i weren't, because i'm a consumer of their product, these really are three of the best experts in america on this topic.

all of these divisions that are so aptly listed in the little lurb on this arab-persian-sunni-shia, arab-israeli autocratic dictators verse vuss debhands for liberalism or fundamentalism, one or both, are not new. i mean, arab-persian is older than islam. sunni-shia is old as the early days of islam. and even the jewish-arab dispute is hardly new. so i would like to start by asking each of you to briefly ay, of this, why is this set of what i would regard at some level of old issues such a toxic brew now?

at's made it so dwissive and toxic? because all the elements have been there. >> i think first of all recent events really -- there is a fundamental change in what we're seeing now in that some of the structures that were established a century ago during and in the wake of world war one are coming apart. nd as these artificial borders dissolve, as some of these governments autocratic governments have been removed, what we're seeing particularly in iraq and in syria is we are seeing in a sense the thin ven near of control that existed having been ripped off. and so all of these have come to the surface again.

and so we're seeing all these conflicts. i think the second thing that makes it so different for the united states is that at one time these conflicts were seen from this country as distant conflicts. the shadow of 9/11 they are somehow seen as having the ability to directly impact us. and in fact concerns about fears that they might impact us directly here in the united states has been certainly used as a justifyication for a more active policy. so things are coming apart but it's not just there. it affects us in a very, very direct way because there's no difference now between a front line and a home front. >> jim. >> well, i think first of all i would say it's kind of important to put what's going on in the middle east in a little bit of perspective. we've had regional upheevels of this sort pretty continuously

since the end of the second world war. so in the 1950s, 1906s and 1970s it was east asia hah was in turmoil. there were wars going on, american soldiers killed in two of those wars, much larger numbers of civilian casualties and refugees than anything we're seeing in the middle east. in the 1980s it was mostly latin america and africa. you had 20 wars going on, more casualties and more refys than anything we're seeing today. also had more terrorism. american planes were getting hijacked every wuke few weeks for a while and flown to cuba. americans were being killed and held hostage in the middle east. american soldiers were being killed in several countries. american ambassadors were being killed in several countries. in the 1990's it became the balkans and we had four different international military interventions going on in the balkans in that ten-year

period and the civil war in bosnia was just as intense as the civil war in syria today. so what's different is now it's the middle east. it's not east asia, it's not africa, it's not latin america. all those places -- you have a single, dominant language. . they were all part of a single country less than 100 years ago. so, instead of having half a dozen somewhat autonomous conflicts going on and a certain amount of contagion of among them, you have what appears to be an up evil in entire

civilization, and the conflict more intense. it has several conflicting strands and one dimension. the second thing is, the immediacy and intensity and volume of the media content. americans were being killed in as brutal a fashion as the journalists who were beheaded in the 1980's. one poor man in a wheelchair was pushed overboard when an entire ship was hijacked. but there were not the u.s.. videos, there were only three channels and then of them are broadcasted. those pictures would have never gotten out. it would not have had the immediacy of seeing mr. foley the beheaded and almost real-time. nine 11 as a

course, 9/11 as a background makes this more real and apparently more threatening for americans although i would argue that the level of threat is not as bad as it was. have auld like to discussion on the threat level. >> i would probably say two issues are of interest and may be new in one sense. we are seeing unprecedented levels of westerners traveled to , particularlyt from europe to go fight in both syria and to a greater degree in the last several months, in a rock. in iraq.add in --

when you add in twitter, youtube, facebook, the connection that we can make to homes in the united states that has encourage people from denver, from florida, to go fight in this area. there is a kid north of miami, radicalized here in the united states, in florida, goes over to fight with the al qaeda affiliate in syria, comes back to the united states for six months, no one in the united states law enforcement system realized that tn gone to fight with an al qaeda affiliate. he makes a decision to blow himself up. it they are.e does he comes back here for six months, then goes back there and blows himself up. with the islamic state of iraq, isis or isil or whatever acronym

an interestinge situation where a nonstate at work has made a pretty serious bid to take over pretty important parts of one of the larger states in iraq. we have seen this in has ball and lebanon but this is been a blitzkrieg strategy. that is something we have not seen much of it the last couple decades. you put those two together, and you have a very volatile situation with westerners coming to fight. >> can you try to explain to all of us what make us the islamic qaeda, what makes that fundamentalist jihad e philosophy appealing to young americans or young arabs.

