chris is a well-known and thoughtful critic of american overextension and american interventionism overseas. he often suggests we should focus on truly vital national security interests, that we often exaggerate threats and often find ourselves squandering precious resources in efforts around the world that are not only unwise but also unnecessary and very costly to the united states. he's also joined by kim holmes, the distinguished fellow at heritage, longtime vice president and really one of the pillars of heritage's foreign policy and defense programs. kim has recently authored a four-part series in "foreign policy" magazine, saying america needs a new foreign policy for 2016. he talks about a more active american role in the world, stepping away from any notion of retrenchment, and committing the resources that would be necessary for a robust american leadership and for intervention in world affairs in order to advance american interests. brian cotules is a senior fellow here. he is the author of "the

prosperity agenda" and runs our mideast program but thinks broadly about how america functions on the global stage. he argued against disengagement in a recent article in the "journal of democracy." so we look forward to a very robust discussion today. the panel is going to be moderated by our own larry korb, our senior fellow and former assistant secretary of defense who needs no introduction and who is a frequent and prolific contributor on the debate. i'm really pleased that all of you all are here today, to have what i think will be the first of many debates on the u.s. role in the world, as we start entering a new political season. we're really thrilled that all of these very thoughtful leaders in national security and defense and foreign policy have joined us. please welcome our guests. thank you. [applause] >> let me join in welcoming you all here today, which given the folks that we have, it's going

to be, i think, a very vigorous, and enlightening debate, given all the challenges that the that the country is facing right now. this event was a result of jim's recent article. by the way, they are out there, copies of the articles that all these people have written. and jim, again, you are the one who started this debate, so we're going to let you go first and tell us about the realism, old and new. >> all right. thank you, larry. and i'm glad to be here. i've spent most of my life as a

journalist, a writer. i consider myself on foreign policy mostly a critic. i've sometimes told conservative audiences you would not want to hear my views on health care or on taxes. but my role in foreign policy is simply to question assumptions that take hold, most notably on the idea that trade and investment would lead to political liberalization in china. in this piece, i focus on the current fixation with calling

the united states the indispensable nation. it's a phrase that goes back to the 1990's, usually madeleine albright is given credit for it, although it really started with bill clinton and some of his aides in 1996. and it's not a uniquely democratic -- it's sort of a democratic phrase, but essentially the same idea comes up in the republican incantations of american leadership in the world. what i want to do is question whether that's a viable phrase or whether it actually gets in the way of american policy or even american power in the world. the place i want to start is with a disagreement i noticed between the clintons, bill and hillary, or if you look at it differently, between the public and the private bill clinton, because after bill clinton left office, he at one point told his

friend, who wrote about it, strobe talbot, who was deputy secretary of state, that he really thought his job as president was to build the world for our grandchildren to live in where america was no longer the sole superpower, for a time when we would have to share the stage. and talbot said, gee, how come you never said that when you were president? and clinton, bill, told him, um, that's why you're a wonk and i was president of the united states, because if i go around talking about a time when america is not going to be the top dog in the world, i'd be ridden out of town on a rail. nevertheless, his own administration's phrase "indispensable nation" lives on as strongly as ever. and what i want to ask really is, do we really play that role today? can we play that role for the foreseeable future?

and should we? and my answer to all of those questions really is no. do we play that role? yes. but not always. we tend to not notice when we're not playing that role. and the example i would use is ukraine where it looks from over here, where this is a cold war-style dispute between american power and russian power, if you get to europe or you actually look at what's going on, you see that the dominant -- the interlocuter with russia and the country that really counts is germany and angela merkel. and sometimes people think here that she's too accommodating. germany has stepped up the sanctions. their own sanctions, slowly. when they do, putin notices. a we can't do this on our own,

because actually our trade with russia is much less than germany's. i'm not saying that's a bad thing, but the truth is germany is has much more influence with russia than we do. and that gets to the question of whether we alone are as powerful as we are working with allies. so we can talk about, you know, stepping up sanctions against russia. but in fact we work with germany. and the larger point is that our alliances are the basis of our power, that if we get out too far -- and that's true in dealing with russia, true in dealing with china as well -- if we get out too far in front of our allies, then it weakens our power. and we have had to learn some the hard way, the realities after the end of the cold war.

i'm sure that many people in this room think that the intervention in iraq was a disaster, and it was. but what you don't see is that one of the disasters was a diplomatic one, because i was covering the bush administration, preparing to write about it in the run up to the war, and i can tell you that they sincerely believed what i call the leadership hypothesis, that if the united states took certain positions at the u.n. and elsewhere, ultimately, the allies, like the french and the germans and the british, would follow. and they honestly believed that. and they were wrong. they were spectacularly wrong, because they didn't quite analyze the fact that after the end of the cold war, the allies were less dependent on us than

they were before 1989. the other problem with "indispensable nation" is the more we run around and tell everyone that, the less other countries are willing to do on their own, because the united states is taking care of it. and the more they get a little bit offended. so in short, when bob, the editor of the american prospect, just called me with a random question, would i like to write a piece on what a policy of realism means today, and i said sure, but i thought that progressives sometimes don't quite understand what realism is, since the end of the cold war, younger progressives have taken realism to mean anti-interventionism, because that's what it meant at the time in 2002. but in fact, realism has a much broader history of believing in simply balance of power politics, on power diplomacy, at the expense of values.

and those were views that i thought that progressives should not buy into. but in thinking about it, i thought that realism in a new way would be a realistic view of an america which is not always going to be the world hedgemon. finally, i do think that on this, for all of the criticism that he gets, that obama has been ahead of his time. i think that he has recognized and will be recognized in history as having tried, whether it succeeds or not, in moving towards a more modest and therefore realistic view of america's future role in the world. and i'm sure that i will be criticized by some of my colleagues, but the example i would use is libya, where in

describing -- first of all, the intervention in libya came about for two reasons. one is the one that most of you read about, that there was a strong desire for humanitarian intervention and that many people in the administration believed it. the second strand was that the british and the french, particularly the french, were coming to the united states. they were more concerned with libya than the united states was. and they were saying things like, you know, we are helping you all over the world, translate afghanistan and troops, and we would like you to help us out on this one. and in that context, the fact that obama allowed the french and the british to have the lead out front there and to show their sum of the financial burden, and they described that as leading from behind, i have yet to understand what the

problem was with leading from behind. and the answer to me is that it touched this nerve that we have to be, as the united states, what we were in 1946 or 1956 and in 1990 and '91, after the collapse of the soviet union, and and i think that episode and the reaction to "leading from behind" shows me that we have not yet begun to move off from this fixation that we have and have to be always in the front. thank you. >> thank you very much, jim. in addition to writing this article and book, jim was -- worked for 20 years for the "l.a. times," covered things all over the world and really knows an awful lot about china. he was one of the first reporters we had out there.

