the most difficult circumstances. it's no secret to anyone that the c.i.a. does not want this report coming out, and i believe the nation owes them a debt of gratitude. they are dan jones, who has led this review since 2007, and more than anyone else today is a result of his effort. evan godesman and tad turner, each wrote thousands of pages of the full report and have dedicated themselves and much of their lives to this project. elisa starszac, who began this as cohead and contributed extensively until her departure from the committee in 2011. other key contributors to the drafting, editing and review of the report were jennifer barrett, nick basiano, mike buckwald, jim katella, eric

chapman, lor lorenzo goco, trecd genif, michael neblet, michael pezner, caroline tess and james wolf. and finally david granite, who has been a never-faltering staff director throughout this review. madam president, this study is bigger than the actions of the c.i.a. it's really about american values and more or less. it's about the constitution, the bill of rights, our rule of law. these values exist regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. they exist in peacetime and in wartime, and if we cast aside these values when convenient, we have failed to live by the very pre-septembers that -- pre-cepts

that make our nation a great jaun. there is a r twhee carry the banner after great nation. so we submit this stud on behalf of the committee to the public in the belief that it will stand the test of time and with it the report will carry the message "never again." i very much appreciate your attention and i yield to senator mccain. >> you can see the report. up next, we'll would hear from the vice chair, senator chambliss was critical of the report. mr. chambliss: thank you. madam president, i rise today as the vice chairman of the senate select committee on intelligence to respond to the public release of the declassified version of the executive summary and findings and conclusions from the committee's study of the c.i.a.

's detention and interrogation program. this is not pleasant duty for me. during my four years as the vice chairman of the intelligence committee, i have enjoyed an excellent relationship with our chairman, senator diane feinstein. we have worked closely to conduct strong bipartisan oversight of the u.s. intelligence community, including the passage and enactment of significant national security legislation. however, this particular study has been one of the very, very few areas where we have never been able to see eye to eye. putting this report out today is going to have significant consequences. in addition to reopening a number of old wounds both domestically and internationally, it could be used to incite unrest and even attacks against our service members, other personnel overseas, and our international

partners. this report could also stoke additional mistreatment or death of american or other western captives overseas. it will endanger c.i.a. personnel, sources and future intelligence operations. this report will damage our relationship with several significant international counterterrorism partners at a time when we can least afford it. even worse, despite the fact that the administration and many in the majority are aware of these consequences, they have chosen to release the report today. the united states today is faced with a wide array of security challenges across the globe, including in afghanistan, pakistan, syria, iraq, yemen, north africa, somalia, ukraine, and the list goes on. instead of focusing on the problems right in front of us,

the majority side of the intelligence committee has spent the last five years and over $40 million focused on a program that effectively ended over eight years ago while the world around us burns. in march, 2009, when the committee first undertook the study, i was the only member of the intelligence committee that voted against moving forward with it. i believed then as i still do today that vital committee and intelligence community resources would be squandered over a debate that congress, the executive branch, and the supreme court had already settled. this issue has been investigated or reviewed extensively by the executive branch, including criminal investigations by the department of justice, the senate armed services committee, the international

committee on the red cross, as well as other entities. congress has passed two separate acts directly related to detention and interrogation issues. specifically, the detainee treatment act of 2005 and the military commissions act of 2006. the executive branch terminated the c.i.a. program and directed that future interrogations be conducted in accordance with the u.s. army field manual on interrogation. also, the supreme court decided roughly v bush in 2004, hamdi v rumsfeld in four, hamdan v rumsfeld in 2006 as well as boumadinev bush in 2008. all of which established that detainees were entitled to habeas corpus review and

identified dish sis in the detainee treatment act and the military commissions act. by the time i had became vice chairman the, attorney general's holder's decision to reopen the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the c.i.a.'s interrogation program. this unfortunate decision deprived the committee of the ability to interview key witnesses who participated in the kaye program and essentially limited the study to the review of a cold documentary record. now, how can any credible investigation take place without interviewing witnesses? this is a 6,000-page report and not one single witness was ever

interviewed in this study being done. this is a poor excuse for the time of oversight that the congress should be conducting. there is no doubt that the c.i.a.'s detention and celebration program which was hastily executed in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in our nation's history, had flaws. the c.i.a. has admitted as much in its june 27, 2013 response to the study. there is also no doubt that there were instances in which c.i.a. interrogators exceeded their authorities and certain detainees may have suffered as a result. however, the executive summary findings and conclusions released today contain a disturbing number of factual and analytical errors. these factual and analytical shortfalls ultimately led to an unacceptable number of incorrect

claims and invalid conclusions i cannot endorse. the study essentially refuses to admit that c.i.a. detainees, especially c.i.a. detainees subjected to enhanceed interrogation techniques provide ed intelligence information which helped the united states government and its allies to neutralize numerous terrorist threats. on its face, this refusal doesn't make sense, given the vast amount of information gained from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that were generated as a result of them, the capture of additional terrorists and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning. instead of acknowledging these realities, the study adopts an analytical approach designed to obscure the value of the intelligence obtained from the program. for example, the study falsely claims that the use of enhanceed

interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of jose padilla because abu glued iowa hea who has direct dies to osama bin laden provided to information about padilla during an interrogation by f.b.i. agents who were exclusively using what's called rapport-building techniques against him more than three months prior to the c.i.a.'s use of d.o.j.-approved enhanced interrogation techniques. what the study ignores, however, is the fact that abu glueda's earlier -- zubaydah's interrogation did involve use of techniques that were later included in the list of enhance ed interrogation techniques. specifically, the facts demonstrate that abu zubaydah was subjected to around the

clock interrogation that included more than four days of dietary manipulation, nudity and more than 126 hours, which is about five days, of sleep deprivation during a 136-hour period by the time the f.b.i. finished up the 8 1/2 hour interrogation shift in which abu zubaydah finally yielded the identification of jose padilla. so during a five-day time period, abu zubaydah got less than 10 hours of sleep yet the majority does not acknowledge this was an enhanceed interrogation. in light of these facts, the study's claims that the f.b.i. was exclusively using rapport-building techniques is nothing short of being dishonest. more important, the actionable intelligence gleaned from the enhanced interrogation of abu zubaydah that started in april

of 2002 served as the foundation for the capture of additional terrorists and the disruption of the -- disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning. his information was also used to gather additional actionable intelligence from these newly captured terrorists which in turn led to a series of successful capture operations and plot disruptions. by the study's own count, the numerous interrogations of abu zubaydah resulted in 766 sole-source disseminated intelligence reports. that's an awful lot of actionable intelligence collected under the c.i.a. program that this study tries to quietly sweep under the carpet in order to support its false headline that the c.i.a.'s use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective. the study also overlooked several crucial intelligence

successes that prevented terrorist attacks against the united states and our allies around the world. al qaeda affiliateed extremists subjected to the program's enhanceed interrogation techniques made admissions that led to the identification of the man responsible for plotting the september 11 attacks, khalid sheik khalid sheikh mohammed or k.s.m. it stopped attacks on the u.s. homeland and against our military forces overseas. al qaeda affiliate abu zubaydah's statements to interest raters led to the identification of jose padilla, tasked with conducting a terrorist attack inside the united states. the intergays disrupted al qaeda 's plotting against camp lemeyia in djibouti, and at

that time home to some 1,600 u.s. military personnel. there is no telling how many lives this program saved in those particular interrogations alone. intelligence gathered under the detention and interrogation program also prevented terrorist attacks on our allies in the united kingdom. terrorist plots against london's heathrow airport and canary wha wharf were disrupted because key conspirators were apprehended and questioned on the basis of intelligence gathered using several interrogation techniques, including enhanceed interrogation techniques. and finally, information from detainees held in the program was critical to ascertaining the true significance of abu ahmad