what is it that makes you want to be a jihadist? i think it is out there. i will make a pitch on brian's recent publication on american and to other european fighters who have got ever, particularly to syria. it hits on some of these. >> webpage he jihadists come marching home. >> i think you need sheet music to that. [laughter] >> i am sitting on a panel with bruce hoffman, and one of the things we have looked dad is what has inspired people to go over there. there are a couple things that analyticalfor a more

brand-style project. there are couple things that appear to be motivating. taking territory appears to have inspired some individuals. the videos of what looks like success on the battlefield has some individuals, particularly since june to go fight with a group that appears to be winning. i was on cnn a couple nights ago to comment on this video that or three days ago. what is interesting is, it was cnn, of people on fox, on on msnbc. a americans. former generals, diplomats, stating that isis is gaining ground. they actually took this clips, used it in a propaganda video, and pushed it out. a have been that using our own words to push that to our own

population. interesting. that domino argument appears to be one reason. some of the people who have gone over to fight have clearly been looking for something. they tend to come from -- some of them come from broken households. some are impoverished. some have dropped out. i would not call most of these individuals who have gone on particularly well-educated. there are things they are being drawn to that to make them want to be part of a group that appears to be important as well. i wouldn't point, at least from the date i have looked at, to anyone fact her. but several things that happen there and in their own lives are drawing them to go over. it isis interesting that so attractive. i was just in saudi arabia and i that i talkn imam

to half a dozen years ago. his 18-year-old son is going to -- is begging to go to syria. he told him, "no, you should not go. i do not want to be like an arab government take dating." he encouraged him not to go because he said you do not know enough about islam to do the proper thing in these circumstances you are going to be in, and to do the wrong thing is bad for your salvation, shall we say. lot of young men in his mosque are asking him -- seeking his approval and encouragement to go. with,ligious lady i lived her son has already gone and she is happy about it. why it isur sense of

attractive? >> well first -- >> >> and is it the same for americans as for air rubs? >> no, i do not think so. when you look at those who have gone to previous jihadist fronts in afghanistan, yemen, somalia, and elsewhere, you get very diverse motives. certainly, if you talk to them or listen to what they say, expressions of faith are there. certainly they absorb the etiology of the al qaeda, that it is the duty to take up against the infidels of the west. under assault, that is an important ingredient. are also other, unspoken motives that are touched on. their desire for adventure to do something meaningful. an epic struggle.

personal crisis is a big part of particularly from the united states. it is a very individual decision. florida, and from one of his comments he said that basically his life in florida soccer. florida sucked. quacked that is -- is goodrst of all, that for the united states. there is no exodus. the numbers are very small. 11,licly identified since 9 we have had approximately 120 americans have gone or who have overseas to join jihadists abroad.

we know that there are somewhere around, beyond that, somewhere around 100 or more who have gone to syria. but, this is out of an american-muslim population of 3 million.ly so, we're talking about a very the efforts despite of al qaeda and i sold through very thick internet campaigns and social media to attract young people. [indiscernible] they are not selling a lot of cars. they just are not. the decisions are very individual, not community-supported. that is good. bad news is, of those who will go, some will acquire competence as a result of their experience.

they will be even more radicalized. some clearly will be disillusioned and come back and may be encouraged to continue their campaigns. >> can you talk about the issue you started to talk about? what is the threat to the united states? really a big threat? is it a longer-term threats? an immediate threat? a threat to the homeland or just a threat to our close friends in the middle east? >> i think ultimately it is a threat to the united states although it is a threat to the other things as well. the other terrorist groups, that tog al qaeda, is some degree it is already a state in al qaeda. it takes and holds territories. talk about the

ability of terrorist groups to organize themselves, to strike at great distance, they can organize themselves and operate in highly unfriendly environments with very effective governments. germany, canada, even the united states. but they have difficulty and limited capability as a result. time and an easier states that may be unfriendly incompetent. like yemen or pakistan, where they are under pressure but not for a much because the state is incompetent. they can pose a greater threat to long-distance targets. they have a greater capability to operate in areas with no government at all, like somalia. the biggest difficulty is when they operate in a state that is friendly to them. where they actually have the act of assistance of a government.

