i think your, i take your point and agree with it that once you've got a world of secret law real trouble and that's one of the problems with thatisa court and the idea you could have opinions laws that are passed by a congress that presumably represents you but you don know what those interpretations are, they may and probably have deviated what wasally from intended. >> and it took a leak to force that transparency for the public finally understand what the secret interpretations were. and if that's the only way to reforms, is that good for our society. matt, richard spoke about the protocols. what can technologieses do

ensure that can help companies area.orward in that >> we have a few different things that are happening right now. of technological development for encryption protocols that has the to makety communications end to end secure, to cure devices in ways never been able to do before. if you're interested in software on your machine you can voluntarily obtain that software much what's lookrning is that if you at the, let me throw this out to the audience. how many much you encrypt your e-mail voluntarily, manned hands. number,n amazingly high how many of you are lying? how many of you use apple i to send texts to other people? really, so that's really we're. not what i expected. is a problem is

that we now rely on centralized providers like google and apple take that technology which outside of this room is very itrly deployed and put interest product that everybody can use much if that process does not happen or if that process is circumstance cup -- cup gllz tblz >> the security benefits from encryption are tremendous and we certainly have seen complaints from the law enforcement side of government that holdings a particular equity that is unique around encryption which is for that particular purpose you may not liken kription because it makes the job harder, but the benefits you get from having

encrypted communicationings and the safety of your data that come with that are tremendous. we've got other parts of the government encouraging people to use encryption for those reasons. so it's an encouraging thing to see a move towards encryption. >> that was something that was also discussed in the second panel today in law enforcement and encryption. but as you alluded to, the f.b.i. director has suggested are aidingand google and abetting terrorists with the encryption byn default. and he urged congress to come up legislation that would enable law enforcement to obtain data whencustomers' law enforcement has a warrant. do you see any way to accommodate need of law datacement to get that while at the same time preserving your customers'

privacy? >> there's a very clear cost to that kind ofeat encryption in order to serve theever need it is that director thinks needs to be served there. devices thatese when they're turned off, they're encrypted can they're very in that way. and there's, you don't have back doors, you don't have secret ways of getting into that sort of thing, makes it very secure, of other items in your possession, documents that are locked in a safe, you expect somebody else to have a secret key to be able to get into it to address the holders of some stake out there. i think what these kind debates you've got to take a look at what are the costs of doing this and what are you trying to solve for. what are the use cases where going to be in a locked state where you can't keyh the person who has the

to unlock it, and is it an particularor some situation. matt is better at talking about cam vuller in apill tees -- vulnerabilities. todo you see any way accommodate desires or needs there? >> nothing is impossible, you frontll a back door or a door. can absolutely build back doors into anything you want. the question is can you preserve the security of the original device. you can obviously build in a google hase apple or a master key, and you can assume that as long as that key is very

secured, as long as you have some kind of row bus monitoring that prevents google from misusing those keys and you have legal you canons, then maybe achieve something that's almost as secure as the original unweakened device. but that's a lot of assumptions. you're taking something that's to be as secure as possible and then saying it will we assumeas good if xyz and abc. those assumptions hard to believe in if you're building complex systems. >> laura to the extent you can question, can you think of any way to try to comby's desire for get legislation that would them when they want? i know that >> we haven't seen any concrete legislative proposals at this point on this issue. it's obviously extraordinarily

complex. so people are starting to look at it and dig into it. but there's noth clgcreet at this point. >> it seems to me that this get n that -- we have to back to first principles. it isn't how are we going to get government the access they need? the government has information. the question is whether the got has a right by virtue it might have a warrent to get you to retain your information in a particular way that makes it easy to the government. the government has never had that right in any other context. you've never been required to maintain your information in a way that is easier for law enforcement. and so why you should have to do that in terms of the communications or the information that -- the process from your smart phone is a little beyond me. that will be a new -- there's almost an analogy to the

freedom of information act. you get to ask the government for the information it has but ask the get to government to create information for you. it's the same thing. but to require us to maintain our e-mails in a particular way so the government can see it is kind of stepping over a new line, i think, unless i'm -- >> they're not just requiring us to do it. they're saying that the companies that are the companies that provide the technology are the ones that have to do it. no, no, you have the right to use encryption as long as it's not from a major provider. >> the rational is being used here is that there is information and it's going to take us 20 years to break that encryption. you could make the same argument for a security system for your home. the government shows up with a warrent to search you're home and you decide not to open your door. you have a very vo bust security system and you have dobermans and whatever you have

it's going to take the got 20 minutes to get inside your house. you can imagine the doomsday scenario where during that time you've killed your hostage, you flushed your drugs, whatever. i'm not trying to be flip. but because of that we don't require people to make their homes easier to break into by law enforcement and by everyone else. >> in fact, there has been a response to that with senator widen has introduced legislation in the senate and i think congressman massey and congresswoman love gren have introduced companion law lation that would make enforcement to go through the back door to access your information. do you think that's going to stand any chance?

>> if i had a better idea whether it has better chance of passing -- >> the law you're referring to did pass the house over the summer. it then was stripped from the larger bill as it proceeded actually this week. so i think that's instructive and interesting. i think there has been a lot more focus. it's interesting that that passed in the house before the announcement from apple and some of the more recent discussions and i think it's going to lead to a lot more discussion and how that debate will end. i will not predict at this point. >> there's another challenge with saying that people have to provide weak crypto. and this is a battle that we had in the 1990s over whether you could publish strong encryption. the end result of that was that of course realized that code is speech and it was protected by the first amendment.

so if somebody wanted to publish a strong encryption program they can do so and then somebody can then download it and then use it. so if you try to set up a system where it is unlawful to have strong encryption without back doors, it's going to run up against some serious constitutional problems. >> i want to move on to the surveillance issues but i want ask matt one question about vulnerabilities in software. in many technologists have raised concerns that the government by withholding and using software vulnerabilities is making the internet overall less secure. they've announced that they have sort of a new reinveg rated policy on disclosure on these vulnerabilities that they say they favor disclosure. the default is toward disclosure and they only withhold a small minority of

vulnerabilities in data. and when they see vulnerabilities that are linked to software that's in wide commercial use, there are tendties to want to disclose. and they will withhold only when it's sort of use in the foreign intelligence investigation and that even with that eventually they will dischloe. what then is the real cost to security here and where and how should the line be draub between protection of protection of national security and that of network security? >> so the one thing that we don't know how to do well, crypt og if i -- is build secure software. we have absolutely no idea. it's not that there's a path from here to there that we just don't want to spend enough money to get from here to there. we have no idea how to make software that is not going to be vulnerable. we can maybe reduce the number

of vulnerabilities slightly but that's about it. so right now we have this idea that you can go out and create these vulnerabilities. and some are called zero days which means they've never been revealed to anyone they haven't been published yet. we know that the government stockpiles these. they're very useful if you want to get into any system. they're probably vulnerable to any system you use. the question is should we prevent the government from using it? we know we're not going to succeed at that. we know there's going to be a certain amount of hacking just because everybody does. but the real cost, the thing that worries me the most is that we have now created this economy around finding vulnerabilities in software where it's actually starting to take energy away from the people who are out there trying to build more secure software. there's a huge market where you can get luns of thousands of dollars for selling a vulnerability to the u.s. government and maybe 10,000 for fixing it. so what concerns me is not that

