what has happened to the oversight committees? have they been modernized? have they been given insight into nsa operations with the same kinds of tools and capabilities? the answer is no. and i think you're paying for it also on the judiciary side where now we changed the court system and create a special court instead of using the article 3 courts that could be used simply -- with the electronic services, programs that could eriesapproval to nsa quie within seconds. the thing about data, digital information, especially data that is generated by machines -- and that is a lot of what you do when you swipe a credit card, user easy pass == ezpass, machines, and estate your etc., alldress,

automatically, and you are going through your world whether your smartphone or your credit card, you are doing this hundreds of times a day, maybe. all ofue is nsa can use that to establish a profile. that is a good thing. why do you have to do it to hundreds of millions of innocent people? that is a problem. that is where i have a problem. i do not want to hurt nsa. i served 30 years there. and it is a needed capability to keep us safe, but my goodness, we need to observe the three legs of the government, the legislative process, to the judiciary, as it was always intended. we do not need to say that we are at perpetual war and can never go back to a democratic visible. we need to get away from that. >> and that is on the idea that there's a lot of information that is limited to the dish it

-- to the leadership. i can only speak to what i've that is really quite only for sensitive operations. abbotobad --aid on when you're talking about the kinds of things from the surveillance nsa does, those are briefed in detail. thisu have watched oversight process, so do you feel like congress has the technical understanding to be able to oversee something like nsa programs >> they either have it or can get it. i do not think that is the problem. i think the oversight process is broken in significant ways, and i think we can see it in the response to the snowden disclosures. were -- we did a science expect to test the oversight process.

as bob says, the intelligence oversight committees were fully briefed on the programs that were disclosed by this note in. the idea desk by snowden. the idea that the committees should serve as a proxy for the congress and the public as a whole. they are giving access to things that the rest of us are not allowed to see. but when snowden hit that system over and made that information available to a broader cross-section of congress and the public, the response shows that the committees were not serving as a proxy for the larger congress. there is a firestorm of opposition and concern, outrage, efforts to change the policy. theknow, it is true that legislative attempt to change failed, but it failed because we no longer in live in a system where majority rules. they only got 58 votes out of 100. you need a super majority now to

change policy it seems. at any rate, the point is that the oversight committees are not accurately representing the full spectrum either of congressional of public opinion. >> i want to say that is especially true on the conservative side for whatever reason. in a house, you have a very strong libertarian caucus, who have some of the strongest voices against surveillance. there are zero members of that on the oversight committee, and i think that shows one of the limits of having a select committee, where the leadership -- >> that is not right. there are members of the house intelligence committee who are quite on the libertarian side. i have been interrogated by them. i prefer not to lie. i have been interrogated by then. i can assure you. >> gerund, you have had a chance

chanceon, you have had a to look at this. how do you rate the adequacy of the current oversight mechanism? >> the board is the new kid on the block any oversight arena, and the opening that we are newly invigorated, newly existing. would say integrated. we do not exist. the board in its current form is an independent agency and only came into existence in the fall of 2012 when four of our board members were confirmed, and her heirman was confirmed, and started the job for days before the snowden leaks. we were immediately thrown into this arena and spent its first year of having five board members starting with just a couple of months of staff,

looking at the section 215 telephone records program as well as the section 702 program, which has often been referred to as prism. diveas able to do a deep investigating into both programs and providing a fresh independent look at those programs. we hoped that that will continue be a productive role and a continuing part of the oversight arena. we are situated somewhat differently than the committees and congress as part of the executive branch. so some of those conversations can be easier in terms of the deliberative process privileges that flow within the executive branch. and so far so good. i think we are trying to establish a productive relationship as we move forward with these studies. we found that all of the agencies that were operating the programs were very responsive to our requests.

allfive board members and of our staff are fully cleared to the top levels, so we had access to all the classified information relevant to the program. at the end of the day, the board came out somewhat differently on the programs, with the section 215 or graham. the majority of the board found that program was not properly authorized by the section 215 statute. commended ending the program. with the section 702 prism program, they came to a different conclusion, that that program fit within the statutory authorization. also with the effect of it this -- the effectiveness of the 215 program. the majority viewed that it was not sufficiently effective to justify the program. a different conclusion with regard to the 702 program. the board found it was an effective program. we look forward to moving forward as an important part of this oversight round. >> as you rate system, how would

you gauge the adequacy of the current system? >> i do not know we are in a place to rate the overall oversight structure. i think it is important to have these different roles as you look at it. intelligence community has a lot of operations. it is hard to have a window into everything that is going on. so -- >> ok. well, another key part of thisut ability process is notion of transparency, and bob the fairly sort of large number of documents the government has put out in the wake of the snowden revelation. i wonder if stephen and sharon could guide us through this sense of what role transparency place in the oversight process. >> right now transparency is a

significant barrier to effective oversight. it impedes canoe cajuns -- it impedes indications between the intelligence community and its oversight bodies, between the bodies and the public, between the intelligence community and the public. a few examples.lots of criticism in the senate intelligence committee report on cia interrogation, that they were incomplete,dequate, incorrect information. that is not the way things are supposed to work. the department of justice inspector general, in a report last month, said he had submitted several reports for the classification and odni in 2013 and they were still not available. the basic oversight function of sharing information is impeded. say bob said the very

important thing that he and the dni have said before that in retrospect we would all have been better off if the intelligence community would have been more forthcoming about our surveillance program, authorities, and practices rather than letting snowden disclose them. and i do not think anybody would disagree with that at this point. but importantly, nobody says disclose, likeen the first fisa order on the verizon is this order, -- business or come nobody said that that was not legitimately classified under the executive order. it clearly did meet the criteria for classification. the problem is we have lots of information that is " properly classified," but that should be public. and the government 20 intelligence community, nobody

really has to find a good mechanism for distinguishing or isentangling what legitimately classified under the terms of the executive order from that information which should nevertheless be in the public domain. that is a major task that remains to be undertaken in secrecy reform. >> i would go further than that. i would say there's no enforcement mechanism for public classification. none. >> i want to pick up on the themes that steve was articulating there on declassification in the public interest. and the board in developing its report on the section 702 program i think had a very positive experience in that regard. so as the board looked into this program, a lot of information about how the program operated.

