in my opinion. can provide that legitimate -- legitimacy. they have had a role to play on the prevention act. o it has provided venues and fora that enabled some elements of -- some agreements, as i said, like the 2013 act to take place. the question is that in this situation i think what needs to happen is the arab legitimacy for that process. iraq looks at itself as an arab anchor, as an arab center of power. and having egypt, for example, with still the political grativas that egypt carries in the arab region can prove to be

less polarizing at the same time bring the kinds of legitimacy that, national conciliation process, under an arab umbrella will have, especially with the different components of iraqi society. >> very quick comment. >> i agree the u.n. might be the most credible party. but it's about having a party with well intentions -- we need a party that is able to enfold them, to oblige them. agree first because i hope the egyptians will work on their own national conciliation. i don't think they have that force. credibility is very much derived from the power you have. >> and on religious

institution, one sentence comment. the religious institutions and suss , i mean, actually tanie being the figure, they're losing power to politics since 2003 because of the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of politicians and political parties, which enables them to co-op the religious institutions and figures. >> but he is in a whole different category. >> right. that's why i started with that. my comment would be it has somewhat accuracy if he is in the picture. >> we've move quickly. thank you. i have got a good news/bad news scenario and maybe some of you can help provide an answer to at would happen if, as i

suspect, dash is really overextended. we're going to have a cold summer. places like mosul are running out of fuel, distribution of food is breaking down, to say nothing of the total failure to reestablish the economy, school system, health care. what happens if you've got what would be considered at first good news with some former bautsdz army officers rising up and starting to kill dosh officials and under pressure from the outside you have a sudden kind of implosion of the dosh administration there. but everything i've heard doesn't indicate the iraqi state would be at all prepared to move in and do much better. so it would be like 2003 and

the u.s. led coalition to do anything to reconstruct iraq after the fall of saddam hussein. am i wrong? is there some way that the iraqi state could take vantage of such a fortuitous development? >> i would briefly say that the skep air yo that you're de-- scenario that you're describing happens with the sons of iraq, rising against al qaeda and zarqawi and that put an end to al qaeda's foothold in the country. the necessary step after that, which was power sharing or partnership inclusion did not follow through. and therefore that military victory would not -- was not caps liesed on. so i would imagine in the psychie or in the short memory of any leader any sunni leader they would say why would we play that movie again?

we have already seen it and we know how it ends, unless there is credible evidence on the ground that if they do the same thing the result will be something different. >> the gentleman in the blue pen collar on this side. great presentation. my question is regarding the question that the current egyptian regime could act as a mediator. the gentleman mentioned that given the fact that the kurds regime is unable to strike any kind of national reconciliation inside the country itself might preclude egypt from playing a viable role. added to this is also egypt, the current egyptian regime would not be viewed actually as a neutral one. t is viewed by many,

especially sunni, islam, as an anti-islamic regime. so in this case it would not be really viewed. the third is the grativas that you talked about. what kind of leverage in terms f enforcement and so on does egypt have right now given its economic conditions deteriorating and it's like creating the trouble it's going through at the moment. thank you. >> good point. >> all good points. i don't think any of us -- i can we concede your points. >> just quickly. i'm somehow with ron on this that egypt does not have to be involved as a state but egypt has great skills among its statesmen. there are those who are important, skillful negotiators, skillful mentors, if you will, for something like this. it doesn't have to be egypt alone.

there are several other people. you would like to see something, a combination of egypt with a u.n. umbrella. the u.n. does not have -- the u.n. has one option on the menu and anything happens in the middle east. mr. bra himi. who i respect a lot but there needs to be other talented to do this because there are places where he cannot be as effective as in other places. but, yes, egypt can provide the talent and the u.n. can provide the umbrella. and maybe it can even have people from south africa who have been there to provide moral authority and people who walk and they will be -- it could be an international effort with some kind of an international talent and international -- a u.n. umbrella to give it the

credibility and if needed even the resolution. >> i totally agree in terms of, when i proposed -- when we talked about during before about egypt, we were trying to look at which of the regional powers can play the source. be led by a regional power but then which one? iran de nill is polarizing for half of the iraqis, south arabia is polarizing be led by regional power but then which one? iran de nill is polarizing for half of the iraqis, south arabia is polarizing for the other half. the u.n. is not acceptable for the large swath of the population. that leaves you with a very small cast of characters from which you can choose. and egypt of that cast of characters i agree does not have to be alone in this. but egypt's involvement is critical to launches and to give it the kind of arab umbrella. >> egyptians don't have negative approval ratings they are not as resisted as saudis. >> they're not seen as a party. >> exactly they are not a party. >> that helps. >> the woman in the second row ere.

>> two quick questions. the first one involves some reporting and reading about what is isis composed of? and my question if you don't mind, there are people reporting isis is just a cover for the old groups. can you please tell us a little bit and you please about what kind of composition you see inside isis if you can. the second question is, how important is the american role in keeping iraq together? thank you. >> i think isis is the latest incarnation of the group led by .arqawi in iraq yes, they manage to attract many people who are part of the

former iraqi army, ex bautsdzist and those people are playing an important role in the military operations, in the military planning, in creating sleeper cells in the cities. but i still think that within isis there are the competition and the divide as isis as an umbrella for sunni militant groups and isis as a global jihaddist group. sooner or later i think that divide will become clear and influence the ability of isis to maintain its unity. so in answering your question, i think, yes, ex pathists are members of the former army but i don't think they are very influnetial in deciding the

strategy decisions of isis. >> i guess i will give a closing comment to what i am told is the last question. i think the answer is both. isis is both an international zarqawi inspired terrorist organization that has i think rated a number of resistance groups and pieces of the old regime. i think there are were many analysts who were confused as to which was primary in the immediate fall of mosul in the -- may/june time frame. the minute though that the group took its left turn and turned other orbeal it was very clear which was the motivation of this. this was just the latest iteration of sunni resistance to a perceived oppressionive regime in baghdad then why attack orbeal? that move by isis was a huge strategic flaw on their part. they could have really exploit

that had ambiguity for a long time had they not taken the turn into kurd stan. but now i think that question is settled. while it certainly has sunni resistance elements in it it is primarily an extreme islamic group that has aspirations to do exactly what it says, take over the entire law vaunt and eventually the islamic state from morocco to indonesia. >> i think we have time for one more question. >> the americans, because america is america it continues to have an important role. that said, starting with 2003 there's a very complex history at makes america's role very complicated and america will always be a player because it remains a global super power but its history in iraq in particular would require it have partners to achieve legitimacy.

>> my question is about -- >> can you identify yourself, please. >> yes. if you look at the history of the last two, three years, the issue of the region would come up when there is negotiation with kurd stan region. baghdad is trying to use the formation of this region as a leverage against the krg. so my question is, are there real efforts, credible efforts by the people to form autonomous region similar to the cuddist ann region. thanks. >> there is right now a movement led mainly by certain figures, the judge who has been a minister and then a parliament member, who is probably the best person to

articulate the cause right now at the national level. his narrative is quite well known. and that is there. i think what goes on in the area, see, it is not just about there. the leadership there, the political leadership, the governor and the city council, they belong to strong parties that are national parties. these are leaders who are from outside there who pull their own politicians and say don't approve this. and the biggest problem they have to achieve its provencial status is the politicians of basra and baghdad who are resisting it. but ink what they are trying, there's a mechanism to present signatures and then present them to the election commission and then it will go forward

that way. the question is will the same people who caused the previous attempt to fail do it again or is the momentum too strong right now in light of the national changes that will force it? that remains to be seen. i am personally i think it is more workable to have not just basra but at least the three south provencial, what used to be in the otmoon times. that's more contiguous demographically and geographically, many other aspects, that will work. but a that's also this idea of having a full fledged shia province. if you get that, at least you are going to force more than one province. that will lessen the tensions nationally that you don't have really a three-way division, but more than that. >> i think the answer is both. it is a real thing but it

becomes more salient whenever their perceived bargain, the rest of iraq, looks wor to them. so i don't think the two ways you're putting it are tension. they're very, very real. as the perceived deal that basra gets starts to look worse then the sailions of basra's regional status or larger regional status just becomes ore salient. i'm from the city college of new york, graduate student. my question is again i want to go back to the role of the u.n. itself. you mentioned that it has no oblinald power over iraq or any. actually, they do have in 2005 the outcome of the conference all member state are obliged to