hacking is going on, but that it's becoming the default way of business and i think that will long term have very bad effects for all of us and for our networks. >> from the public policy perspective, do you see any response to that, any steps you can take to try to change that situation? >> well, it's part of the overall challenge of trying to get public support in an area where there's a lot of technological complexities that are hard for people to understand, hard for me to understand. i don't understand anything you just said. so there you go. and so i mean that is a huge challenge. and it's one of the many challenges in terms of engaging the public in some of these fixes because there is a general sense of sort of the nsa is looking at more than we would like the nmp sa to look

at -- nsa to look at but there isn't the same understandings of why they're looking at it, what they're doing with the data. what some of the effects are. so it's a real issue of public education and trying to explain what the public needs to be worried about and why they need to be worried. >> richard. i'm curious, has the nsa ever come and said hey we've found this zero data or this vulnerability we would like to make sure you know about it? >> we will -- this will sound like i'm not answering but i am. we get vulnerability reports and tips all the time and from a lot of different sources. and we love it. and we have a program that where we encourage people -- i don't know that we pay enough that it totally disrupts the economy on zero but we actually have a responsible bug reporting program so if you discover something you can tell us about it you'll get

compensated for it and the product gets better. that's really a great program or the ethical tinkeror who is trying to find vulnerabilities but yes we get information from the government about attacks, that vulnerabilities might get discovered in protocols. >> about how many times a year would you say that you get a tip? >> it's fairly routine. i mean, the federal government has an effort to try to let potential victims know about vulnerabilities. and it's not some secret thing. it's -- you get an email with a warning and you can take action on it. or one that is are a little bit less that kind of broadcast maybe you may get a classified briefing about a threat that the government may be willing to give to you and then you can try to learn from that classified briefing. so there are sometimes we can get threats given to us that

way so that we can then go fix our network. those are imperfect. and this kind of goes back to our discussion about secrecy and one of the problems of just having so much stuff classified all the time. you heard other panelists talk about the complexities that come with that. staffers who aren't going to be able to hear about what the programs are, what the law means because it's classified. it also happens in these tips situations. we'll get a tip to be able to understand it the government maybe willing to give us classified information. again very happy to be getting these tips but in some ways it burdens you. but you've got this information. you're not allowed to tell everybody about it because it's in a classified format but you're supposed to operationalize it. so another exasm of how classification can make things difficult for others i'm sure as well.

>> thanks. so laura can we now turn to u.s.a. freedom, the efforts to bring about some surveillance reform? you want to start by explaining briefly the provisions, the drafting process, and what do you see as a path forward with the new congress given that we -- congress will be forced to act? good news or bad? >> absolutely. so you heard a little bit of the history of how the u.s.a. freedom act came about from congressman massey this morning. i will do a brief recap on that and then try to pick it up where he left off, which is where the house passed the bill. last october they came together to introduce the u.s.a. freedom act of 2013. have ended ll would he bulk collection of american

records it had a range to various other authorities as well. as congressman massey described the house en went to was watered down. but most critically there were concerns that the house bill as passed, although it was intended to end bulk collection, may not have done the job. that caused privacy groups like some of the ones representing on this panel as well as technology companies like google to pull their support

lottor leahy -- including a of folks from the intelligence commune as well as other folks, and ultimately the end of july introduced the u.s.a. freedom act of 2014 which was -- took the framework in the structure of the house passed bill but improved upon it in various ways. so i will try to give you a preef overview without totally boring everyone on a friday afternoon of what that bill does. and then we can talk about paths

forward. the first and most important thing of course is ending the bulk collection of americans' records not only under section 215 which is what the phone records is based on but also the fisa pen register statute. this is a provision that had previously been used to engage in bulk collection of internet meta data. that program is no longer happening but it has been used in the past. that was important. also national security letters. and this is an authority that permits without judicial approval or review in advance certain types of records to be obtained by the got based on the same relevant standard that section 215 and the register authority had in them. so we thought it was important to make sure it was clear that you couldn't use these national security letters or nsl's for bulk collection as well. how do we do that? senator leahy's bill said that

the government had to base its search on terms that would narrow -- basically narrow the search to the greatest extent reasonably practcabble. and then also said you can't use overbroad terms like a geographic area or city or state, or the name of service provider to do your search or other similarly broad types of terms. so that was the key element. there were a number of other other provisions in the bill that would provide meaningful reform. one of them is to include what was discussed on the last panel, a panel of special advocates to argue before the foreign intelligence surveillance court. that would -- and there was a provision in the house bill that permitted this but we wanted to make sure that when those advocates came into court they had the resources and the information that they needed to be effective. we also add add provision that

would allow for additional appellate review in the fisa court. since 1978 when the fisa court was created there has been two peels of -- of the lower court's decisions. i think that's a really amazing statistic so we wanted to include a mechanism that would create the opportunity for additional appellate review given the types of thing it is fisa court has been reviewing especially in the last decade or so, the bulk collection programs of course being the prime example of that. senator leahy's bill also included some provisions that he had been pushing for a long time related to the nondisclosure orders that come along with section 215 orders and national security letters. this gets to some of the transparency issues that we've been discussing. when you receive a section 215 order or a fisa court order or a nasa security letter it comes with something that says you

can't tell anyone ibet. there have been decision that is says that violates the first amendment as it is implemented in the current statute. so we have provisions to deal with this and provide after the fact judicial review of those gag orders. there was also a small but significant reform to section 702. it's not the backdoor search fix that people have talked about which was an issue that we could not come to consensus on. but there is a smaller but important fix to 702. and then critically, especially again given the conversation we've been having, there were very important transparency provisions. and here senator franken was deeply involved in that and deserves a lot of credit. they came in two types. one is additional they came in two types. one is additional mandatory

government reporting on a range of surveillance that really goes far beyond what is in statute today. institutionalizing that in statute is part of what is so important to continue giving these debates and conversations. the second was related to company reporting and this would give recipients of fisa orders the ability to say publicly they received certain number of range of orders and something many of the companies had worked very hard for. that is the most important provisions of the bill. there are a range of others. >> don't forget the transparency part. >> that is exactly right. another provision was providing for the declassification of fisa court opinions. sharon said on the last panel there is right the fisa court i hink is now realizing that and

many more decisions have been classified and i think they are writing the opinions that makes it much easier for this to happen but the bill would create the statutory structure for hat. >> so you could not get the bill, you got to that point, you took months, it was blood, sweat and tears an got a lot of people on board and national security agencies to the privacy groups, clu and you couldn't pass. >> what makes you think you have the republicans in control of both houses and you have got your rising concern about the islamic state violence and threats to the homeland. what makes you think you can get it past the finish line there next congress? >> a few things i would say. number one congress often requires an act enforcing event and we have that. june 1, section 215 of the u.s.a. patriot act if nothing happens and no legislation is

passed reverts to the version affecting 215 that existed before the original patriot act in 2001 was passed. there is this sunset date oming. there is an expectation there will be a desire to move forward with legislation before then. also the coalition that was built around the u.s.a. freedom act and we had co-sponsors and great republican allies from senators cruz, heller and democrats, all over the spectrum. schumer, durbin, whitehouse. the aclu, brennen center, the coalition is not going away. it is going to continue to be working very hard. i think it will actually be a really interesting process in the new congress under republican congressional leadership because the republican caucus as i think with congressman the prime example today it is split on his issue. coming into the senate we have

two new republic senators co-sponsors of the original broader version of the u.s.a. freedom act. we heard from congressman massey this morning that he has been talking to many of the new republican house members and there will be a number of them in the civil libertarian pro reform camp. i think that it will be a very interesting run up to june 1 and i can't predict what will happen but i think we've got an interesting road ahead. >> you did put together a broad coalition but there were significant minority of advocates who opposed it because

it didn't go far enough. you didn't get the ban on the backdoor loophole for 702. marcie has written where she opposed it. how do you as advocate, curt and liza, how do you decide we something is good enough to support? what is your thinking in terms of what battles are worth fighting and where are your red lines? give some examples and talk about that. >> sure. i'm more on the litigation side. we will look at legislation and have internal discussions about whether it goes far enough and there is a tradeoff. if you get something passed and it doesn't go far enough it is harder to get the next thing to pass down the road. but if you don't get something passed things are status quo which is also a bad result. and we try to be principled about it. stand behind something that a good thing that is not making too many compromises or compromising core values along the way. as they evolve then we will support it or not.