al-kuwaiti, the facilitator who served as osama bin laden's personal courier and the man who led c.i.a. intelligence analysts and the navy seals to bin laden himself. for anyone interested in a nice chronological survey of the significant intelligence gained from the program and how it was used to capture additional terrorists and drupt terrorist plots -- disrupt terrorist plots; i would invite you to read pages -9d 6 and 97, which delineate exactly a chrono milliochronologyof intelligencee that allowed for take joan of individuals. it seems the study takes every opportunity to unfairly portray the c.i.a. in the worst light possible. presupposing improper motivati motivations and the most detestable behavior at every turn. now the very enemies who the program helped keep at bay for all those years as well as

adversarial nations will be able to sploi exploit what is essentially a dangerously inciteful and dangerous treasure-trove of information about our intelligence operations. now i'm all for pointing out and correcting problems with the intelligence community, and i have been very outspoken sonl on some of them, but i prefer that our oversight be conducted quietly and in a manner that does not yep dice the national security of the united states. ultimately, our nart views examined eight of the study's most problematic conclusions, many of which attacked the c.i.a.'s integrity and credibility in developing and implementing the program. these problematic claims and conclusions created the false impression that the c.i.a. was actively misleading policy-makers and impeding the counterterrorism efforts of other federal government agencies during the program's

operation. we found that these claims and conclusions were largely not supported by the documentary record and were based upon flawed reasoning. specifically, we found that, one, the c.i.a.'s detention around interrogation program was effective and produced valuable and actionable intelligence; two, most of the c.i.a.'s claims of effectiveness with respect to the use of e.i.t.'s were accurate, three, the quia attempted to keep the congress informed of its activities and did so on a regular basis. and as a member of the committee, i can attest to that. four, the c.i.a. did not impede white house oversight. the white house was very involved in doing oversight of the program. five, the c.i.a. was not responsible nor did it have control over sharing or

dissemination of information to other executive branch agencies or to members of the principles' committee. six, many of the study's claims about the c.i.a. providing inaccurate information to the department of justice or themselves totally inaccurate. seven, the c.i.a. did not significantly impede oversight by the c.i.a. office of the inspector general. and, eight, the white house determined that the c.i.a. would have the lead on dealing with the media regarding detainees. these findings are not matters of defense of the c.i.a. the c.i.a. is fully capable of defending its own actions and i know will do so. rather, these findings are a critique of certain aspects of this particular study. as a general rule, i want our committee findings, conclusions, and recommendations to be

unasalablunasalable in every investigation that we conduct. unfortunately, that didn't happen here and i'm very concerned about the unintended consequences that will result from the study's erroneous and inflammatory conclusions. i imagine that some members of the media may choose to repeat the study's false headlines contained in the report without checking the underlying facts. by doing so, they will only be damaging their own credibility. i invite anyone who reads the study's executive summary and findings and conclusions to pay particular attention to how often the text uses lieutenantst absolutes such as "played no role, no connection, or no indication." please then read our minority views to find the clear counterexamples that disapprove most of these absolute claims.

i suspect that the readers who make this effort will be disappointed, as i was that this study makes so many inaccurate claims and conclusions. our minority views also explain how thissitude was crippled by -- this study was crippled by irregularities that hampered the committee's ability to conduct a fair review of the program. these procedural defects resulted in a brie mature committee vote in december of 2012 to approve the study before the text was adequately reviewed by the committee membership or subjected to a routine fact check by the intelligence community. typically once a senate committee report has been approved, staff are only authorized to make technical and conforming changes. the executive summary and findings and conclusions released this week have undergone such extensive and

unprecedented revision since the study was approved back in december of 2012 that the traditional concept of technical and conforming changes has now been rendered meaningless. amazingly, the majority made significant changes in the substance of the study for months after it was voted on by the committee. in addition, after we mitted our minority views, the majority staff then went back and made a few changes to specifically correct some of the more blatant errors that we identified in the views and that c.i.a. identified in their review. while i am pleased that our views led to some minor improvements in the study, those ultimate -- those untimely changes required us to add text explaining the validity of our initial conclusions and criticisms. simply put, the documents released today are very

different from the documents that were approved almost exactly two years ago by the committee at the ent end of thet congress on a partisan basis. another significant weakness of this study is its disregard of the context under which the c.i.a.'s detention and interrogation program was developed. it is critical to remember that the intelligence community was inundated by a surge of terrorist threat reporting after the september 11 attacks. the fear of a follow-on attack was pervasive and it was genuine. the nation was traumatized by the horrific murders of nearly 3,000 americans and at the c.i.a. there was no greater imperative than stopping another attack from happening. this congress text is entirely absent from the study. in addition, everyone must remember that the c.i.a. was directed to conduct this program

by the president. i have spoken with a number of c.i.a. officers over the years who remember the contentious debates about the program at the time it was being considered, but at the end of the day, the agency did what the president directed them to do under color of law and based upon opinions issued and updated by the department of justice. many of my colleagues continue to discuss the brutality of many of the enhanced interrogation techniques. while i agree with waterboarding which only occurred against three detainees is particularly severe, many of the other techniques were not. and by comparison, k.s.m., who was one of the detainees that was subjected to waterboarding, personally beheaded "wall street journal" reporter daniel pearl and a number of other u.s. citizens have been tortured by

al qaeda-inspired groups since. the current threat level posed by isil and other al qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups may be greater today than what we face the prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. they are better-funded, better-equipped, and have recruited hundreds of terrorists who have american as well as european passports. isil terrorists are using social media to encourage new recruits to conduct lone-wolf attacks in their home countries such as the united states. they are murdering and beheading captured hostages and planning terrorist attacks against u.s. citizens. in light of these significant threats, the president is still attempting to make good on a misguided campaign promise to close down guantanamo bay. itdon seem to matter to -- it doesn't seem to matter to him that we are now down it the worst of the worst or that his own review groups have strongly recommended against the release of these remaining terrorists.

instead, he has returned to the pre-9/11 practice of treating terrorists like ordinary criminals. we are reading terrorists their miranda rights instead of conducting extended intelligence investigations to develop actionable intelligence that might lead to additional captures or plot droppings. i think -- or plot droppings. i think we would be better off if we would return to cap tiewrpg the enemy and use authorized enteration techniques to obtain the actionable intelligence information needed to neutralize these dangerous terrorist organizations. while there is no doubt that there were indeed moments diewrpmoments duringthe c.i.a. d interrogation program where they exceeded their authorized limits, such were few and far between. in this, my last week of service here on the floor of the united

states senate, and the vice-chairman of the intelligence committee, i want to thank the men and women of the c.i.a., the rest of the intelligence community, and the members of our armed forces who have served us so well since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. yieforts and your sacrifices have not gone unnoticed. i will be forever grateful for your patriotic service to our beloved country. may god bless you all and may god bless the united states of america. >> john mccain and rockefeller of west virginia also spoke about the report. this is 30 minutes. er: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: madam president, i would like to begin by expressing appreciation and admiration for the men and women who serve in our intelligence

agencies, including the c.i.a. they are out there every day defending our nation. i have read the executive summary and i also have been briefed on the entirety of this report. i rise in support of the release, the long-delayed release of the senate intelligence committee's summarized, unclassified review of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were employed by the previous administration to extract information from captured terrorists. it's a thorough and thoughtful study of practices that i believe not only failed their purpose to secure actionable intelligence to prevent further attacks on the u.s. and our allies but actually damaged our security interests as well as our reputation as a force for good in the world. i believe the american people

have a right -- indeed, responsibility -- to know what was done in their name, how these practices did or did not serve our interests, and how they comported with our most important values. i commend chairwoman feinstein and her staff for their diligence in seeking a truthful accounting of policies i hope we will never resort to again. i thank them for persevering against persistent opposition from many members of the intelligence community, from officials in two administrations, and from some of our colleagues. the truth is sometimes a hard pill to swallow. it sometimes causes us difficulties at home and abroad. it is sometimes used by our enemies in attempts to hurt us. but the american people are entitled to it, nonetheless.