chris prebble, who in addition to being at cato, is a former naval officer. and chris, i was looking at your biography. you came in, soviet union collapsed. we won the gulf war. then you're able to get out. >> they gave out certificates from everyone who served in the cold war, and that's one of my proudest certificates. chock one up for the good guys. i will admit, i'm really thrilled to be here. partly because larry's invitation prompted me to read jim's article for the first time. it had been discussed but i hadn't had a chance to read it. so i read it last week. i read it again. my favorite part, by far, is the kind of bottom line, which is this conceit that we are the indispensable nation. he writes it has become downright, well, unrealistic. and even before i got to that line, i started reading the article. and that was the word, unrealistic, that sort of struck out in my heads.

it is not unrealistic, in the sense of kind of alice through the looking glass. this is more like a virtual reality. people inside of washington believe their world view is an accurate one. the problem is, and i think kind of the fundamental disconnect, the reason why the current grand strategy is not realistic, is because it is so disconnected from the view of reality of people outside of washington. there are so many different polls that show this. but interestingly, i think that a lot of astute observers of u.s. foreign policy have known about this for some time. one of my favorite lines is from a book that didn't get as much attention as it should have, a book called "america at the crossroads." mostly people focused on the fact that this was a

neoconservative criticizing neoconservatives on iraq. he sees, it rests on a belief in american exceptionalism that most nonamericans simply find not credible. the idea that the united states behaves disinterestedly in the world stage is not woodly believed, because it is for the most part not true. that most non-americans find non-credible. the idea that the united states behaves disinterestedly in the world state is not widely believed because it is, for the most part, not true and indeed could not be true if they fulfill their responsibility. a core element, it was hard to sustain the belief over time. both for the attitudes here in the united states but also abroad. other was a prediction that american foreign-policy begins at home. american'sd that

role in foreign-policy was if americans not scrutinizing it too closely. we all know what happened in 2005 and 2006. the financial crisis in 2008 has really caused a lot of people to revisit the fundamental propositions of the u.s. foreign-policy. my modest case today is the one approach is to continue to count on this disconnect between the people and the elite. it is not a new phenomenon and frankly it hasn't really mattered it plays out that way and a minute. i think that is a reasonable approach. there is a couple different ways this manifests itself. during the cold war, this presumption of course, it was a bipartisan problem. this is how vital it is. and to not resort to the sort of

hyperbole that characterizes u.s. foreign-policy. this is from dean acheson's book. i urge people to make a case honestly for american hegemony. everyone, again, this is from dean acheson's book.

when they were making the case for the truman doctrine. thator vandenberg defies dean acheson scare the hell out of people, and he said i will paint a picture clearer than the truth. in long history of american foreign-policy, speaking in a way that it doesn't expect them to respond well enough or urgently enough unless things are painted to them clearer than the truth. let me lay out three aspects that will bring the american people into the discussion. first of all, is the argument about allies. what is the relationship with our allies? what are they purporting to do? interestslies's ?ynonymous with what we do

what do they actually do? american exceptionalism, at some level, depends on them being synonymous. can we make the case for hegemonic grand strategy? terrorism is not an existential threat. iran's military spending is 1/77th of the united states. in his book, he argued that iran is romania, not germany if this was the 1940's. and u.s. military hegemony and economic leadership around the world. i think there has been a long-standing belief that there are clear economic benefits down to the united states and the american people for playing the role that we do, and i think there is really good research that calls that in the question. point to some of the work that sandra's hair -- that dan dresner has done. i will leave those three on the

table and i'm sure we will have a lot of time to discuss. >> in addition to this article that is out there about hillary, isis, he has written a terrific book called "the power problem: how american military dominance makes us less safe, prosperous, and free." when you think of heritage, you think of kim. i went back and checked 30 years on and off. he and i were on a panel together in the early days of the bush administration. how come you're not in government? the secretary of state for international organizations, what do you think in terms of ?hat you have heard so far >> i am delighted to be here with regards to distinguished panelists. i think of was thinking back on

the days in the reagan years and the first bush administration. there was a lot more interaction between people who call themselves liberals and conservatives back in those days. we spent a lot of times each in our own bubbles. i do that myself and i suspect you all do that as well. i have a feeling there is a yearning that we want to move beyond that. i suspect we want to learn what we have in common more than what divides us. even though i do disagree, we will try to and on something that's a bit more positive. the year after barack obama took office, i wrote an op-ed called "the new liberal realism." the alliance forming in the wake of the controversies of the iraq

war that did not have much to do with one another. at least not that they did with president obama's foreign policy. and i said at the time what was driving president obama was was commonlyas it understood as a doctrine. but it was more in a reaction to the perception that the iraq war was a disaster. that we were over extended. time to try the opposite. it ended up being very much along the lines of whether you intervene or don't intervene with military forces and that became the driving controversy. still inink we are that, and i think that there are some faultlines in that

alliance. i think it has something to do with the fact that many of the objectives and policies that president obama tried to do, which were in line with the view of the world they have been , tried and they are not working very well. the president tried to reset relations with russia which he thought was based on the fact that george w. bush had been too harsh against the russians. forgetting the fact that the reason we had 2008 relations with russia is because of russia's intervention with georgia. before that, president bush and thatcherher -- maggie

looked in putin's eye and thought they could work with him. after georgia, he was disappointed and there was a pulling back. i think president obama over interpreted that, being too much of a cowboy and apply that to the policies of russia and it didn't work. in some ways, we did farm out foreign policies to the european union. we try to get closer to the european union. it actually sparked russia over the ukraine. we did see our national interest involved in that particular intervention. they also had commercial and economic reasons. the same thing happened in libya.

and now libya is in chaos. our intervention there was not followed up on. and it was a disaster. on this whole question of the indispensable nation, those of us that work in foreign-policy. in some ways, we over interpret them. they become almost like buzz words. so sometimes, the indispensable nation is used interchangeably with hegemony or used interchangeably with american leadership. and each one of us here probably has a very different definition of what each one of those things means. for example, i'm pretty pragmatic about whether america is dispensable or not.