that has only occurred once in modern history, that was in afghanistan in 2001. that is where the threat and the operational control of 911 occurred. to see another state to emerge in the middle east which becomes a large platform for terrorists with larger aspirations, clearly tends to replicate what we have spent a decade trying to prevent in afghanistan. it creates the possibility of threats of that dimension again. , the capacity to take and hold territory is important. >> but what is the goal right now? it as, and is the taking and holding the more territory and knocking off the saudi regime? yesterday they called on the the royal overthrow

family were coming to mecca -- well, i would say the answer to that question is that to the group's name indicates its priority -- its priorities are in areas from iraq into syria, parts of lebanon and jordan. israel and palestine. though, how well they would be received by even sunni groups there is an open question. it is at least a regional issue. areasname highlights the they are most interested in. at the same time, what is interesting with isis, i'm just back from the middle east and south asia, they have adopted a strategy recently that is more similar to the way al qaeda has operated over the past 10 years

in the even outside of the areas that they are primarily operating in. they have reached out to basessts groups and other and through encouragement, some have proved loyalty. we have seen that in the last week. pledgedst group loyalty. we have seen a isis members in libya going around. we have one group that has pledged loyalty and southeast asia. and pakistan, we have seen support from groups from the pakistan taliban to isis. it means pledges of support rather than the willingness to bring in fighters. there is also a willingness to expand their networks in a broader area than just the one they are fighting. briefly, where does the u.s. fits? in general, you look at the

level of violence going on, they are primarily focusing on local regimes. syria andregime in the iraqi regime. that is where their energy is focused. there does appear to be an otherst in inspiring outside of those others to conduct attacks, especially in europe and potentially in the u.s.. but the focus, without a doubt, is their own region. >> the taliban and never had any intention of striking the united states. it had no ambitions whatsoever. but they were willing to host and facilitate groups that did. it is hard to believe that isis would not do the same thing if they were allowed to take and set up aitory and to state. >> can i follow up on that? look, the idea of the islamic state, not just how many square miles it holds on the ground,

the idea of the islamic state excited islamists around the world. it has galvanized people around the world. in the process of in air campaign against it. that is going to have consequences. to the extent that we ultimately -- [indiscernible] extent that we become an impediment to the achievement of their goals, or even the survival of that enterprise, is going to have an effect on their asategic calculations both an organization as well as individual jihadist who are there who might be scattered and of a vengeanceas as well as other groups that are not there. we are going to be dealing with

this for a long time. these jihadists come back care, they will most likely be arrested. we can identify them. there is a bigger problem in europe. this is a fascinating problem. europe has somewhere in the neighborhood of about 2000 people who am gone. primarily from france, united kingdom, belgium who have gone over to fight in syria and iraq. some of them are going back and forth. the polling data indicates in some of these countries an extraordinary level of support for the as law mixed state. >> from the european countries? really? >> yes. i am talking about and extraordinary level of support because in many cases, they are coming there for marginalized communities and it is seen quite differently.

backthese g hotties come -- when these jihadists come back and are emboldened, two neighborhoods where they are going to enforce sharia, that becomes the catalyst for a therontation with >> with government -- >> not only with the government, but altra right-wing get nativists and political groups. europe has not just a terrorist problem, not just a police problem -- >> so what is a police problem now can become a societal problem? i think it is very important to underscore what brian just said ,bout the excitement a lot of

certainly saudi's, but arabs in general see about the -- islamic state. idea that the democracy movement did not work and many of them are still unhappy with their government and this is that we canw way have justice and freedom that we can get the kind of idyllic if we can had in time just get the islamic state. i do not think it will be just an idyllic society but it clearly seems to excite people in a way i think a lot of americans do not understand. what should we be doing about this? -- we aree what bombing now, but what should we do to protect ourselves -- is it good enough to just contain isil?