this was a program where the government was targeting non-americans located abroad, that may incidentally pick up the communications of americans and collect the content of communications. that was public. there was a lot of information out there based on the state of public disclosures and leaks and partial attempt at verification. so i think a very important role that the board's report played was being able to describe how the program operated and provide more detailed, and we then thought of interest declassification of a lot of facts about the operation. and we reached out to the relevant agencies. it was hard to do. and'sere against those he documents and the information, the first ever lateral request. usually a request comes from a member of the public or ae president, but this was

fellow agency in the executive branch making a lateral request for declassification recognizing that that that of its were properly classified in the first place, but now the current state of affairs with public debate going on there was a real public interest need to know more information. and where those lines should be drawn. and i think the people that we worked with started out a little bit suspicious and where he. -- wary. in a lot of put effort and we were able to engage in what was a very productive dialogue. a lot of people putting a lot of time to talk through what the board's request was. the board to not request that every detail of the program be declassified. you were certain operational details that we fully recognized needed to remain classified. a trend to provide a better picture. and talking through with the representatives of those agencies are they would say, well, that thing that you want to say, that would reveal

sources and methods, and then we might be into redraft something that they would be covered wall with. at the end of the day, and our report, which is the whole thing is almost 200 pages, there is a 60-page narrative the scrubby how the program operates according to one of my colleagues, over 100 newly staff, and i think that was a productive experience at how much that is a model for the future is going to vary. we fully recognize that there are a lot of programs out there that are -- that we are not going to be able to have that much declassified. there will be much more sensitive, there will be a lot more sensitive information that cannot legitimately be released. but hopefully it is a model that in some sense can be declassified, and i wanted to point out what i said before, the board's enabling statute includes that we are supposed to inform the public on our reports to the greatest extent

consistent with the protection of classified information. so we have that affirmative obligation to try to make our reports public while protecting because of that information, so it would really sink through that kind of worship that line be drawn in a way that the conversation is not necessarily always happening. >> i want to say, i actually agree, with most of what steve said. there is a provision wit regarding government order of presentation, which says information can be declassified, and that is the basis on which the dni ordered the d cause occasions a portion of the senate to committee report that was released. there is a practical problem here of resources. as sharon said, because occasion of their report requires a lot of time by a lot of people. >> how long? >> i cannot tell you, but there

were a number of -- and i cannot tell you because i do not know. but there were several -- >> i was wondering-- >> i do. intensive process was about a month where we were back and forth in a room -- >> but in involved several different agencies. because occasion is not easy. it is very resource intensive, and we do not have a lot of resources to devote to it. and to a great extent, those resources are driven, are driven to respond to outside pressures. we have thousands of foya lawsuits pending, and it makes it hard to step back and say, what do we think as a matter of good government in the public interest what ought to be released, because we just do not have the resources.to do it is something i feel very painful about it, because i would loved to step back and say these

are the things we need to have declassified. i just cannot find people to do it. >> i think when information --leaving aside the situation properly thing is classified, when something is not properly classified, say something is classified that conceals violations of law, which the order per bid -- order forbids --we have a first amendment. because vacation is a restraint on speech. there is a very compelling government interest, but there needs to be some -- one actually has to check. of the things that the senate report we keep referring to shows us is that, i mean, is a properly classified? if it was, then you can properly classify evidence of crime.

>> there is a difference between classifying something for the purpose of covering up illegal activity and cuts of buying something for legitimate national security reasons that happens to involve illegal activity. i can only speak from my own personal experience. a i have not seen a single instance in my personal expense of anything that has been classified for an improper purpose. there's a question that there's stuff that has been classified that could be embarrassing or otherwise harmful if it came out, but i have not seen it. >> kirk, in your spirits, have you seen that? >> when you customize something at nsa, because of the amount of information and data that is being turned and reviewed for intelligence purposes, is a pretty simple process, believe it or not. learns thel analysts rules of the game, and the rules are pretty general in terms of

severity of damage to the country if anything is linked or gets out that the public. so maybe one or two bank people are involved in cause of buying a report issued by nsa. out,s bob litt has pointed to declassify it is almost an act of god, and it is a difficult -- difficult. just going back for a moment on the issue of the adequacy of oversight. added last night that hopefully all of you knows, -- notice. -- noticed. one new bit of legislation describing something called 09 wasn 3 introduced into the legislation that takes away due process from united states citizens under the

guise of mass surveillance. the other thing that happened was the constraints that the congress, the house in particular, had already put into place last summer to constrain nsa were conveniently snatched out in the moments before vote. that, i think, serves to indicate that oversight is terribly, terribly broken. so i have no idea what the second thing you are referring to is on the first thing -- >> none of us do. guest: i do not know what you are talking about. i could talk about the airline which is not part of the appropriations bill. it is in the intelligence authorization bill, and it absolutely does not do what people have said it does. it does not give any authority to the nsa to do anything.

what it does in fact, it imposes restrictions on the -- on surveillance. what it says is when you collect information about americans, regardless of the authority you collect it under, whether it is under fisa or any other authority, you must limit the retention of that. i do not know why people that to give authority to nsa. >> if i'm referring to the correct position, i think it imposes minimization guidelines that occur across the authority, including 1233. that can include ratifying 1233 3. 12333 collection has been around a long time. this does not tell nsa you can do something you cannot do before.

it says if you are doing what you are already doing, you have recessions. point, andrimary waitwill be debated, why until the last moment in the heat of an omnibus spending bill to do this kind of thing? it is very disingenuous. >> is actually in the senate committee intelligence committee's version. it was not in the house bill. it was put in the conference -- the consent of conference bill that was passed through. >> i wanted to go back to the earlier discussion about the classification and the challenges and time it takes. one of the board's for him dacians in its first report -- first recommendations into 15, going forward now that we have had this conversation about the importance of transparency and a

better understanding of where those lines need to be drawn, that when the fisa court decides a case involving a novel legal issue or application of technology, the judges can draft an opinion with an eye toward a classified version. they have already started doing this. thisey think going forward is something that could be valuable to the public to see on this legal issue and can drafted to the specific facts and the operational methods are easily be blackedand can out that that will facilitate the process so it will be easier to proactively declassify those kinds of documents. add that thest intelligence authorization bill also includes a provision calling on the dni to provide recommendations on how the because occasion process could

be improved. more money, more people. >> that is one answer, but there has to be a better answer than that. if you follow the demand for declassification, there is a new issue almost every day. yesterday senator levin on the senate floor said there is a cia letter about -- concerning a meeting in product. can we see it? can we see the underlying information? perfectly reasonable request. the day before there was a resolution introduced by senator udall saying we want to see the records of the cia covert action mid-1960'sa in the associated with the coup there. there is increasing demand, non-effortless -- nonfrivolous request, and it is incapable of funny to those requests.

whatever the way of doing exists right now, and needs to be upgraded and approved. >> and i say in all seriousness, in others but i have for you, i would welcome the opportunity to sit down with you and get your thoughts-- >> i would welcome the opportunity to give you my thoughts. >> it is a deal. >> can i come? [laughter] >> you are all invited. >> i prefer a somewhat different format. >> i think the crucial step is of the the issue outside originating office or the originating agency. if i do to cia and i asked the cia for a cia document, they go into a defensive crouch. they are protective. they are looking out for their .wn interests

that is their first priority. if the decision is taken out of cia or nsa or out of whatever is the originating agency is and given to a body that has a broader cross-section of interests, even if i am not saying i should be on it, but i am saying it if somebody has a broader vision, a broader perspective, a broader understanding of what the national interest might justify, then you are likely to get a different result. and i think that would be a useful step for requests of a certain magnitude or urgency or public interest. >> yeah. i mean, i think the just addition of the effective order is that the original authority has the greatest expertise. delegated tots make the decision.