i guess depending on the circumstances. >> what were some of the red lines, laura or liza? >> i will go on what chris said, in theory you would support any legislation that is an improvement over the status quo but then in practice you will often only get one bite at the apple and you know that going into it. for us, certainly the question is do we think that there's a nontrivial chance we will get something better and that is the question that we ask. does there make significant improvement?

and assuming they are not as significant as we would like them to be, do we have a realistic chance and,to the under we fight to get the additional improvements that we want. at the end of the day if we feel we don't have a realistic shot we will support it because we are going to tell the truth about our reservations and concerns because we are in it for the long haul. any bill that makes it worse even in one respect we would not want to support that. and there are red lines around things that may not make it worst but enshrine a principle that we have a problem with. you can imagine a bill that creates a lot of improvements in surveillance but only for u.s. citizens in this country and other people in this country would not be protected. that would be the kind of something that is self-discriminatory even though it is better. that would be a red line for s. on balance you add these considerations and it was easy to support the u.s.a. freedom act with a number of absolute frank admissions by things it didn't do that we wish it did and things we think need to be done and there much things you would think we didn't try to take on like 702 and we will do with it later.

>> laura, do you think the coming congress will start with u.s.a. freedom and do you see a chance to improve on it? do you think the prospect is that it will actually be weakened are greater? o you think that this is something congress is not likely to act on until the very end until the sun sets upon hem? what do you think? >> it is hard to know exactly how this will play out. the senate is still in session today and there are people trying to deal with the final days of this congress. but next year i'm sure there will be a range of legislation in various directions.

it is hard to imagine, for those who have been supporting reform, it is hard to imagine doing something less than u.s.a. freedom act given the broad coalition that has supported hat. but i can't predict how it is going to play out. and whether for example in the senate it will be a bill that, what bill will be moved by the senate republican leadership. think in the house you will see, last year in the house you saw congressmen and one is leaving who was the care of the house intelligence committee and judiciary committee, it was the u.s.a. freedom act that moved to the house. i don't know what will be the vehicle in the senate. senator leahy and his cohorts will want it to be the u.s.a. freedom act. it is hard to know how it will

proceed. >> kirk, tell us about some of the cases that you were involved in in both the appeals level and lower court level. >> right now we are counsel in three cases that are against the n.s.a. for the warrantless wire tapping program and gone records program. one of which is at the appeals level. it was just argued before the ninth circuit on december 8. then we have two cases that are at the direct court level. one of which was actually filed in 2008 long before the snowden leaks but based on the information available at that time from "new york times" and "u.s.a. today" reporting. we had actually an earlier case before that against at&t for their cooperation with the warrantless wiretapping program. but that was shut down by the congress's retroactive immunity and fisa amendments act.

in addition, we have two cases consolidated on appeal dealing with the national security letter power mentioned the district court, federal district court in san francisco ruled that that power was unconstitutional and struck it own. so the judge stayed her decision pending appeal and we just argued that in early october before the ninth sector court of appeals. we are trying multiple strategies to try to get the courts to rule that these programs are unconstitutional. one of the underlying problems here are decisions in the secret courts that were represent thed in ways that were not

understood. >> referring to section 215. >> i am. i think that the section 215, language of that statute relevant to an authorized investigation when you interpret that relevancey to mean all of the records for all of the people all of the time you have written vell advancey out of. i it means the same thing whether you have that the same or not. that is not a traditional interpretation of statutes. the supreme court has indicated in the usv jones case dealing with g.p.s. they have some doubts about smithfield, maryland. those doubts written by five of the justices. not all of the same opinion but that shows there is some support there for a reinterpretation of smith smith. smith v. maryland is a lot of programs and the interpretation. if you can get the courts

outside of the secret court to hit these issues and find some things unconstitutional, this makes it much more difficult for them to twist the words and make sort of creative arguments in the secret court to expand on things, even if we don't know what they are knowing that court and we end up having a special advocate that gives them something to work with in those courts. so we're hopeful by getting some judicial change on this, we can set the stage for widespread reform. >> and if you don't -- if the courts rule against you instruction worried about segment unwelcome precedence thact come against reform? >> our -- that could come against reform? >> our plan is to win. this is a good court for it. unanimous opinion in riley finding that there was a

necessity for a warrant before searching a cell phone incident to arrest. the analysis in the jones case, there are some good indications that the supreme court is rethinking privacy or it is more understanding that some of the thinking that had been known a different era needs to be -- how does it fit with new technologies? that if you have a decision that says smith that it was ok to look at the register for one person for a short period of time for a particular crime, that might not mean the you can do that for all of the people ll of the time for everything. it came up in there and the

government argued because you did share this information with a third party at some point that it was retroactively, you lost your fourth amendment case on your phone because it was the kind of information that you would share. the government is trying to move forward with interpretations that would strip out fourth amendment interpretations for anything besides your house. lock things inside your house. the court rejected that theory. they spent a lot of time on it but it wasn't worth spending a lot of time on. i'm hopeful that the current supreme court may be useful here and of course we still have to get through the ninth circuit. fls a ways to go. -- there is a ways to go. >> the constitution is this wonderful document that has served endlessly. has these timeless principles that are adaptable to new circumstances and technologies.

but the courts have to do their part and apply them to the new circumstances and technologies. they can't wait 30 years before they start -- before they agree to hear this. the supreme court is still trying to avoid hearing a third party case. ruling on the most narrow grounds it can. the other courts are applying smith vs. maryland as if that applies to the facts. technology changes so quickly that the current 2010-20-30-year lifetime that we see is serving us very poorly. the courts are taking themselves out of the game. the congress can't -- she really can. [laughter] what are left with with? i think there really needs to be -- there are institutional failures that we need to be looking at here just beyond the f.s.a. was collecting too much information. why can't we get information on

this? why has v the courts taken almost 40 years since smith vs. maryland to look at this again when we have had several technical revolutions. >> we have about 10 minutes left for a few agrees the audience. -- questions from the audience. raise your hand. you know the drill. >> while we're waiting for the mic, let me add to that. i think we see r-seeing an rogues of that doctrine and i ink the prime example is the yace the court, the fifth circuit said you retain a reasonable level of privacy meaning the third party doctrine doesn't eliminate your constitutional right to privacy and email your email provide that case is significant

for providers who now all -- certainly those in the ninth circuit which includes google and a lot of the big providers require warrants before they will disclose the contents of scored things like your email but the statute actually doesn't always require a warrant. we do have some case lou. you need to turn over that content based on something less -- you're about to jump out of your seat. o ahead and talk about it. >> rick is exactly right and there is actually legislation to address this problem. it is partially at least being addressed by the court but the statute is out of state. it is electronic privacy act. senator leahy and others have legislation to require probable cause. it is another surveillance