they must know when the values that define our nation are intentionally disregarded by our security policies, even those policies that are conducted in secret. they must be able to make informed judgments about whether those policies and the personnel who supported them were justified in compromising our values, whether they served a greater good, or whether, as i believe, they stained our national honor, did much harm and little practical good. what were the policies? what was their purpose? did they achieve it? did they make us safer? less safe? or did they make no difference? what did they gain us? what did they cost us? the american people need the answers to these questions. yes, some things must be kept

from public disclosure to protect con destine operations, sources and methods, but not the answers to these questions. by providing them, the committee has empowered the american people to come to their own decisions about whether we should have employed such practices in the past and whether we should consider permitting them in the future. this report strengthens self-government and ultimately, i believe, america's security and stature in the world and i thank the committee for their valuable public service. i have long believed some of these practices amounted to torture as a reasonable person would define it, especially, but not only the practice of waterboarding, which is a mock execution and an exquisite form of torture. its use was shameful and unnecessary, and contrary to assertions made by some of its

defenders, and as the committee's report makes clear, it produced little useful intelligence to help us track down the perpetrators of 9/11 or prevent new attacks and atrocities. i know from personal experience that the abuse of prisoners will produce more bad than good intelligence. i know that victims of torture will offer intentionally misleading information if they think their captors will believe it. i know they will say whatever they think their torturers want them to say if they believe it will stop their suffering. most of all, i know the use of torture compromises that which most distinguishes us from our enemies, our belief that all people, even captured enemies, possess basic human rights which

are protected by international conventions the united states not only joined but for the most part authored. i will, too, that bad things happen in war. i know in war good people can feel obliged for good reasons to do things they would normally object to and recoil from. i understand the reasons that governed the decision to resort to these interrogation methods, and i know that those who approved them and those who used them were dedicated to securing justice for the victims of terrorist attacks and to protect americans from further harm. i know their responsibilities were grave and urgent, and the strain of their duty was onerous. i respect their dedication and appreciate their dilemma, but i dispute wholeheartedly that it was right for them to use these methods which this report makes

clear were neither in the best interests of justice nor our security nor the ideals we have sacrificed so much blood and treasure to defend. the knowledge of torture's dubious efficacy and my moral objection to the abuse of prisoners motivated by sponsorship of the detainee treatment act of 2005, which prohibits -- quote -- "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of captured combatants whether they wear a nation's uniform or not and which passed the senate by the vote of 90-9. subsequently, i successfully offered amendments to the military commissions act of 2006 which among other things prevented the attempt to weaken common article 3 of the geneva conventions and broadened definitions in the war crimes act to make the future use of waterboarding and other -- quote -- "enhanced interrogation

techniques" punishable as war crimes. there was considerable misinformation disseminated then about what was and wasn't achieved using these methods in an effort to encourage support for the legislation. there was a good amount of misinformation used in 2011 to credit the use of these methods with the death of osama bin laden and there is, i fear, misinformation being used today to prevent the release of this report disputing its findings and warning about the security consequences of their public disclosure. with the report's release, will -- will the report's release cause outrage that leads to violence in some parts of the muslim world? yes, i suppose that's possible. perhaps likely. sadly, violence needs little incentive in some quarters of the world today. but that doesn't mean we will be

telling the world something it will be shocked to learn. the entire world already knows that we water boarded prisoners. it knows that we subjected prisoners various other types of degrading treatment. it knows we used black sites, secret prisons. those practices haven't been a secret for a decade. terrorists might use the report's reidentification of the practices as an excuse to attack americans, but they hardly need an excuse for that. that has been their life's calling for a while now. what might come as a surprise not just to our enemies but to many americans is how little these practices did to aid our efforts to bring 9/11 culprits to justice and to find and prevent terrorist attacks today and tomorrow. that could be a real surprise, since it contradicts the many assurances provided by intelligence officials on the

record and in private that enhanceed interrogation techniques were indispensable in the war against terrorism. and i suspect the objection of those same officials to the release of this report is really focused on that disclosure, torture's ineffectiveness. because we gave up much in the expectation that torture would make us safer. too much. obviously, we need intelligence to defeat our enemies but we need reliable intelligence. torture produces more misleading information than actionable intelligence. and what the advocates of harsh and interrogation methods have never established is that we couldn't have gathered as good or more reliable intelligence from using humane methods. the most important -- the most important lead we got came from using conventional interrogation methods and i think it's an

insult to the many intelligence officers who have acquired good intelligence without hurting or degrading prisoners to assert we can't win this war without such methods. yes, we can and we will. but in the end, torture's failure to serve its intended purpose isn't the main reason to oppose its use. i have often said and will always maintain that this question isn't about our names, it's about us. it's about how we were, who we are, and who we aspire to be. it's about how we represent ourselves to the world. we have made our way in this often dangerous and cruel world not by just strictly pursuing our geopolitical interests but by exemplifying our political values and influencing other nations to embrace them. when we fight to defend our

security, we fight also for an idea, not for a tribe or a twisted interpretation of aonian gent religion or a king but for an idea that all men are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights. how much safer the world would be if all nations believes the same. how much more dangerous it can become when we forget it ourselves, even momentarily. our enemies act without conscience. we must not. this executive summary of the committee's report makes clear that acting without conscience isn't necessary. it isn't even helpful in winning this strange and long war we're fighting. we should be grateful to have that truth affirmed. now let us reassert the

temporary proposition that it is essential to our success in this war that we ask those who fight it for us to remember at all times that they are defending a sacred ideal of how nations should be governed and conduct their relations with others, even our enemies. those of us who give them this duty are obliged by history, by our nation's highest ideals and the many terrible sacrifices made to protect them by our respect for human dignity, to make clear we need be risk our national honor to prevail in this or any war. we need only remember in the worst of times through the chaos and terror of war, when facing cruelty, suffering, and loss, that we are always americans and different, stronger, and better than those who would

destroy us. madam president, i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from west virginia. mr. rockefeller: madam president, i ask unanimous consent to speak in a seated position. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. rockefeller: madam president, i come to the floor to wholly support the comments of my colleagues, the senator from california and the senator from arizona, to speak about a matter of great importance to me personally but more importantly, to the country. the senate intelligence committee's study of the detention program, i'll just call it the program, is the most in-depth, the most substantive oversight initiative the committee has ever undertaken. i doubt any committee has done more than this. it presents freely extremely valuable insight into the problems that need to be addressed by the c.i.a.

