because others, as jim notes in his article, germany has a closer interest in dealing with ukraine. sometimes you overstate the alaska alaskach our distracts or sanctions them from that. i think they understand that they had an interest. coming back from jordan in the middle east, i think there is a recognition that they have an interest in the anti-isil coalition. which i think we will talk about. and i think finding the right fit in terms of u.s. leadership in countries like israel, they do look to the u.s. to call some plays, but not in the way that we are going to shock and awe the region with our military might and force which i think we tried in the previous decade. i mentioned this already but the third point i would say, the bush administration experienced this as well.

how do wen between work between international institutions and liberal internationals. and where do we actually use the force directly. one of the things you mentioned in your article was the first two years of the obama administration was more realist. if you look at things like the smartistan surge and the power sort of campaign. if you look at the israeli-palestinian negotiation effort, one would say that was not terribly realistic or did not produce the results that they hoped. there was a strand of idealism that goes back. it's hard for us to check these high ideals. there is the instinct there and it is hard, i think, for many americans to leave that at the door. the one thing that has changed which maybe wasn't so much in the article but we will talk about is how the world is changed fundamentally.

i think obama has adapted to it somewhat. and the criticism of the indispensable power framework is spot on. thes not only the rise of other countries like india and china which is quite obvious and nothing new over the last few decades. it is the diffusion of power. complicates things in how we talk about diplomacy and foreign policy. whether it is the arab uprising or the arab spring. what we're seeing on the streets almost every place these days. and i do think what leads to the comments, these changes are fundamentally different. the way technology is bringing different value systems directly at odds with one another. the way it allow allows actually smaller groups that aren't a

threat, i agree with you. it gets into our policy. it gets into our politics and consciousness. it makes it very hard. puts it in the space that obama tried to do and makes it ease look, equities to say they are coming to get us. it makes it very easy to say that they are all coming together. i was not saying that the obama administration was necessarily disengaged. right balance the on most issues. issues ways the value reticence to talk about this. this is where we may disagree. while the torture report was released, you see that people actually still look up to america in some ways. you see it's a form of power that has been damaged by some of our past mistakes. you see that people look at our politics in many ways.

they look at it as ideal. unfortunately, we see the assumptions that we all see, which is that we often make these unforced errors that hurt ourselves. i will close maybe with a little bit of optimism. looking at where america is today, especially when i was in europe last week and the middle east, it is less pessimistic coming back here when you look at how people look to our country still as an economic engine. especially in this year and the we are producing more energy. not that we are fully back to where we were. think we ever will be. i think we need to pragmatically recognize that. the real trick is how we actually adapt to these new trends? in terms of people being able to have more of a say in their own politics and their own country's power which makes for a much dynamic environment west ort of east versus wet or cold war politics.

the next ministration will have to react more quickly than it is capable of doing right now. >> we have 15 minutes before we turn it over to you folks who have been very patient. jim, do you want to respond to the comments made? >> on obama's first two years, i do mean the old-style realism. and when obama took office, he cited him as a model. and then the green movement in iran. which he decided to keep hands off on. ever i do think that is realism. you mentioned israel and the palestinians. that is interesting because it goes back to a debate about the time of the iraq war.

and before. that was where the neo-conservatives felt, through the gulf war, that a display of military power opened the way for some negotiations. that was their belief. arafat. arafat was scared. he was marginalized. therefore, that would work with the iraq war. and the other side, they had been arguing that you can't get anywhere in the middle east without an agreement between israel and the palestinians. so that is where that -- and onma takes office very much the scocroft side on that. and obama got swept up in the arab spring. my heart was with him and it did not work out well.

he really believed that democracy would sweep the middle east. on europe, i'm not quite sure that the eu is the economic agency. i'm not sure when you say obama would have delegated to the europeans, it is the eu that would have expanded to the ukraine. i'm not sure and nato -- >> it was a nato expansion issue is what i was saying. which is what the russians also really orrery about. >> i'm not sure you're saying we should have pushed nato expansion when the germans and others would not have -- would not have bought it. >> an example when we do sit back and let them take the lead it always doesn't work out -- it doesn't always work out well. >> chris, let me ask you a question. in your article, you talked about the tension between republicans that want to save

the world and at home they don't want the government to do anything. how does that get resolved? >> nothing, but less than democrats. i think there is a -- less than liberals. a tensionere is between a skepticism of the efficacy of government that conservatives and libertarians share and a strange enthusiasm and the confidence that government can do lots of great things overseas. i guess the pithiest way to say this is that folks like me have some doubts about the u.s. postal service's ability to deliver the mail and we believe the united states can deliver democracy in a foreign country where we don't know the culture and aren't really welcome. much of the time, not all the time. but much of the time. is -- there is a real disconnect there. another thing i was struck by

when reading kim's series of articles, this notion about state failure and the need to rebuild failed states. this isn't to add nation building. the idea that this is not nationbuilding. well, what is it? if we are going to avert their decline or make them stronger, that is nationbuilding. i think many conservatives and libertarians have some skepticism. i call it the fatal conceit. i think there is a tension there between the confidence in the u.s. government's ability to do great things abroad even as they retain their skepticism about them doing great things here at home. >> how do we balance between our values and our interests. like we talked about the arab spring. stayed withve mubarak or should we have sided with those who wanted to at beginning move toward democracy? >> i hate to say it but there is

no simple answer. doctrineno that canophy ever guide us because you have to look on a case-by-case basis. it will have our own particular interests we're going to have to weigh. to that extent, i see a need for realistic values and interests. the point i make is that you have to have both. not only because the american people will not support a purely realistic imperial germany. they do believe america has ideals that they want to live up to. if they are going to make the in lives in treasure of their military, people wasn't they feel like they are doing the right thing. how does that translate into

what you support? the whole middle east policy has never been based mainly on values. not only the strategic interests we have in our access to oil, with the rise of isis, and all of the other conflicts had there, we still have a preeminence to strategic interests. >> i see because i sevenned in administration, they came out with the so called freedom agenda which all of my friends hated with a passion. ever they saw it as the ideological motivation for the iraq war when it had nothing to do with that. it came later as a way of trying to rationalize what happened after the fact with an idealistic purpose. the real what liberal friends said, i don't think they really -- >> i know but to this day when a neoconservative making wars it is like selling

the point of the spear and all that sort of thing. that is what i mean. the fact is, we will never be able to sell a leadership role, however you may define it. to the american people unless there are some values. alliances areur always based on values as well. democracies for the most part. i'm not the talking about the middle east. mainly europeout and asia. we are partners and allies because of who we are and that is not insignificant. it is defining with the fundamental allied structure is, simply something overtaken by evens because there power and the of like. the real question that i have is, that i kind of agree with the analysis we were making but what do you do about it? does that mean you cut your defense budget and go back on military capabilities because

you don't think you have a need to use it? what does that mean about trade policy in asia? do you let the chinese take the lead? because we no longer have the kind of interests we have before? if we let our allies in europe or the middle east take the lead, that means that they are going to be asserting their own interests in cases. happened in is what libya in which we feel obligated tonypport them much like blair felt obligated to support george w. bush o over iraq because he didn't want to do the intervention either. they begin to follow their own parochial interests. and calling it leadership. and that is the worry that i have. >> let me ask you a question that comes up a lot about the whole responsibility to protect. should that be a good guiding principle? should not? president clinton said his biggest regret was not doing anything about rwanda. should we have? >> it should be part of the debate but people often forget

is what can you do realistically and practically? what can be done? that is one thing that strikes me, if you read this week's "new yorker," there is a profile of samantha power in there and there is an interesting line when asked about libya and syria. libyand not syria?te there seems to be a pathway towards success where something could be done where our actions where our actions would load to nower lives being lost as opposed to more. it is a serious analytical debate today. still to this day on syria. it is why the obama administration itself is stuck. it's paralyzed. on the one hand he said, we should go. but there was a strand inside of its own administration that we can't overlook the stacks of tens of thousands of bodies of what he's done and work with them.