is, what other nation could perform the task that we perform in the world but us? just as a matter of fact, we are indispensable. there is an overaggressive foreign-policy where we would be hegemonic and all these other things. i think that sometimes the example of the iraq war with respect to germany and france not following the iraq war is used as a case example of this. i was at the state department. at the time, i look at the u.n. issue and i do remember that yes, germany and france had their own particular reasons not to want to support the iraq war. but i also remember going to moscow at the time and talking

to the russian foreign ministry, they have their own reasons at that particular time to do it. and so did germany and france. whether or not we have a coalition or an alliance system, in fact, we have 37 allied countries in iraq with 150,000 ground troops. ground troops. which is not something anywhere close in the coalition against isis. i don't think it should be dismissed out of hand. the last point i will make is it's not just the issue on russia. i think the president pulled out of iraq faster than his military advisers wanted to. as a result, he's been forced back under dramatically worse circumstances had he stayed. and yet, as i show in my articles by every objective

standard it's actually greater and worse than it was six years ago. many of our allies are complaining because they don't have the certainty of knowing what u.s. policy is. it is also a component of leadership. been straightened consistent, not just going out and bossing them around and telling them what to do. playing the traditional role of consulting with them and doing what the united states can do to get things done. i don't believe it's a case of simply bossing our allies around. and we define leadership i going out and telling them what to do. i think it is much more subtle than that. that is we have to figure out , where we have a common alliest with particular and realizing that the allies will change. they have their own particular interests. not just france and germany with respect to iraq but other

countries that do very much want the connection with the united states strategically and with nato, because we fear russia. we are not as indispensable as we used to be. i will concede that but it point. doesn't mean we are not indispensable at all i don't mean to suggest that you are suggesting this, i think your analysis is much more subtle. but we have to be aware of any kind of-ism. whether it is realism or any other kind of-ism. and to become something by which we can discuss among ourselves the obama doctrine and the like. but at the end of the day, there there will be so many outline principles of the doctrine that you will not get a lot of guidance.

i think it is true of your are a conservative realist or a liberal one. >> thank you very much, kim. in addition to his article, he has written a really great book "rebound: getting america back to great." our last speaker has been a bulwark over the last decade. he knows more about the middle east than anyone i've ever met. he's worked there, he's lived there, he speaks arabic. >> i want to thank jim and cam for coming, i hope this discussion brings you into this and we are in a time of transformation when we think about national security strategy. in substance and in terms of

politics. and i think we've seen the politics quite clear. it's not just what happened last week with the budget and the domestic scene, but if you look at things like syria war vote, the one they had on the non-strike event and the lineup on support for the opposition split within both parties. part, we talked to the hill quite a lot, we are in this transformative moment. i have a lot that i agree with in jim's article. the first point i want to make is that i struggle to bit with realism and a realistic term because somebody that has studied international relations. essentially, i agree with your main point as i understand it. obama himself as a pragmatist.

he is not driven by a particular balance of power theory or liberal internationalism. if you read henry kissinger's new book, he talks about this where there is a delicate balance between the two. the main thing that has driven much of president obama's foreign-policy which i think has been transformative is what is the limiting factor? how do we limit our own engagements? i think we needed to learn from the previous decades. we needed to learn why he brought the combat phase of the the iraq war to an end, or the afghanistan war coming to an end later this year, how much more can we do in terms of expending that? it is a realistic assessment. i don't think obama looks at

state actors as a fundamental actor, in and of itself. this second thing i think you definitely get right and our analysts need to get in sync with where the country is at, is that obama pragmatically recongizes a rise of the rest. when he was running for president, that was an appeal to say ok. i have no problem with the phraseology leading from behind. there are other ways you can describe it, politically, but i think that getting others to have an interest and recognize that, we will be in trouble.

because others, as jim notes in germany has a closer interest in dealing with ukraine. sometimes you overstate the case. i think they understand that they had an interest. coming back from jordan in the middle east, i think there is a recognition that they have an interest in the anti-isil coalition. which i think we will talk about. and i think finding the right fit in terms of u.s. leadership in countries like israel, they do look to the u.s. to call some plays, but not in the way that we are going to shock and al the region with our military

might and force which i think we tried in the previous decade. i mentioned this already but the third point i would say, the bush administration experienced this as well. and where do we actually use the force directly. one of the things you mentioned in your article was the first two years of the obama administration was more realist. the smart power negotiation effort. if you look at the israel e-palestinian negotiation effort, one would say that was not terribly realistic or did not produce the results that they hoped. there was a strand of idealism that goes back. it's hard for us to check these high ideals. there is the instinct there and it is hard, i think, for many americans to leave that at the door.

the one thing that has changed which maybe wasn't so much in the article but we will talk about is how the world is changed fundamentally. i think obama has adapted to it somewhat. and the criticism of the indispensable power framework is spot on. it is the diffusion of power. in how we talk about diplomacy and foreign-policy. whether it is the arab uprising or the arab spring. what we're seeing on the streets almost every place these days. and i do think what leads to the comments, these changes are fundamentally different. the way technology is bringing directly value systems

at odds with one another. it gets into our policy. it gets into our politics and consciousness. it makes it very hard. it makes it very easy to say that they are all coming to get ogether. i was not saying that the obama was dissing gage, i think they were engaged on most issues. i think the value issues and the reticence to talk about it -- this is where we may disagree. while the torture report was released, you see that people actually still look up to america in some ways. you see it's a form of power that has been damaged by some of our past mistakes. you see that people look at our politics in many ways. they look at it as ideal.

we see thely, assumptions that we all see, which is that we often make these unforced errors that hurt ourselves. i will close maybe with a little bit of optimism. looking at where america is today, especially when i was in europe last week and the middle east, it is less pessimistic coming back here when you look at how people look to our country and an economic engine. especially this year. especially because we are producing more energy. it is not because we are fully back to where we were. i don't think we will be. i think we need to pragmatically recognize that. how wel trick is actually adapt to these new trends? they have more of a say in their own politics.

a creates much more of a dynamic policy that east first is west politics. the next ministration will have to react more quickly than it is capable of doing right now. >> we have 15 minutes before we turn it over to you folks who have been very patient. jim, do you want to respond to the comments made? on obama's first two years, i do mean the old-style realism. and when obama took office, he cited him as a model. and then the green movement in iran. i do think that is realism. you mentioned israel and the palestinians. that is interesting because it goes back to a debate about the time of the iraq war.

