this cdc in the stands there is nothing more important than in education system that works for black children and encourages or to meighen's to have legislation to have opportunities for african-american students to strengthen the 105 historically black colleges said universities who educated black children with other institutions were closed for:we will continue to push for science and technology and engineering and math recall is stab for young african-americans to provide retraining for adults in the 21st century. and june 25th 2013 u.s. supreme court suspended use of section five of the voting rights act because of

what it called the outdated formula. the absence of section five protection now allows the states to pass discriminatory laws that disenfranchise african-american voters and other groups. partisan redistricting scales have been acted with impunity. as a caucus will continue our fight to restore section five of the voting rights act. [applause] and we will evaluate whether american corporations will depend on the government contracts and tax preferences if they make a serious effort at diversity of executive suites and a workforce. we will look at corporations the fortune 500 corporations

are investing in underserved communities and if they are failing we want to expose it we are ready for the fight in the future if it is a fight all fair minded americans and should promote we need to use political means policy and legal means to reduce racial disparity to closer to the day when every american receives and realizes the american dream. so in closing i issue a call to action for what i call the all hands on deck strategy with the cbc to work with our allies and state and local government to push for good policies and welfare and education and health period criminal-justice. we will work with grass-roots organizations all across america, a national black organizations

with the faith community to gather data to organize masses of the people to promote our agenda. and pursuing legal strategy to reverse those most egregious laws it finally pushed for full participation in presidential elections, a state yet local elections with the goal to elect people every level of people who share our values. this is our all hands on deck strategy that the cbc and its allies will promote as we begin our work we will continue to struggle to provide leadership to make the difference for those who we represent. may we bless our communities with talented leaders as you see on the stage may god continue to bless each of you.

thank you for this privilege. now it is our time to make a difference. thank you very much. [applause] >> next, a discussion on global conflicts. of after that, we discuss bipartisanship. it live at 7:00, your calls and comments on "washington journal." on wednesday come the council on foreign relations held a discussion on global conflicts and instability. panelists included international crisis group's and control risk groups.

this is just over hour. >> we take stock on the last year look forward to the new year. we thinking about the crises in the world and the potential horrible things that could happen. we debate a little bit. we think about what it means for the united states and for the rest of the world. before it started, let me say this is on the record. we do have media here.

for those of you who need to make sure about what you are saying, we are on the record. could you turn your cell phones off, not just on vibrate. the sound system gets interference. it's my pleasure to introduce three panelists today. the first is mark schneider. first we have jim brooks. he is the ceo of control risk. do they have any of the risk map? they published a risk map from. jim is not just the ceo of control risk, he has experience as an operator in the intelligence field area to his right is mark schneider. a he is from the international crisis group.

he has had many positions in government. he was the director of the peace corps. it's great to have him here to talk about the handout for his organization, the 10 worst watch. he will talk about what's wrong with that assessment. we will have our own hall stairs -- paul stairs. he prevented the priorities survey. he is the author of 10 books. he is at brookings and other places as well. what i would like to do is have a vibrant discussion with the entire group. we will start off with each of our panelists giving a brief overview of the work that their organization has been doing.

we think about all the crises in the world. talk about the criteria and the way you think through how to rank order things in your methodology. do all that really briefly. we will start with jim. >> thank you ray much. it's great to be here. i consider this how to frame such a broad topic. i thought i might lead often say we can expect deflating optimism and continued conflict. i thought that might be a bit heavy. control risk has published our 2015 version of risk map. each year, we attempt to take a look on a global basis of what we expect to see principally

from a security operational risk and integrity risk standpoint around the world. this is both on a country level and on a thematic level. what are those things that underlie the global governance system around the world itself. i think what i will focus on today is probably three principal themes. the first one is really looking at politics without power and a resurgent nationalism occurring around the globe. looking at this from the lens of international business predominantly. if we look back over the last six or seven years, up until the financial crisis, we saw governments around the world thriving on performance legitimacy. they had rapidly growing middle classes and booming economies around the world. that is what gave them their