but then there is also this strand of realism that says we've got to work with him. so i think that idea is always out there and it's been applied where we could. i think that practical consideration is a big thing. kim just said, and i think in the case of egypt, it is in some ways the wrong question. whether obama decided that mubarak should go or not. the egyptian people decided that he should go. i feel like it connects with jim was trying to say in his article. we were somewhat of a bystander in that. our statements mattered quite a lot. but what strikes me is if you look at the counterrevolution, with great popular support into a large extent, the u.s. had been on the sidelines and

letting things play out. pragmatic strand in it. i think my worry moving forward in a place like egypt and some of these other tough cases, if you don't have that struggling of how to blend realistic interests and working with security and the values of how do you actually get ordinary egyptians that are being thrown in jail by the tens of of think it willn't work in this day and sage. this is when the presidents row impose, it may load to wider explosion. cases moving beyond a level of liberal have policy. realist foreign that is where the rubber hits the road. for the most part, the obama administration has taken a step back. not dark on thoseon issues.

>> what about iran for example? how do you apply that to iran? >> i think i would do more in the obama administration, highlighting the human rights abuses. there are bits and pieces of this. i would not scuttle attempted diplomacy. unfortunately, sometimes some of the conservatives in the camp say it doesn't happen. i would continue to have this on the agenda. c. l. whether in u.n. bodies. basic human rights and highlighting it. president obama has done it episodically. from ourt turn awhich values. i don't think we should invade countries and impose democracy. i think it would be great to have them talking about this because it connects with the next generation. talking about what i was trying to say. in terms of the changes this i come ine likely to iran. >> let me --

>> do you want to say something? get to thelike to audience and you can make these points as we go. i call on you, if you would stand up and wait for the microphone and tell us who you are with anou organization. sir? >> i am retired and i served in the clinton administration, with bruce babbitt in the interior department and later as the secretary for the environment development of the state. my interest is more on the environmental side of foreign policy, but i guess i will reflect on being 65 for just a second. i don't find a debate between the realist and idealist is very helpful. what i think i have seen since the kennedy administration is the failure of two kinds of interventionism. liberal interventionism, which failed miserably in

vietnam. and then conservative interventionism which was a a disaster in chile. iran.en a disaster in all of which have led to further disaster for us, by the way. it seems to me that i i would like to hear more reflection on the panel. i have loved everyone's comments. i'm a yellow dog democrat from texas. [laughter] >> welcome. >> please get to the point. >> what is the real problem? what is the real challenge? is the real challenge the evolution of democracy in places like china? is the real challenge a resurgent china that economically threatens our position in asia? what is the landscape we are trying to play into when we are saying we need to be more realistic or less realist or more idealistic? what is the landscape? >> thank you, sir. want to comment first? jim, why don't you --

>> i guess this is stating the obvious. the landscape to me is divided between a world in which there are contentious powers. russia and china, specifically. and a broad series of transnational threats. the problem is in a way, russia and china are similar problems that we can all come up with lots of differences. and the transnational threats are similar problems. we have to cope with both. the most obvious is military terms, of course. those are vastly different military problems and we can't give up what we need to do militarily with major powers and

transnational threats. we have a hard time dealing with both. particularly the transnational threats. >> chris, he mentioned you. >> quickly. i like the way you framed that. the failure of two types of interventionism. liberal and conservative. to me there is an interventionist bias in washington, not just on foreign-policy issues. it is on a range of public policy issues. the burden of proof, generally speaking, should be on those calling for intervention because they have lots of unintended consequences. and also in the foreign-policy realm because i believe the united states is safe and secure. of securityeasure that our contemporaries envy and tors would envy.ed

there is an even higher bar for me for intervention abroad and that doesn't mean never, but it means rare. this gets to the question about indispensable nation. must we be the intervener? do we presume that an intervention is required, must we be involved? answer is no as a normative question. but as a practical question, there have been a number of interventions that have not involve the united states at all. the problem is, because we have sheltered our allies for so many years, they have allowed the military power to atrophy. if i were in their position, i would do the exact same thing. it is a great deal. we agree to defend them and they agree to let us. and so we shouldn't be surprised that they don't have the military power to carry out a very small mission which is truly in their backyard. the last point is, we just have to be honest with one another in this company and with the american people. the purpose of u.s. foreign-policy has been to discourage other countries from developing their own capabilities. we talked about it all the time.

we believe that most people believe it's a good idea. i tend to believe it's a good idea, too. but i don't believe it's a good idea forever. i would like our allies to do something that did not require our intervention. >> comments? >> that last point i couldn't agree with more. call it burden sharing. the fact is, we do want our allies to do more. it doesn't mean we have to do less. that shouldn't necessarily be the reason. that bargain often doesn't work with them. if we go to our allies and say, if we want to do less, we want you to do more and carry more of the burden, they don't come back backey almost always compa come and say ok, we will do less like you are. what worries me the most is the diffusion of power. the resulting uncertainty in the world with all these kinds of threats. some are related.

some are not related. the rising china and russia. there is a terrorism threat. we all know what they are but it as very confusing landscape. thing that concerns me the most is that pause of our internal political and ideological debates, mainly because of the bitterness that occurred is that we are going to be making some serious mistakes and adjusting to this new world. because we have a tendency to overlearn or learn the wrong lessons when we make a mistake. so in vietnam, in the 1970's, we pulled back and we have the chaos not only in iran but the soviet invasion in afghanistan. we learned from this lesson from be strong and to draw the conclusion that the soviet union collapsed because were strong. and then the gulf war. it was a cakewalk. it was very easy. so we got the conclusion that we

can use military power in a way that we have never seen before. and so we do the iraq war. and the iraq war turns out to be the way we don't want it to be. so we do the exact opposite. we disengage, we pull back, and make the mistake of equating engagement internationally with military interceptionism. they are not the -- interventionism. they are not the same thing. as pragmatic and reluctant as you may be to use military force in this environment. they are not the same thing. it is probably the utility of it that's not demonstrated. that we should be cutting our military capabilities. that we should be showing up at meetings and reassuring our allies. o and even in the middle east theire understand interests. this is just old-fashioned

diplomacy. it is not interventionism, per se. i do think that one thing that we should learn is that we have to be damn careful about using military forces. places like the middle east. we learned that lesson. it and's not overlearn draw the opposite conclusion that basically we need to pull back and do little or nothing. >> should we have gotten involved in syria earlier? >> mott in military force. it was a situation where i could not see the use of force turning out very well. and i think the problem was is that actually talking about responsibilities to protect that was set up as a model for libya that could not be applied to syria pause there was strategic overriding interests against doing this. as many of as far the europeans were concerned libya was not just about human rights. it was also about commercial interests. >> i would put more of a stress the transnational threats talking about the future of u.s.

