his capacity to deliver chemical weapons and sending a limited we came here with great specificity about serious limitations on what we were seeking. allowing that restraint at that had no imposition on the capacity to carry out the mission. be mission was going to without troops, without ground forces -- it was designed that way and would have been executed that way, and we were losing absolutely nothing whatsoever because we had no intention of putting forces in do what we were going to do. >> but that is similar to your statements you have made about this for. -- this war. >> this president knowledge is as any president would -- as any ask anyoneuld -- whether they feel comfortable

knowing whether they have been limited on what actions might or may not be available. the president has made it clear it is not his policy. i have never seen anybody more adamant about that and more clear in every statement he has made. they were all quoted. he has reiterated it. but that doesn't mean that you want to take away what might be conceivably necessary -- the president is absolutely clear about his policy. president's the decision to use force -- and thank you to this committee for voting and having made clear that congress was moving in that direction -- guess what? instead of one or two days of bombing, in order to send a message that you shouldn't use these, we got a deal with russia to get 100% of the weapons out.

that is because you didn't limited. -- didn't limit it. that was another moment where for the first time in history during a conflict we removed all known declared chemical weapons from a country, and believe me -- thank god we did. today, isolate is in their controlling half the country and imagine what would've happened if they had gained control of those weapons. it is a completely different situation, senator, where you have a limited goal and are willing to live under it and the executive says i will live under it. who you have an executive has said already that he is going to limit his means of achieving the goal but doesn't want to be hamstrung in every other way with respect to the --stitutional

>> a senator -- that.nderstand >> i know both of you would like to engage in a debate but i have to get to the other members. there was a limitation on ground forces. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, mr. secretary. we thank you for your incredible service. i am one of the few members of congress who voted for the authorization of military force in 2001 and 2002. when i look back at that, i never contemplated that it would authorize 2.5 million american military personnel to go to iraq

and afghanistan. envisionedld have that 670,000 of them would be declared officially disabled or treated for ptsd. that the health care bills would now have risen to over $1 trillion, separate from the trillion spent on those conflicts. so it is from my perspective, -- we are trying our best as a congress to ensure that we don't.

i never imagined that george bush would interpret the 2002 authorization the way he did, but he did. even as we debate this authorization it will go into the next presidency will stop we have to be careful, necessarily. i think that is why we are all being very cautious. we have lived through this recent american history that we don't want to repeat. i'm looking at iraq right now, looking for hope. you have had some breakthroughs. they named a sunni defense minister. there seems to be some progress that would obviate the need for american combat troops on the ground. could you talk a little about

that in the hopes that you have that the iraqi sunnis would start fighting isis and stop fighting the iraqi security forces? could you talk a little bit about that and how hopeful you are that we are on the correct path? you, senator, and thank you for your generous comments. i appreciate your comment very much about your vote and what you did or didn't contemplate and i certainly would agree with you. that is why president obama and vice president biden are both aumfy so committed to an that appropriately if rights -- appropriately reflects where we are today.

i do believe that we will be stronger as a country if we have this broad vote that i have talked about. i would say to all of you, notwithstanding the passion with which you approach this sense of mistakes made and the open-ended miss of war, etc.. i do believe there are ways to craft this so that it's not open ended and so that there are without getting into something that would be impossible to get that broad vote for. and i ask you to keep that in mind. here is at for a vote very important part of what we are trying to achieve, the unanimity. it is a message to everybody involved, the coalition, our allies, andclosest even to the people we are fighting.

i appreciate your focusing on iraq. we were deeply involved from the moment the president made the comment that we have to know we had a government to work with in order to be able to commit to doing something. we would be in a really difficult situation here. who knows whether isil would have been in baghdad or whether iran would have decided to go further in. but, we became deeply engaged diplomatically and a superb team worked hard, working with our allies in the region to help the iraqis be able to make the choices they made and they made them.

they got a new speaker. that took a lot of effort and that opened up the door to the selection of the president. and when ayatollah and others wait in there were a whole series of events that took place that brought about the change in government. and just last week we were in brusels with a new prime minister speaking to some 60 countries about his efforts to bring people together to recognize that there was no room for the kind of sectarian divide that had torn the place apart previously. there is an impact in iraq, because iraq is 80% shia and there are interests. and other interests, i might

add. religious sites and other kinds of things. hopefully the militia with whom the current administration is currently working to try to restrain them for violence and the chiefs can come together with confidence that the military is evolving in a way that together with their concept of a national guard and with new president within the government itself -- our feeling is that the training is coming along , that's with the oil deal and other measures being taken there is a constant effort being made to try to unite the government. importantly, regional efforts are taking place. when we had the meeting which was the beginning of the organization the coalition within the region, the foreign

minister promptly stated we will recognize the new government, open up diplomatic relations and exchange visits. that's happening. the prime minister of turkey visited iraq. the foreign minister visited iraq. so there's a regional shift taking place. undoing the sectarian divide that has taken place. building confidence is going be a long process. but it has started. and it is having some impact and it has the potential of having a profound impact as well.

>> that is what the american people want. they want a diplomatic resolution of this issue among the people that live in iraq and syria and surrounding companies. that is what they want more than anything and they don't want another open ended opportunity for a commitment of another 2.5 million americans into that region. the potential is there. there are some members on this committee who believe that it should be open-ended and i just think that that debate is the debate that we have to have this time before we go more deeply and i thank you for your great service. >> can i just say that president obama deserves credit. >> we're going to have to synthesize this because we have been here three and a half hours and i still want to get to the next senator. >> president obama deserves credit for having made the decision, which i think was key, that he wasn't going to move

until they began to make the moves to put a government change in place. that is really what leverage this entire effort -- i think he deserves credit for having done that. >> my apologies. we have a hearing on the state of civil rights in america that was scheduled that coincided with this i presided and couldn't attend this, but i have a good summary of what happened from my staff. some of us who voted against the invasion of iraq felt that we did the right thing, voting to go after al qaeda. i don't think anybody visioned we were voting for the longest war in the history of the united states and that our pursuit would take us into this situation today and apparently some within the administration believe that my vote then was an

approval for what we are doing today. whether i agree or disagree today, i think that is a stretch to call this an al qaeda operation. even after al qaeda has disavowed isis. mr. secretary, what it gets down to is this. the president has said there will be no ground troops. the administration was quick to correct it and said we have no plans for ground troops. many of us believe we ought to standby the president's statement about no ground troops. our fear is that if we don't, either this president or some future president will drag us into another deep, long lasting bloody almost pointless conflict. i am troubled that that is the new position of the administration to want authority for ground troops. i thought that issue was clear. >> it is. it is absolutely clear.

there is nothing that has changed. the president is not planning to, there is no thought in his hand of using ground troops. >> i object to saying clearly in our objection to use of military force. >> what is contemplated by that is clearly this notion that we're not going do some big deployment and get involved in an enormous war. if there is some one-time operation that requires it -- you try to cover them. you have tried to make that clear. but the issue is can you provide an adequate guarantee for an exception for everything that may or may not arise? there is no effort here to slide or try to change this. not going to be an effort to do that. all we're suggesting is we think there is a capacity to clarify to try to work this through in a way that could bring both sides of this together in a an effort to have a more powerful message

in this vote and a clearer aim. -- a clearer aumf. i am not going to ask any further questions other than to say, mr. secretary this is , important. critically important. it is not just important for those who lives are being risked but it has an importance. it relates to our constitutional responsibilities, each of us. i think if we do not assert ourselves and our constitutional responsibility, when it comes to this conflict, we are remiss. i don't want to be condemned by future generations by walking away from this responsibility. if we can work out an agreement, fine. if we cannot, we still have a responsibility to pass this authorization. i hope we do it before we leave. >> we have three former members of this committee who are asking for the authorization who agree who would like to see us do it in a way that gets the vote we talked about.