political mandate. since the financial crisis we've seen a weakening of their power. we've seen the rise of the middle class where they move beyond a significant and start looking at things like transparency and accountability and wanting to improve their lives and become more restless and have more demands on government. as the government changes and grows, we are starting to see a huge resurgence in nationalism. governments were moving to short-term political agendas and moving to nationalist or populist behaviors in order to reassert their political legitimacy itself an appeal to the public. who gets caught in the crosshairs of that is multinational business. we see it in terms of increased

regulatory frameworks targeting international business. we have seen that across china in 2014. we also see issues like we saw in vietnam with the anti-chinese riots going after the manufacturing industry. the trick is how do they get the political bark without the economic bite. we are going to see nationalism increasing bureaucratic red tape. there will be more competition favoring the domestic players who will have greater access to contracts, who won't be delayed with the beaker -- bureaucratic

hurdles moving capital and talent across borders. we see this in western countries from canada to france and i can more domestic policies to protect their economies. we see it any merging markets around the world. it's becoming constrictive as compared to the past where they were quite open and willing to let international investment flow freely. we are seeing a large increase in tension between business multinational corporations, and politics. as we've seen over the last decades, most international businesses have significantly rebuilt themselves and redesign themselves as global companies that no longer operate and find themselves by geography and

state borders but increasingly by regions, whether its agent pacific or expanding multiple markets. they need the ability to move capital and move talent freely without hassle across borders. as we see the increase in the nationalism on many fronts around the world, we see that at odds and businesses have become less capable of dealing with localized politics. this is creating conflicts between business. we are seen a significant increase in the amount of gross domestic product globally produced in medium to high political risk environments around the world. that has increased over the last decade of 16% of global gdp

coming from medium to high risk environments to 39% in the last year. we are trading a lot more with higher political risk environments around the world. the economic output of the world is going toward those environments. we see the political risk increasing in a variety of ways. we see it in a series of coup d'etat's around the world. we see it insignificant security crises around the world. ukraine and yemen are great examples. we see it as the end of the political dynasty in the cuba. we see it in what used to be very stable and predictable environments becoming less predictable. poland, sweden spain are all great examples. this is an environment where historically safe areas around the world are less predictable

and much more complex for businesses operating in those environments. i think the final point that i would add is with the information of technology around the world and weaker state power. government is less powerful than it has been. we see the way organized criminal groups around the world and terrorists are doing business. if we look at technology itself, it's changing how the nonstate actors are able to hold and project power around the world. the competition between the old jihadist network and the new islamic state is increasing and technology is aiding the ability to proliferate its voice in its

power around the world. we are seeing the cyberattacks that are occurring around the world. 2015 is going to increase the proliferation of cyberattacks, especially as groups learn from these and start using the tactics in different ways. we're going to see cyber jihadists begin to learn from organized crime and use retail malware for their purposes. we are going to see criminals use malware that was crafted or state-sponsored espionage for their purposes. were going to see the proliferation of nationalist cyber hackers or freelance recruits act on behalf of

nationalist governments. the week law enforcement an international framework around cyber protections is going to continue and we will see week law enforcement enforcement in places like india and brazil. they will be breeding grounds for cyber activism. i would add that we will probably see a large increase in the amount of cyberattacks within a supply chains around the world. as those are operated by multinational companies which and become easy targets. that is back to that same nationalism that we see emerge across the world. without taking too much time, i

will him back to you. >> happy new year to everyone. i am hoping that as we talk about what to worry about in 2015, as result of the actions you take at the end of the year, we can talk about the wars that were prevented in 2015. but me thank paul and jim for allowing to participate in this panel. i think is a port to recognize that we start each year not with a past history of national and personal interests. the past year saw crises flair out in almost every corner of the globe. the handout that our new president has put out indicates