director brennan, if it is the cia. yes, there is expertise, but there is also the highest possibility of conflict of interest. and so broadening it is really important for that reason. want to circle back to a point that bob and steve had hit thehen you're talking about briefings to congress and sort of how that process goes. i was wondering if katherine and bob could help us understand the issue here. when it comes to congressional oversight come as we saw with the release of the snowden documents, there were varying degrees of understanding in congress of what nsa was doing. then it tapered off from there. programs,nse, certain congressional staff are not brought in. them often they have

the greatest expertise in helping lawmakers who have -- to better understand the particulars of an issue, particularly technical ones. catherin katherine, if you could talk about what the issues are there. on the assumption that the intelligence committees imr to get a fair amount of information, specifically to specific lawmakers, but the staff of the intelligence committees and some other committees also have equities there. >> i will begin by giving the obama administration to complement. i think that as bob said earlier, there are fewer programs that have -- the full intelligence committee now than there were in and last administration, i think. it is not quite true that the intelligence committees know everything about the snowden disclosures. senator feinstein said she did not know things about 12333.

senator wyden said he has not come close to getting to the bottom of it. the disclosures helped spark a senate investigation into 12333 action. senator wyden had to burst get answers privately on the number of backdoor searches under 702. the fbi does not currently collect that number for reasons i did not fully understand. committee have the most information. there is less information to members of outside committees. there is less information to staff. this is aon of staff, supreme court decision. the court says that members of congress cannot function without

-- but intelligence matters that are so complex and technical, they are sometimes expected to do so, and it does not work. this is especially acute in the house, i think, but both the house and the senate have a rule that personal office staff curses.old top secret only committee staff can. that means there are members of the house intelligence committee that have no staff on the issue. practice members of congress like to have their own staff. exert ae chairperson's high degree of control over the committee staff. my he is on the committee. -- >> he is on the committee. staffere doesn't have a that can get the briefing.

i would say the bigger problem from what you mentioned is that personal staff cannot get the highest level of clearances means that members of congress who don't fit on the -- thegence committee judiciary committee has a certain level of staff. if you do not sit on one of those committees you will not have a staffer that has a direct relationship with you, who was cleared to that highest level. with regard to the to 15 health and records program, where the intelligence committees were fully briefed. if you don't sit on one of those committees eu as a member of congress would have to go yourself ---- go in if you don't sit on one of those committees as a member of congress you would have to go in yourself. as bob mentioned, director cap or said we should have been more

transparent about the scope of and what we were expecting it to do, what we interpret it to uncover. if you can have members of , access to that toormation, you may need have some stuff in there and have a greater level of transparency about the rules. and that maybe some of the -- the public non-operational details would be confined to these people that are fully cleared with the intel. do not have a lot of sympathy for the complaint that members of congress like to have their own personal staff. there are a lot of things i would like to have as well. there are 40 members on the house intelligence committee, 40 members on the house committee, and the

armed services committee. there are an awful lot of staff members with clearances. on the 215 and 702 programs, before these statutes were reauthorized we offered briefing to all members where we would come in and fully explain the program. we had eight house members who showed up for the briefing. i agreed this is important stuff. if members of congress cannot take the time to learn about the intelligence activities, i guess about half past oversight being worse than not letting them in the door at all. you may be able to tell that this is something i feel strongly about. >> i would like to respond to that. there is no question that members of congress off the oversight committee, just by by askingust questions, can make a difference.

there is a congressman that would never be allowed near it. >> but he did show up for the briefing. >> he engages. some of it is will. the numbers bob just gave compare that to the size of the intelligence community. recommendations. just one issue because it is newsy and came up in our conversation. curious what the panel thought of mark udall's impassioned recommendation on wednesday to have the declassification of the inspector general's report on allegations that the cia was improperly accessing the senate

that officers improperly accessed, particularly on this network having to do with the investigation into the agencies in the interrogation program. i am curious what the view is of the classifying something like that. that would be perhaps an area where transparency would be thatng to accountability we also assess how difficult it could be to classify. >> it ought to be declassified. there may be privacy considerations of the individual that deserve to be protected. it is an issue of constitutional significance, separation of and it is an example

where the agency that has the most immediate interests should not be the one making this decision as to whether or what gets declassified. >> i think it should be declassified. i did not have time to get speech into the conference materials. you may see me handing it out in the halls later. senatore sequel to feinstein's speech in march. i think it is a lesson of what when oversight takes place in the open. since their speech, two things have changed. the department of justice has decided it will not prosecute the staffers that wrote the torture report. the report will not be suppressed. those are very important things.

that is a huge relief. as getting answers on what happened in march, we are no further than where we were. i'm not going to read but it basically says that getting stonewalled by the cia, i think that is going to keep happening unless that is released. , but sunshine on it, get it out there, let's find out what is going on it. that is what oversight is. there is a real importance to oversight being conducted independently without interference. i cannot speak to this context at all. aboutm not going to talk the specific document.

i would note there is skill pending and accountability for the cia, which is being chaired by the former members of the senate intelligence committee and is investigation by the sergeant at arms. i think it is important to get .t all out i generally favor that. .> there was a news report sergeant of arms investigation had ended. there was earlier talk of recommendations, are there any other recommendations? >> we can talk about those off-line.

it would use up the rest of this panel today. benefit in establishing as many points as among the different parties that are concerned here. thepress, the public, congressional committees that are not represented on this panel, the executive branch. i see him or hear him or see him moreing in public frequently than any of his counterparts in other branches of government. i would like to express appreciation for that. i think it speaks well of him and his agency, and it helps clarify some of the issues. we need more interchange.

conferencean annual across the intelligence community each year. we invited steve to be one of our keynote speakers. i think he was very well received. he did not hold anything back. it is important for the lawyers to hear that's in the community. >> a local researcher. sure i have my memory correct. ayear ago a congressman gave talk here at cato and outlined the extreme difficulty in getting to these meetings where he could find the information that was legally required to be available to him. it clearly was a case where every effort was made to be scheduled at inconvenient times.

just check with him on that. in terms of the security, not the staff leave old -- staff it is an interesting story from baruch schneider. he was given access to some of undisclosed snowden papers for some period of time. there was a request by members of congress to come and briefed them on the details of some of these programs. the security clearances did not work out, even though the congress tried to find it out. he could have briefed that person. >> it there a question?

is the same issue that comes with foia. what do you really propose to do about this? you mentioned a mosh. >> i am stymied by the question, go ahead. >> i didn't do a short fellowship. one of the things i learned was how limited member time is area did -- is. suddenly i had to learn everything. that is as a staffer. when there is a trade agreement, hundreds of pages long, and the only way a member can read it is go down himself and read the eight hundred page document,

that does not work. he may not be able to discuss it with staff either. i do think it is essential. >> this is a question for bob. of the seven d congressional staff, i'm wondering how many of them have a technical background. there have been proposals to have a special advocate work for the fisa court. has reallycourt smart lawyers. my understanding is they do not have any staff. if you read the declassified opinions, it is clear this stuff is complicated. at various points in time they did not really understand how some of the programs were being implemented. specialu support a

advocate that was technical? would you support the fisa court and employing full-time technologists? the you believe these communities should have more technical staff advising them? idea what the technical background on the staff is. the usa freedom act, which we did support, contained a provision to allow the pfizer court to appoint technical experts to assist them in particular cases. i wish the freedom act has passed. we will see what happens in the next congress. madee oversight board recommendations along those lines. turn -- wehould

don't need any legislation enacted to do this to call on experts on their issues. i would imagine them getting clearances, and then they would have to take steps to make that happen. certainly something that board supported as well. >> i can see both sides of the issue. if they had not spent so much time making a less than credible argument, it would not be such a concern. >> we can agree to disagree on that. >> i want to know if you have any special insight on fbi oversight. i have some concerns about nsa. steve mentioned the id reports, one of those happened to be that 215 report, which did not come

out before usa freedom was voted on. tag the source of their data, some of which comes from nsa, which nsa has had to do since 2009. nsa is required to do, the fbi is not required to do, yet they are the ones throwing people in jail. >> we made a policy choice after 9/11. separate mastic intelligence agency. the choice was made that we are going to keep it in the fbi. that does not necessarily mean pertainsn agency that to intelligence and law enforcement. every commission that has looked at every terrorist attack has said we need a greater flow of information back and forth.