foreign policy and the issue focused on in terms of climate change. -- i try toolicy follow all of it. initially on the grand international scheme and now they are being pragmatic and pragmaticbuild co-alists building locks and that isart about it and another thing about progressives which define us against some not all but that we accept change and realize there is a thing called climate should troy to harness it and deal with it as opposed to go back to a decade or two. is delayed in releasing its new national security strategy we had this fracturing and fragmentation, diffusion of

of power in the world. >> yes, sir? young man here. >> thank you very much. tyson.f a reporting fellow with devex. i wonder if you could touch on future of foreign policy. hillarysomebody like clinton might elevate to a cabinet department or make u.s.a. id part of the state department. inwound oar what you thoughts are. >> you were in the state department. problem with a.i.d. from the get-go is that it is formed in the 1960s with a certain philosophy of what economic to bepment is supposed about and very much motivated at the time about a humanitarian abusing government aid

otherck nation build and do things strike. outdated philosophy. they struggled for ey identity d concerns about humanitarian policies and health polesis and the like and sames gets combined -- i don't think a.i.d. hud be part of certainly not a position. i do think that is does make sense that you have an economic moreopment policy that is strategywith what our goals are but you cannot do that because of the way that a.i.d. constructed. always have its separate afe aga had their ownt independence from what the

wants.dor it has been this way for many years. i don't want to put it inside department so it becomes an agency lobpying that tont of view but rather try have a breakdown perhaps even elimination of a.i.d. so you of a strategic economic polesis and foreign aid policies they recommend with what the rest of doing.ernment is >> any quick comments? yes, is sir? then we will come back. this side and then. >> i'm aaron. i'm a post cap. are. know who you >> i'm a graduate student. on m iting my thesis milennial foreign policy. we going to be -- i millenial.self a

never saw a cold war. born in 1990. foreign policys. system work with our style of who we are and how we see the world? key issues what us and driveate our foreign policy outlook? >> i don't know but i would urge you to not assume that you all is the same have point of view in the same way that generation xeres don't have same point of view and cold war eras and baby boomers don't have the same point of view. will point to jim referenced this exchange, it is the book, twooint of my people who were quot quite closn a similarew up in time period but madeleine albright and colin powell could not have been more difference in military intervention.

all bright said to powell what purpose of this wonderful military if we are not going to be able to use it. be reactions that millenials toe bewarery of military intervention and others who will in iraq andrience afghanistan and say this teaches us that we need to do it right, better, we need to have a larger nation building cabinetd maybe even a level agency since having it inside the state department well for scrs.y it is interesting to kind of ponder this but i would be if there is a unitary point of view. back thed in my obama-ians and starting to look generational outlook and i would mention two things. one of them i thought turned out far less significant then

the obama people tout at the the other more. the first is in this new in thereation coming were certain milennial buzz words. is interconnected. the world is interconnected over again except ier would never quite find out in general how that changed the policy.ation to foreign it did one good thing which was there was an emphasis on new forms of communications where it was in iran or china or anywhere of of promoting openness on the internet which one of the tangible things hillary clinton did was i thought important. general, yes, the world is interconnected but we have a the same foreign policy problems as we did. be one that turned out to more important was as you say that absolutelily in the milennial outlook the old

problems of the cold are are the past seen as in and the new problems of "rising saying i think i was beforehand that ben rhodes told me in the first year or two of administration when are, it you know, i even reading about rising powers is rising powers, was just at the copenhagen summit where o obama managed to serious problems with with the chinese and indians and so on and he said they didn't powers to me,ng they were role powers and that is what -- real powers and that have to deal with. so that part is different. lotsnk although there are whorench, german, diplomats worry about this, there is less of a -- less of a focus on europe. this is a relative statement, than there was during the cold war. >> up here?

postm with the naval popular graduate school. i can't thank you enough at listening to this. first of all, i think there is a terms. with linguistic the problem with the the term realism and others that think it doesn't seem to be realistic. it is not -- they are used but don't understand what you are talking about. >> yeah. this.t is why we have >> pulpibut i wish somebody woud that we couldion all start using. secondly, i'm struck by the governance. we somehow don't think about governments. waltzed into iraq and assumed when we got rid of the army they out how to run themselves. governance is really hard and nobody talks about it. >> okay. thanks. >> i have two more comments? of other people here.

>> i met from the c.m.o. and i heard him in september i fell he said ourre when real issues are understanding relationships. >> all right. >> give a try at that. you are right about the use or misuse of the term "realism." beingwhen you are realistic you are look at the truth and trying to understand remember thant is as it should be. that is what realism means to me trying to assess what is all about. the term i actually prefer is of what theterms guidance for u.s. foreign policy should be. we should be careful and assess we are doing and not get carried away in some kind of idelogical crusade h whether it orfrankly engaging too much engaging too little. i think to be prudent you should facts as they are and try to come up with a policy

that matched that reality. getting back to the question agreethe milennials, i with with chris that you are probably to the going to be any different than any other whether mine or the other you will have differences of opinions and interests this bring to the table but at end of the day just like the rest of us you will be shaped by and ha have to respond to events just like president obama is having to respond to what is happening in iraq right now. as it is.is you have an in box and vow to react to it. react to it.ve to where you have most of your control in the long run is capabilitiesh the and training and the understanding of what you do unexpectedve these someone either attacks or change of events. was of our depate idebateis all about. chris and ieasons disagree on military

capabilities. he probably sees it as an instrument which can be misused and therefore military interventionism whereas i see it as a matter of deterrences. if you don't have it people see will bed weak and you challenged and may have to respond with a weaker capability one.if you had a strong that is no not the interventionism. warmongering. that is capability and deterrences. that is a debate worth having. it since youarify brought it up. i do believe in having a strong military. thedifference is capabilities you need to defend and defer attacks against from theis different military that you need to defend and deter attacks against others that have not developed military capabilities to defend themselves because they are sheltering under your security umbrella. forcesson we deploy around the world is not

primarily to defend aand deter attacks against the united states. it is pry tearily to defend and attacks against others. that is a key distinction. >> can i -- >> absolutely. >> in defense ofisms just for realism is an i.r. term means something which in basic context means there is anarchy in the world system and state's behavior is grounded in security concerns. thissism orve that it informs your policy making then it will guide how you respond. you believe that peace or war come interests different believe inystems you a democratic peace, that informs your foreign policy. you believe that peace comes from economic interdependence informs your foreign policy. no one i have met is purely a purely -- even john,

you talk and ask them and say you don't that mean trade with the chinese? >> no, no, not really because if thatctually believed in then you wouldn't be trading with the chinese because you might have the effect of of stronger, right? they are becoming wealthy remember. defense ofisms i think it can help us to sort out how different people, presidents, will approach foreign policy inblems and what they will hierarchy where doig problems. the >> i think for your generation ourwe have seen it with generation multiple avenues for to engage with the world. we have had several friends go civilianularly the agencies and become frustrated and for all of our talk of smart forr and need to reform almost 10 years now, think tanks

have been talking about smart power. rice tried to the -- condoleezza rice tried to reform the state department. agencies need to reform but also i think you will see more and more people going u.s.other avenues of engagement in the world. real quick on governance. spot on. the summer iraq in of 2003. i was against the war but i believed it was important for us take a sad song and make it better. and governance is a nice label, i think the main point i wanted to say is that it touches politicsr politics and in the strands that i was talking about the fusion of power. that is where kim and i disagree with little bit. there was the notion if weigh stuck around with tens of thousands of troops and held it expensive duct tape. the real fault in the obama administration wasn't leaving it was inattention to the

sectarianism that contributed to in sunni radical jihaddism. not managing those politics point i was trying to make in terms of diffusion of managing.even we don't manage these things but keeping an eye to it and understand that other actors have efficacy and they will write their own destiny and we can can shape on the parks. is where obama gets it right. he is portrayed as too stand offish. in a sense i think he understands that people neat to write their own history. think it would be great if we talked more about the things we would like to see which he is ting now with an inclusive government in iraq but we are pretending we will reinvade and reoccupy. >> don't try iron create putin.on vladimir >> we could go on and on but you sir.he last question, >> i'm unaffiliated.