>> final remarks? >> i want to thank you for having the hearing. i think this is much better than what was contemplated last week. i want to thank the secretary for coming in today and providing some principles that i really believe we can all build on. and i do applaud the president and you for making sure that in iraq we had a different government situation there before we committed and i think that was a good thing. i do want to say again, i think that we can get to a place where there is that broader support i really believe that. i'm going to say something that my friends on this side of the aisle will disagree with. the reason we're here is a total failure of the president to lead on this issue and set something

up here. we find ourselves divided when in essence we all want the same thing. we want to authorization the president to be able to do the things that are necessary to deal with isis. i think we're united there. the reason we're in this cluster, which is where we are, is because the president has not really sought that authorization. today you came closer, not quite all the way through, but you came closer to asking for an explicit authorization. came closer. a better approach would be to send up the language. there might be some common ground, more than we think. but the one piece that i think is missing by not asking explicitly is we don't have the opportunity to really delve into the strategy of this. we're talking about limitations

in writing but one of the things we have not had the opportunity to do and anyone who attended the briefing we had a month ago with military leadership and others, i don't think anybody left there believing that we understood how we were going to deal with isis. i think there were a lot of gaps that we didn't understand. what is missing is not just the document, but it's also what's missing as when you seek something explicitly, we have the opportunity to probe how you're going to go ahead doing that. we just heard from leaders in the region. i know there is tremendous division over the assad issue. that is the magnet for isis in the first place. i do hope that we will continue. i hope that you will end up -- that you will send up explicit language and i hope that we will have the opportunity to understand how we

are going go forward. one of the reasons we ended up in a 12 or 13 year war is there wasn't any of this discussion. it didn't happen. it's not just the language. it's actually understanding how we're going to go about dealing with this and that is a massive missing element. i think he is conducting himself fairly well except for evading the issue of the explicit request. i thank him for the principles. i do look forward to working with you to achieve in spite of all the things that i just said to achieve a more broadly bipartisan support of something that i think we all agree needs to be undertaken. but i don't think you have come to us in a way that is appropriate in making that happen. but i thank the chairman for having us. >> can i just -- i'm surprised by that. i want to get a better grade from you, senator. i quote my own testimony --

>> he's a tough grader. >> we ask you now to work closely with us on a bipartisan basis to develop language that provides a clear signal of support. the authorization should give the president the clear mandate and flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed conflict. we have requested that we work together. we are requesting an aumf. >> mr. secretary, i look forward to working with you a little more closely. i will grade on a curve. and give you a little bit better attaboy. >> i hope the curve goes up and not down. >> i'm not even going to go there. let me just say that i want to thank you on behalf of all the members. you have a great deal of respect here.

you have equipped yourself most admirably today. i think some of these questions are beyond the role of the secretary of state. and yet you have done a very admirable job of trying to explain to the committee where we're at, where we want to go and how hopefully we can get there. i certainly continue to welcome as i have for month to try to evolve language that can put the administration in a place that is in sync with the congress. i have no concern about our collective goal. our goal is to defeat isis and i am convinced that we will. i think there is a very compelling reason for congress to act. i think this hearing has helped us crystallize some of the core issues that are still in

difference between the legislative and executive branch and i would hope that we could find a way to broach them. it is the chair's intention to continue on thursday. if we can work from here to thursday to further narrow those, that would be great, but it is the majority of the committee's desire to express themselves on a vote on an authorization of the use of military force. i am going to honor that view and move forward, and we will see where we end up from there. i am not sure if we are going to end this session in in the senate. if we don't, then i would actually argue that there should be a broader debate in the senate as well. but in any event we look forward to working with you. this hearing is adjourned. >> the assistant secretary of state for security and the state

department inspector general will testify before the house committee on the 2012 attack on the u.s. consulate in benghazi. let coverage begins tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 3. new jersey senator cory booker testified at the senate hearing on policing practices. raised in aut being predominantly white community and about the u.s. prison system. >> this is a personal issue for me. every day and up say the pledge of allegiance, that we are a nation with liberty and justice for all. but these last few weeks, we have seen tens of thousands of americans taking to the streets, in anguish and rage and

frustration, and i agree with the senator that it is too early in many ways to draw conclusions whether federal investigate -- while there are federal investigations going on. i appreciate his remarks. but please understand that the anguish that folks are feeling on the street, the anguish that has penetrated this body, that had me pulled aside by many people who do the dignified and important work, who have asked me, please do something about this. what is that "this?" in a community wash my family, in 1969, the first black family to integrate the area. my classmates and teammates were all white. my dearest and closest friends,

people who are like blood to me, are from all different backgrounds. as our parents talk to us about police officers, talked to us about behavior. there was dramatic differences between the expectations of black parents, latino parents, and white parents. my -- i remember my parents lecturing me that i did not have the margin of error when it comes to experimenting with drugs or other behaviors that others have. what i want to do right now is put this in context of what you called us to talk about, which is legislation. put it to a context in a horrible history. of bias, that we are desperately trying to work our way out of. we have seene, something happen that is remarkable on the planet earth. the explosion of the american prison system.

america has 5% of the global population but 25% of the imprisoned people. and by god, we do not have a country that has more criminals, more criminality, more crime intent people, then china or russia or india. criminalityon of has made us seat in the last 30 years and 800% increase in the federal prison population. half of those prisoners at the federal level and the overall majority on the national moment -- national level are nonviolent offenders. not picking up guns, not beating people, not assault. lee, as americans, unlike any other country, spent one quarter of a trillion dollars carrying the system. the point that is felt in the is not the -- it

specifics of cases but of the knowledge that we all have that none of my colleagues have denied to me that this system is woefully biased against minorities in our country. >> you can watch all of his judiciary subcommittee testimony on our website, c-span.org. >> massachusetts senator elizabeth warren was critical of what she called "the revolving door" between wall street executives in washington. she repeated her opposition to president obama's nationally -- nomination of the treasury undersecretary. senator warren spoke at an event hosted by americans for financial reform.

>> good afternoon. i am the executive director of americans for financial reform and i welcome you and thank you all for coming. i am going to very quickly say something about what we hope to do and then quickly introduce senator warren so we can spend as much time as possible listening to the senator before she has to go. especially after the recent jobs report, next week's meeting of the market committee will be the occasion for argument about whether the fed should increase short-term interest rates and prevent excessive secular nation -- excessive speculation.

it is likely to her job growth and damage economic recovery which is already coming very slowly for too many people who were hit hard by the financial crisis. what if there are alternative ways? with regulatory tools that are more targeted to specific risks? itt if you can manage effectively and help allowed to stimulate the economy in ways that deliver more benefits to working people and are less likely to overweight the financial sector. these are hardly radical questions. talked about the importance of regulatory tools to deal with financial stability. we think they are very important questions and that they need more attention, and we want to dig in further. for many of us, putting these pieces together is part of our continuing focus on deepening our understanding and the public's recognition of the

fundamentally important relationships between the financial system, financial regulation, and how the economy works or fails to work for everyday americans. paddle after senator warren speaks will focus on the downsides of relying only on monetary policy, as well as on the debate about how far the fed should pull back on economic recovery. then there will be a second , and the second panel will examine the financial regulatory tools available and consider how into what extent they can be used to control financial risks. now for senator warren. we are fortunate to have her with us today and to have her in enjoy her and leadership standing up to the excepted economic power and political influence of wall street. she insists that things can and need to be different. we have been lucky enough to work with the senator on the

creation of a new consumer financial protection bureau, a remarkable example of the difference in approach can make. senator warren. [applause] thank you, thank you all. thank you for the kind introduction. thank you for this chance to join you all today. today's event focuses on how the federal reserve can use its monetary tools to promote economic growth and its regulatory and supervisory tools to reign in our financial system. the fed has always had dual responsibilities -- monetary policy and regulatory supervisory policy. but in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, congress gave the fed even more regulatory and supervisory authority than it had before.