because the fbi is part of the department of justice, i do not have the same visibility or oversight. the problems are much more complicated because of the dual functions. thank you. >> i have a question. last year your boss did intentionally obfuscate a question that he later acknowledged that was clearly erroneous. what would you say to the millions of americans around the overry concerned with policing and their exposure to hypervigilant justice, so severe that unarmed people were being murdered in the streets with impunity while officials paid taxpayer dollars to commit crimes. whether it is your boss lying to

impunity when there is to the operations without legal consequence, what is your message to the communities? do know something about directive clapper. a chancenow if you had to read the letters to the new york times. it is wrong to say he lied. even a dog knows the difference between being tripped and being kicked over. cuttingans you are false intentionally. i -- da i the di before and actor that. hearing. a i can't hear what you are saying. >> the question is did he do it

in public before the disclosed -- before the disclosure? he didn't. we talked about this immediately after the hearing. if you read his answer, you see he is clearly a 702 program -- clearly thinking about the 702 program. i had conversations about this. you essentially would have to reveal the program that was still classified. it was wrong and kind of annoying that people continue to repeat this statement that he lied. the difference between this and other things is there was not a crime committed here.

>> do you think it should have been handled differently? >> yes. what would have been the right way to do it would be sent a declassified letter to the committee, saying i miss spoke but i cannot reveal it on a public record. one of the things i regret in five-and-a-half years on the job is i do not advise them to do that. >> if there is public testimony there should be at least some public marker that there is a classified addendum to some testimony to that hearing. there shallem is not be classified programs and public hearings. >> you are probably ok. them a great panel.

i appreciated your comment a couple of moments ago that you thought additional transparency and additional expertise being provided was important. may i hope that you feel equally as strongly that it is important for the pfizer court to have special advocates, that was a provision in the very late stages of the freedom act negotiation. uncomfortable rumors worth traded away. be good in the coming debate to have your endorsement. >> i think the house bill had a provision for special advocates, it just had a civic -- a different threshold. there was any likelihood that it was going to be traded away.

at least not by the administration. i have no idea what will happen with this next bill in congress. from my perspective would like to see that bill introduced and passed. the bill as a whole. >> yellow shirt. >> i wanted to follow-up with the usa freedom act. while many of the provisions require action by congress, other provisions, notably government transparency requirements and permitted committee reporting, could be enacted by the administration, which has endorsed the bill today. do you thinkg,

that the administration should on itsthose provisions own as opposed to waiting for congressional action? >> i guess i always feel uncomfortable talking about what the administration may or may not be considering. i think that should be kept under wraps until a decision is made. >> hello. i will like to ask if we trust our national security information with the israelis and the british. we do not allow 10 year for a political professor. how do we decipher that to i don't get it. why would a person teaching at a

u.s. institution not be trusted more than an israeli or british agent? >> assuming that is directed and me, i to not know about the fact you're talking about enough to offer an opinion. >> gentleman in the back. >> i am daniel schuman with crew. >> can you speak a little louder? >> can you all hear me? this is directed to other members of the panel. major speeches by both the chairman and former chairman of the intelligence committee, where they raised a number of concerns in the context of the torture report. providethe cia extensive amount of inaccurate information but the operation program and its effectiveness to the white house, doj, congress,

inspector general, and the american public. senator rockefeller, the former chair, said the study is the breakdown of our system that allows the cover meant to deviate in such a way. one of this was through meaningful congressional oversight. this is the former chair of the senate intelligence community. it is clear the briefings you refer to or -- referred to earlier were not meant to answer any questions and were intended to provide coverage to the cia. these statements were made in the context of the torture report.

would you dress questions of credibility in the intelligence community? particularly when you have the former chairman of the communities saying themselves it was less than credible, misleading both to themselves and their overseers within the executive branch. to directorefer you brendan's remarks yesterday. add -- id like to understand where the question is coming from. would be reluctant to paint the intelligence oversight committee as heroes or victims. they have a lot to answer for themselves that they have not attempted to address. they are the ones writing the checks for the one -- for where we have been for the last couple of dozen years.

i think that is a serious defect on their part. why not ask why did we not to do a better job? and why weren't we in a better position to compensate for that? >> they did get accurate briefings and they did get shut out. the criticism of intelligence oversight and that period was this started coming out to the press. senator feinstein did not get briefed on the program until a bushours before president

talked about a. a rockefeller did try to investigate. i don't think he pursued it as strongly as he could. pat roberts shut it down. i think it goes to show the intelligence community -- the intelligence committee contains multitudes. this is why differences in the leadership changes. if you increase the individual powers of the committee and congress, ask for oversight. that means that you don't not want to rest in the hands of one person, whether there is

oversight or not. >> we have time for one more question. >> i am with the washington post. not to gang up on you, bob. >> i knew what i was getting and four. >> about bulk collection. president obama made clear that his preference would be to have the government and the bulk collection of phone metadata, and he asked congress to work with him on it so far. it is a year later, still no progress. what obstacles are there to the administration moving on its own administratively to end that collection of phone metadata now on its own? would be preferable to have that enshrined in the legislation. why can't you move it now to do that?

what obstacles are there? >> if you go back to what the president said, he said he would collection the boko and replace it with something that provides the same operational utility without having the bulk collection. without legislative reform, we cannot do something. >> we believe this conference for live coverage of the u.s. house. this is a scheduled pro forma ascension -- perform a session. -- pro forma session. the speaker pro tempore: the house will be in order. the chair lays before the house a communication from the speaker. the clerk: the speaker's rooms, washington, d.c., december 12, 2014. i hereby appoint the honorable luke messer to act as speaker pro tempore on this day, signed, john a. boehner, speaker of the house of representatives. the speaker pro tempore: the prayer will be offered by our chaplain, father conroy.

chaplain conroy: let us pray. dear god, we give you thanks for giving us another day. bless the members of the people's house as they depart the nation's capital to return to their homes. may they find rest and renewal during their time with family and friends. bless our nation as the holy days of he religious traditions for so many of our citizens approach and as the year comes to a close. help us to look to the future with hope, committed to a renewed effort to work together as citizens of the united -- of a united america. help us all to be truly grateful for the blessings of this past year and as always, we pray that whatever is done this day be for your greater honor and glory. amen. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to section 3-a of house

resolution 775, the journal of the last day's proceedings is approved. the pledge of allegiance will be led by the gentleman from texas, mr. culberson. mr. culberson: please join me in the pledge. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. the speaker pro tempore: the chair lays before the house a communication. the clerk: the honorable the speaker, house of representatives, sir, pursuant to the permission granted in clause 2-h of rule 2 of the rules of the u.s. house of representatives, the clerk received the following message from the secretary of the senate on december 11, 2014, at 11:07 p.m., that the senate passed, without amendment, house joint resolution 130. signed sincerely, karen l. haas.