act collectively should any member state fail to protect their own citizens. and they already did that. and they -- they could do that sing coercive means. ut the question is, with the p 5 led the u.n. interfere in the iraqi issue? they could -- i mean, for example they could build the trust that they lost in all these attempts to reconciliate iraqi society or the iraqi political system. so i think they do have that ole. >> i think the u.n. has a role to play but i think in this issue -- and it has played over, since 2003 it has played important roles in helping

iraqi's reach agreement on some laws and some acts it has play add role in training with the iraqi government. but in terms of nationally conciliation levels involving the top political elites, i think the u.n. where this process needs to happen under the umbrella. but in terms of the actual leaders, the actual people to ead this process i -- my theory and hypothesis is that it has to be led by arabs, it has to be led by people in the region. and it has to be led by a country that's seen for all practical purposes as an important country and as an anchor in the region. and egypt is such country. and as because has been applied fore, it doesn't involve the kind of negative attitudes among iraqis that other potential regionals who can

play this role. but i agree with you the u.n. has to play a role. but we are now in a different game in terms of iraqi politics. and having egypt play that role it could be a mediator, it could be a member of the convening team bring that game to the level that it needs to be brought to at this stage of the conflict in iraq. >> i agree. i think the u.n. has a great moral persuasion role to play. but in terms of enforcement mechanism, in terms of getting a chapter 6 or chapter 7 in iraq i think that's a paper tiger. i don't think any of us think that's in the realm of possibility. >> i think we need to be realistic here. we are talking about a region in which there are almost five failed states now. i don't think -- and probably there are more coming.

i don't think that the international community will be able to have the same commitment it has in 2003 towards the iraqi issue. i do think that still if you need to renegotiate the political process in iraq and to reach a new compact between a iraqi factions, you need party who is able to enforce a solution or at least to ask the parties to oblige themselves by what they promised to do. sort of l think that collaboration between the united states and iran and turkey might be helpful. i mean, you cannot exclude regional powers. if you want to explude them they will not exclude themselves. so they will try to influence the process.

and the best way is to involve them to be part of the solution rather than being part of the problem. >> part of the context group. >> do we have time for one more? >> yes. >> in the very back. >> good morning. . question to my dear friends i'm from syria. you mentioned that the sunni, they kick out the shia from their many areas. can you elaborate more about what they did, assad, the sunni as well? can you elaborate about how the the will react to that, shia and others will fight isis in their own area, how that --

city? and dear friend, in 2006 in damascus you were there to brief us at that time about -- >> meaning the government? >> yes. at that time. about that you were doing with the iraqi community. what's the basis that you think of the people that say there is no one representing no one and you are very proficient, so how do you pick up the people that they don't represent? how -- you know the point? thank you very much. >> ok. let's look at what he was referring to. since the coming of isis in mosul and then later on in ther provinces, isis clearly did not allow -- they gave the questions not just the shia by the way, but the christians

were all sort of pushed out. but at least they were given 24 hours to leave or some of them were asked to convert. i went to school in mosul for to college for four years. it is a shame that mosul for the first time in over 1,000 years and 500 -- 1,500, has no christians at all. not a single one. these also were slaughtered. but anybody else. but also with the shia they were not even given that luxury. the shia was to be killed wherever they were caught. and the other areas before isis came there was a slaughter of the shia, 1700 cadets were killed by sunni tribes, not by isis, before isis got to that place. and anbar, beheadings of shia became commonplace, anybody who got caught. as i said, it is not every sunni killed every shia.

referred to so many families from those provinces at the risk of their lives rescued them and sent them back. that's there. but also if you look at from the other side, all of the other internal displaced people from fallujaha, where are they? i dined with them in car ballet. sunnis who are hosted right now. the same thing. nothing of that nature happened in the south in basra and nass rea and other places, there was no sort of counter act where the sunnis were slaughtered and shia areas. none of that happened. but your question i think refers to what they were doing in the fight. you are referring here to groups that have been acting out of the -- they have their own leadership, their structure. and they have done sort of a mixed bag. a lot of the footage that was

shown was very disturbing to say the least, and no less than the torture that happened elsewhere. but also let's face it, there are those groups, whether you like them or not, they were the only ones who did any successful fighting in iraq since isis came in. the iraqi military, none of that -- they have not done anything to speak of. they are the ones who acheaved an army, they sort of external fighters, the volunteer fighters as they are called. and they are the ones who achieved in the outskirts of baghdad, they held other places, all of that. are they the favorable way to go? no, for sure. you would rather see the states do its job and the military does its job. the military has not functioned and iraq was left to those

groups to defend it. it is very hard to speak of them in terms of yes they have american blood on their hands from the old days. but so do the others who are being trained by the united states right now. i mean, who are the recruits from the sunni militias that are being formed by the united states equipped and funded? they are the ones who shot at americans in fallujaha and elsewhere. so we have the same history dealing with them also is problematic. i think the american approach to it rather than sort of doing something for the iraqi military they are approaching t in a madssonian way. if you have a problem with faction the solution is to make more of them. so it seems like you know having a problem with shia militias now we are making more of them and we are making sunni militias and we are having others. and i don't know. let's hope that madisonion

solutions work for iraq will work just like it did for the united states turning it noontime an interest group. i doubt it. but yes. i am not going to sugar coat anything for you but there is a hell of a difference between cold-blooded butchers who were killing shia for being shia and there are those who are in the battlefield doing things. both of them are wrong. but equating them i think isis and the militias is kind of really being misleading in that sense. but i am on the record. my favorite way is to have the iraqi government and in fact even i was hoping that american troops would go and do the job. but since this is out of the table as a policy by the president obama administration then there is no other option. but to whoever is willing to --

also, let's remember that the tricky issue is that these people are backed by sis tanie and it's very hard to go against them right now in the current situation in iraq. any loss of life, sunni or shia or curd or even the past few months since june until now particularly even though all of the time was bad, but the last few months have been heart breaking for anyone with any sense of decency to watch those people killed, christians, kurds, shia, sunnis, everybody else who -- whose ill fate put them in a cross fire of a battle that is not their battle. >> just to add, when it comes to disbanding the militias you're going to have to deal with it for iveragete those

militias, especially cadets rom the brigade answer and march to the iran yrn tune. in the her iran decides ture that their presence serves or undermines its strategic objective for iraq will go a long way in what happens to them down the line. in terms of how you pick members or people for this national rec sillyags initiative, you work with what you have. there is a problem definitely with sunnis representing the sunni communities. and there are ways to go about that. in the case of the 2006-2009 we basically went and chose members of parliament at the time, tribal leaders, and some representatives but at the same time we had a track which convened only one time involving members of sunni

insurgent groups some of whom now are part of the mosul. but that was a one-time meeting to just get to understand the lay of the land in terms of their own calculations and in terms of their own plans going forward. but in terms of the going now forward i think you have to work with what you have. you work with members of parliament. you work with civil society, and also you work with tribal leaders. these groups remain the components that any track needs to work with. thank you. >> we're out of time? >> i think we're out of time. >> thank you very much. and we certainly want to encourage you to remain. we'll have a syria panel following again feature the ambassador. thank you very much.

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>> are you considering maybe getting into politics as candidate? >> i've been building buildings all my life. we've done a great job as you understand. and one thing about that if he didn't think we did good job i wouldn't be here tonight. i am considering it very strongly. a lot of people think that i have fun with it, that i'm playing games, that i enjoy the process. and i do enjoy the process to a certain extent. but the country is in serious trouble. we just broke $18 trillion in debt. largely to different places like china and others. and we just are in very, very serious trouble. so i am considering it very strongly. >> so when do you think you might make a decision? >> sometime after the beginning of the year, probably sometime in march, april, or may.

>> you can see that entire event with donald trump later in our programming schedule or any time on line. >> it goes back to like i said where the idea for this book came from was the 2012 dnc convention when they were showing this tribute video to him because he had passed away. and portraying him as a woman's rights champion when he left a young woman to drown in his car. and if he had not gone back for nine hours and tried to save his own behind, she would have probably survived. and you can't do an entire

video at a convention claiming to be preaching and fighting about the war on women and glorify someone like that while not including that part of his life in a video about his women's rights record.