reform effort that has been ongoing. > thank you. in january 2010, google revealed to the world that they had been compromised by the chinese government. it wasn't until the "washington post" article that we learned it was google's electronic surveillance system that was compromised by this foreign government. why do we have to read about it in the newspaper? why didn't google ever tell in that three or four-year period, they didn't they tell world that their surveillance had been compromised? and then separately krks you tell us in the few years since, has their surveillance system been compromised any other types that you know about? thank you. >> the attack back in 2009 was

one that we got hit by this ttack. at the time of the attack, back in 2009-2010, you may remember there were not a lot of victim s of computer attacks out there announcing that they had been attacked. within google we had a debate about -- are we just a company that is going to have this happen, clean up our system and just hope nobody notices? or -- the attacks could be continuing on other industries. and other companies and particularly in the course of that investigation, we discovered that there were some considered attacks against some human rights activists. one of the things we decided was that we're just not going to do what other companies presumably

have done and just fix it and move on. we wanted this to be known. nd so somewhat at that time, famously, sergei brin wrote a post describing the attack. actions that we were going to take as a result of our discovery and of our investigation and i have to say i think that was exactly the right thing to do. as far as i know it was unprecedented in doing that. since then, i guess this is going to be unfair. it has almost become vogue to have been attacked and to blog about it. we're very proud of the results that came from being open. that companies could talk about being attacked and victimized and not feel shame of it. it is ok to come out. we can have better secure systems as a result of this. and let's let it be known that this is an environment of aggressive state-sponsored in

some cases attacks against these networks and that we have got to take security seriously. it was a turningpoint i think for a lot of companies in how we have to secure our systems and our data. both corporate, which is really what was at issue there, but as well onsumer data that we hold on behalf of our users. ofdidn't go into the details that attack and we still are not going to go into the details of that attack. i will not go into the particulars of it. i do think it was a good thing to talk about it to the degree that we did and make sure that the world understood this is serious. network security is not just something you put a halftime technical engineer on your network to address. companies need to take this as the threat it really is and be

realistic about it. >> ok. gentleman right there. >> i would like to follow up with a question to richard on that. but also you emphasized how you are keeping the email secure. but isn't -- aren't you also arguing in court against this class action suit, the statement that there is no expectation of privacy in email and that's why you are -- take the position that you can scan the emails without the position of the people who put themselves in g mail and why you can correlate that information and pass on that specific information to advertisers and us produce targets advertisers to this individual? it is of value to you. that is the other side of the coin. how, given that, do you respond o the criticisms that eric

assagne or tim cook? >> if i answer this like a lawyer because i'm a lawyer and you can come back. what we're talking about, where i am at google is about securing the data and and other entities in the world. not google. the reasonable expectation of privacy i'm talking about is your reasonable expectation of privacy that, the government is not going to be getting into your business without there being probable cause established to do so. that is what the -- that is what surveillance is about. the government getting to your information, your private information, your meta data. and the other part of that would any external party what i'm

talking about a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is what i'm talking about. > thank you. >> hi. i'm atologist for the tour project. i actually had a curious question for richard. five years is a really long time in terms oftologist. is this a sthraublet still affects google in some fashion or is this something that has been resolved? >> oh, no. the attack that google had, i think we described it somewhat but it was -- it was a fairly sophisticated one but it wasn't like there was a vulnerability that was exploit and i think if you talk to people who have been -- had attempts against them,

sometimes successful and sometimes not, it is not like there is a single noel the system that gets exploited. this is the kind of attack that we're talking about was pretty sophisticated. it is little by little by little and one nothe get one place, -- method to get one place and maybe stay quiet in that one place and you wait for your chance and move to another part of the network, presumably all along the way, increasing your authority on the networks, permissions to gets into other networks. it is all cleaned up now. a vulnerability, it wasn't fixed. it was a sophisticated attacker on a network is not going to be picky about the tools they use to get into your network. sometimes they will use stupid things, but they work, it is reat and sometimes they will turn to zero days if they have to get in. it is not as if there is some magic thing that gets you there.

it is very smart, patient attacks. >> ok. in back there. on the-hand side. >> one final question. >> that will be our final question. ok. >> thank you. >> john from virginia. the panel asked about a technology solution perhaps as an alternative to a back door. i want to just remind them in 1996, the federal reserve bank sponsored a technology that went to the american national standards institute and created a national standard in 1999 and renewed every five years by about 150 companies and the technology would provide the solution, which i won't go into, was frustrated by the n.s.a. because of its game with messing with the commercial encryption business.

but i recommend that x 973 be reviewed as a solution and i will stop there. >> matt, would you like to respond? >> i don't know what x 973 is at the top of my head, unfortunately. there are many technologies that will work. >> join me in thanking our panel. [applause] >> this morning on "washington journal" al sharpton talks about police brutality and grand jury decisions not to issue criminal indictments in the deaths of michael brown and eric garner. he is in washington to lead a protest called the justice for all march. and larry pratt, executive director of gun owners of america will discuss public opinion polling on gun regulations. washington journal begins at 7:00 a.m. live on c-span. we'll bring you that justice for

all march in washington organized by civil rights, labor and church groups. a.m. eastern 1:30 ime. >> the senate returns today at noon teern continue work on the spending bill to fund most federal agencies through september. the government will run out of money tonight at midnight if no taken.is harry reid reminded that a vote is expected throughout the day. they confirmed a series of federal appointments including six ambassadors. live coverage of the senate on -span 2. >> this week on q & a.

political reporters manu raju and john bresnahan. >> he had planned for four years this campaign. this started in 2010 right after he saw what happened in the republican primary for rand paul, the republican kentucky senator. he beat the hand picked guy, grayson in that primary. at that point mcconnell realized i have to recal bragsebrate everything i know about republican politics in my own state. he started to build this sophisticated infrastructure. they knew they were going to spend a lot of money on technology. they had watched the obama campaign in 2008 and 2012. they had watched harry reid's re-election in 2010. they knew they needed to go from this 2008 race where he beat bruce lunsford.

it was a tough race. he was going to have the latest technology. he said he was going build the most thorough senate campaign ever. >> in american history. >> in american history. he probably got -- he probably got there. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's q average and to mark 10 years, we're airing one program from each year starting december 22 t 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> speaking at a christian science monitor breakfast, house intelligence committee chair mike rogers the senate intelligence committee's report on cia interrogations and defended practices. this is an hour. >> select committee on intelligence. this is his second visit with our group. he was here in june. we thank him for coming back. after serving in the army, he became an fbi special agent, specializing in public

corruption cases in chicago. he returned to michigan in 1994 and was elected to the state senate. the next year, rising to become the majority floor leader. in 2000, he won a hotly contested race for the house. he was reelected six times. he became chair of the house intelligence committee in 2010. in march, he announced he would leave at the end of the current session to host a radio show for cumulus media. so much for biography, now onto the ever popular process of our progress. as always, we are on the record. no live tweeting or filing while the breakfast is underway. to give us time to actually listen to what our guest says. there is no embargo when the session ends. if you would like to ask a question, please do the traditional thing and send me a subtle signal and i will call one and all.

we will allow the guest to have opening comments and then go to questions around the table. we will start with chris straw mark and julian and guy taylor, and mark thompson. thanks for doing this, sir. >> thank you for having me back. i would like to believe that you came to hear what i have to say, but i know the breakfast here is pretty good. i thought i would not say to offer much. -- awful much. it is a chairman of the intelligence committee, it has been a rough couple of years in the intelligence business for those who choose to serve the united states in that capacity. and hopefully we can get through this and get this behind us so we can continue to get out and do what they need to do. i thought it was unprecedented to have the cia director have a press conference at the cia to defend the cia.