i spent most of my life in it isch and the way i see that influenced the rest of the products it new provided. it has had a large impact and is that wen i have spent $2 trillion in afghanistan where weand we are are. had we spent more of that money research education and here in infrastructure would the better offmerica be or not? >> let me take that meant and then give each of you a comment to wrap it up. let mow say if i could summarize how about the phrase don't do stupid stuff. would that make sense? let upgjim go last to you go first. think you answered your own question, sir. it was a leading one. clock.'t turn back the the question i have is how to we mob forward. i think having the discussion disagree on different

points how do you synthesize the with somethingup compelling to the american people. i think they are done to a large extent. of of thea lot adventurism and mistakes that need to show you tangible results and reminding last thing ise lat thing i 2014 five years later in a than where weion 2009 but we are 49er still not great. power in thet world and multiple influence and not hard power and old ways that and whatabout things the military does also what we could do outside of government to engage with the rest of the world is eception. >> thank you. kim? stands torre never still -- history never stands still. i have the impression that we cuspe on the point on the maybe where the bitterness that created by can --

been created by the iraq war is fade a little bit. a whole new set of historical experiences over the last six also that we have to process and understand. milennial ande new generations come up they will be dealing with new and i hope that this will be an opportunity for us as i said in my opening remarks to focus obit more on what we agree on than what we disagree on. the uncertainty that exists in the world right now is sort of tying our hands and we kind of clarity in our foreign policy that i think that we need. to do withf it has us squabbling among ourselves all means but also a lot of score setting and also the of this debate over iraq war where are we are calling each other a lot of fames and not moving forward -- of names and not moving forward. >> chris? >> i will second something that said.just when people ask me about u.s.

foreign policy there is a what the u.s. is government does in interaction governments. the most successful foreign policy is the interaxe of as private citizens and individuals and businesses who interact with people every day who are nonamerican and that is foreign policy, that. i think we have to have a pretty of wholistic approach to this because when people talk about exceptionalism and understandably i get a little upset and say yeah, i believe the united states is an nation and we have been a shining city, a shining example that people wished to emulate in the past and i think we still are and still can be and that is where i would like the focus asf opposed to the reflective presumption that u.s. foreign policy is defined by the use of force and military prowess which have seen has some short comings we have seen over the last 15 years. >> i would sum up and say the is discussion where there are

disagreements but there are respectful and they go beyond the slogans it shows me exactly to maket i was trying onch was if you get fix ated indispensable nation it gets in the way of discussions. the other slogan and this is more from the republicans i covered the reagan administration. aheard him say i believed in city on the hill regularly. i never heard him and looked he used the word american exceptionalism. at suched by scholars and such university to describe reagan's views. slogant caught on as a for republican presidential candidates is beyond me but that of what in example think we need to get beyond. >> listen, i want to thank you all very much. want to thank the audience for coming and also tell you we finished right on time.

time. so thank you very much. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> you will hear more about the u.s. foreign policy tomorrow byh a day-long event hosted the brookings institution centering on u.s. relations with china and south korea. watch that live 9:00 a.m.at the eastern on c-span3. the senate tuesday confirmed u.s.urphy to be the next surgeon general by a vote of 51-43. nominees that the stat is considering before the current congressional

session. senators return tomorrow to vote on nominees picked to serb at state and homeland security departments. watch live coverage of the c-span2. this week on q and a, author and editor on what she perceives as hypocrisy of liberals. back tois you problem number four as you say of ted kennedy. the bookthe idea for d.n.c.om was the 2012 convention where they were showing this tribute video and as a women'sm rights champion when he left a woman to drown in his car and if he had not gone back for his hours and tried to save own behind she would have probably survived and you can't a an entire video ought

convention -- at a convention claiming to be preaching and the war on women and glory tying somebody like that. night.ay nate >> we are airing one program year starting december 22 at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. a look at the different fractions that make up iraq and reconciliationl can bring an end to the recent violence in iraq lense occurring there. discuss the impact isis is having in the region and u.n.ole of the this was hostedpy the middle east institute and the johns advancedchool of international studies. it is just under two hours. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014]

>> thank you very much. we will talk from our seats here today. i believe i'm the only americatative of new here today. one of the three cosponsors so our president and the vice president for studies and head of the international security program, thank you very being here today. we are very excited about this panel and about talking about the possibility for reconciliation in iraq. far too much of our conversation has veryq these days little to do with either politics or reconciliation. the focus is on things military. tic, air strikes, terrorist attacks, isis, so on sometimes i and think there is far, far more important diey log when we look to saylonger term not the military piece is not very

important in the short-term. as elook at the longer term this is and this action is where the hope for iraq i think.es so with that i think we will go to our four panelists. close.then each of our panellities will have 10 minutes. i was clear to them that i will rude in a nonarabbic of way if they go over the so minutes. we look it -- over their 10 minutes. we start with my friend from the institute in harvard. was published widely on issues the arab world and iraq in particular and on reconciliation issues. with that new mexico. you, doug. here.re to be

we need a historic analysis of 2003.appened since the main problem in my point of facingat iraq has been since 2003 is the failure to the sunni arabs in the political process post 2003. and this problem is also related which the new iraq is based. power sharing. before 2003 iraq used to be a centralized state dominated by sunni elites and those elites adopted visions and homogenzation with sec tarial or ethnic identity a that must be eradicated.

arabs were told that threatse three major for iraq they use to govern and dominate. the foreign occupation, the nationalists who were portrayed as part of the proxies ofovement, foreign enemies and the shiite were portrayed as reactionary group controlled by iranian mullas. the sunni arabs those three enemies, the occupiers, kurdish nationalists and the shi'ites were sitting together and setting the rules for the new iraq. so what happened after -- in only a regimet change, it was the beginning of process thattion

entirely changed the nature of iraqi policy. change in the nature of the iraq policy is the idea of sharing. the idea of these national identities that previous regimes as a threat are the main categories that define and organized politics in iraq. and kurds managed to adopt to the new realities theiry because they had representations antithreat chart autonomous and some degree of legitimacy. in the shiite community there was the establishment that maintains some level of autonomy, legitimacy and is able communalent the interests and to organize communal collective action. shiite parties that were

operating in the opposition. kurdish commune out you had the original government, the kurdish parties, the national kurdish movement and they had their institutions that were and afterwards91 to represent able the communal interests and to demands and defined vision for the iraq that the wanted to be part of. the sunni arabs the main problem that theyfaced is lack any institutions or the state theyde used to dominate. sunni arabs is only a category imposed on people who shared very little the basic structure.