10 of the key complex in 2015. i added a couple were a think there is a greater likelihood for direct impact. there are a series of crises waiting to happen. they were triggered by faulty elections, economic mismanagement and corruption, or a combination. sri lanka, as early as tomorrow. nigeria, smut. venezuela later this year. there are additional risks and all of the west africa ebola affected countries that are barely a decade out of conflict. the only good news that i see

coming up his columbia. there will be a peace agreement. the last couple of days you have had a cease-fire and the president announced an end to military actions. i think there will be an agreement and referendum approved by the end of your. cuba normalization does put an end to the cold war. we have not seen any open or political space in cuba. we had 50 years of isolation policy that clearly failed in that regard. the most important in terms of impact on the united states and the rest of the world is the slim possibility of a nuclear arms agreement with ironic. -- iran. it's in the interest of both countries. it's in the interest of the region. there is a darker side which is

why you will see it listed as one of the potential conflicts. what are the four trends that we see likely to produce more conflict? as we have already heard, it's the return of geo-political international competition and hostility. there is an estimation of regional competition that leads to a less protectable world. the obvious example is the problem with russia and the west. there is risk-taking, this is one of the areas i have added between china and japan and china and southeast asian countries, particularly the philippines. nobody really knows about early warning mechanisms.

china's more aggressive. the second trend is jihad groups are growing in numbers and arenas. they often reinforce one another and produce brutal acts of terrorism and real-time national security threats. it's important to recognize we have not been able to deal with one of the scariest aspects of their ability to recruit. they recruit new members from large disenfranchised youth populations around the world. that partly reflects government's failure to prevent -- provide adequate sense of opportunity for that population. third, the international community, and this is where we have an opportunity continues to accept imperfect peace

processes and our accessories to failed transitions. the u.s. and other u.s. countries should be an effective system. they are too late and offer too little and the part too fast. you saw that in iraq and many of the african conflicts as well. you can look at sudan, south sudan. hopefully the current secretary general mandated examination of peacekeeping will do that. whether those nations with more capable military's then most regional forces they will support to establish those peacekeeping operations and do more to contribute to the financing. finally, weak and corrupt states continue to set the stage for internal wars.

while this is often portrayed accurately as a lack of capacity, it's usually a portion -- question of political will. you have the list in front of you. i'm just going to talk about one. i think it's crucial to u.s. national security and international stability, and that ukraine and russia. from the standpoint of the administration, it's one of the most dangerous situations in the world and it's coming to a head this spring. what i mean by that we published a report just a few weeks ago the report ascribes a way forward to avoid that class. since the beginning of this

year, there have been 5000 deaths. you have more than 540,000 displaced people. this winter, you see increasingly vulnerable large-scale human suffering in eastern ukraine. while no one can easily predict russia's next steps, even if there is less than a 10% chance of a new russian military action, the west must plan how will respond. we don't see that. we also don't see enough action taken to discourage some of the voices in kiev about military action against the eastern ukrainians. that would offer an excuse to president putin. that is the one area i would

single out. we talk in the report about isis, the serious problems that are faced there. we talk about china and japan and china and the philippines. pakistan. i would emphasize the concern in pakistan about the failure to seek any strategic change in the way they view the relationship with certain jihadists. they are going after much of the ttp. we have yet to see them take any effective action against lec. while i and there. -- why don't i and there. if you think the secretary of state and the present don't have

anything to worry about, you are wrong. >> excellent. paul? >> let me echo my appreciation for all of you coming out today. it's always good to see you. this is the third or fourth year i have done this briefing at the beginning of january. what i thought i would do in this short time is give you a brief overview of the findings of our annual preventive priority survey. many of you participate in this each year. essentially, we polled 2000 experts in the government and outside and asked them to rank 30 contingencies that we can see plausible. we do a crowdsourcing exercise earlier in the year to take suggestions of what those 30 contingencies will be.