i'm still trying to figure out what all that means, i think, as we move forward. with that, i thought i would give more time for questions than hearing from me. i do have a very riveting 4000-word two-hour presentation on the u.s. tax code. that is pretty good. i brought the slides if you need to see them. >> in terms of figuring things out, let me do one or two and then we will go around the table. at director brennan's press conference yesterday, do you agree with his assertion that a cause-and-effect relationship between eit's and useful information is unknowable? >> unknowable? >> that's what he said. >> no, i think it is probably better than that. i was an fbi agent so i was trained in the rapport building, interrogation technique, which i think works.

however, given the circumstances in which they found themselves in the time in which they found themselves in, with the great unknown of another attack at the time, and remember, we did not have -- at the time, we did not really understand all of the way that al qaeda operated. we had pretty good intelligence, but not great intelligence. and so, after that event had happened, there was a time-sensitive era, and one thing about rapport building is that you need time to make it work. to say it is unknowable, we know there was certainly the events that happened and information that was gleaned that was later used in everything from fully understanding and being able to put pressure on al qaeda to --so when you talk to the people who were in the program, and they adamantly and passionately believe that the information was helpful and useful from enhanced interrogation techniques.

>> let me ask another. then we will go to my colleagues. you said before the release of the senate report that its release will "cause violence and death." the initial response seems to seems to not overly strong. have been not overly strong. do you still think there will be violence and death as a result? yes, i base this on the fact that foreign leaders believed this would insight violence. i will intelligence services said it would incite violence. we believe the information will be used as a propaganda tool for groups like isis and others, who are seeking opportunities to incite violence against westerners in the united states. change inthat the posture in certain operations on the behalf of the cia and other

organizations, the state department trying to figure out better security for embassies to deal with the new threat, it is hard not to argue it won't have that impact. >> from bloomberg? >> thank you, mr. chairman. brendan talked about it being unknowable, we thought it would be a more new ones condition than previous case files. that the value was critical. now, seem to be more new wants to as well. can you clarify what you think in terms of value and what was gained? >> i believe the information that was taken from the enhanced interrogation techniques serve

to save lives and provided intelligence on al qaeda we had not previously had. that, because everyone i've talked to at the agency, when you followed pieces of information that came out of the interviews in the near-term and long-term, they had inherent value in ways that they didn't have before. i don't know how -- you may have said it well. talk had taken 90 days and to them we may have gotten the same information, but that is not what happened. they went through the process. that caninformation clearly be attributed to saving lives the united states. i'm not sure how much more on nuanced -- how much more un -nuanced i can be. i've not talked to one person who is involved in the or abouttion program,

information that was it used to put pieces together. i sure -- i'm sure people had a notion in one event they thought they were in. osama bin laden was main street, and then there was another organization. no one believed the organization would be built on compartmentalization. if you can get the valuable information, the name of a courier, the description of a courier. you can use that information to .ut together the conclusion if you don't have the information you can't get to the conclusion. to say it is unknowable, i would disagree. i think it is noble. able..is know

i don't know why we would debate the value of it. that was clear to me by all the people we talked to who participated. further ino back time to the benghazi report. one of the conclusions you reached was this. there was no intelligence failing. of report describes a number instances. i would like to hear what you characterize them as. the cia was unaware that their route to the diplomatic compound had been blocked that evening. totook them 42 minutes travel a mild. they didn't know the libyan general who set of transportation from the airport was untrustworthy and had turned off his phone. iny allow the analysts washington reading bad news

accounts to dictate what happened instead of asking the stasis chief and other witnesses, which is why we had the talking point problem for so long. if that is not an intelligence failing, what is it? the broaders question, what is an intelligence failure. anytime there is a successful attack that is an intelligence failure. the intelligence that was provided on the ground, the strategic intelligence saying we have a higher threat environment in here is why, was done. it was done for months. 4000 leading up to the 9/11 event. it led to a security posture in benghazi and libya.

you could see the deterioration happening over time. that thereferenced other nations had pulled out because of the security posture. ciaad testimony from security officials in august when they wanted to merge the two facilities. they said we are not coming because it is unsafe. and you need to fix it, talking to the state department. none of that happened. to say that every time there is anpecific event there is intelligence failure, i would disagree. they have the right context. the event on the night -- the event on that night, we didn't know, or they didn't know, to clarify. they didn't notice that they should be in a heightened

posture because of the deterioration of the security footprint, and the likelihood that something would happen on 9/11. that memo was posted at the cia and. they knew something bad would happen. the problem was they were not prepared. that is a different question. clearly, the state department was not in a configuration for the security environment they ran. that was very clear to me. that was out of the laying of the investigation for us. it was the cia who loaded up their cars and went over there. with any change in conflict on the ground, it would be crazy to think in a changing battle the roads weret blocked or unblocked. they were blocked because there was an event that had some level of preplanning going into that particular night. >> let me get a follow-up. >> are you saying the cia was

not prepared for 9/11? the cia annex was never breached. they took casualties and i was a tragic loss of life, but their facility was never breached. they had a fairly significant assault on that facility. facility,ary mission was woefully unprepared. not only were the agents assigned for the security they didn't have the right experienced agents to be there. they had not even configure the compound in a way that was safe. the cia told them that in august before the september attack. me of the striking quotes to was that one of the security officers told one of the agents

-- the state department agent, that if you do not change what you are doing or get help you will die here. i don't know how much clearer you get. their problem was they told the and aresked for it getting no response. >> a quick follow-up. key?sn't chris stevens theould've have made sure security was ok at the temporary facility? >> that was out of the lane of my investigation. >> he is the ultimate security officer. it is our understanding -- of theas out of my main -- out of my lane of the investigation. asked for security and

didn't get it is a question that needs to be answered. there has been no investigation into that threat, which is where appears tocommittee be focusing. my report was very narrow. only on intelligence activities. i think we answered those questions. put anynot of information and that i could not cooperate. -- that could not be cooperated. two people can see the same thing two different ways. is wrong orean one being misleading, it just means that in that high-intensity environment you may recollect things differently. that is why we used all the levels of cooperation that we did. do you think the next

congress will or should ring of nsa reform, or do you think the threat from isis or other groups will set a damper on efforts to do that? >> they will have to do something. june 15, the 215 and 702 portion expire. and 215, or some variation, which hinder the national security of the united states. i hope they can work it out between now and next year. there are still hurdles remaining. they will come to a conclusion before jean. i think the adults in the room will understand we have to have these provisions. and push back on the wrong narrative on what is actually happening, or not happening, in that space.

i think, the whole notion of the program i find ironic facing the threat we have was to make sure that terrorists activity overseas was identifiable in the united states. and you think there are 20,000 western passport holders becoming more radicalized under eastern syria under the isil is a significant tool we better have or we will be in trouble. those people will come home and you will have known identified saying that operations are go in the united states. if we can't figure that out, we will have problems at home. i think will get to a place where people understand the threat versus what we are doing, and what protections are on the information.