and before. that was where the neo-conservatives felt, through the gulf war, that a display of military power opened the way for some negotiations. that was their belief. arafat was scared. he was marginalized. therefore that would work with , the iraq war. and the other side, they had been arguing that you can't get anywhere in the middle east without an agreement between israel and the palestinians. obama takess -- and

side on the scocroft side of that. and obama got swept up in the arab spring. my heart was with him and it did not work out well. he really believed that democracy would sweep the middle east. on europe, i'm not quite sure that the eu is the economic agency. i'm not sure when you say obama would have delegated to the europeans, it is the eu that would have expanded to the ukraine. >> it was a nato expansion issue is what i was saying. >> i'm not sure you're saying we should have pushed nato expansion when the germans and others would not have -- >> an example when we do sit back and let them take the lead it always doesn't work out -- it doesn't always work out well. >> chris, let me ask you a

question. in your article, you talked about the tension between republicans that want to save the world and at home they don't want the government to do anything. how does that get resolved? >> less than liberals. i think there is tension between a skepticism of the efficacy of government that conservatives and libertarians share and a strange enthusiasm and the confidence that government can do lots of great things overseas. pithiest way to say this is that folks like me have some doubts about the u.s. postal service's ability to deliver the mail and we believe the united states can deliver democracy in a foreign country where we don't know the culture and aren't really welcome. much of the time, not all the time. but much of the time.

another thing i was struck by when reading kim's series of articles, this notion about state failure and the need to rebuild failed states. the idea that this is not nationbuilding. well what is it? , if we are going to avert their decline or make them stronger, that is nationbuilding. i think many conservatives and libertarians have some skip the schism -- skepticism. i call it the fatal conceit. i think there is a tension there between the confidence in the u.s. government's ability to do great things abroad even as they retain their skepticism about them doing great things here at home.

>> how do we balance between our values and our interests get co should we have state -- interests? should we have stayed with mubarak? or those at the beginning that wanted to move toward democracy. >> there is a simple answer or doctrine or philosophy that can guide us because you have to look on a case-by-case basis. it will have our own particular interests we're going to have to weigh. to that extent, i see a need for realistic values and interests. the point i make is that you have to have both. not only because the american people will not support a purely realistic imperial germany. they do believe america has ideals that they want to live up to. if they are going to want to make sure that they feel like they are doing the right thing.

how does that translate into what you support? the whole middle east policy has never been based mainly on values. now with the rise of isis, we still have to have strategic interests. because it served in the bush administration, they came out with the so-called freedom agenda. all of my liberal friends hated it. they saw it as the ideological motivation for the iraq war when it had nothing to do with that. it came later as a way of trying to rationalize what happened after the fact with an idealistic purpose. >> and do you remember what your liberal friends also said?

>> to this day, >> if you talk about a neoconservative, it is like selling democracy at the point of the spear and that sort of thing. that's what i mean. the fact is, we will never be able to sell a leadership role, however you may define it. frankly, our allies are based on our values as well. liberal democracies between europe and asia. we are partners and allies because of who we are and that is not insignificant. because there is a diffusion of power and the like. the real question that i have is, that i kind of agree with

the analysis we were making but what do you do about it? does that mean you cut your defense budget and go back on military capabilities because you don't think you have a need to use it? what does that mean about trade policy in asia? do you let the chinese take the lead? because we no longer have the kind of interests we have before? if we let our allies in europe or the middle east take the lead, that means that they are going to be asserting their own interests in cases. we feel obligated to support them because he really didn't want to do the intervention either. they begin to follow their own parochial interests. that is the concern that i have. >> let me ask you a question that comes up a lot about the whole responsibility to protect. should that be a good guiding principle? should not? president clinton said his

biggest regret was not doing anything about rwanda. should we have? >> it should be part of the debate but people often forget is what can you do realistically and practically? what can be done? that is one thing that strikes me, if you read this week's "new yorker," there is a profile of samantha power in there and there is an interesting line when asked about libya and syria. there seems to be a pathway towards success where something could be done where our actions would be leading to more lives lost -- if you are lives lost as opposed to more. it is a serious analytical debate today. it is why the obama administration itself is stuck. it's paralyzed. on the one hand he said, we

should go. but there was a strand inside of its own administration that we can't overlook the stacks of tens of thousands of bodies of what he's done and work with them. but then there is also this strand of realism that says we've got to work with him. so i think that idea is always out there and it's been applied where we could. i think that practical consideration is a big thing. and i think in the case of egypt, it is in some ways the wrong question. whether obama decided that mubarak should go or not. the egyptian people decided that he should go. i feel like it connects with jim was trying to say in his article. we were somewhat of a bystander in that. our statements mattered quite a lot.

but what strikes me is if you look at the counterrevolution, with great popular support into a large extent, the u.s. had been on the sidelines and let ting things play out. moving forward in a place like egypt and some of these other tough cases, if you don't have that struggling of how to blend realistic interests and working with security and the values of get ordinarytually egyptians that are being thrown in jail. by the thousands. i don't think it will work in this day and age. it may actually lead to a wider explosion. there are tough test cases moving beyond the level of liberal values. that is where the rubber hits the road. for the most part, the obama administration has taken a step

back. >> what about iran, for example? how do you apply that to iran? >> i think i would do more in the obama administration, highlighting the human rights abuses. there are bits and pieces of this. i would not scuttle attempted diplomacy. unfortunately, sometimes some of the conservatives in the camp say it doesn't happen. i would continue to have this on the agenda. president obama has done it episodically. i don't think we should invade countries and impose democracy. i think it would be great to have them talking about this because it connects with the next generation.