it is true that most sunni arabs ideas some visions and about themselves and iraq and visionstity but these were not based on solid structures. words, for sunni arabs and they was the sect no longer are controlling that state. factorse three main that deepen the sunni alienation. first there is not one side to be blamed for that. very complex situation -- i think it is a very complex situation and these three factors that i think that are important to understand what happened for the sunni arabs 2003. first the sunni resistance or the idea of the power sharing required them to become a minority group. shiite kurdishhe

thatance and the processes shaped the new political rules system inlitical which the sunnies were underrepresented. third, you had the sunni-sunni conflict for leadership which continued arab unity.e sunni in the election of 2010, most of ae sunni arabs who voted for coalition led by alawi and that coalition presented a o the discourse narrative of iraq. it was a discourse that was nostalgic for the past and a disours that emif sized that iraqis were -- emphasized that iraqi were a unified community of there were elements antiiranian discourse. ideas that most

sunni arabs identified with. election you had ten months of negotiation that in my ended up to strengthen the rules of power sharing over the written rules that constitutional rules. just wards, prime minister maliki tried to weaken the sunni arab theps using the stick and carrot. policies,esult of his a political vacuum was created sunni arab community and that was filled by isis and other radical groups. so the

conflict today between isis and sunni adversaries is not only a conflict to control territory. conflict to define .he meaning of being sunni next.t's i think we all agree that the fightask today is to isis. and this is not an easy job. we might agree that this withoute achieved securing a genuine sunni sunnientation, a genuine partners that are able to challenge isis now without the support of the sunni communities. there is a need for a vision the sunni community challenge the state

build.is seek to needpeople think that we to radically decentralize government in iraq in order to prevent an individual or group of people in baghdad from using anothernues to bill authoritarian exclusionary regime. i agree with this perspective, but i want to conclude by ontioning some issues problems that we need to be oure of in order to make debate on decentralization more serious. first, the moment we start shareg about how to resources in iraq, we will start do we have towhy share resources. oil dependentst state in the world. governmental budget

is secured through oil revs, is almost 69% of the gdp. of it is in the nature the -- to empower rule elites in the or in irbil.hdad and to strengthen their tendency to execute others. a good not easy to find resources,share especially when we know that these resources are not distributed evenly, and saw that after the latest government, there were that why basra irbil.pay money to and we will see the same coming out when we talk

about giving resources to the most impoverished sunni regions. arabs mistakenly think that having a sunni region them with an acon the my from the shiite to that --similar i think this is very unlikely. because sunni arabs don't have leadership.united they don't have enough resources fromt independently baghdad and therefore they lack power thating kurdistan enjoys. think also to form a sunni region that will lead to the of a --n i'm not dismissing this idea, but i think this way we are strengthen if not

tensions, and even intracommunal conflicts as each region tries to turn itself into a state. so finally i think probably a more realistic approach is to going intoer without more conflict is to grant more powers to the already existing iraq.ces in friendl now turn to my abbas, a senior foreign policy fellow at the foreign policy at john hospital kins. he's the author of reclaiming the 1920 revolution and the founding of the modern state. recently in iraq in this summer, july and august. >> thank you for the organizing panel.

it.any people worked on point.ll go right to the and my watch is in my hand so i moderator.own whatnk i can only second everything he said, a lot of these remarks he just made are they are fairly iraq.be what goes on in and maybe i can elaborate on a few things and just provide a points of view that might sort of broaden the picture and let us in on some covered soare not far. aboutfirst think reconciliation in iraq. if you talk to the iraqi government, they tell you we do on a daily basis is reconciliation. meetings after

meetings, we are talking to people, we are trying everything to accommodate everybody and everything else. the question is that in iraq is in the eye of the beholder, isonciliation for the shia different than it is for the --nies, the occurred, the kurds, and the region and and otherans interested great powers in the world. wewhose reconciliation are going to talk about? also the narrative of reconciliation has been set in a way that there are so many myths and realities but always there a dominant perception that the shia are the ones who are the government and they are pushing everyone else. and that is done because many don't look at the math first. when you talk about pushing the government, how can that be when the sunnies credible sta it's

than 20%,are no more but if you count the positions in the iraqi cabinet on top they have 34%. greatly appreciated or must be. the 99% they not used to get before 2003, but quotare still above their and including the ministry of defense, the ministry of planning, education, trade, and the list goes on and then they have the speakership of the parliament which controls the in iraq.on so there isn't a lack of representation there. that math doesn't lie. question is why aren't we getting satisfaction in the there areunity, if these people. i think we need to look deeper at the micro level. the big people, that's

question, do these people who get these positions really sunnies and work for their interests? onen't tell you that any kurdish member of parliament in better than all shiae sunni and representatives combined for their own constituents, all right. problem is who is getting aected, who is getting pointed to a cabinet job, much more than how many there are, and is that very important for us to think. who are nowpeople in the cabinet in baghdad or in don'trliament, they represent much of the sunni community because they cannot even set foot in their own districts. yet they do speak and they do doe decisions and they business, day-to-day business, on behalf of the sunni

community, and same thing with the shia representatives in the and in the cabinet. you cannot believe the level of the shia.ction of iceberg, theof the dissatisfaction of the shia sunnies sayf the that our representatives are not able to deliver much us to, the shia, their going cry is that out.are sell us every single concession that is the reconciliation is coming out of what, when they go deal on oil, for example, well, that goes from basra oil mostly right now. when they make arab reconciliation -- a reconciliation with the sunnies, that's another problem. and the shia are less loud

sort, in their complaints, but those looking at the micro shia community and listen to them talking within their community. there is much more dissatisfaction and i think consequencesy more that are coming very soon. so far as we speak, there is a the provincereate of basra, and that is going to done mainly really as movement of revenge towards what the government in baghdad is doing. doesn'tat feeds iraq have any kind of reppation in notdad to speak of, it has time.r a long be changingoing to the rules of the game. there is another movement at a and i don't know where it will go is the --called

republic. here the calls are will from the rest of iraq. so there is a division there for the first time in my own in iraq, when i went to went to self provinces in the middle euphrates and central iraq, the lack of commitment of the shia, where i grew up, in two words, the unity of iraq has not seen in my own lifetime differently. know, are not, you committed any more because of the blood that was shed, because are notact that people be.ed the way they should the south and the central iraq is in ruins right now. yeah, there are some shia in baghdad, but they are no better their representation and in their performance than the sunnis for their own

community. so what is going on here in the reconciliation. think we are thinking about the reconciliation in the wrong place much we are thinking about reconciliation in terms of how many positions go to how many in each community. and that is quota system, not reconciliation. you are not reconciling the nottions in baghdad do translate into better betterance and deliverance to the respective constituents of the people who give them these positions. the other problem here that we least the overall iraq, is the fact that we need look at the grievances of the populous rather than the politicians. the and there has not been even 10% the effort spent on

reconciling populations as much we are working on reconciling politicians. other part is what he mentioned, who is going to be reconciled in the sunni community. those in the government are complaining every day, they don't have much to complain about, but there are others who a real and -- and these are people who are not on talking terms with the so-called sunni representatives the government. what about these people too. reconciling with them? also, there are two kinds of disputes. there are disputes that are irreconcile able. there are people that tell you entire process, i'm not interested in it. is know, everything that

built on the occupation should be torn down and then we should again on a new term. or those who are willing to work the existing system. that is also an important. have to look at of theliation in light previous or the parallel reconciliation. there are great examples in the world, south africa, or even morocco. we don't see any of their elements present in iraq. before reconciling these, can you not turn the page on # 0 ininjureious history everything,s forget and especially the fact that right how the perpetrators of andpast are still thinking insisting and that everything right thinge is the to be done. the so-calledear

representatives of the sunnies in many places that you need to reconcile with calling the shia, know, indians and not iraqis or persians, and saying that everything that was done to them exactly what should have been done, and until today we places in the north and in the west of iraq, i'mh, not kurdistan, talking about mosul all the way to baghdad where not a single alive, either they fled or were butchered. and not a single shia can go to any of these places until now. sunnies whore some put their lives at risk to rescue a shia fleeing from mosul got them to their homes, but how many are those and are they changing that. that kind of thing needs to be

worked out within what i said and people to people. one last sentence, if i could, basically looking at reconciliation in terms of a mediator. until now there has not been a sponsoriator that would workable andand sensible reconciliation in iraq, leaving the reconciliation project to the iraqis to work on their own devices, with all of the kind of troubles we have with the representatives of every group, i think is the way to go. and we deeply will be deeply in trouble and we are in need a effective mediator to work that project in a fairway. can talk about other things, i think, in the q and a.