i think if americans have the we will be with and support these programs. there have been -- do you think that is appropriate? what can the congress, administration, or intelligence committee to --. ? thankfully they are dedicated people who believe in their mission. as the european union and the workings of the u.n. about , that is incredibly

disappointing. definitive report. the department of justice did a criminal report and found no wrongdoing. they even sent a statement saying there was nothing in this report that would change their outcome. the collateral damage of releasing a report that is partisan in nature, the methodology is in question. zero people.wed i don't know how you come to a conclusion without interviewing anyone. it doesn't make sense. this is the collateral damage where countries will find another reason to try to kick around the united states. i think it is unfortunate. we should push back on any goort they would make to after u.s. citizens who are working on behalf of the united

states government to protect the united states, and stand up for our national security. >> from the bbc? >> have a question about the report. have you read it? pages., not all 6000 >> [indiscernible] it surprised me. >> did you know everything? >> i never claimed to know everything. although members of congress are likely to tell you they would know everything. i think the graphic nature of the descriptions, and the strong conclusions they drew in the report without evidence or testimony. that is surprising and shocking that they would draw those conclusions without any cooperation.

why you do eyewitness testimony and put it together. --as surprised what was it about the press conference yesterday? it was very strange. you try to figure out what that meant? the idea of secrecy is very difficult. looking back, what areas of secrecy could be improved upon? so -- >> you said the report did not provide context. they did not interview people.

that was notmation provided. to what extent do try to explain that to the american people? we wentgument is through this already. that is what went through the document. manual as a we went through a self loathing. -- a self-loathing time where we kicked ourselves for doing something wrong. we went through this process. we corrected it. we legislated on it. the department of justice reviewed it. i don't know what we gained. i know what the consequences were. i don't know what we gained. we already had this discussion. as a chairman my job as oversight over the 16 agencies, review,dget, and policy and making sure they are

successful in their mission. somehow that often gets left off the table. they have a tough job, and we need to make sure they have the resources and classifications to get their job done. sometimes, if disclosure hurts your friends or allies you don't do it. it is like your family. you don't tell everything that happens in your family in public on every occasion, right? that would be interesting to read. when you think about what we have done, there were issues. we corrected them. no criminal wrongdoing. in the context after 9/11, by the way one of the people interrogated answered the question: are there any other imminent attacks planned and he said, you will soon find out. if it is after 9/11 and we just

lost 3000 people, and those folks were told to stop another inack, how can we sit back dhe comfort of our non-attacke country for 10 years and say, i wouldn't have made that decision ? it seems hypocritical. this report is partisan and shows the dysfunction of our congress rather than happened at the agency. they went through the process of cleaning it up and correcting it . we have heard our friends overseas. our friendsurt overseas. now we will have to deal with that notion when the eu and you win tries to go after our cia officials or intelligence collectors overseas, or makes it hard for our embassies to do their jobs. force forly one great

good left in the world, and that is the united states of america who doesn't ask for much other than trying to sell you something. that is been a good role for us. ablee find ourselves less to provide information to our european allies to stop attacks. that is my frustration. this is not new information. we already knew it. you have to stop talking about the things you already corrected and move on. we've already corrected it, we have to move on. now, people that nothing to do with this program will pay the price overseas. chairman, -- mr. chairman, you sound frustrated by this. i want to take it in another direction and give you a unique opportunity.

you have had a unique position for several years presiding over dozens of classified briefings from the intelligence community. from the cia. you probably knew more about the .hreats posed now you are moving on and walking out of that spotlight. us on yourindulge a personal views of whether or not the united states is winning the global war on terrorism as the bush administration created in the weeks and months after 9/11, and has been in the background and forth of the back

heated debate. if we are, can you say why. given your unique position, could you indulge us on what we should or could be doing differently as these new threats rear their heads? >> i will disagree with the part of your question that the war on terror was created by george bush. america was at war with islam longr radical before 9/11. we just did not know what. -- we just did not know it. the east africa bombings. these were terrorist acts that took innocent lives. the 1993 bombing at the 20 hours -- at the twin towers, and there are probably three or four more that i could put in there. after the 9/11 commission took a

, they said that one thing that struck them was that every time the united states didn't react al qaeda got more emboldened. they thought america would not do anything. in some of the interrogations a came out that they thought america was weak and soft, and prevent -- and presented a good target. it fit within the same understanding that the 9/11 commission found leading up to 9/11. they had been attacking and trying to kill and engage us. that is how we got to 9/11. the notion that this was new, i think once they got to our shores and slaughtered 3000 people, that is when we thought we had to do something about it.

the fundamental approach then changed. isis was not created by us being engaged and being mayor. this was an organization that had pledged allegiance to al qaeda in 2006. they had similar relationships in 2005 as they wanted that banner of credibility that al qaeda brought to the terrorist fight in their mind. with it came resources, recruiting, and other things beyond their reach in. that is why we have 21 al qaeda affiliates that we track. what happened and what changed factisis or isil, was the that people argue this was about brutality. al qaeda decided that that daddy dadhi was too brutal.

that is not true. he just wanted to do a tax outside of syria. they wanted them to stay in syria and attack the sod. -- and attack assad. bagdadhi saw that because he was holding his ground people were being recruited. think about 9/11, one thing they did not have was an the ability to get into united states. they had to have an elaborate plan. they were able to raise enough money to put the plan together. so they could get people who were not western passport holders into the united states. dadhi looked at it like he had a lot of money, he was winning the fight on the ground, and he had the ability to get people back into the west.

that is how they split. he decided he wanted to go into the holding of ground in the caliphate. that is when he went into western iraq. he thought he could count on the western sunni tribal leaders to be with him. malikire because of the issue. this has led us to where we are today. -- we disengaged from the world when we did not answer the call to trouble rising in eastern syria. we made conscious decisions to disengage. when we did that, they took full advantage to run rampant in eastern syria and western iraq. the threat matrix i have never seen as bad as i see it today. i've been on the committee for a

decade. i've never seen it so bad. you have more screams of individuals who are associated who say theyislam have an aspiration or capability to do attacks in the west, meaning europe and the united states. some are credible, some are ill in the aspirational stage, meaning we don't believe they have the ability to pull it off. some of them however do. some al qaeda chains have expressed support for the goals and aims of isil. you say, who cares? that means if they connect to their logistical frameworks, that gives them the ability -- if they need something to fall off an attack like money,

people, or capability, their reach is expanded significantly. we had huge challenges. we spent the last few years, and i buy -- and i have had significant disagreements on how hard we make it on our intelligence services to do the work they need to do to disrupt their activities. it is a combination of pulling back and deciding not to engage , and i mean places that with diplomacy and not necessarily military engagement. and that we were not going to ofly around the pole bringing sunni nations into the fight early. those mistakes had huge consequences. i argued that we did not do anything prior to 9/11. and we gotester 9/11. we are in the process of letting

it fester. the longer we let it go, the more ability they will have to pull off an attack in the united states. we have debated among ourselves ad nauseam making sure every detail is perfect. you can't fight a conflict with isrorists if every detail perfect. some would say we need to take the risk at home. that is great if you're someplace that is not the highlight of one of their suggested attacks. it will eventually cause you harm and pain economically. i saw some estimates that there would be a trillion dollars -- that there was a trillion dollars lost in the economy after 9/11. that affected us all. we are not configured today to win this fight.