talking about what i was trying to say. >> do you want to say something? i would like to get to the audience. if you would stand up, wait for the microphone, tell us who you are and if you are with an organization. >> i am retired and i served in the clinton administration, with bruce babbitt in the later asdepartment and the secretary for the top environment development of the state. my interest is more on the environmental side of war and policy but i guess i will reflect on being to five for

just a second. i don't find a debate between the realist and idealist is very helpful. what i think i have seen since the kennedy administration is the failure of two kinds of interventionism. liberal interventionism, conservative interventionism which was the disaster in chile. all of which have led to further disaster for us, by the way. it seems to me that i would hear -- i would like to hear more reflection on the panel. i have loved everyone's comments. i'm a yellow dog democrat from texas. [laughter] >> welcome. >> please get to the point. >> what is the real problem? what is the real challenge? is the real challenge the evolution of democracy in places like china? is the real challenge a resurgent china that economically threatens our position in asia? what is the landscape we are trying to play into when we are

saying we need to be more realistic or less realist or more idealistic? >> anyone want to comment first? jim? >> i guess this is stating the obvious. the landscape to me is divided between a world in which there are contentious powers. russia and china, specifically. and a broad series of transnational threats. the problem is in a way, russia and china are similar problems that we can all come up with lots of differences. we have to cope with both. the most obvious is military

terms, of course. those are vastly different military problems and we can't give up what we need to do militarily with major powers and transnational threats. we have a hard time dealing with both. >> i like the way you framed that. the failure of two types of interventionism. liberal and conservative. to me there is an interventionist bias in washington, not just on foreign-policy issues. it is on a range of public policy issues. the burden of proof, generally speaking, should be on those calling for intervention because they have lots of unintended consequences. and also in the foreign-policy realm because i believe the united states is safe and

secure. our contemporaries and ancestors within this period. there is an even higher bar for me for intervention abroad and that doesn't mean never, but it means rare. this gets to the question about indispensable nation. must we be the intervener? do we presume that an intervention is required, must we be involved? but as a practical question, there have been a number of interventions that have not involve the united states at all. the problem is, because we have sheltered our allies for so many years, they have allowed the military power to atrophy. if i were in their position, i would do the exact same thing. and so we shouldn't be surprised that they don't have the military power to carry out a very small mission which is truly in their backyard. the last point is, we just have to be honest with one another in this company and with the

american people. the purpose of u.s. foreign-policy has been to discourage other countries from developing their own capabilities. we talked about it all the time. we believe that most people believe it's a good idea. i tend to believe it's a good idea, too. but i don't believe it's a good idea for ever. i would like our allies to do something that did not require our intervention. >> that last point i couldn't agree with more. the fact is, we do want our allies to do more. it doesn't mean we have to do less. that bargain often doesn't work with them. if we go to our allies and say, if we want to do less, we want you to do more and carry more of the burden, they don't come back and say ok. what worries me the most is the diffusion of power.

the resulting uncertainty in the world with all these kinds of threats. some are related. some are not related. there is a terrorism threat. we all know what they are but it's a very confusing landscape. and the thing that concerns me the most is because of our internal political and ideological debates, mainly because of the bitterness that occurred is that we are going to be making some serious mistakes and adjusting to this new world. because we have a tendency to learn the wrong lessons when we make a mistake. so in vietnam, in the 1970's, we pulled back and we have the chaos not only in iran but the soviet invasion in afghanistan. and then the gulf war. it was a cakewalk.

it was very easy. so we got the conclusion that we can use military power in a way that we have never seen before. and so we do the iraq war. and the iraq war turns out to be the way we don't want it to be. so we do the exact opposite. we disengage, we pull back, and we make the mistake of equal eating internationally with military interventionism. they are not the same thing. it is probably the utility of it that's not demonstrated. that we should be cutting our military capabilities. that we should be showing up at meetings and reassuring our allies.

this is just old-fashioned diplomacy. it is not interventionism, per se. i do think that one thing that we should learn is that we have to be damn careful about using military forces. let's not over learned and dropn involved in syria russian mark >> not with military force. the same problems applied there that apply to libya. it was a situation where i did the usage of force turn out well. the problem was protecting. there was a humanitarian operation that could not be applied to syria. as many arefar concerned, it is not about human rights.

put more ofickly, i transnationale and the issues that you are focused on, in terms of climate change. this is a great example. have those were concerned about the environment and you grand international scheme. now, trying to build the pragmatic coalition or welding blocks. that is another thing about progressives. we change. there is a thing called climate change and we should try to deal with it, as opposed to going back a decade or two. defining late strategic context is really hard to do.

it is why the obama administration has delayed the strategy. we had a fragmenting and fracturing of power. >> yes. yeah. this young man. >> thank you very much. >> my name is jeff. i wonder if you could talk about the future of development. i heard that hillary clinton might be inclined to all of a u.s. aid. i heard that she might make a part of the state department. >> the problem with a id from the get-go is that it was in the 1960's with a certain philosophy of what economic development is supposed to be about. it was very much motivated by humanitarian interests and

nationbuilding. that's a pretty much outdated economic philosophy these days. they have the struggle for an identity. they mix a lot of their concerns about humanitarian policies. sometimes it gets combined with values like democracy. it hardly ever gets straightened out. i don't think aid should be part. certainly not a cabinet position. you have a policy that is more in sync and you have a more serious discussion about what that is. because of the way it is actually constructed. that people in the embassies that have their own independence, they have been this way for many years. i don't want to put it inside the state department. but rather try to have maybe an

elimination where you have some kind of a strategic thinking of the policies being recommended with what the rest of the government is doing. >> will come back to the side. >> i am aaron. >> we know who you are. >> i am writing my thesis on millennial foreign-policy. as cold warriors retire, stepping into these policymaking positions -- i consider myself a millennial. never saw cold war born in 1990. how does it work with our style of who we are and how we see the world? and what will motivate us and drive our foreign-policy outlook?

>> i don't know but i would urge you to not assume that you will have the same point of view in the same way that generation xers don't have the same point of view. jim referenced this exchange for the starting point of my book. you have two people quite close in age. madeleine albright and colin powell could not have been more

different in terms of their attitudes on military intervention. what's the point of this wonderful military if we're not going to use it? there will be reactions to u.s. interventions in iraq and afghanistan that will cause a millennial's -- some millennial's to be wary of military intervention. some will look at the experience and say this teaches us that we need to do it right. we need to have a larger nationbuilding corps and maybe a cabinet level agency. so i think that it's interesting to ponder this. i would be surprised if there is a millennial point of view. >> i was starting with the new obama administration to look for the generational outlook. i would mention two things.

one i thought turned out to be far less significant than the obama people thought it would be, and the other more. the first is, in this new administration coming in, there were certain millennial buzzwords. the world is interconnected. over and over again except i cannot quite find out in general how that changed the consideration of foreign-policy. it did one good thing. there is emphasis on new forms of communication whether it was in iran or china or anywhere else. the idea of promoting openness on the internet which was one of the tangible things hillary clinton did. in general, the world is interconnected but we have a lot of the same foreign-policy problems. one that turned out to be more

important, as you say, in the millennial outlook, the old problems are seen as something in the past and the new problems of rising powers. i think our saying beforehand that ben rhodes told me in the first year of the administration, i keep reading about rising powers. i was at the copenhagen summit where obama meant -- happened to run into serious problems with the chinese and the indians. they said they did not look like rising powers to me, they look like real powers. that part is different. even though there are lots of french or british german diplomats worried about this. it is less of a focus on europe.