moreover, the study exemplifies why this committee was created in the first place following the findings of the church committee nearly 40 years ago. and i commend my friend and the committee's leader, the senator from california, for shepherding this landmark initiative to this point. for years often behind closed doors and without any recognition, she has been a strong and tireless advocate and she deserves our thanks and recognition. it is my hope and expectation that beyond the initial release of the executive summary and findings and conclusions that the entire 6,800-page, 37,000 footnotes will eventually be made public and i'm sure it will with the appropriate redactions. those public findings will be critical to fully learning the necessary lessons from this dark episode in our nation's history and to ensuring it never happens again. it has been a very long, very

hard fight to get to this point. especially in the early years the c.i.a.'s detention program, it was a struggle for the committee to get the most basic information or any information at all about the program. the committee's study of the detention program is not just a story of the brutal and ill conceived program itself. the study is also the story of a breakdown in our system, madam president, of governance that allowed a country to deviate in such a significant and horrific way from our core principles. one of the profound ways that the breakdown happened was through the active subversion of meaningful congressional oversight. a theme mirrored in the bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program during that period. i first learned about some aspects of the c.i.a.'s

attention and interrogation program in 2003. when i became vice chair of the committee at that point and for years after, the c.i.a. refused to provide me or anybody else with any additional information about the program. they further refused to notify the full committee about the program's existence. you remember, there was always the gang of four, the gang of six or the gang of eight. they'd take the chairman or vice chairman, take them to the without, 45 minutes with the vice president and off we go. senator roberts and i went down by car and were instructed we couldn't talk to each other on the way back from one of those meetings. it was absurd. they refused to do anything to be of assistance. the briefings i received offered little or no insight into the c.i.a.'s programs. followups were rejected and at times i was not allowed to consult with my counsel. i'm an lawyer. there are legal matters involved here.

they said we couldn't talk to any of our staff, legal counsel or not. or other members of the committee. who knew nothing about this because they had not been informed at all. it was clear that these briefings were not meant to answer any questions but were intended only to provide cover for the administration and the c.i.a. it was infuriating to me to realize i was part of a check box exercise that the administration planned to use and later did use so they could disingenuously claim that they had -- in a phrase i will never forget -- "fully brief the congress." in the years that followed, i fought and lost many battles to obtain credible information about the detention and interrogation program. as vice chair i tried to launch as has been mentioned a comprehensive investigation into the program but that effort was blocked. later

in 2005, when i fought for over 100 specific documents in the c.i.a. report, the c.i.a. refused to cooperate. the first time the full senate intelligence committee was given any information about this detention program was september 2006. this was the year after the program -- this was years after the program's inception and the same day that the president informed the nation. the following year when i became chairman, the vice-chairman kit bond and i agreed to push for additional access to the program. for heaven's sake, at least allow both the senate and house judiciarinteel generals committe -- intelligence committee to be informed on this. we finally actually prevailed and got this access. i think i withheld something from them until they agreed to

do that which enable which enabe much-needed hearings on the program. i made sure we scrutinized it from every angle. the challenge of getting accurate information from the c.i.a. persisted. it was during this period that the house and senate considered the 2008 intelligence authorization act and a potential provision that set the army field manual as the only way to go, set that a as the standard for the entire government. this would have ended the c.i.a.'s interrogation techniques, a term eerily sanitized in bureaucratic jargon for what in many cases amounted to torture. as chairntion i knew the inclusion of the army field manual provision would jeopardize the entire bill. i thought it might bring it down. people would think it was too

soft or radical or whatever. which i was dmitte committed tod happen. in the end it was an ease i decision. i supported including the end of the c.i.a.'s program because it was the right thing to do and i did it because congress needed to send a clear signal that it did not stand by the bush administration policy. this is 0 notious going to be a critique of the bush administration, incidentally. the house and senate went on to pass the bill with bipartisan votes and although the bush administration vetoed the bill to preserve its ability to continue these practices, it was an important symbolic moment. in the same period i also sent two committee staffers, as our chairwoman, has indicated, to begin to review cables of the c.i.a. regarding the interrogations of dub disub and abd al-rahim al-nashiri. i firmly believed that we had to

review those cables which are now the only source of important historical information on this subject because the c.i.a. droid these tapes which they had done of some of their interrogation sessions and they droid those tapes against the explicit direction from the white house and the director of national bell generals. -- intelligence. the investigation i began in 20 0*8 07 grew under chairman feinstein's dedication and tremendous leadership into a full study of the c.i.a.'s detention interrogation pravment the more the committee dug, the more the committee found. the results they found are shocking and deanly troubling. first, the detention interrogation program was conceived by people who were ignorant of the topic and made it up on the fly, based on the

untested theories of contractors who had never met a terrorist or conducted a real-world interrogation of any kind. second, it was executed by personnel with insufficient linguistic and interrogation training and little if any real-world experience. moreover, the c.i.a. was aware that some of these personnel had a staggering array of personal and professional fail ution innumerated by the committee's chairwoman, including potentially criminal activity and should have disqualified them immediately, not only from being interrogators but being employed by the c.i.a. or anybody in government. nevertheless, it was consistently represented that these interrogators were professionalized and carefully vetted -- their term -- understand that became part of the hollow legal justification

of the entire program. third, the program was managed incompetently by senior officials who paid little or no attention to critical details and it was rife with troubling personal and professional conflicts of interest among a small group of c.i.a. officials and contractors who promoted and defended it. obviously it was in their interest. fourth, it was, as the chairwoman has indicated, physically very severe, the program, far more so than any of us outside the c.i.a. ever knew. though waterboardin waterboardid the most attention, there were other techniques that i believe -- one in particular -- that was much worse. finally it's results were unclear at best but it was presented to the white house, the department of justice, to the congress and to the media as

a silver bullet to "savings lives." that was their man travment in fact, it did not provide the intelligence it was supposed to provide or that the c.i.a. argumented that it did provide. to be perfectly clear, these harsh techniques were not approved by anyone ever. for the low-bar standard of learning useful information from detainees. these techniques were approved because the administration lawyers and first of all, were told and therefore believed that these coercive interrogations were absolutely necessary to elice i think intelligence that was unavailable by any other collection method and would save american lives. it was simply not the case. for me personally, the art of the story comprises more than a decade of my 30 years of work in

the senate and one of the hardest fights fights -- i thie hardest fight i've ever been thriewvment many othrough. many of the worst years were in the bush administration. however, i did not fully anticipate how hard these last few years would be -- how hard it would be in this administration to get this summary declassified and to tell the full story of what happened. indeed to my great frustration, even after months of negotiations -- endless negotiations -- significant aspects of the story remain obscured by black ink. i have great admiration for the president and i am appreciative of the leadership role he has taken to depart from the practices of the bush administration on these issues. his executive order formally ended the c.i.a.'s detention program practices, and it is a

good example. it is a great example. and so it was, therefore, with deep disappointment that over the course of a number of private meetings and conversations came to feel that the white house's trong deferencwhite house's -- strongt throughout this process has at times worked at cross-purposes with the white house's stated interest in transparency and has muddied what should be a clear and unequivocal legacy on this issue. while aspiring to be the most transparent administration in history, this white house continues to quietly withhold from the committee more than 9,000 documents related to the c.i.a.'s programs. i don't know why. they won't say. and they won't produce. in addition to strongly supporting the c.i.a.'s insistence on the unprecedented re-daks of fake -- redaction of fake names i in the report, whih

obscures's the pubs ability to understand the connections which are so important for weaving together the tap century, the administration also pushed for the redaction of information in the committee study that should not be classified, contradict the administration's own executive order on class dpaismght--classification. that order states that in no case shall information fail to be declassified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error or prevent embarrassment to a person, to an organization, or to an agency -- close quote. in some stains, the -- in some instances, the white house asked not only that information be redacted but that the redaction itself be removed so that it would be impossible for the readers to tell something that was already hidden. strange. given that, looking back, i am deeply dapted rather than priced

that even -- rather than surprised that even when the c.i.a. conducted an unauthorized search of the committee's computer files at an offsite facility which were potentially criminal and even when it became clear that the intent of the search was to suppress the committee's awareness of an internal c.i.a. document and review that corroborated parts of the intelligence committee's study and contradicted the public c.i.a. statement, the white house continued to support the c.i.a. leadership, and that support was unflinching. despite these frustrations, i've also seen how hard chairman feinstein has fought against great odds, stubborn odds, protective odds, mysterious odds, which are not really clear