you. >> thank you very much. a lecturer at to the american university of iraq. politics in the political economies of petroleum he has been on an extended winter break in the united states since october. much.e and thank you very >> i'm surprised that always takes a war for iraq to be on washington d.c.'s radar. it's very unfortunate. ofanted to comment on some what was said earlier by my andnd and colleagues here then make talk a little more about the vantage point from kurdistan. in iraq we have political representations, you know, sunnies are represented in the federal government, kurds are represented in the federal government. missing, however, is power sharing.

look at the kurdish representation in baghdad for example. government cut, you know, earlier this year, cut the budget of the kurdish government. kurdistan gets 17% of the national budget. revenue sharing agreement that has been in place since 2005. and then without going to the parliament it was an executive formerthat was done by maliki and the budget was crippled overnight not being able to pay the salaries. this is the fept where the deputy prime minister is kurdish, where the foreign youster is kurdish, where have a large kurdish block representing the iraqi kurdish population. they could not do anything. they could not lift a finger to policy.his you have representation, but you don't have power sharing.

as strong asuals, they are, they could not really help their constituents, and grievance. the and this is what hasn't changed about iraq. party you had one enjoying that kind of power and morellowing much representing a, in least in the party.years of the bath at least representation wide it was -- that's the problem that we still have, that's the legacy that remained. at that is in baghdad vantage point, for some reason which is probably obvious, refuses to share power. representation is fine, sharing power is a problem. that is why the people are not being taken care of. it yes i cone have said better than abbas did. no one thinks of the people. look at the budget that iraq has been spending in the past decade. budget was $s's hundred billion. 100 or 120?

lot of money. the largest budget that iraq has ever seen. now i hope that one of you gets baghdad. it the largest village in the world. where did that money go? where did that money go? i think that one problem with that we focus is too much on history and on freefances, and we do not -- grievances and we do not look at institutions and structures. the economy of iraq is failing country. and he talked about the dependence on oil, and by the way i'm still talking about iraq, not u.s. addiction oil, reality check, the iraqi economy, that's real addiction oil. there is nothing else going on. when the budget was cut, which revenue, it was 95% of kurdish government's budget. from a rich you go country aspiring to be the next dubai interest a government is not able to pay salaries. that is the kind of economy.

kind of incentive structure, politicians have no be myopic.to it's not just the election cycles. the myopia, i describe the iraqi not anc system as economy because it does not have institutions, it's simply a distribution system. oil, we cash it, we sell it. if we cannot sell or prices are low, then there's nothing to distribute. so that's one dimension. the other dimension is unfortunately the other chronic problem which is corruption. this is something that's not enough attention. let me make a major distinction corruption in the washington d.c. context, you know, we being close to world and umf and these other institutions. corruption in iraq, usually when talks aboutnk corruption it's about money not being well spent, not having enough efficiency. but in the case of iraq, corruption is not an economic

ofblem, it's a matter national security. the iraqi amendment dissof not didn't have state of the art hardware. we had --se soldiers, corruption in the ranks. of that aflished -- let me turn to kurdish politics kurdish vision for iraq. it may be confusing to look at what do thed occurred want. some people talk about the kurdish commitment to federal others talk about the kurdish grand scheme or grand strategy for secession and independence. i think the kurds have been working as a plan a, plan b, an trajectories. on the one hand yes is there a desire for independence.

that respectsry iraq's sovereignty is the united honest.let's be and unfortunately i don't go visit the south. comee in the south rarely visit the north. although i'm very happy to say that the american university of from all overnts the country, that's a plug for my institution. a countryunately it's only on a map. it does not feel like a country. i visit washington d.c. more often than i visit baghdad. i visit istanbul more than i baghdad. so it has failed, this country put together has failed its people for a variety of this isal reasons that probably not the right venue to talk about that. so why should we be committed to this nation that's already failing. another question that is being asked nowadays is if isis is allowed to have a state and country, part of the why can't we? the grievances are there, the

humanitarian requirements, genocide, a country that has failed you, and course the kurdish government has been building in thattitutions direction. -- have a person peshmerga that is somewhat independent. the economy that is infrom baghdad. towardhave some attempts secession. in the kurdish sub conscious, and this is something that political leaders often say that foryone has a desire statehood. but that also is very aware of the challenges associated assoch independence. in ae know that we're not very friendly neighborhood. people are aware of the risks of regional, of the history of the legacies. so that's one track. have aspirations, you have some political populism

youciated with that and also have some serious work associated with building the requiredcture that is for a state. that's why you see the k.r.g. acting like a sovereign state. they have representation, there is an economy, you know, when they visit capitals there is the thecarpet, which it's kurdish media really highlights the red carpet. deals because they represent symbol imof their sovereignty. the is one side of schizophrenia. on the other hand you have federalism. the occurred were most adamant about enshrining federalism in iraqi constitution. again some see this as a step independence. others, which is my opinion, is basically an opportunity to live within iraq, suffering associated with central indiana the past.

have enjoyed the perks of statehood thanks to federalism without the responsibilities that are associated with sovereignty. you have institutions have been built, the economy of drastically different. irbil looks much much nicer and different city compared to other iraqi cities. again that is partly due to readership, more consolidation of power. and also a unity that my mentioned that does not exist in other areas of the country. however, iraqi federalism is still personal and political, ander than institutional legal. we have a constitution, again it depends on who reads it, you know, oil federal imis at the heart of iraq's federalism. still not clear. we have had many political aals, iraq still lacks national hydrocarbons law that

should regulate the management iraq's hydrocarbon resources, the sharing of those, the right to sign oil contracts, the right to sell oil. these are completely unclear. there's a situation, such as baghdad needs some there's arom k.r.g., political deal, for example i'm talking about 2007. there was a political deal, baghdad allowed them to sell oil, there was some progress. oil went up, price of oil was enough to cover iraqi running on the decisions. two years later, three years deal. there was another and then this time the k.r.g. went in because now they didn't because they built their own independent pipeline. they're all political deals. historyll you this because we just had a new deal on december 2, 2014 where the and the iraqiment government again agreed on some political deal to sell oil and share the revenues.