it's essentially a risk assessment. it's not just asking people about the likelihood of these conflict happening or escalating. i think it's an important distinction. we ask people to rank them in terms of their importance to u.s. national interests. we allow people to make that judgment. on the basis of that, we distilled the results and put them into these three tiers of relative rivalries. i'm not going to go through the whole list. but i thought i would do is focus on the three concerns that i take to be of most concern to the respondents to the survey. i think there are three clusters. the first is the conflict in syria and iraq and the potential

for a major deterioration of the situation in afghanistan. the concern here is the fear that the united states will be pulled back into both theaters. we see some aspects of this. the mission in afghanistan has been extended. advises of gone back into iraq. there is a likelihood of intensified operations in iraq. the u.s. will be more directly involved in addition to the air operation. that is the first cluster of concern. the second is concern over an intensification or deterioration in eastern ukraine. concurrently, the possibility of another flareup or flashpoint in the south china sea.

both raise the risk of u.s. developing a more adversarial relationship with russia and china. that has profound implications not just for security but for cooperation on a range of global issues. i think that came through very much in the survey. the third is concern over the nuclear activities of north korea and iran. there are signs in the case of iran that the agreement will not last and that might unravel. there is always an abiding concern about the unpredictability of north korea. we've seen this in recent weeks with the hacking activity.

here again the concern that the united states will be directly involved in any escalation of those two conflicts. they are the three main themes. i want to add that there are some outlier concerns that also came through in the survey. i think a were the -- they are worthy of us hate attention to. deterioration of the situation in the west rank, there are signs that we could be on the cusp of a major corruption of palestinian violence on the west bank. the upcoming elections in nigeria could be extremely violent and have profound implications for the stability of that country. third, the power transition on

the way in zimbabwe could unravel in ways that are unpredictable and violent. yemen, the situation there has deteriorated in recent weeks. a major bombing today, 35 people were killed in an attack today. finally, thailand. there are concerns about how the succession will play out there. instability is latent in that country. these are other areas that i would be mindful of the coming year. >> great. reading through some of the work that you have done and listening to you here, there are so me ways to think through what may happen and what that means. what i think is interesting about paul's work is you try to say these are most likely moderately likely, not very

likely and then also this is most consequential versus least consequential. with respect primarily to the united states. it's very tightly scoped. lots of bad things are going to happen in the world. you've got this most likely lens and most dangerous. it's not always clear about most dangerous to whom. there are lots of most we could talk about. nobody has mentioned much of central america. that is one of the most dangerous places in the world. why? because we can't do anything about it or it doesn't affect us that much? most impactful is a word i hate. most disruptive to whom? most disruptive to the international system?

your lens is looking at global business. things that are disruptive as opposed to violence. you can have places that are inconsequential to the global economy spiral completely out of control. they can really gross us out in other ways. it would not be at the top of your list. seeing the different ways in which you can look at these it's important to present what lens you are looking with at first. with that in mind, what is your response -- none of these lenses take on this issue of her and this violence that could potentially spin out of control

in places like central america because these are not normal conflicts necessarily. how do you see that in context? >> central america dropped out this year. this is only because the other countries are those with the likelihood of deadly violence is greater in terms of numbers and something new. there is violence in central america. it has decreased in the last year. it's also one of the reasons why we did include both libya and south sudan as a link. the conflict and south sudan is directly linked to sudan supporting the rebels in south sudan.