the speaker pro tempore: the house -- the chair lays before the house a communication. the clerk: the honorable the speaker, house of representatives, sir, pursuant to the permission granted in clause 2-h of rule 2 of the u.s. house of representatives, the clerk received the following message from the secretary of the senate on december 12, 2014, at 10:34 a.m., that the senate passed without amendment h.r. 3096, h.r. 4771, h.r. 5057, that 3008, te passed senate senate 2338, senate 2983. appointment national committee on vital and health statistics, public health safety medal of valor review board. signed, sincerely, karen l. haas. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to clause 4 of rule 1, the following enrolled joint resolution was signed by the speaker on thursday, december 11, 2014. the clerk: house joint

resolution 130, making further continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2015 and for other urposes. the speaker pro tempore: for what purpose does the gentleman from texas seek recognition? mr. culberson: i ask unanimous consent that the committee on appropriations be discharged from further consideration of house joint resolution 131 and ask for its immediate consideration by the house. the speaker pro tempore: the clerk will report the title of the joint resolution. the clerk: house joint resolution 131, joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2015 and for other purposes. the speaker pro tempore: is there objection to the consideration of the joint resolution? without objection, the joint resolution is engrossed, read a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. for what purpose does the gentleman from texas seek

recognition? mr. culberson: i ask unanimous consent to take from the speaker's table the bill s. 2338 and ask for its immediate consideration in the house. the speaker pro tempore: the clerk will report the title of the bill. the clerk: an act to re-authorize the united states anti-doping agency and for other purposes. the speaker pro tempore: is there objection to the consideration of the bill? without objection, the bill is read a third time. and passed -- a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. the speaker pro tempore: for what purpose does the gentleman from texas seek recognition? >> mr. speaker, i ask unanimous consent to take from the speaker's table the bill s. 3008 and ask for its immediate consideration in the house. the speaker pro tempore: the clerk will report the title of the bill. the clerk: senate 3008, an act to extend temporarily the period f protection for mortgages and

other purposes. the speaker pro tempore: is there objection to the consideration of the bill? without objection, the bill is read a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider is laid n the table. for what purpose does the gentleman from texas seek recognition? >> mr. speaker, i send to the desk a privileged concurrent resolution and ask for its immediate consideration. the speaker pro tempore: the clerk will report the concurrent resolution. the clerk: house concurrent resolution 125, resolved that when the house adjourns on any legislative day from friday, december 12, 2014, through wednesday, december 31, 2013, on a motion pursuant to this joint resolution, it stand adjourned until 1:00 p.m. on friday, january 2, 2015, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first, and that when the house adjourns on the legislative day of friday, january 2, 2015, on a

motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by the majority leader it stand and that when die the senate recesses or adjourns on any day from friday, december 12, 2014, through friday, january 2, 2015, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its majority leader or his designee it stand adjourned sine die or pursuant to any reassembly pursuant to section 206 this resolution whichever occurs first. section 2, the leader of the house may eninstruct the members of the house to gather at such a time if the public interest shall warrant it. pursuant to ling

this, the house shall again stand adjourned pursuant to the first section of this concurrent resolution. section 3-a, the majority leader of the senate or his designee after concurrence of the minority lead eof the senate shall notify the members of the senate to reassemble at such place and time as he may designate if, in his opinion, the public interest shall warrant it. b, after reassembling pursuant to subsection when the senate adjourns on a motion offered by the majority leader or his designee the senate shall stand adjourned pursuant to the first section of this concurrent resolution. the speaker pro tempore: without objection, the concurrent is agreed to and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. for what purpose does the gentleman from texas seek recognition? mr. flores: i ask unanimous consent when the house adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at noon on tuesday, december 16,

2014, unless it sooner has received a message from the senate transmitting its concurrence in the house concurrent resolution 125 in which case the haas shall stand adjourned pursuant to that concurrent resolution. the speaker pro tempore: without objection, so ordered. the chair lay tpwhevers house a communication. the clerk: the honorable the speaker, house of representatives, sir, pursuant to section 1238-b--3 of the 2001,authorization act of amended by division p of the consolidated appropriations resolution of 2002, 22 u.s.c. 1601, i am pleased to appoint mr. michael wessel of falls church, virginia, to the commission. thank you for your attention to this matter, signed sincerely

nancy pelosi. the speaker pro tempore: the chair lays before the house a communication. the clerk: honorable the speaker, house of representatives, sir, pursuant to section 3-b of the public safety medal of hon valor act, i am pleased to appoint mr. brian fingell to the medal of valor review board. thank you for your attention to this appointment. signed sincerely, nancy pelosi, democratic leader. the speaker pro tempore: for what purpose does the gentleman from texas seek recognition? mr. flores: mr. speaker, pursuant to the order of the house today, i move that the house do now adjourn. the speaker pro tempore: the question is on the motion to adjourn. those in favor say aye. those opposed, no. the ayes have it. the mollings is agreed to -- the motion is agreed to. accordingly, pursuant to the previous order of the house today the house stands adjourned until noon on tuesday, december 16, 2014, unless it sooner has received a message from the senate transmitting its adoption

of house concurrent resolution 125. in which case the house shall stand adjourned pursuant to that concurrent >> the house gaveling out of this pro forma session. voted for the 1.1 train dollar omnibus spending bill. that may be passed at some point this weekend. senate lawmakers have been debating programs and policies. the spending bill is expected to and later. the 114th congress will convene in full for the first time at noon on january 6 of next year. to bring you the house alive when they gavel back in here on c-span. coverageed to live for of the day long conversation on

surveillance issues. next is a panel on limiting surveillance. >> you have seen stories about apple and google moving to default encryption. there was a mention of governments bulk of -- bulk collection of data. there have been moves by advocates to challenge the constitutionality of bulk collection and the laws underlying some of these programs. these are just a few of the ways responsewe see various to concerns that have been raised, in particular after the disclosures by edward snowden last year. some of the exceptional capabilities we have seen in

breaking into what we thought it secure means of communications. julian mentioned the array of expertise we have here. i will briefly introduce everyone. we would like to launch in our discussion of keeping it free-flowing as possible. encouraged to jump in. we will leave time for questions and answers pre-it without further do we have the senate 's chief counsel on security. elizabeth is a public advocate advocater -- and legal for the senate of justice -- for the center for justice. is google's director for law enforcement and national

security matters. we look forward to hearing from him about what google has done to promote surveillance laws. the project frontier foundation has challenged the constitutionality of several surveillance programs at is trying to build grassroots awareness about privacy issues. and matthew green is a cryptographer who teaches and conducts research in privacy enhancing techniques at john hopkins university. richard, why don't you launch by telling us about google's efforts to promote privacy, limit surveillance -- eric efforted the encryption on the data centers. i am curious, did you do that in response to snowden's disclosures? referring to is increasing data, it goes from one google data center to the other google data center. some of you may particularly

recall the stories about the collection of data from between those data centers. mentioned, during the aesentation, that was shocking moment that we learned it was happening. >> what was your personal reaction? that personal reaction was it was pre-shocking to receipt -- it was pretty shocking to see this was happening. i know what that front door is, i man that front door. it would have been nice if they had used the legal but -- legal mechanisms that are available. my reaction is, what is this about? it was somewhat confusing. i know leadership in the company was flat on outraged by it.