to me. i've raid to support her thoughtful and determined efforts at every opportunity to make huer as much of the story can be told as possible, and i'm deeply proud of the product that the committee ended up with. now it's time to move forward. for all of the misinformation, incompetence, and brutality in the c.i.a.'s prarnlg the committee study is not and must the senate is not in order simply backward-looking condemnation of the past. the study presents a tremendous opportunity to develop forward-looking lessons that must be central to all future activities. the point has been made -- and i thothoroughly agree with it that the vast majority of people that work at the c.i.a. do very good work and are working very hard and have absolutely nothing to do with any of this. but if this report had not been released, the kurn would have felt that everybody at the c.i.a. and the world would have felt that everybody at the

c.i.a. was involved in this program, so it's foreign say that that was not the case. it was just 30 or 40 people at the top. many of the people that you see on television blasting this report were intimately involved in carrying it out and setting it up. the c.i.a. developed the detention program in a time of great fear and aing diet -- unprecedented crisis. but it is at these times of crisis when we need sound judgment, excellence, and professionalism from the c.i.a. the most. when mistakes are made, they call for self-reflection and scrutiny, without process to begin, we first have to make sure there is an absolute accurate public record of what happened. that we are continuing to do. the public release of the executive summary and findings and conclusions is a tremendous and consequential step towards that end. from some i suspect there will

be the temptation, the fact to leeject, to cast doubt, to trivialize, to attack, or rationalize parts of the study that are disturbing or are embarrassing. indeed, the c.i.a.' c.i.a.'s prs divergent from the standards that we hold ourselves is hard to reconcile. however, we must fight that sure-sighted temptation to wish away the gravity of what this study found. how we deal with this opportunity to learn to improve will reflect on the maturity of our democracy. as a country, we are strong enough to bear what -- the weight of what the i mistakes we have maivmentd so is the central intelligence agency. we must confront this dark period in our recent history with honesty and critical intertrough specks. we must draw lessons, apply

those slowness as we move forward. although it might be uncomfortable at times, we will grow strong and ensure that this never happens again. i thank the presiding officer and yield the floor. the use of military force. that is next on c-span. and that massachusetts senator elizabeth the warm red talks about changes in the u.s. financial system. >> on our next washington journal, will talk about the release of the senate report on cia interrogations. intelligence a writer of the associated press joins us. we will talk to john bradshaw of the national security network can be of an north dakota

senator will weigh in on the interrogation report and take your calls on the government funding deadline. and immigration. washington journal is live at 7:00 eastern and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter.

this is three hours and 20 minutes. it will come to order. >> welcome back to the committee. when you last appeared before this committee in september, you ask congress to write the use of military force against isis. we have, we will consider later

this week and today we're asking you to provide the administration on this text. and on your strategic planning to counter syria andagree and iraq of which it can crave the operational capacity to attack interest and america itself

demand action. second, we need to understand ground troops would be groundhog day all over again. we will have to hear what authorities the chief expects to achieve this political and military goals. now frankly, we undertake is not the one i sought, i hope to

begin this conversation weeks senate, notntire just as committee would have time to consider a comprehensive bipartisan anti-you a mf but it did not happen and we are here to begin the process of taking action and i think the american people expect their congressional leaders to engage fully on this issue and to understand the mission of parameter and the risk. i amhave said many times, not comfortable with the administration's reliance on the 9/11 and the 2000 and two iraq. nine he left was adopted to counter al qaeda in the wake of september 11 attacks and no member could've foreseen that we would still be acting under its authority 13 years later. i do not believe it provides the authority to pursue a new enemy in different countries undergo clearly different circumstances that -- and then exited 13 years ago.

responsibilitye and we are the check and balance on power regardless of who the executive is and if we abandon the role, we would've done a grave disservice to the american people. the techs i have presented is on consultations with members of the committee and addresses for the senator whitehouse. in my view and iso-should in broad terms authorize the president to use military force sil individuals or organizations, fighting for. it shall limit the activities so there will be no large-scale ground combat operations and the president feels he needs that and he should ask for a congress can consider it. they shall limit the authorization to three years and should require the administration to report to congress every 60 days.

-- notted it will list allow ground combat operations except as necessary for the protection or rescue of u.s. soldiers for intelligence operations to a naval air strikes, operational planning or other forms of advice and assistance. the authorization will be limited to three years. the president has said it will be a multiyear campaign but i do not believe the amf should be unlimited a three-year time frame would allow a new president time to assess the situation and make responsible decisions together with the congress about whether and how to continue military action. that said, we would love to hear from the administration, what the framework is what you see as the us-led strategy to categorize. let me conclude by saying i do not believe lazy limitations and this sends a message of weakness to our enemies.

to authorization is intended provide the authority required by the commander in chief to do our part in this multinational effort to defeat isis. it is not only an american problem it is a global problem and no strategy can rely on american military power alone. we need to train iraqi security forces and kurdish forces and stand up and train and equip for moderate fighters being defenseed and the authorization bill that the congress will consider this week and work with coalition partners to cut off financing and fighter flows and provide humanitarian aid to a dress the situation a million of people whose lives have been uprooted. we look forward to working with you and it ministration of our mutual goal of degrading and the ice and welcome you back to the committee. to senate record >> mr. chairman, thank you for

allowing us to move away from what we consider last week which was an amendment to the water bill. i think that is a step forward and i appreciate you doing that. i want to thank the secretary for being here and i'm not sure that, i am pretty sure it is not where he would like to be this afternoon so i thank you for killing before our committee and -- and iman again thank you for coming before our committee and the chairman again. occurred andnot understand that we, some of the things that will be discussed are things like books on the ground and yet we have no presentation here. no intelligent presentation here. that back inso say

the syrian issue. the original about a year and a half ago where we were on the rising something that did these are my words that would last 10 hours. we were able to go for process that was much more serious than the one we are going to have this week. all of us know that whatever passes that committee this week is not going to become law. agree with some comments that the chairman i had that at least it will be part of a process and i thank him for saying that and i agree with that. at the same time for what it is worth, i know we are not going to get to a place where the house and senate passes in authorization and i want to say that we weaken our nation when we began a process like that and we do not actually in accident law. we weaken our nation. nation we also hurt our

when we attempt to pass something on a partisan basis. in one of the things about the earlier syrian amf was it had bipartisan support in bipartisan opposition. for what it's worth regardless of what happens in these worth, regardlesshat it is of what is happening, my plan is to act in such a way that will not harden the positions. will build an opportunity for us to act in a more full way down the road. that the testimony will be helpful. i listened to the chairman and referred back to the

authorization that was passed in 2001 that has led to outcomes that people did not anticipate. standpoint, i would like to have something much more full. i want to have laid out a way. nation, we in our have had multiple conflicts. one thatd to remember ended up with a says factory outcome. start conflicts without teasing out how we are going to go about being successful. we start the process. in this particular case, it aumf wasthat the

offered to a process that limits the commander in chief possibility to carry this out. what would happen under this is that, we can use all efforts, if you will, to go against al qaeda . were to pass the authorization as written, we would say that, against isis, we will only do certain things. it is somehow viewed as a lesser evil than the group we have gone after and the tell a group we have gone after. i hope that we will all conduct ourselves in a manner that will not harden the positions. we are not going to do anything that passes. i do not think it is good for our nation. i think it is good to start this at a time when we can finish

this with a congress that can deal with this from start to finish. i appreciate trying to make the process slightly better and i presentation he is going to make. >> mr. secretary. , mr. chairman, ranking number corker, it really is a pleasure for me to be back for the foreign -- before the foreign relations committee. during my time here we have some things right. we certainly wound with up wishing we had done things differently. most of us would agree and i saw it during both parties' chairmanships including the years senator luger and i were here that this committee works best and makes the greatest contribution to the foreign policy and our country when it

addresses the most important issues in a strong bipartisan fashion. this is one of those issues. the chairman and the ranking member both said that. this is one of the moments when the bipartisan approach really is critical. as you know, the president is committed to engaging with the committee and all of your colleagues in the house and senate. regarding a new authorization for use of military force as weal call it the aumf. specifically against the terrorist group known as isil though in the region it is called dash. specifically because we believe deeply it is not a state and it does not represent islam.