if we are still having this weversation in seven years will be in worse trouble. the longer the world sees them as winning, the more recruits hey will that's what we see happening. that is just the facts. we see more people showing up still. right now the current plan is let them take -- even though they didn't. let's not let them do that. let's not let them take village a or b. that's not a plan for victory. they are constantly moving their strategy. moving their logistics. functioning like an organization that wants to be there for a very long time. we're functioning like a country that is tired of it. the problem is they are not tired of it. they are still in this fight. >> we're going to go next to rk and then david, robert, a linch na and dave from the

detroit news, paul of the u.s. news and world report and david straws. just a -- strauss. just a logistical note. >> along that line. you were sworn in eight months before 9/11. you wound up in one of the most interesting and valuable seats to pay attention to what's going on. i wonder over that span of time what you have seen what happened you learned? we had bad guy who is hit us with our airplanes into our skyscrapers. maybe they were lucky the first time and they couldn't get lucky again. we now look at isis and see thugs with good social media skills scaring us to death. my question to you as the military says, we can't do this alone in iraq and syria.

we need y clinton says to see what these guys are up to. given the current state of local war on terror, do you believe in tone and track, we are on the right course to deal with this problem? >> no, not currently, i don't. some notion that you're going to sit down and drink tea with people who have committed to cut people's heads off, use rape as a political tool, i think is nonsense. i think we are absolutely fooling ourselves at a cocktail party with our pinkies up. these folks are seriously committed to using violence to subjug it a population. they have killed more muslims

than they have killed christians or jews. which is why we had lost an opportunity about a year and a sunni to pull our nation leaders, our arab league partners to start pushing back at what is extremism. which risks more muslims than it does chris choorns jews or americans or europeans. and so we missed it because we thought well, we are going to disengage from the world. what i think was so striking to me, is i had that political philosophy before i became chairman and to really watch it from the inside with access to all of the classified information to watch that unravel, what just absolutely reconfirmed why i believe engagement in the world is so absolutely important. and i watched it happen.

and we didn't gain respect in the world. as a matter of fact, i would say we have lost respect in the world. when i had foreign leaders -- let me tell you one anecdotal story. i had befriended an middle eastern intelligence official over time and we were working through some cooperative issues we might do and trying to build better relationships as well. after one particular meeting, this very senior intelligence official grabbed my arm and said would you do me a favor? would you tell americans not to give up on themselves? who else would help someone like us in a place like this, ask for nothing and risk your lives to do it? the russians? the chinese? e said it can only be america. unfortunately he was killed mabe maybe six months later by a suicide bomber attack.

it was a great way to sum up what they saw happening, which was the united states pulling away saying it is too hard, too difficult. we don't want to be sympathetic, empathetic. we just want out. the problem is in the world we live in, that is i think an unconscionable decision. and i see the same thing happening in afghanistan. we asked half the population to come out of the back of their houses from being imprisoned, women. we have more women in schools. their life span has gone from 41-63 just in the short time we have been there. access to healthcare. we have spent most of the time talking about how bad and terrible we are and that we just never quite get it right. i think that is dangerous and dangerous for world and the russians love it and the chinese love it and the iranians love it and they can't wait to continue this narrative about how bad the united states is. i think we're making -- we're

making a serious mistake and it is that change. >> when you say the united states, you seem to be saying the obama administration. >> they certainly kicked it off but we all join in. i have a wing of my party that is very much isolationist. very much pushing this notion that we should disengage from the world. i'm not sure if the wing is probably the wrong description but it is a group of individuals in my party joining with a larger group in the democratic party who have decided isolationism is the answer to our problems. nobody has explained why, including the president. i think it kicked off under president obama and his rhetoric has not been great. i don't here any lofty rhetorical speeches about the greatness of america. i do hear a speech about every two weeks about how we're doing something wrong. think about it. if you turn on the tv today and you're not here, you don't live

in the united states, you think we have massive race problems all across america. we are locking people up and throwing them in the basement and torturing them on a daily basis. we can't quite get our engagements -- better just leave afghanistan and iraq. that is what the world is seeing. that's what i see all the time. i had the great distinction to be able to see it not just from a 30,000 foot level but from the folks who are actually in the gritty side of international engagement. and i think it has cost more lives than it will ever save. >> mr. sanger? >> thanks very much for doing this, as chairman. let me turn to two subjects you haven't touched today. one is soccer and the other is iran. if you look back as you have been doing today over the course of your time, one of the big

issues in trying to develop a cyber deterrent has been our troubles in attributing attacks. think about the sony attack that is underway now. we have gone through a week or two trying to figure out whether it is the north koreans or someone else who is leaking salary records and emails about angelina jolie. we had the same problem with the attacks that were on the white house and state department, the same problem with jpmorgan chase. i'm just going back to the summer. so i was wondering first just on that one, whether you can tell us a little bit about why you think this problem has been so difficult for the united states to solve and how it fits into the overall strategy that you have been pushing? >> sure. first of all, americans have a

healthy distrust of their government. i can say that in a good way. it is a healthy distrust of their government. so the narrative on cyber , we got on i think the solution got on the wrong side of the narrative of what it meant and what we were trying to accomplish. as a government. but i can tell you why sony is -- is a game change when it comes to cyber in the united states. i do believe our at bution is getting much, much better. let me tell you why. i think it went relatively unnoticed. i saw some reporting on it. if in fact you take at face value according to public reports that it was a nation state that did this in retaliation for some wrongdoing in what they believed or perceived. they didn't just steal this. that is only getting worse

because more countries are getting in on it because there is no consequence. they destroyed data on those machines. they tried to take pieces of that company down. that was the first, again, if you take it face value, public reports, a nation state decided a retribution act could result in us destroying data, bringing down a company. we have seen it before with iran , which is why i'm sure the nation state that you see might have better capability than what people may have assumed they have. so you have this attack with the iranian government attacking saudi arabia and almost taking it down. imagine 30,000 people showing up at work and not one computer works and you're not rebooting it and you're not getting data back off of it. that is a huge disruptive problem. that happened at sony.

they didn't get autoof it. >> do you think it was a nation state? >> i was just saying -- on the non-- do you believe it was a nation state? >> i'm not in a position to that he knows question. at bution muchur better. there are security companies that attributed it to -- i would ark as a former f.b.i. guy, that when a nation state says this group that doesn't know who they are, but did this on behalf of the people, i would say as we would say in the f.b.i., that is clue. >> let me take you to the iran question. we have these negotiations going on. we were in a better place than

we were a year ago. a good deal of the material that they were producing could be used for bomb material -- what is your assessment about what has happened within the actual weapon side of the program? the group that has worked so hard over the years to actually work on a design, not part of the negotiations, not part of this, do you have a sense that we have not been back? they are coming back forward? what is your sense and how does that match in with what the administration is saying? >> well, i've had concerns over this from the beginning. mainly if you recall the first flap over this was when the iranians came out after the first secret deal, the first problem and said we have the right to enrich and secretary kerry said no, no, we never agreed to the right to enrich

and now into the negotiations we're talking about how their right to enrich -- whole point of sanctions was to get them not to have the ability to enrich. how we don't look at that as a major setback and we very rarely talk took into account consequences of a nuclear iran. and we're already seeing this. u.a.e. turned 123 agreement was the gold standard how you move forward on a nuclear enrichment program because they agreed it would happen separately and there would be a removal of that material. why we would do this to our friends and then engage and allow enrichment with people who are known adversaries and adversaries to our friends, i don't know how we say that this is successful. we have no view into trigger research and of course without ort trigger, you can't do it any of the weapon models. we have given -- >> you think it is still at that