>> our first case this morning is heine versus north carolina. mr. fisher. >> mr. chief justice and may it please the court.

in a country dedicated to the rule of law governmental officers should be presumed to know the law at least as well as the citizens are. that being so, when questions about individualized suspicion arise under the fourth amendment they should be addressed against the backdrop of the correct interpretation of the law not simply any plausible reading an officer might have. north ppose the state, carolina, did have a good-faith exception to the exclusionry rule. what would you be arguing today? >> we would still be arguing, if that were the case, that not only the fourth amendment was violated but that the good-faith exception didn't apply, but you wouldn't have to reach that question in this case. and i would concede to you, justice kennedy, that would be a debatable argument. >> why would it be any more debatable than the argument you're making here? i more or less anticipated your answer. i think that has to be your answer. i think you have to tell us

even if the good faith exclusionry rule applies mistake of law doesn't count. >> that's not exactly what the juris prudence holds of course. reasonableness of mistakes of law can be taken into account at the remedy stage. >> but then the question is why isn't that a problem for you when you say there cannot be a reasonable mistake of law? we know there can be. >> well, there's a difference between rights and remedies. when you ask the question about what is reasonable as to whether or not the fourth amendment was violated. in criminal cases and in qualified immunity cases. you do that assessment against the correct interpretation of the law. >> what we're talking about whether as a categorical matter jurice peru dential matter, we can have this dichotomy known as a reasonable mistake over law, a difficult and interesting question. but it seems to me that you have to make the same argument here or -- in the case where

they have a good-faith exception as they're making here and you have a problem undermines on, that your argument. >> i really don't think so. i think the best exposition of this problem in the course juris prudence is actuallyerson versus craten case where the court wrestled with this notion how can something be reasonable in one sense and unreasonable in another. and the answer the court gave is that when we ask the fourth amendment was violated we do not take mission takes of law into accounted. but the reasonnability of a mistake of law can go to the remedy question. this is the premise from which lee i don't know, crole, and davis all derive. >> mr. fisher, i have a preliminary question. -- right e wright about a mistake of law, isn't it a moot question in this case?

because as i understand it, the traffic stop ended with a warning citation. because the traffic stop is over. and at that point the police officer asked if he can inspect the car. and the answer is yes. why isn't the consent to the search the end of this case? >> because it would be the fruit of the poisonous tree if the stop was illegal there would have never been an opportunity to ask for consent. i think that's why the state and solicitor general haven't made any argument that the consent wipes away the fourth amendment question here. >> suppose the officer said, all right, i'm giving you a warning. you're free to leave now. but by the way, may i search your car? >> i think that's more or less what the officer did say here. >> and you would say then even in that situation that that would be the fruit of the

poisonous tree? >> yes. because the stop wouldn't have taken place. the court's cases say that a traffic stop is a seizure. and so upon pulling mr. hyne over the officer needed to have reasonable suspicion to do so. and the only argument for reasonable suspicion is the mistake of north carolina law as to the brake light in this case. >> i understood you to say earlier that you don't take distinguishing the exclusionry rule and qualified immunity, you don't take reasonableness into account when it comes to a mistake of law. >> i'm sorry. what i think i said is that you don't take the reasonableness mistake of law into account when you ask if the fourth amendment was violated. you do sometimes when you ask about the remedy. and that's -- >> but the fourth amendment itself protects only against unreasonable searches and seizures by its term. i don't understand. it would seem to me that there's a stronger argument for taking the reasonableness of

the officer's actions into account when you're talking about a mistake of law. because that's what the fourth amendment says as opposed to remedies and qualified immunity. >> mr. chief justice of the court reject that had precise argument in anderson that reasonableness means that the fourth amendment incorporates mistakes of law. and because of a deep common law rule which is that when we ask -- >> if i can just -- >> i thought we said exactly that in hering though. when we said that even though we're going to look at it in terms of remedy that is not to say that the reasonableness didn't go to whether there was a substantive violation of the fourth amendment. >> my understanding is that would be a mistake of fact case whether there was a warrent outstanding would have been a factual question not necessarily a legal question. in anderson and crowle and lee i don't know -- and lee i don't nowion the court said acted as a reasonable officer could and should have acted.

and time and again in the court's exclusionry rule cases they said the officer acted reasonably because of the reasonableness stage you could take into account whether the officer reasonably misunderstood the law. >> putting aside our discussion s, why does it make sense to say that you don't take reasonableness into account when the fourth amendment only protects against ub reasonable searches and seizures? >> i think for three reasons. there's a practical reason, a theatrical reason, and a jurequiss peru dential reason. i will start with the theory because that's what i was just descrike. the deep common-law rerdage that we've always followed, is that the criminal law is presumed to be definite and knowable. so in all kinds of settings, whether it be punishing somebody for violating the law or any other actions, citizens or the government engages in, we always assume a correct understanding of the law even if it's later construed by a court in a way that wasn't

exactly predictable. >> isn't it -- didn't the court hold in cheek that in the circumstances there, ignorance of the law would be a defense? >> because of a special statutory exception that congress had written, the beginning of part 2 of cheek is what i'm relying on where there's a paragraph or two that sets out with numerous citations this principle justice holmes described and many others that the criminal law is presumed to be definite and knowable. and once you take that presumption and put it into the police officer's mind in this case or any other governmental actor who acts on a mistake of law, then there is no reasonable suspicion because we presumed them to know the law when they acted. >> suppose the officer stopped and he said i've been going to law school and we don't know about this one light, two light. it sounds like they're going to say, but i don't know what the law is. you'd better get this fixed. >> i think there's two

questions in there. >> and then he sees the contra band. >> well, i think there's two questions embedd in there. one is whether the officer can look to court decisions or other third-party sources to help him do his job. now, again, that is what the court has said in the cases that you take into account things like police manuals, court decisions. the court has embraced that but rand has said that is off limits. there's also an element of your question asking about what if all the officer was worried about was the safety on the roadway? that would be a very different case. again, i'm going to turn the court to ren where the court said that if there's a stop done for reasons aside from probable cause, then the purpose of that stop such as the community care taking function might kick in but of course the state hasn't made any argument in this case

because the record is quite clear the officer was performing a criminal investigation. mr. fisher, we don't review opinions. we review judgments, we review results,. what you're explaining about here is the admission of what was discovered in the search of the car. right? now, what difference does it make whether that was lawfuly admitted because it was a onstitutional search or it was lawfuly admitted because the remedy of eek cluding it -- excluding it would not be applied if there was a mistake of law, a reasonable mistake of law? i mean, the constitutional problem is the admission of this evidence. and it seems to me whether it's properly admitted because the fourth amendment wasn't violated or whether it's properly admitted because the

remedy for that violation is not exclusion of the evidence? you lose either way. don't you? >> well, nobody has addressed the question of remedy in this case because nobody needs to address -- >> if we find, as you were just to find that it violates the fourth amendment, to make the search, we would then have to -- in order to decide whether this judgment is lawful we would have to decide whether the remedy of excluding that evidence has to be applied. and you know the answer -- >> forgive manage we respect i don't think the court needs to do that. of course i think the court can vacate and remanned the remanned just as it does when it minds a problem with the lower court decision and sends it back. even if this were a federal case i think i would will b saying the same thing which is nobody has briefed or argued the good faith exception in this case.

>> well, you have -- and you acknowledge -- that it applies to remedies. >> no, no. here's what i've acknowledged, justice sclayscleea and i guess this is important. we've acknowledged that the question of whether the mistake was reasonable would be relevant if at all at the remedy stage. so what you would do is you would ask the question if this were a federal case where you had to reach the question you would ask whether the officers' mistake of law in this case renders oppression inappropriate. now, i would add that holding that it did render suppression inappropriate would be an extex of the court's good faith juris prudence which has held good faith doctrine applies only when an officer applies binding law. >> so the most you can get from us is a remanned. >> that's right. but i do think it's -- >> north carolina court decide whether the remedy of exclusion should have applied. >> that's right. for example, i'm not sure if

it's any difference if i said it's a constitutional violation under chap anywhere because the air was harmless or not. those are the kinds of situations where the court remedy for that violation is not exclusion of the evidence? you lose either way. don't you? >> well, nobody has addressed the question of remedy in this case because nobody needs to address -- >> if we find, as you were just to find that it violates the fourth amendment, to make the search, we would then have to --