last? is it going to or is it just another short lived political deal. my hope is of course that it will be a step in the right direction, and the right being a national hydrocarbon law that has at least the adequate political backing of both sides. but i also have worries, you know. legacy is not very promising. and of course you also have all of these pending issues such as sharing.h as revenue the grievances of basra, the echoeding that's being in kurdish street, why should the kurdish share oil with the government, should should basra share oil with kurdistan. these are serious challenges the hydrowar bond deal is being faced with. think kurdish oil policy when it started in 2004, 2005, was a small cat. all the kurds wanted was some

how oil in kurdistan is being managed. but the pushback from baghdad strong and so fierce and small cative, this was cornered into a corner and then the oil industry turned it that now is big enough for baghdad to deal with. that's been one of the land kurdish policy, to shoot and ask, or maybe not ask questions later. quote on status baghdad, to build the pipeline, here it tell baghdad, is, would you like to fight it or would you like to join it so can share revenues. so far that's where the iraqi kurdish government is. there's also regional and international pressure on the stay in iraq, coming from this capital, coming from to the and in addition realities on the ground. to con cloud there are some

isssures that the k.r.g. currently under. what really angers and disappoints kurdish leadership and the kurdish streak in every timethat something goes wrong the iraq the kurds are the first to be either help solve it or to offer concessions. isis attacks, now kurds have to go back ask make sure that iraq doesn't fall. and thees go down, kurds also come under pressure that they need to rescue iraq once more. prime minister maliki creates a ton much problems for everyone kurds say that's it, that's the last straw and game.going to call it and then there's again pressure on kurdistan, come on, give baghdad another chance. this doesn't go well in kurdistan, okay. again politicians have played this because as i the, any institutes al federalism that i was talking

about comes with perks, comes of kftant. it makes, it offers room for lot of transparency in a realms including revenue. kurdish streak is starting to get fed up with it. promised too much a sovereign state, and now it's time to see it. so it's time that i'm expecting that that kind of rhetoric that beenurdish leaders have promoting, again either as politics or as policy, is going fire if iraq as a deliveris not going to what the kurds want, which is at least an independent economy, a continuous revenue stream, and maintaining the level of autonomy that iraqi kurdish government has been enjoying. k.r.g. alsos on the include an influx of refugees, internallyyria and displaced people from isis captured territories. and of course you add this

demographic pressure in addition to budget cuts from baghdad that this new deal of december 2 is going to address low oil pricess rice crisis this the country is facing. the economic crisis that the country is facing. failed state. news.t the bearer of good but my main point here is that there are these two tracks. just focus on the past and grievances, we also need to incentiveonomic structures as well as institutions. and i thank you very much. >> thank you very much. our hostess, she a long-time activist and democracy promoter who has been working reconciliation tracks

many years. here at thea fellow foreign policy institute as well as the middle he's institute. much.nk you very a nationalved in reconciliation process between and 2009 in iraq, and listening to my colleagues here all over again. it's like i was brought back to involvinging rooms iraqis, many of whom how are in iraqi positions in government. it's the same issue over and again. and that should be telling us why national recognize reconcils needed. i was meeting with a group of senior iraqi figures, experts

officials, and quoting one of the participants in that meeting said, while we can now, but without reconciliation, we are not sure we can prevent it from returning again. there are many people, many former u.s. officials who have served in that that is al iraq 6.0. so if this critical opportunity facing my opinion is iraq today, as talking another nationalt reconciliation, is not taken up by theiraqis as well as region. i think i'm afraid that even if defeat isis in a year or so, that in five years from now we are going to have, who knows,

maybe different terminology. importantly there is the realization today in iraq that this is it. is the opportunity to make this country work. it this time, at there will not be a second chance. there is, as many of you know, in conflict resolution there's always critical country's life or any conflict process trajectory intervention can really move that conflict from one state to another. today andk iraq national reconciliation in iraq is at this critical juncture serious effort at national reconciliation can have impact on the future of the country, and its make it work. think it's important to

also address previous national reconciliation efforts why, they failed and then use that as forward in going thinking about a national reconciliation process. between 2004 and 2006, 2007, attempts athree national reconciliation efforts. 1.5,'m talking about not i'm talking about official attempts. there was the arab league in 20042005. al-maliki's national 2006.iliation project of and there was the top down effort. an then there is, there was attempt or in fact an assumption despending the surge in 2011 which says instead of looking at national level, which at the time was stalled, was going

focusing onbe by the -- space through reconciliation and, to create a space and go andnity that can then move the national reconciliation opportunity. thesethink each of attempts failed. reasons why these attempted failed. abbas said,is what the lack of a mediator, that was accepted, seen as neutral, and the role and political gravitas, in the eyes of all of parties, sunni, shia, kurds, all groups, political movements. arab league was not seen as a neutral mediator by the shia

of kurds for its years silence, you know, facing the regime acts of violence kurds. the shia and and definitely mal iki was not as a neutral mediator. thinkcond issue is i is this failure to deal with this clash that existed at the time between the narratives of violence. competinghere are narratives in iraq about the era,nce during the saddam but also the violence and the from 2003. and each much those national recognize on sell yaition efforts -- owe reconciliation efforts

with theseeal matters. there was also the escalating sectarian violence at the time, starting in 2006, creating aot help in national climate that make feasible.tion invasion ofrs, the fore,rought to the parties, iraqi party movements, them.oups, hundreds of many of which did not have political skills, did not have practice of working politically with each other. have diverse agendas, some of them have the agenda, butiraq some of them have very much a sectarian agenda. between these different movements and the createdagendas also obstacles to reconciliation.

maliki was the single most influential, if we can put it national obstacle to reconciliation. and the way he went about it, put forward this 2006 initiative for national allnciliation and he made the right moves, you know, supported and push it forward. then in 2011 the surge and the -- excuse tohe perfect go back and say, well, we don nationalo reconciliation at the national level because you have all these happeningnciliation at the local left. so he used the awakening an excuse of the national government and his group of doing anything at the national level. ate we are, we are now another critical opportunity. and i think the window is going quickly.very but we are there, at this

critical juncture where a national reconciliation process mediator,acceptable and we were talking about that. i think if we look around the agree with abbas, it's not going to be the iraqis doing that. iraqi mediator will be a polarizing figure for some party. regional figure. i don't think the americans can play that role. we have lost in a way that is credibility of. doug and i were talking before i think egypt still is a possibility. for egypt possibility of mediator,role of national reconciliation process. egypt maybe has an opportunity

to claim that leadership role that it has, as being an anchor of the arab region and playing mediator of a national reconciliation process in iraq is maybe one of the ways to do it. it has also to do with the leadership, what vision they have for the country, their foreign policy and the role that egypt can play arab conflict.n anyi agree with abbas that national reconciliation effort going for, while it needs to be level involving political elites coming to readdress some of the issues opinion the constitution failed to address. constitution of 2005, talk about a missed opportunity. constitution writing is always negotiating,y for along the different movements theparties in a country, new rules of the game going forward. negotiating new rules for the

for thel government, social government, and i think 2005, that in opportunity was missed partly of at the time the administration's own political consideration and pushing the iraqis to finish writing up the opinion, in, in my a way that prevented that kind ofdiscussion that kind negotiation among the political elite. but at the same time the kind of iraqi public the to readdress the issues of how this country can move forward, game.w rules of the i think we need a national reconciliation effort definitely political aleads, among the different representing the different components of iraqi society, and i agree with abbas, when i comes to the who represents them. and whether this pragmatic fact that has been

between parts of the sunni community, rival theents, large groups of sunni community, and isis can be broken. whether these political sunni elites who are in that government today or who out of baghdad, the officials from mosul, can sunni community is a question here. but you work with what you have these are the elites of the that have political participation and are best make the argument for the rest of the sunnies about the benefits of sticking with political participation forward. so you need that level of national reconciliation at the top. but at the same time you me the kind of national reconciliation level.grass root a -- has to be

whether in the form of formrences, whether in the of meetings, at the professional level, at the local level. you can, this two-track important. but also importantly, since 2003 removal of the saddam actors haveonal important role to play now inside iraq. in the regionns flows into iraq but also what happens in iraq affects the on.on also whatever national reconciliation happens, it needs blessing of the recent mal actors that have most influence in iraq, and i mean by i mean bymericans, that the saudis, i mean by that iranians. and the and that brings up to question you-iraniane of iran relations.