the new chair of the fed recently knowledged the board's supervisory responsibilities are just as important as its better-known obligation to set interest rates and conduct monetary policy. i think the lapses that led to the 2008 crisis drove that point home with searing intensity. the fed is now our first line of defense against another crisis, and we have made progress through the dodd frank act -- even so, the risk of another crisis remains unacceptably high. take one example. this summer, the fed and the fdic determined that 11 of the country's biggest banks have no credible plan for being resolved in bankruptcy. that means that if anyone of them takes on too much risk and

starts to fail, the taxpayers would have to bail it out to prevent another crash. we are all relying on the fed to stop that from happening, which means we are all relying on the fed to get tough in regulating the biggest banks. the question is whether the bank regulators can do the job we need them to do. that raises an issue about the influence of wall street on financial regulation and economic the. -- and economic policy. it affects the head and the other banking regulators, the treasury department, and our government's entire economic policymaking structure. let's look at some facts. fact 1 -- wall street spends a lot of time and money influencing congress. and -- in the

run-up to dodd frank, the financial services sector employees447 former to carry out their lobbying former, including 73 members of congress. to a report at the institute for america's future, --010, the six used tanks the six biggest banks employed 243 lobbyists who once worked in federal government, 33 who had been chief of staff, and for members of congress and 54 who had worked as staffers for the banking oversight committee in the senate and house. that is a lot of former government employees and congressman pounding on congress to make sure that the big banks get heard. no surprise that the financial industries made more than $1

million a day lobbying congress on financial reform, and a lot of that money went to a former -- wednesdayial former elected officials and government employees. wall street dedicates enormous time and money to influencing regulatory policy. a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization took a look at all of the meeting laws from 2010 to 2012. found that three agencies reported meeting with one of the 20 big banks, or banking 12.5x aions, a combined week. that is about five times as often. nearly 1300ut to meetings over two years.

goldman in jpmorgan each met with those agencies at least 175 times, or nearly twice per week every week, on average. keep in mind, that is the count out of only three of the seven major regulators. fact 3 -- democratic administrations have filled in a norma's number of senior economic policy decisions with people who have close ties to wall street. starting with robert rubin, a three oftigroup ceo, the last four treasury secretaries under democratic presidents have had citigroup affiliations before or after their treasury service. the fourth was offered, but declined, citigroup's ceo position. the new vice chairman of the federal reserve was a citigroup executive.

directors of the national economic council, the office of budget, andnd doe senior officials at the treasury department, have also had citigroup ties. that is a record for just one single bank. many other senior officials in recent administration have had ties to goldman, jpmorgan, bank of america, organ stanley, -- morgan stanley. were lawyers who spent huge portions of their careers representing wall street institutions. this is the revolving door at its most dangerous. in virtually every economic policy discussion held in washington, the point of view of wall street banks is well represented. fact,l represented, in they have often crowded out

other points of view. context forkind of thinking of the nomination of antonia weiss. he spent the last 20 years at the investment bank and has been named under-secretary for domestic finance at the treasury department. he is focused on international, corporate mergers, companies buying and selling each other. it may be interesting, challenging work, but it does not sufficiently qualify him to oversee consumer protection and domestic regulatory functions at the treasury department. in addition to his lack of basic wasification, mr. weiss part of the burger king inversion deal that moved the u.s. company to canada as part of a merger that would cut down on its tax obligations. weiss'se that mr.

friends are giving him a golden parachute valued at about $20 million as he goes into government service. one spin of is just the revolving door too many. enough is enough. the response to these concerns has been, let's say, loud. first, his supporters say, come on. he is an investment banker, so of course he should be qualified to oversee complicated financial work at treasury. but his defenders haven't shown that his actual experience qualifies him for this job. a bought professor who teaches financial regulation at georgetown wrote a good piece about this last week. he looked at each of the functions of the under-secretary's position, and none eventt, "almost

relates to the work of an investment banker doing international m&a." economist ofief the imf now teaches at m.i.t., and he agrees. he noticed that this position is "the third most senior official in the executive branch with regard to fiscal decision-making." then he goes on to say, "it is iord to think of any seen fiscal official from tha serious country as we get those of mr. weiss." these professors are right. i worked at treasury and i know how critical this position is to financial regulation issues. despite what some of weiss's supporters have said, the job

isn't just to handle the u.s. treasuries to foreign investors, and even if it were, weiss is a corporate dealmaker not a bond trader. one professor makes another good point. shock of mr. weiss's supporters that anyone would dare question his suitability reflects an unspoken assumption that anyone from wall street is of course expert in all things financial." hooey.s wh i agree. we would all scratch our heads the president nominated a theoretical physicist to be the surgeon general because she had a background in science. is no less puzzling for the president to nominate a national merger specialist to handle largely domestic economic issues at treasury because he has a background in finance. nd, weiss's supporters say

that burger king isn't a "classic" inversion deal. so when burger king moved to canada and a deal that would lower its taxes, i guess it was in "un-class." 2600 new stories mentioned burger king in the context of taxes version. there has been some debate over the details. people disagree about what the exact applications will be for burger king and whether the taxes will go down a little or go down a lot. but no matter how many burger king executives lineup in the newspapers to say that they have other motives, this is an inversion deal, and mr. weiss was right in the middle of it. this matters because at the end

of the day, the administration undercuts its own opposition to this practice by nominating someone to a high-profile cross-border inversion. way, a $50 million in the last two years in a firm that did three of the four major announced inversions. it isn't an american company. it already moved to bermuda because it's taxes are lower. third, and maybe you can help me understand this argument -- people say opposition to mr. weiss is unreasonable because -- wait for it -- he likes poetry. [laughter] i am actually not kidding. supposedly because he helped

push a literary magazine called "the paris review," we should trust that he would zealously pursue financial reform. i confess, i don't read any literary magazines, but really? if you like to monster truck racing, with that show that he supported wall street bailouts? id. get what his hobby has to do with overseeing consumer protection and domestic regulatory functions at the treasury department. so what is this really all about? why call out the cavalry for a guy whose experience doesn't match the job he has been nominated for? up $20uy who is picking million to take on a public service job? it is all about the revolving door. thats well oiled mechanism sends wall street executives to make policies and government, and sends government

policymakers straight back to wall street. in,s defenders are all loudly defending the were holding door and telling america how lucky we are that wall street is willing to run the economy and the government. fact, weiss's even defend the golden parachutes like the $20 million payment that weis will receive for taking this government job. is an important tool in making sure that wall street executives will continue to be willing to work on government policy. if that sounds ridiculous to you, you are not alone. republican, a responded that "only in the wonderland of wall street logic could one argue that this looks like anything other than a bribe." want people "we

entering public service because they want to serve the public. frankly, if they needed $20 million incentive, i would rather they stay away." why does the revolving door matter? because it beans that too much of the time, the wind blows from the same direction. government,ime in the wall street view prevails, and time after time, conflicting views are crowded out. consider the deregulation that the banking industry -- the deregulation of the banking a notry, followed by strings attached the bank bailout in the aftermath of the 2008 when angel crisis. most recently, the anemic efforts to help homeowners who had been systematically cheated by financial giant. the wind always blows in the same direction.