in order to decide whether this judgment is lawful we would have to decide whether the remedy of excluding that evidence has to be applied. and you know the answer -- >> forgive manage we respect i don't think the court needs to do that. of course i think the court can vacate and remanned the remanned just as it does when it minds a problem with the lower court decision and sends it back. even if this were a federal case i think i would will b saying the same thing which is nobody has briefed or argued the good faith exception in this case. >> well, you have -- and you acknowledge -- that it applies to remedies. >> no, no. here's what i've acknowledged, justice sclayscleea and i guess this is important. we've acknowledged that the question of whether the mistake was reasonable would be relevant if at all at the remedy stage. so what you would do is you would ask the question if this were a federal case where you had to reach the question you would ask whether the officers' mistake of law in this case renders oppression inappropriate. now, i would add that holding that it did render suppression inappropriate would be an extex of the court's good faith juris prudence which has held good faith doctrine applies only when an officer applies binding law. >> so the most you can get from us is a remanned. >> that's right. but i do think it's -- >> north carolina court decide whether the remedy of exclusion should have applied. >> that's right. for example, i'm not sure if it's any difference if i said it's a constitutional violation under chap anywhere because the air was harmless or not. those are the kinds of situations where the court would always resove the constitutional question that the lower court addressed and then send it back down for the question of remedy. >> i don't know why following up on what justice scalia is saying. he's saying we don't give you a remedy unless we believe that one is warrented under the fourth amendment. >> the lower court hasn't addressed so you should send it back for a full briefing. >> but north carolina has a rule, i thought that if you violate the fourth amendment that's it. we don't have a good-faith exception. >> that will be our position on remanned. >> isn't that what the north carolina law is now? so it would be futile to send it back. but then to answer the good faith exception. >> it wouldn't be futile, justice ginsberg. i think the analogy that i gave earlier about chap man is more

or less on point. the court has held that if the constitution is violated that the defendant in a criminal case doesn't get a remedy unless he satisfies that test. now, all the time in criminal cases you would just decide the constitutional issue and send it back for remedy analysis. >> that's because they would be applying federal law. they would be answering the question that you want us to leave unanswered. mainly whether the constitution requires that this evidence be stricken from the case. >> well -- >> if indeed they're not going to ask that question, when we send it back, it seems to me we have to answer that question here before we are able to reverse or affirm the north carolina court. it's a federal question. they are not going to -- they are not going to get to that. but you're asking us to invalidate this conviction on the basis of federal law. and it seems to me we cannot do that unless there has even -- if there has been a violation of the fourth amendment, the remedy must be exclusion of the evidence. >> that's a federal question. i think we're going to have to decide it if we send it back to north carolina they're not going to decide it. are they? >> no. i don't believe they would or should. but i -- but just if the state had adopted a rule saying we're going to have a more favorable

juris prudence of constitutionaler r and give automatic new trials, the court wouldn't be prohibited from deciding a constitutional issue and sending it back down to the state. in the retro activity sphere, dan forts against minnesota is another case that said states can choose for themselves and the court deals with the federal question. >> there's no question that if north carolina applied a state constitutional analog to the fourth amendment they could have a more extepsive remedy than is recksniesed under our fourth amendment cases. but your argument is they can adopt a state law rule for fourth amendment violations. that is more protective of defendants than federal case law provides. that would be your argument. right? >> i don't need to make that argument. i think that would be an i want resting question and i think the state may be able to do that. but what the carter decision in north carolina says is that violations of the state

constitution cannot be overlooked on good faith doctrine. >> was this decision based on the state constitution? >> no. it was based on the federal constitution. so we would send it back down. and we've preserved an argument that under state law the violation of the fourth amendment also violates the north carolina constitution. >> but you're asking is to reverse it on the basis of federal law. and you're asking us to send it back through a state court which is not going to inquire any further into federal law. even though federal law arguably, you will concede, says that even if there is a fourth amendment violation, if there's a good-faith reasonable belief that the law was violated, the remedy of exclusion will not be imposed. that's what the constitution requires. and you're asking us to say, oh, no. there's been a violation of the

constitution. and we're going to reverse this judgment. even though we haven't inquired into whether the remedy that you want is required. it seems to me -- i don't see how we can do that. >> i don't want to keep saying the same thing. i'll try and say one more time. i think it's fully customary for this court to have a case from state courts where a state court issues a ruling on federal law. there may be many oshtse issues in the case. federal, state, whatever. but if the question of federal law the state court decided is incorrect, this court can reverse that judgment say you got federal law wrong and we're going to send it back down. >> but it choose tozz decide based on only half of the federal law or three quarters of the federal law. can north carolina more or less set us up this way? >> i think -- >> this is -- >> there is -- >> this is a concern. >> forgive me. >> which is a follow on to justice scleea's question. they didn't get federal law

wrong. their opinion got federal law wrong. but their judgment did not get federal law wrong if indeed a good faith mistake of law does not require the exclusion of the evidence from the trial. the judgment did not get federal law wrong. if that's the case. >> well, i think that their analysis got federal law wrong for the reasons we've described. >> we don't review your analyses. we review judgments. you're urging that this conviction has to be set aside. that's what we're reviewing. not the opinion. >> if you want to decide the good faith question that has not been briefed by any party, i suggest you might want to tread carefully. now, we've given you -- maybe what i need to do at this point before i sit down and reserve my time for rebuttal is explain even if you need to get to that question, which i don't think you need to. but if you did need to get to that question, why you should say that the good faith

doctrine doesn't apply. >> your argument this morning has confused me on something i thought i understood. i thought the reason why you've argued this case the way that you have trying to convince us to draw a very sharp distinction between right and remedy is because you believe that north carolina has the right under state law to devise its own version of the exclusionry rule. if you're not -- if that's not your argument then i'm really puzzled by what you're doing. >> functionly that's the way things work in north carolina. i think the only thing that maybe i need to make more clear is that the reason why it works that way in north carolina is because the state has held that violations of our state constitution cannot be subject to a good-faith exception. the state has also held. >> the constitution is irrelevant because you're arguing whether there can be mistake of law in determining whether a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment to the constitution of the united states. whatever we hold on that, north carolina can do whatever it

wants on the same question with respect to the state constitution. >> that's the next thing i was going to say. in theeryur you're right. but what north carolina has said is that we contrue article 1, section 20 which is the state counterpart to be coterminus with the fourth amendment. so that's not the way the court goes about its business. so functionly in the state of north carolina where you are is that fourth amendment questions run exactly parallel to state substantive constitutional law questions. and if there's a violation you suppress. >> suppose this were a federal case. and we had available to us it had all been briefed two alternative holdings in order to support the conviction and one holding was this is not a violation of fourth amendment law in the first instance and the other holding was this is a violation of fourth amendment law but the exclusionry rule operates and so the -- the good faith exception to the exclusionry rule operates. and so the evidence comes in. is there any difference between those two holdings?

>> i think the difference between those two holdings, if the court remanneded, may well play out differently in north carolina. >> no. if it were a federal case. >> oh, i'm sorry. i missed that. if it were a federal case it would be functionly the same holding as to the outcome of that case. but there would be important reasons nonetheless. even though that would be a functionly identical holding for the parties in the case to be very important reasons nonetheless to make sure that you rendered that holding as to remedy juris prudence not the fourth amendment itself. and one reason i opened with and tried to say a couple times that the government should be presumed to know the laws. it would undercut public confidence in law enforcement and the common-law rule upon which the criminal law is built to say that government doesn't have to be presumed to know the law. >> you say that but some people say that the existence of a rule remedy gap undermines public confidence in the law. so why should we take that argument any more seriously than the rule remedy gap

problem? >> because that argument comes from academic literature and my argument comes from the court's juris prudence where people have argued that you shouldn't suspend remedy. and the court has rejected and said no as judge wilkinson wrote in the piece that i cited in the brief there's reason to renounce the right if you're not going to give a remedy. the court has given leeway to officers only to the extent the officer are relying on a clear directive from a third party like a legislature or a court. this is very different. this is like the johnson case from 1982 where the court held if the officer acts of his own view of an unsettled rule of law, we suppress. so even if i have to argue this case -- >> do you dispute this was a reasonable interpretation of state law? >> i would dispute if you were asking it in a sort of sench sense that the statute was

ambiguous it had been read this way but yorning it should be viewed as a reasonable mistake under the good faith doctrine because the good faith doctrine deals with third parties. johnson that i was just citing to you says that -- >> i don't need to ask this in the context of any other body of the court's case law. just in the common sense understanding of the term. was it reasonable? if a -- of any other courts case law. just in the commonsense understanding of the term. if an attorney sat down and read north carolina statutes, do you think it would be reasonable for the attorney to conclude that you need to have two functioning brake lights and not just one? >> i think in the commonsense way, i could concede that would be reasonable. there is a legal way of asking what is reasonable and what is not. the court has never taken into account ambiguity or the

possibility for error in asking whether an officer gets the law of right. secondly, you have to define the concept of reasonable. if you look at the facts of this case and you think this mistake was reasonable, the other side hasn't given a definition of what it would say would be a reasonable mistake to the law. there is reference to qualified immunity. the solicitor general references a foothold in the statutory text. i'm not sure what the definition would apply here. for qualified immunity, you would have to define that concept. the definitions that exist now are very, very broad. this illustrates why you shouldn't hold the fourth amendment to satisfy here is because if you say anything is reasonable, susceptible to debate, you vastly expanded police officer discretion to conduct a traffic stop. s noted officers