we see that level of violence increasing in both places during the year. it's a matter of looking at this coming year, when we see the likelihood of greater deadly violence were greater impact? i was looking at it in terms of national interests. the focus was on overall instability. >> the potential from spillover from mexico was classified as a tier two level priority in our survey. as you alluded to, a lot of people have a hard time grouping what is criminal violence that we see related to organized crime in central america and mexico with more political violence and identifiable type

conflict. where does it fit in? we all recognize in terms of the number of people affected and killed and so on, criminal violence is extremely costly. the numbers are horrific from central america. it would be classified as a war anyplace else. >> it's criminally driven. >> we recognize that political violence has a criminal element. there is a blur tween the two. it depends on how you classify it and how you rank it. >> you raise the point whether it's the humanitarian side or for business, from a risk perspective, the world is open for business everywhere. what do you need to do to

operate and mitigate the risks in those environments and succeed and what is the cost of doing so? if you look at central america not a lot of foreign directed investment. the risk from criminal activity and the risk of violence in guatemala and el salvador increased last year. it doesn't get a lot of attention. on the other hand, you see mexico and mexico is very well covered from a security risk standpoint. you see high levels of drug investment and close ties with the united states. you see an influx of manufacturing in mexico. the risks are manageable. if you understand them and put them in the right context, it is

a very been look -- business friendly environment. the ability for foreign concessions in the oil and gas industry, it's a huge change in that environment and its driving more attention. >> i'm going to ask one more question. you made a very interesting comment. you said the international community arrived too late and they do too little and the part too fast. i'm thinking about these teetering conflicts. you mentioned columbia. you might also think about myanmar. the degree to which the norms associated with the international community conflict resolution associate with human rights we need to moderate that

a little bit. is the -- are the standards about war crimes and retribution , undermining anyway. we've got both sides wondering what's going to happen. have you get beyond that. how you manage both of these sets of values that we have the international community? >> we focused rectally on traditional justice in colombia with the report and looked at how you move forward in terms of dealing with the question for mass atrocity. at the same time, you enable a priests -- peace agreement to take place.

we believe that columbia and the negotiators are conscious of the need to deal with that issue in an effective way. if you don't deal with that issue of accountability, if you don't deal with somebody being held accountable to tell the truth about mass atrocities, it's unlikely that a peace agreement will hold. we have argued that there is a way to deal with this issue that holds some accountable and recognizes the need to view the political consequences of continuing the conflict which will make more victims. we think they are down the path of finding the right balance. the other point that you mention that i think is important to refocus on, when we go into a post-conflict situation, we have to recognize that this is not a

three years and you're out situation. you're not going to rebuild institutions that are going to sustain peace in a short time. they said it takes 17 years on average to get from war with a peace agreement to sustainable institutions and peace. after three or four or five years, you are mistaken to think you've got it done. my point is we have to recognize that if we are going to assist countries reach a peace agreement, we have to be there a lot longer. we should know it now in the case of iraq. leaving iraq did not produce stable government institutions and a stable security force. i suspect that's the reason why in afghanistan we are saying

maybe we should rethink whether we should pull all the troops out on the same timeline. we should ensure that the nsf has the capacity to withstand accelerated taliban attacks. >> just a general point, most of these conflicts with few exceptions are all internal conflicts. your cost constantly grappling with how to reconcile universal norms of sovereignty with these growing norms of human rights and responsibility to protect. there is no good formula for reconciling this. the problem is, this is the real challenge, as relations among the major powers who can veto

any action by the u.n. to provide legitimacy once those relations fray, the prospect of getting a high level consensus to put aside these principles becomes difficult. conflicts fester and increase. almost by definition, the international community will come to those conflicts late. they are difficult to deal with and we know that coming late means they are harder to deal with. that is the challenge we will face. >> i think marx comments on columbia -- mark's comments on columbia are exactly right.