the impact of the revolving door can sometimes be subtle. ignoring phone calls from former colleagues, advancing policies that could hurt future employers. relationships matter and anyone who doubts that wall street's outside influence in washington has watered down our government's approach toward too big to fail banks has had their eyes deliberately closed. take one example. was a commitment to the dodd frank act that would have broken up the largest financial institutions. that amendment might have passed, but it ran into powerful opposition from an alliance between wall street are's in government and wall streeters still on wall street. this was notand on subtle. a senior treasury official publicly knowledge --

publicly acknowledged it. too many people at jobs -- have jobs based on who they know and not what they know. haveany others who might brought a different perspective to this work get crowded out. i know that there are experienced and innovative people in financial industries who are qualified for top economic positions in government. the new consumer financial protection bureau, i interviewed, i hired, and i worked alongside many people would wall street experience, and i was glad to do so. in the senate, i have voted for plenty of nominees with wall street experience. but we need a balance. not every person who sweeps in through the revolving door should be offered a top job without some serious cross-examination.

qualifications matter. weiss doesn't have them. counterabout building pressure on wall street bankers. members of congress, their staff and regulatory agencies, are going to hear the wall street perspective loud and clear, each and every minute of each and every day. change.'t going to but we need a real mix of people in the room when decisions are made. when the president has an who willty to decide be at the financial decision-making table, he should think about who knows the economics of job creation, about community banks and access to finance, about who has the skills and determination to make sure that the biggest banks can't take down our economy again. street havef wall

succeeded in pushing government richy that made mega banks beyond imagination. while leaving working families to struggle from payday to payday. so long as the revolving door keeps spinning, government policies will continue to favor wall street over main street. i hope you will join me in saying enough is enough. thank you. [laughter] [applause] >> the senate intelligence committee released a summary of

its investigation into the cia's detention and interrogation program, which claims the cia misled the white house and congress. we will hear from senator dianne feinstein, and the vice chair, and john mccain. john kerryf state testified about the militant group isis during that hearing. he was asked about the cia interrogation program. david cameron quoted saying "torture is always wrong." will fillnick clyde in for mr. cameron at question time in the house of commons. live coverage begins at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 2. >> senate intelligence midi

dianne feinstein said that the methods were "far more brutal than people were led to believe." her committee released a report describing the cia's methods of interrogating terror suspects in the aftermath of 9/11 stop senator feinstein spoke on the senate floor by the findings. you can read the committee's report at c-span.org. senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from california. mrs. feinstein: mr. president, i want to thank the leader for his words and for his support. they are extraordinarily welcome and appreciated. today, a 500-page executive summary of the senate intelligence committee's five and a half-year review of the c.i.a.'s detention and interrogation program, which was conducted between 2002 and 2009, is being released publicly. the executive summary which is going out today is backed by a 6,700-page classified and unredacted report with 38,000

footnotes, which can be released, if necessary, at a later time. the report released today examines the c.i.a.'s secret overseas detention of at least 119 individuals and the use of coercive interrogation techniques, in some cases amounting to torture. over the past couple of weeks, i have gone through a great deal of interspecs about whether to delay the release of this report to a later time. this clearly is a period of turmoil and instability in many parts of the world. unfortunately, that's going to continue for the foreseeable future whether this report is released or not. there are those who will seize upon the report and say see what the americans did? and they will try to use it to justify evil actions or incite

more violence. we can't prevent that, but history will judge us by our commitment to a just society governed by law and the willingness to face an ugly truth and say never again. there may never be the right time to release this report. the instability we see today will not be resolved in months or years, but this report is too important to shelve indefinitely. my determination to release it has also increased due to a campaign of mistaken statements and press articles launched against the report before anyone has had the chance to read it. as a matter of fact, the report is just now as i speak being released. this is what it looks like. senator chambliss asked me if we could have the minority report

bound with the majority report for this draft that is not possible, but in the final draft, it will be bound together. but this is what the summary of the 6,000 pages look like. my words give me no pleasure. i'm releasing this report because i know there are thousands of employees at the c.i.a. who do not condone what i will speak about this morning and who work day out, day and night, long hours, within the law, for america's security in what is certainly a difficult world. my colleagues on the intelligence committee and i am proud of them just as everyone in this chamber is, and we will always support them. in reviewing the study in the past few days with the decision looming over the public release, i was struck by a quote found on page 126 of the

executive summary. it cites the former c.i.a. inspector general, john hell garyson, who in 2005 wrote the following to the then director of the c.i.a., which clearly states the situation with respect to this report years later as well, -- and i quote -- "we have found that the agency over the decades has continued to get itself into messes related to interrogation programs for one overriding reason. we do not document and learn from our experience. each generation of officers is left to immaterial pro advisea -- improvise anew with problematic results for individuals and for our agency." i believe that to be true.

i agree with mr. helgerson. his comments are true today but this must change. on march 11, 2009, the committee voted 14-1 to begin a review of the c.i.a.'s detention and interrogation program. over the past five years, a small team of committee investigators pored over the more than 6.3 million pages of c.i.a. records the leader spoke about to complete this report or what we call the study. it shows that the c.i.a.'s actions a decade ago are a stain on our value and on our history. the release of this 500-page summary cannot remove that stain, but it can and does say to our people and the world that america is big enough to admit when it's wrong and confident enough to learn from its mistakes. releasing this report is an

important step to restore our values and show the world that we are, in fact, a just and lawful society. over the next hour i'd like to lay out for senators and the american public the report's key findings and conclusions, and i ask that when i complete this, senator mccain be recognized. before i get to the substance of the report, i'd like to make a few comments about why it's so important that we make this study public. all of us have vivid memories of that tuesday morning when terror struck new york, washington, and pennsylvania. make no mids take, september 11, 2011, war was declared on the united states. terrorists struck our financial center, they struck our military center, and they tried

to strike our political center and would have had brave and courageous passengers not brought down the plane. we still vividly remember the mix of outrage and deep despair and sadness as we watched from washington. smoke rising from the pentagon. the passenger plane lying in a pennsylvania field. the sound of bodies striking can owe anies at ground level as innocents jumped to the ground below from the world trade center. mass terror that we often see abroad had struck us directly in our front yard, killing 3,000 innocent men, women, and children. what happened? we came together as a nation with one singular mission -- bring those who committed these acts to justice. but it's at this point where the

values of america come into play, where the rule of law and the fundamental principles of right and wrong become important. in 1990, the united states senate ratified the convention against torture. the convention makes clear that this ban against torture is absolute. it says -- and i quote -- "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, including what i just read, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may be invoked as a justification for torture" -- end quote. nonetheless, it was argued that the need for information on possible additional terrorist plots after 9/11 made extraordinary interrogation techniques necessary. even if one were to set aside

all of the moral arguments, our review was a meticulous and detailed examination of records. it finds that coercive interrogation techniques did not produce the vital otherwise unavailable intelligence the c.i.a. has claimed. i will go into further detail on this issue in a moment, but let me make clear, these comments are not a condemnation of the c.i.a. as a whole. the c.i.a. plays an incredibly important part in our nation's security, and has thousands of dedicated and talented employees. what we have found is that a surprisingly few people were responsible for designing, carrying out, and managing this program. two contractors developed and led the interrogations. there was little effective