, have an enormous discretion. >> let me try one last time before your time. you assert that we should not decide the remedy question because it hasn't been argued. but wasn't it your responsibility to argue it? you are asking us to set aside a judgment of the north carolina court. that judgment could be set aside only if, number the fourth one, amendment was not violated number two, it was violated, but the remedy does not have the exclusion of the evidence? it seems to me it is your burden to establish not just that the fourth amendment was violated, but also that exclusion was necessary under the constitution. it is no answer to say that has not been argued. you haven't argued it. that is the problem. >> they need to argue it.

i would refer you to the part argument in the opening brief three explains why even if you move good faith into -- those of -- are my arguments. the other case that comes to mind is a case from several years ago. the court divided into several pieces. pieceurt reversed on one and sent it back down. what i'm asking for is not terribly different. >> send it back down for the court to decide that other piece. but that this court will not decide. >> federalism should respect that choice, justice scalia. i would like to reserve the rest of my time. >> thank you, mr. fisher. >> mr. montgomery. >> mr. chief justice and may it please the court. prohibits amendment

unreasonable searches and seizures but does not require officers to be perfect. because the touchstone is reasonableness all that is , required is that a police officer has a reasonable view of the facts and applies those faxed to a reasonable understanding of the law. >> when will we get a right understanding of the law? if i leave the north carolina supreme court -- if i read the north carolina supreme court decision it still hasn't told me , whether it is one or two brake lights. the next police officer who wants to stop someone will not know that either. he might be bound by the appellate court decision, but that will not help clarify the state of the law. isn't what you are doing going to leave criminal law unclear? it is one thing to say you want to not subject officers to civil liability.

it is another to say you want to leave the law unclear in a criminal prosecution. >> in north carolina, controlling precedent does come from the intermediate court of appeals. that is not to say the supreme court may not reach a different decision someday. for now, police officers would be bound by what the north carolina court of appeals decides. the law has been decided. an officer who makes a stop tomorrow because one brake light is out would be acting unreasonably under that decision. so it doesn't leave criminal law uncertain. >> it will for the appellate division if it is now taking your view that it can find out whether the officer's reading of the law is reasonable. it basically means that any open

, police officers will rule in favor of the right to search. >> it depends on whether the question is an open question and whether that interpretation by the officer is reasonable. it certainly may be an unreasonable interpretation. define -- >> what would make it unreasonable? >> it would be unreasonable if there was some language of the statute that no one could breach and interpretation at all or if there was a definite decision by an appellate court. it would be unreasonable for the officer to interpret in his own way. the whole standard would be a reasonable person standard. would a reasonable person be able to take this view of the statue? >> that is a very broad definition of reasonable. i understand the idea that when 99 out of 100 think you need to e lights like you

have to everywhere else. it is reasonable for the officer to think that. it's helped me like you're -- it seems to me like you're adopting the same standard that would apply in qualified immunity that gives officers quite broad scope. that is troubling. >> it is not the same as qualified immunity. it protects the plainly incompetent. we're not saying that is the standard here. >> i think what the chief justice is asking you is to describe a case for us where the officer would receive qualified immunity, but it would not count as reasonable for these purposes. >> one of the things this court has said in wilson v lane, the can look beyond officer's interpretation like this you could look to other matters. it could be an officer who had an unreasonable interpretation on the statute. yet he might still have

qualified immunity because he was told by a judge or by the attorney general or someone that this was correct and that was a complete misunderstanding of the statute. it might be that the officer would be protected by qualified immunity. but for fourth amendment purposes, that would not be a reasonable interpretation of the statute. you would not give a pass -- i mean, let's say the cases flip and the most reasonable reading is you only need one brake light. someone's driving around with one brake light. you pull them over. i reasonably thought i only need one. the court says i need two. in that case, anger and 70 law -- ignorance of the law wouldn't save him, would it? >> no, it would not. officers believe you needed all of your brake lights. and that is not actually the law, it does not mean that person is guilty.

in other words, the defendant here, the driver, could not be held liable for the brake light violation. it is not the fact that an officer thinks reasonably that the law is something -- that does not make it the law. who does notitizen think that is the law, that doesn't mean he could escape liability. >> the police officer was not stopping him because of the brake light. the police officer was involved andriminal introductions admitted this was a pretext. a lawful pretext, he thought. he wasn't there just to tell him that. fix your brake light and drive away, there were never be a lawsuit, correct? >> that is correct. >> how many citizens have been

stopped for one brake light and are asked to have their cars search? is that something we as a society should be encouraging? >> innocent people are stop quite often because of mistake. -- mistakes of fact. a turns out that citizens have not committed any criminal offense and yet they were stopped. this is another example of that in which an officer acted reasonably, just as with a reasonable mistake of fact. it turns out this was not actually a violation. >> i would like to focus on your definition of reasonableness. let's say you have two court of appeals decision. one says you need two brake lights and the other says you need one. is it reasonable for the officer to pull somebody over when one

of their two brake lights is burned out? >> if you went by the court of heels it would be reasonable , than for the officer to decide which he felt was the better rule. if there were two different decisions from the court of appeals, which is not supposed to happen in our system. but if it did happen, it would be reasonable for the officer to rely on either one of those. >> one of mr. fisher's arguments is that this looks like a remedies question. it doesn't look like a rights question. it focuses on the culpability of the officer in the way we do when we think about immunity or the exclusionary rule. why isn't that exactly right -- that to the extent that this conviction ought to be upheld, it ought to be upheld on remedy reasons rather than rights reasons to fit in with our basic understanding of what remedies and rights do and do differently in our law?

>> this court looks at different things when it looks at the rights versus the remedy. reasonableness is important in the rights stage. in the remedy stage, that might be considered, but also the culpability of the officer and whether he was deliberately disregarding the law. those types of things. this court has addressed mistakes of law both in the rights and the remedies stage. it would be important to address the rights stage in this particular case because we don't get into the source of things that would be necessary in the remedy stage. >> what about the dissent in the north carolina court of appeals? who said north carolina has no good-faith exception. that this decision does is it allows the police to get around the absence of a good-faith exception.

wasn't that the position of the dissenter? allowing for a reasonable mistake of law to support a warrant is the functional equivalent of a good-faith exception. >> that was the position of the dissenting justices at the north carolina supreme court. again, this gets back to the reasonableness as the standard for the fourth amendment. that is what this court has said is important at that stage of whether an officer's acting reasonably. there are other considerations that take place at the remedies stage. the state was asking for nothing whether this violated the fourth amendment and not about remedy. >> counsel, maybe you have the answer to the questions i was asking mr. fisher.