is probably the maximum, if the bombing can do that. more?you have to do >> this is at the heart of the -- >> text do you contain it? it is not succeeding. whack's this is the debate. the air campaign is beginning to succeed and degrading some of the capabilities. an air campaign -- by itself will ultimately degrade and destroy the islamic state is another question. that we have to do more. this gets into the argument of what is on the ground and if we have to accelerate and persuade the sunni tribes in iraq to switch sides as they did once before. qaeda. against al

i do not know how much of a stomach there is on the part of the cities in iraq. there is some movement now against isis. i am just not sure how much of a strength of feeling there is on the part of the sunni tribes in iraq right now to take on the islamic state, especially on the behalf of a government -- although the government has changed -- it is still not an inclusive government. there is still that she thing in baghdad. >> there is a feeling that the iraqis cannot defeat them, we have to get the turks, and the turks will not do it unless we go after a side. are we getting sucked in deeper? back to the original question. what should we do, jim? >> i think there is no doubt

that isis will eventually lose control. they may go underground, but they will lose control. they are a minority of the sunni population which is a minority of the iraqi population. them, whatever marginal help they get from the sunnis, they are going to eventually retake that territory with our assistance. i do not think that means that to you have to put an american infantry on the ground. there are boots on the ground. there will be forward observers and advisors, and some of them may get killed. at that is a different level of engagement. the row question is syria. iraqis, they'de emerged out of syria. it is the syrian civil war that is the hot head from which much -- violencernment is coming. the situation there is much more complicated.

a minority, not a majority. a small ethnic minority. byt conflict is complicated a great deal of international involvement on both sides with the russians and iranians and all of the other sunni governments on the other sides. -- >> and i was trying to stay out. >> we are doing both. we are bombing in syria. we are arming moderate factions of the syrians. we are seeking eventually to overthrow a sod, but not now. it is a question of sequencing. regional conflagrations in eventually burn themselves out, but the question is how much damage they do. the quicker you can accelerate that, the better. one fact or that may change this

dynamic is that if we exceed in getting an agreement with iran on their nuclear deal, we will we can beginiraq it not just operating in parallel lines without communicating, but actually communicating with one another. this would make our assistance to the iraqis much more affect the. perhaps eventually being able to peace agreement of some kind in syria, which would require of course also cooperation with russia. i think that will happen, the question is how long will it take? how many more people will be killed and how many more will get radicalized? ifi think it is fair to say there is an iranian deal of the form that is under discussion, while it may have the easing that you suggest, it is also sunni-arabtrage our

friends. especially my dear friends in saudi arabia. go ahead, seth. >> i want to add two things. asko need to continue to not just what should we do, but .hat to our interests are here do we really have interests? i would say the connection between the west and the way the iraqrners are going and and syria in particular, makes this important to us. these are countries that if their names do not get identified in and put on it no-fly lists for example, that through visa waiver programs can come to the united states. these are countries where we have issa-waiver laws allowing them to come. art of the issue is that i think if we do not do anything, if the area continues to attract

westerners, the small numbers that brian is talking about of americans that larger numbers of europeans, i do think this presents a problem. especially when we have a small al qaeda contingency that is plotting attacks in both syria and the united -- in both europe and the united states. i think we have the same problem that we did with afghanistan in 2001. you cannot ask the act that staying out makes you more secure. then the problem is, what do you do? one issue that we do not want to do and i would struggle your to staying away from is the introduction of conventional this area.es in iraq,saw after 2003 in radicalism went way up with american forces moving in. i would stay away. we have a presence on the ground.