it's a relative statement. >> i'm with the postgraduate school and i can't thank you enough for listening to this. i think there is a problem with linguistic terms. the problem with the term realism and others think realistic and it doesn't seem to be realistic. most people don't understand what you are talking about. >> that's why we have this. >> i wish somebody would make a definition that we could all start using. we somehow don't think about governments. we assumed when we got rid of the army, let's figure out how to run themselves. governance is really hard and nobody talks about it.

i heard him in september. i fell out of my chair when he said our real issues are understanding and relationships. >> the use and issues of realism, you are basically telling the truth and trying to look at the objective facts. the term is actually prudence in what the guidance for u.s. foreign policy should be. and not get carried away about some kind of ideological state. i think you should look at the facts as they are and try to come up with a policy to match that reality. back to the question of millennial's, it will probably not be any different than any other generation.

you will have the interest that you have. it will be shaped by events. just like president obama is having to respond to what is happening right now. and as it is, you have an inbox and you have to react to it. either attacks or change of events. that's one of the reasons why chris and i disagree on this capability. he sees it as an instrument being misused. whereas i see it as a matter of deterrence. if you don't have it, people will perceive you as weak. you may have to respond with a weaker capability than you would have if you had strong one. that's the way i look at it.

>> he capabilities you need for a strong military to defend attacks against yourself, it's quite different than the military you need to defend attacks to get others that have not developed model terry capabilities to defend themselves because they are sheltered under your security

umbrella. the reason we have the structure we do and a ploy our forces as we do is not primarily to defend and it's her attacks against the united states. it's too determined -- to deter attacks against others. realism means something, that in the basic context, that there is anarchy in the world system and state behavior is grounded in security concerns. if you believe in that ism, and it informs your policymaking, it will guide how you respond. if you believe that peace or war comes from different political systems, you believe in democratic peace, that informs your foreign-policy. if you believe peace comes from

economic interdependence, that informs your foreign-policy. know what i have ever met is purely a realist. even john, that means do you not trade with the chinese? if you actually believed in that, you would not be trading with the chinese. they are becoming wealthier. in understanding what these terms mean, it can help us to sort out how different people, presidents, will approach foreign-policy problems and in terms of their hierarchy, do they place priority on different things? >> for your generation, we have seen it. multiple avenues. you see things like the gates foundation. we have several in the civilian agencies become very frustrated. we have been talking about smart power. there is in a norma's amount of frustration. we actually have an impact.

those agencies need to reform. you will see more going in the other avenues. i went to iraq in the summer of 2003. it was important to try to make it better. there is enormous frustration. that is big challenge. those agencies need to reform but also you will see more people going into other avenues of u.s. engagement in the world. real quick on governments, spot on. i was against the war but i believe it was important for us to try to take a sad song and make it better. governance is a nice label but

the main point is it touches of town power politics. this is where we disagree. there is this notion that if we stuck around and held it together, the real fault in the obama administration was the inattention to the sectarianism that has contributed to this spike in sunni radical jihadism. even the phrase, management, we do not manage it. other actors have efficacy. they have infallible rights and we can shape on the margins and that is where obama gets it right. he is often portrayed as to standoffish but in a sense he understands that people need to write their own history.

i happen to think it would be great if we talked a little bit more about the things we would like to see which he is doing now with an inclusive government but we are not pretending we will re-invade and preoccupy and remake the society which is a good thing. >> do not try irony on vladimir putin. >> we could go on and on. the last question. >> i spent most of my life and research and the way i see it is america has influenced the rest of the world, it has had a large impact in the question i have is they spent $2 trillion in afghanistan and iraq. had we spent more money in higher education and research, with the world in the -- america be better off or not? >> let me take that comment and then give each of you a comment to wrap it up.

if i could summarize what i have heard how about the phrase do not -- do not do stupid stuff. >> you answered your own question. it was a leading one. but you cannot turn back the clock. the real question is how do we move forward and that is where having this discussion, we may disagree under from points but how do you synthesize the points to come up with something that is compelling to the american people because i think they are done. they are done with the adventurism and mistakes that were made and you need to show tangible results. we are in a much stronger position than where we were in 2008, 2009 but we are still not great. thinking about how we think about power in the world and the multiple avenues of influence and us just hard power in the ways we think about things and military but also we can do it outside of government to

continue the engagement of the rest of the world. that is essential. >> i had the impression that we may be on the point, on the cusp may be that the bitterness that had been created by the iraq war is starting to fade. there is a new set of historical experiences that we have to process and understand. and then as the millennial generation,, they will be dealing with new problems. i hope that this will be an opportunity for us as i sit in my opening remarks to focus on what we agreed on than what we disagree on. i think the uncertainty that exists in the world right now is

tying her hands and we do not have the kind of clarity in foreign policy that we need. a lot of it has to do with a squabbling among ourselves over what it means. also a lot of score-setting and also part of this debate over the iraq war, we were calling each other a lot of names and not moving forward area >> i will second something that ryan just said. when people ask about u.s. foreign policy, there is a presumption is what the government does create less successful foreign policy that we have is the interaction of individuals and private citizens as businesses and ngo's who have interacted with people who are not american. you have to have a holistic approach to this because when people talk about exceptionalism and understandably i get upset about it, i believe the u.s. is an exceptional nation. we are a shining example and his family. that is why we like to see the focus as the full press a presumption that u.s. policy is

defined by his forest and military prowess which we have seen has some shortcomings. >> i would sum up and say this is -- discussion where there is disagreement but they are respectful in the gobi on the slogans. it shows me the point i was trying to make which was if you get fixated on slogans like indispensable nation, it gets in the way of the scotian. i will say the other slogan and this one is more from the republicans, i covered the reagan administration, i heard him say i believed in the city on the hill regularly. he never used the word american exceptionalism.

that was used by scholars out it such and such university to describe reagan's views. how that caught on as a slogan for republican presidential candidates is beyond me but that is an example of what we need to get beyond. >> and want to thank you all very much. i want to think the audience for coming and also we finished right on time so thank you very much. we will hear more about foreign policy tomorrow. 9:00an watch that live at on c-span three. which -- pavlich

on what she perceives' as. >> the idea where the book came from was the democratic convention when they showed a tribute video because he had passed away and portray and him as a women's rights champion when he left a young woman to drown in his car and did not go back for nine hours. survived.e would have you can do an entire video at a convention talking about the war on woman and clarifying -- and glorifying the man without including that. we are airing one program from each year.

