>> welcome to "newsmakers." lots of discussion in town and around the country of the tactics employed. we are very pleased to welcome our guest, john yoo. he joined the bush administration. thank you for joining us from berkeley, where your teaching now. let me introduce you chart to reporters. eric lichtblou works for the new york times. he is also written two books that deal with the cia, the most recent "the nazis next-door." is dan lamothe.

would you tell us a little bit more about your arguments? >> okay, sure. thanks for the opportunity. i'm sorry to say is biased. a neutral handed report made a significant contribution. against them by for two basic reasons. it excluded republicans. a serious at is mistake, especially when you cannot see the underlying documents because of the classification. if you look at the investigations into in the gence communities as t, those were always done bipartisan affairs. i was a staffer in the senate.

i ran investigations. as the as massive to -year 40,000,000 50,000,000 report. second thing, it is incredible the way the report was done, there were no witnesses interviewed. again, i cannot think of in the senate investigation when you refuse to interview witnesses. for me, as a lawyer -- it's and you you go to court want a fairchild, but only the prosecution to put on the case. that is why i have been critical. i'm very disappointed in what did intelligence committee this time. >> eric. >> prof., years from now you as a lawyer who

-- for you personally, is that a source of pride? >> i hope it's not only thing i remembered for. you are probably right. look, i do not rush to do this. the d not volunteer for bush administration to work on interrogations. i started in july before the 9/11 attacks. just thinking -- this will domestic policy investigation. other hand -- i thought was my job to do it. we had just been attacked. of our just lost 3000 fellow citizens. this unprecedented question

came with us, wwe had this guy who was unwilling to cooperate with us -- we still had holes in the ground where the pentagon, and where the world trade center was -- there was a huge demand for information. to us -- can came we interrogate -- go beyond the normal sort of questioning that we normally use. i wish the nation as a whole consider these o questions, but they were thrust on us. people who some would probably would have never really ever done it before. but it was my duty. you come either way out. >> to follow up on that, did have any hesitation when you solve some of the was niques that the cia

considering -- waterboarding, extreme privation, cold, etc. signatory to the commission against torture. as a lawyer, homicide did you think about this before he signed on? >> ffirst i have to say, half jokingly, you've asked me more questions than that senate committee asked me about it. was a scholar in national security law before the 9/11 attacks -- let me say, before 9/11 attacks, it was a small, small area of law. i had read about what great ira ain had done with the terrorist problem. a e israelis also had terrorist problem -- there were even judicial opinions in israel about this issue.

i knew that democracies with legal traditions like our own had to use tactics like this -- maybe not the exact but similar ones because of the same difficulty that we had. we had a need for information in a timely way. i think the hardest way, we are all familiar -- all this on the we w for sure, as americans, all know the law enforcement system. these ing about interrogations -- we needed information right away. with law enforcement, you have the ability to way, you do not have the pressure of time. that was really the thing that was striking to me. so now., when those questions came up -- i think, in we eventually hen answer the question, in august

-- we worked around the clock. i will be the first to admit, i wish we had more time. the one thing about this, go back to 9/11, go back 13 years to the months right after the attack -- i thought the had been not down -- get we're struggling to back up. i wish we had more time to think about it than we did. i'm not saying that our memos think we ect, but i did a good job based on the time we had. we were worried about a second attack on the united states. the other thing -- we knew very little about al qaeda at that time. i think we probably knew more about north korea that we did about al qaeda at the time. we're struggling to get as much as we could.

>> i think one of the things that stuck with people about is the way -- the secrecy involved. i know one thing that stuck out to me was -- there were passages in which u. s. military raise concern about people disappearing. about the e passage site in appearing at a afghanistan -- and the rest that the u. s. military might have with a closer tie to the program. i understand the content, but does it have to be so binary. we do these sort of interrogations, or the things most of human beings, us take exceptions to. >> i don't know if i agree with the last part of your statement -- what all human beings take

exception to -- i'm sure we'll talk about that later. the question -- why is this so secret. by was meant to be used only the cia with high-ranking leaders. if you look at the justice department document, that is it was written, that is how it was presented to us, all sorts of suggestions that may have been other people, but waterboarding was only approved for the use of three al qaeda leaders. that part of it -- i think we of it -- that's what's went into the legal part of it. because of the emergency of the tax, and the demand for information. i do not deny some other things you're saying in the report. i cannot tell how much of it was true, because of the way the report was done, because there were no witness

testimonies that maybe the context, or contradict what was saying in the report. but, i think what you're seeing is a lot of chaos. after 9/11 -- the cia was not in the interrogation business at the time, the white house, congress, were united in going from zero miles per hour to 100 miles per hour. in people have been out public saying that they were asking the cia to do things -- of nderstand a lot organizational chaos, which is not unexpected, given what they had to do so quickly and so fast. what i find remarkable, and think the report in quarreled with -- for the last 13 years, there has been no other major terrorist attack on the united states. i think that is incredible.