oversight. analysts -- analysts -- on occasion gave operational orders that interrogations and c.i.a. management of the program was weak and diffused. our final report was approved by a bipartisan vote of 9-6 in december, 2012, and exposes brutality in stark contrast to our values as a nation. this effort was focused on the actions of the c.i.a. from late 2001 to january of 2009. the report does not include considerable detail on the c.i.a.'s interactions with the white house, the -- excuse me, it does include considerable detail on the c.i.a.'s interactions with the white house, the departments of justice, state, defense, and

the senate intelligence committee. the review is based on contemporaneous records and documents during the time the program was in place and active. now, these documents are important because they aren't based on recollection. they aren't based on revision. and they aren't a rationalization a decade later. it's these documents referenced repeatedly in thousands of footnotes that provide the factual basis for the study's conclusions. the committee's majority staff reviewed more than 6.3 million pages of these documents provided by the c.i.a. as well as records from other departments and agencies. these records include finished intelligence assessments, c.i.a. operational and intelligence cables,

memoranda, emails, real-time chat sessions, inspector general reports, testimony before congress, pictures, and other internal records. it's true, we didn't conduct our own interviews, and let me tell you why that was the case. in 2009, there was an ongoing review by department of justice special prosecutor john durham. on august 24, attorney general holder expanded that review. this occurred six months after our study had begun. durham's original investigation of the c.i.a.'s destruction of interrogation videotapes was broadened to include possible criminal actions of c.i.a. employees in the course of c.i.a. detention and interrogation activities. at the time, the committee's

vice chairman, kit bond, withdrew the minority's participation in the study, citing the attorney general's expanded investigation as the reason. the department of justice refused to coordinate its investigation with the intelligence committee's review. as a result, possible interviewees could be subject to additional liability if they were interviewed. and the c.i.a., citing the attorney general's investigation, would not instruct its employees to participate in interviews. notwithstanding this, i am really confident of the factual accuracy and comprehensive nature of this report for three reasons. first, it's the 6.3 million pages of documents reviewed, and they reveal records of

actions as those actions took place, not through recollections more than a decade later. second, the c.i.a. and c.i.a. senior officers have taken the opportunity to explain their views on c.i.a. detention and interrogation of operations. they have done this in on-the-record statements and classified committee hearings, written testimony, and answers to questions, and through the formal response to the committee in june, 2013, after reading the study. and third, the committee had access to and utilized an extensive set of reports of interviews conducted by the c.i.a. inspector general, and the c.i.a.'s oral history program. so while we could not conduct new interviews of individuals, we did utilize transcripts or

summaries of interviews of those directly engaged in detention and interrogation operations. these interviews occurred at the time the program was operational, and covered the exact topics we would have asked about had we conducted interviews ourselves. these interview reports and transcripts included but were not limited to the following -- george tenant, director of the c.i.a., when the agency took tuft and interrogated the majority ofdownees -- detaineeees. jose rodriguez, a key player in the program. c.i.a. general counsel scott mueller, c.i.a. deputy director of operations, james pavitt. c.i.a. acting general counsel, john rizo and c.i.a. deputy director, john mclaughlin.

and a variety of lawyers, medical personnel, senior counterterrorism analysts and managers of the detention and interrogation program. the best place to start about how we got into this -- and i'm delighted that senator rockefeller is on the floor -- is a little more than eight years ago on september 6, 2006, when the committee met to be briefed by then-director michael hayden. at that 2006 meeting, the full committee learned for the first time -- for the first time, of the use of so-called enhanceed interrogation techniques or iit's. it was a short meeting in part because president bush was making a public speech later that day disclosing officially for the first time the existence of c.i.a. black sites and

announcing the transfer of 14 detainees from c.i.a. custody to guantanamo bay, cuba. it was the first time the interrogation program was explained to the full committee as details had previously been limited to the chairman and vice chairman. then on december 7, 2007, "the new york times" reported that c.i.a. personnel in 2005 had destroyed videotapes of the interrogation of two c.i.a. detainees. the c.i.a.'s first detainee as well as abwal rashime. the committee had not been informed of the destruction of the tapes of the days later on september 11 -- december 11, 2007, the committee held a hearing on the destruction of

the video tames. director hayden testified that the c.i.a. had concluded that the destruction of videotapes was acceptable, in part because congress had not yet requested to see them. my source is our committee's transcript, december 11, 2007. director hayden stated that, if the committee had asked for the videotapes, they would have been provided. but, of course, the committee had not known that the videotapes existed. and we now know from c.i.a. e-mails and records that the videotapes were destroyed shortly after c.i.a. attorneys raised concerns that congress might find out about the tapes. in any case, at that same december 11 committee hearing, director hayden told the committee that c.i.a. cables related to the interrogation sessions depicted in the

videotapes were -- and i quote -- "a more-than-adequate representation of the tapes and, therefore, if you want them, we'll give you access to them." that's our transcript, december 11, 2007 hearing. senator rockefeller, then chairman of the committee, designated two members of the committee staff to review the cables describing the interrogation sessions of abu zbabieda. senator bond similar directed two of his staffers to review the cables. the designated staff members completed their review and compiled a summary of the content of the c.i.a. cables by early 2009. by which time i had become chairman. the description in the cables of c.i.a.'s interrogations and the

treatment of detainees presented a starkly different picture from director hayden's testimony before the committee. they describe brutal around-the-clock interrogations, especially of zbabaida, in which multiple coercive techniques were used in combination and with substantial repetition. it was an ugly, visceral description. the summary also indicated that the two did not result, as a result of the use of these so-called e.i.t.'s, provide the kind of intelligence that led the c.i.a. to stop terrorist plots or arrest additional suspects. as a result, i think it's fair to say the entire committee was concerned and it approved the scope of an investigation by a vote of 14-1, and the work

began. in my march 11, 2014, floor speech about the study, i described how in 2009 the committee came to an agreement with the new c.i.a. director leon panetta for access to documents and other records about the c.i.a.'s detention and interrogation program, so i won't repeat that here. from 2009 to 2012, our staff conducted a massive and unprecedented review of c.i.a. records. draft sections of the report were produced by late-2011 and shared with the full committee. the final report was completed in december 2012 and approved by the committee by a bipartisan vote of 9-6. after that vote, i sent the full report to the president and asked the administration to

provide comments on it before it was released. six months later, in june of 2013, the c.i.a. responded, "i directed them that if the c.i.a. pointed out any error in our report, we would fix it. and we did fix one bullet point that did not impact our findings and conclusions. if the c.i.a. came to a different conclusion than the report did, we would note that in the report and explain our reasons for disagreeing, if we disagreed. and you will see some of that documented in the footnotes of that executive summary as well as in the 6,000 pages. in april 2014, the committee prepared an updated version of the full study and voted 12-3 to declassify and release the executive summary, findings, and conclusions and minority and

additional views. on august 1, we received a declassified version from the executive branch. it was immediately apparent that the redactions to our report prevented a clear and understandable reading of the study and prevented us from substantiating the findings and conclusions. so we, obviously, objected. for the past four months, the committee and the c.i.a., the director of national intelligence, and the white house have engaged in a lengthy negotiation over the redactions to the report. we have been able to include some more information in the report today without sacrificing sources and methods or our national security. i'd like to ask, following my remarks, that a letter from the white house dated yesterday

conveying the report also points out that the report is 93% complete and that the redactions amount to 7% of the bulk of the report. the presiding officer: without objection. mrs. feinstein: thank you, mr. chairman. mr. president, this has been a long process. the work began seven years ago when senator rockefeller directed committee staff to review the c.i.a. cables describing the interrogation sessions of abu zubaydah. it's been very difficult but i believe documentation and the findings' inclusions will make clear how this program was morally, legally, and administratively misguided and that this nation should never again engage in these tactics. let me now turn to the contents of the study. as i noted, we have 20 findings

and conclusions, which fall into four general categories. first, the c.i.a.'s enhanced interrogation techniques were not an effective way to gather intelligence information. second, the c.i.a. provided extensive amounts of inaccurate information about the operation of the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the c.i.a. inspector general, the media, and the american public. third, the c.i.a.'s management of the program was inadequate and deeply flawed. and, fourth, the c.i.a. program was far more brutal than people were led to believe. let me describe each category in more detail. the first set of findings and conclusions concern the effectiveness or lack thereof of the interrogation program.