there is a real ability to get that agreement. i think it's been handled very well. i think we draw back to the global governance system, one of the challenges we are seeing on the global stage is as governments refocus on domestic politics, we saw the push at the g 20 two be a larger global governance group, there isn't the diplomatic space to handle global crises. we have seen over the last year real weakness globally. i think as we put that as a backdrop to everything going on, things diminished on the global stage. there is no will, that's a difficult position to be in. >> we want to go on ahead and

open this up to questions. remember that we are on the record. raise your hand. give your name and affiliation. >> i am with the capital trust book -- group. saudi arabia, you have not mentioned saudi arabia. it is surrounded by problems. there are terrorist threats. i would like your assessment on that subject. >> we are kept to seven minutes saudi arabia is definitely there. when i mentioned one of the trends in terms of geopolitical competition, the rivalry between iran and saudi arabia is a fundamental driver of conflict

in the region. but we are concerned about is trying to see whether there is a way to diminish that conflict in order to help deal with the roles of each are playing in syria with respect to yemen and at the same time one of the concerns that we have about saudi arabia, which is a partner in many ways, what they will do to help diminish the level of financing of jihad ease in pakistan. that is a driving force for the pakistan taliban. when we talk about saudi arabia, it's a fundamental concern of both in the region and elsewhere. >> if i could add, it comes up every year. this year it was

at this year it was not mentioned as a particular concern and that was her saying why that was the case. i think there has been set year with the balancing payment issues becoming a bigger problem in the kingdom, that they would you more unrest. we keep sort of probing experts on the kingdom to get their assessments and make the deal that it is still a fundamentally stable place. that she and others essentially to various payments and they have the resources to do this indefinitely and it will remain a stable place. i'm not an expert on saudi arabia. i am always nervous when people make those pronouncements because i am always worried about that. continuing with the instability. some interpret that how you

will. >> hi. it is no doubt true that the conflicts would be gravely held if the international community would stay longer and you can't get in and out in a short time. but i don't know who is going to do that. i mean, we all here can recognize that it is certainly not the europeans entering a period of the inflation and rising nationalism with a enough of that element to it. and it is not the united states. you know, john mcain and lindsey graham can hold their breath until they turn blue.

the united states and the congress are not going to support ground forces in iraq no matter what happens. so i don't know if you have any suggestions about what happens to these conflicts if they are forced to resolve them more or less on their own or to continue. >> i think first i am not willing to accept that it is not the united states to engage more actively over a longer period of time and some of these areas. not all. but let's just take into questions the area. the u.s. now said there is a need to more effect to fully support the moderate rivals and that is one element in dealing effectively with the threat of isis. i suspect that means that there is going to be more even beyond what authority been discussed in support of those moderate forces.

in three years ago, that wouldn't have had even in the realm of possibility. currently, there is a guinea to have some u.s. military involvement with some of the u.n. peacekeeping forces in africa, in south sudan, and providing let's say planning. as the fact that might be possible because the one thing that the u.s. clearly has said is that mass atrocities and see another rwanda is not acceptable. i suspect that there is a broader range of political support for tribes to ensure that doesn't happen. now how you manage it and how you put it together, i great you there is no clear roadmap, and i suspect it may be possible to see more u.s.

direct involvement supporting the peacekeeping. >> can i just add something quick? you know, we have seen this video before, very, you remember the same consolation in fact yours in terms of our lack of political will to intervene and then they split very quickly. so you know, just because there is this very unpromising environment for doing things early and intervening and so on, it is owing to it that way. i think the other trend you would see is greater empowerment of some of the regional organizations, rather

than hoping for the u.n. to rise to the rescue that we will see coalitions within the regional organizations, maybe be more active. whether it is the au, gcc, not sure about ose, certainly some of these that they will take matters into their own hands. i can see that. the mac i mean as we look at different environments, the u.s. has always been very good at planning military assistance in form of planning, training and assistance of foreign governments around the world, either overtly or continuing and expanding below in different directions. i think we need a much stronger push towards countries around the world also taken stronger ownership. if you look at the islamic state and iraq, it is not going to be solved. the issues will not be solved by an air campaign and not necessarily solved by boots on the ground. there are no credible ground soldiers that will go into iraq at this point anywhere around the world. iraq needs to take control of its own political system and allowed inclusive involvement across the spectrum in order to get durable change that is going to support a defeat of the islamist state in iraq and