google actually started about a year before, including the data between the data centers. of thisuse they knew particular kind of collection that was going on, but because it was the right thing to go -- to do. you try to secure your data, where are the vulnerability points? here is a potential vulnerability point. there's no reason to think it would be exploited. let's clean it up. let's get it in crypt it. a year before the first batch of snowden revelations came out we had already started in cryptic the data centers. it looks at it is really happening. up the efforts to encrypt that. it is no longer a point of the collection of data. >> but that is not all.

>> that is not it. the first reaction, when we saw the stories come out, was a bit of confusion about what are these flyovers we are seeing. why is our local flashed on them? -- our logo flashed on them? it was a little baffling to figure out. once we kind of got an idea of what this was, mostly from the press -- almost exclusively from the press -- we felt the first thing we needed to do was clear of the misunderstandings about google and its relationship with government asking us for data, which is a very arm's-length. was howt focus we had can we be open about things we are not allowed to talk about? this goes back to the classification discussion. we were very big on the right to be transparent with the users.

we ended up in court, in the fisa court, with the justice department tried to get the right to be transparent. kind of like where we are with our criminal requests. some of you are aware of the transparency report companies have. publishedears we had staff on the kernel side. we wanted to expose that to the national security. another big effort was trying to be transparent. there is all the other stuff that we are doing, and that i think other folks are more familiar with. side are trained to approve more authorities. my knowledge of how the hill works stars in and with schoolhouse rock. day-to-day,uld say but the more rude and nice to is looking at the

requests that are coming in, making sure they are valid, that they are scoped correctly, we thattarting to see things are uncomfortable and questionable in the law. if necessary, getting them to the court and providing them. thenological, legislative, courts are part of our responsible handling of the use reports. thing is you moved through default encryption on your new android operating system. you move -- it is a move privacy advocates have been calling for years. you could be doing -- if you it, why doing more on not do more on encryption? >> certainly when you get to -- as you mentioned,

phones are the new android operating system, where you enter a pin code or a swipe code. it will be default encrypted. -- if lose it, if you get it gets stolen. the criminal will have a lot of trouble trying to figure out what can of data is on there. that is a good security data measure for all of us to have. it is a common experience when you go through the moment of panic of where is your phone. that is to help reduce the impact. companies like google are always looking at their product. this is a product that makes sense. will that refute some future if you do it? is there other technological problems with it? it towardsard about

more encrypted secure communications. dependent onll companies to protect the privacy of users through encryption. what if things should change? with every new video of hostage and beheading showing up on youtube, and if the government appeals to your sense of pay forsm, they will your assistance. what guarantee do customers have that google will move in the and not bevacy retrenching? >> that is a good question.

google is much reliant on users trusting we are going to do the right things with the user's data. it fits with the culture of the company and how the products are offered. folksing that does help have some trust in the provider is if the provider is telling them what their experience with government is. you could be watching what the companies are doing. maybe somebody will notice it and record it. company is not making it available information available for you is a company that will have an easier time shifting to a model that you might be uncomfortable with. some of this is making it hard

to make a move area >> it is great to see the markets expanding in this way and adding protections the customers are demanding. my concern is that as folks know very well, the markets will only the when the consumers have information they need to make informed choices. until snowden consumers had no information about what kinds of programs countries can be pulled to. it is because of them that market is now working. there are new interpretations of .uthorities and new programs we cannot necessarily rely on markets to be the solution. public good.a protecting it will require regulation.

>> the secrecy piece to this makes it worth it. we were allowed to be transparent about really early on. we got into lengthy negotiations. frankly it made it easier for us to make an argument to extend it. so.ere able to do i agree that once you get a world of secret all, we have trouble. we have opinions interpreting laws that are passed by congress. you don't even know what those interpretations are.

we have to keep our eye on that. took a week to discover what the secret interpretations were. is that good for our society? richard spoke about some of the encryption protocols. what can technologists do to ensure companies are moving forward in that area? >> we have a few different things that are happening right now. there is a lot of technological development that has the capability to make communications and secure devices and ways we have not been able to do before. if you are interested in downloading stop -- demoing software. you can probably obtain that

software. how many of you encrypt your e-mails voluntarily? that is an amazingly high number. how many of you are lying? it is reasonable. how many of you use apple i message to send text? it is not even that high of a number. we now rely on centralized providers like google and apple to take that technology, which is very poorly deployed. happen process doesn't or circumvented, which is something that has also been happening, there is not much we can do about it. unfortunately we have these .reat technological solutions

>> i think it is absolutely right. the security benefits are just tremendous. we certainly have seen complaints from the law enforcement side of government that holds particular equity as unique around encryption. the benefits you get from having communications in the security and safety of your data that comes with that are just tremendous. other parts are encouraging people to use encryption. it is encouraging thing to see. something that was also discussed in the second panel today in law enforcement and the fbi director has

and googlehat apple are aiding and abetting terrorists and criminals. he urged congress to come up with legislation that would enable law enforcement to obtain access to customer's data when law enforcement hasn't worked. do you see any way to accommodate the need of law enforcement to get that data, while at the same time preserving your customers privacy? >> there is a very clear cost in trying to serve whatever need the director thinks needs to be served there. you have these devices that when they are turned off, they are encrypted. they are very secure in that way. you don't have backdoors for it. there are knows what -- no ways

of getting into that thing. it is very secure. you don't expect somebody else to have a secret key to be able to get the equities of some stakeholder out there. we really have to take a look at what are the costs of doing this , and what are you trying to solve for? what are the cases in which your phone is going to be in a locked state where you can't reach the key to unlock it, and is it to create this emergency situation. it will be in place for some framework. the technicalbout vulnerabilities that get inserted when you back door into