the committee found that the c.i.a.'s coercive interrogation techniques were not an effective means of acquiring accurate intelligence or gaining detainee cooperation. the c.i.a. and other defenders of the program have repeatedly claimed that the use of so-called interrogation techniques was necessary to get detainees to provide critical information and to bring detainees to a -- quote -- "state of compliance" -- end que -- in which they would cooperate and provide information. the study concludes that both claims are inaccurate. the report is very specific in how it evaluates the c.i.a.'s claims on the effectiveness and necessity of its enhanced interrogation techniques. specifically, we use the

c.i.a.'s own definition of "tect an"--of "effectiveness." the c.i.a.'s claims that the e.i.t.'s were necessary to obtain -- quote -- "otherwise available" -- end quote -- information that could not be obtained from any other source to stop terrorist attacks and save american lives, that's a claim we conclude is inaccurate. we took 20 examples that the c.i.a. itself claimed to show the success of these interrogations. these include cases of terrorist plots stopped or terrorists captured. the c.i.a. used these examples in presentations to the white house, in testimony to congress, in submissions to the department of justice, and ultimately to the american people.

some of the claims are well-known. the capture of khalid sheikh mohammed, the prevention of attacks against the library tower of los angeles, and the takedown of osama bin laden. other claims were made only in classified settings, to the white house, congress, and department of justice. in each case, the c.i.a. claimed that critical oon and unique information came from one or more detainees in its custody after they were subjected to the c.i.a.'s coercive techniques. and that information led to specific counterterrorism success. our staff reviewed every one of the 20 cases, and not a single case holds up.

in every single one of these cases, at least one of the following was true: one, the intelligence community had information separate from the use of e.i.t.'s that led to the terrorist disruption or capture; two, information from a detainee subjected to e.i. t.'s played no role in the claimed disruption or capture; and, three, the purported terrorist plot either did not exist or posed no real threat to americans or united states interests. some critics have suggested the study concludes that no intelligence was ever provided from any detainee the c.i.a. held. that is false, and the study makes no such claim. what is true is that actionable intelligence that was -- quote -- "otherwise unavailable" --

otherwise unavailable -- was not obtained using these coercive interrogation techniques. the report also chronicles where the use of interrogation techniques that do not involve physical force were effective. specifically, the report provides examples where interrogators had sufficient information to confront detainees with facts, know when they were lying, and when they a-- and where they applied rapport-building techniques that were developed and honed by the united states military, the f.b.i., and more recently the interagency high-valued detainee interrogation group called the hague that these techniques produced good intelligence. let me make a couple of additional comments on the claimed effectiveness of c.i.a. interrogations.

at no time did the c.i.a.'s coercive interrogation techniques lead to the collection of intelligence on an imminent threat that many believe was the justification for the use of these techniques. the committee never found an example of this hypothetical ticking time bomb scenario. the use of coercive technique methods regularly resulted in fabricated information. sometimes the c.i.a. actually knew detainees were lying. other times the c.i.a. acted on false information, diverting resources and leading officers or contractors to falsely believe they were acquiring unique or actionable intelligence and that its interrogations were working when they were not. internally, c.i.a. officers often called into question the

effectiveness of the c.i.a.'s interrogation techniques, noting how the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate information. the report includes numerous examples of c.i.a. officers questioning the agency's claims, but these contradictions were marginalized and not presented externally. the second set of findings and conclusions is that the c.i.a. provided extensive inaccurate information about the program and its effectiveness to the white house, the department of justice, congress, the c.i.a. inspector general, the media, and the american public. this conclusion is somewhat personal for me. i remember clearly when director hayden briefed the intelligence committee for the first time on

the so-called e.i.t.'s at that september, 2006 committee meeting. he referred specifically to a -- quote -- "actually slap" -- end quote among other techniques and presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful and implied in a highly clinical and professional manner. they were not. the committee's report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful and that the constraints that existed on paper in washington did not match the way techniques were used at c.i.a. sites around the world. a particular -- of particular note was the treatment of abu zubaydah over the span of 17 days in august of 2002. this involved nonstop interrogation and abuse, 24/7,

from august 4 to august 21, and included multiple forms of deprivation and physical assault. the description of this period first written up by our staff in early 2009 while senator rockefeller was chairman, is what prompted this full review. but the inaccurate and incomplete descriptions go far beyond that. the c.i.a. provided inaccurate memoranda and explanations to the department of justice while its legal counsel was considering the legality of the coercive techniques. in those communications to the department of justice, the c.i.a. claimed the following -- the coercive techniques would not be used with excessive repetition, detainees would always have an opportunity to provide information prior to the

use of the techniques. the techniques were to be used in progression starting with the least aggressive and proceeding only if needed. medical personnel would make sure that interrogations wouldn't cause serious harm and they could interview at any time to stop interrogations. interrogators were carefully vetted and highly trained. and each technique was to be used in a specific way without deviation and only with specific approval for the interrogator and detainee involved. none of these assurances which the department of justice relied on to form its legal opinions were consistently or even routinely carried out. in many cases, important information was with withheld

from policymakers. for example, foreign intelligence committee chairman bob graham asked a number of questions after he was first briefed in september of 2002, but the c.i.a. refused to answer him, effectively stonewalling him until he left the committee at the end of the year. in another example, the c.i.a. in coordination with white house officials and staff initially withheld information of the -- withheld information of the c.i.a.'s interrogation techniques from secretary of state colin powell and secretary of defense donald rumsfeld. there are c.i.a. records stating that colin powell wasn't told about the program at first because there were concerns that -- and i quote -- "powell would blow his stack if he were briefed." source, email from john rizzo

dated july 31, 2003. c.i.a. records clearly indicate and definitively that after he was briefed on the detainee abu grab you'da the c.i.a. didn't tell president bush about the full nature of the e.i.t.'s until april of 2006. that's what the records indicate. the c.i.a. similar withheld information or provided false information to the c.i.a. inspector general during his conduct of a special review by the i.g. in 2004. incomplete and inaccurate information from the c.i.a. was useed in documents provided to the department of justice and as a basis for president bush's speech on september 6, 2006, in which he publicly acknowledged the c.i.a. program

for the first time. in all of these cases, other c.i.a. officers acknowledged internally -- they acknowledged internally that information the c.i.a. had provided was wrong. the c.i.a. also misled other c.i.a. white house officials. when vice president cheney's counsel, david addington, asked c.i.a. general scott mueller in 2003 about the c.i.a.'s video taping the waterboarding of detainees, mueller deliberately told him that videotapes -- quote -- "were not being made" -- end quote but did not disclose that videotapes of previous water word boarding sessions had been made and still existed. source, email from scott mueller dated june 7, 2003. there are many, many more examples in the committee's report. all are documented.