we have clandestine line intelligence. i think where we do a very poor job of combating this is that this really is, all four of us appear narrow, this is a struggle of ideas. we do a very poor job of pushing back. one thing the saudi's did effectively with defectors from saudi arabia was giving them a forum to speak about their time in al qaeda. tv interviews. we do have people, i know this because i know their names and i know their locations. we have people that have gone to syria and come back to the united states and are completely disillusioned. they believe they were sold a bill of goods. this is a bad used car salesman deal that they got to go over and fight with jihadists. what they found they did not

like. >> i don't think our law enforcement agencies have been willing to identify those people. >> i suspect they might be afraid. >> it sends out the counter message that the propaganda we are hearing on the news is not reality. >> questions? >> i have a question about the rise of radical islam in southeast asia. cambodia, where i heard references to the presence of some islamist fundamentalism.

of course, it it exists in indonesia. what we have been reading about the repression of muslims in myanmar and china, will that create a kind of radicalism? >> great questions. since -- in some work we have done in the last couple of months, we have looked at the numbers of jihadist activity. between 2010 and 2013, there was a 58% increase in the number of jihadist groups. most of those tend to be the middle east, not southeast asia. there is a doubling of jihadist fighters during that same period . most of that is happening in north africa.

southeast asia have seen some swings back and forth. the philippines, for example. groups have been weakened because of philippine efforts. involved in aeen very significant struggle in the philippines since 9/11. it is primarily special operations forces and intelligence units, not conventional. it has decimated the jihadist groups in the philippines. groups which have groups.n other jihadist that area right now, we have seen a slight revival in the

-- in the areat of pakistan and india, but i would say across that region, there are some concerns about the growth of jihadist groups. across the board, the levels are still lower than what we are seeing in the middle east and north africa and probably south asia as well. jim is in a better position than i am, but the decisions about what the u.s. does in 2016 after in south asia, in afghanistan, have a lot of implications about the jihadist activities by 2017, 2018, and 2019. has an impact on other areas, bangladesh and cambodia. recently to some

officials, they underscored the --t that this law make islamic state idea does have pull. it has awakened some sentiments the indonesians thought they had under control. keep in mind, when there was an original wave of activity in indonesia, there was both a crackdown an attempt to deal means, theough other group responsible for much of this was a group with the i. and they j. ultimately backed away from violence. the term they used was interesting 1 -- they disengaged. it has a contingent quality.

reengage. you could >> it is not turning off, finishing or anything like that. it has this ephemeral quality to it. -- does someone else want to ask a question ? radicalization in european countries, what are the possible solutions to that? what is the appetite to handle this in a decisive way? >> the europeans have a much greater problem. that is a huge generalization. there are large populations, immigrant-based populations in a germany,f countries --

primarily from turkish workers, france, primarily from north africa, united kingdom, primarily from south asia. problems of assimilation, despite the fact that some of these communities have been there for multiple generations. they are more marginalized. -- extremely more high levels of support for these ideas. it is a much greater problem. our challenge here is identifying specific individuals. there it is much more a matter of dealing with communities.

insofar as how they deal with them, the europeans are having debates among themselves how to deal with the latest group that has gone to syria. some of them are taking a law enforcement approach and that is passing legislation that will prohibit going abroad to join these groups, make it a crime. others are taking a position that we must welcome these them, andk, monitor rehabilitate them back into society. it is a typical european kind of -- [laughter] >> that was the saudi way of dealing with it. prison.ilitate them in >> let them live happily ever after. rather like ebola, isis seems

to have appeared in the last three months -- at least for the general public. mentionedering -- you the syrian connection, were any of them working with al qaeda? how does al qaeda get on with isis? politics withcal all of these jihadi groups? >> the reason why isis has appeared so suddenly on the horizon, it it was the collapse of the iraqi army. it is suddenly overrunning most of sunni iraq. is when it moved into iraq

and the iraqi army collapsed. what was surprising was the collapse of the iraqi army, not the existence of isis. >> can one of you a dress the relationship between al qaeda and? -- >> this is a really good question. --s group has its history afghanistan in the 1980's. iraq around 2002. -- affiliated and pledged this organization. they changed their name to al qaeda in iraq and became an affiliate. december 2000 4 -- they fought