>> next, a look at factions that make up a rack and whether reconciliation can bring an end to the recent violence. also, the impact of isis on the region. this was hosted by the middle east institute. >> thank you. i am the only representative of the new america foundation here today. on behalf of the president and peter, the vice president for studies, thank you for being here today. about the panel and talk about the possibility for reconciliation in iraq. too much conversation has very little to do with either politics or reconciliation. obviously, the focus is on things military, airstrikes, terrorist attacks, isis, so on

and so forth. to look at the dialogue. not to say the military piece is not important. in the longer term, this is where the action is and where the hope for iraq lays. with that, we will go to our panelists and i will close. that i will be rude and we look forward to each having a conversation. we will start with my friends at the radcliffe institute who covers issues of identity and the arab world and iraq. >> it is a pleasure to be here. i only have 10 minutes.

think any reconciliation starts with identifying the problem. in order to understand the problem, we need a brief analysis of what has happened in the maine 2003 problem, and my point of view that iraq has been facing is a failure to integrate sunnis since 2003. and this is related to what the new iraq was based on. used to be airaq highly centralized state thatated by a sunni elite had visions of homogenization

and national secretary and sectarianntities -- and ethnic identities. arabs were told there are three -- to govern and occupy. movement separatist from foreign enemies. islamist reactionary groups controlled by the iranians. 2003, arabs saw the occupiers, kurdish nationals, and the shiites sitting together in setting the rules for the new

iraq. in 2003, it was not only regime change. it was the beginning of a state reformation process that entirely change the nature of iraqi politics. the main change is power-sharing. other regimes that were perceived as a threat are the main categories that define politics in iraq. the shiites adapted to the new realities quickly because they some degree of legitimacy. establishment had a level of autonomy, legitimacy, and was

able to represent the common or collective action with the parties operating in opposition. community, you andthe regional government institutions in 1991 and afterwards all stop they were able -- and afterwards. they were able to represent the colonial interests and visions of what they wanted to be part of. sunniin problem that arabs phase is that they lack institutions and structures outside of the space that they used to dominate.

sunni arab is a category imposed on people outside. ideashared visions and about themselves, iraq, and its identity. based on social structure. a sectbs, the state was and they no longer control it. ere are three more factors. -- there is not one side to be blamed. it is complex. it isthree factors, important to understand what happened since 2003.

the resistance for power-sharing that requires them to become a minority group. processes that shape new political rules in which the sunnis are underrepresented. and third, you have a sunni-sunni conflict for leadership weakening the community. , in the elections, most of the sunni arabs voted for a presenting a vision of sunnihat appeals to all arabs and was nostalgic for the past. it emphasized the iraqis are and there a community

was elements of anti-iranian discourse. most arabs identified with it. you had 10lection rounds of negotiations that over the -- >> afterwards, the prime minister use the stick and the arrot. a political vacuum was created in the sunni arab community filled by isis and radical groups.

andconflict between isis it's reluctant sunni adversaries is a conflict to control define the meaning of being sunni. so, what is next? that thee all agree main task is to fight isis. this is not easy. we may agree this cannot be achieved without securing a andine sunni representation partners who can challenge isis without losing the support of the sunni arab community. there is a need for a vision

appealing to the sunni community and some people think that we need to radically decentralized governance in iraq to prevent any individual or group of people to build another authoritarian exclusionary regime. i agree with the perspective. by mentioninglude some issues that we need to be aware of to make the debate on decentralization more serious. first, the moment was are talking about sharing resources in iraq, we will start talking about why we have to. the most oil-dependent

state in the world, 95% of the government is secured through oil. gdp.is almost 69% of their elites at theling center of baghdad and tendency totheir exclude others. it is not easy to find a good formula to share resources. -- we know the resources are not distributed evenly. they were saying, why should to erbil.oney

we will see the same question come out when they talk about giving money to the most impoverished sunni regions. region willni provide autonomy from the shiite-dominated government. i think this is unlikely. arabs do not have established united leadership or beugh resources to independently from baghdad and .ack bargaining power i think this will lead to the formation of a shiite region.

we're going to see andarian tension intra-communal conflict. think they need to grant more powers to the existing in iraq. thank you. >> he is the author of "reclaiming iraq." he was in iraq in the summer. >> thank you and thanks for

organizing this panel. i have -- so many people worked on it. i will go to the point. i will be my own moderator. all right. only secondn everything said. a lot of the remarks are to the point and describe what is going on in iraq. maybe i can elaborate on a few things and provide a few other points of view that may broaden on picture and let us end thoughts that are not covered so far. let's think about reconciliation. "e government tells you,

everything we do on a deal he basis is reconciliation." we are trying everything to accommodate everybody. the question is, is reconciliation in the by -- in the eye of the beholder? is for the region and the who areional players interested in the world will stop whose reconciliation are we going to talk about? also, the narrative of reconciliation has been in a way that there are so many myths realities -- myths and realities. because many do not look at the math. you talk about pushing sunnis out of the government, how can

that be when sunnis, by most credible statistics, or add 20%. if you count the top positions, they have 34%. they are not the 99% they used to get. including the ministry of planning, education, trade, and the list goes on. rhetoric can be formed in any way. the question is, why are we not getting says faction in the sunni community?