the third set every findings and conclusions notes the various ways in which c.i.a. management of the detention and interrogation program from its inception to its formal termination in january of 2009 was inadequate and deeply flawed. there is no doubt that the detention and interrogation program was by any measure a major c.i.a. undertaking. it raised significant legal and policy issues, and involved significant resources and funding. it was not, however, managed as a significant c.i.a. program. instead, it had limited oversight and lacked formal direction and management. for example, in the six months between being granted detention authority and taking custody of its first detainee, abu

zubaydah, the c.i.a. had not identified and prepared a suitable detention cite. it had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques outside of the rapport-building techniques that were official c.i.a. policy until that time. in fact, there is no indication the c.i.a. reviewed its own history. that's just what helgerson was saying in 2005, with coercive interrogation tactics. as the executive summary notes, the c.i.a. had engaged in rough interrogation in the past. in fact, the c.i.a. had previously sent a letter to the intelligence committee in 1989, and here is the quote -- "that inhumane physical or

psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers" -- end quote. that was a letter from john helgerson, c.i.a. director of congressional affairs, dated january 8, 1989. however, in late 2001 and 2002, rather than research interrogation practices and coordinate with other parts of the government with extensive expertise in detention and interrogation of terrorist attacks, the c.i.a. engaged two contract psychologists who had never conducted interrogations themselves or ever operated detention facilities. as the c.i.a. captured or received custody of detainees through 2002, it maintained

separate lines of management at headquarters for different detention facilities. no individual or office was in charge of the detention and interrogation program until january of 2003, by which point more than one-third of c.i.a. detainees identified in our review had been detained and interrogated. one clear example of flawed c.i.a. management was the poorly managed detention facility referred to in our report by the code name cobalt to hide the actual name of the facility. it began operations in september of 2002. the facility knew few formal records -- excuse me, the facility kept few formal records of the detainees housed there,

and untrained c.i.a. officers conducted frequent unauthorized and unsupervised interrogations, using techniques that were not and never became part of the c.i.a.'s formal enhanced interrogation program. the c.i.a. placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of the cite. in -- the site. in november, 2002, an otherwise healthy detainee who was held mostly nude and chained to the concrete floor died at the facility from what was believed to have been hypothermia. in interviews conducted in 2003 by the c.i.a. officer of the inspector general, c.i.a.'s leadership acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at this specific c.i.a. detention site, and some

c.i.a. -- excuse me, senior officials believed erroneously that enhanceed interrogation techniques were not used there. the c.i.a. in its june, 2013 response to the committee's report agreed that there were management failure in the program, but asserted that they were corrected by early 2003. while the study found that management failures improved somewhat, we found they persisted till the end of the program. among the numerous management shortcomings identified in the report are the following -- the c.i.a. used poorly trained and nonvetted personnel. individuals were deployed, in particular interrogators, without relevant training or experience. due to the c.i.a.'s redactions to the report, there are limits

to what i can say in this regard but it's a clear fact that the c.i.a. deployed officers who had histories of personal, ethical, and professional problems of a serious nature. these included histories of violence and abusive treatment of others, and should have called into question their employment with the united states government, let alone their suitability to partnership in a sense -- participate in a sensitive c.i.a. covert action program. the two contractors that c.i.a. allowed to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation operations conducted numerous inherently governmental functions that never should have been outsourced to contractors. these contractors are referred in the report in special pseudonyms, swag earth and dunbar. they developed the list of so-called enhanceed interrogation techniques that

the c.i.a. employed. they personally conducted interrogations of some of the c.i.a.'s most significant detainees, using the techniques, including the waterboarding of abu zubaydah, khalid shekh mohammed and al-nashiri. the contractors provided the official evaluations of whether detainees' psychological states allowed for the continued use of the enhanceed techniques. even for some detainees, they themselves were interrogating or had interrogated.evaluating thel state of the very detainees they were interrogating is a clear conflict of interest and a violation of professional guidelines. the c.i.a. relied on these two contractors to evaluate the interrogation program they had devised and in which they had

obvious financial interests; again, a clear conflict of interest and an avoidance of responsibility. by the c.i.a. in 2005, the two contractors formed a company specifically for the purpose of expanding their work with the c.i.a. from 2005 to 2008 the c.i.a. outsourced almost all aspects of its detention and interrogation program to this country as part of a contract valued at more than $180 million. ultimately, not all contract options were exercised. however, the c.i.a. has paid these two contractors and their company more than $80 million. of the 119 individuals found to have been detained by the c.i.a.

during the life of the program, the committee found that at least 26 were wrongfully held. these are cases where the c.i.a. itself determined that it had not met the standard for detention set out in the 2001 memorandum of notification, which governs a covert action. detainees often remained in custody for months after the c.i.a. determined they should have been released. c.i.a. records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees. due to poor record keeping, a full accounting of how many specific detainees were held and how they were specifically treated while in custody may nevadnever be known. similarly, in specific instances, we found that enhanced interrogation techniques were used without authorization in a manner far

ditch and more brutal -- different and more brutal than had been authorized by the office of legal counsel and ducted by personnel not approved to use them -- conducted by personnel not approved to use them on detainees. questions about how and when to apply interrogation techniques were ad hoc and not proposed, evaluated, and a. approved in the manner -- and approved in the manner described by the c.i.a. in i think weren descriptions and testimony about the program. detainees were often subject to harsh and brutal interrogation and treatment because c.i.a. analysts believe, often in error, that they knew more information than what they had provided. sometimes c.i.a. managers and interrogators in the field were uncomfortable with what they were being asked to do and recommended ending the abuse of a detainee.

repeatedly in such cases, they were overruled by people at c.i.a. headquarters who thought they knew better, such as by analysts with no line authority. this shows again how a relatively small number of c.i.a. personnel -- perhaps 40 to 50 -- were making decisions on detention and interrogation despite the better judgments of other c.i.a. officers. the fourth and final set of findings and conclusions concern how the interrogations of c.i.a. detainees were absolutely brutal, far worse than the c.i.a. represented them to policy-makers and others. beginning with the first detainee, abu zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the s.d.i c.i.a. applied its sod

enhanced intier ga interrogation techniques for days and weeks at a time on one detainee. in contrast, th to c.i.a. representations, detainees were subjected to the most aggressive techniques immediately -- stripped naked, diapered, physically struck and put in various physical stress positions for long periods of time. they were deprived of sleep for days. in one case up to 180 hours. that's 7 1/2 days over a week with no sleep, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands tied together over their heads chained to the ceiling. in the cobalt facility i previously mentioned, interrogators and guards use what had they called "rough take-downs" in which a detainees was grabbed from a cell, cleedges cut off, hooded, and

dragged up and down a dirt hallway while being are slapped and pashed. the c.i.a. several detainees to believe that they would never be allowed to leave c.i.a. custody alive, suggesting to abu zubaydah that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box. that's c.i.a. cable from august 12, 2002. according to another c.i.a. cable, c.i.a. officers also planned to cremate abu zubaydah should he not survive his interrogation. source: c.i.a. cable july 15, 2002. after the use i the news, the ie committee held a hearing on the matter on may 12, 2004. without disclosing any details of its own interrogation program, c.i.a. director john

mclaughlin testified that c.i.a. interrogations were nothing like what was depicted at abu ghraib, the united states prison in iraq where detainees were abused by american personnel. this, of course, was false. c.i.a. detaineeses at one facility described as a dungeon were kept in complete darkness, constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. the u.s. bureau of prisons personnel went to that location in november 2002 and according to a contefn rainious internal c.i.a. e-mail, told c.i.a. officers they had -- quote -- "never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived." end quote. again source: c.i.a. e-mail sender and recipient redacted,

december 5, 2002. throughout the program, multiple c.i.a. detainees subject to interrogation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. multiple c.i.a. psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems. the executive summary includes far more detail than i'm going to provide here about things that were in these interrogation sessions, and the summary itself includes only a subset of the treatment of the 119 c.i.a. detainees. there is far more detail, all documented in the full