it's unlikely. in fact, it is more likely drifting towards full sectarian violence right now and will likely look more like see reactive the months ahead and it does the old iraq. >> i think also why i'm going to add something to this because where the conversation is sort of focused on whose underground intervention military thing, in this editing your thing you are talking about, there were so many other things that need to be done. i think you saw this in libya. doesn't necessarily mean we need a robust military intervention and present over a long period of time, but we need to do other things to help the libyans or in this case the afghans to sort of take control of the peace that they potentially could have. that is that teeter reading middle right there. i think there is probably more of an appetite for those kinds

of things, even though they are not big and getting a lot of news, they may actually be helpful. there is more appetite for that and to have the political will to invade interventions like driving that lack of appetite that they may be talking about. in the back there. >> tom downey, middle east broadcaster. i want to follow up on the saudi arabia question with a question about egypt. it is obviously potentially an explosive leg and market has been that way for 2000 years, so i don't think a 17-year road bankroll up my spare. so could all of you or some of you comment on the egyptian economy, the lack of reform in egypt and the egyptian effort against terrorism and that includes egyptian, is really

operations, which are warming up, strangely. >> tom, thank you as always. i think the reason that is not on the list is not because it is a problem in egypt, for the region or for the united states. we don't think deadly violence likely. unfortunately, there is likely to be a continuation of the same, obviously i cannot goblins, and unfortunate continued closing space within the country that is not going to move in the direction we would like as a democratic opening, but it is also unlikely to result in major civil conflict internally over the next year. as to the point that you just made, is relative to the

relationship of conflict in israel and palestine that egypt appears to be a stabilizing force in that regard at the moment. that is the reason. >> i would just point to three things. one is the economy as you point out being heavily subsidized by the gulf countries and if that was to add, i am not sure. i think egypt would go into an often see. this is very ugly and burgeoning insurgency and finite. the government has done a very poor job or good job in alienating the tribes they are and that has sort of cross national problems and that group is now formally affiliated with the isis. so that is of concern.

thirdly, many of us worry about the strong late in support for the brotherhood and how that might manifested health in the long term if there is no real reform politically inside egypt. >> question over here. >> i am perry came back with the state department. two pair raise the great political theorist, yogi berra prediction is hard, especially about the future. thinking about some of the most geostrategic events in the last couple of years, it would be the annexation of crimea followed by mosul is there not things any of us predicted. we knew with the removal of john vukovich, we had obviously people waiting for the spillover of the theory of civil war, but i think -- i guess the question is as you think are your presentations

how do we structurally prepare ourselves for these black swans? we cannot make contingencies. but maybe there are structural things we can do better more adapt and when these black swans do a riot that we are a more nimble on our feet and can be more proactive than stuck in a reactionary mode. thank you. >> i took a look at all of the countries that are listed as likely conflicts from 2011 to mac now. there's only two that we missed. one was ukraine and the other one was 79 as a separate conflict if you will. it wasn't iraq. we all saw the failure to

establish inclusive institutions, including the sudanese and iraq as a precipitate or of likely violence. that we saw. what we didn't see was isis. in the case of ukraine, we did not see the russian -- likelihood of the russian military action that went across international borders and put together the result did crimea. in terms of trends, back to janine's point is that what all of us recognize that we haven't been able to figure out how to do it perfectly is the need to strengthen institutions in these countries, and these fragile countries. economic institutions, political institutions and civilian law enforcement institutions that protect citizens and give a feeling that they are protected and that it is not a power

structure for his own interest that uses security forces for its own interest and the widespread population simply is left out of it. >> i would just add to that, certainly if we look across, let's pick decade, we can pick any period of time. the world has moved increasingly away from being able to come up with old collateral agreement and over the last couple of years we have seen more you don't want real agreement that we are seeing is people -- countries began seen on domestic politics, we see anti-ladder listen globally. the way to get beyond, we do ed to strengthen institutions. we need to strengthen the law-enforcement apparatus and criminal justice system, et cetera, within environments around the world because we are never going to see the black swan and we will never be in the business of predicting everything is going to happen.