ask the bigeed to questions. do the people who get the positions really represent the sunnis and work for their interests. onen tell you that any kurdish member works better than all of the sunni and shiite representatives. elected andng appointed to a cabinet job matters more than how many there are. that is important for us to think. most two are in the parliament do not represent much of the sunni community. they do speak and make decisions business on behalf of the

sunni community and speak on behalf of the sunni community. same thing with the shiite representatives in the parliament. the tip of the iceberg is the dissatisfaction of the shiite community. thesunnis say representatives are not able to deliver much in the shiite are selling us out. part of the reconciliation comes out of them making deals on oil. go and make a reconciliation with the sunnis, the echoes from the shiite share. loud with are less

thoseints and there are who are looking in the shiite community. dissatisfaction as we speak,ces there is a movement to create a that is perceived as a revenge movement to what the government is doing. -- if the province is established, it changes the rules of the game. there is another movement at a thes the summa

republic. it is about separation from the rest of iraq. for the first time in my own to several have been provinces in the middle euphrates and central iraq, the lack of commitment of the shiite towards unity has not been seen. people are not committed. people are not served the way they should be. the south and central are in ruins and there are some who are no better in their

representation than the sunni community. what is going on here in the we areliation is that thinking about reconciliation in the wrong place. we are thinking of it in terms of how many positions go to how many people in each community reckons -- not real reconciliation. it will not translate to better performance and deliverance to peoplestituencies of the in these positions. havether problem that we we need to look at the grievances of the populace.

onre has not been 10% or 5% reconciling population as much as we are working day and night to reconcile politicians. is who will be reconciled with in the sunni community. are one's complaining that to not have much to complain about and there are others in mostly, whorope, are not on talking terms with the sunni representatives in the government. people?ut these there are two kinds of disputes. there are people who tell you the entire process, they are not

interested in it. and shouldis built be toward down, started again on new terms. there are those who are willing to work with the existing system and we have to look reconciliation in light of the previous or parallel reconciliations. there are great examples in the world. south africa and morocco. these, younciling cannot turn the page on history and the been alluded to fact that the perpetrators of insisting that

everything that was done was the right thing to be done. up to now, we have heard sunnisntatives of the reconcile --to that you need to reconcile with say that everything that was done to them was exactly what should have been done. we are looking at places in the iraq wherehe west of not a single shiite is left alive. anya single one can go to of these places up to now. there are silver linings, definitely. there are many who put their lives at risk to rescue a shiite and got them to their homes. how many are there?

are they effective? that needs to be worked out from peoplei said to people. thing, looking up now,toliation, there has not been a good mediator who will sponsor a sensible reconciliation iraq, leaving the project to the iraqis to work out on their own with their own devices with all the troubles we have. weis the wrong way to go and will be deeply in trouble and andin need of an honest

effective mediator to work the project. we can talk about other things. >> thank you. lecturer. turn to a politics on the economies of petroleum states. he has been on an extended winter break. welcome. am surprised it takes a war for iraq to be on washington, d.c.'s radar. i want to comment and talk a look more about it from the vantage point of iraqi kurdistan . we have political representation. sunnis are represented, kurds are represented.

what is missing is power-sharing. look at the kurdish representation in baghdad. budget ofment cut the the kurdish government and curtis dan gets 17% of the budget. that is the revenue sharing agreement. without going to the parliament, it was an executive order that was done by the prime minister. he cut the budget and the economy was crippled overnight, not being able to pay salaries. listen to the federal government -- was into this. this is the federal government. large kurdish bloc that could not do anything.

they could not lift a finger to change the policy. they have representation and not power-sharing. this is what has not changed about iraq. before, there was not much representation. initially, representation-wise, it was not sectarian. that is the problem we have. , which iseason obvious, they refused to share power. sharing power is a problem and that is why the people are not being taken care of. i could not have said this better. nobody thinks of the people. look at the budget being spent.

the last one was $100 billion and a lot of money. the largest budget iraq had ever seen. i hope one of you gets to see baghdad. it is the largest village in the world. where did the money go? where did the money go? we do not look at institutions and structures. the economy is failing the have not talked about the chronic dependence on oil. i'm talking about iraq and not the u.s. addiction to oil. .hat is a reality check the budget and you go from being a rich country to

being a government that is not able to pay salaries. this kind of power structure that leaves no choice but to be myopic. as an economyaq that is a distribution system. we sell oil. we cash it. if we cannot, there is nothing to distribute. is,other dimension unfortunately, the other chronic problem, corruption. it is not getting enough attention. let me make the distinction. when the world talks about the

corruption, it is money not being well spent. in the case of iraq, it is not an economic problem. it is national security. fell because we had ghost soldiers and corruption in the ranks. unfortunately, some of that kurdishafflicted the and some they faced when they were attacked by isis. let me turn to the vision for iraq. it may be confusing to look at what the kurds want. some talk about a kurdish commitment to federalism or a kurdish grants team, grand plan, or strategy. workingthey have been on these two directories --

trajectories. there is a desire for independence. -- whoy one who read respects the sovereignty is united states. unfortunately, i do not visit the south and people from the south did not visit the north. university of iraq has people from all over the country. unfortunately, it is a country on a map. it does not feel like a country. i visit washington, d.c. more than i visit that debt. this country that was put together has failed its people for historical reasons. to commit we be asked to the nation that is failing? and the question being asked. in the is allowed

country, why can we. the grievance are there to stop the genocide. government has been building institutions and we have some that are somewhat independent. you have an economy that is independent. attemptsave some towards secession. ,n every kurdish subconscious everyone has a desire for statehood in a desire for independence. is aware of the challenges facing independence. people know that we are not in a friendly neighborhood and are aware of the regional risks and the history's. -- the history.

that is one track. you have aspirations and serious work associated with the infrastructure. that is why you see the government some time acting like a sovereign state. capital, itsit the is very important they highlight the red carpet. those are big deals because they represent symbolism. this is one side of the schizophrenia. on the other hand, you have federalism. were adamant about enshrining federalism and the constitution. some see this as a step towards independence and others, which is my opinion here, see it as an opportunity to live within

without suffering the decentralization of the past and yes, they have enjoyed the perks of statehood through federalism without the responsibility associated with sovereignty. andhave institutions built the economy is drastically different. it feels nicer and is a completely different city. because of better leadership, consolidation of power, and also, a unity that does not exist in the country. federalism is still personal and political, rather than institutional and legal. we have a constitution that depends on who reads it. that is still not clear. we have many political deals.

hydrocarbon law. the sharing of the resources, the right to sell oil, those are completely unclear every time there is a situation such as baghdad needs from revenues, there is a political deal. for example, i'm talking about 2007, there was a political deal baghdad allowed them to sell oil, there was some process. price of oil went up, but oil was enough to cover iraqi budgets, baghdad on the decisions. two years later, three years later, there was another deal and then this time, the k.r.g. wanted it, they didn't need baghdad. they build their own independent pipeline. they're all political deals. i tell you this history because we just had a new deal on december 2, 2014, where the kurdish government and the iraqi government agreeon