>> do you see a way to ccommodate those or is it impossible? >> nothing is impossible. you can build a back door or front door. while preserving the data security. >> you can build back doors into anything. the question is can you preserve the security of the original device. you cannot do it. you can build a system where apple or google has the master as long ou can assume as that key is very well secured, as long as you have a monitoring to present employees from misusing the keys protections then maybe you can achieve something the is almost as secure as original unweakened device. assumptions. of you are taking something that is designed to be as secure as will be almost as good if we assume things and

very hard to believe in if you are building complex systems. the extent you can address that question, can you think of try to answer jim's , some or needs legislation that would get what want? i know they started to have discussions on a fact level with hill. what can you say about that? concrete n't seen any legislative promises from anyone on this. extraordinarily complex legally, technologically. they are starting to look but there is nothing concrete at this point. that this notion to get back to first principles it is not just question of how do we get the government access to this information. the government has access to the encrypted. and it is

does the government have a right it may have a warrant to get to you maintain information in a particular easily hat makes it accessible to the government. had that.never you have never been required to maintain your information in a that is easier for law enforcement. so, why should have to do that terms of the communication or information that you process smart phone is beyond me. that would be a new -- it is an analogy of the freedom of information act. you get to ask the government but you don't get to ask them to create new information. encrypted can get our records. but to require us to maintain way -mails in a particular so the government can see it is new of stepping over a line, i think, unless i'm using

analogy. >> they are saying the companies that provide the technology are it.ones that have to do you have the right to use ncryption as long as it is not a major provider. >> a rationale is being used will is information and it take 20 years to break the encryption and during that time we don't have that luxury. be the same argument for a robust security system for the home. overnment shows one a warrant to sefplg your home and maybe you are a criminal or maybe you to not and you decide not open the door and you have a very robust security system and tkoyou can oeber imagine during that 20 minutes the ill the hostage, flush drugs, whatever it is. thing.d your pedophile i'm sorry, i'm not trying to be because of don't that require people to make their homes easier to break into everyone orcement and

else. >> there's been a response to senator wide n introducing legislation and legislationompanion that would bar the government from requiring companies to doors into those devices to enable surveillance. a good idea that is and stands any chance of passage? anyone wants to take a crack at that? .> it is a good idea it has a fer to -- if chance of passing. >> the provision you are the house o did pass over the summer. from the s stripped larger bill as it proceeded. i think that is instructive and interesting. more k there's been a lot

focus on this since then. it is interesting that that thouse before the recent discussions and it will a lot more discussion and how that debate will end i will not predict at this point. >> there's another challenge with saying people have to weak encryption and this was a battle in the 1990's on you could publish strong encryption and the courts code is speech and protected by the first amendment nd if somebody wanted to publish a strong encryption program they can and somebody download and use it. if you try to set up a system unlawful to have strong run against d will constitutional problems. >> i want to move on to the

and ask matt one uestion about vulnerability in software. ists have said it less secure.ernet hey have announced they have a new policy on disclosure of vulnerabilities that they say they favor disclosure, the default is toward a disclosure they withhold t only a small minority of when abilities and that they see vulnerabilities that to software that is in wide commercial use there are want to disclose and if it will be -- if it will only when it is of use n fortune intelligence investigation and that

disclose.y they will matt, what is the real cost to how ity here and where and should the line be drawn between rotection of national security and network security? >> one thing we don't know how do well is build secure software. we don't know how to make software -- we have no idea. it is not that there is a path don'tere to there that we want to spend enough monday to get from here to there. it is just that we have no idea make software that won't be vulnerable. we can reduce the number of vulnerabilities slightly but about it. ight now, we have this idea that you can create vulnerabilities and some of them are zero days which means they revealed to en anyone and not published. we know the government these.iles they are useful if you want to get in any system. there are probably multiple of any system you use. the question is should we

revent the government from usi using? we know we won't succeed at that. a certain amount hacking. but the real cost and worries me the most is that we have now created this economy around finding vulnerabilities in software where it is starting to take energy from the people who are out there trying to build more secure software. market where you can get hundreds of thousands of dollars for selling a ulnerability to the u.s. government and $10,000 if you are lucky from a manufacturer it.mixing what concerns me is not that hacking is going on because i foe it will lap -- know it will is becoming the default way of business and i has very long term bad effects for all of us and our networks. > from the public policy perspective liza do you see any response to that, any steps you try to change that

situation? >> it is part of the overall get enge of trying to public support in an area where of toechnological complexities that are hard for people to understand, hard for me to understand. i don't understand anything that you just said so there you go. huge challenge and one of the many challenges in terms public in some of these fixes because there's a the al sense of sort of n.s.a. is looking at more than at.would like them to look but there isn't the same understanding of why they are it, what they are doing with the data, what some of the negative effects and are.s it is a real issue of public education and trying to explain hat the public needs to be worried about and why. >> richard? government or n.s.a. aid we have found this

vulnerability and we would like to make sure you know about it? we have gone into that this will sound like i'm not answering but i am. vulnerability reports and ips all the time from a lot of sources and we love it. we have a program that we -- i don't know if we pay enough that it totally economy but we have a responsible buzz reporting to discover something you can tell us about it and get compensated when the product gets better. hat is a great program for the ethical tinkerer to find vulnerabilities. but we get tips from the attacks that we expect on our network, vulnerabilities that might have been discovered in protocols. and they are very much appreciated. >> about how many times would you say you get a tip?

fairly routine. the federal government has an to let potential victims know about vulnerabilities. secret thing. you get an e-mail with a warning on it oran take action the ones that are a little bit kind of broadcast you may get a classified briefing about a threat that the government may be willing to give to you and you can try to classified hat breaching. so there are sometimes we can given to us that way and we can fix our network. those are imperfect and that back to our discussion about secrecy and one of the having so much stuff classified and you heard other anelists talk about the complexities that come with that. staffers who won't hear about programs.

t also happens in tip situations, we will get a tip, to be able to understand it the overnment may be willing to give us some classified information. to get the tips but in some ways it burdens you because you get the information, allowed to actually tell everybody about it because it is in a classified format yet supposed to operationalize it. o it is another example of how classification can make things difficult for companies and inly and policy makers others i'm sure as well. can we turn to u.s.a. freedom and efforts to bring surveillance reform. do you want to start by xplaining briefly the provisions of the drafting process and what you see the forward with the new e ngress given that waoe

[inaudible] was forced to act. good news or bad? you heard a little bit of the u.s.a. of how the freedom act came about from this ssman matthew morning. i will pick up where he left off. last october, 2013, senator congressman sensenbrenner introduced the 2013.. freedom act of that bill definitively ended, collection nded the of americans' records under ection 215 of the u.s. patriot act and other authorities. it had a range of other reforms various surveillance authorities as well. as congressman matthew described the bill was taken up by the and the bill out of the house was significantly watered

down. many reforms were removed. but most critically there were the house ised that bill as passed although it bulkly was intended to end collection may not have done the job. groups like rivacy some of the ones represented on his panel and technology companies to pull their support from the bill. when it came over to the senate we took the may bill and looked at it and the leahy was to or try to bring those important take.olders back to the but he roecognized it was to maintain the intelligence community to have a real shot of getting it done. president had announced at this point that he supported collection and we thought it was something we could accomplish. others he was nd working with in the senate embarked on a really fun the course of r

the summer involving many hours with a whole ms range of stakeholders including lot of folks from the intelligence community and represented in this room, privacy groups, the technology ultimately in july introduced the u.s.a. freedom of 2014 which took the framework and structure of the ouse passed bill but improved upon it in various ways. will try to give you a brief ov overview without totally boring does.ne of what that bill then we can talk about it. > the most important thing is ending the bulk collection of american records. whichly under section 215 is what the phone records but the s based on statute that will previously to engage in bulk collection of internet metadata. longer happening.