we are looking for authorization with respect to efforts against dash and affiliated groups. i want to thank chairman menendez and the committee for leading the effort in congress. and for all the important work you have done on this complicated and challenging issue. it's important that the committee lead a congress and the country. i think you know i believe that. i realize we may not get there overnight. i have heard the ranking member's comments just now. we understand the clock. we certainly won't resolve anything and get there this afternoon in the next few hours. but i do think this discussion is important. we all agree this discussion has to conclude this is not one party's fight against dash but rather it reflects our united decision to defeat dash.

the world needs to understand it from the united states congress above all. our coalition partners need to know that from all of you. the men and women of the armed forces deserve to know it from all of you. that's why this matters. toward that end we ask you to work closely with us on a bipartisan basis to develop language that provides a clear signal of support for our ongoing military operations against dash. our position on the text is really pretty straightforward. the aumf should give the president the clear mandate and flexibility to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against dash and affiliated forces.

it should be limited to the threat posed by that group and by forces associated with it. i will come back to the question of the aumf in a minute. we believe that as we embark on this important discussion, context matters. all of us want to see the united states succeed. all of us want to see dash defeated. we are united on that. i want to bring the committee up to date on where our campaign now stands. mr. chairman, less than three months ago, perhaps two and a half months or more have passed since the international community came together in a coalition whose purpose is to degrade and defeat dash. two and a half months ago it didn't exist. not it dash, but the coalition. and 60 countries that assembled in brussels. i had the privilege of chairing the first meeting of the coalition last week.

we heard prime minister abbatti describe the effort his team is making to bring iraqis together, strengthen security forces, take the fight to dash and improve and reform governance. we heard general john allen, our special envoy to the coalition review the progress being made in the five lines of coalition effort to shrink the territory controlled by dash, cut off financing, block its recruitment of foreign fighter, expose the hypocrisy of the absurd religious claims and provide humanitarian aide to the victims of the violence. during the meeting i have to tell you i was impressed by the leadership activism. frankly the anger towards dash that's being displayed by arab and muslim states.

governments that do not always agree on other issues are coming together in opposition to this profoundly anti-islamic terrorist organization. now, to be clear, isil continues to commit serious, vicious crimes. it still controls more territory than al qaeda ever did. it will be years, not months, before it is defeated. we know that. but our coalition is already making a difference. to date we have launched more than 1,150 air strikes against dash. these on rags reduced its leadership. squeezed its resources.

damaged the logistics call and operational capabilities and change its tactics. it's becoming clear that the combination of coalition, air strikes and local ground partners is a potent one. in fact, virtually every time a local iraqi force has worked in koord coordination with air cover they have not only defeated dash. they have routed it. in iraq, progress also continues in the political arena. this is no less important, frankly. last week after years of intensive efforts the government in baghdad reached an interim accord with the kurd stan government on hydro carbon exports and revenue sharing. that's been long sought after. it is a big deal that they got it. it's good for the country's economy. it's even better for its unity and stability and for the imprint of the direction they are moving in. the new defense minister is a sunni.

the appointment was an important step toward a more inclusive government. the process of securing the nation's security forces has a genuine chance for success. meanwhile the prime minister is taking bold steps to improve relations with the neighbors of the country including saudi arabia, the uae and turkey have been responding. i want to under score it's too early to declare a new era in regional relations. but countries that had been drifting aparter or even in conflict with each other, are now in the process of coming together and breaking down the barriers that were create ed. that's helpful to our coalition and it is bad news for dash. beating back the threat is job one for our coalition and our iraqi partners.

even if the baghdad government fulfills its responsibilities it will still face a dire challenge because of the events in syria. if you recall. the coalition's decision to carry out air strikes in syria came in response to a request from iraq for help in defending against dash's brazen attack. to date, we and our arab partners conducted over 500 air strikes in syria, targeting areas where dash had concentrated its fighters, targeting on command and control nodes, finance centers, training camps and oil refineries. our objective is to further degrade dash's capabilities and deny the freedom of movement and resupply that it has previously enjoyed. at the same time, we will continue to build the capabilities of the moderate opposition. i want to thank the members of this committee and many in congress who supported these efforts, supported them strongly.

our goal is to help the moderate forces stabilize areas under their control, defend civilians, empower them to go on the offensive against dash and promote the conditions for a negotiated political transition. recognizing recognizing, as i think almost every person has said, there is no military solution. now, mr. chairman, we all foe that dash is a threat to americans' security and interests. it poses an unacceptable danger to our personnel and facilities in iraq and elsewhere. it seeks to destroy both the short and long-term stability of the broader middle east. it is exacerbating a refugee crisis that's placed extraordinary economic and political burden on our friends and allies in the region. one thing is certain. dash will continue to spread until or unless it is stopped. there should be no question that we with our partners have a moral duty and a profound international security interest

and national security interest in stopping them. that's where the fight now stands. a coalition that two and a half months ago didn't exist is now taking the fight to the enemy. it was cobbled together by strong american leadership and steady intensive diplomacy with country that is disagree on many things but all share an aversion to extremism. i think you would all agree we need to summon the same determination to find common ground here in washingtonment in the hours, days and weeks to come we are determined to work with you. first to develop an approach that can generate broad bipartisan support while ensuring that the president has the flexibility to successfully prosecute this evident.

that's the balance. what do we envision specifically regarding an aumf? importantly -- and i think i will lay out today a clear set of principles that i i hope will be instructive. we do not think an aumf should include a geographic limitation. we don't anticipate conducting in countries other than iraq or syria. to the extent that isil poses a threat to american personnel in other countries we would not want an aumf to constrain our ability to use appropriate force against isil in those locations if necessary. in our view it would be a mistake to advertise to isil that there are safe havens for them outside of iraq or syria. i know this is hotly debated with passionate and persuasive arguments on both sides. the president has been crystal clear. his policy is that u.s. military

forces will not be deployed to conduct ground combat operations against isil. that is what the local partners and allies want. that's what worked best in terms of the iraq experience. that is best for preserving the coalition coalition. most importantly it is in the best interest of the united states. while we certainly believe this is the soundest possible policy and while the president has been clear, he's open to clarification on the use of u.s. combat troops to be outlined in an aumf.

it doesn't doesn't mean we should preemptively bind the hands of the commander in chief or commanders in the field and responding to contingencies that are impossible to foresee. finally with respect with respect to duration. we can be sure this confrontation won't be over quickly as the president and i have said many times. we understand, however, the desire of many to avoid a completely open-ended authorization. i note that chairman menendez has suggested that a three-year limitation should be put into an aumf. we support that proposal. we support it subject to a provision that we should work through together. that provides for extension in the event that circumstances require it. we think it ought to be advertised as such up front. to sum up, mr. chairman, and members of the committee.

i ask for your help in, above all, approving on a bipartisan basis with the strongest vote possible because everybody will read messages into that vote. an authorization for use of military force in connection with our campaign and that of our many partners in order to defeat a terrible, vicious, different kind of enemy. almost a quarter century ago when i was here, then a 47-year-old senator with certainly a darker head of hair, president george h.w. bush sent his secretary of state james baker to ask this committee for the authority to respond military -- to the iraqi invasion of kuwait. the country was divided. congress was divided. this committee drafted an authorization and it passed the congress with a majority as bipartisan. armed with that mandate. they built the coalition that

won the first gulf war. that was a different time. it was a different conflict. it called for a different response. it was also this senate at its bipartisan best. what we need for you today to strengthen and unify our coalition is that kind of effort. the world would be watching what we together are willing and able to do. this is obviously not a partisan issue. it's a leadership issue. it is a test of our ability and our nation's ability to stand together, a test of our generation's resolve to build a safer, more secure world. i know every one of you wants to see a bold, bipartisan mandate to strengthen our hand to move closer to the goal. thank you. i'm pleased to answer any questions.