if you terrorism experts back then, they would have been astounded that al qaeda would not succeed in launching the united ack in states. >> your site by naming the report many times, as you probably know. >> i use the search replacing and i only found three. >> i found 10. you probably spelled your name wrong. >> they often do. >> the cia tactics that they to start using were said to be not illegal because not intended to inflict severe emotional or physical harm. the looking in hindsight, it many americans as that to ng what they were trying

do -- talking about waterboarding, etc.. they do seem to be inflicting emotional and physical harm. >> it's a really good question. -- you have looked at the memos. hardest one of the questions -- going back and looking at the memos -- the language used. congress is there has to be the 10 to inflict and suffering -- what does congress mean by the specific intent. as a higher standard than to say just the intent to do something. the difference -- one explain it e way to -- it's the difference between first-degree murder and

second-degree murder -- the difference between cold-blooded calculation murder, and what conflicted of, homicide. this has to come up with waterboarding. memos too. the we approve waterboarding in very specific circumstances. in the memos -- cause oarding does not long-term injury. because of that very high standard, you are not violating the law. how do we try and figure this out? this is a hard question. mayor plan, that statute, which you accurately quoted, that's all it says -- it does not of what is examples prohibited, or what is permitted. all know, 'm sure we

congress passed an act that start to draw clear lines. thing we did, we went out to find -- has there ever been medical issues with officers who and have undergone waterboarding. this for y, we did waterboarding and not for other interrogation felt they fell e well short of waterboarding, like solitary confinement, or sleep deprivation, only allowing someone to sleep five or six hours per day. that's what we did, because we felt waterboarding came closest to the line which you just pointed out. other thing -- it doesn't just strike most americans as being tortured.

either the message that we the report -- i'd say that's a hard question to answer, what people consider to be torture. i think there's some things that we all agree, and that we all nondegree -- i think solitary confinement for periods of time is not torture. we use a quite often in our own -- no court sons has determined not to be tortured. -- cia is ng on here -- what things can we do that but not crossing the line, come close. the opinion at are out -- they show americans roughly, to no one,

these methods are justified to get information from terrorists. necessarily i agree, when someone says, oh, i think i know what the americans about these questions. i think that something false the report -- silly not the report, k of but a senator thinks that she what happened -- i think also mistakenly, she it up the cia covered deliberately. i'm one of the people that in the tly got lied to report. >> do you think you were lied to? >> no, of course, i would say closely at that part of the report. what i see -- iin the first in august, what was being

to e, i think the problem the cia -- the approval they got from the justice department for this interrogation method is only good based on those facts. weren't try and misrepresent things, that would be stupid on their part, because they would be putting themselves at an enormous risk. i do not think that is what happened. do ing it at face value, i not see agency in negation in conspiracy and cover-up, to beat up and brutalized al qaeda to no s for what appears reason. that's what the report says, there was no reason. i do not think that is the true that all.

what i see as a chaotic and bureaucratic response. the cia has no infrastructure. it's been demanded of them by the white house and congress, on ically everyone, to go the defensive for al qaeda. see not surprised to miscommunications -- lack of clarity, lack of direction. personally i was not in contact with the field offices, that be appropriate -- but, i talked quite often with the cia and the national security council -- i do not lied to me. i think they gave me the best fact that they had available at the time. -- dan me go to dampen for the next question. >> i would be interested in knowing about the training for these techniques.

in the etty clear at the time clear that there was no sense for how long tactics like this would be used on individuals before there was a breaking point. you knew you were walking on a fine line legally with that as well. how do you justify that, both then, and now. good question. i think unfortunately, it's a question of my successes had a than i did.ore as you know, if you look at the memos, we do not examine this question -- how long could you method for -- what is longterm effect. you are quite right. that's something that we cannot we looked at.