i guess the answer is you haven't argued that point, right? you did not assert in your brief and haven't inserted it in oral -- and you have not asserted it in oral arguments, thus far anyway, that even if it did constitute a violation of the fourth amendment, the remedy did not have to be exclusion of the evidence and that remedy is indeed subject to reasonable mistake of law. therefore the decision has to be affirmed. but you did not make that argument. you want to put all your eggs in the basket of whether it is a violation of the fourth amendment. am i right? >> that is right. >> i'm sorry to waste so much of

your time. >> we did not make that argument. mr. fisher is correct in that it is our state constitution that says there is no good-faith exception. if a defendant had only raised a fourth amendment question in our courts, the good-faith exception would still be available if that defendant didn't make a claim under the state constitution. >> i'm not too sure it makes prudential sense to allow north carolina supreme court to put to us what is basically an abstract question. to give an answer without reference to the fact that part of the fourth amendment the -- is the good-faith exception. it bears unreasonableness. >> that is correct. this court has in cases like rodriguez dealt with mistake rightsaw just in the

stage rather than the remedies stage. that is all that has been briefed in this instance. >> that is correct. >> one of the things that is different is that we are not talking about -- >> excuse me. in other cases we decide the right and the not have to decide the remedy. but this is a case in which unless the remedy is exclusion, there is no basis for us to set aside the judgment of the north carolina supreme court. unless the remedy is exclusion. it seems to me that is part of the case to reverse. if we cannot say that, we have no business reversing. if it hasn't been argued, i guess we could do that. >> got has not been argued here are below, that is correct. the difference between this case and the other is this involves a

mistake of law rather than a mistake of law as to the fourth amendment itself. the difference in that is that a reasonable violation of the fourth amendment is still a violation of the fourth amendment. if there is a statute that gives an officer the opportunity to make a seizure or less than what is required by the constitution -- less than probable cause or less than reasonable suspicion, even if officer is reasonable, that is still a fourth amendment violation, which is why the court would have to go to the remedy portion to decide whether the exclusionary rule applies. in this instance, this case was a mistake as to a substantive statute that was used by the officer as part of the facts and circumstances of this case. the totality of the circumstances of this case the , officer considered what he thought was the correct law. >> why is there a line drawn between if he gets the fourth

amendment wrong, before the amendment is violated. but if he gets a statute wrong, then the fourth amendment is not violated? >> because the officer only needs to act reasonably. the fact that he gets the statute wrong doesn't mean that he acted necessarily unreasonably. >> the fact that he made a mistake about what the fourth amendment requires could also be reasonable. >> it could be. that would be proper to consider in the remedies stage, as this court has, rather than in the rights stage. in another case that this court decided, there was a situation where a substantive statute was found unconstitutional and void for vagueness. yet this court found there was probable cause in that case for the officer to make an arrest based upon that statute. that was one case in which this

court looked at the rights stage as a mistake of law rather than the remedy stage. >> do you think if that case that weagain today would decide it the same way, or do you think we would decide it now as a remedies question? >> i think the court would decide it the same way. the court in arizona v evans decidedt if the case is before the good-faith exception, it is still viable in terms of the fourth amendment. >> what kind of mistake to the officer make in di filippo? the loss said exactly what he thought it said. what do you classify as a mistake of law question? you said it was presented fleet

valid -- we he asked according said it was presumptively valid and he asked according -- we said it was presumptively valid. he asked according to a statute. you do not ask police officers to ignore the law. >> that is correct. >> this is a mistake of law. he was following the law. isthe di filippo case important is because you had someone who is acting wholly innocently. he was not committing an offense at all. in this case, you have someone who is acting innocently and not violating the law. even though the conduct was innocent, there still is probable cause despite the mistake of law. that is all we are saying. >> isn't there another difference between those two cases? lippo talkedd di fi a lot about there was a presumption of constitutionality

for any statutes. we do not want officers to go around questioning the constitutionality of statutes. here, there is a statute. an officer is not supposed to ,ead it as broadly as possible they're supposed to read it fairly. there's no presumption. they do not want officers to inquire into this area. >> we want officers to enforce the law. fairly and as written and not to push every statute the furthest it could go without being found utterly unreasonable. >> that is correct. we do want them to act reasonably and enforce the law and not turn a blind eye to what might be a violation. >> how does the statute read here? what were the exact words of the

statue? >> the statute has two parts. it has a subsection d. >> where do we find that? >> in the appendix to the respondent's brief. pages 1-5 has all of the relevant portions of the statute. subsection d involves rear lamps. it says that every motor vehicle should have all rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order. that is the relevant portion of subsection d. subsection g on page three says persons shall sell or operate on highways of the state any motor vehicle manufactured after december 31, 1955 unless it is

equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. that is a language the north carolina court of appeals said when it said a stop lamp. that meant only one was required. >> that seems to be what it says. >> the confusion comes in in the last sentence of subsection g. appendix page three. which says the stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps. where the confusion comes in is that that sentence is that the -- would seem to imply that the stop lamp is a rear lamp. that it could be incorporated into a unit with one or more rear lamps. if you go back to subsection d that is a section that says all eare originally equipped lamps must be in good working order. there is some conflicts. >> that applies to all rear lamps and other lamps. >> that is correct.

tage bank so it has to be plural it's going to apply to stop lamps, of course. >> my time is up. thank you. >> mr. chief justice, and may it please the court, since its founding, the probable cause standard has allowed police officers to make stops when there are reasonable grounds to believe a person committed a crime he even if the officer later turns out to have been mistaken about the facts or the law. as justice kennedy observed, given the court case has been recognized, there may be a reasonable mistake of law. an officer who makes a reasonable mistake of law might have a reasonable grounds to believe a person committed a crime. if i can go to a question that

justice kagan asked about why this question has been more properly addressed at the rights thand then -- rights stage at the remedy stage, we think there are three main reasons. the first is history. since the founding, the court has treated the probable cause standard of allowing for reasonable mistakes of law. >> of all the cases that you cite, including riddle, on the context of a statute that did not permit customs officers to suffer damages. >> yes, your honor. >> for purposes of an error of law, correct. >> that is correct. none of those cases involved a violation of the fourth amendment. >> that is correct. those are interpretations of the probable cause standard. >> how is this different in terms of analysis from what we ultimately find is a qualified immunity standard with respect to civil damages today.

don't they follow exactly the same reasoning? >> i don't think so. those cases, the probable cause reasoning in those cases is what the court has done at the merit stage of the fourth amendment. this course has routinely cited cases under those customs statute as eliminating the thisng -- eliminating -- court has routinely cited cases aser those customs statutes ating the meaning of the probable cause standard. >> so when he looked at those cases and made the point i just made, he was wrong? >> no, there is no doubt in those cases the court question was answering was liable, but the way he was answering this question is was determining whether the officers had probable cause. probable cause is a constitutional standard, and that is why this court has relied on those cases. >> assume for the sake of argument i agree with you, that a reasonable mistake of law is an excuse, but what is a reasonable mistake?

now, that is what i would like you to address. in particular, would you have objection to it has to be one, exceedingly rare, two, , it has to beee that a reasonable lawyer would think that the policeman was right. brief, if ae your careful scrutiny in construing the law does it turn out he is wrong. what do you think about that or some other sentiment? >> i think we agree with each of those descriptions. >> if you agree about those, what about this case? after all, it does say a stop light. what is the difficulty of construing that to mean a stoplight? >> we think the north carolina supreme court and court of appeals were right that an officer can reasonably interpret the statute to require -- >> only after careful scrutiny

in serious difficulty construing the law does it turn out the officer was wrong. what is the difficulty? it's a stoplight. >> here the difficulty is the provision that requires ought reasonably equipped -- all ampsonably equipped rear l to be working. >> that includes the stop lights and any other lights. stop lights, the turn lights, the backup lights. so you had to use the plural. >> agreed, it is not the plural. it is the fact that all originally equipped rear lamps have to be working. originally equipped with multiple stop lamps, as cars now are, if one of them is broken, one of the originally equipped rear lamps is not working. that is the difficulty. that is why none of the courts itt consider this thought was anything other than a very hard question of statutory interpretation. >> so when we come out with the hypotheticals, is it reasonable for the officer to say i will pick this one and follow that? >> if the officer is in a jurisdiction whose court of

appeals has decided the question, we think the officer is bound by that interpretation, even if other courts of appeals come out differently. but if the officer is in a jurisdiction where the question is undecided and different courts have come out differently in other jurisdictions, we don't think the fact one court has decided it in one way is dispositive. we think the court looks to this question of is this a difficult question. >> i forgot one thing which may be obvious. we are not talking about the difficulty of construing the fourth amendment itself. we are talking only about a difficulty in construing a criminal statute where in fact the reason for the stop or seizure is based on a violation of criminal law. >> that's right, we think the probable cause standard allows for the officer to act with reasonable grounds. >> how is your standard different from the qualified immunity standard? >> we think in order to have reasonable grounds for a stop, the officer needs to be able to point to something in the statue

to affirmatively support his view. the qualified immunity standard seems to require the opposite. that there is a precedent that for poses what the officer does in order to protect everybody except those who are clearly incompetent. >> the only thing in your brief i did not follow is the importance in deciding the way you recommend is getting this question solved. here is the question, what is the rule, one light or two lights. yet in this case the evidence that came in had nothing at all to do with the traffic violation. so the court would not need to decide the traffic violation case. i think the north carolina immediate appellate court said