-- >> i think there is a reason ey don't want us at that faspifment i'm not that bright. when they are saying you can see everything else but what we're doing here. y the way, they continue to do bullistic missile research. that tells you that they are maneuvering the table to get to a very short period of time and so you can do a lot of testing through computer models now, more so than you used to be able to do. the hardest part is getting the materials in a configuration of which can function on the head of a missile. that is really one of the most difficult things on do. but you don't necessarily have to have that test in order to get there. o trigger research, modeling weaponizeation and ballistic research continues unabedded i think. -- unabetted i think.

it is one of the things we needed to continue their bad acting and one of the things we did, we said we don't trust our allies enough that we're going to tell you about these negotiations. i will use a technical term. it was a sign of disrespect in their minds and the fact that we just didn't trust them. and they are suffering turned weight of iranian actions all through the region. in yemen. if you saw the arrests in saudi arabia. certainly concerning. you see what they are -- the iranians were doing with hamas. at the time that we were engaged in the exchange of gunfire or missile fire with israel. you see where they are at this their bad acting in baghdad. think about it from their perspective. they are sitting there thinking hey, wait a minute. we're getting killed here by

these guys. you're marching them down path for -- >> the u.a. sembings going to go nuclear. i'll guarantee you that turkey will do this. we are under some naive notion this is going to cause a nuclear -- in the middle east, we are fooling ourselves. we have gottn the information that came from the statement -- techniques.

is it ok toract, torture if it provides actual intelligence that we deem useful? do you think that things like waterboarding and things like this, doesn't qualify as torture? >> to me, with answered all of those questions. we did after all of this happened. none of those techniques exist today or will be used. to me, you don't have to be hypothetical. it's done. we've answered it. is gone. .e haven't done it for decades the cia hasn't done it for a decade. i think with answered the question. like americans have answered that question. where americans are upset is that we are looking back at people that the government told to protect them after 9/11 and gave them authority to get

information from people that are brutal murders. and did and we look back now we want to ruin their lives or careers or put them in jail. i think that's what most americans are upset. we made that judgment already. that's why it shocked me we decided now. why now? very few reasons for yes. knowing we had answered all of these questions in the past. >> reuters. [indiscernible] >> i have a couple of security related questions. pass -- whoplan to do you plan to pass on your cyber mantle to? [indiscernible] sharing that should

be a focal point in congress or other things? >> our bill collapsed last weekend, on friday. it didn't pass in the senate and what it allow the information sharing a bill which was unfortunate. showed that now there is a disruptive part of the cyberattacks which is very dangerous and imagine you are a financial institution. that has economic consequences. it should keep us all up at night. [indiscernible] it has to come that the next year. we are in discussion with folks with what it might look at. cause for cyber sharing. , easy way youck can get at a big part of the problem.

the narrative has been so distorted. most americans, i went back to my district and talked about cyber sharing what they believed the nsa was doing. they believed the nsa monitors private networks. that's against the law for them to do it. the rhetoric was so overwhelming the other way, it was very difficult to get to that conclusion. what we were trying to do and why it's so important, nsa goes overseas and sees really nasty source code very always tried to do was say that if you can do this in real time, and only share them ,- the malicious source code you could stop a lot of problems

to witness have them all. so a lot of them. that collapsed around misguided toions of what they believed the nsa is going to monitor private networks. >> [inaudible] >> go figure. level of the attacks only get worse to will only get worse. i fear that they will be able to pull off a significant attack that has real financial consequences. if you just take the public information by private security companies, we know that nationstates have been on our critical infrastructure truth they are waiting to cost-effective capabilities in

case of a conflict. we have a penetrative it. we know they were successful. we know they were successful on getting into our financial networks, large financial institutions, not once, but twice. is somebody at some point is going to decide to flip the switch. when they do, we will have a significant economic, catastrophic event. actuallys we are just fat guys. that is a losing equation from always. i fear it would take something like that to get most members of congress to understand the real threat. that i will say stop the nsa spying on you. because they don't silently.

-- because they don't spy on you. we are finally seeing how sophisticated these gosar. it was an international state capability. it went to others. now it's medical records, financial records. sony, maybe because it's the entertainment business, but the psycheis on the public is i want to be a movie producer . those guys like a lot of money. my fear is that if we don't fit here,ill, i think you are i'm not sure what it was a good idea.

again, i fear if we don't start getting on the defend ourselves side of the trouble. parts we're out of time. thank you for doing this. we are out of time. i want to thank you for doing this. in a form commentary january. >> daunting. thank you. thank you everybody. >> here are some of the programs you'll mind the weekend on the c-span network. & a, manu raju and john

bresnahan. c-span 2, tonight at 10:00 on book tv afterwards, lindsay mark lewis on money and politics and how it has grown and changed and senior correspondent for the daily best on the military's use of cyber space to wage war and 2:00, how today at ronald reagan's career as an actor helped hone his communication stills to help him be a successful politician and president and frank gannon shows clips about his former interviews with the president. let us know what you think about he programs you are watch call tweet.il us or send us a join the c-span conversation.

like us on facebook. ollow us on twitter. >> the senate returns today at noon eastern to continue work on the spending bill to fund most agencies through september. the government will run out of money at midnight if no action is taken. votes are expected throughout the day. in other action, the senate voted to pass the $577 billion efense bill. live coverage of the senate on c-span 2. >> yesterday at a conference on surveillance, former national security agency contractor edward snowden spoke via video conference. the justice department has charged him with violating the espionage act for leaking n.s.a. documents. he is currently living in russia

where he has been granted asylum. e talked about how the protect privacy on the internet. this is an hour. ile we arrange to be able to be heard as well as to hear us, we wanted to set up obviously had a year disclosures that ignited a pretty fierce debate, so the question is for someone who has , d an extraordinary price surrendered a fairly comfortable life, do you feel satisfied with what you've seen, how this is unfolding? you've seen major legislation proposed, nothing yet passed, we've seen a presidential

directive. are you satisfied with the reaction you've had? >> first of all i want to confirm, can fortune hear me? >> yes. >> yes. hello. >> great. okay. thanks. apologize there. i am broadly satisfied with what's happened in the last year. we have seen an extraordinary change in public awareness. we have seen an increased openness. i would say innovative spirit in government, not by choice, but by necessity. i believe we had bob lits speaking earlier, which was great. he mentioned they'll be more transparent in the future because they recognize these policies of over classification, over secrecy, are not helpful and, in fact, are damaging. i think we should really scrutinize the value not just of the government's, shall we say, improvement, and not just the encouraging moves we're seeing around the world in the

court systems. a number of panelists have spoken about the beneficial things we're seeing in the united states court system. the first federal court system, or the first open federal courts review programs found they're unlikely -- they're likely unconstitutional. the european court justices struck down the european version of sort of a smith v. maryland. said the directive is unallowable, a fundamental vile rights. we've seen the united nations issue reports that mass surveillance is not permissible under any circumstances. a is necessarily contradiction of our fundamental values and" hernt violation of rights. we see a lot of things like that. but beyond that we see the real change that's happening is actually occurring outside of court, outside of congress, outside of the executive agencies entirely and this is

happening through things like technology companies. let me actually make sure that i've -- i can see these right. what we've seen are things on the technological side, sort of in the fabric of the internet, where immediately upon the public awareness of the problem, technologists, academics, engineers around the world all came together and went, this is a serious concern. and how do we address this? how do we solve these problems? how do we make sure we don't have to deal with this in the future? we see that individuals as well are taking action, taking steps o try to retrieve their rights that have been sort of unnecessarily taken out of their hands, out of their domain. this is done by a canadian group. they don't really have a dog in the fight. they got a representative sample of internet users around the world and they found that 60% had sort of heard of e