the americans and the iraqi government for the rest of the u.s. incursion. the u.s. leaves in 2011. as the syrian insurgency starts, they send cells into syria to start getting involved, which becomes -- to start getting involved. al qaeda in iraq wants iraq and syria in its area. it wants control of operations. >> this is like a feud between inner city gang. looks the had -- >> the head about qaeda -- the head of al iraq al qaeda in should keep iraq. these are two separate

organizations. al qaeda in iraq says we do not agree with this decision, so they are kicked out. there is a really funny john stuart episode. qaeda in iraq has become so bad, so difficult to deal with, al qaeda felt they were too bloody, and to buy lent -- and to violent. how bad do you have to be for al qaeda leaders to kick you out of their organization? this is the origin of isis. we have seen some tension between al qaeda and isis over the past 10 months, particularly in north africa, south asia, competing for a range of jihadist groups.

twould say we have competing major global jihadist movements. one led by al qaeda and one led by isis. isis has a long history. we know this group well. >> is interesting how often metaphors from the field of epidemiology and public health, and to our security round -- come into our security round. ebola, should we try to intervene in africa and stamp this out before it becomes a pandemic and creates bigger problems for us in the future here? or the idea that we can somehow quarantine ourselves.

we will cut off flights and do all sorts of things to insulate ourselves. same kind of debate going on with regard to isis. to revise ourry visa waiver program, identify these carriers before they come frontiers?it at our or are we oblige their and -- obliged to go there and stamp this thing out before, something more serious -- before it becomes something more serious? good analogy. it makes the case well that we should go there. >> the american policy is to withdraw all american combat

forces from afghanistan in 2016. would you please comment on that? was that a good policy? [laughter] reviewed. it will be if not by this administration, then the next. i would guess it will be debated in the campaign leading up to it. decision to withdraw entirely by the end of 2016 was made a few weeks before the emergence of isis and the object lesson that provided, the costs of having left iraq prematurely. it was a mistake to go into a rock in the first place -- into iraq in the first place. government,afghan

the new afghan government, which has a much better relationship with washington and congress, will probably ask the president to reconsider that decision. if things are going well, it we pretty easy -- it will be pretty easy to say yes. if they do not need us, we will stay. us, we will have a harder time deciding whether to stay. i do not think it means staying in large numbers, but i think even the drawdown at the end of 2014 may be too large. we will have to see how 2015 goes with only 9800 troops. how much pressure the afghan armed forces are put under. it could be quite considerable.

as i said, i think the decision to leave entirely at the end of 2016 will probably be reviewed. about the neighbors? what is the relationship of the neighborhood with turkey and the kurds? this is not necessarily good for their world. why are they allowing us to settle into an extended long period of conflict? while we are focused on isis in the civil war in syria, these countries are fighting at least six conflicts. they are involved in one way or

another. the authoritarian governments do sts.like democratic islami the government are constantly recalibrating their policy. the contradictions and inconsistencies in turkish policy is assigned that they are being jerked in several different directions. chess. six dimensional all of the coalition's are temporary. all of the commitments are conditional and all of the fadetions will tend to as they begin to have some success. , we canefault decision get the americans to do this.

soldiers are insufficient to contain isis cap hash as -- isis, which 20,000 fighters, the americans can do this with their air power or forces on the ground. there are -- one of the good things about the coalition is the current air campaign is to get some of these people to step up closer to the plate. arabia, jordan, are 600-800, there advanced combat aircraft parked around the area, but it is the united states leading the campaign. we have to take care that we do

not take on imperial missions. hypothetical young boy today age 13, this country has been at war for his entire life. affectedt war has not directly, but we are talking about conflicts that are still going to be going universityfinishes and goes on to postgraduate school. and he has a 13-year-old boy. that is something we have to consider very carefully. what are level of commitment is going to be to contest that have been going on in some form or another for centuries and could well put us in a situation of open-ended warfare. what does that mean for our

society? -- it is in a very fragile position, more so than -- during the 2003, 4, 5, 6 war in iraq, the primary front movement was through damascus and syria and then into iraq. that was the pipeline. implode,a begins to that pipeline reverses from iraq in two syria -- in two syria. syria. almost every jihadist is coming through turkey. it is the primary area homeland