there was consent. there was consent, and we never have to deal with what the traffic regulation was. >> that is correct, and this comes up in two contexts. sometimes it will be litigated in the suppression context. sometimes it will be litigated because the officer issued a citation. our concern is if the court takes the position that whenever an officer is wrong about the law he violated the fourth amendment. it's going to deter officers from making stops when there are arguments on both sides. >> do you believe that if there this consent stop, is the fruit of a poison tree? >> that is a difficult question. we don't necessarily agree with that. even as the stop was a but for cause, that does not necessarily mean it was a poisonous tree, this has been argued by the state that it has not been

briefed here. we would address simply the question. >> you start your argument by saying you were going to give three reasons why they should be the right question rather than a remedy question. you said history, which frankly i think history probably does not say as much as you think it says. i want to know what number two and number three are. >> the second is and admin stability -- the second is an ability section. sure, we think this is a simple standard to simply ask officers to decide, the courts to decide whether an officer could reasonably think a person has committed a crime. you don't have to separate the question of law or fact. the third is we don't think there is a normative reason to treat the stakes of law and fact effort lay. when an officer makes a stop in this situation, he can just as reasonably confused as to what the law is under the statutes as to what the facts are. if we are going to treat mistakes of fact as the right analysis, it make sense to treat reasonable mistakes of law in the same way. >> mr. fischer, you have three

minutes left. >> i would like to make four points. to start with the question of question of what would reasonableness mean mr. chief , justice, i think your hypothetical of differing court of appeal opinions in a state, i think there is the analysis that it would violate the fourth amendment and half of the state and not the other half of the state. because each would be binding in its own component of the state. that shows why this court has rejected that kind of analysis only to the remedy stage. >> in this case, do the dissenters in the north carolina supreme court say the adoption -- say the interpretation adopted was surprising? all we have to say unreasonableness is if it is surprising, if the correct interpretation is surprising, then the contrary interpretation is reasonable. what we have to go further than that?

>> i think you do because you have to give more teeth to it. said -- what the solicitor general said is that you have to have a foothold in the statute. i think that is more or less what was cited today. there is a recent d.c. court of appeals opinion that holds that a police officer could argue that all license plate frames are illegal. they rejected that under the code, but that is one of innumerable arguments a law enforcement officer might make and that the reasonable test would give grave -- >> one court one way, the other court the other way, the officer loses. it has to be unusual. >> i think, justice breyer, the problem with that is the core presumption the officer needs to understand the law as it is existed. as was later construed, and mr. chief justice, i think you asked about the ignorance canon. states response is, well, if somebody is reasonably mistaken about the law, we would convict

them. the reason why as we would assume he knew the law. if the court of appeals split and this court divided five/four, they are still convicted because we assume they knew the law when the active. -- they acted. all we are asking for today's apply tomption to police officers. with respect to the solicitor general, the founding documents don't help them. they are only remedy cases. what the court did not distinguish his rights from remedies. if you want to look at the founding, the controlling rule would be the common-law rule. as we said in our brief, with no disagreements on the other side, the common-law rule dating back centuries was ignorance of the law on the police officer's part, even if perfectly reasonable, did not justify the stop. if i could say one last thing, justice scalia, with all due respect, i really do think there is nothing unusual about a party litigating a case up through the

courts. it may arise in federal court or in state court, but they can choose the arguments they choose to raise. when we got a judgment in our favor from the north carolina court of appeals, it was up to the state at that point to choose what argument it wanted to pursue further in this case. just like a state, a party may look at the right questions instead of a remedy, we think that has happened here. >> thank you, counselor. the case is submitted. >> british prime minister david today it will appear before a parliamentary committee to answer questions about the u.k.'s climate change priorities. he will take a second round on efforts to combat extremism. the center for strategic and international studies will hear from dr. anthony fauci. he will be part of a panel

discussing the latest research being done to create an ebola vaccine. 3:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. q&a, author and townhall.com editor katie pavlich on what she perceives as the ignorance of liberals on their war on women rhetoric. the idea where this book came conventione 2012 dnc when they were showing a tribute video to ted kennedy and portraying him as a woman's rights champion. he left a young woman to drown in his car. back for ninegone hours and try to save his own behind, she would have probably survived. you cannot do an entire video warming to be fighting the

on women and glorify someone like that while not including in apart of his life video. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on q&a. we are airing one program from each year starting december 22 at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. massachusetts senator elizabeth warren recently laced concerns about the $1.1 trillion spending bill that passed in congress. pointing to rolling back regulations in the dodd frank act. that was passed in response to the financial crisis, something senator warren spoke at an event hosted by americans for financial reform. this is 25 minutes.

>> good afternoon. i am the executive director of americans for financial reform and i welcome you and thank you all for coming. on behalf of americans for financial reform and also the economic policy institute and the roosevelt institute, with whom we are jointly sponsoring today's event. i am going to very quickly say something about what we hope to do and then quickly introduce senator warren so we can spend as much time as possible listening to the senator before she has to go. especially after the recent stronger jobs report, next week's meeting of the federal open market committee will be the occasion for argument about whether the fed should increase short-term interest rates and prevent excessive speculation in

the world of finance. job growth and damage economic recovery which is already coming very slowly for too many people who were hit hard by the financial crisis. what if there are alternative to approach dealing with bubbles and speculative dangers with regulatory tools that are more targeted to specific risks? what if using financial regulation effectively can help stimulate the economy in ways that deliver more benefits to working people and are less likely to overweight the financial sector. these are hardly radical questions. janet yellen has talked about the importance of macro regulatory tools to deal with financial stability. we think they are very important questions and that they need more attention, and we want to dig in further. for many of us, putting these pieces together is part of our continuing focus on deepening our understanding and the public's recognition of the fundamentally important relationships between the financial system, financial

regulation, and how the economy works or fails to work for everyday americans. our first panel immediately after senator warren speaks will focus on the downsides of relying only on monetary policy as a tool for stabilization. as well as on the debate about how far the fed should pull back support for economic recovery to keep inflation in check. there will be a second keynote from paul krugman. and the second panel will examine the financial regulatory tools available and consider how into what extent they can be used to control financial risks. now for senator warren. we are fortunate to have her with us today and to have her in the senate every day and enjoy her leadership standing up to the excepted economic power and political influence of wall street. spelling out the harm that does to families and communities. insisting that things can and need to be different. we have been lucky enough to work with the senator on the creation of a new consumer financial protection bureau, a remarkable example of the

difference that approach can make. senator warren. we are glad to be able to continue the conversation to advance these important principles. [applause] >> thank you, thank you all. thank you for the kind introduction. thank you for this chance to join you all today. today's event focuses on how the federal reserve can use its monetary tools to promote economic growth and its regulatory and supervisory tools to reign in our financial system. the fed has always had dual responsibilities -- monetary policy and regulatory and supervisory policy. but in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, congress gave the fed even more regulatory and supervisory authority than it had before. the new chair of the fed janet yellen recently knowledged

the board's supervisory responsibilities are just as important as its better-known obligation to set interest rates and conduct monetary policy. i think the lapses that led to the 2008 crisis drove that point home with searing intensity. the fed is now our first line of defense against another crisis, and we have made progress through the dodd frank act. even so, the risk of another crisis remains unacceptably high. take one example. this summer, the fed and the fdic determined that 11 of the country's biggest banks have no credible plan for being resolved in bankruptcy. that means that if anyone of them takes on too much risk and

starts to fail, the taxpayers would have to bail it out to prevent another crash. we are all relying on the fed to stop that from happening, which means we are all relying on the fed to get tough in regulating the biggest banks. the question is whether the bank regulators can do the job we need them to do. that raises an issue about the influence of wall street on financial regulation and economic policy. it is an issue that affects not d but also the other banking regulators, the treasury department, and our government's entire economic policymaking structure. let's look at some facts. fact 1 -- wall street spends a lot of time and money influencing congress. public citizen and the center for responsible politics found that in the run-up to dodd frank, the