6,700-page study. this summarizes briefly the committee's findings and conclusions. before i wrap up, i'd like to thank the people who made this undertaking possible. first, i thank senator jay rockefeller. he started this project by directing his staff to review the operational cables that describe the first recorded interrogations after we learned that the videotapes of those sessions had been destroyed. and that report was what led to this multiyear investigation, and without it we wouldn't have really had any sense of what had happened. i thank other members of the senate intelligence committee, one of whom is on the floor today from the great state of new mexico. others have been on the floor -- who voted to conduct this investigation and to approve its

result and make the report public. but most importantly, i want to thank the intelligence committee staff who performed this work. they are dedicated and committed public officials who sacrificed and really sacrificed a significant portion of their lives to see this report through to its publication. they have worked days, nights, weekends for years in some of the most difficult circumstances. it's no secret to anyone that the c.i.a. does not want this report coming out, and i believe the nation owes them a debt of gratitude. they are dan jones, who has led this review since 2007, and more than anyone else today is a result of his effort. evan godesman and tad turner, each wrote thousands of pages of

the full report and have dedicated themselves and much of their lives to this project. elisa starszac, who began this as cohead and contributed extensively until her departure from the committee in 2011. other key contributors to the drafting, editing and review of the report were jennifer barrett, nick basiano, mike buckwald, jim katella, eric chapman, lor lorenzo goco, trecd genif, michael neblet, michael pezner, caroline tess and james wolf. and finally david granite, who has been a never-faltering staff director throughout this review. madam president, this study is bigger than the actions of the

c.i.a. it's really about american values and more or less. it's about the constitution, the bill of rights, our rule of law. these values exist regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. they exist in peacetime and in wartime, and if we cast aside these values when convenient, we have failed to live by the very pre-septembers that -- pre-cepts that make our nation a great jaun. there is a r twhee carry the banner after great nation. so we submit this stud on behalf of the committee to the public in the belief that it will stand the test of time and with it the report will carry the message "never again." i very much appreciate your attention and i yield to senator mccain. >> you can read the report at

our website, c-span.org.rt at of next, we will hear from the committee chair who was critical of the report. i rise asresident, the vice chairman of the senate select committee on intelligence to respond to the public release of the declassified mr. chambliss version of the executive summary and findings and conclusions from the committee's study of the c.i.a. 's detention and interrogation program. ation program. this is not pleasant duty for me. during my four years as the vice chairman of the intelligence committee, i have enjoyed an excellent relationship with our chairman, senator diane feinstein. we have worked closely to conduct strong bipartisan oversight of the u.s. intelligence community, including the passage and enactment of significant national security legislation.

however, this particular study has been one of the very, very few areas where we have never been able to see eye to eye. putting this report out today is going to have significant consequences. in addition to reopening a number of old wounds both domestically and internationally, it could be used to incite unrest and even attacks against our service members, other personnel overseas, and our international partners. this report could also stoke additional mistreatment or death of american or other western captives overseas. it will endanger c.i.a. personnel, sources and future intelligence operations. this report will damage our relationship with several significant international counterterrorism partners at a time when we can least afford it. even worse, despite the fact

that the administration and many in the majority are aware of these consequences, they have chosen to release the report today. the united states today is faced with a wide array of security challenges across the globe, including in afghanistan, pakistan, syria, iraq, yemen, north africa, somalia, ukraine, and the list goes on. instead of focusing on the problems right in front of us, the majority side of the intelligence committee has spent the last five years and over $40 million focused on a program that effectively ended over eight years ago while the world around us burns. in march, 2009, when the committee first undertook the study, i was the only member of the intelligence committee that voted against moving forward

with it. i believed then as i still do today that vital committee and intelligence community resources would be squandered over a debate that congress, the executive branch, and the supreme court had already settled. this issue has been investigated or reviewed extensively by the executive branch, including criminal investigations by the department of justice, the senate armed services committee, the international committee on the red cross, as well as other entities. congress has passed two separate acts directly related to detention and interrogation issues. specifically, the detainee treatment act of 2005 and the military commissions act of 2006. the executive branch terminated the c.i.a. program and directed that future interrogations be conducted in accordance with the u.s. army field manual on

interrogation. also, the supreme court decided roughly v bush in 2004, hamdi v rumsfeld in four, hamdan v rumsfeld in 2006 as well as boumadinev bush in 2008. all of which established that detainees were entitled to habeas corpus review and identified dish sis in the detainee treatment act and the military commissions act. by the time i had became vice chairman the, attorney general's holder's decision to reopen the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the c.i.a.'s interrogation program. this unfortunate decision deprived the committee of the

ability to interview key witnesses who participated in the kaye program and essentially limited the study to the review of a cold documentary record. now, how can any credible investigation take place without interviewing witnesses? this is a 6,000-page report and not one single witness was ever interviewed in this study being done. this is a poor excuse for the time of oversight that the congress should be conducting. there is no doubt that the c.i.a.'s detention and celebration program which was hastily executed in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in our nation's history, had flaws. the c.i.a. has admitted as much in its june 27, 2013 response to the study.

there is also no doubt that there were instances in which c.i.a. interrogators exceeded their authorities and certain detainees may have suffered as a result. however, the executive summary findings and conclusions released today contain a disturbing number of factual and analytical errors. these factual and analytical shortfalls ultimately led to an unacceptable number of incorrect claims and invalid conclusions i cannot endorse. the study essentially refuses to admit that c.i.a. detainees, especially c.i.a. detainees subjected to enhanceed interrogation techniques provide ed intelligence information which helped the united states government and its allies to neutralize numerous terrorist threats. on its face, this refusal doesn't make sense, given the vast amount of information

gained from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that were generated as a result of them, the capture of additional terrorists and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning. instead of acknowledging these realities, the study adopts an analytical approach designed to obscure the value of the intelligence obtained from the program. for example, the study falsely claims that the use of enhanceed interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of jose padilla because abu glued iowa hea who has direct dies to osama bin laden provided to information about padilla during an interrogation by f.b.i. agents who were exclusively using what's called rapport-building techniques against him more than three months prior to the c.i.a.'s use

of d.o.j.-approved enhanced interrogation techniques. what the study ignores, however, is the fact that abu glueda's earlier -- zubaydah's interrogation did involve use of techniques that were later included in the list of enhance ed interrogation techniques. specifically, the facts demonstrate that abu zubaydah was subjected to around the clock interrogation that included more than four days of dietary manipulation, nudity and more than 126 hours, which is about five days, of sleep deprivation during a 136-hour period by the time the f.b.i. finished up the 8 1/2 hour interrogation shift in which abu zubaydah finally yielded the identification of jose padilla.