>> thank you, mr. secretary. i think there is undoubtedly -- and i will let the members express themselves -- there is a bold bipartisan view that we need it to defeat isil. and there is no debate about that. virtually every political element of of the spectrum from those considered dovish to those considered hawkish and everyone in between has a common collective goal of defeating isil. i must say they have not sent us five, six months into the engagement in aumf and had the administration sent an aumf maybe we would be better for congressional debate but that's not happened. if we wait for that and it's not forthcoming, by this or any other administration then the absence of getting an aumf from the executive branch and congress not acting because it's waiting for an aumf from the executive branch would create a de facto veto of pro rate of growth tifs and responsibilities the congress has.

there are many of us on the committee for the purposes of understanding the administration's views felt it is congress's responsibility to move forward and define it. no one worked harder in the last two years as the chairman of this committee to make this a bipartisan effort not just on aumf but across the spectrum. i'm proud to say working with a ranking member, we have virtually passed out every major

piece of legislation on some of the most critical issues on our time from are the aumf on syria and the use of chemical weapons to oas reform to north korea, iran, a whole host of issues they have been bipartisan. virtually every nomination, except for three of hundreds have largely been on a bipartisan basis. no one has driven harder in the process. there are some principled views here that may not be reconcilable. it starts with when the administration itself -- and i think you have reiterated what you said earlier in the previous visit that the president has been clear that his policy is that the united states military forces will not calm down combat operations against isil. that's what our local partners and allies want. what's best for preserving the coalition and what's in the best sbre of the united states.

some in the congress have a different view. they would have a robust and open ended use of combat forces in this regard. if the administration wants that, it should come forth and ask for that. based on your testimony and on what the president wants or has said he wants, i reject the characterization of my text as something that is constraining to the president. my text gives the administration the ability to do everything it is doing now. the text makes clear an activity on the grounder for protection of the members of the u.s. arm aed forces would be allowed. support of intelligence collection and sharing would be allowed. activities on the ground to enable air strikes by identifying appropriate targets would be allowed. activities on the ground to support operational planning

would be allowed. activities on the ground including advice and assistance to forces fighting asill in iraq or syria would be allowed. obviously air strikes would be allowed. everything the administration is doing and has said it seeks to do and has said ewingyou using the president's own words which we incorporated into the aumf when he said the president articulated five lines of effort in the campaign to counter isil including supporting regional military partners, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, cutting off isil's access to financing, addressing urgent humanitarian needs and contesting isil's messaging. nothing in the aumf constrains

the administration or the president's efforts in any of that regard. indeed, authorizing u.s. ground troops is a subject of debate here. my next precludes america from being dragged into another unlimited and unending war in the middle east. it does preclude the deploilt of large scale combat forces done in iraq at far too great a cost in my view. unless i hear something differently, how would you have us reconcile the view of some members of the committee who want combat forces to enter into iraq and syria as well. versus the president's own stated view that that's not what we or allies want. >> mr. chairman, first of all, i'm not characterizing your bill negatively whatsoever.

it is very close to what the president could support with the exception of a few things i mentioned. those are a few. you have done a good job pulling together a broad authorization. and there is a fundamental core that the administration would absolutely be supportive of. i mentioned a few things we think we ought to reconcile with work amongst ourselves. with respect to when and timing and all of this i will work with youen on behalf of the administration to get it done. the president has said he wants an aumf. there is nothing in the aumf they want to be the niche yayer tor of that. there is past record of this

committee taking the lead and drafting it. we are delighted to have your draft. we think it is a good draft. there are limitations to the choices to the president. none of us can imagine all of the circumstances that may a rise rise. would a hostage attempt be permitted? what if chemical weapons fall into the hands of isil or are about to and there is a need to keep it from happening because there is a kacache that we discover. >> the response would be an open ended authorization not only this president with two years on his term but whoever would be elected by the american people as the next president of the united states for another year the president said this is a multi year campaign.

we would get past this administration. we would give a year to the new president to come forth and talk about how the war with should be prosecuted. >> let me suggest thisment again, we want to get a broad based boat. you said some of this may be irreconcilable. i'm not sure it ought to 00:37:31 be. the president could not have been more clear about policy. no one that i know of is in favor of open ended effort. we have just accepted the idea of the limitation of time with some capacity for review that we ought to work on together so it's sensible. it seems to me there is no way to go through the hypotheticals. you wind up tying the hands -- >> it sounds to me like you are making a case for a rather open

ended authorization. which i would say to the secretary in fact the very elements of what the president described as the strategy has been rejected by members particularly on the other side of the aisle saying they don't believe it can succeed. that's a question of debate. they believe that's not a strategy that can succeed. they believe that there are those member who is believe the only way to achieve with this strategy is to have combat forces and the wherewithal to issue those. we cannot imagine every single circumstance -- but the use of long term combat troops on the ground which of course is totally different from what the president said. >> what i suggest, mr. chairman, because i think it is a much better way of trying to resolve it because we can't exhaust the hypotheticals. we sit down, very specifically and work through what may be the best balance of this that might be able to bring people from both sides to the table.

>> we are always open to that. we have shared several drafts with the white house chief counsel on this issue as we have with the rest of the administration. to be very honest with you, we get relatively little in response. so if there is a desire to have language that can accomplish the mutual goal, we are certainly willing and open to receive it. in the absence of it, the absence of language is not going to create a permanent veto of the committee's actions or the members of the senate's actions and the administration needs to know that. >> the administration, i want you to know 100%, president obama, he has no intention of sending combat troops 00:40:04 in. there is a way to come together

to work through how to resolve the difference in a way that isn't open ended and i think putting a time limit on it is pretty -- a serious statement about the administration. >> there is a famous movie that says show me the money. i say show me the language. maybe we can get there. >> let's work on it. >> this conversation is interesting. do believe that i what the secretary said is true. if we sat down, understood what authority the white house, the secretary of state is seek ing, i believe there is a way for us to craft legislation but more importantly craft legislation that the administration supports. i mean, passing legislation, passing a bill out of the

committee or an authorization is one thing. passing something on the house and senate floor is quite another. the only way that's going to happen is if the administration is firmly behind what we do. i would just say to every member here, i think it is harmful to our nation to begin the process and not see it through to the end. i thought the last effort harmed us greatly. so, again, i understand the frustration by the chairman. i realize he's tried to have witnesses here and it hasn't occurred. i believe sitting down with the secretary and sitting down with the general counsel at the white house as we did last time. i believe we could come up with

an authorization that passes the test for the bulk of the members of the party, of this committee and actually enacted into law. let me ask this question -- do you believe the administration today has the authorities that it needs to carry out the operations that it is carrying out? >> very clearly, yes. >> so i will say there are some members of the committee that believe otherwise. they believe that the best way we can make ourselves effective and relevant is just to pass legislation that makes what you are doing legal and somehow that are doing legal and somehow that makes us relevant. that's beyond. i don't see how that's the case. it seems that part of what is missing here is an understanding. i don't think i am in the same place that they characterize. i would like to ensure we have an out come here that is worthy of the effort. i go back to what i said and we had multiple efforts since world war ii that did not end well. they cannot produce the out come. that's how you made your name.