looking this report, doing things i cumulatively, that may line of that statue -- so, individually, that does cross the line. a lot of this depends on the person. i think that's also addressed in our memos. as far as, not letting someone sleep for one day, i think you cannot say that is torture. at the time we were under unprecedented events. again, the pressure to get information to stop a second attack. we did not have time to get to wanted to -- we do not have resources and the luxury of time.

in hindsight, we are all enjoying now of 13 years of no attack, we can take through everything we did. and say, we couldn't understand her. if you go back then, it is what we le that we did did. i personally convinced that a is to stop future pending plots. the justice left department, some of your successes second-guessed your legal opinions. these were republican lawyers in the bush administration that too far -- in one this broad authority that you gave the cia and executive branch. in fact, one of the lawyers that succeeded you, submitted themselves to waterboarding to find out what that felt like. was the criticism of view, tthat fair?

>> i look to the memos that they issued. if you look at those, none of the successes of mine actually any of these interrogation methods cannot be used by the cia. we all reach the same conclusions about approving the methods. the same l found, the anti-torture statute, what i felt was what would happen if the president and the cia not ed the line intentionally -- but because we were unsure of what something meant. and later on, something that is a future right now, president, or future attorney general, felt that they would be more statute to

narrow than we did. is that case, what you have a conflict -- conflict in interrogators at can do. as a he can do commander-in-chief. this goes back to some of the questions on the show, i wish we didn't have to think of those questions -- there were questions that lincoln had to face in the civil war. they are the most difficult can face that present presents k that commander-in-chief power, that he could do it. on the first 10 men, many will disagree, that is a controversial question. that is the main difference -- >> can i just -- wheelie have -- we only have one minute left.

>> i think it's important to ask, what is next? i've heard a number of people raise questions of whether use the als who techniques face any legal questions -- you know, any kind of risk. can you way and a bit on your perspective was that. whether they can, and whether they will. >> i do not think they will in the united states. well ustice department, before this report came out -- ttwo dddifferent teams of prosecutors, both under bush and the obama administration, at these cases, and did not choose to bring charges. once the justice department closed the case twice, usually it is settled -- i using the issue of foreign prosecutions, apparently the un prosecutor is at this -- the un also

thinks that the use of drones by the obama administration is a war crime. -- they are worried about complying with u. s. laws, i think they should not about the un, which does not represent anyone, and has particular interpretation of law. for it, they benefit from the u. s. providing defense around the world. >> you're the public about for years -- now that the report details some tactics, they have for ssed concerns reprisals. are you concerned about security? >> you mean, terrorist.

i do not worry about it, but maybe that's because i've been living in berkeley for so long. i'm used to being surrounded by of marxists already. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> well, gentlemen, let me pick of what's next. have this unusual press conference with the cia director in response to it. how do you see this playing out as far as policy questions, the response by the homeland security apparatus. let's start with dan. >> i think it's only fair to look at it in context of history. make a number of the same decisions over and over when faced with similar situations. that's not to say that 9/11 will happen again, but we will have conflict again. feel like -- there's a

out there -- and it probably should be addressed, how do we make sure that there is not secrecy in the future do we ensure that things are a proper context. >> history something you have done in this area, with your two books. what can history tell us. i think -- especially in the here and now, it will have a real impact. there's a lot of fighting -- as far as prosecutions, legal, i do not see much. u. question of whether the s. lost its moral compass after 9/11. >> what about the response of

the white house. >> they are in a difficult position. they have been giving conflicting signals. the one hand, they have been condemning other tactics. on the other hand, they have been somewhat supportive of the cia director brendan -- who of course is very critical of this report. obama inherently within the torture program, and then ended it. in two directions. >> what you make of the the icisms of mr. yoo of way that report was assembled heard from him.e >> i think some of those are reasonable things to raise as questions. obviously, this report to the lifetime and cost a lot of

money. it is a pretty important issue for them to not even have weight and. with that said, maybe more republican but the patient what -- republican participation would have treated. use comments sor -- he was careful to frame it in the context of the time, and people who the methods were proof for. what happened beyond that -- >> i think that the key question. -- weren't these tactics ended sooner. i think we would not be having this conversation, is the tactics were ended six months, 12 months after the attack.

fact that these were used into 2006 -- 2009. years beyond 9/11 at that time. the only director hayden of cia -- not only did he not condemn it, or ended, but continued it. >> last question for you. on the reprisal, or national security being enhanced around the globe. holiday travel season when security ime is on extra alert. how has the security apparatus responded to this report?