financial services sector employed 1447 former employees to carry out their lobbying efforts, including 73 former members of congress. according to a report by the institute for america's future, by 2010, the six biggest banks and their trade organizations employed 243 lobbyists who once worked in federal government, 33 who had been chiefs of staff for members of congress and 54 who had worked as staffers for the banking oversight committee in the senate and house. that is a lot of former government employees and congressman pounding on congress to make sure that the big banks get heard. no surprise that the financial industry spent more than $1 million a day lobbying congress

on financial reform, and a lot of that money went to a former -- went to former elected officials and government employees. fact 2 -- wall street dedicates enormous time and money to influencing regulatory policy. the sunlight foundation, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization took a look at all of the meeting logs from 2010 to 20 12 of the treasury department, the commodities trading commission, and the fed. it found that three agencies reported meeting with one of the 20 big banks, or banking associations, a combined 12.5 times a week. that is about five times as often as reform oriented groups combined. that works out to nearly 1300 meetings over two years. goldman in jpmorgan each met

with those agencies at least 175 times, or nearly twice per week every week, on average. keep in mind, that is the count at only three of the seven major regulators. fact 3 -- democratic administrations have filled and enormous number of senior economic policy decisions with people who have close ties to wall street. starting with robert rubin, a former citigroup ceo, three of the last four treasury secretaries under democratic presidents have had citigroup affiliations before or after their treasury service. the fourth was offered, but declined, citigroup's ceo position. the new vice chairman of the federal reserve, stanley fischer, was a citigroup executive. the directors of the national economic council, the office of

management and budget, a current u.s. trade representative, and senior officials at the treasury department, have also had citigroup ties. that is a record for just one single bank. many other senior officials in recent administrations have had ties to goldman, jpmorgan, bank of america, morgan stanley or other major wall street firms. still more officials, including two recent appointees to the commodity futures trading commission were lawyers who spent huge portions of their careers representing wall street institutions. this is the revolving door at its most dangerous. in virtually every economic policy discussion held in washington, the point of view of wall street banks is well represented. so well represented, in fact, they have often crowded out other points of view.

that is the kind of context for thinking of the nomination of antonio weiss. he spent the last 20 years at the investment bank lazard and has been named under-secretary for domestic finance at the treasury department. he is focused on international, corporate mergers, companies buying and selling each other. it may be interesting, challenging work, but it does not sufficiently qualify him to oversee consumer protection and domestic regulatory functions at the treasury department. in addition to his lack of basic qualification, mr. weiss was part of the burger king inversion deal that moved the u.s. company to canada as part of a merger that would cut down on its tax obligations.

also note that mr. weiss' friends at lazard are giving him a golden parachute valued at about $20 million as he goes into government service. for me, this is just one spin of the revolving door too many. enough is enough. the response to these concerns has been, let's say, loud. first, his supporters say, come on. he is an investment banker, so of course he should be qualified to oversee complicated financial work at treasury. but his defenders haven't shown that his actual experience qualifies him for this job. professor adam leviton, a law professor who teaches financial regulation at georgetown wrote a good piece about this last week. he looked at each of the functions of the under-secretary's position, and as he put it, "almost none event -- none of that relates to the

work of an investment banker doing international m&a." theessor simon johnson, former chief economist of the imf who now teaches at m.i.t., agrees. he noticed that this position is "the third most senior official in the executive branch with regard to fiscal decision-making." then he goes on to say, "it is hard to think of any senior fiscal official from a serious country with qualifications as weak as those of mr. weiss." professor adam leviton and professor johnson are right. i worked at treasury and i know how critical this position is to financial regulation issues. despite what some of weiss' supporters have said, the job is not just to peddle u.s.

treasuries to foreign investors, and even if it were, weiss is a corporate dealmaker not a bond trader. -- leviton itin makes another good point. "the shock of mr. weiss's supporters that anyone would dare question his suitability reflects an unspoken assumption that anyone from wall street is of course expert in all things financial. that is hooey." i agree. we would all scratch our heads if the president nominated a theoretical physicist to be the surgeon general just because she had a background in science. it is no less puzzling for the president to nominate an international mergers specialist to handle largely domestic economic issues at treasury because he has a background in finance.

second, weiss' supporters say that burger king isn't a "classic" inversion deal. ok, so when burger king moved to canada in a deal that would lower its taxes, i guess it was inversionsic" deal. clear, in august of this year, more than 2600 new stories mentioned burger king in the context of tax inversion. there has been some debate over the details. people disagree about what the exact implications will be for burger king and whether the taxes will go down a little or go down a lot. but no matter how many burger king executives lineup in the newspapers to say that they have other motives, this is an inversion deal, and mr. weiss was right in the middle of it. this matters because at the end of the day, the administration

undercuts its own opposition to this practice by nominating someone who was involved in a high-profile cross-border inversion. who, by the way, made $50 million in the last two years thatng for lazard, a firm did three of the four major announced inversions. lazard isn't an american company anymore. it already moved to bermuda because its taxes are lower. third, and maybe you can help me understand this argument -- people say opposition to mr. weiss is unreasonable because -- wait for it -- he likes poetry. [laughter] i am actually not kidding. supposedly because he helped publish a literary magazine

called "the paris review," we should trust that he would zealously pursue financial reform. i confess, i don't read any literary magazines, but really? if you like to monster truck racing, would that show that he supported wall street bailouts? i do not get what his hobby has to do with overseeing consumer protection and domestic regulatory functions at the treasury department. so what is this really all about? why call out the cavalry for a guy whose experience doesn't match the job he has been nominated for? why circle the wagons around a guy who is picking up $20 million to take on a public service job? it is all about the revolving door. that well-oiled mechanism that sends wall street executives to make policies for the government, and sends government policymakers straight back to wall street. weiss defenders are all in,

loudly defending the were -- the revolving door and telling america how lucky we are that wall street is willing to run the economy and the government. in fact, weiss suppporters even defend the golden parachutes like the $20 million payment that weiss will receive from lazard for taking this government job. they say it is an important tool in making sure that wall street executives will continue to be willing to run government policymaking. if that sounds ridiculous to you, you are not alone. sheila bair, a republican, and former head of the fdic responded that "only in the wonderland of wall street logic could one argue that this looks like anything other than a bribe." she went on, "we want people entering public service because they want to serve the public.

frankly, if they need a $20 million incentive, i would rather they stay away." why does the revolving door matter? because it means that too much of the time, the wind blows from the same direction. time after time in government, the wall street view prevails, and time after time, conflicting views are crowded out. consider the deregulation of the banking industry in the 1980's and 1990's. followed by a no strings attached bank bailout in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. most recently, the anemic efforts to help homeowners who had been systematically cheated by financial giants. the wind always blows in the same direction. the impact of the revolving door

can sometimes be subtle. no one likes to ignore phone calls from former colleagues and no one likes to advance policies that could hurt future employers. relationships matter and anyone who doubts that wall street's outsize influence in washington has watered down our government's approach toward too big to fail banks. have had their eyes deliberately closed. take one example. brown kaufman was a commitment -- component to the dodd frank act that would have broken up the largest financial institutions. that amendment might have passed, but it ran into powerful opposition from an alliance between wall streeters in government and wall streeters still on wall street. the hand in hand between treasury executives and wall street officials on this was not subtle. a senior treasury official publicly acknowledged it.

the revolving door rips the heart out of public service. too many people get jobs based on who they know and not what they know. too many others who might have brought a different perspective to this work get crowded out. i know that there are experienced and innovative people in the financial industry who are qualified for top economic positions in government. when i set up the new consumer financial protection bureau, i interviewed, i hired, and i worked alongside many people with wall street experience, and i was glad to do so. in the senate, i have voted for plenty of nominees with wall street experience. but we need a balance. not every person who sweeps in through the revolving door should be offered a top job without some serious cross-examination. qualifications matter.

and weiss doesn't have them. this is about building counter pressure on wall street bankers. members of congress, their staff and regulatory agencies, are going to hear the wall street perspective loud and clear, each and every minute of each and every day. that isn't going to change. but we need a real mix of people in the room when decisions are made. when the president has an opportunity to decide who will be at the financial decision-making table, he should think about who knows the economics of job creation, about community banks and access to financing for small business, about who has the skills and determination to make sure that the biggest banks can't take down our economy again. the titans of wall street have succeeded in pushing government

policy that made mega banks rich beyond imagination. while leaving working families to struggle from payday to payday. so long as the revolving door keeps spinning, government policies will continue to favor wall street over main street. saying,ou'll join me in enough is enough. thank you. [applause] >> thank you so much. >> on the next "washington journal" emily