would you that kind of umbrella the countries that have influence in iraq, i think national reconciliation whether or at the grass roots level has limits in how can go. in terms of agenda, i think my panelists here have talked about what the agenda of national reconciliation process should be focusing on. partly is the federal question, now back and how you make that work. is i agree with you, there no power sharing. 2006, 2007,er in many of the sunni participants that 1.5 national reconciliation, the wore they came back to time and time again idea of partnership. is that what you looking for is

partnership in governing. the second issue that needs to an dressed going forward is the of kirkuk. we know that the new state of peshmerga inthe control and kirkuk is not going reversed. i don't see anybody arguing for reforring the -- so what will be the status of kirkuk going forward. and how this is settled guess a at tiey affecting the especially of the sunnies. the lastly this phenomenon shiite militias which are now playing an important role in be isis, but to eventually the feel is they'ring about to start developing agendas that will have to be reckoned with. withd a bad experience militias that don't get disbanded in the middle oos.

established in 1982 and hezbollah now is the lebanon and the politics. lebanese i think there is a fear among political elites militiaof these shiite militias, are starting to develop these political aspirations going forward. the same thing with the sunnies, knew that ison being grazed about especially in baghdad,ke basra and but the national guards and the formed can become the focal point for creating a militias to stand up .gainst the shiite militias so how also the national guards and --agreed upon role is agreed upon and how they important in is

going forward. i'll stop at this time. >> very good. give just a few points. say astess asked me to few things in addition to moderating. i think today has been a example of the difficulty of reconciling narratives, which we've her in very mild, polite and academic terms here on the stage. but in iraq itself become much more pointed and much more political. mop.pick on hareth for a certainly from the perspective of the sunnies and the old influencestarian begins in 2003. i think from the perspective of the sunniurds and arabs that's simply not the case. of sure from the perspective baghdad, there happened to be these unruly people up in the who revolted in the mid minutes and it went and put them down, and the fact that they

kurds wereed to be irreal van to baghdad. that is not the way it was north. received in the like wise from the perspective of baghdad you have one particularly unrulery cleric in 1980 who needs to be removed and by theed under torture government. you have the uprising that ofurs, it an after effect the war with the americans in the south and then you have this other unruly cleric that need to assassinated at the end of the 90's. from the perspective of the shia the killing by the mohammed sadr, then the slaughter of the shia south followed by the narrative of, is a sectarian repression, from the people.ive of these two so we have these competing narratives of what was going on happening.s from the perspective of the regime, probably not a sectarian

intent, but from the perception of those who were on the receiving en of this repression, certainly had a sectarian effect, and fed into long both on the part of the kurds and the shia of sunnision by either the or arabs depnlding on which camp you're from. that said, i think we're at a point where in is both the best worst time to attempt reconciliation. it is the best time because i think objectively speaking when the situations, all that sides have realized iraq needs to stay together and better for all sides to stay together. the iraqi sunni, for all intents live in syria, and who wants to live in syria right now. withoute in an area government control and without any significant resources.

they areng as separated from the central state, of course they still continue to receive some from the central state which mitigates their situation somewhat, but so long islamiclive under the state outside of baghdad, they are in a bad place. they need to rejoin a larger iraq, both for the security that it provides for the moneys that and becausede, outside of this they would saudi client, or a gulf state client. think are a very interesting case right now. thee all heard in town for last 10 years, in our heads we know we need to be part of iraq, to be in.ts we want i've never seen those two as inives more magnified the last year. occurreds', the expansion into kirkuk, the cube came --t the exuberance really put

euphoria over the possibility of independence. i think the fact that they are what aing to terms with border with isis means, what brand,s done to their for the last decade kurdistan has been the other iraq. you're a border with isis, you're just iraq. you have all the violence, you all the risk, and so on. and i think just in the last month we've seen the stub bond facts, of the fact that kurdistan cannot declare independence and for that matter cannot export oil without the concurrence of ang -- ankara. and if kurdistan was to do anything that baghdad does not of, it must have concurrence.

do they would be able to nothing without the concurrence of ankara, that their political only commodity singled still remains commodity economy, but also has the political situation on top of that. those two risks together i think strike all of us anectively speaking as overwhelming argument againstics. of course this has nothing to do with what's in the hearts of the kurds. so we have this unique time objectively speaking it a very good time. both groupsearts of it's a very difficult time. this is further compounded by the perception, which i ploaf has been a sunni-shy adynamic time, that the shia have perceived the sunni as in a collaborators with terrorism. what we see now is that narrative has now spread to the kurds, and we are now seeing,

the kurds of course don't use militias or death squads to push the sunni out. they do use visas and checkpoints and bureaucratic procedures. and we are hearing at least stories if not full coverage of it being much more least for sunni arabs to cross borders into indistan for them to act kurdistan. sites a very interesting, both of best of times and worst times. on who couldhunder bring this together. is a uniquet egypt figure that perhaps could bring this altogether. states, the united states, iran, turkey, are awe the three parties and therefore aren't really plausible. tension i think that is at the heart of trying federalism right approach for iraq.

had, my good friend was talking about how we need a more decentralized and less powerful baghdad. well yes in a way. but on the other hand you want a enough is that powerful to pull all the revenues from bass remarks bring it to the center and distribute it. there is certainly tension in these two positionings. want a strong baghdad or do you not want a strong baghdad? tose are very difficult reconcile, and i think think the perhaps insufficiently attuned to how baghdad is balancing not only their negotiations but everyone else's. for for example, if we were just talking about baghdad and the kurds we could probably reach some kind of accommodation. not a party, their advocates could reach some kind of accommodation on how much oil is publicked through the state oil company and how much can the

kurds manage to export on their own. but because there's basra in the to be redbaghdad has lined on having must come influence the state oil company. baghdad with afford to compromise on that position, not because it work it out with the custody, but because of the president that was sent for basra. and this is the problem of it being a multiplayer game, like you can just reach an accommodation between two reach anu have to accommodation that includes everyone much and i'll close on a pessimistic note. if even of the prime minister were able to do whatever it deal, there are no red lines for baghdad, whatever it takes to get a deal we will do, i'm not sure he can cut a deal with the sunni that's acceptable to the kurds and i'm not sure he can cut a deal with the kurds that's acceptable to sunni. that is the difficulty of mooing forward on these negotiations

bringing peace to an iraq that absolutely needs peace, and objectively speaking really needs to stay together. note.lose on that and with that, what time are we -- >> 10 minutes. >> we'll start right here in the front. >> i have two short questions. religious the role of leaders? nobody has mentioned this, but they figure very largely in the narratives. and secondly, why are you ignoring the u. n. which seems like the obvious meet yairt. mediator. >> religious institutions? >> religious institutions or leaders, i just met with -- it was such a great honor to see him in august. and i can tell

is somethinghere who is holding the shia from secession, then it would be him. with the basra there was another a basra region in the past, and when i met his son him in 2010, he told me point blank wectly in this direct quote, made the so i think anybody who is interested in keeping iraq together they should say thank depod for sis tani. >> u.n.? why not the u.n.? >> the u.n. could be that -- i mean, the process needs to happen under an u.n. umbrella

in my opinion. can provide that legitimate -- legitimacy. they have had a role to play on the prevention act. o it has provided venues and fora that enabled some elements of -- some agreements, as i said, like the 2013 act to take place. the question is that in this situation i think what needs to happen is the arab legitimacy for that process. iraq looks at itself as an arab anchor, as an arab center of power. and having egypt, for example, with still the political grativas that egypt carries in the arab region can