security letters. this is an authority that judicial thout approval or review in advance records to be obtained by the government. based on the same relevant 215 and the is is we r authorities taught it was important to make sewer you can't use these letters for rity bulk collection as well. how did we do that? senator leahy's bill said that the government will to base its that would rms narr narrow, basically narrow the earch to the greatest extent reasonable and specifically said you can't use overbroad terms geographic area, city or state or name of service rovider to do the search or other similarly broad types of terms.

that was a key element. there are a number of other bill we think he reforms.eaningful one includes what was discussed n the last panel a panel of special advocates to argue before the foreign intelligence .urveillance court there was a provision that there but we wanted to make sure when the advocates came into court they had the and information that they needed to be effective. a provision that would allow for additional appellate court. in the fisa since 1978 when the fisa court was created there have been two of the lower court's decision. a really amazing statistic. we wanted to include a mechanism would create the opportunity for additional

review concerning the things the court has been reviewing the last decade the program being the prime example of that. leahy's bill also included provisions he was to the for related nondisclosure orders that come orders th section 215 and national security letters. there gets to transparency discussing.ve been when you receive a section 215 or fisa court order or national security letter it comes with something that says tell anybody about it. there have been federal court ecisions that have said that violates the first amendment as it is implemented in the current statute. provisions to address his and provide for meaningful after the fact judicial revenue of the gag orders. also a small but significant reform of section 702.

backdoor search fix that people have talked about which was an issue we on d not come to consensus but in is a smaller but 702.rtant fix to then, critically, given the conversation we have been having very important transparency provisions and here developed nken was and deserves a lot of credit. they came in two types. one is additional mandatory overnment reporting on a range of surveillance that really goes far beyond what is in statute today. institutionalizing that in statute is part of what is so giving t to continue tease debates. related to as company reporting and this would recipients of fisa orders theybility to say publicly received certain number of range f orders and something many of

the companies had worked very hard for. he most important provisions of the bill. there are a range of others. >> don't forget the transparency part. >> that is exactly right. another provision was providing declassification of fisa court opinions. sharon said on the last panel fisa court i the think is now realizing that and decisions have been classified and i think they are writing the opinions that makes for this to r happen but the bill would create he statutory structure for that. >> so you could not get the bill, you got to that point, you months, it was blood, sweat of peoplean got a lot on board and national security groups, to the privacy

pass.nd you couldn't >> what makes you think you have the republicans in control of both houses and you have got rising concern about the islamic state violence and threats to the homeland. makes you think you can get it past the finish line there next congress? a few things i would say. number one congress often event s an act enforcing and we have that. june 1, section 215 of the patriot act if nothing happens and no legislation is assed reverts to the version affecting 215 that existed before the original patriot act in 2001 was passed. is this sunset date coming. there is an expectation there a desire to move forward with legislation before then. also the coalition that was built around the u.s.a. freedom we had co-sponsors and great republican allies from

cruz, heller and all over the spectrum. whitehouse.bin the clu, brennen center, coalition is not going away. it is going to continue to be hard.ng very i think it will actually be a eally interesting process in the new congress under republican congressional leadership because the as i think aucus congressman the prime example today it is split on issue. coming into the senate we have two new republic senators of the original broader version of the u.s.a. freedom act. e heard from congressman matthew he's been talking to lou f the new republican house members and there will be a number of them in the civil

pro reform camp. i think that it will be a very 1 andsting run up to june i can't predict what will happen but i think we've got an road ahead. >> you did put together a broad there were t significant minority of advocates who opposed it because it didn't go far enough. you didn't get the ban on the loophole for 702. arcie has written where she opposed it. how do you as advocate, curt and you decide we something is good enough to support? what is your thinking in terms what battles are worth fighting and where are your red lines lines? give some examples and talk about that. >> sure. i'm more on the hit tkpwaeugs -- litigation side. we will look at legislation and

about ternal discussions whether it goes far enough and there is a tradeoff. passed and omething it doesn't go far enough it is harder to get the next thing to down the road. but if you don't get something passed things are status quo also a bad result. to be principled about it. a nd behind something that good thing that is not making compromises or compromising core values along the way. they evolve then we will not.rt it or >> what were some of the red lines, laura or lizliza? go on what chris said, in theory you would support any legislation that is an over the status quo but then in practice you will one bite at the

apple and you know that going into it. or us, certainly the question is do we think that there's a nontrivial chance we will get is theng better and that question that we ask. does there make significant improvement? assuming they are not as significant as we would like a m to be, do we have realistic chance and,to the under we fight to get the dditional improvements that we want. at the end of the day if we feel shot 't have a realistic we will support it because we are going to tell the truth about our reservations and bass we are in it -- because we are in it for the haul. ny bill that makes it worse even in one respect we would not want to support that. lines around red hings that may not make it worst but enshrine a principle that we have a problem with. bill that gine a

kraots a lot of improvements in surveillance but only for u.s. citizens in this country and people in this country would not be protected. the kind of something that is elf-discriminatory even though it is better. us. would be a red line for on balance you add these considerations and it was easy support the u.s.a. freedom absolute number of frank admissions by things it idn't do that we wish it did and things we welthink need to and there much things you would think we didn't try to like 702 and we will do with it later. laura, do you think the coming congress will start with freedom and do you see a chance to improve on it? o you think the prospect is

that it will actually be weake weakened are greater? do you think that this is something congress is not likely o act on until the very end until the sun sets upon them? > it is hard to know exactly how this will play out. still in session today and there are people rying to deal with the final days of this congress. there t year i'm sure will be a range of legislation in various directions. hard to imagine for toes who have been supporting reform t is hard to imagine doing something less than the u.s.a. freedom act given the broad that has supported that. but i can't predict how it is to play out. and whether for example in the be a bill that, what bill will be moved by the republican leadership.

i think in the house you will s you last year in the house and one is men leaving who was the care of the house intelligence committee and judiciary committee, it was the u.s.a. freedom act that moved to the house. what will be the vehicle in the senate. enator leahy and his cohorts will want it to be the u.s.a. freedom act. t is hard to know how it will proceed. >> kirk, tell us about some of the cases that you were involved in both the appeals level and lower court level. right now we are counsel in cases that are against the warrantless wire tapping program and gone records program. is at the appeals level. it was just argued before the circuit on december 8.

then we have two cases that are level.direct court actually filed was in 2008 long before the snowed the eaks but based on information available at that time from "new york times" and "u.s.a. today" reporting. actually an earlier case efore that against at&t for their cooperation with the warrantless wiretapping program. ut that was shut down by the congress's retroactive immunity amendments act. adds, we have two cases onsolidated on appeal dealing with the national security letter power mentioned the court, federal district court in san francisco ruled that that power was and struck it l down. decisiondge stayed her pending appeal and we just argued that in early october the five-on-one sector

court of appeals. multipleying >> so we're trying a strategy to try to get the courts to rule these programs are unconstitutional and try to unseat some of the legal series that the the government has been really relying on in the secret courts. one of the underlying problems are secret decisions in the secret courts that have interpreted statutes in ways that were not readily apparent from the language of the statute, stretching beyond i think the breaking point, and -- >> referring to section 215? >> i am. i think that the section 215, the language of that statute, relevant to an authorized investigation, when you interpret that relevancy to mean all the records of all the people for all of the time, you have written relevancy out of it. it means the same thing whether you have that statement or not. thatno