we need to focus on the government system in bringing together the parties that get back to multilateral cooperation to solve the crises that emerge that we don't see. >> just a general point. we are enamored with the dei if we can tweet i think this is just an idea that instead the early warning and putting everything on early warning as your trigger for action, for early preventive action that we should move more towards this what i call for site risk assessment in which we try to anticipate areas of risk without necessarily trying to be precise about how our potential crazies might evolve.

on the basis of that, stop taking early preventive and preparatory measures. we also missed ukraine in last year's survey. though we have had it before. we do d's regular planning exercises. we did ukraine several years ago. we've done saudi arabia. this is not rocket science to see where certain places are at risk of instability. and moreover, hasbro consequences. and that is the key. it is combining not only the risk of something happening, but also an appreciation that if it were to happen, that there will be serious implications and that should drive early action rather than waiting for these precise signals because by the time you get that certainty, it is too late. it's arty happening by definition.

we've got to get away from this early warning paradigm in my view and move towards this anticipatory approach. >> even then, we don't know necessarily what to do about it. it is a problem because you can have these little shocks to a system like what happened in ukraine and even though we saw all the bad things. even when there is a long simmering crisis and we see it happening, we still wag our fingers and we are not sure what to do. that is part of the work you do. how do you think how to do what is stymied a lot of our ability not only to act in advance, but sometimes to act at all. that is part of the problem as well. in the back. i think we have time for this test may be the last question. >> jim lobe, interpress service. just to go back on what mr. burke said. global government should be the purpose.

what are the implications of increasing the u.s. republican congress? >> can i get back to paul? >> be my guest. >> you know, i am optimistic. actually met certainly with time we are going to realize and i think we are probably already farther or nearing on the verge of a breakthrough that american politics is about inclusiveness and working on both sides of the aisle. and we are going to move away from being utterly opposed on two sides of the ohio and get back to actually having conversations, substantive conversations that will move us back into a position to reassert ourselves in a global leadership role that is positive to start the development and diplomatic maturity of smaller governments around the world and to really do what we wanted to do for the

last couple of years is push the cost of their security back onto them as their burden and not shoulder that so much within the u.s. economy itself. >> my comment is from your lips to god's ears. and i do hope that in fact occurs. i will say though that it does seem to me the one test will be the degree to which there is a bipartisan response on a series of the issues we have been talking about. on ukraine, there needs to be at the very least a really thoughtful after to help that country moves towards and i n sense push them towards the reforms that everybody knows needs to take place in turn away. i'm libya and the how, when i talk about too little too late into partying too soon, the lack of security sector reform dealing with those illegal armed militia is in libya early on was the major reason we are

where we are today. it seems to me there was a way to have a bipartisan recognition of that and a greater degree of active positive support for making that happen. i would just say that the same kind of issue, getting in early and doing something on central african republic before it exploded was also helpful and in the future we will see greater bipartisan willingness to deal with those issues. >> i will see my time to one last question. >> one last question. right here in the middle. >> thank you. amy hawthorne from the atlantic council. we saw today that terrible attack in paris and obviously we don't know exactly what took place or who was behind it. assuming it was a jihadists

group that seen in some fashion against not just civilian targets, but civilian targets for a very specific political reason, using a level of sophistication, does seem to me to be a potential game changer. i am wondering if we were to see other attacks like this in the west, first of all do you think that is possible and if that did happen, what would the impact be on european foreign policy and so forth? >> i am happy to start with that. i am not going to regulate on the details surrounding today's incident in paris. i will say if we look from a european perspective, i see no possibility of a sustained terrorist campaign across europe in any way. i think we will continue to see sporadic, localized incidents that occur. you know, thinking we see within africa itself. i think the counterterrorism