security is monitoring flights into. country, here is this which is a nato ally, is bringing -- we see so many foreign fighter pipelines coming through turkey. if there was a decision by some of these groups to start striking against our embassy, we have a very serious problem. the turks are clearly concerned about the direction their country is going in. >> the people or the government? >> i am talking about the government. >> he seems to believe he is somehow going to benefit from the creation of this islamic state and the revival of the .ttoman empire,

unfortunately, can we take one more question from year? -- from here? no? we are finished. thank you very much for your attention. [applause] next, q&a with author david mark. live at 7:00, your calls and comments on washington journal. week, we will have interviews with retiring members of congress. tonight, we will talk with

wisconsin republican. he is retiring after more than three decades in office. he was first elected in 1978. congresswoman mccarthy has served nine terms in the house. here is part of her remarks. of talented lot younger members. pelosi.t just misses pelosi. start training younger people and bring younger people into the caucus. things i believe with

all my heart, you have to know when to leave. nancy does not feel this is the time to leave. many of us thought she would stay for this coming year. around, is anybody ready to replace her? it is a hard job. i give her a lot of credit for what she has been able to do, but it is time the leaders start looking at who is going to fill my spot? we are all replaceable. there might be some bumps in the road, but it is time for younger people to take our spot with fresh ideas and new ways of doing things. that is a normal progression. >> c-span interviews with retiring congressional members

tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span. tonight, founder and ceo on their technology to predict outcome to legislation. down legislator by legislator how likely are to vote for a single bill. a lot of opportunities for attorneys, lobbyists, to say, let me look at this bill. based on the coast ponders -- cosponsors, and here are the 50 people most likely to vote for it. is our analytics do not provide all of the

answers. power, analytics combined with raw intelligence. should be able to get to the answers. >> tonight at 8:00 on the communicators on c-span 2. here are a few of the comments we have received from our viewers. >> i have to tell you to see these people in person, to hear them have the panel discussion on a congressional hearing, it is so important to understand the context and listen to the statement in its entirety. >> i've been watching the tv for a few years -- book tv for a few

years and i think it is the greatest program on tv. i like how these authors take , the moderator does a great job of stimulating the conversation. to onwhat i look forward the weekends for me. time,tch c-span all the the only station i have on most of the time. i think it is absolutely excellent. i watched all of the debates around the country. thank you for the book talk and for the history. i like all of it and i'm thankful it is there. i teach at a community college in connecticut. >> continue to let us know what you think about the programs you are watching.

, or you canail us send us a tweet. >> this week on "q&a," our guest is david mark with a new book entitled "dog whistles, walk-backs and washington handshakes: decoding the jargon, slang and bluster of american political speech." mr. mark talks about the humorous side of politics and the language used by politicians to speak to each other and to the american people. >> david mark, why did you want to decode the jargon of american political speech? >> my co-author and i, chuck mccutcheon, had covered

congress, we covered campaigns, been out on the trail, watched hundreds of hours of news, maybe thousands of hours. we had heard politicians of all stripes use many of the same phrases. republican, democrat, they would use a lot of these clichés. we wanted to explain to people who don't work in politics what these folks are actually getting at. >> when did you become interested in politics? >> that would be in my early college years. i grew up in a political house in southern california where my parents talk about it around the dinner table but i got interested myself around 1992 when i was a freshman in college. the bill clinton presidential campaign was going on against george h.w. bush.

i found myself after that very exciting campaign in which a sitting president was defeated, starting to watch congressional proceedings on television. i watched the house and senate. i would hear members of congress use phrases like "my good friend." being young and naive, i figured they actually were friends with each other. years later, i realized that wasn't quite the case. >> why did you come to d.c.? >> i wanted to get involved in politics. i was a political science major in college. i realized i wanted to do something with it. i liked doing politics, following it from a nonpartisan point of view. i thought about academia, getting a phd. i realized i was kind of a news junkie. i followed it all the time. that is when the internet was burgeoning. print newspaper still had a lot of clout along with television networks. i said to myself, i do this in