talking about that. i would say that for all of us to conduct this situation, it would be good to understand how the administration will go about it. is the strategy evolving, yes or no? the strategy of how you will go about this. are you building on successes right now to try to morpho -- are we going to go against him? do we plan to militarily go against a sat? >> not at the moment, no. >> let me ask the question. do we pla know to go militarily. do we, the united states, plan, at this moment to attack as part of this? no. we are asking for isil-oriented

authorization. you going to explicitly ask? >> let me finish. we are heavily engaged thanks to you and the passage of $500 million authorization act and now, the training and equipment after that all of the groundwork is being laid out, in addition to other things that you are aware of to support those who are engaged in the fight directly. many of the partners are particularly focused on the a sat component. when i say are we, the united states, no, but as part of the policy. let me try to help ow this. >> help this way. are you going to ever explicitly seek an authorization from congress? >> we are seeking authorization now. >> and if you don't receive that authorization, will you continue the operations? that's an explicit seeking.

>> the authorization for what we now in iraq and syria? >> that's correct. >> absolutely. we will continue it. we believe we have full authority under the 2001 and parts of the 2002. here is where i want to help you, if i can. if congress passes a new dash-specific aumf, we will support the inclusion of language in the new one that will clarify that the did she-specific aumf is the basis for the use of military force. i think that will give comfort to a lot of people. number two, we will support the repeal of the 2002 as part of an effort to clarify that the isil-specific aumf is the only source of legitimacy for theus of military force. therefore we would live under the confines of what we pass here. that's a pretty clear and important addition to the discussion.

>> do you plan to send us a draft to work off of? >> we think the cha chairman has a draft and there differences of opinion about parts of it. >> there is a component that is more of a technical fix that refers to to the forces associated. we believe that the fighting alongside language that has been interpreted out of the 2001 aumf is important to a full explanation of how to fight this effectively. there are technical fixes like that. the fundamental draft that the committee has is a fair starting point.

>> you are proposing they engage more fully to develop using language that has been draft and to edit and change that in such a way that you believe more fully addresses the issue that we are talking about is that , correct? >> i'm not proposing it. i'm here doing it. >> what do you think would be the appropriate timeframe to work through it? >> i don't think it will be finished by thursday or friday, but we can engage in the effort . over the next days and as we come back in early january let's -- >> do you think it would be helpful? >> we are anxious to operate. this helps everyone. this is important for the conference and the country. >> other than not explicitly asking for an authorization to

be candid, i appreciate what you are saying and think it's exactly the way we should go about it i know members on the other side feel differentlily about that and feel we should act this week and i understand that and appreciate it and i plan to conduct myself in a way that we don't harden ourselves prior to the first of the year. >> senator, if we could do it, we are not trying to not do it. >> most of us would like to hear from the pentagon. you are talking about boots on the ground and that would the helpful to hear about to work through the origin. i appreciate you coming here and i understand where we are and hopefully will move towards authorization that most of us can get behind.

>> thank you for the work you do. i believe president obama has the authority because i voted to give any president the authority to go out to the outgrowth of al qaeda. i feel he's got it, but having said that, this is a threat to humanity that i don't think human kind has ever seen before. i'm assuming you understand why many of us want to go on record as a former senator, can you understand that, not getting into the details which i think our chairman working specifically with all of us here and in particular senator cain has worked so hard that reflects what the president said he wanted. i won't get into the details because that's our job to do. now it's your job to do something else. you do it well, but we have to do this.

i would say from the standpoint of a former senator, you understand then why so many of us would like to go on record on this threat, is that correct? >> absolutely, senator. i have total respect for it and i understand it and welcome it. the president does too. >> good because let me be clear. >> the president wants an aumf. >> he may have it from the majority and last time it was more of a bipartisan 00:50:44 vote. i hoping it can be bipartisan and having to do with syria. it can be enacted with the chairman and ranking member. we set forward that had limitations on it. it had a tremendous impact. we didn't wait to talk and talk and talk. we knew that assad had the chemical weapons. i say to my friend, even without it going to the floor, it had an effect on what happened. i want to talk to you about an amazing hearing i had with the senator this morning.

about isil and the abuses specifically. we had an amazing panel including a woman who is the only member of parliament talk to us about what it's like. it appeared today in the daily beast. hi it is taken from a question d answer. it's unbelievable. that answers questions of the recruits as they come into isil or dash or whatever they want to call them. can i put this in the record? i will give you a sample. i want people to not be upset

and i think we can't not talk about this. can all women be taken captive? there is no dispute. it is permissible to capture unbelieving women. question, is it permissible to have intercourse with a female captive. answer, it is permissible to have sexual intercourse with a female captive. they quote alla. if you do, you are free from blame. question five, is it permissible immediately after taking possession of her. he, her master can have intercourse with her immediately after taking possession of her, however if she is not a virgin, her uterus must be purified. this is disgusting garbage.

i understand your desire to put this off and control. i need to be on record. because of what i am learning. they say their knife and they will quench their thirst for american blood. the language is evil and vicious and as tom said from your administration, when it comes to being terrorists, they are in a league of their. and there so many other groups out there. he will speak for himself. i made the point today. when i was a kid growing up rks, i want to make a point that there is a lot of room for plexibility and we don't limit it to four exceptions. we say including these exceptions. please look at it, mr. secretary. i think it's very important.

i didn't vote to go to war in iraq. i treasured the fact that i voted no. this cannot be boots on the ground and another invasion. it can't be. if it is, i won't vote for it. the president is working with others on the ground, particularly the kurds and hopefully we can do it with the syrian moderates. we are on the right track here. i am sad frankly that we haven't been able to work with you to craft something. i understand you want to do more work and bring in more parts. i have no problem with that. i want to say to you, i hope you understand the passion with which everyone that i talked to view this is question.

i hope the administration won't take it as some kind of act of an unconstitutional act if we go ahead without you. it's clear what our responsibilities are. i hope you will take it if we do this and i hope we do to cotify what the period said. instead of being westerned as you think you are concerned about it, hopefully you can embrace it and that you can work with us to make it better, but i don't think we should put this off. i'm done. i have to go on record. my constituents expect me to go on record. >> senator?

>> we appreciate you coming here and have been anxious to do it for some time they are asking for an aumf. is that correct? is there a reason this has taken so long? >> we asked for it last time we were here. we were prepared to work. >> this is different. >> you have to look at what is going on here. mosul fell months ago tomorrow. we took our flights up from one a month to 60 a day. way back. we started pouring in and no one anticipated the fold that took place in mo actual. that has been pushed back and the point i'm making is the first step was to get a government they could work with. since then we are prepared to

work work to do it. >> this is the first time they asked for an aumf. the letter would have been responded to and someone like yourself would have come up and said this is what we wanted to do. what angers me about this, our enemies have to be looking at this and saying look what's going on. this is not a republican democrat thing. this is not a first or a second branch thing. i'm with the chairman and feeling aggravated that this is playing out like this.

we have to pull the wagon together. this is a serious american problem. not a republican-democratic problem. you can understand our frustration on this. admittedly, we do have a difference in what the rules of each party -- the founding fathers were very wise when they put in the hands of the first branch of government the power to declare war and not give it to the second branch which is the military -- one of their responsibilities is military. we take this seriously and i think the american people take this seriously. let me ask this